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Law and Morality

by O S W A L D BAYER

T HE QUESTION OF THE LAW concerns not a marginal condition of


existence, but rather the core of our being human. We are hu-
mans as beings of language, and thus as rational creatures. We are
human beings addressed by God in a language mediated by worldly
language. As beings of language addressed by God, we can hear and
respond to the divine Word. We must be accountable in hearing and
responding. Constituted by hearing and responding, we already exist
as social creatures.1 I can listen only to the other and likewise, I can
address only the other. Hearing me and addressing myself can only
be understood as derived from my relations to the other. As social
creatures, we Uve from what is given and from what is heard, that is,
from the trustworthy Word that is put into action and is perceived.
This trustworthy Word is the spirit ofthat right and that state gov-
erned by the rule of law deserving its name.
The order of the state ruled by law is political rule. How is the
state governed by the rule of law as political rule related to the fun-
damental essence of humanity, meaning rational and social beings ad-
dressed by God? In order to clarify this relation, we cannot avoid
using concepts of "power," "violence," and "political rule." How are
these concepts to be distinguished? How are their mutual relations
to be determined? What approach would emerge from an under-
standing of these concepts?

The Third Way

I will first outline two distinct and recognizable approaches, and


then present, in critical relation to them, a third approach. The first
approach arises from the Lutheran justification of an ethic of the po-
litical. In modernity, this line of argumentation has become influen-
tially associated with the concept of a state of nature and the social
contract theory, as represented by Thomas Hobbes. The argument
of this approach focuses mainly on the question of how sin and its

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LUTHERAN QUARTERLY Volume XVII (2003)


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consequences are to be encountered. According to Luther's inter-


pretation of the biblical account of primeval history, in paradise there
was originally the church and the oikonomia (meaning, the house-
hold as marriage, family and economy), but not the politici.2 The poli-
tici, what we would today call the state, is an institution that became
necessary only after the fall. It is not established as an order of cre-
ation but an order based on need. As an emergency order, the state
is primarily perceived in terms of brute force. Brute force, that is to
say, violence, is necessary to hold arbitrary power in check and to
tame the predatory drives of some who threaten the lives of others.
Only violence can stand up to Cain, the brother-slayer. The breach
in such a theological and political order is tantamount to the breach
in a dam through which the waters of chaos rush in, bringing total
devastation.
The second approach, based on the concept of natural law, is quite
different from the first approach. Standing in the Aristotelian-Stoic
tradition, this concept has its roots in the idea of the original socia-
bility of humanity. By virtue of reason, the human being strives for
consensus, and strives to maintain it in all situations.Violating a rule
is the exception to the rule. The underling thought in this approach
is not that of averting chaos but it presupposes the existence of a cos-
mic order in which humankind is considered to be capable of living
in peace and of making reasonable and social use of freedom. In con-
junction with such an approach, a utopia of "communication with-
out domination" can be envisaged, anticipating a life in community
built on mutual understanding that completely contradicts factual re-
ality. Nevertheless, this utopia can and may serve as the point of de-
parture for striving after the consensus.
This second approach is recognized in certain theological and
churchly positions. These positions agree, at least in practical and re-
alistic terms, with the type of thinking abstractly universalizing the
redemption that has occurred in Jesus Christ and becoming enthu-
siastic in the process. Relations in the state, as civil community, are
conceived in analogy to the Christian community. The demands es-
tablished in one community are mirrored in the other community.
One can understand the position of the church and of theology,
at least in Protestantism, as located in the conflict between the two
LAW A N D M O R A L I T Y 65

approaches typologized sharply above. It should not be necessary to


point out explicitly the political orientations associated with and cor-
responding to the above approaches. In contrast, I am advocating a
third way which avoids the lack of a theology of sin in the second
approach as well as the lack of a theology of creation in the first ap-
proach.
If the state is a consequence only of sin, and not of humanity's
original nature, then fateful consequences result for the understand-
ing of the state: the state will tend to become one led by pure force.
The position of the representatives will be strengthened and rein-
forced at the expense of the represented. In the development of the
political will, the plebiscite factor will be distrusted on principle. One
would fear the rule of the mob. But if the state is a response to hu-
manity's original nature, which should be acknowledged as consti-
tuted by means of social intercourse, then one must evaluate the sit-
uation completely differently.
Initially the phenomenon of power was perceived differently: not as
something that unfortunately had to be established and pursued for
the sake of hindering sin as the greater evil, indeed not—as a coun-
termove—to what is evil as such, but as that which constitutes the hu-
manity of the human, that which is thereby given such that the human
is a living creature which hears, and therefore can, as a response, speak,
and is responsible. One who listens relinquishes oneself into the power
of the one to whom one is listening. One who speaks, addresses an-
other, positions, orients, indeed exerts power over the other.
As human beings, we are not determined by a symmetry akin to
pure equality in our competence to speak, but rather, by an asym-
metry. It is the asymmetry between hearing and speaking, speaking
and hearing. Needless to say, those who are speaking and hearing
cannot be divided up into two different groups so that some always
have a say and all that remains for the others is to obey. Asymmetry
appears in one and the same person. There is no one who does not
have both sides represented, side by side, in shifting proportions de-
pending on position and on disposition.
As a hearer and a speaker, I, like any other person, am someone
over whom others have power, and someone who has power over
others. The human person possesses dignity and freedom only inside
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of and not outside of this relational context of power and responsi-


bility. Freedom and dignity are not individual possessions that I con-
ceive of, let alone have, independently of others. Rather, human dig-
nity and human freedom exist in the social play between speaker and
hearer, offer and acceptance, give and take, authority and criticism.3
Freedom as social play lives, as it has lived from the very begin-
ning, by reason of God's creative will. Freedom does not exist in
a space "free from domination" but in relations of power benefit-
ing the life of the other. Life is initially formed, actually created,
by freedom living out of power relations. The dignity of bodily
and spiritual parenthood is constituted by this understanding of
freedom.
There is a second factor decisively determining the power in free-
dom. This power no longer acts in an unbroken way to create and
benefit life. Humanity has thoroughly perverted and corrupted its
original condition of hearing and speaking: its power, freedom, and
dignity is entirely fallen. Humanity exists in the state of corruption
(in statu corruptionis). This corruption has been misjudged by the sec-
ond approach. At the very least, the second approach has underesti-
mated the universal significance of corruption in the history of hu-
mankind. The life-giving and the life-enhancing power has been
corrupted into a violence threatening and harming life. Corrupted
power is violence: violence is the abuse of power.
The Bible narrates the story of humanity's origins as the abuse of
power: woman's subordination to man (Gen. 3:16 in contrast to Eph.
5:21) and especially the murder of one's brother (Gen. 4). In light of
Abel's murder, the Fifth Commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is di-
rected against the abuse of power. Similarly, all the Commandments
serve freedom by being directed against the abuse of power. In view
of the law, the Eighth Commandment should be brought to mind:
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor!" This Com-
mandment serves both the power of a trustworthy Word and the law
together with its freedom.
In a situation where power is abused and corrupted into violence,
life cannot be preserved and enhanced without political rule. In the
face of and against violence, there is a political rule serving the power bene-
fiting life that is legitimate, responsible and accepting its responsibilities.
LAW A N D M O R A L I T Y 67

Political rule opposes naked violence, prevents brother from mur-


dering sister and keeps at bay the law of the jungle. Even a democ-
racy, as the word "democracy" itself indicates, is a type of political
rule. The curbing of violence in the face of its unpredictability and
its arbitrary nature represents a tremendous cultural achievement even
though this is qualified by the totalitarianism of state power that has,
of course, been made possible by modernity. The progress of the
modern state consists in its monopoly of physical violence, regulat-
ing it so that it can serve the aims of its own system ofjustice. One
must not forget what this progress means over the old law of the jun-
gle and over the past in which wars of anyone over everyone threat-
ened to erupt at any time.
Note: what is meant by legitimate physical violence 4 (not brutal
violence) is not the political rule by which a state governed by the
rule of law is ordered. Legitimate physical violence is only a last re-
sort, that obviously must neither be misinterpreted nor go beyond
reasonable bounds. Nevertheless, this possibility is a serious one, not
a threat but an option that can be exercised. This does not mean that
the use of violence is the norm; it is "the last resort."5
It would be politically destructive to turn decrees or laws legis-
lated in an extreme situation of crisis, or any emergency rule, into
the model for legislating laws and a state's organization. The rea-
son that this would be destructive is that the original power, the
life-creating, life-giving and life-sustaining asymmetry between
hearing and speaking, has fortunately not been entirely lost and ex-
tinguished by all the corruptions and distortions. This is why p o -
litical order exists not just as a counterviolence to violence. As po-
litical rule, it differs from sheer violence countering violence
because it presupposes and can presuppose an order that is desired
and affirmed from the inside. The political rule of the state gov-
erned by the rule of law rests not only on the threat of legitimate
violence or in the extreme case of exercising (legitimate) violence,
but also on the acknowledgment of this rule by the state s citizens.
The political rule of the state governed by the rule of law would
not endure unless it could count on some degree of agreement by
its citizens; it would not be legitimate unless it could be supported
by a moral consensus.
68 LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

Between Legalism and Moralism

What happens, however, when the political rule of a state governed


by the rule of law is no longer carried by this kind of consensus or,
less radically, when the consensus is in danger of dissolution?
The results of the Infas commission published in 1982 " O n the
situation of youth in North-Rhine/Westphalia" can be used to il-
lustrate this problem in a particular way. What a challenge to law
and order the statistics of this study present! Twenty-three percent
of the adults and thirty-nine percent of the youth consider illegal
house-occupation, itself a form of violence, to be "in principle, jus-
tified!"6 What a challenge is posed by the enormous scepticism re-
garding the judgment of the courts! Fifty-six percent of adults and
sixty-one percent of youth agree with the opinion that the judg-
ments of the courts are "not neutral," but "protect the interests of
the powerful."7
Lawlessness has already begun where visible demonstrations con-
cerning understandable grievances abandon the domain of the law
and where "decisions to disregard the law in limited cases" are taken
into account to resolve these grievances. This challenge will now be
discussed in the context of the fundamental considerations presented
in the first section. The first approach toward an understanding of
the state in the exclusive terms of an emergency order served the in-
ternal political peace and the freedom of all. It did not serve the fu-
ture of the state governed by the rule of law as political rule because
it was accompanied by the danger of a legalistic short-circuit.
Similarly, the orientation toward an understanding of the state
based on natural law did not serve the future of the state, above all
in its Utopian form of anticipating a "communication free from dom-
ination." The actual play of power would be underestimated in this
approach and, more important, the really existing power could be
expressed in a moralistic short-circuit.
The future of the law and the future achieved through the law de-
pend on the ability to find a critical political equilibrium. This equi-
librium is precarious, never stable but always unstable, avoiding the ex-
treme of a legalistic short-circuit as much as avoiding the extreme of a moralistic
short-circuit.
LAW A N D M O R A L I T Y 69

In view of the danger of the legalistic short-circuit, the social-


political and legal-political situation in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many must first take the following into account. One must take care
not to count on that last possibility of "legitimate physical violence"
anticipated for the extreme case. If it is reckoned as a possibility that
can be implemented prematurely, one runs the risk of deferring, de-
laying or not seriously coming to terms with the handling of press-
ing social-political problems.
The federal chair of the police union has clearly addressed the
problem. Democracy and its political representatives have failed if the
police are called in to pacify a situation related to unresolved social-
political problems. 8 This is a harsh judgment and it is certainly not
applicable in every respect. Nevertheless, it undisputably points out
a moment of truth that is to be taken seriously.
(The scandal of unoccupied living quarters would be eased or even
removed by a legal decision insisting on the social responsibility of
owning property where it is not complied with voluntarily. On the
contrary, to enforce individual legal determinations without simul-
taneously providing a check against their abuse would be a legalistic
short-circuit without a future. The abuse of these legal determina-
tions would consist of violating article 14 of the Basic Law9 on the
one hand and on the other hand, would avoid complying with the
social responsibility of owning property. A clear and, in my opinion,
a basically just decision was determined in the Netherlands. Ac-
cording to this law, indefinitely leaving living quarters unoccupied is
considered to be illegal and together with this, illegal house occu-
pants are to be criminally prosecuted.
Everything must be done in order to remove the ingredients feed-
ing the opinion shared by a considerable percentage of the German
population that one sometimes arrives more with violence at the
goal of the law than on the path of legal process. The fire support-
ing this opinion is fed when those who have broken the law by il-
legally occupying a house are given leases to sign and the others, who
are waiting for an apartment by legal means, go away empty-handed.)
In the case of rewarding the law-breakers with a lease, the moral-
istic short-circuit is being honored. This moralistic short-circuit is
manifest by the impatience toward allowing the anticipated process
70 LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

of further legal development to run its course and by taking the case
of the corresponding effort into one's own hands.
In the moralistic short-circuit the particular individual with his
limited perspective is privileged. The individual brings onto the po-
litical terrain his personal sensibilities concerning justice, his indi-
vidual convictions of conscience and his moral judgment over right
and wrong understood in the strict sense of the legitimate and ille-
gitimate. The individual sets himself against what is legal when the
lawful case, for example, the eviction from an illegally occupied
house, is deemed to be illegitimate. The particular perspective is not
yet renounced if the individual identifies with a group or a larger
grouping, finding there sympathy and support. The individual and
the group should not appoint themselves as representatives of the
"progressive consciousness," advocates of the "common interest" or
of the "true needs of the population," if a military conflict between
the parties of civil society on one side and institutions of the state on
the other side is to be avoided.
A military conflict between these two sides would ensue if a so-
cial group revolts violently against a decision that has been made on
the path of legal process. Rather than calling a spade by its name, the
breaches of law resulting from this use of violence are dismissed as
"disregarding the law in limited cases" and are possibly even excused.
By dismissing breaches of law as insignificant, the seriousness of vi-
olent political expression is dangerously downplayed.
The legalistic short-circuit is not to be welcomed either. This le-
galistic short-circuit would constantly depend on calling in the po-
lice to act and on prosecuting criminal activity without also, in all
seriousness, reflecting on and being accountable for the entire polit-
ical domain. Earnest political reflection and accountability can in-
clude turning the concept of social defense toward the internal po-
litical sphere when institutions of the state are threatened. It can also
involve endeavors to extend the right of assembly and the right of
the freedom of speech and to listen to and examine the motives and
intentions of these endeavors to see if such programs would first stand
the test of self-criticism. The form in which specific demands can-
not be met would then be determined by such a self-criticism. The
form would then have to be contradicted on account of preserving
LAW A N D MORALITY 71

the liberal democratic order of law. Hearing criticism does not sim-
ply mean granting a wish; the answer emerging from the hearing can
also be a specific contradiction.
The following question will now be investigated in the wider con-
text of such a free and judicious hearing: Would the safety of both
atomic power stations and the disposal of atomic waste have been so
carefully considered, as is now the case, if it had only been for peace-
ful demonstrations? Does success of an infringement of the law jus-
tify its right? With this question, I am raising the controversial point
of arguing from the success of legal infringement by the use of vio-
lence. This point has been shown by the Infas commission to seem
plausible to so many citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The question must be asked once more. In practical terms, what must
happen if this argument is to be invalidated by the practice of the
current legal system together with its possibilities? The proof that
would diminish the significance of the argument can only remain by
acknowledging questions and arguments from citizens' action groups,
really listening to peaceful demonstrations, not putting off petitions
for a later date and paying attention to complaints brought forward
through official channels.
The decisive factor in political engagement is what is experienced
on this legal path. The experience of being heard at all, even if de-
mands cannot be met, opens up the door of the future; the disap-
pointment of not being heard shuts it. Are our unemployed, above
all, our unemployed youth, going to be heard or not? It is not sur-
prising when, according to the Infas-commission, "violence appears
to be one of the few, if not the only, means to revolt against the so-
cial situation" of the youth, "above all, those who sympathize with
violent actions" and those "who are unemployed."10
The political rule of our social state based on the rule of law is
grounded in the moral consensus of its citizens. There would be no
future if the moralistic short-circuit, accompanied by the threat and
the use of violence, were countered by a legalist solution. Similarly,
there would be no future if, to uphold the law in a situation of emer-
gency, one could not avoid calling in the police and prosecuting
criminals. In the overall political context, the important aim is to
steer a course between the Scylla of the legalistic short-circuit and
72 LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

the Charybdis of the moralistic short-circuit. Steering through the


course is always to seek critically-politically an equilibrium between
legalism and moralism and to maintain this equilibrium vigilantly in
every new circumstance.
The fundamental duty toward the law is to seek and to maintain
this equilibrium. Christians can only perceive this duty by waiting
for the future of God as expecting God's coming to judge. In the
final section, the meaning of this expectation will be further clari-
fied. I will summarize what has already been stated and then discuss
the entire theme again in a new light.

Temporal Law and the Last Judgment

One main point emerges in answering the question of the law.


The law is the interconnection between hearing and speaking, more
precisely, between the spoken promise given to be heard and the trust
placed in that promise. Sociability is originally and unavoidably
founded on trust and faith. As has already been emphasized, the
power, dignity and freedom of humanity constituting original socia-
bility is fundamentally corrupted and abused by violence. Counter-
ing the abuse of violent power with violence, even in an emergency
case, is the second main point of the law. Freedom and force are
united in the rule of the law by the play between the violent abuse
of power and its countering by violent action. To illustrate in the
case of unoccupied living quarters, the freedom to leave personal
property unoccupied is accompanied by the coercion for a minimum
of solidarity among those who illegally occupy the houses.
Those who work toward the goal of increasing power, freedom,
and dignity and lessening their abuse as violence can neither deny
nor suppose in contradiction to the real state of affairs that even the
best worldly and earthly order of the law is a type of political rule
that must be able to threaten and to exercise violence as a last resort.
The fifth thesis in the "Barmen Theological Declaration" of 1934
emphasizes this point. "Scripture tells us that, in the as yet unre-
deemed world in which also the church stands, the state has by di-
vine appointment the task of providing for justice and peace. [It ful-
LAW A N D M O R A L I T Y 73

fills this task] by means of the threat and exercise of force, according
to the measure of human judgment and human ability."11 The doc-
ument goes on to say "The church acknowledges the benefit of this
divine appointment, in gratitude and reverence before him [God]. 12
The church acknowledges this, not without all of its strength, the
strength of the Word alone and not by violence, to "call to mind the
kingdom of God, God's commandment and righteousness, and
thereby the responsibility both of rulers and ruled. It trusts and obeys
the power of the Word by which God upholds all things."13
The ministry of the community of Christians to the civil com-
munity rests on the hearing, trusting, and witnessing outlined by the
Barmen Declaration. The community of Christians and the civil
community, state and church, are each given different tasks in the
context of political rule just as God works through both communi-
ties in different ways. The fifth thesis of the "Barmen Theological
Declaration" concludes by stressing this distinction and averting a
confusion between politics and religion.
We reject the false doctrine that the state over and beyond its special commission
should and could become the single and total order of human life, thus fulfilling
the church's vocation as well.
We reject the false doctrine that the church, over and beyond its special commis-
sion, should and could assume the characteristics, the tasks, and the dignity of the
state, thus itself becoming an organ of the state.14

Whoever seeks to perceive the state and its legal order as an analogy
to the church, meaning the civil community as an analogy to the
community of Christians, ignores and does not maintain the required
distinction between the two realms. By confusing the distinction, a
clericalization of the political realm follows, which religiously over-
whelms and vacates the process of shaping the political will or even
directly imposes its values on the political terrain.
The enthusiasm of confusing the political and the spiritual realm
can be countered by an appropriate understanding of the law as it is
developed from the gospel. Indeed, many factors of our legal order
cannot be understood apart from the gospel. Against such an en-
thusiasm, it is necessary to acknowledge and to maintain that this un-
derstanding of the law developed from the gospel is a concept of hu-
74 LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

manity that has come from the law and does not belong to the new
world, but to the passing old world. The law shaping and governing
humanity is a means of God's preserving activity as Creator, a means
of divine forbearance and patience by which God protects the world,
preserving it toward its future.
Only the eternal trustworthy Word continues to be unsurpassably
new. This Word is Jesus Christ who is God's definitively binding
Word, in whom all God's promises are true. It is the Word of God's
law that has come to us and is coming to us in the unconditional
righteousness granted to us. Unsurpassably new is the faith trusting
in this law, trusting this trustworthy word that guarantees all crea-
tures the right to life. Unsurpassably new are those actions accom-
plished in the strength of faith through love. To ascertain and to judge
these actions, however, is a matter to be decided on the last day, at
the last judgment.
Faith in Jesus Christ and trust in God's definitively binding Word
do not remove the believer from the ambiguity of deciding and act-
ing. Even those causes for which we, as Christians, work here and now,
those actions we determine to be either good or evil, must be tried
by the fire of the judgment of works. We are not yet justified when
we act with what we consider to be a good conscience (i Cor. 4:3-5).
The expectation of the last judgment relieves us from passing final
judgments and, in the legislative role, from the necessity of reaching
final decisions; the expectation frees us from legalism. The expecta-
tion also frees us from moralism; it relieves us from impatiently set-
ting ourselves in an abstract opposition to the ruling culture of the
law, from being systematically suspicious of this culture and, in the
sense of the mentioned moralistic short-circuit, from arrogantly hav-
ing at one's disposal the criterion for distinguishing between legal-
ity and legitimacy. By freeing us from the extremes of legalism and
moralism, the expectation of the last judgment holds the space free
for the critical-political equilibrium that holds open the future for
the law.
Translated by Christine Helmer, with permission, from "Gesetz und
Moral. Zur ethischen Bedeutung des Rechts/' chap. 3 in Freiheit als
Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul
Siebeck], 1995): 272-82.
LAW A N D MORALITY 75

NOTES

ι Aristotle relates the definition of human beings as rational animals to social animals
in Politica 1,2,1253a 7-10. "Now, that man is more of a political animal... and man is the
only animal whom she [nature] has endowed with the gift of speech." In The Basic Works
of Aristotle, ed. and with an Introduction by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House,
1941), 1129.
2. Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 6g vols. Eds. J.F.K.
Knaake et al. (Weimar: Bohlau, 1883 fF.), 42:79.3-9 (Gen. 2:16-17; 1535). (Hereafter cited
as WA ) Luthers Works, American Edition, 5 5 vols. Eds. Pelikan and Lehmann (St. Louis
and Philadelphia: Concordia and Fortress, 1955 fF.), 1:103-104 Hereafter cited as LW.) Al­
though Luther does not decisively see here the pohtia as an order of creation (see also: WA
42:79.7-9: "Pohtia autem ante peccatum nulla fuit, ñeque emm ea opus fuit. Est enim Poh-
tia autem remedium necessanum naturae corruptae." LW 1:104: "Moreover, there was no
government of the state before sin, for there was no need of it. Civil government is a rem-
edy required by our corrupted nature."), he nevertheless knows that the political order is
grounded in the economic order. This is seen particularly clearly in the explanation of the
Fourth Commandment in the Large Catechism. "For all other authority is derived and de-
veloped out of the authority of parents" The Book of Concord, edited by Robert Kolb and
Timothy J Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 405.141 Die Bekenntnisschriften der
evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche (Gottingen.Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992): 596.20 fF. = WA
30/l· 152.20-21.) "Domus est fons omnium rerum publicarum." (Psalm 127.1 [1532/3]:
WA 40/111:220.4-5 ) Luther does not exclusively ground pohtics in hamartiology, but he
can occasionally understand it in relation to a doctrine of creation. "Denn Gott hat die
Menschen geschaffen, daß man sich freundlich und friedlich in Zuchten und Ehren zusam-
men halten soll." In D Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Tischreden, 6 vols.
(Weimar: Bohlau, 1912 fF.), 6:266.23-25 (Nr. 6913 )
3. Oswald Bayer, Autorität und Kritik. Zu Hermeneutik und Wissenschaftstheorie (Tubin-
gen. J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1991.)
4. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans, by A.M. Hen-
derson and Talcott Parsons, ed. and with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, IL*
The Free Press and The Falcons Wing Press, 1974), : 5 9 [Translator's note. The English
translation of Weber's phrase, legitimate "physical force," does not capture the sense of
Bayer's use of the term "Gewalt" or violence rather than force. Bayer seeks to emphasize
the aspect of violence associated with the political rule encountering violent action with
the use of violence.]
5. Ibid., 154
6. "Grundsätzlich berechtigt," in Zur Situation der Jugendlichen in Nordrhein-Westfalen,
vol 1, Erhebung unter deutschen Jugendliche Endbericht (1980), 30
7. "Bei ihren Entscheidungen mcht neutral," sondern "schützen die Interessen der
Machtigen." Ibid., 27.
8 Speech by the chair of the federal pohce union, G. Schroder, held on May 23,1982,
in the Church of Saint Paul in Frankfurt, in Frieden nach innen—Veranstaltung der Gewerkschaft
der Polizei am Tag des Grundgesetzes, 23 Mai 1982, ed by the Pohce Union, pp 23-31 (1982),
29-30
9. Article 14 of the Basic Law is concerned with property, the right of inheritance and
expropriation. "[Eigentum, Erbrecht, Enteignung] (ι) Das Eigentum und das Erbrecht wer-
76 LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

den gewahrleistet. Inhalt und Schranken werden durch die Gesetze bestimmt. (2) Eigen-
tum verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soll zugleich dem Wohle der Allgemeinheit dienen.
(3) Eine Enteignung ist nur zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit zulássig. Sie darf nur durch
Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes erfolgen, das Art und Ausmaß der Entschädigung
regelt. Die Entschädigung ist unter gerechter Abwägung der Interessen der Allgemeinheit
und der Beteiligten zu bestimmen. Wegen der Hohe der Enschädigung steht im Streitfalle
der Rechtsweg vor den ordentlichen Gerichten offen." In Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1991), 18.
10. "vor allem diejenigen Verständnis für gewalttätige Aktionen" haben "die arbeitslos
sind," und ihnen deshalb "Gewalt als eines der wenigen—wenn nicht als einziges—Mittel
erscheint, sich gegen ihre Lebenssituation aufzulehnen." Zur Situation der Jugendlichen in
Kordrhein-Westfalen, 42.
11. In Rolf Ahlers, Tlie Barmen Tlieological Declaration of1934. T\%e Archeology of a Con-
fessional Text. Toronto Studies in Theology Series, no. 24 (Lewiston, N Y and Queenston,
Ontario: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 41. The German text of the Barmen Theolog-
ical Declaration is found in Ernst Wolf, Barmen. Kirchen zwischen Versuchung und Gnade, 3d.
ed. (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1984), 137. "Die Schrift sagt uns, daß der Staat nach gott-
licher Anordnung die Aufgabe hat, in der noch nicht erlosten Welt, in der auch die Kirche
steht, nach dem Maße menschlicher Einsicht und menschlichen Vermögens unter Andro-
hung und Ausübung von Gewalt für Recht und Frieden zu sorgen."
12. Ahlers, The Barmen Theological Declaration, 41-42. "Die Kirche erkennt in Dank
und Ehrfurcht gegen Gott die Wohltat dieser seiner Ordnung an." Wolf, Barmen, 137.
13. Ahlers, The Barmen Tlieological Declaration, 42. "an Gottes Reich, an Gottes Gebot
und Gerechtigkeit und damit an die Verantwortung der Regierenden und Regierten" zu
"erinnern." "Sie vertraut und gehorcht der Kraft des Wortes, durch das Gott alle Dinge
trägt." Wolf, Barmen, 137.
14. Ahlers, Tlie Barmen Tlieological Declaration, 42. "Wir verwerfen die falsche Lehre, als
solle der Staat über seinen besonderen Auftrag hinaus die einzige und totale Ordnung
menschlichen Lebens werden und also auch die Bestimmung der Kirche erfüllen. Wir ver-
werfen die falsche Lehre, als solle und könne sich die Kirche über ihren besonderen Auf-
trag hinaus staatliche Art, staatliche Aufgaben und staatliche Würde aneignen und damit
selbst zu einem Organ des Staates werden." Wolf, Barmen, 137.
^ s
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