CASE 24

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, ET AL.

78 SCRA 470 | August 31, 1977
Ponente: FERNANDO, Acting C.J.

FACTS:

A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a
pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged
breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the
leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting
as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53
other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent’s decision is valid.

RULING:

No. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the
present Constitution: “The State may not be sued without its consent.

The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]
Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the
assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be
predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly
expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is
not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is
injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by
pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial
tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence
Washington Insurance decision: “Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent,
as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice,
considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever
difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the
balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is
to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing
recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law.

The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out
by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to
have no binding force on the government.