REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) and DR.

ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA
S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24,
2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan
National College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as
Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner
of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate
area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic
Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by
Mabilo Creek; and on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin
(deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his
capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and
declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of the property they
inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they
wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation
No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said
portion of private respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF
Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private
ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the
service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother, Maxima
Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by
virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees
and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF and converted into a
fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of the
disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land until it was converted into a fishpond by the
ANCF. To prove possession, respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and possessor of the land in
question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan
National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the unearned yearly income
from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when the same has been converted by the defendants
into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the
possession of the land in question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
costs of this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. "LL") shows that the disputed
property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under
Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960 (Exh. "4-D"). The MCTC observed that the
phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415" was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under
Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of Appeals4 where it was pronounced
that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. The claims of
persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are
considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a
proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously
acquired in such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for
lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC,
citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from the reservation, the MCTC
concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and
protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo Andres from the payment
of damages and attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision are affirmed in toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private individuals prior to its issuance
on March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal unless the court below has
overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however, absolved the
Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with malice or in bad faith in the
implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the new Superintendent of the
ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. In addition to the
findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise declared a timberland before
its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also
within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the
subject land was agricultural, and therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject property from its previous
owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was
declared a timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the previous owners and that of Maxima
Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property had been
privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession
has ripened into an ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this
should come under the meaning of "private rights" under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the
mass of civil reservation granted to petitioner.7(Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’

CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION
THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE
SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND
AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of Natural Resources and by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil
Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an
aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares, situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines,
designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x [.]9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to the disputed
property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon. The private right referred to is an alleged
imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property, through their predecessors-in-
interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated respondents’
complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to
determine if respondents complied with the requirements therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No.
141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and disposable before
1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal
classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the fairly recent case of Valiao v.
Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which
is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.1âwphi1 To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
(Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On
September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents-claimants in said
case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.
The respondents claim that through their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this Court, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable). Petitioner-claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their "prior vested right" over portions of
Boracay which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the petition for
review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3- 82.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-à-vis the right of the claimants to lands they claim to have possessed since
time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141
limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented
to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already
open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.14 (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject land was
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was
alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public
lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,15 wherein we held:
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and the
equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the
members of this Court in
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands
declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was,
however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since
respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and
could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of
Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to
reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for
lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390),
segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and
Batan, Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the
Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-
11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application4 with the RTC for judicial confirmation of
title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077,
Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondent’s application for registration sufficient in form and
substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30,
2002.6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages
1631-16337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The
Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous
place on the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit
its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for registration.10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an
employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena
(Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic
engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A.
Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The
respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively,
in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted
different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold
the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the
respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent;13 (2) survey plans of the subject
properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations
of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002;17 and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno
(Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject
parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section
41(11) of Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga,
testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the
topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National
Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That
upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations
of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the
subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to
LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60
m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the respondent’s application for registration of title to the
subject properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises
Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in
Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769 respectively and
ordering their registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that
the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map
that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was
indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the elevations of the
subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map
used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the
elevations of the subject properties, pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s witness merely compared their
elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his [benchmark] or reference point in
determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that was then under the
construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the
said [benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters.
x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz
who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the [benchmark] or reference point in
determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz
determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters
from the information he got from FF Cruz.22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could
not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake
extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of
12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake
form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed
out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and
waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was
able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA
found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellee’s
witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the subject lots, ably proved that the elevation
of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it
was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest
portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under
paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966,
prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land are so situated in the
submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial photography over the area of Taguig
conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due execution and authenticity of the said document. As
regards the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5
meter elevation, the same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his admission that his findings
were based merely on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the
subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the
petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior
to June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which
granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s application for registration since the subject
properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The petitioner insists that the
elevations of the subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No.
4850, are considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower
courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the
RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of
facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.25
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No.
4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the
subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which
is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."26
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 152927, which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired
under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. 28 Under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications30 issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig,
Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable
and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,31 the Court clarified that, in addition to the
certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain
as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the
Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He
must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the
applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the
public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding
the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate
government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of
P.D. 1529.34 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not
sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is
still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which
must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application
for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008,
must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4
of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title to
the subject properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N.
Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant
the denial of its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in
T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-
retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court
constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.35 "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to
the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for
registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on October 22, 2004 and
was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the application for registration of the
subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the
foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since
1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the subject properties were originally
owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the
subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject properties
by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of
possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the
testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and
occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented
to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the
application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather
than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject properties, by planting
different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the
conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
There was no showing as to the number of crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce
harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the
subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in
the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere
casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.
For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession
of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years."40
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002.
The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to
declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership."41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no
improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration should be denied.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, Petitioner,
vs.
EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL, JOHN BRACEWELL,
EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF GEORGE BRACEWELL,Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution3 dated August 14,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 31, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pifias City, Branch 275 in Civil Case No. LP 98-0025, directing the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to set aside Decree of Registration No. N-217036 (Decree No. N-217036) and Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-78 in the name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner), and ordering the latter to cause the amendment
of Plan PSU-129514 as well as segregate therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598.
The Facts
On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered
by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23, 1989 by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, acting as a land
registration court.5 Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later
obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering the said parcel of land.6
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a
petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,7 otherwise known as
the "Property Registration Decree," before the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 (Las Piñas City-RTC), docketed as Civil
Case No. LP 98-0025,8 claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-129514, consisting of 3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of
Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) – of which he is the absolute owner and possessor – is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-
217036.9 He allegedly filed on September 19, 1963 an application for registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well
as of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Piñas City, which was granted by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 58, on May 3, 1989.10 He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of
the adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant of the registration proceedings involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-
129514.11 Instead of impleading him, petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining owner,
although she had already died by that time.12
In his answer13 to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called Bracewell a mere interloper with respect to the subject lot,
which the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan PSU-129514.14 He argued that his Plan PSU-
129514 was approved way back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan PSU-180598 was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that
the latter plan, in fact, contained a footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion of the parcel of land
covered by Plan PSU-129514.15
The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez in his 2nd Supplementary Report dated August 5, 1996,
which was submitted to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.16 The report, which contains a recommendation that petitioner
be ordered to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 in view of Bracewell’s claims, reads as follows:
COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the Honorable Court respectfully submits this report:
1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the Honorable Court on February 23, 1989, confirming the title
of the herein applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land covered by plan PSU-129514;
2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru its tie line, it was found to overlap with plan PSU-
180598, Lot 5, applied in LRC Record No. N-24916, which was referred to the Lands Management Services, El
Bldg., Quezon City, for verification and/or correction in our letter dated January 12, 1996 x x x;
3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief, Surveys Division, in his letter dated 20 June 1996, x x x,
informed this Authority that after [re-verification] and research of the plan, they found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598
applied in LRC Record No. N-24916 is a portion of plan PSU-129514, applied in the instant case;
4. Our records further show that the petition for registration of title to real property pertaining to Lot 5, PSU-180598
filed by the petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case No. N-4329, LRC Record No. N-24916 has been
granted by the Honorable Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information with the recommendation
that the applicant [herein petitioner] in the instant case be ordered to cause for the amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject
of registration, by segregating therefrom the portion of Lot 5, PSU-180598 also decided in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328. The
approved amended plan and the corresponding certified technical descriptions shall forthwith be submitted to the Honorable
Court for its approval to enable us to comply with the decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the instant
case.17 (Emphases supplied)
The Las Piñas City-RTC Ruling
Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC rendered a
Decision18 on July 31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by
Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs (respondents). Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT
No. 0-78, and ordered petitioner (a) to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 and to segregate therefrom the subject
lot, and (b) to pay respondents the sum of ₱100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the cost of suit.19
The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing respondents from participating and objecting to his
application for registration when the documentary evidence showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes
for the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the owner thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way
back in 1965, as well as in the City Assessor's Office.20
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal21 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, arguing mainly that
the Las Piñas City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529,
which should be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the decision and ordered the issuance of the
decree.22 He likewise raised (a) the failure of Bracewell to submit to conciliation proceedings,23as well as (b) the
commission of forum shopping, considering that the decision granting Bracewell’s application for registration over Lots 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598 was still pending resolution before the Court at the time he filed Civil Case No. LP 98-
0025.24
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the assailed judgment of the RTC, finding that respondents
were able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement of Decree No. N-217036, which is the only ground
that may be invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529. It held that, since the
petition for review was filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned decree, and considering that the subject
lot is located in Las Piñas City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over the case.26 It further declared that: (a) there was no
need to submit the case a quo for conciliation proceedings because the LRA, which is an instrumentality of the government,
had been impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was committed because the petition for review of the decree of registration
before the Las Piñas City-RTC and the application for land registration then pending before the Court involved different
parties and issues; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees was well within the sound discretion of the RTC.27
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration28 having been denied,29 he now comes before the Court via the instant petition for
review, challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Piñas City-RTC which set aside and nullified the judgment rendered
by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 that had not yet become final and was still within its exclusive control and discretion
because the one (1) year period within which the decree of registration issued by the LRA could be reviewed has not yet
elapsed.30
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for
review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch
134.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must fail.
Under Act No. 49631 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as amended,32 – which was the law in force at the time of the
commencement by both parties of their respective registration proceedings – jurisdiction over all applications for registration
of title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land
sought to be registered is situated.33
The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979,34 and under
Section 1735 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province
or city where the land is situated.36
Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their comment to the instant petition that when petitioner filed his
land registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over applications for registration of property situated in Las Piñas City
was vested in the RTC of Makati City in view of the fact that there were no RTC branches yet in the Las Piñas City at that
time.37 Bracewell’s own application over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in Las Piñas City, was thus
granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58.38
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,39 otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," was
enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981,40 authorizing the creation of RTCs in different judicial regions, including the
RTC of Las Piñas City as part of the National Capital Judicial Region.41 As pointed out by the court a quo in its Decision
dated July 31, 2003, the RTC of Las Piñas City was established "in or about 1994."42Understandably, in February 1998,
Bracewell sought the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Piñas City-RTC, considering that the lot subject of this
case is situated in Las Piñas City.
Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been filed with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, which
rendered the assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree No. N-217036, citing the 1964 case of Amando Joson, et
al. v. Busuego43 (Joson) among others. In said case, Spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a
petition to set aside the decree of registration issued in favor of Teodora Busuego (Busuego) on the ground that the latter
misrepresented herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, the Sps. Joson were owners of one-half thereof, having
purchased the same from Busuego’s mother.44 The court a quo therein dismissed the petition for the reason that since its
jurisdiction as a cadastral court was special and limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues raised. Disagreeing, the
Court held that, as long as the final decree has not been issued and the period of one (1) year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree,
which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another.45
To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the
cadastral court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.46 It should be
pointed out, however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC
and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and
determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to
lands and petitions filed after such registration.47 Accordingly, and considering further that the matter of whether the RTC
resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of
procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction,48petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson pronouncement
to advance its theory.
Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of registration falls within the jurisdiction of and, hence, should be
filed in the "proper Court of First Instance," viz.:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.1âwphi1 The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and
the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained
by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not
later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights
may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it
shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds from the land registration court’s directive, a petition taken
under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for
"as long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of
entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."49
While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 which rendered the decision directing the LRA to
issue Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying the general rule as above-stated, be the same court before which a
petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must consider the circumstantial milieu in this case that, in
the interest of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition before the Las Piñas City-RTC.
Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original registration in this case was only filed before the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December 1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. Barring this situation,
the aforesaid application should not have been filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on
venue prevailing at that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1,
1964, the proper venue for real actions, such as an application for original registration, lies with the CFI of the province where
the property is situated, viz.:
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.— (a) Real actions. — Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or any part thereof lies.
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the application for its original registration should
have been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact that the said court had yet to be created at the time the
application was filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the complication at hand is actually one of venue and not
of jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases pursuant to Section 32 of PD
1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds that the Las Piñas City-RTC has the authority over the
petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the Las
Piñas City-RTC was only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set
back only because of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the Court perceives no compelling reason
to deviate from applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of procedure50 and, hence, should succumb
to the greater interests of the orderly administration of justice.51
Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum shopping, submission to conciliation proceedings, and award of
attorney's fees, suffice it to say that the same have been adequately discussed by the appellate court and, hence, need no
further elucidation.
Finally, on the matter of petitioner's objections against the trial judge's "unusual interest" in the case, the Court concurs with
the CA in saying that such tirades are not helpful to his cause. Besides, as pointed out in the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of
the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, petitioner already had his chance to disqualify the trial judge from further hearing the
case, but the appellate court dismissed his petition in CA G.R. SP No. 74187 for lack of merit.52
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed
VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, granting
petitioners' application for registration of title over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners4 Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed
with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535
square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the
following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar
the application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the application for registration on the following grounds, among others: that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if
any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain
belonging to the Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the present action is barred by a previous
final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties and involving the same parcel of land.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the
death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of
Sale5 dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19,
1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in
the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor
Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave
Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the subject property, petitioners
submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No. 95626dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for registration of the subject property,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the
present proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the applicants, who are declared the true and lawful
owners of said Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right to Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration and Certificate of Title be issued in the name of
the applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio Grandea,
subject to the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay over said lot whose fishpond permits are
declared VALID and will expire on December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an
appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the
classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and in
the absence of such classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which
ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a
subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the public
domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated
December 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees,
DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of private oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the
subject parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence,
the present petition with the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED
LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES
JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-
IN-INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR PRESCRIPTION.9
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The possession of applicants'
predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had been open, continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land
into a private land. The subject lot had already become private in character in view of the length of time the applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot, which entitles them to the confirmation of their title. Petitioners
further claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for
registration of a parcel of land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain and whether petitioners have the right to have the said property registered in their
name through prescription of time are questions of fact, which were already passed upon by the CA and no longer reviewable
by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA, when supported by sufficient evidence, are conclusive and binding on the
parties. The OSG further claims that petitioners failed to prove that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and that petitioners' application for land registration is already barred by a prior decision in a
cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to prove that their possession over
the subject lot applied for had been open, peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the principle is well-established that this
Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court.10 Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and
evidence adduced before the lower courts.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.11 These the petitioners must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.12
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which
is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.13 Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject
of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government,
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.16
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.17 Verily, the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.1âwphi1
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July 11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral
Case No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to reopen the proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is
Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in its Order18 dated October 20, 1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It
found that after the subject lot was declared public land, it was found to be inside the communal forest. On appeal, the CA, in
its Decision19 dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible error and affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a
petition elevating the case to this Court was dismissed for lack of merit.20 In the present case, the CA, in its Decision dated
June 23, 2005, ruled that such judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land registration on the
same land.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 4822 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said
public lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land
is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
mandated by the law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer
general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.23 Actual possession consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.24
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-in-interest's possession and ownership over
the subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax
declaration covering the subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947,
was presented in evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced
improvements on the subject property, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio
was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by law. Hence,
petitioners' assertion that Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and self-
serving.
As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a
tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date. What is required is
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.25 Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was
only in 1976 that they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or of their
predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.26
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their
application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03,
is AFFIRMED. The application for registration of title filed by the petitioners Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao,
Bienvenido Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental, is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
LAUREANO V. HERMOSO, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact FLORIDA L. UMANDAP, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANTONIO FRANCIA and PETRA FRANCIA, NAMELY: BENJAMIN P. FRANCIA,
CECILIA FRANCIA, AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., FRANCISCO F. VILLARICA, DANILO F. VILLARICA, RODRIGO F.
VILLARICA, MELCHOR F. VILLARICA, JESUS F. VILLARICA, BENILDA F. VILLARICA and ERNESTO F.
VILLARICA, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated
October 15, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546.
The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra
Francia and Lot 3415 owned by Antonio Francia. The lots comprises an area of 2.5 and 1.5850 hectares, respectively, and
forms part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr., Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra,
Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed Francia.3
Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants
thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.4 On July 4, 1995, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing facts and jurisprudence considered, Order is hereby issued:
1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag
situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and
2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to process the issuance of emancipation patents in favor of said
Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag after a parcellary mapping have been undertaken by the Bureau of Lands
over the subject landholdings.
SO ORDERED.5
Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and reinvestigation. On December 9, 1995, the DAR affirmed with
modification the earlier order, and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued AFFIRMING the first dispositive portion of the Order,
dated July 4, 1995, issued in the instant case, but MODIFYING the second dispositive portion of the same now to read, as
follows:
1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag
situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and
2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to hold in abeyance the processing of the emancipation patent of
Miguel Banag until the issue of tenancy relationship in DARAB Cases Nos. 424-Bul’92 and 425-Bul’92 is finally
resolved and disposed.
No further motion of any and/or the same nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.6
In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and 425-BUL-92. The cases delved on whether both petitioner and Banag are tenants
of respondents in the subject landholding. On June 3, 1996, the DARAB rendered a Decision7upholding the tenancy
relationship of petitioner and Banag with the respondents. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the CA. However, the petition was denied on technical grounds in a
Resolution8 dated October 9, 1996. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was likewise denied in a
Resolution9 dated December 27, 1996. The case was eventually elevated to this Court in G.R. No. 127668. On March 12,
1997, the Court denied the petition for lack of verification,10and subsequently, also denied the motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution11 dated July 14, 1997.
Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR, an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an emancipation
patent. On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the motion.12 On March 21, 1997, respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. They claimed that the lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban purposes in an
Order13 dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land.14 On March 10, 1998, the DAR
issued an Order15 affirming the March 13, 1997 order granting the motion for issuance of emancipation patent in favor of
Banag. On March 30, 1998, respondents filed a notice of appeal and correspondingly filed their appeal memorandum.16 On
April 21, 2003, the Office of the President through the Deputy Executive Secretary rendered a Decision17 denying
respondents’ appeal. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Order dated 10 March
1998 of the DAR Secretary AFFIRMED in toto.
Parties are required to INFORM this Office, within five (5) days from notice, of the dates of their receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.18
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. They maintained that P.D. No.
27 does not cover the subject parcels of land pursuant to the June 5, 1973 Order of the DAR Secretary reclassifying the
lands and declaring the same as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes. Furthermore, the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands as early as October 14, 1978.
On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,19 the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision of the Office of the President is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new decision is hereby rendered dismissing the Petition for Coverage under P.D. No.
27 filed by respondents [now herein petitioner].
SO ORDERED.20
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 19, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Resolution21denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The sole issue in this petition is whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No. 27.
Petitioner avers that the final and executory decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127668 affirming that he is a tenant of the
landholding in question entitles him to avail of the right granted under PD 27. In other words, because of the finality of the
decision declaring him a tenant of the landholding in question, in effect, the subject lots are considered as agricultural lands
and are thus covered by P.D. No. 27. Parenthetically, we take judicial notice of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 127668,
in which the tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents was upheld. That decision is already final and
executory.
Respondents, for their part, claim that the lands were already declared suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 as early as 1973. Hence, they are no
longer subject to P.D. No. 27.
We resolve to deny the petition.
Section 3, Article XII22 of the Constitution mandates that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The
primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically
mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that
agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.23
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June
15, 1988, explicitly provides:
Section 65. Conversion of Lands.— After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with
due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land
and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 199124 states:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. —
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for
the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned:
 Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at
the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-
seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be
affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed
by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next
preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases
for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and
industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where the approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt
of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of
R.A. No. 6657.
But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative enactments, there was already R.A. No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, which was approved on August 8, 1963, Section 36 of which reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender,
of the land, agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will
convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-
agricultural purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more that five hectares, in which case
instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural
year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate
the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to
demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any
of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously
agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-
nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is
not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-
seven.
The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled to the issuance of an emancipation patent under P.D. No. 27. The
said decree promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on October 21, 1972, is entitled, "DECREEING THE
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF
THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS THEREFOR". However, the law
specifically applied "to tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share
tenancy or lease tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not."
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine
whether the land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:
(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing
of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This
considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27. The pertinent portions of the
June 5, 1973 Order25 read:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as amended, the said requests of the petitioners were referred to the
National Planning Commission as well as to the Agrarian Reform Team Leader, Valenzuela, Bulacan for proper investigation.
The National Planning Commission in compliance therewith after due investigation and physical survey of the subject areas,
favorably recommended the suitability of the same to residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes.
Similarly, the Agrarian Reform Team in Valenzuela, Bulacan after due investigation thereof found the parcels of land subject
hereof highly suitable for conversion into urban purposes in view of his findings and verification of the location, facilities
necessary for urban development and also, the low agricultural income thereof (unirrigated), of the said land. The Team
Leader concerned in his recommendation submitted to this Office made mentioned (sic) that in his declaration of the
suitability of the subject properties for urban purposes, he believes that the conformity of the tenants consisting of eleven (11)
tenants are no longer needed so long as the petitioners are willing to pay the disturbance compensation as provided for by
law. The petitioners manifested to the Team Leader concerned their willingness to pay each and every tenant the disturbance
compensation according to law. To show further their sincerity to comply with the provisions of the law on disturbance
compensation, and to show that their (petitioners) purpose of the instant request is not to evade the provisions of Decree 27,
they stated in their letter-request that they will not eject any tenants therefrom, nor dispossessed (sic) them of their
landholdings until after they are fully and justly paid the disturbance compensation according to law.
The subject parcels of land are not included in the land transfer operation according to the team’s report.
It maybe mentioned in this connection, that from the report of the National Planning Commission submitted to this Office, it
appears that the subject properties are strategically located in the urban center of the town of Meycauayan wherein there are
already existing developed and occupied residential subdivisions and even low cost housing projects subsidized by funds
from government financial institution. Likewise, there are also industrial establishments in its vicinity according to the National
Planning Commission’s report.
In view of the foregoing, and considering the parcels of land subject hereof to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes as found and recommended by the National Planning Commission and the Agrarian Reform Team
concerned, and considering further that the said parcels of land by reason of their location and the existence of developed
and occupied residential subdivisions and industrial establishments in the immediate vicinity maybe considered as one of the
possible areas to be reserved for urban development as contemplated in the Letter of Instruction No. 46 of the President, and
considering finally, that the right of the agricultural tenants therein will be fully compensated and there will be no ejectment of
tenants until after full payment thereof, as manifested by the petitioners, the instant requests of the petitioners should be, as
hereby it is, given due course and the parcels of land subject thereof are hereby declared suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as amended.
It is understood however, that no agricultural tenants and/or lessees shall be ejected from or dispossessed of their
landholdings by virtue of this Order not until after they are duly and justly paid the disturbance compensation according to
law, the amount of which maybe determined and fixed by the proper court in the absence of any mutual agreement thereto by
and between the agricultural lessees and the owner-petitioners.
SO ORDERED.26
The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the emancipation patent in his favor under P.D. No. 27 is the fact that
respondents were not able to realize the actual conversion of the land into residential purposes. To bolster his claim,
petitioner relies on Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, viz.:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert
the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes:
Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be
entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided,
further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the
tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of
said dispossessions.
xxxx27
However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already been amended by R.A. No. 6389, as early as September 10, 1971.
Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the
last five preceding calendar years;
xxxx28
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to non-
agricultural purposes within a certain period was deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory law, the condition imposed
on the landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural purpose within a certain period
was deleted.29 The remedy left available to the tenant is to claim disturbance compensation.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform30 , the Court held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity and
those that were previously converted to non-agricultural uses are outside the coverage of the CARL, viz.:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall
"cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what
constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this
limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon
approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed
as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members
even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources
needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands
are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL. 31
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 15, 2004
and the Resolution dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546 are hereby affirmed. The
case is remanded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan for the proper computation of the disturbance
compensation of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES PEDRO S. PALANCA AND SOTERRANEA RAFOLS VDA. DE PALANCA
namely: IMELDA R. PALANCA, MAMERTA R. PALANCA, OFELIA P. MIGUEL, ESTEFANIA P. PE,
CANDELARIA P. PUNZALAN, NICOLAS R. PALANCA, CONSTANTINO R. PALANCA, EDMUNDO
PALANCA, LEOCADIA R. PALANCA and OLIVERIO R. PALANCA, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
OFELIA P. MIGUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the Lands Management Bureau), REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PALAWAN (Office of the Executive Judge) and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PALAWAN, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the decision 1 dated July 16, 2001, and the resolution 2 dated December 21, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 62081 entitled "Republic of the Philippines (Represented by the Lands Management Bureau)
v. Court of First Instance (CFI) of Palawan (now Regional Trial Court), Seventh Judicial District, Branch II
presided over by Former District Judge, Jose P. Rodriguez, et al."
The antecedent facts 3 are as follows:
On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners herein), filed an application to bring the pieces of
land they allegedly owned under the operation of the Land Registration Act. These are: a two hundred thirty-nine
thousand nine hundred eighty (239,980) square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Panlaitan, Municipality of
Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000074, and a one hundred seventy-six thousand
five hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square meter land in Barrio of Panlaitan (Island of Capari), Municipality of
New Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000073. They acquired said realties by
inheritance from the late Pedro S. Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land openly and continuously
in the concept of an owner since 1934, or 39 years before the filing of said application, and planted on said lands
about 1,200 coconut trees on each land, declared the same for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereof.
The first parcel of land is presently occupied by Lopez, Libarra, an encargado of herein (petitioners), while the
second is occupied by (petitioner) Candelaria Punzalan. In Civil Case No. 573 entitled "Heirs of Pedro Palanca,
Plaintiffs, vs. Alfonso Guillamac, Defendant," for "Recovery of Possession of a Parcel of Land" the Court of First
Instance of Palawan rendered a decision on March 4, 1970, declaring (petitioners), the heirs of Pedro S.
Palanca, as the rightful possessors of the land at Talampulan Island, Bario of Panlaitan, Municipality of
Busuanga, Province of Palawan, covered by Psu-04-000074, including the two (2) hectare portion occupied and
claimed by Alfonso Guillamac.
It also appears that the jurisdictional requirements as to notices, as prescribed by Section 31, Act No. 496,
namely publication in the Official Gazette, were complied with.
During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions to the application were made by the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan purportedly for and in behalf of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Bureau of Lands, and the
Department of Agrarian Reform, some inhabitants of the subject properties and a businessman by the name of
Alfonso Guillamac. The Provincial Fiscal stated that the lands subject of the application had no clearance from
the Bureau of Forestry and that portions thereof may still be part of the timberland block and/or public forest
under the administration of the Bureau of Forestry and had not been certified as being alienable and disposable
by the Bureau of Lands. He therefore requested that the resolution on the application be stayed pending the
examination and issuance of the required clearance by the Bureau of Forest Development. 4 After the lapse of
three years from the date of the initial hearing, however, no valid and formal opposition was filed by any of the
oppositors in the form and manner required by law. 5 Neither did the Provincial Fiscal present witnesses from the
relevant government bureaus and agencies to support his contention that the subject lands had not yet been
cleared for public disposition.
On the other hand, petitioners submitted the plan and technical description of the land, a survey certificate
approved by the Bureau of Lands and also tax declarations showing that they have consistently paid the realty
taxes accruing on the property. Petitioners likewise presented six witnesses in support of their application,
namely Constantino Palanca, Ofelia Palanca-Miguel, Lopez Libarra, Alejandro Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero and
Augustin Timbancaya.
Both Constantino Palanca and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel testified that: (1) they were heirs of one Pedro S. Palanca;
(2) they, together with their other siblings, were applicants for the registration of two parcels of land located in
Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan; (3) their father, Pedro S. Palanca, acquired ownership over the subject
properties by continuous, public and notorious possession; (4) their father built a house on each parcel of land
and planted coconut trees; (5) since their father’s death, they have continued their possession over the lands in
the concept of owners and adverse to all claimants; and (6) the properties have been declared for taxation
purposes and the corresponding taxes religiously paid for over forty (40) years. 6
Lopez Libarra and Alejandro Cabajar testified that they knew the late Pedro S. Palanca and worked for the latter
as an overseer and a "capataz" respectively in the cultivation of the subject properties. Cabajar, in particular,
claimed that he helped clear the lands sometime in the mid-1920s, planted upon such lands coconut trees which
are now bearing fruit, and continued working with Pedro S. Palanca until the latter’s death in 1943. He
subsequently went to work for the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca whom he confirms now own and manage the
properties. 7
For his part, Libarra testified that he had been the overseer of the two coconut plantations of the late Pedro S.
Palanca since 1934. He identified the location of the properties, averring that one plantation is in Talampulan,
Panlaitan Island and the other in Talampetan, Capari Island. He further testified that at the time he was
employed in 1934, there were already improvements in the form of coconut trees planted in the areas, a number
of which were already bearing fruits. His duties included overseeing and cleaning the plantations, making copra
and replanting the area when necessary. He also claimed he worked with Pedro S. Palanca until the latter’s
death in 1943 and continues to work for the latter’s heirs up to the present. 8
Also presented were Alfonso Lucero and Augustin Timbancaya, who testified thus:
Alfonso Lucero testified that he is a Forester in the Bureau of Forest Development, formerly the Bureau of
Forestry. He was once assigned as the Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55 in Palawan. Presently, he is a
member of the Composite Land Classification Team No. 32 in the province with station at Puerto Princessa City.
He has been employed with the Bureau of Forest Development for about 30 years, starting as a Forest Guard in
1947. As chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he covered the territory from Puerto Princesa City northward
up to Busuanga, where the land in question is located. His duty was to supervise the team that conducted the
limitation, segregation and deviation of agricultural lands within the area. He served in this capacity for twelve
(12) years until December 1975. As such, he issued certifications after due classification by his office, of
alienable and disposable land for administration by the Bureau of Lands and eventual disposition to interested
parties. He had been in Busuanga, Palawan a number of times and is familiar with the lands in question, one of
which is in Talampetan, Capari Island and the other in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island. He is aware that the lands
in question are claimed and administered by the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca. The improvements on the land are at
least 40 years old in his estimation. He recalls having issued a certification of release of this property for
disposition to private parties, but could not remember the exact date when he did so. He identified Exhibits "JJ"
and "KK" to be certifications to the effect that Talampulan in Panlaitan Island and Talampetan, a portion of Capari
Island, both in Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan, are fully cultivated and mainly planted to coconuts before
World War II by herein applicants, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca. He is fully convinced that the lands in question
have already been released before the war for agricultural purposes in favor of Pedro S. Palanca, applicants’
predecessor-in-interest. Releases of agricultural lands which are done in bulk at present was not in vogue before
the last war, for releases at that time were made on a case-to-case basis. Under the pre-war system, an
application for a piece of land was individually referred to the then Bureau of Forestry which in turn conducted a
classification of the area as to its availability, whether it be for sale, homestead, etc. On the basis of the Bureau
of Forestry investigation, a certification was then issued as to its availability for the purpose for which the
application was made. The certification was made on the basis of such application, and was called the isolated
case release or the case-to-case basis. This procedure was followed in the case of herein applicants and there
seemed to be no reason to doubt that the area was in fact released to herein applicants. Therefore, the area is
no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
Alfonso Lucero also testified that as Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he was the one directly in charge
of classification and release of lands of public domain for agricultural purposes. His office is directly under the
bureau chief in Manila, although for administrative purposes he is carried with the district forestry office in Puerto
Princesa City. The certifications he issue carry much weight in land classification and releases in the province
unless revoked by the Manila Office.
Augustin O. Timbancaya testified that he is a licensed geodetic engineer, formerly called a land surveyor. His
services were engaged by applicant Ofelia P. Miguel, the representative of the other applicants, to conduct and
prepare a land plan for two parcels of land subject of the application. He went personally to the lands in question.
He executed Exhibit "U", the Plan of Land covered by PSU-04-000073, containing an area of one hundred
seventy-six thousand, five hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square meters situated at Talampetan, Capari Island,
Busuanga, Palawan, approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. He also identified Exhibit "V", the
Plan of Land under PSU-04-000074, containing an area of two hundred thirty-nine thousand, nine hundred
eighty (239, 980) square meters located at Talampulan, Panlaitan Island, Busuanga, Palawan, which was also
approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. Both lands are in barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga (formerly
Coron), Palawan, and have an aggregate total area of four hundred sixteen thousand five hundred sixty-eight
(416,568) square meters. All these surveys were properly monumented. He personally prepared the technical
description for both lots. He also prepared the Geodetic Engineer’s Certificates and had the same notarized by
Atty. Remigio Raton, the first on January 24, 1972 and the second on March 14, 1972. He believes that both
parcels of land have been released for agricultural purposes because if it were otherwise, the survey plans he
executed would not have been approved by the Director of Lands. In other words, the approval of the Land
Plans by the Director of the Bureau of Lands indicates that the lands in question have been previously released
for alienation and disposition. Both parcels of land have been fully developed and the coconuts planted thereon
are about 50 years old. He has no doubt that these lands were released for agricultural purposes long ago. 9
After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision on December 15, 1977 declaring petitioners as the owners in
fee simple of the two parcels of land in question. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4295 was
issued in the name of petitioners. Subsequently, out of OCT No. 4295, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-7095,
T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-10418, and T-10884 were issued.
On December 6, 2000, or after almost twenty-three years, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the
CA a petition 10 for annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of registration and title, and reversion.
Respondent sought to annul the December 15, 1977 decision of the CFI, arguing that the decision was null and
void because the two lands in question were unclassified public forest land and, as such, were not capable of
private appropriation. In support of this proposition, respondent presented Land Classification Map No. 839,
Project 2-A dated December 9, 1929 showing that the subject properties were unclassified lands as of that date
as well as a certification dated November 24, 2000 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office stating that "the islands of Talampulan and Capar(i) Island located in the municipality of
Busuanga, Palawan are within the unclassified public forest." Respondent likewise drew attention to Executive
Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 which classified the Province of Palawan as a National Game
Refuge and Bird Sanctuary and the small islands off Palawan as national reserves closed to exploitation and
settlement under the administration of the Parks and Wildlife Office, subject only to existing private rights. 11 In
view of the fact that the properties were never classified as alienable and disposable, respondent argued that the
CFI did not have jurisdiction to make a disposition of the same.
In addition, respondent asserted that the participants in the proceedings committed perfidious acts amounting to
extrinsic fraud which is one of the grounds for the annulment of a judgment. Respondent maintained that a
culture of collusion existed between and among the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal and the ranking officer of
the District Forestry Office, Alfonso Lucero, such that the State was deprived of the opportunity to fairly present
its case to the court.
On July 16, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Court of First Instance of Palawan,
Branch II, dated December 15, 1977, in Land Registration Case No. N-21, LRC Record No. N-44308 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Decree No. N-172081 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title
No. 4295 issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as well as the subsequent Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-10410 and T-10884 and all subsequent TCTs
issued thereafter are also declared NULL and VOID. Private respondents Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca
are DIRECTED to surrender said transfer certificates of title to public respondent Register of Deeds of Palawan;
and the latter is also DIRECTED to cause the cancellation thereof.
SO ORDERED. 12
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in a resolution 13 dated December 21,
2001. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the CA disregarded settled jurisprudence and applicable land laws when it ruled that the
subject properties covered by their application for registration were forest lands and that, consequently, the land
registration court did not have jurisdiction to award the same to them. They opine that it is not necessary for
them to prove that the government had expressly given a grant of the subject properties to Pedro S. Palanca,
their predecessor-in-interest, separate of the legislative grant given to them purportedly under Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released
by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v.
Director of Lands 14and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. 15 They likewise argue that the CA
erred in relying upon Executive Proclamation No. 219 and upon Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A to
nullify petitioners’ mother title. According to petitioners, the reversal of the CFI’s decision violated the principle
of res judicata as well as the rule on incontrovertibility of land titles under Act No. 496.
Respondent, on the other hand, denies the allegations of the petition in its comment 16 dated August 6, 2002
and contends that (a) the claim that the subject parcels of land are public agricultural lands by virtue of a
legislative grant is unfounded and baseless; (b) the land registration court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was
devoid of jurisdictional competence to order titling of a portion of forest land; (c) the CA is correct in declaring
that there must be a prior release of the subject lands for agricultural purposes; (d) the rules on res judicata and
the incontestability of Torrens titles do not find proper applications in the exercise of the power of reversion by
the State; and (e) estoppel and laches will not operate against the State. Respondent also reiterates its
contention that collusion existed between the parties in the proceedings below which prevented a fair submission
of the controversy, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that an action for reversion filed by the State to recover property registered
in favor of any party which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation never prescribes. Verily, non-
disposable public lands registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any
time 17 and the defense of res judicata would not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of
the public domain.18 That being said, it must likewise be kept in mind that in an action to annul a judgment, the
burden of proving the judgment’s nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner has to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the judgment being challenged is fatally defective. 19
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that respondent met the required burden of
proof. Consequently, the CA did not err in granting respondent’s petition to annul the decision of the land
registration court. This petition for review, therefore, lacks merit.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon which petitioners anchor their claim states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
The above provision clearly requires the concurrence of two things: (1) that the land sought to be registered is
public agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking registration must have possessed and occupied the
same for at least thirty years prior to the filing of the application. That the petitioners, through Pedro S. Palanca,
have been in possession of the properties since 1934 is not disputed. What is in doubt is the compliance with the
first requisite.
To reiterate, the validity of the CFI decision was impugned on the basis of the court’s lack of jurisdiction. If the
properties were alienable public lands, then the CFI, acting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction over
them and could validly confirm petitioners’ imperfect title. Otherwise, if the properties were indeed public forests,
then the CA was correct in declaring that the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and, as a result, its decision decreeing the registration of the properties in favor of petitioners
would be null and void.
The reason for this is the fact that public forests are inalienable public lands. The possession of public forests on
the part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private property. 20 Possession in such an
event, even if spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. 21 It bears stressing that unless
and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 22
In the present case, Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A 23 indicated that the Talampulan and Capari
Islands on which the properties were located were unclassified public lands as of December 9, 1929. It was by
virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 that these islands were subsequently classified
as national reserves. Based on these, it becomes evident that the subject properties have never been released
for public disposition. Obviously, from the time that petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest were occupying
the properties in 1934 until the time that an application for registration was filed in 1973, these properties
remained as inalienable public lands.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the
fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or
timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. 24 When the
property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot ripen
into private ownership. 25 This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in such lands and is charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. 26 Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to show in registration
proceedings that the government, through a positive act, has declassified inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. 27
Petitioners’ reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands 28 and Ankron v. Government 29 is misplaced. These
cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.
As petitioners themselves admit, registration of the properties is sought under Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide as follows:
Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Section 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Based on the foregoing, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the courts no
longer have the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.30
To the Court’s mind, petitioners have failed to present incontrovertible proof that the lands they claimed had
previously been classified as alienable. The bare allegation of Alfonso Lucero that a certification had been issued
releasing the properties for agricultural purposes is not sufficient to prove this fact. The best evidence would be
the document itself which, however, was not produced in this case. It was error for the land registration court to
have taken Mr. Lucero’s testimony at face value, absent any other evidence to conclusively prove that the land
had been released for public disposition.
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ contention that the State has the burden to prove that the
land which it avers to be of public domain is really of such nature applies only in instances where the applicant
has been in possession of the property since time immemorial. When referring to this type of possession, it
means possession of which no person living has seen the beginning and the existence of which such person has
learned from the latter’s elders. 31 Immemorial possession justifies the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. 32 The
possession of petitioners in this case does not fall under the above-named exception as their possession, by
their own admission, only commenced sometime in 1934.
To reiterate, where there is a showing that lots sought to be registered are part of the public domain, the
applicant for land registration under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 must secure a certification from
the government that the lands claimed to have been possessed by the applicant as owner for more than 30
years are alienable and disposable. 33 Petitioners’ failure to do so in this case, when taken with the evidence
adduced by respondent showing that the lands in question indeed remain part of the public domain and form part
of the national reserves, confirms that the CFI never acquired jurisdiction to order the registration of such lands
in favor of petitioners, and certainly justifies their reversion to the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN,
REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY,
DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of
all those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED
NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL
TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their
occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped
island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation
Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest,
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were
presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and
other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or
less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any
legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the
case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-
5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These
lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no
legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the
applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent
Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and
5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed
with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands
and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in
the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues
on the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER

THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30
YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE
THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD
705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER

THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED
YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6,
CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED
RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED
BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO
SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE
SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants
in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their
right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure
title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a)
Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b)
Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these
laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber
or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay
Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law
provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It
established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took various
forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine
Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions,
to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of
"agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The
Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and
for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act.
This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No.
141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June
12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act
No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens
system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented
to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already
open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private
claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the
whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain.
Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the
public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This
was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can
be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases
were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or
President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
 agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on
land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain
had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all
lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would
take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No.
926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption
applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply
to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of
Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by
the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on
proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land
in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we
think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there
exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present
or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether
it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the
latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened,
the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall
be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that
have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave
the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to
determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable
case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity
for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926
was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was
decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was
already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was
whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could
acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from
acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain
are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply
here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite
period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply
for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion
of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of
patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the
friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act
No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands
are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and
the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a)
of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the
present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island
resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has
already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism
industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of
the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No.
1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is
nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
"private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands.
Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are
declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by
the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then
Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together
with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the
PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential
with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and
Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan
de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to
private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the
proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to
classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent
such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land.
The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make
such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that
Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring
conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into
agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified
lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the
fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber
land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the
opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there
has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not
been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes
and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have
not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do
they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island
into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine,
is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to
those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the
requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that
the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12,
1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They
have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in
Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in
the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called
the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential,
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial
investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to
preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt
them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private ownership.
This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest
reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for
politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and
difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest
lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover
on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers
and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As
waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and
highways – not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumberman’s decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA
S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY,
DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO,
JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO
H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR.,
SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M.
EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in
part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA,
Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of
112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization
of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of
land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of
the indigenous peoples;
 "(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371;
and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of
R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR., et al., SPOUSES EDUARDO and ARCELITA MARQUEZ and RURAL BANK
OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Interplaying in this case are two (2) counter-balancing doctrines in the law of land titles: one, the doctrine
of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant, which basically means that no one may enjoy the fruits of fraud, 1 and
the other, the doctrine that a fraudulent title may be the root of valid title in the name of an innocent buyer
for value and in good faith.2
Invoking the first, petitioner Republic of the Philippines in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated September 26, 2002 3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55732, which reversed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at
Cabanatuan City, Branch 25, in its Civil Case No. 831-AF, an action for cancellation of free patent, original
certificate of title and derivative transfer certificates of title, thereat filed by the petitioner against, among
others, the herein respondents.
The facts are well laid out in the decision under review:
On May 26, 1958, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for Free Patent No. 5-1414 covering two
parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
containing an aggregate area of 18.6486 hectares with the Bureau of Lands. On January 18, 1967, he was
issued Free Patent No. 314450 by the Director of Lands.
On February 6, 1967, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija registered Free Patent No. 314450 and issued
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.
On March 10, 1967, the heirs of Eusebio Perez, represented by Francisca Perez, caused the annotation on
the said OCT of an adverse claim in their favor over a portion of 15.1593 hectares of the property.
On July 30, 1975, the said heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a formal protest docketed as B.L. Claim No. 760 (n)
with the Bureau of Lands alleging that Lot 1341 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No-P4522 is identical to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200 which had been
adjudicated as private property of said protestant pursuant to a decision promulgated on October 24, 1960
by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Land Registration Case No. 430, LRC Records No. 14876.
On May 3, 1976, the chief of the Legal Division, Bureau of Lands, conducted a formal investigation and
ocular inspection of the premises and it was ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450 and its
corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and fraudulently issued (Records, p.78)
On July 31, 1979, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs, namely Gregorio Sr.,
Tomas, Lilian, Angelito and Gregorio, Jr., executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in favor of
Joaquin Sangabol for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 166270 was issued in favor of the aforenamed heirs. Said TCT No.
166270 was again cancelled by reason of the concurrent sale to Joaquin Sangabol in whose favor TCT No.
NT- 166271 was issued.
On August 1, 1979, Joaquin Sangabol sold an undivided portion of three (3) hectares of the property
described as Lot 1341 in TCT No. NT-166271 to Fortunato Para for and in consideration of the sum of
Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (3,500.00)
The following day, he sold the property described as Lot 1342 in TCT No. NT-166271 to Virginia P. Jimenez
for and in consideration of the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) in whose favor TCT
No. N-166287 was issued.
On May 12, 1980, the adverse claim of Francisca Perez, et al. annotated at the back of the OCT was
cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit G).
On January 16, 1981, Joaquin Sangabol subdivided the property described as Lot 1341 in TCT No. NT-
166271 into three lots designated as Lot Nos. 1341-A, 1341-B, and 1341-C of plan Psd-299875 duly
approved by the Land Registration Commission. l^vvphi1.net

TCT No. NT-166271 was cancelled and TCT No. NT-168972 covering Lot No. 1341-A was issued to
spouses Fortunato Para and Araceli Sena. TCT Nos. NT-168973 and NT-168974 covering Lot Nos. 1341-B
and 1341-C were issued in favor of Joaquin Sangabol.
On June 15, 1982, Virginia P. Jimenez sold the property covered by TCT No. NT-166287 in favor of
spouses Blandino and Josefina A. Salva Cruz for Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P11,500.00)
where TCT No. 174634 was issued in favor of said spouses. On June 17, 1982, Josefina A. Salva Cruz
effected the subdivision of the property into thirteen (13) lots designated as Lot Nos. 1342-A t0 1342-M as
per subdivision plan Psd-03-004756 thereby canceling TCT No. NT-174634 and TCT Nos. NT- 174635 to
174647 were issued in lieu thereof.
On November 2, 1982, Fortunato Para, through his attorney-in-fact Gloria Bergonia, mortgaged the
property covered by TCT No. NT-168972 in favor of the Perpetual Finance and Investment, Inc. in the
amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00). The mortgage was foreclosed and
the property was sold at public auction. Thereafter, the corresponding certificate of sale was executed in
favor of Perpetual Finance and Credit, Inc.
On March 3, 1983, the properties covered by TCT Nos. NT-174643 and NT- 174644 were mortgaged with
the Rural Bank of Gapan for Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). On February 25, 1985, the mortgage
was likewise foreclosed and the properties were sold at public auction in favor of the said bank.
On December 16, 1986, Joaquin Sangabol sold the property covered by TCT No. NT-168974 to Eduardo
R. Dee for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Twenty [Thousand] Pesos (P120,000.00).
Subsequently, TCT No. NT-168974 was cancelled and TCT No. 196579 was issued in the name
of Eduardo R. Dee.
On January 5, 1988, the heirs of Ruperto Perez (oldest son of Eusebio), now represented by Sabina P.
Hernandez, filed a supplemental protest alleging that:
a) Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269 of the Sta. Rosa Cadatre have been exclusively occupied and
cultivated by them and their immediate predecessors-in-interest who have introduced permanent
improvements thereon consisting of irrigated ricelands, mango trees, bamboo groves and other
crops;
b) Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. never occupied and cultivated said parcels of land in the manner and for
the period required by law;
c) Said parcels of land are identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion of 87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of
the amended plan-47200 Amd. as shown by the relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer
Deogracias L. Javier on July 29, 1977;
d) The patent and title issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. were obtained through fraud and
misrepresentation. (Records pp. 9-10)
The Bureau of Lands conducted anew an investigation and ocular inspection of Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta.
Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, and came out with the following findings, to wit:
a) Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija is located at Barangay Imbunia (formerly
Marawa), Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija;
b) Said lot was originally registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City on
May 23, 1914 under OCT No. 125 issued in the name of Valeriano Espiritu, pursuant to Decree No.
15733 issued on May 20, 1914 in Land Registration Case No. 9552;
c) On May 13, 1952, said property was conveyed in favor of Isaias Carlos under TCT No. 11554
and the latter conveyed the same in favor of the spouses Santiago Mateo and Leogarda Juliano;
d) TCT No. 11554 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 17471 was issued in the name of
Santiago Mateo. (Records, pp. 13;78)
On May 10, 1988, the Chief of the Legal Division recommended to the Director of Lands that court action
be instituted for the cancellation of Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. P-4522 in the name Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., as well as other subsequent transfer certificates of title
issued therefrom based on the foregoing findings (Underscoring supplied).
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on May 24, 1990, in the Regional Trial Court at
Gapan, Nueva Ecija petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the
complaint4 in this case against several defendants, among whom are the herein respondents Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., his children, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 831-AF, petitioner Republic alleged, inter
alia, as follows:
"30. Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 were procured
by defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation since the property in
question (Lots 1341 and 1342) at the time the patent and the title were issued was already adjudicated as
private property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, respectively. Consequently, the then
Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no longer had any jurisdiction and control over the
same. xxx xxx.
31. The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. had misled the then
Bureau of Lands in issuing said patent. Since the property in question was no longer a disposable public
land, Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 issued to
defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. are null and void and should be cancelled. Moreover, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.
has not occupied and cultivated the land in the manner and for the length of time required by law (C.A. 141
as amended; see also RA 782) (Emphasis supplied),
and accordingly prayed for a judgment -
1. Declaring Free Patent No. 314450 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all other subsequent transfer certificates of title
emanating therefrom, i.e., Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-168972, NT-168973, NT-196579,
NT-174635 to NT-174647 (inclusive), including all liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, null
and void;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owner’s duplicate copies of all subsequent transfer
certificates of title emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the Register of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija;
3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the aforesaid certificates of title;
4. Ordering defendants and all those claiming under them to desist from exercising or representing
acts of ownership and/or possession in the premises (Underscoring supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Eventually, in a decision dated September 9, 1996,5 the trial court rendered judgment for the Republic,
thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. Declaring as null and void Free Patent No. 314450 and the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all other subsequent transfer
certificates of titles emanating therefrom (TCT Nos. NT-166270, NT-166271, NT- 168972, NT-
168973, NT-168974, NT-166287 and NT-174634 to NT-174647, inclusive, of the Registry of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija) including all liens and encumbrances annotated thereon;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owner's duplicate copies of all the said subsequent
transfer certificates of titles emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the aforesaid certificates of
titles;
 3. Ordering reversion of the pieces of land embraced in Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-
4522 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, to the mass of public domain except the pieces of
land which were already the subject of land registration proceedings;
4. Ordering that henceforth the defendants and all those claiming under them to desist from
disturbing the ownership of the government over the said pieces of land, and
5. To pay costs of suits.
For lack of evidence, the third-party complaint filed by the Rural Bank of Gapan, Inc. against defendants-
Spouses Blandino Salva Cruz and Josefina Salva Cruz is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED (Underscoring supplied).
Therefrom, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija went to the Court of Appeals, whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55732.
As earlier stated herein, the appellate court, in a decision dated September 26, 2002, 6 reversed and set
aside the appealed decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered to read as follows:
1. Defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. is declared to have validly and properly acquired Free Patent
No. 314450 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 over Lot Nos. 1341 and
1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija; and
2. The title over the portion of Lot No. 1342, now covered by TCT No. 196579 in the name of
defendants-appellants Spouses Dee is likewise declared valid for having acquired in good faith and
for value.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioner, submitting for our resolution the following issues 7 :
"I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER

IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT GREGORIO AGUNOY,
SR. HAD VALIDLY ACQUIRED FREE PATENT NO. 314450 AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. P-4522 OVER LOT NOS. 1341 AND 1342, CAD. 269, STA. ROSA CADASTRE,
NUEVA ECIJA.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE
OVER THE PORTION OF LOT NO. 1342, NOW COVERED BY TCT NO. 196579 IN THE
NAMES OF RESPONDENTS SPOUSES EDUARDO DEE AND ARCELITA MARQUEZ IS
VALID FOR HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE".

We DENY.
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest in
this case.
Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, meaning "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit",8 a procedural rule reechoed in a long line of cases decided by
this Court. For sure, not too long ago, in Shipside, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,9 citing earlier cases, we wrote:
xxx. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor
may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the
government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." To qualify a person to be a
real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a
mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
The very complaint in this case, supra, filed by petitioner Republic before the trial court unmistakably
alleges that at the time Free Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-
45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., "the property in question (Lots 1341 and 1342) xxx was
already adjudicated as private property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu", and that at
that time, "the property in question was no longer a disposable public land". In fact, in paragraph 27(f)
of the same complaint, petitioner further alleged:
f) Furthermore, it was found that prior to the issuance of Free Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967, Lot
1341 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, which was one of the two (2) parcels of land applied for by
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., was already the subject of an application for registration filed by the heirs of Eusebio
Perez in 1958 before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, docketed as LRC Case No. 430, LRC
Record No. 14876, and wherein a Decision was promulgated on October 24, 1960 adjudicating Lots 1 and
2 of Plan Psu-47200 as private properties of said heirs-claimants. The aforesaid Decision was already final
and executory at the time the patent was issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr". (Except for the
underscoring on "as private properties", the rest are of the petitioner itself).
With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are
already private properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore, "no
longer disposable public land" over which the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau,
"no longer had any jurisdiction and control", we are simply at a loss to understand how petitioner
Republic can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this case, and insists that the disputed properties
are still part of the public domain. If ever, the real party-in-interest could be none other than the heirs of
Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner.
Then, too, it is striking to note that even as the complaint is basically one for reversion of private property to
the mass of public domain, petitioner did not implead either the heirs of Eusebio Perez or that of Valeriano
Espiritu. Without doubt, if our decision hereon were to be in favor of petitioner, the real beneficiary thereof
is not the State. And because, as no less admitted by the petitioner, the lands subject of this case are no
longer part of the public domain, the nullification of Agunoy’s Free Patent P-314450 and OCT No. P-4522
would not result in the reversion of the lands subject thereof to the mass of public land. And the
government, not being the real party-in-interest, is without personality to institute reversion proceedings. So
it is that in an earlier case,10 we had an occasion to say:
There is no merit in petitioners' contention that only the State may bring an action for reconveyance of the
lots in dispute. To reiterate, Lot 2344 is a private property in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the Santiago family. The nullification of its free patent and title would not therefore result in its
reversion to the public domain. Hence, the State, represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real party
in interest.
We could have, at this point, already written finis to this decision. Nonetheless, for the peace of mind of
those concerned, we have opted to address the second issue raised in the petition: whether the appellate
court erred in declaring as valid for having been acquired for value and in good faith the title over the
portion of Lot No. 1342, covered by TCT No. 196579 in the name of the respondent spouses Eduardo Dee
and Arcelita Marquez-Dee.
After sleeping for an unreasonably long period of time lasting for decades, the heirs of Eusebio Perez can
longer defeat the better right arising from the Torrens titles in the names of the present transferees of the
properties, unless and until anyone succeeds in overcoming the presumption of good faith in securing their
respective titles.
For one, even granting as true the petitioner’s allegation of a prior cadastral case - LRC Case No. 430,
LRC Rec. No. 148 - involving a portion of the lots subject of Agunoy’s Free Patent, wherein a decision was
allegedly promulgated on October 24, 1960 in favor of the heirs of Eusebio Perez, which decision,
according to petitioner, was already final and executory, we are greatly bothered by the fact that none of the
heirs of Eusebio Perez could show having exerted due diligence towards at least attempting to accomplish
the registration of the properties involved in the said cadastral case, which properties, according to
petitioner and the Perezes, are identical to Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342. Verily, were we to believe the
allegations of the heirs of Eusebio Perez in their own protest with the Bureau of Lands dated July 30,
1975,11 there is an express order for registration in LRC Case No. 430, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered affirming the order of general default heretofore entered and
ordering the registration of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200, situated in the Barrio of Marawa,
Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, containing a total area of 21.9284 hectares in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
From as early as October 24, 1960, when the aforequoted decision in LRC Case No. 430 was
promulgated, to as late as February 6, 1967, when OCT No. P-4522 of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. was issued, or
a slumber lasting for more than six (6) years, the heirs of Eusebio Perez had numerous opportunities to
cause the implementation of the said registration order. Inexplicably, they let this chance passed
by. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on
their rights.12 And speaking of rights, one may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its
pristine purity.13
For another, Jose Mendigoria, Public Lands Inspector and Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, made the
following remarks in his certification dated February 28, 1966:14
10. Remarks: Attached hereto is the certification of the Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds,
Cabanatuan City for ready references in connection with the speedy issuance of patent in favor of
the applicant.
It is informed in this connection that the survey claimants of these Lots, 1341 for Eusebio Perez and
1342 for Valenciano Espiritu could not be located in the locality. The lots were already abandoned
by them so that in the year 1941, the present applicant took possession of the land thru his tenants.
Countering the foregoing certification, petitioner Republic claims that a more recent verification survey
conducted on February 15, 1988 by Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas, also of the Bureau of Lands,
reveals an anomaly in the issuance of Agunoy, Sr.’s Free Patent No. 314450. Again, we quote from
petitioner’s complaint, particularly paragraph 27 (c) thereof, to wit:
c) The results of the verification survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas of the Bureau
of Lands on February 15, 1988 on the premises confirmed the earlier findings of said Office that Lot 1341
Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered by Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 in
the name of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., is identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion of 87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of
the amended Plan Psu-47200 which was surveyed and approved on January 21, 1966 in the name of
Eusebio Perez. It was verified likewise that Lot 1341 is within Barrio Marawa, Jaen, Nueva Ecija.
As between the February 28, 1966 certification of Jose Mendigoria, supra, which led to the issuance of
Agunoy’s OCT No. P-4522 and numerous derivative titles descending therefrom, and the February 15,
1988 verification survey of Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas, cited in the aforequoted paragraph of
petitioner’s complaint, which led to nothing, suffice it to quote herein what this Court has said in PEZA vs.
Fernandez:15
xxx. Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of land registration must be upheld in order
to give stability to it and provide finality to land disputes,
and in Heirs of Brusas vs. Court of Appeals:16
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land and stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered the owner may rest secure without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his
land. Indeed, titles over lands under the Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends
the stability of the country's economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
1ªvvphi1.nét

If at all, the discrepancy in the two (2) separate survey reports of Mendigoria and Mangahas can only be
imputable to either the past or more recent officials of the Bureau of Lands.
Of course, we are well aware of the rule reiterated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Santos,17 that,
generally, the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. In that very
case, however, citing 31 CJS 675-676, we went further by saying -
"xxx. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations xxx, the doctrine
of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals"
In any event, the verification survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas on February 15,
1988 came almost twenty-two (22) years after the February 28, 1966 certification of Jose Mendigoria; more
than twenty-one (21) years after the issuance of Agunoy Sr.’s Free Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967
and its registration as Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 on February 6, 1967; and more than eight (8)
years reckoned from July 31, 1979 when, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. In the meanwhile, for
about half a decade thereafter, ownership over the properties transferred from one buyer to another, with
each and every transferee enjoying the presumption of good faith. If only on this score alone that the
present petition must fall.
There can be no debate at all on petitioner’s submission that no amount of legal technicality may serve as
a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable why petitioner chants
the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.
Significantly, however, in the cases cited by petitioner Republic, 18 as well as in those other cases 19 where
the doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant was applied against a patent and title procured thru fraud
or misrepresentation, we note that the land covered thereby is either a part of the forest zone which is
definitely non-disposable, as in Animas, or that said patent and title are still in the name of the person who
committed the fraud or misrepresentation, as in Acot, Animas, Republic vs. CA and Del
Mundo and Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, et al.and, in either instance, there were yet no innocent third
parties standing in the way.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of
the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their
favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have reechoed in Pino vs.
Court of Appeals20 and the cases21 therein cited:
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a previous illegal
contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here
for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is
simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or
the name indicated by the forger.
It is even worse in this case because here, there is no forger to speak of. The remark of Land Inspector
Jose Mendigoria about the abandonment by Eusebio Perez and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by itself, be
fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may even turn out to be the truth. What petitioner perceives as
fraud may be nothing more than the differences of professional opinions between Land Inspector Jose
Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas. But regardless of who between the two is correct,
the hard reality is that the properties in question are no longer floating objects on a spring that cannot rise
higher than its source, as they are now very much ashore and firmly standing on the high solid ground of
the Torrens system of land registration.1awphi1.nét

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and this petition
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to
review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch 8, of
Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) 3 of Ibajay-Nabas,
Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon
Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the
MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union,
Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP –
060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation
of respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for
the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a
later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February
20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of
Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. 4 On July 9,
1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein
he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her
attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as
mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years
old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land
surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection
from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not
intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico
Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a
decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the
name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI. 7 However, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.8 1awphi1.nét

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. 9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the
Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on
September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in
holding that there is no need for the government’s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain
before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit
had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period. 11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject
land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since
prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close
examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1)
– that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a
bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 13 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court
noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable
and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the
established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the
application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the
subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the
DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the
claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified
as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the
claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and
disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified
1awphi1.nét

as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. 20 It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of
Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it
into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. 22 In the
case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the
ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration
proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership
going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to
vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting
point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural
lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that
"alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the
same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only
after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 25 There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. 26 With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and
thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register
the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over
fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
as correctly accomplished by the lower courts. l^vvphi1.net

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the
concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the
assertion—shown earlier to be unfounded—that there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership
prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the
right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of
the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the
factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the
existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations
executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that
of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed
beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion of respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner
to surrender the owner's duplicate of the certificates of title in her possession.
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint 1 for specific performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP)
docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937. Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an
Absolute Deed of Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at Tandang Sora,
Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The parties stipulated in the deed of
sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five
(45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its
obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay damages to INK.
IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the
purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.
On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that there was actually no
genuine issue as to any material fact.
On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and on 7 October 1991 an amended
partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except the prayer for damages which was to be
resolved later.
On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the
certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its
name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of
petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated requests.
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the ground that the IDP was not
served copy of the motion, and the ownership of the INK over the property was still in issue since
rescission was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim. She prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be
granted, the Register of Deeds be directed after registration to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of the
new certificates of title to her.
On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court because the motion involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she was not made a party
to the main case.
On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the
owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in open court for the registration of the
Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of
petitioner on the new transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK. 2
On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court reconsidered its order by directing her to
deliver the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 3
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the two (2)
orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders
of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in ruling that it had jurisdiction over
petitioner; (b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even as they violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a
single cause of action and forum-shopping; (c) in holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled
to registration of its ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of the
owner's copies of the certificates of title.
Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance by the trial court of the order of 2
March 1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for intervention informing said court that the sale of
the properties was not executed by it but was made possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale
is void. The trial court denied the motion since jurisdiction over the incident properly belonged to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith, IDP brought the matter before the
SEC which later declared that the sale of the properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this favorable
decision in similarly seeking the nullification of the questioned orders of the trial court.
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless
the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon
order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or
fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a
new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a
new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the
registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered
by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate
of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to
the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any
person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a
new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the
outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the
annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
Such new, certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the former
law, Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, and all jurisprudence interpreting the
former law had established that summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of owner's
duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed with and granted by the Regional
Trial Court sitting as a land registration court if there was unanimity among the parties or there was no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case became
contentious and controversial it should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the
incident properly belonged.4
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The above provision has
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial
courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed
after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.5
The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court was for specific
performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well within the exclusive
jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. 6 When IDP, the defendant in the trial court, did not question the
genuineness and validity of said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued
by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of
the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the
deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. When
the sale of the property was upheld by the court in its judgment and the defendant was directed to comply
with its terms and conditions, the right of INK to have the same registered with the Register of Deeds could
not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct
the surrender of the certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, they
may therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction. 7 Even while Sec. 107 of P.D.
1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as
incident therein the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title to be
surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the principal action. 8 This principle is based
on expediency and in accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in the certificates of
title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to
the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way
prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates
of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. This
is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly
and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable from the property
mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists
notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all
subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the
consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the property. 9 It is clear therefore that
the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court
will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a new action in
order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations where
no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be avoided. Courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. The rules are intended to
insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of the higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the
parties' substantive rights. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its
HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C.
DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON,
ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS,
FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately
173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," 1 on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim,
according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as
Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of
Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. 2

Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and
rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the
Supreme Court, 3 in connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183
[1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145
SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and
Orphans Association, Inc.(WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court
of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985];
and Director of lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994] 4 terminated the controversy as to ownership of
lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the
land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end,
Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the
modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the
same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties,
continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of
no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be
laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. 5 [Cited cases
omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein
writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate's claim of
ownership over this vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of possession and/or
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision 7 dated July 7, 1989, the
dispositive portion 8 of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the
defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff
 to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
and for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages and with
a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial
administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo,
Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R Soliven,
Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S.
Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol
Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the
aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of
the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624,
279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original Certificate of
Title No. 614 9 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original
Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and
possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and
through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the
Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation
to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and
(4) that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25,
1894 which covers the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated
April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. 10
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO,
Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for
improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action
considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic
Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 12
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following
grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land
covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136,
covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled "In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its
dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System
by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner estate interposed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and
the lower court's decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court
ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the
proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens
system hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the
Titulo titled lands of private individuals;
 (4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as
correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and
Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not
declaring the same as null and
void. 16
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the
present petition 17 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a
petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
which eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.
The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect
and that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions
involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void
and of no force and effect.
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any acts of
possession or ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered
by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within
twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the
estate which had come into their possession or knowledge under oath.
7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the
presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.
The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting and inventory of the
presentation of movants-intervenors' evidence as well as the consideration of all other
incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a.m.
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-
administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners was
received by the lower court without any opposition. 21
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro
as Administrator of the subject estate. 22
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting
of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters of
administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to
the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which properties of the estate
are located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon
City. 24
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about by
various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the
subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of
the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the
TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court
proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496,
which is not true in the proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136
as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs
have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the
ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of
inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far
submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and
cannot be legally considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the
petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of
valid adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in State
ownership.25
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings. 26
On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was dismissed
by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
 WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby
DISMISSES the "Opposition" dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15,
1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are
ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed in
Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof. 27
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
Republic. 28
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately 214,047
quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon,
Quezon City and Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon,
Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo
Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased,
consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said
above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,
excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under
the Torrens System, by private persons, or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its
instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government as reservations for
public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions
thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the Administrator
and duly approved by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter be set
aside, after due consideration on a case to case basis, of various motions to set aside the
said Court order which approved the said sales, quit-claims, and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co- administrator, is hereby revoked to take
effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the
responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose
appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is
hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate,
consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San
Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or
to take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice,
government offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the
estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a
project of partition of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the
projected urban land reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land
reform program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the
government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.
No Costs.
 SO ORDERED. 29
On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30

On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of
the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the Republic filed its
Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said petition. 31
After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the
aforestated Order 32 dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasao's decision
dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and
effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and
alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republic's motion for
reconsideration which was merelypro forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of
the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased
Mariano San Pedro. 33
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs. 34 In affirming the
assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Priopriedad No. 4136 null and void. The
appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title;
(b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish
title under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance
of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land
Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by invoking certain
cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of
Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 35
Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to
consolidate both cases on September 15,
1994. 3 7
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention which we
denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was
denied due process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court
grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower court's null and void
judgment.38
In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a question
of title or ownership over which the lower court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and
over the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners. 39
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez
setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby
acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and
decision of Judges of equal rank. 40
 Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge
Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of
Judge Bagasao, both of which were already final. 41
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was
appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence,
thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal. 42
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before
Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez
who never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guide title over
Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme
Court upholding the Guido title. 43
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners'
Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court's resolution of the question of ownership of
the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the
issue of whether or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and
effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the
petition for letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan,
Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate court" 44 to resolve the question of title or ownership raised
by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. 45
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that
petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the
estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness
and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower
court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of
the State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased. 46
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are
due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of
wills. We held in the case of Maniñgat v. Castillo, 4 7 that "the main function of a probate court is to settle
and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration."
Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased
so as to rule on whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of
distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:
. . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased
maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without
prejudice to third persons . . .
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties
ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for
letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case
of Garcia v. Garcia 49 that:
. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through
the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said
properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory
submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits
which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this
duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of
 the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or
person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court's attention to the
fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise
the court's duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations
should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to
the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
the said properties. 50 [Emphasis Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error
when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April
25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands
covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of November
17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the
public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners
thus dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his
predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C.
Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded without authority and/or
jurisdiction.51
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a
newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the
evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied.
The "reviewing judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact
that the judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason
to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal." 52 In
the case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez
bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting aside
Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez' disposition of
the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus
on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No. 106496 committed reversible error in
excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered
by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal
force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R.
Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove
ownership by the Late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act 53 within
six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, non-
compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be
countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 56
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
Sec. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all
lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be
considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
 Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage
Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Act. 3344.
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of
public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been
perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of
dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and
litigations between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands,
on the one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles
or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property ownership and
threatening the peace and order renditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system
has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of
the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership
unless accompanied by proof of actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the System of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings
under the Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took cognizance of this Decree
and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles
taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution
subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was
brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time
and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land
registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered
the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and
authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision,
emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence
of private ownership in the special proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the
Titulo, to wit:
The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the
nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the pendency
of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying
portions of the so-called estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and
religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the
gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and
unsuspecting victims. 60
In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial
administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance
with damages in G.R No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978
in support of the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been
set aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts'
holding in G.R No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the
private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system
is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892.
We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its
genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs were not able to
present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special
proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh.
"Q-RP") to produce it as requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate
estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove
their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the
Spanish term is 'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither
properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or
reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence.
Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in
unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a
writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:
Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed — When the original writing
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and
loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.
Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody. — If the writing be
in the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the
contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not
necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or
withheld by the adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as
photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that
the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy
submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an
inadmissible piece of evidence. 61
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due
execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced
was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact
extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case
of Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 62 we pointed out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows:
 existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. 63
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his
decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report
dated January 28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat
copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca Registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4,
1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's April 1978 decision
correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures
of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo
itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the
Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished
counsel for the government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo
propiedad 4136.
COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think the question of counsel is
already answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the due
existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the
question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the testimony
of this witness for the government to the effect that there is actually in
existence titulo propiedad 4136; we are asking the question candidly to the
government counsel whether he is prepared to state that there is really in
existence such titulo propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this court that there was such a document
examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and
Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic. 64
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement that the
Titulo is of dubious validity:
. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977
(Exhibit "O-RP") concluded that the document contained material alterations as follows:
a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2, Title," the word "Pinagcamaligan" was
written after "Pulo;"
b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to "mil;"
c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the end of "tres" in "tres mil;"
d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil" was written after "setentay tres;"
e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a semblance of "uni;" and
 f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the titulo. According to
Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still "pieces of black ashes around the rings of the
portions which are indications of burnings". The burnings were made on the very portions
where there were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the
burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act. 65
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et a1. 66 Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera, in reinstating the trial court's judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
. . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of
Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly
increase the area and change the location of the land described in the original title . . .
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower court's
analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court.
Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP") was issued to
the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other
interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one
produced the titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the
Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence.
It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain
Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not
be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the
claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the Court
order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are unknown or that
there are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the
original would be adverse if
produced. 67
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate estate, the
petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary
evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the
same acquires no probative value. 68
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel
M. Muñoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al. 69 is enlightening. In said
case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., (PIADECO), claimed
to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and
San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its
ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the
Titulo is of doubtful validity, 70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed
facts. First. The Title embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon,
and Quezon City." Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan,
and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries
desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of
land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity
of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1,
8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51
Phil. 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a
Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare
or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The
fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying
lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder to
Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by
its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its "Opposition" of
May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p.
48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's land,
Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these
proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on
the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the
Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized
adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment — showing the location,
boundaries and area of land applied for — were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administration Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the
assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment
at one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on
September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 ( Ibid.).
If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then,
seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October
26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arids lands, 500 hectares of land
with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154;
Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26,
1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable
error up to 5%. Ponce, op cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again
that Piadeco's Titulois held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894),
published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28).
That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for
those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law (Ibid.).
Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by
Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888,
which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established
by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents
which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either
dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its
rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation — not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188)
we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto
de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This
transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don
Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the
land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration
was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria
Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the
land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a
 certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to
Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don
Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to
himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was
paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian
Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco
was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed
out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 71 we categorically
enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any
probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated
February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R No. 69343. On
March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the issue
of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muñoz case,
we had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In
both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before
this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court explained the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:
. . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action
and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in
one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination
of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue
and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity
of cause of action is not required by merely identity of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The
Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the
petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the probate court consisted
solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net estate" to speak of after the
Titulo's exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain,
Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" — De
Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2" — Dela Cruz). 73 Under the Torrens system of registration, the
titles of private respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final
decree. 74 More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens
system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast
estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they
failed to prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own
counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to
substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is
null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client. 76The
records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to
prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was
not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 77 we held:
 It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client.
This negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may,
such mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by
the mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the
application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto
be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against
the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported
claim that the petitioner bad been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an
explanation to that effect.
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were denied
due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without
recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to
apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within
six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as
evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings
under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded
under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling
land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in
the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired
ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San
Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated
May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino's motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the
aforementioned bonds were not included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then
administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could
be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of
the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B,
should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or
ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately
vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.