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G.R. No.

L-48006 July 8, 1942 damages was instituded not only against the
driver but the operator of the taxi.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs. Issue: Wether or not the operator could be
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA charged in a separate case regarding the
ALMARIO, respondents. negligence of the taxi driver?
RULING:
(Article 1162, Quasi-delict)
Authorities support the proposition that
FACTS: a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a
At about half past one in the morning of May separate legal institution under the Civil Code
3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and with a substantivity all its own, and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head- individuality that is entirely apart and
on collision between a taxi of the Malate independent from delict or crime. Upon this
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a principle and on the wording and spirit article
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
carretela was overturned, and one of its responsibility of employers may be safely
passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, anchored
suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against ART 1902. Any person who by an act or
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of omission causes damage to another by his
Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to fault or negligence shall be liable for the
an indeterminate sentence of one year and damage so done.
one day to two years of prision
correccional.The Court of Appeals affirmed ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal next preceding article is enforcible, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for
case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
those of persons for whom another is
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939,
responsible
brought an action in the Court of First Instance
of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
Owners or directors of an establishment or
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer business are equally liable for any damages
of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the caused by their employees while engaged in
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded the branch of the service in which employed,
damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 or on occasion of the performance of their
plus legal interest from the date of the duties.
complaint. This decision was modified by the
Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to At this juncture, it should be said that the
P1,000 with legal interest from the time the primary and direct responsibility of employers
action was instituted. It is undisputed that and their presumed negligence are principles
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the calculated to protect society. Workmen and
mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side employees should be carefully chosen and
of the road, and at high speed. . It is admitted supervised in order to avoid injury to the
that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There public. It is the masters or employers who
is proof that he exercised the diligence of a principally reap the profits resulting from the
good father of a family to prevent damage. In services of these servants and employees. It
fact it is shown he was careless in employing is but right that they should guarantee the
latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
Fontanilla who had been caught several times
patrimonial safety of others. Hence making
for violation of the Automobile Law and
Barredo liable.
speeding violation. Public Works available to
be public and to himself. Hence a civil case for
the trip was nonetheless ratified by the
company's board of directors, and that in any
G.R. No. L-25172 May 24, 1974 event under the by-laws he had the discretion,
as general manager, to authorize the trip
LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner, which was for the company's benefit..
vs.
ANTONIO R. DE JOYA, respondent. A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the
respondent against Vicente Araneta, the
(Article 1162, Quasi-delict) petitioner and Ricardo Taylor. The respondent
proved that Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of
the firm, signed a check representing the
FACTS:
company's share of the transportation
expense of Taylor to the United States, and
Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, that a series of payroll checks from
then general manager of the Ace Advertising, September 15, 1953 to December 31, 1953,
proposed to the board of directors that an
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inclusive, which included the salaries of
employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the Taylor, was signed by Vicente Araneta and the
United States to take up special studies in petitioner who is a vice-president of the
television. The board, however, failed to act company. Both Aranetas disowned any
on the proposal. Nevertheless, in September personal liability, claiming that they signed the
1953 the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J. checks in good faith as they were approved
Antonio Araneta, a company director, inquired by the respondent
about the trip and was assured by the
respondent that Taylor's expenses would be
Issue: Whether or not the two other officials
defrayed not by the company but by other
who signed the checks be jointly liable with De
parties. This was thereafter confirmed by the
Joya?
respondent in a memorandum.
RULING:
While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to
March 15, 1954, Taylor continued to receive
his salaries. The items corresponding to his The basic legal issue is whether the petitioner
salaries appeared in vouchers prepared upon is guilty of a quasi-delict as held below.
the orders of, and approved by, the
respondent and were included in the semi- The petitioner's assertion that he signed the
monthly payroll checks for the employees of questioned payroll checks in good faith has
the corporation. The petitioner signed three of not been substantiated, he in particular not
these checks on November 27, December 15 having testified or offered testimony to prove
and December 29, 1953. The others were such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his
signed by either the respondent, or Vicente being a vice-president and director of the Ace
Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part Advertising, the petitioner remained passive,
of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad,
handed him letters for delivery in the United concerning the unauthorized disbursements of
States. The Ace Advertising disbursed corporate funds for the latter. This plus the
P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's fact that he even approved thrice payroll
travel and studies. checks for the payment of Taylor's salary,
demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner
On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a neglected to perform his duties properly, to the
complaint with the court of first instance of damage of the firm of which he was an
Manila against the respondent for recovery of officer.The existence of a contract between
the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the parties, as has been repeatedly held by
the trip was made without its knowledge, this Court, constitutes no bar to the
authority or ratification. The respondent, in his commission of a tort by one against the other
answer, denied the charge and claimed that and the consequent recovery of damages. 2
G.R. No. L-49852 October 19, 1989

EMILIA TENGCO, petitioner, RULING:


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN Under the circumstances, the refusal to
CIFRA JR., respondents. accept the proffered rentals is not without
justification. The ownership of the property
(Article 1169, Mora accipiendi) had been transferred to the private
respondent and the person to whom payment
was offered had no authority to accept
payment. It should be noted that the contract
FACTS: of lease between the petitioner and Lutgarda
Cifra, the former owner of the land, was not in
writing and, hence, unrecorded. The Court
Herein private respondent, Benjamin Cifra, Jr.,
has held that a contract of lease executed by
claiming to be the owner of the premises at
the vendor, unless recorded, ceases to have
No. 164 Int Gov. Pascual St., Navotas, Metro
effect when the property is sold, in the
Manila, which he had leased to the herein
absence of a contrary agreement. The
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petitioner, Emilia Tengco, filed an action for


petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the
unlawful detainer with the Municipal Court of
transfer of ownerhip of the property because,
Navotas, Metro Manila, docketed therein as
by her own account, Aurora Recto and the
Civil Case No. 2092, to evict the petitioner,
private respondent, at various times, had
Emilia Tengco, from the said premises for her
informed her of their respective claims to
alleged failure to comply with the terms and
ownership of the property occupied by the
conditions of the lease contract by failing and
petitioner. The petitioner should have
refusing to pay the stipulated rentals despite
tendered payment of the rentals to the private
repeated demands. Petitioner's excuse for her
respondent and if that was not possible, she
non-payment of the rentals on the premises
should have consigned such rentals in court.
deserves scant consideration. If, indeed, her
Hence petitioners contention is bereft of merit.
offer to settle her obligation was refused by
private respondent, she should have resorted
to the judicial deposit of the amount due in
order to release her from responsibility.
Sometime in May, 1976, petitioner received a
letter (Exh. 1) from Aurora C. Recto, sister of
private respondent, informing the former that
the latter, was the owner of the property in
question, was offering the same for
sale.Sometime later, or in August 1977,
petitioner received another letter, this time
from the private respondent, demanding the
surrender of the possession of the premises in
question, also claiming to be the owner of the
property. The petitioner offered payment to the
collector designated by the sister of the
respondent yet it was refused without any
justfication.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such action should be barred


by delay/mora accipiendi when respondent
refused to accept the tendered payment?
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.
RULING:
G.R. No. L-12191, 14 October 1918
There is no contributory negligence on behalf
of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court provides
(Article 1172, Negligence)
some test that may find the contributory
negligence of a person. Was there anything in
FACTS: the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at
the time he alighted from the train which
Jose Cangco was in the employment of would have admonished a person of average
Manila Railroad Company. He lived in the prudence that to get off the train under the
pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, conditions then existing was dangerous? If so,
which is located upon the line of the the plaintiff should have desisted from
defendant railroad company; and in coming alighting; and his failure so to desist was
daily by train to the company’s office in the contributory negligence.
city of Manila where he worked, he used a
pass, supplied by the company, which entitled Alighting from a moving train while it is
him to ride upon the company’s trains free of slowing down is a common practice and a lot
charge. of people are doing so every day without
suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and
During his ride in the train he arose from his agility of young manhood, and it was by no
seat and makes his way to the exit while the means so risky for him to get off while the
train is still on travel. When the train has train was yet moving as the same act would
proceeded a little farther Jose Cangco step have been in an aged or feeble person. He
down into the cement platform but was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of
unfortunately step in to a sack of watermelon, watermelons were there as there were no
fell down and rolled under the platform and appropriate warnings and the place was dimly
was drawn under the moving car which lit.
resulting to his arm to be crashed and
lacerated. He was rushed to the hospital and Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or
sued the company and the employee who put negligence of the obligor consists in the
the sack of watermelon in the platform. omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ with the circumstances of that persons, of the
clock on the dark night. It is that time of the time and of the place. When negligence
year that may we considered as season to shows bad faith, the provisions of Article 1171
harvest watermelon explaining why there are and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
sacks of watermelon in the platform. The
plaintiff contends that it is the negligence of In the case the proximate cause of the
the Manila Railroad Co. on why they let their accident is the lack of diligence of the
employees put a hindrance in the platform company to inform their employees to not put
that may cause serious accident. The any hindrance in the platform like sacks of
defendant answered that it is the lack of watermelon. The contract of defendant to
diligence on behalf of the plaintiff alone on transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication,
why he did not wait for the train to stop before the duty to carry him in safety and to provide
alighting the train. safe means of entering and leaving its trains
(civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
ISSUE: Whether or not the company is liable contractual, was direct and immediate, and its
or there is a contributory negligence on behalf non-performance could not be excused by
of the plaintiff. proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company
is liable for damages against Cangco. ISSUE:

G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988


Whether or not the award of the moral,
compensatory and exemplary damages is
TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS/PHILIPPINE
proper.
WIRELESS, INC., petitioner,
vs. RULING:
IGNACIO CASTRO, SR., SOFIA C. Yes, there was a contract between
CROUCH, IGNACIO CASTRO JR., AURORA the petitioner and private respondent Sofia C.
CASTRO, SALVADOR CASTRO, MARIO Crouch whereby, for a fee, petitioner
CASTRO, CONRADO CASTRO,
undertook to send said private respondent's
ESMERALDA C. FLORO, AGERICO
message overseas by telegram. Petitioner
CASTRO, ROLANDO CASTRO, VIRGILIO
CASTRO AND GLORIA CASTRO, and failed to do this despite performance by said
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE private respondent of her obligation by paying
COURT, respondents. the required charges. Petitioner was therefore
guilty of contravening its and is thus liable for
(Article 1170, Contravention of Tenor) damages. This liability is not limited to actual
or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner's
FACTS: contrary position in this regard would result in
an inequitous situation where petitioner will
The petitioner is a company engaged in
only be held liable for the actual cost of a
transmitting telegrams. The plaintiffs are the
children and spouse of Consolacion Castro telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago.Art. 1170
who died in the Philippines. One of the of the Civil Code provides that "those who in
plaintiffs, Sofia sent a telegram thru Telefast to the performance of their obligations are guilty
her father and other siblings in the USA to of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who
inform about the death of their mother. in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
Unfortunately, the deceased had already been are liable for damages." Art. 2176 also
interred but not one from the relatives abroad provides that "whoever by act or omission
was able to pay their last respects. Sofia causes damage to another, there being fault
found out upon her return in the US that the or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
telegram was never received. Hence the suit damage done." Award of Moral,
for damages on the ground of breach of compensatory and exemplary damages is
contract. The defendant-petitioner argues that proper. The petitioner's act or omission, which
it should only pay the actual amount paid to it. amounted to gross negligence, was precisely
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
the cause of the suffering private respondents
and awarded compensatory, moral,
had to undergo. Art. 2217 of the Civil Code
exemplary, damages to each of the plaintiffs
with 6% interest p.a. plus attorney’s fees. The states: "Moral damages include physical
Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling but suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
modified and eliminated the compensatory anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
damages to Sofia and exemplary damages to feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
each plaintiff, it also reduced the moral similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
damages for each. The petitioner appealed computation, moral damages may be
contending that, it can only be held liable for P recovered if they are the proximate results of
31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. the defendant's wrongful act or omission The
Crouch for the telegram that was never sent to award of exemplary damages by the trial court
the addressee, and that the moral damages is likewise justified for each of the private
should be removed since defendant's respondents, as a warning to all telegram
negligent act was not motivated by "fraud, companies to observe due diligence in
malice or recklessness. transmitting the messages of their customers.
could not have been prevented and forseen
hence making them not liable.
National Power Corporation
vs
Honrable Court of Appeals ISSUE:
(Article 1174, Fortuitious Event)
Whether or not such event suffered by the
pondowners is a fortuitious event?

FACTS: RULING:

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) NPC staunchly asserts that the damages, if
is a government-owned and controlled any, were due to a fortuitous event. Again, we
corporation created under Commonwealth Act cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead
No. 120, as amended.It is tasked to undertake to the findings and opinions expressed by the
the development of hydroelectric generations Court of Appeals that NPC cannot escape
of power and the production of electricity from liability on the mere excuse that the rise of
nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as water was due to heavy rains that were acts of
well as the transmission of electric power on a God. The rainy season is an expected
nationwide basis. On 15 November 1973, the occurrence and the NPC cannot stop doing its
Office of the President of the Philippines duty when the rains fall. In fact, it is during
issued Memorandum Order No. 398 - these critical times that the NPC needs to be
"Prescribing Measures to Preserve the Lake vigilant to make sure that the lake level does
Lanao Watershed, To Enforce the Reservation not exceed the maximum level. Indeed,
of Areas Around the Lake Below Seven negligence or imprudence is human factor
Hundred And Two Meters Elevation, and for which makes the whole occurrence
Other Purposes." Said decree instructed the humanized, as it were, and removed from the
NPC to build the Agus Regulation Dam at the rules applicable to acts of God. Furthermore
mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur, at a the Regulation dam was established for the
normal maximum water level of Lake Lanao NPC to regulate the amount of waterflow in
at 702 meters elevation. Pursuant thereto, the river. Also the provisions of the
petitioner built and operated the said dam in Presidential decree has made mention that
1978. Private respondents Hadji Abdul Carim the purpose of such “regulation dam” are as
Abdullah and Caris Abdullah were owners of follows: (1) to maintain the normal maximum
fishponds in Barangay Bacong, Municipality of lake elevation at 702 meters, and (2) to build
Marantao, Lanao del Sur. All of these benchmarks to warn the inhabitants in the
fishponds were sited along the Lake Lanao area that cultivation of land below said
shore. In October and November of 1986, all elevation is forbidden. We should take note
the improvements were washed away when that the constructed dam is under the
the water level of the lake escalated and the jurisdiction and control of the NPC thus
subject lakeshore area was flooded. Private making them liable for such short comings.
respondents blamed the inundation on the
Agus Regulation Dam built and operated by
the NPC in 1978. They theorized that NPC
failed to increase the outflow of water even as
the water level of the lake rose due to the
heavy rains. Hence urging the constitutients to
file a case for damages and compensation
against the NPC. NPC insist that such
damage was due to a fortuitious event which
CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC., 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was
liable to the [petitioner] for the amount
vs. of P49,925.51 which was the value of the
damaged pairs of denim pants and demanded
COURT OF APPEAL AND NORMA SIAPNO refund of the aforesaid amount. Filed a case
against the petitioner for the collection of the
principal amount of P76,410.00-CA
(Article 1175, Usurious Transactions)
promulgated a decision awarding her the
sum of P76,140.00 with interest thereon at
FACTS: 12%per annum, to be counted from the filing
of this complaint on January 8, 1981, until fully
During the period from February 1979 to April paid
1979, the [herein petitioner], which was
engaged in the export of girls denim pants, ISSUE:
contracted the services of the [respondent],
the sole proprietress of the DWilmar Whether or not the 12% interest as awarded
Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of by the Court of Appeals was proper?
assorted girls[] denims supplied by the
[petitioner] under Purchase Orders Nos. 1404, RULING:
dated February 15, 1979, 0430 dated
February 1, 1979, 1453 dated April 30,
The rate of interest shall be six percent (6%)
1979. The [petitioner] was obliged to pay the
per annum, computed from the time of the
[respondent], for her services, in the total
filing of the Complaint in the trial court until
amount of P76,410.00. The [respondent]
the finality of the judgment. If the adjudged
sew[ed] the materials and delivered the same
principal and the interest (or any parts
to the [petitioner] which acknowledged the
thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the
same per Delivery Receipt Nos. 0030, dated
interest rate shall be twelve percent
February 9, 1979; 0032, dated February 15,
(12%) per annum computed from the time
1979; 0033 dated February 21, 1979; 0034,
the judgment becomes final and executory
dated February 24, 1979; 0036, dated
until it is fully satisfied. Interest shall be
February 20, 1979; 0038, dated March 11,
computed in accordance with the stipulation
1979[;] 0039, dated March 24, 1979; 0040
of the parties. In the absence of such
dated March 27, 1979; 0041, dated March 29,
agreement, the rate shall be twelve percent
1979; 0044, dated Marc[h] 25, 1979; 0101
(12%) per annum when the obligation arises
dated May 18, 1979[;] 0037, dated March 10,
out of a loan or a forbearance of money, goods
1979 and 0042 dated March 10, 1979, in good
or credits. In other cases, it shall be six
order condition. At first, the [respondent] was
percent (6%). In this case, because the
told that the sewing of some of the pants was
amount due arose from a contract for a
defective. She offered to take delivery of the
piece of work, not from a loan or
defective pants. However, she was later told
forbearance of money, the legal interest of
by [petitioner]s representative that the goods
six percent (6%) per annum should be
were already good. She was told to just return
applied. Furthermore, since the amount
for her check of P76,410.00. However, the
of the demand could be established with
[petitioner] failed to pay her the aforesaid
certainty when the Complaint was filed, the
amount. This prompted her to hire the
six percent (6%) interest should be computed
services of counsel who, on November 12,
from the filing of the said Complaint. But after
1979, wrote a letter to the [petitioner]
the judgment becomes final and executory
demanding payment of the aforesaid amount
until the obligation is satisfied, the interest
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. On
should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%)
February 7, 1990, the [petitioner]s [v]ice-
per year. - Thus, the rate of interest shall be
[p]resident-[c]omptroller, wrote a letter to
six percent (6%) per annum, computed
[respondent]s counsel, averring, inter alia, that
from the time of the filing of the
the pairs of jeans sewn by her, numbering
Complaint in the trial court until the
finality of the judgment. If the adjudged
principal and the interest (or any parts
thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest
rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time the
judgment becomes final and executory
until it is fully satisfied. The appeal is granted