Hilton vs.

Guyot
(1895)

FACTS: Guyot, a Frenchman, sued Hilton, an American, in a French court for the
recovery of a sum of money. The French court rendered judgment in favor of Guyot.
Plaintiff brought the action to a US court to recover the sum of money adjudged by the
French court to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment of a foreign nation’s court entitled to full credit and
has a conclusive effect when sued to other nation.

HELD: No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force
within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree
shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation depends upon the
comity of nations.

A foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon another nation,
but is a prima facie evidence only of the claim.
William Gemperle v. Helen Schenker
19 SCRA 45 (1967)

Facts:
Paul Schenker, a swiss citizen and resident, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a complaint against Gemperle through his wife, Helen Schenker, for the
enforcement of subscription to shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co.
Inc., among others.
As a response, Gemperle filed a suit against Paul for damages, saying that Paul
caused allegations to be published attacking his reputation and bringing him into
public hatred and discredit as a businessman.
The CFI dismissed the case against Paul Schenker for lack of jurisdiction, he being a
swiss citizen, over the person of the defendant because he is beyond the reach of the
magistracy of the Philippine courts.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.

Held:
Jurisdiction was acquired by the lower court over the person of Paul through service of
summons addressed to him upon Helen Schenker, it appearing from the answer that
she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband in the civil case.

Pennoyer v. Neff
Facts: Attorney John H. Mitchell provided legal services to Marcus Neff in connection
with a land grant in the state of Oregon. Mitchell later sued Neff in an Oregon state
court to recover unpaid legal fees. Neff no longer lived in Oregon and was apparently
now living in California. Since Neff lived out of state, the Oregon state court allowed
Mitchell to “serve” Neff with notice of the suit by posting an advertisement in a local
newspaper. This is called “substituted service by publication.” In accordance with a
state law allowing for service be made by publication of summons, Mitchell published
a notice in a local newspaper regarding the lawsuit. When Neff failed to appear in
court, Mitchell won a default judgment.
After Neff’s land in Oregon was seized to satisfy the judgment, Mitchell purchased it at
public auction. He subsequently assigned it to Sylvester Pennoyer. Nine years later,
Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court to recover his land.
Issue: Whether jurisdiction over Neff was acquired by the court of Oregon.
Held: No. The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect
independent, many of the right and powers which originally belonged to them being
now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained
and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of
independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are
applicable to them.
1) One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence,
every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its
inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the forms and
solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations
arising from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and their
obligations enforced; and also the regulate the manner and conditions upon which
property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired,
enjoyed, and transferred.
2) The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is,
that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory. Story, Confl. Laws, c. 2; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 2.
The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one
implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an
elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its
territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it
can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property
to its decisions. ‘Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit,’ says Story, ‘is
a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any other
tribunals.’
Direct power of one sovereign (one State) does not extend outside of the borders of that
state. So service outside Oregon did not matter.
Since, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Neff and his land, the selling of his
land was void. Mitchell acquired no right over the land, following the principle of nemo
dat quad non habet, Pennoyer also never got a good title over it.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
Facts
The plaintiff, the State of Washington, established a tax on employers conducting
business therein with the stated legislative purpose of providing a fund to be used for
financial assistance to newly unemployed workers in the state. The tax was in effect a
mandatory contribution to the state's Unemployment Compensation Fund. The
defendant, International Shoe Co., was an American company that was incorporated
in Delaware with its principal place of business ("PPB") in Missouri. The corporation
had maintained for some time a staff of 11-13 salesmen in the State of Washington,
working on commission. The salesmen were residents of that state and they met with
prospective customers in motels and hotels, and occasionally rented space to put up
displays. The company thus had no permanent "situs" of business in the State. Each
year, the salesmen brought in about $31,000 in compensation. International Shoe's
solicitation system allegedly was set up explicitly to avoid establishing the situs of the
business in other states insofar as salesman did not have offices, did not negotiate
prices, and sent all orders back to Missouri; shipments from the plant to customers
were sent f.o.b. Washington state filed suit and engaged in service of process (legal
process to ensure a person is given notice of a suit) with International Shoe by
personally serving a member of the sales staff and sending a copy of the summons, via
registered mail, to the company's place of business in Missouri. The company sent
attorneys to the court for the limited purpose of objecting to the court's jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not there existed sufficient contacts between the defendant, International
Shoe Co., and Washington, the forum state (the state attempting to enforce
jurisdiction) for it to sue the out-of-state corporation and submit it to its process of
service.
Ruling:
The issue involved a determination of the level of connection that must exist between a
non-resident corporation and a state in order for that corporation to be sued within
that state. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (and
in which Justice Robert Jackson did not participate), held that in view of 26 U.S.C. §
1606(a) (providing that no person shall be relieved from compliance with a state law
requiring payments to an unemployment fund on the ground that he is engaged in
interstate commerce) the fact that the corporation is engaged in interstate commerce
does not relieve it from liability for payments to the state unemployment compensation
fund. The activities in behalf of the corporation render it amenable to suit in courts of
the State to recover payments due to the state unemployment compensation fund. The
activities in question established sufficient contacts or ties between the State and the
corporation to make it reasonable and just, and in conformity to the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the State to enforce against the
corporation an obligation arising out of such activities. In such a suit to recover
payments due to the unemployment compensation fund, service of process upon one
of the corporation's salesmen within the State, and notice sent by registered mail to
the corporation at its home office, satisfies the requirements of due process. The tax
imposed by the state unemployment compensation statute—construed by the state
court, in its application to the corporation, as a tax on the privilege of employing
salesmen within the State—does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In reaching its decision the Court stated that throughout American
history, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam has been grounded
on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment
personally binding him. But now that the capias ad respondendumhas given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that, in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Justice Hugo Blackwrote a separate opinion, agreeing with the outcome in this
case, but contending that the Court has excessively restricted the power of states to
find jurisdiction over companies doing business therein.
The court held that there were sufficient minimal contacts, which did not violate
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, for the State of Washington to
sue the out-of-state corporation and submit it to its process of service.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)
FACTS:
Appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, is the owner of one share of stock
in the Greyhound Corp., a business incorporated under the laws of Delaware with
its principal place of business in Phoenix, Ariz.
Appellee filed a shareholder's derivative suit in a Delaware Chancery Court, naming
as defendants a corporation and its subsidiary, as well as 28 present or former
corporate officers or directors, alleging that the individual defendants had violated
their duties to the corporation by causing it and its subsidiary to engage in
actions (which occurred in Oregon) that resulted in corporate liability for
substantial damages in a private antitrust suit and a large fine in a criminal
contempt action. Simultaneously, appellee filed a motion for sequestration of the
Delaware property of the individual defendants, all nonresidents of Delaware,
accompanied by an affidavit identifying the property to be sequestered as stock,
options, warrants, and various corporate rights of the defendants. A sequestration
order was issued pursuant to which shares and options belonging to 21 defendants
(appellants) were "seized" and "stop transfer" orders were placed on the corporate
books.
ISSUE:
Is it proper for Delaware to assert jurisdiction over appellants based solely as it is on
the statutory presence of appellants' property in Delaware? No.
RULING:
The Delaware courts based their assertion of jurisdiction in this case solely on
the statutory presence of appellants' property in Delaware. Yet that property is
not the subject matter of this litigation, nor is the underlying cause of action
related to the property. Appellants' holdings in Greyhound do not, therefore,
provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the jurisdiction of that State's
courts over appellants. If it exists, that jurisdiction must have some other
foundation.
Appellants, who were not required to acquire interests in Greyhound in order to
hold their positions, did not, by acquiring those interests, surrender their right
to be brought to judgment only in States with which they had had "minimum
contacts."
The Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding
a judgment . . . against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations."
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS vs. MAMERTO ROXAS, ET AL.
On July 5, 1938, Eugene Arthur Perkins filed a complaint in the Court of First Instace
of Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of the
sum of P71,379.90, consisting of dividends which have been declared and made
payable on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being
withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and
disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others.
In its answer, the company alleged that the withholding of Eugene's right to the
disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to
said shares by Idonah Slade Perkins and by one George H. Engelhard.
Eugene thus included in his complaint as parties defendants Idonah and Engelhard,
and prayed that Idonah and Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of
stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Thereafter,
summons by publication were served upon the non-resident defendants, Idonah and
Engelhard.
Engelhard filed his answer, while Idonah filed an answer with a cross-complaint in
which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against Eugene from the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole
legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in
question together with all the cash dividends declared thereon by Benguet
Consolidated.
Idonah then filed a demurrer on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction of the
subject of the action," because the alleged judgment of the New York SC is res
judicata.
ISSUE: WON, in view of the alleged judgment by the New York SC, the local court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in the case filed by Eugene Perkins.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The local court has jurisdiction.
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and
of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority
specially conferred. Eugene Perkins’ action calls for the adjudication of title to certain
shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated, and the granting of affirmative reliefs,
which fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Similarly, the Court of First Instance of Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several
demands contained in Idonah Perkins’ cross-complaint. Idonah, in her cross-
complaint brought suit against Eugene and Benguet Consolidated upon the alleged
judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court below to
render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon.
This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now
section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settled and determine.
Idonah expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment reversing
the judgement made in her favor by the New York SC and argues on the assumption
that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause.
Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity
and efficacy to the New York judgment is a question that goes to the merits of the
controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to
the jurisdiction or power of the court.
The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the
inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision
is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the
question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by
that court — and the rightful exercise — of its jurisdiction.
Heine vs New York Insurance Company
45 f2d 426

FACTS:
New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company, each of which
is a New York corporation, were sued for recovery of some 240 life insurance policies
made and issued by them in Germany, in favor of German citizens and subjects, and
payable in German marks. The policies of the New York Life Insurance Company were
issued prior to August 1, 1914, and those of the Guardian prior to May 1, 1918. As a
condition to their right to do business in Germany, the insurance companies were
required to and did submit to the supervision and control of the German insurance
officials, to invest the reserves arising from German policies in German securities, and
to establish, and they to now maintain, an office in that country with a resident
representative or agent upon whom service of process can be made. The actions now
pending are brought and prosecuted in the name of, or as assignee of the insured by,
certain parties in the United States and Germany, under an irrevocable power of
attorney, by which they are authorized and empowered to sue for, collect, receive, and
receipt for all sums due or owing under the policies, or compromise the same in
consideration of an assignment and transfer to them of the undivided 25 per cent
interest in the policies and all rights accruing thereunder. None of the parties to the
litigation are residents or inhabitants of this district. The plaintiffs reside in, and are
citizens of, the republic of Germany. The defendants are corporations organized and
existing under the laws of New York, with their principal offices in that state, with
statutory agents in Oregon, upon whom service can be made. None of the causes of
action arose here, nor do any of the material witnesses reside in the district, nor are any
of the records of the defendant companies pertaining to the policies in suit in the district,
but such records are either at the home office in New York or at their offices in Germany.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
The courts of Germany and New York are open and functioning and competent to take
jurisdiction of the controversies, and service can be made upon the defendants in either
of such jurisdictions. To require the defendants to defend the actions in this district
would impose upon them great and unnecessary inconvenience and expense, and
probably compel them to produce here (three thousand miles from their home office)
numerous records, books, and papers, all of which are in daily use by it in taking care
of
current business. In addition, it would no doubt consume months of the time of this
court to try and dispose of these cases, thus necessarily disarranging the calendar,
resulting in delay, inconvenience, and expense to other litigants who are entitled to
invoke its jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the defendants, while conceding that
the court has jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, urges that it should refuse,
in its discretion, to exercise such jurisdiction.

It should be remembered that parties do not enter into civil relations in foreign
jurisdictions in reliance upon our courts. They could not complain if our courts refused
to meddle with their affairs, and remitted them to the place that established and would
enforce their rights. The only just ground for complaint would be if their rights and
liabilities, when enforced by our courts, should be measured by a different rule from
that under which the parties dealt.

Wing On Company vs Syyap Co., Inc.

Wing On Company incorporated in NY and Syyap Co., Inc. incorporated in RP entered

into contract in NY for the latter's purchase of clothing material, w/ verbal agreement
that Syyap would pay Wing On the value of the clothing material, then after the sale,
the profits would be divided between them. The clothing materials worth $22,246.04
was shipped from NY to RP. However only $3,530.04 paid. Syyap failed to settle debt
and account for profits. Wing On Company sued Syyap in RP. RTC ruled in favor of
wing on.
Respondent appealed stating that Wing On is not licensed to do business in RP nor
legal capacity to sue here in the Philippines and that the court should habe declined
jurisdiction base on forum non convenience.
Issue: Whether or not Wing on does not have legal capacity to sue in the Philipiines.
W/N the court should have decline jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens
Ruling: The Court affirmed the decision of the RTC. The present suit is a PERSONAL
ACTION, the case may be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
On Forum non Conveniens, the court would only decline jurisdiction based on
foum non conveniens, Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. The court should should
consider also both public and private interest. In private interest court should
consider relative ease of access to source of proof; Availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling witnesses; cost of obtaining and attendance off willing
witnesses; possibility of viewing the premises if appropriate; all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. In public
interest, administrative difficulties encountered when courts are congested; jury duty
or burden on community; appropriateness of having the trial in a court that is familiar
with the applicable state law rather than getting another forum enmeshed in a
complicated conflict-of-laws problem. However the court may not refuse to exercise
jurisdiction when forum is the only state where jurisdiction over defendant can be
obtained or when the forum provides procedural remedies not available in another
state.

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
(March 17, 1930)

FACTS: Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Hix appealed from the
decision of Judge of First Instance denying the probate of the document alleged to be
the last will and testament of the deceased.

The alleged will was claimed to be executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3,
1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West
Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882,
c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p.
1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library.

ISSUE: WON the laws of West Virginia should be applied and be recognized by the
Philippine courts?

HELD: NO. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The
courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of
the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.

Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book
from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the
State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor
was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of
the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., v. MAGDALENA

C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

Doctrine: As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator provided
that the law be evidenced in the court.

FACTS: Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce
was granted to him on May 20, 1922.
Decedent in this case gave out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares
of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To
his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of
the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated,
claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede
to them.

Lower Court Ruling: Dismissed the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary
Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor
and approving the said project.
The testator permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon
his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at
the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his
death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will
and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and
admits the same to probate.

ISSUES:
Whether Magdalena C. Bohanan can claim. (NO)

Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short
of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid (NO).

RATIO: The court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922;
that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage
was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court
below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the
estate left by the testator.
Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each
only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance
with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in
1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided
that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his
domicile and his permanent residence. So the question at issue is whether the
testementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that
the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905,
Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only
be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as
follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we
have found that the foreign law was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein)
counsel as Exhibits "2".
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-
quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above
circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by
us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition

Elserce A. Gray v. Frank M. Gray

SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
87 N.H. 82; 174 A. 508; 1934 N.H. LEXIS 21; 94 A.L.R. 1404
September 4, 1934

FACTS:
Wife sued husband for damages in New Hampshire alleged to have been caused by the
husband while driving from their home in New Hampshire to Maine where the accident
happened. In Maine, spouses are barred from maintaining an action against each other.
On the other hand, no prohibition exists in New Hampshire

ISSUE: W/N the wife has a cause of action against her husband

RULING: The effect of the prohibition in Maine is to divest the wife of any cause of action
against husband.

If there is a conflict between lex fori and lex loci, lex loci governs in torts in respect to
the legal effect and incidents of the act.

The status as spouses is determined by New Hampshire law but the incidents of that
status is governed by the law of the place of the transaction (Maine).

Moreover, an examination of the Maine Law would show that it does not merely prohibit
the spouses from maintaining an action against each other, but that the acts
complained of do not give rise to any cause of action. Hence, there has been no breach
of legal duty.
Alabama G. S. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803,
Facts
W.D. Carroll (plaintiff), an Alabama citizen, was employed as a brakeman under an
Alabama contract with the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company (Alabama
Southern) (defendant). While working on a freight train running from Alabama to
Mississippi, Carroll was injured on account of a defective link between two cars. The
injury occurred in Mississippi, but Carroll alleged that its cause happened in Alabama.
Evidence showed that fellow employees of Carroll were negligent in failing to discover
the defect or remedy it. Carroll sued Alabama Southern in Alabama court. He alleged
that the employment contract rendered Alabama Southern subject to Alabama law even
if Carroll were working outside of the state. If Mississippi law were applicable, Alabama
Southern could not be liable because Mississippi subscribed to the common law rule
that a master is not liable for harm to a servant caused by a fellow servant. An Alabama
employers’ liability statute, however, modified the common law in that state so as to
make a master liable for injury to a servant. A jury decided in favor of Carroll. Alabama
Southern appealed.

Issue.
May recovery be obtained for a tortious act in the state where the breach of duty
occurred, but not where the injury was sustained?

Held.
No.

Where a negligent act is committed in one state, but causes injury in a different state,
an action seeking damages for injuries resulting from the act may be brought only in
the state where the result occurred, and not where the act was committed. The general
rule is that recovery cannot be made in one state for the injuries to the person sustained
in a different state unless the infliction of the injuries is actionable under the law of the
state where the injuries were received. In this case, up to the time the train passed from
Alabama, no injury had resulted. The Alabama statute has no efficiency beyond state
lines. Only Mississippi could apply proper jurisdiction over the claim. There may have
been a different result if Carroll had been injured in Alabama but suffered in
Mississippi. As for an argument that the Railroad (Defendant) was under a contractual
duty to Carroll (Plaintiff), which arose in Alabama, the Alabama law will govern only
occurrences of the employment relationship and not with any specific contractual
obligations. Reversed and remanded.
Auten vs Auten

Facts: In 1917, Margarite and Harold Auten got married in England and lived there with
their two children. In 1931, Harold Auten left and moved to New York. Thereafter,
the wife went to New York and executed a separation agreement in 1933 which
provided that Harold Auten had to pay an amount of 50euro a month in favor of
Margarite through a trustee in New York for her support and their children. It is
also included in the separation agreement that they agree to live separately and
Margarite promised not to bring any action relating to their separation.

Harold Auten failed to tender support and thus, Margarite brought a suit for legal
separation in England on the ground of adultery but the case never went to trial.
In 1947, the action was brought to New York for the enforcement of the separation
agreement; Harold Auten agreed to the existence of the agreement but denied his
 obligation by alleging that the wife’s institution of legal action was a violation of
the agreement thus extinguishing his obligation.

The lower court dismissed the complaint (with the application of New York’s law).
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the lower court.

Issue: Which law should be applied as to resolving the issue on whether or not
Margarite’s institution of the English case constituted as a rescission and
repudiation of the separation agreement?

Held: (Fuld, J.) Judgment reversed and English law to be applied. In choosing the law
to be applied in contractual transactions with elements of different jurisdiction,
the New York decisions evidence a number of different approaches:

•”All matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity of
contracts are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made”
•”All matters connected with performance are regulated by the law of the place
where the contract, by its terms, is to be performed.”
•”What constitutes a breach of the contract and what circumstances excuse a
breach are considered matters of performance, governable, within this rule, by
the law of the place of performance.

The most recent decisions have resorted to a method that rationalizes the choice
of law, a method called “center of gravity’ or “grouping of contracts” theory. The
courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties’ intention or the place of
making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place which has
the most significant contracts with the matter in dispute.

In the case at bar, the agreement was between British subjects – who were
married in England, lived there for 14 years, the sole purpose of the agreement
was to get Harold’s support for the family, the money to be paid is in euro (a
British currency). The court also noted that under the English, there was no
breach of the agreement.
DOROTHY HAAG, Also Known as DOROTHY HAWTHORNE, Appellant,
v. NORMAN BARNES, Respondent
9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65

FACTS:

Complainant Dorothy Haag was a legal secretary residing in New York. She was hired
by the defendant, Norman Barnes, an Illinois lawyer, to perform temporary work for him
while he was in New York. The two entered a romantic relationship in New York, where
she became pregnant. During the pregnancy, Haag went to Chicago at Barnes’s request,
and the baby was born in a Chicago hospital. Barnes paid for the expenses of the birth,
and, with the assistance of an attorney, Haag signed a support agreement in Illinois
under which Barnes promised to pay the sum of $275 per month for the support of
complainant and the infant on condition that such payments "shall not constitute an
admission" that he is the child's father; that the complainant agrees to keep the child
in Illinois for at least two years, except if she marries within that period; and that their
agreement "shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of
the State of Illinois” (choice-of-law clause). Shortly after the agreement was signed, the
complainant received permission to live in California where she remained for two years.
For three years Barnes paid substantially more than he promised to pay, but Haag sued
him in New York seeking further support. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant
on the ground that the action is precluded by the laws of the State of Illinois which, the
parties expressly agreed, would govern their rights under the agreement. In opposition,
the complainant contended that New York, not Illinois, law applies. Under the Illinois
law, this substantiated suit would be barred by the previous agreement. However under
New York law, the suit could proceed because the prior agreement was not court
approved. The motion to dismiss was granted by the Court of Special Sessions and the
resulting order was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

ISSUE:

Whether the law of New York or of Illinois applies?

HELD:

The law of Illinois applies. The motion to dismiss was properly granted.

RATIO:

Haag may not upset a support agreement which is itself perfectly consistent with the
public policy of New York, which was entered into in Illinois with the understanding that
it would be governed by the laws of Illinois and which constitutes a bar to a suit for
further support under Illinois law.

The traditional view was that the law governing a contract is to be determined by the
intention of the parties. However, The more modern view is that "the courts, instead of
regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or the place of making or performance, lay
emphasis rather upon the law of the place `which has the most significant contacts with
the matter in dispute'". Whichever of these views one applies in this case, however, the
answer is the same, namely, that Illinois law applies.

The agreement, in so many words, recites that it "shall in all respects be interpreted,
construed and governed by the laws of the State of Illinois" and, since it was also drawn
and signed by Haag in Illinois, the traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt, treat
these factors as conclusive and result in applying Illinois law.

But, even if the parties' intention and the place of the making of the contract are not
given decisive effect, they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining
which jurisdiction "`has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute'".

And, when these important factors are taken together with other of the "significant
contacts" in the case, they likewise point to Illinois law. Among these other Illinois
contacts are the following:
 1. both parties are designated in the agreement as being "of Chicago, Illinois",
and Barnes’ place of business is and always has been in Illinois;
2. the child was born in Illinois;
3. the persons designated to act as agents for the principals (except for a third
alternate) are Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for both parties who drew
the agreement; and
4. all contributions for support always have been, and still are being, made from
Chicago.

Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New York contacts are of far less weight and
significance. Chief among these is the fact that child and mother presently live in New
York and that part of the "liaison" took place in New York.
BABCOCK V. JACKSON (1963)

FACTS: Miss Babcock (as guest) went with Mr. and Mrs. Jackson (as hosts) to Canada
for a weekend trip using the Jackson’s car. (All are residents of Rochester, New York).
Mr. Jackson was driving along Ontario, Canada when he lost control of the car and went
off the highway. Babcock was seriously injured and consequently sued Mr. Jackson for
Tort/ Damages in NY court. Jackson moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the law of the place where the accident occurred should govern. The law of Canada
states that any owner or driver of a vehicle is not liable for any bodily injury (except if
in the business of common carrier).

ISSUE: What law should be applied in this case?

HELD: New York law should apply.

The traditional view of

Lex Loci Delicti (“Law of the place where the tort was committed”) or the Vested Rights
Doctrine has already been discredited because it fails to take account underlying policy
considerations. It affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state
the practical considerations involved. More particularly, as applied to torts, the theory
ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may
have in the resolution of particular issues. Citing Auten v. Auten (1953), the traditional
view has been abandoned and has applied what has been termed the "center of gravity"
or "grouping of contacts" theory of the conflict of laws.

This is applied by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern
with the specific issue raised in the litigation.

In this case, New York has the greater and more direct concern than Ontario. The
present action involves (1) injuries sustained by a New York guest (2) as a result of the
negligence of a New York host (3) in the operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed
and undoubtedly insured in New York. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship
with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred
there.
New York's policy of requiring a tortfeasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused
by his negligence cannot be doubted. This is attested by the fact that the State
Legislature has repeatedly refused to enact a statute denying or limiting recovery in
such cases.
ALLISON G. GIBBS vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA
Facts:
Petitioner Allison Gibbs was the husband of the decesed Eva Johnson Gibbs. Gibbs
and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in California. During their marriage,
they acquired lands in the Philippines which formed part of their conjugal partnership
property. The wife died in California.Gibbs was appointed administrator of the
intestate proceedings instituted in Manila. Gibbs asked the court to adjudicate to him
lands acquired in the Philippines not under our laws on succession but because in
accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are
citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband,
belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. CFI granted such
petition and entered a decree adjudicating Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of
said lands applying Section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs presented this
decree to the Register of Deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a
Transfer Certificate of Title.The register of deeds refused to transfer such properties on
the ground of non-payment of inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that the conjugal right of
a California wife in a community property is a personal right and even if this was a
case of succession, California law would still apply.
Issue:
Is Gibbs exempt from inheritance tax?
Held:
NO. The court held that it is a principle firmly established that to the law of the state
in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent,
alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10
of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of
the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife,
upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an
interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of
management and disposition which the law vests in the husband. It results that the
wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible
interest, equal to that of her husband and the descendible interest of Eva Johnson
Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and
this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of
Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances.
Grant vs. Mcauliffe (1958)

Brief Fact Summary

Two California residents driving separate cars in Arizona crashed into one another and
one died as a result. Under Arizona law, a tort action did not survive the death of the
plaintiff, while under California law it did.
Facts
Pullen was a resident of California and the driver of an automobile who died as result
of an auto accident in which he was allegedly the negligent party. The accident took
place in Arizona. Grant (Plaintiff), also a resident of California, was injured in the
accident and sought damages from McAuliffe (Defendant), Pullen’s
administrator. Under California law, tort actions survive the tortfeasor’s death,
however, under Arizona law they do not. The California trial court found that Arizona
law applied sine it was a substantive rather than procedural nature and, therefore,
granted McAuliffe’s (Defendant) motion to abate Plaintiff’s suit. Plaintiff appealed,
arguing that the law was in fact procedural and therefore the law of the forum,
California, should apply.

Issue
Is a survival statute as to tort actions substantive law that would govern litigation over
injuries sustained wherever the case is tried?

Held
(Traynor, J.) No. A survival statute as to tort actions is not substantive law that
would govern litigation over injuries sustained wherever the case is tried. This court
recognizes the doctrine that the substantive law of the place of the wrong must govern
litigation wherever it is tried. However, the forum state may always follow its own
procedural rules of law. Since the authorities are split on whether a survival statute is
procedural or substantive, this court will determine which argument has the most
merit. Because a survival statute does not create a new cause of action but simply
allows the continuation of an existing action, it is procedural. All the relevant contacts
are with California and the survival statute does not relate to liability but is a
procedural rule to enforce claims for damages. Since a court may always follow its
own procedural rules, this case may properly be tried under California law. Reversed
and remanded.

Cadalin vs. POEA

Facts: Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their
own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a
class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and
employment by BRII.

BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in

construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to
recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its
foreign principals.

The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of
the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely. From the records, it
appears that the complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by
respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root. They
were all deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries
in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain,
as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.

In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed, His
Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on
June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the
provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-
appellants are as follows:

Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to
his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per
centum thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty per
centum thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to
being from seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in the morning. . . .

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.

. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly
day of restif circumstances so require and in respect of which an additional
sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him. . . .

Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official
holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal
wage.

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service with
his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not less than
21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five
continuous years of service.

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of

the proportion of his service in that year.

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration

may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party thirty
days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly
paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without giving the required notice shall pay to the other
party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker
for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.

Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each year of the
first three years of service and of one month's wages for each year of service
thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity
upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed
within a year.
 All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to
the Philippines at the time of the filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 59-65).

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the
lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract.

Issue: Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing
law.

Ruling: As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true
even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it
may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization
given such a law.

Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the
statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that
there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give
way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law

becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance. A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the
laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this
kind. Said Section provides:

If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex

proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum's public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the
public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized
that:

The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national

development. (Sec. 10).

The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall

protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).

In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.