THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-45839. June 1, 1988.]

RUFINO MATIENZO, GODOFREDO ESPIRITU, DIOSCORRO FRANCO, AND LA SUERTE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs. HON. LEOPOLDO M. ABELLERA, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, HON. GODOFREDO Q. ASUNCION,
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, ARTURO DELA CRUZ, MS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., NEW FAMILIA
TRANSPORTATION CO., ROBERTO MOJARES, ET AL., respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary injunction, seeking the annulment and inhibition of the
grant or award of provisional permits or special authority by the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) to respondent taxicab operators,
for the operation and legalization of "excess taxicab units" under certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 101 "despite the lapse of the
power to do so thereunder," and "in violation of other provisions of the Decree, Letter of Instructions No. 379 and other relevant rules of
the BOT."
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate
"colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the
respondent Board for the legalization of their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, promulgated on
January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate
and responsible operators." Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and
granting applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization was sought. Thus, the present
petition.
Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment of permits already
granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization
and awarding special permits to the private respondents.
Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation the power, among others "To grant special permits of limited term for the
operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators
into legitimate and responsible operators." (Section 1, PD 101)
Citing, however, Section 4 of the Decree which provides:
"SEC. 4. Transitory Provision. — Six months after the promulgation of this Decree, the Board of Transportation, the Bureau of
Transportation, The Philippine Constabulary, the city and municipal forces, and the provincial and city fiscals shall wage a concerted and
relentless drive towards the total elimination and punishment of all clandestine and unlawful operators of public utility motor vehicles."
the petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the petitions
were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months
from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus
officio. LLjur
To reinforce their stand, the petitioners refer to certain provisions of the Rules and Regulations implementing PD 101 issued by respondent
Board, Letter of Instructions No. 379, and BOT Memorandum Circular No. 76-25 (a). In summary, these rules provide inter alia that (1)
only applications for special permits for "colorum" or "kabit" operators filed before July 17, 1973 shall be accepted and processed (Secs. 3
and 16 (c), BOT-LTC-HPG Joint Regulations Implementing PD 101, pp. 33 and 47, Rollo); (2) Every provisional authority given to any taxi
operator shall be cancelled immediately and no provisional authority shall thereafter be issued (par. 6, Letter of Instructions No. 379, issued
March 10, 1976, p. 58, Rollo); (3) Effective immediately, no provisional authorities on applications for certificates of public convenience
shall be granted or existing provisional authorities on new applications extended to, among others, taxi denominations in Metro Manila
(BOT Memorandum Circular No. 75-25 (a), August 30, 1976, p. 64, Rollo); (4) All taxis authorized to operate within Metro Manila shall
obtain new special permits from the BOT, which permits shall be the only ones recognized within the area (par. 8, LOI No. 379, supra); and
(5) No bonafide applicant may apply for special permit to operate, among others, new taxicab services, and, no application for such new
service shall be accepted for filing or processed by any LTC agency or granted under these regulations by any LTC Regional Office until
after it shall have announced its program of development for these types of public motor vehicles (Sec. 16d, BOT-LTC-HPG Joint
Regulations, p. 47, Rollo).
The petitioners raise the following issues:
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER TO GRANT PROVISIONAL PERMITS TO OPERATE
DESPITE THE BAN THEREON UNDER LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO. 379;
"II. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER TO LEGALIZE, AT THIS TIME, CLANDESTINE AND
UNLAWFUL TAXICAB OPERATIONS UNDER SECTION 1, P.D. 101; AND
"III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEDURE BEING FOLLOWED BY THE BOARD IN THE CASES IN QUESTION SATISFIES THE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS." (p. 119, Rollo)
We need not pass upon the first issue raised anent the grant of provisional authority to respondents. Considering that the effectivity of the
provisional permits issued to the respondents was expressly limited to June 30, 1977, as evidenced by the BOT orders granting the same
(Annexes G, H, I and J among others) and Memorandum Circular No. 77-4 dated January 20, 1977 (p. 151, Rollo), implementing paragraph
6 of LOI 379 (ordering immediate cancellation of all provisional authorities issued to taxicab operators, supra), which provides:
"5. After June 30, 1977, all provisional authorities are deemed cancelled, even if hearings on the main application have not been
terminated."
the issue is MOOT and ACADEMIC. Only the issue on legalization remains under consideration.
Justifying its action on private respondent's applications, the respondent Board emphasizes public need as the overriding concern. It is
argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators by
replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible ones" (Whereas clause, PD 101). In view thereof, it is maintained that
respondent Board may continue to grant to "colorum" operators the benefits of legalization under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power,
after six (6) months, to do so, without taking punitive measures against the said operators.
Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the
legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to
suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the
State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period
of moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board's exercise
of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose
of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally
construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the
legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are
deemed given (Martin, Administrative Law, 1979, p. 46). Thus, as averred by the respondents: LLjur
". . . [A]ll things considered, the question is what is the best for the interest of the public. Whether PD 101 has lost its effectiveness or not,
will in no way prevent this Board from resolving the question in the same candor and spirit that P.D. 101 and LOI 379 were issued to cope
with the multifarious ills that plague our transport system. . . ." (Italics ours) (pp. 91-92, Rollo)
This, the private respondents appreciate, as they make reference to PD 101, merely to cite the compassion with which colorum operators
were dealt with under the law. They state that it is "in the same vein and spirit that this Honorable Board has extended the Decree of
legalization to the operatives of the various PUJ and PUB services along legislative methods," that respondents pray for authorization of
their colorum units in actual operation in Metro Manila (Petitions for Legalization, Annexes E & F, par. 7, pp. 65-79, Rollo).
Anent the petitioners' reliance on the BOT Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 101 as well as its Memorandum Circular No. 76-25(a),
the BOT itself has declared:
"In line with its duty to rationalize the transport industry, the Board shall, from time to time, re-study the public need for public utilities
in any area in the Philippines for the purpose of re-evaluating the policies." (p. 64, Rollo)
Thus, the respondents correctly argue that "as the need of the public changes and oscillates with the trends of modern life, so must the
Memo Orders issued by respondent jibe with the dynamic and flexible standards of public needs. . . . Respondent Board is not supposed
to 'tie its hands' on its issued Memo Orders should public interest demand otherwise" (Answer of private respondents, p. 121, Rollo). cdrep
The fate of the private respondent's petitions is initially for the Board to determine. From the records of the case, acceptance of the
respondent's applications appears to be a question correctly within the discretion of the respondent Board to decide. As a rule, where the
jurisdiction of the BOT to take cognizance of an application for legalization is settled, the Court enjoins the exercise thereof only when there
is fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law. Furthermore, the court does not interfere, as a rule, with administrative action prior to its
completion or finality. It is only after judicial review is no longer premature that we ascertain in proper cases whether the administrative
findings are not in violation of law, whether they are free from fraud or imposition and whether they find substantial support from the
evidence.
Finally, with respect to the last issue raised by the petitioners alleging the denial of due process by respondent Board in granting the
provisional permits to the private respondents and in taking cognizance of their applications for legalization without notice and hearing,
suffice it to say that PD 101 does not require such notice or hearing for the grant of temporary authority. The provisional nature of the
authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full hearing are the safeguards against its abuse. As to the applications
for legalization themselves, the Public Service Act does enjoin the Board to give notice and hearing before exercising any of its powers under
Sec. 16 thereof. However, the allegations that due process has been denied are negated by the hearings set by the Board on the applications
as expressed in its orders resolving the petitions for special permits (Annexes G, H, I, pp. 80-102, Rollo).
The Board stated:
"The grounds involved in the petition are of first impression. It cannot resolve the issue ex-parte. It needs to hear the views of other parties
who may have an interest, or whose interest may be affected by any decision that this Board may take.
"The Board therefore, decides to set the petition for hearing. . . . .
As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent Board to give personal notice to all parties who may be interested in the matter,
which parties are unknown to it. Its aforementioned order substantially complies with the requirement. The petitioners having been able
to timely oppose the petitions in question, any lack of notice is deemed cured.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned orders of the then Board of Transportation are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
GR No. 79684, Feb 19, 1991 ]

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA +

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated April 3, 1987 of the respondent court, [1] as well as its resolution
dated August 27, 1987 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The restraining order promulgated by this Court on November 3, 1986
restraining the public respondents from issuing any award to the private respondents as the winning bidders in that public bidding held
on October 24, 1986 or in any manner implementing by the public and private respondents the results thereof, is hereby converted into a
preliminary injunction and upon the filing by the petitioner and approval by this Court of an injunction bond the amount of P30,000.00,
the preliminary injunction shall remain permanent until the Minister of Natural Resources shall have acted, as he is hereby directed to
act, on the appeals of the petitioner from the Orders of respondent Director of Lands dated June 20, 1977 (Numancia project) and April
14, 1983 (Valderama project). With costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

The facts are undisputed.

The petitioners Director of Lands and the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources entered into a contract on June 30, 1973 with
the private respondent B.A. Gonzalez Surveying Company for which the latter was bound to execute a public land subdivision mapping
(Plsm) of the alienable and disposable lands in the Municipality of Valderama, Antique, Blk. 1-III, L.C. No. 819, for and in consideration of
the amount of P183,818.00.[2]

On January 28, 1974, the private respondent was likewise contracted by the petitioners to do the photo-cadastral mapping (Pcadm) of
Project PCADM-493-D in Numancia, Aklan, for the sum of P130,000,00.[3] However, despite written demands from the Bureau of Lands to
the private respondent to commence the Numancia, Aklan Pcadm project, the latter failed to do so; consequently, in an order dated
February 7, 1977, the former cancelled the contract with regard to the said project and declared the performance bond No. BCICI-3323
as forfeited.[4]

On a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the Director of Lands reinstated the said contract on June 20, 1977
without however granting the company's request for a price adjustment, which denial the private respondent seasonably appealed to the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. This appeal is pending.

On April 14, 1983, the Director of Lands likewise scrapped the Valderama Plsm contract because of the non-completion of the project
despite the grant of repeated extensions totalling 1,200 days.[5]

Similarly, the private respondent appealed the cancellation of the said contract to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
where the appeal also still remains pending.

Meanwhile, without both appeals being resolved, the Director of Lands conducted a public bidding for the cadastral survey of several
municipalities including the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and the Municipality of Valderama, Antique. In the said bidding, Armando
Villamayor and Cristina Matuod were declared as the successful bidders for the Numancia and Valderama projects, respectively.

Thereupon, the private respondent filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 10421, alleging that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
awarding the said cadastral survey projects to other persons while the appeals of the private respondent remain pending.

As adverted to at the outset, the respondent Court of Appeals in its decision dated April 3, 1987 granted the said petition and denied in a
resolution dated August 27, 1987 the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners assign the following errors[6] allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PUBLIC LAND SUBDIVISION MAPPING (PLSM) AND PHOTO-
CADASTRAL MAPPING (PCADM), ON ONE HAND, AND A REGULAR CADASTRAL SURVEY, ON THE OTHER, "HAVE THE SAME
PURPOSE OF REGISTERING TITLES AND AS SUCH, ONE MAY SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OTHER". (Decision, p. 4, Annex "C").

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE OPINION OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS ON A MATTER WITHIN
HIS EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AS WELL AS NLRC RULES AND REGULATIONS, TO THE EFFECT THAT
GRAPHICAL TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS, AS THOSE PRODUCED FROM A PLSM OR PCADM, CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF LAND
REGISTRATION.

III

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ENJOINING THE AWARD OF THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
VALDERAMA AND NUMANCIA TO THE WINNING BIDDERS WHICH IS A SURVEY ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE MAPPING SURVEY
CONTRACTS OF THE COMPANY WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT THE COMPANY'S MAPPING SURVEY CONTRACTS, WHICH
HAD ALREADY BEEN CANCELLED, CONSTITUTE A BAR TO THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF VALDERAMA AND
NUMANCIA, THEREBY PREEMPTING THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN DETERMINING THE
MERITS OF THE COMPANY'S APPEALS.
The petition is impressed with merit.

The four errors assigned by the Solicitor General appearing for the public officials-petitioners may be integrated into the sole issue as to
whether or not the respondent court erred in holding that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the award of the cadastral survey projects to new contractors involving lands subject to prior
mapping projects with another contractor (the private respondent) whose contracts are involved in a pending appeal to the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources.

The respondent court, in sustaining the private respondent, asseverated that while cadastral survey on one hand, and the Pcadm and the
Plsm projects on the other, are classified differently, i.e., the former being numerical cadastre and the latter as graphical, both projects
nonetheless "have the same purpose of registering titles and as such, one may substitute for the other. Accordingly, allowing the award
of the cadastral survey projects to other contractors will render unnecessary the pending mapping survey contracts of the government
with the petitioner (private respondent herein), as if the same were already awarded to others."[7]

We do not think so. Given the premises that both projects, mapping and cadastral survey, have the same purpose or registering titles
and that one may substitute for the other, do not justify the sweeping conclusion that the undertaking of one would render the other
unnecessary.

The question on the necessity of either or both projects must be better addressed to the sound discretion of the proper administrative
officials who admittedly have the competence and technical expertise on the matters. In the case at bar, the petitioner Director of Lands
is "the official vested with direct and executive control of the disposition of the lands of the public domain."[8] Specifically, Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that "xxx [T]he Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification,
lease, sale, or any form of concession or disposition and management of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall
be conclusive when approved by he Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources)."

We likewise take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on this doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The Court has consistently held that "acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a
court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the parameters of its
own competence,"[9] unless "there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or palpable and serious error."[10] In similar vein, we reiterated
recently the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, in the present case cadastral surveys and mappings and land registration, are accorded not only respect but more often
than not even finality.[11]

On the other hand, the private respondent claims that his case is an exception and invokes Leongson vs. Court of Appeals [12] which states
that "once the actuation of an administrative official or administrative board or agency is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of
the law, then, it is incumbent on the courts of justice to set matters right, with the Tribunal having the last say on the matter."

But ironically, it is precisely the "command of the law" that the Director of Lands sought to implement when the respondent court
enjoined the former from pushing through with the award of the cadastral survey projects. We have quoted earlier the provisions of
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 [The Public Land Law], which explicitly empower and command the Director of Lands to have the
direct executive control of the survey and classification, inter alia, of lands of the public domain. Moreover, in the same law, in Section 6
thereof "[T]he Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources) shall prepare and issue such forms, instructions, rules, and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary
and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions."

Aside from these "command(s) of the law" giving to the Director of Lands the "direct executive control" of the subject matter of the
controversy in this case, the Land Registration Commission (LRC) requires in its Circulars[13] Nos. 371 (1980), 394 (1981), and 32 (1983)
the full and complete technical description of lands prior to their registration. The said requirement can only be accomplished through
the conduct of a regular cadastral survey which, as aforesaid, is under the direct executive control of the Director of Lands.

Moreover, the respondent court admits that mapping projects and cadastral surveys are classified differently. That is correct because
indeed there exists real distinctions between these mapping and cadastral survey projects. Due to these distinctions, the mapping or
graphical survey would apply more to pre-cadastral operations and the numerical one to the regular cadastral survey proper. These
distinctions may be more easily appreciated by a scrutiny of the respective program of activities in each of these three technical
endeavors.

I. Photo-Cadastral Mapping Project (Pcadm)

sub-lot identification and delineation of tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn (photo-
1.
sketching for land reform);

2. project controls of secondary precision only;

3. establishment of photo control points for every photograph by tertiary traverse from control stations;

4. monumenting of lots claimed as private or public lands and sketching on photo-maps;

numerical survey of the residential, commercial and industrial lots in the poblacion and barrios, preparation of cadastral
5.
maps from sketches on maps, and mapping by ground method of covered areas;

6. establishment of political boundary monuments of secondary survey controls;

7. preparation of the complete mapping returns.

I-A . Public Land Subdivision Mapping Project (Plsm)

sub-lot identification and delineation and tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn
1.
(sketching for land reform) and sketching or lots claimed as private or public lands;

2. project controls of tertiary precision only;

3. Monumenting of corners of lots claimed as private or public lands;

4. Numerical survey of the residential lots in the poblacion and barrios;

5. Establishment of poltical boundary monuments by tertiary survey controls;

6. The preparation of the complete mapping returns.

II. Scope of Work - Cadastral Survey Project

1. Sketching by transit and stadia or any acceptable method of lots claimed as private or public lands;
 2. Project controls shall be of primary precision;

3. Monumenting of corners of lots claimed as private, government or public land;

Numerical survey of all lots including parcels covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) whether or not previously subjected
4.
to PMS;

5. Survey of foreshore areas as a strip indicating on the cadastral map areas covered by existing lease applications;

6. Establishment of political boundary monuments and survey thereof by secondary control;

7. Accomplishment of land use maps, questionnaire for land use inventory and land use summary report;

8. Preparation and submittal of the complete survey returns of the cases submitted for verification and approval;

9. Preparation of overlays on drafting film of CMs containing OLT areas and list of claimants thereof.
An analysis of above list depicts that the greater bulk of the activities in Plsm and Pcadm projects is sketching; whereas, in a regular
cadastral survey, the entire area of the municipality is subjected to a numerical survey. While Plsm and Pcadm projects lead to the
preparation of mere graphical sketches or maps, a cadastral survey results in the preparation of complete survey returns and technical
descriptions of individual lots necessary for registration purposes.[14]

But even granting arguendo that the Plsm and Pcadm projects on the one hand, and the cadastral survey on the other, are similar
activities, there is no legal bar for the private respondent, assuming that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources resolves
the appeals in its favor, to finish the mapping projects and then demand the corresponding remuneration from the Director of Lands. In
the same way, compensation would be due to the winning bidders in question once their own cadastral survey projects would have been
accomplished. In case the Director of Lands fails to pay upon fulfillment of the said contracts, then any contractor may validly resort to
judicial action to enforce its legitimate demands.

Meanwhile, the proper remedy of the private respondent would be to pursue promptly its appeals with the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources as regards its cancelled and questioned contracts rather than seek judicial imprimatur to its improper interference
with administrative prerogatives and thus provide a convenient cover-up for its breaches of its own contractual obligations.

Notwithstanding the private respondent's dubious attitude in not participating in the bidding in question, he could have also appealed
the conduct of the said bidding to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as was the case in his Plsm and Pcadm contracts
with the government and asserted therein that the same would be prejudicial to his interests.

In sum, the respondent court committed a reversible error in stopping the implementation of the results of the bidding for the cadastral
survey projects conducted by the Director of Lands. The said injunction issued by the respondent court constitutes a violation of the
doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and defeats the very purpose thereof, which is, "not only to give the administrative agency
the opportunity to decide the controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts." [15]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the injunction issued is hereby lifted; the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3,
1987, as well as its Resolution dated August 27, 1987, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. With costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Hererra, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 95122-23. May 31, 1991.]
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER
ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R.
SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM AND BENJAMIN KALAW,
petitioners, vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER
ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R.
SANTIAGO MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM AND BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN,
SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 95612-13. May 31, 1991.]
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al.,
respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; CONCURRENT WITH SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, HABEAS CORPUS AND INJUNCTION. —
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of
Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. ID.; ID.; COURT OF APPEALS; EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ONLY AS TO QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES PROVIDED
FOR UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5434. — It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 the Court of Appeals is vested with
— "(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of
Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC),
the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable
to the Court of Appeals. In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled: "Under
our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: ". . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial
bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions
of B.P. Blg. 129. "The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows: "SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies. — Any
provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or
judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also
known as the 'Minimum Wage Law'; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also
known as the 'Industrial Peace Act'; the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the
Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner
herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.' "Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts,
jurisdiction over quasi judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor
Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court
through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal. Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land
Registration, en consulta, are appealable to the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise
appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission. "As a rule, where legislation provides for an
appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional
Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter."
3. ID.; ID.; DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND RESOLUTIONS OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; NOT DIRECTLY APPEALABLE TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS. — The Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions,
orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance
with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as follows: "SEC. 25. Judicial Review. — (1) Agency
decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws. ". . ." (6) The review proceeding shall be
filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions
on venue of the Rules of Court." Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies
the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court specified by the
statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue
of the Rules of Court.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEALABLE BY WAY OF SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. — B.P. Blg.
129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the
law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed
through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
5. ID.; ID.; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION); EXERCISE THEREOF OF THE
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS; ADMITS EXCEPTION. — The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction of petitioners' Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33
SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim
of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be
allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation
Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]).
6. ID.; ID.; DECISION; DOES NOT BIND A PERSON NOT A PARTY THERETO. — According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has
been conclusively settled by this Court in the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue
resolved therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision
was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and over it was superimposed the
figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be
reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the
aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of
Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.
7. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT CONSTITUTE RES JUDICATA. — It cannot be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July
6, 1962) finding respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision
did not make any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
8. ID.; REMAND OF A CASE NOT NECESSARY WHERE SUPREME COURT MAY DECIDE CONTROVERSY ON THE BASIS OF
RECORDS BEFORE IT. — In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which
confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line
with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases. Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial
Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it
proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the
Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265
[974]; Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
9. ID.; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES TO BE APPLICABLE IN CITIZENSHIP CASE. — In order that the doctrine of res judicata may
be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the
finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
10. COMMON WEALTH ACT NO. 613 (IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940); SECTION 37 (a) THEREOF; A WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED
PURSUANT THERETO TO BE VALID MUST BE FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING A FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION. — Sec. 37
(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads: "Sec. 37. (a) The following
aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien.". From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing
the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other
words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order
of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is
null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975];
Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs.
Galang, 10 SCRA 411); see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
11. ID.; SECTION 37 (b) THERETO; PROVIDES FOR THE PERIOD TO EFFECT WARRANT OF ARREST IN DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS. — Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid
down the consequences of such inaction, thus: "There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of
the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained entrance into
the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the
mother can no longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of
her admission. Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made a spontaneous
admission before the immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the minor on September 24,
1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the
mother was found to be married to another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued
at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity not serious
enough when, inspite of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a properly documented preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D).
We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute
deportation proceedings against the minor. "Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the
mother would be condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire permanent
residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to remain even illegally to
the extent of validating her residence by inaction thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his
deportation at this late hour would be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him to a
life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of immigration officials
has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved."
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent
arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long
years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by
petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the
identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
13. ID.; PRESCRIPTION; FOR VIOLATION OF OFFENSES ENUMERATED THEREIN. — It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1,
Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by
special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .; (c) after eight years for
those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ." Consequently, no prosecution and consequent
deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the
Immigration Act being a special legislation.
14. ID.; RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS. — "Although a deportation proceeding
does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs.
Court of Appeals, supra).
15. ID.; DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS; NATURE THEREOF. — "The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or
under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
16. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION ON ACTION TO REVIVE JUDGMENT. — Under Art. 1144(3) of the Civil Code, an action based on
judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since
the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William
Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the
decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
17. ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; FOREIGN LAW PRESUMED THE SAME WITH PHILIPPINE LAW ABSENCE OF PROOF TO THE
CONTRARY. — In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]),this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there
arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
18. ID.; MARRIAGE; DOCTRINE OF "PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION" APPLIED IN PHILIPPINE LAW. — Philippine law, following the lex
loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted
abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . .
." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to
the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity
of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in
Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
19. ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; STATEMENTS OR DECLARATIONS REGARDING FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION IN MATTERS
OF PEDIGREE; ADMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian
much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of
Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's
testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and
Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each
other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters
of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil
Code provides: "Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation
may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws." (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code).
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a
Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of
Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines: "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . ." This forecloses any further
question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the Resolution/Temporary Restraining
Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to
dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of
respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990
in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against respondent
Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases. prcd
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or
in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court considers the comment
filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as answer to the counter-petition and gives due course
to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born
Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship
Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria
Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco,
and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission
as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are
the sons of Francisco. prcd
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his
companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate
No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered
by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum
directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen.
Among those cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry,
reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of
exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now
become final and executory (Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20, 1962) became the subject
of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board
of Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for review. LLjur
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-
hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportation case against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6,
1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him (Annex "6", counter-
petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent
Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a),
pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of
1940 (Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation
and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation * issued a mission order
commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo
on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction
over the Board of Commissioners and or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order
dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss. LLjur
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction.
The complaint alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings
against William. on the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from
continuing with the deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian. prLL
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners,
et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent
judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in pre-empting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction
to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent
judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence
and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6,
1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should
have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping. LLpr
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is not sufficient to declare
him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the
question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the
deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported
has already prescribed. cdll
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments
or orders of quasi-judicial agencies boards or commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial
Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of
Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 the Court of Appeals is vested with —
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The
quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No.
5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically
provided that the decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
"Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
". . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by
the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
"The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
"SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies. — Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under
Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the 'Minimum Wage Law'; the Department of Labor under Section
23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the 'Industrial Peace Act'; the Land Registration Commission; the
Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom
to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions
of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved
party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.'
"Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over quasi judicial bodies has to be,
consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor
Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way
of appeal.
"Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
"The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are decisions of the Social
Security Commission.
"As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that
such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter."
(Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It
is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the
Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may
be considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and
resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25,
Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as follows:
"SEC. 25. Judicial Review. — (1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable
laws.
"xxx xxx xxx
"(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court."
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the latter, provides that the
decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court specified by the statute or in the absence
thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for
under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may
be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged
alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]. And a mere claim of citizenship
cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus,
what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should
the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955], this Court
answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
"When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and
the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official
or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection,
either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence
thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after
the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.
". . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at the hands
of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only
after the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public opinion?" (Emphasis
supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception
(Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in
cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words,
the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board,
supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]. It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial,
as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed. LLphil
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would
nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former
jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements
of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings
submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of
action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded
to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil.
74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [974]; Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos
vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]). LexLib
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
"Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice,
as resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice
would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al.,
supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al, 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance
Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
"Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government,
not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up
is that where the dictates of justice so demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA
1039, 1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.)" (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Jan. 29 1988;
See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the form of public documents
attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p.
298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the
deportation charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca
(supra), has already settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship specially so
where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong
vs. Deportation Board, supra). LexLib
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It
must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then
board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date)
"20" was erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period from
July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that
of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on
July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound
by a decision rendered therein. prcd
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship
not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement that respondent
Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections
(supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes
vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971] and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra), this Court
declared that:
"(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court
or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand."
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
"We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative
agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall
constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision
on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in
accordance with the procedure herein stated."
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship
must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative
took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners.
Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of
exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." (Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo
Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo,
20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411); see also Santos vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]). cdphil
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and
administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against
him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that
the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence
of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included.
Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
"xxx xxx xxx
"1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37,
para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xxx xxx xxx
"3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that
he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . ."
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously
no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation
or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners conveniently omitted to state
either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by
the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the
then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1) the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of
the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2) the lifting of
the warrants of arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched
to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded
that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized
travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines
entitles them to remain in the country." llcd
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which affirmed the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant
of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which respondent William
Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of
respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the
very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a
Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:
"The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of immigration in an Order dated July 12, 1960." (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or
grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where
advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the Comment of petitioners
to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian,
the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No.
A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-
petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry which
was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a
Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123. cdll
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing to reopen the question
of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the
records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a
final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine
citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause
of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]),
We laid down the consequences of such inaction, thus:
"There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act
committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a
Chinese resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation
proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above irregularity was
divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made a spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the
investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the
immigration authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to another Chinese
resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a
month, the immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspite of that finding, they decided
to land said minor "as a properly documented preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two years
later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings against the minor.
"Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the mother would be condemned for having made
use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say
unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction
thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would be to condemn
him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and
protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons
of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved." (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of
arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause
of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William
Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the identification certificate of respondent,
among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda. cdrep
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and
the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter
was not a party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only
where the deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of
limitation is applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings should be instituted within
five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more
than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
"Penal Provisions
"Sec. 45. Any individual who —
"(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely appears in the name of deceased individual,
or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name; fictitious name; or
"(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by law to receive such document; or
"(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or
"(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the
Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a material fact; or.
"(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of
the immigration laws; or
"(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations; or
"(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration clearance certificates required by section
twenty-two of this Act; or.
"(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than two years, and deported if he is an alien." (Emphasis
supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional penalties also prescribe
in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: . . .; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated
beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order
of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss
of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture
by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
cdrep
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process
should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be
executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be
enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an action based on judgment
must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. llcd
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of deportation or exclusion arises
when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of
the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation
or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed.
Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in the Philippines. He married
Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that
said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition).
He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-
petition). He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs
and in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He
continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation
proceedings against him. cdphil
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people"
(Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000
people be considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors,
grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US $50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is
an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case
at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out that Santiago
Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok,
likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the
laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been
shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having been
born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson
followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. LibLex
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30
Phil. 46 [1915]),this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption
that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian
who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to
prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the
Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular
and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in
evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore,
this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may
be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws." (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code).
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not self-serving but are
competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.
Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed
outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such
marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt,
all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over
their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in
mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law
bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino,
as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter)
is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution,
which provides:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution . . ."
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling arrived thereat, however,
cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to have been married in China by a village leader,
which undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William
Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings
docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and
3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs. prcd
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.
Board of Commissioners, CID v de la Rosa; G.R. Nos. 95122-23; 31 May 1991; 197 SCRA 853
Published on 26 September 2017 in Legal Chyme by Claudine

FACTS:
The then Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum directing the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
admitting respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigrationissued a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid.

RULING:
NO. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional. A reading of
the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of
investigation of the suspects, respondent Gatchalian included.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 84811. August 29, 1989.]
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY; EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. — The National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving
refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (P.D. 957 as amended by P.D. 1344)
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN A GENERAL AND A SPECIFIC LAW,
THE LATTER PREVAILS. — In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of
their enactment. Thus, it has been held that — The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special
act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the
particular case.
3. ID.; ID.; FACT OF EARLY ENACTMENT OF EITHER LAW, IMMATERIAL. — The circumstance that the special law is passed before
or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification
of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms,
unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
4. ID.; STATUTES CONFERRING POWERS ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. — Statutes conferring
powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with
the legislative purpose.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; DECISION RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION, NULL AND VOID; EXCEPTION; CASE AT
BAR. — Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel, which does not appear in the case before us. On the contrary,
the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer
and, later, on appeal to the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify
the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over a
complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision lot. The position of the
petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and void ab initio because the case should have been
heard and decided by what is now called the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. LibLex
The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on
June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount
of P38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver
the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property
in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid
by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing
Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree
providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance
with the provisions of this Decree." After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to
her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid.
She was also awarded P5,000.00 moral damages, P5,000.00 exemplary damages, P10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. 1
Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, 2 which also berated the appellant for its obvious efforts to
evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the
further amount of P1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and registration expenses despite its inability to deliver the title
to the land.
In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD No. 957 itself providing that:
SEC. 41. Other remedies. — The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies
that may be available under existing laws.
and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension that the court a quo was bereft of
jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the Secretary of Justice as impinging on the authority of the courts of
justice.
While we are disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court on the dubious conduct of the petitioner, we
nevertheless must sustain it on the jurisdictional issue.
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of
Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 967." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between
the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority. 3
The private respondent contends that the applicable law BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more
than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was
issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978. llcd
This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail
regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that —
The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an
exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case. 4
xxx xxx xxx
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later,
it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will
be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. 5
It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.
The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted, is also unacceptable.
We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned
in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see
it, is to reserve to the aggrieved party such other remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of
under the Revised Penal Code. 6
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to
hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore erroneous for the respondent to brush aside the well-taken opinion of the
Secretary of Justice that —
Such claim for damages which the subdivision condominium buyer may have against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman, being a
necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for non-performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily
included in the phrase "claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344.
The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary
consequence of the claims/cases specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the subject
provisions.
The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are recoverable either by agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art.
2208 of the Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages are awarded and (2) where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim. LibLex
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC the authority to adjudicate claims for
damages and for damages and for attorney's fees would result in multiplicity of suits in that the subdivision/condominium buyer who wins
a case in the HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be forced to litigate in the regular
courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in the contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.) 7
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help
in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture
of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties
in accordance with the legislative purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, 9 the Court
sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957
and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.
It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority 10 is not in
point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the procedure for appeal provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that
the National Housing Authority and not the Regional Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section 1 of the
said decree. That is what we are doing now. LexLib
It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before
this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel, 12 which does not appear in the case before
us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to
plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision
will entail, to nullify the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.

Content
[G.R. No. 84811. August 29, 1989.]
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA
PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Teresita Payawal, herein respondent filed a complaint
against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. It was alleged that petitioner
contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina,
and had already paid the defendant the agreed amount of
P38,949.87 in monthly instalments. Solid Homes
subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but
failed to deliver the certificate of title. It was found that
the former had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a
financing company. Payawal asked either for delivery of
the title to the lot or, the return of all the amounts paid
by her plus interest.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being
vested in the National Housing Authority (NHA)
under PD No. 957 citing Sec. 3 of the decree. Payawal
on the other hand relies on BP 129 which confers on
regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
mentioned in its Sec. 19. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the herein respondent. Solid Homes
appealed but the decision was affirmed by the
respondent court.

In case of conflict between a general law and a special

law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of
their enactment. A strict construction of the subject
provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC
the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for
damages and for attorney's fees would result in
multiplicity of suits in that the
subdivision/condominium buyer who wins a case in the
HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim
damages and attorney's fees would be forced to litigate
in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is
obviously not in the contemplation of the law.
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society, it has become necessary to create more and
more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of
its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative
agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to
discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the
legislative purpose.

ISSUE: W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and

the competence to award damages
HELD:
The Court reversed the decision of the CA, and
sustained the contention of Solid Homes Inc. in finding
that the National Housing Authority (NHA) has
jurisdiction over the case.
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD
No. 1344, Section 1 of the latter decree provides: In the
exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real
estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund
and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
Undoubtedly, "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case
between the petitioner and the private respondent is
vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the
National Housing Authority.

[G.R. No. 156164. September 4, 2009.]

SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA, petitioners, vs. HON. JACINTO G. ANG, DENNIS R. PASTRANA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CITY
AND ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR OF PASIG, RESPECTIVELY, FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN L. SOBREPEÑA, NOEL M. CARIÑO,
ROBERTO S. ROCO, ALICE ODCHIQUE-BONDOC, * ROMULO T. SANTOS AND ENRIQUE A. SOBREPEÑA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before us is the petition for certiorari 1 filed by the spouses Leonardo and Milagros Chua (petitioners) to assail the Resolution dated
November 4, 2002 of the City Prosecutor of Pasig in I.S. No. PSG 02-02-09150. The City Prosecutor's Resolution dismissed the complaint
filed by the petitioners against Ferdinand T. Santos, Robert John L. Sobrepeña, Noel M. Cariño, Roberto S. Roco, Alice Odchique-Bondoc,
Romulo T. Santos and Enrique A. Sobrepeña, Jr. (private respondents) for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known
as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree". TcCDIS
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The antecedent facts, drawn from the records, are briefly summarized below.
On February 11, 1999, the petitioners (as buyers) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers) executed a Contract To Sell 2 a
condominium unit. Despite the lapse of three (3) years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condominium unit to the
petitioners.
As a result, the petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 a Complaint-Affidavit 3 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing
the private respondents, as officers and directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No. 957, specifically its Sections 17 and 20, in relation with
Section 39. 4 These provisions state:
Sec. 17. Registration. — All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar instruments relative to the sale or conveyance of the
subdivision lots and condominium units, whether or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated. DSITEH
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and
other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the
issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 39. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued
pursuant to this Decree shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or
imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, That in the case of corporations, partnership, cooperatives, or associations, the
President, Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible for
any violation of this Decree and/or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. [Emphasis supplied] TDCcAE
The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to them and
did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of Deeds.
Of the seven (7) private respondents, only private respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-Affidavit. 5 She countered that the
City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB).
On November 4, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public respondents),
respectively issued and approved the Resolution 6 dismissing the complaint for being premature. The Resolution held that it is the HLURB
that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices.
THE PETITION and THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
On December 12, 2002, the petitioners filed the present petition 7 anchored on the following ground: HaDEIc
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S COMPLAINANT (sic) ON THE GROUND THAT THE HLURB, NOT THEIR OFFICE
HAS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND FILE THE CORRESPONDING INFORMATION IN COURT FOR
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF P.D. No. 957. 8
The petitioners argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is lodged with the city prosecutor and that the jurisdiction of the
HLURB under P.D. No. 957 is limited to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the investigation of criminal complaints.
In their Comment, 9 the private respondents submit that the petition should be dismissed outright because the petitioners failed to avail
of other remedies provided by law, such as (a) the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, (b) the filing
of a petition for review with the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), (c) the filing of a motion for reconsideration of any judgment
rendered by the DOJ, or (d) the filing of an appeal or a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA); that even if certiorari is a proper
remedy, the petition was filed in violation of the hierarchy of courts; and that even on the merits, the petition must fail since the public
respondents correctly dismissed the complaint as a reasonable interpretation of P.D. No. 957 which requires a prior determination by the
HLURB that a corporation violated P.D. No. 957 before criminal charges may be filed against its corporate officers. EHTISC
In their Reply, the petitioners reiterate that the public respondents abdicated their authority to conduct a preliminary investigation and to
indict the private respondents for criminal violations of P.D. No. 957 when they dismissed the criminal complaint for being premature. 10
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
At the outset, we note that the petitioners indeed filed the present petition for certiorari without prior recourse to other available remedies
provided by law and the observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the rules on prior recourse to these available remedies
are not without exceptions, nor is the observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts an inflexible rule; the peculiarity, uniqueness and
unusual character of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case may allow the flexible application of these established legal principles
to achieve fair and speedy dispensation of justice.
A prior motion for reconsideration is unnecessary: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is an extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
or (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. 11 CSTEHI
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
12
On the non-observance of the principle of hierarchy of courts, it must be remembered that this rule generally applies to cases involving
conflicting factual allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not
triers of facts. 13 A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present
case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal. In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that we merely
abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues outright. 14
cCSDTI
In the present petition for certiorari, we find that there are four (4) compelling reasons to allow the petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction
in the first instance, even without prior recourse to a motion for reconsideration or to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, and even
in disregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
First, the petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction over criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957. A question of
law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 15
As noted earlier, this Court is the undisputed final arbiter of all questions of law.
Second, the present case requires prompt action because public interest and welfare are involved in subdivision and condominium
development, as the terms of P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344 expressly reflect. 16 Questions of conflicting processes, essentially based on
jurisdiction, will consistently recur as people's need for housing (and hence, subdivisions and condominiums) escalate. Shelter is a basic
human need whose fulfillment cannot afford any kind of delay. 17 cHSIAC
Third, considering that this case has been pending for nearly seven (7) years (since the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit on September 3,
2002) to the prejudice not only of the parties involved, but also of the subdivision and condominium regulatory system and its need for the
prompt determination of controversies, the interests of justice now demand the direct resolution of the jurisdictional issue this proceeding
poses. As mentioned, at stake in this case is shelter — a basic human need and to remand the case to the DOJ for a determination of the
merits of the parties' jurisdictional tug-of-war would not serve any purpose other than to further delay its resolution. 18 Thus, the
practicality of the situation and the need for the speedy administration of justice justify a departure from the strict application of procedural
rules. Besides, the issue before us presents no special difficulty, and we feel it should be decided now, without going through the procedural
formalities that shall anyway end up with this Court.
Fourth, the petition is meritorious. The public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaints for
violation of P.D. No. 957 on the ground that jurisdiction lies with the HLURB. IDTSEH
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating and defining the terms of the agency's mandate. P.D. No. 1344 clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the
grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB in the following specific terms: 19
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium
units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. SEcADa
The extent of its quasi-judicial authority, on the other hand, is defined by the terms of P.D. No. 957 whose Section 3 provides:
. . . National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate
trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was to
provide for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties — buyers and sellers of subdivision and condominium units
— may seek remedial recourse. The law recognized, too, that subdivision and condominium development involves public interest and
welfare and should be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has technical expertise. 20 In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on the
other hand, is empowered to interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of private parties under these contracts. This ancillary
power, generally judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to the extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide. 21 acTDCI
Viewed from this perspective, the HLURB's jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of parties under subdivision and
condominium contracts comes out very clearly. But hand in hand with this definition and grant of authority is the provision on criminal
penalties for violations of the Decree, provided under the Decree's Section 39, heretofore quoted. Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests
the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to impose
administrative fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective
Decree. This Section of the Decree provides:
Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. — The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the
provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs of
execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
The Implementing Rules, for their part, clarify that "The implementation and payment of administrative fines shall not preclude criminal
prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of the Decree". Thus, the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two
separate remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal
prosecution. ITaCEc
Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (and in this case no such provision applies), the determination of the criminal
liability lies within the realm of criminal procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these Rules provide that the
prerogative to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause lies with the persons duly authorized by law; as provided in this
Rule, they are (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) other officers as may be authorized by law.
In the present case, the petitioners have expressly chosen to pursue the criminal prosecution as their remedy but the prosecutor dismissed
their complaint. The prosecutor's dismissal for prematurity was apparently on the view that an administrative finding of violation must
first be obtained before recourse can be made to criminal prosecution. This view is not without its model in other laws; one such law is in
the prosecution of unfair labor practice under the Labor Code where no criminal prosecution for unfair labor practice can be instituted
without a final judgment in a previous administrative proceeding. 22 The need for a final administrative determination in unfair labor
practice cases, however, is a matter expressly required by law. Where the law is silent on this matter, as in this case, the fundamental
principle — that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions 23 — fully applies, subject only to the rules on forum shopping
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. 24 In the present case, forum shopping is not even a matter for consideration since the
petitioners have chosen to pursue only one remedy — criminal prosecution. Thus, we see no bar to their immediate recourse to criminal
prosecution by filing the appropriate complaint before the prosecutor's office. ATcEDS
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the public respondent prosecutors should have made a determination of probable cause in the
complaint before them, instead of simply dismissing it for prematurity. Their failure to do so and the dismissal they ordered effectively
constituted an evasion of a positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law; they acted on the case in a manner outside
the contemplation of law. This is grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or in excess of jurisdiction warranting a reversal of the
assailed resolution. 25 In the concrete context of this case, the public prosecutors effectively shied away from their duty to prosecute, a
criminal violation of P.D. No. 957 as mandated by Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 5180, 26 as amended,
27 otherwise known as the Law on Uniform Procedure of Preliminary Investigation.
As a final word, we stress that the immediate recourse to this Court that this Decision allows should not serve as a precedent in other cases
where the prosecutor dismisses a criminal complaint, whether under P.D. No. 957 or any other law. Recourse to (a) the filing a motion for
reconsideration with the City or Provincial Prosecutor, (b) the filing a petition for review with the Secretary of the DOJ, (c) the filing a motion
for reconsideration of any judgment rendered by the DOJ, and (d) intermediate recourse to the CA, are remedies that the dictates of orderly
procedure and the hierarchy of authorities cannot dispense with. * Only the extremely peculiar circumstances of the present case compelled
us to rule as we did; thus our ruling in this regard is a rare one that should be considered pro hac vice. cDEICH
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated November 4, 2002 of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig in I.S. No. PSG 02-02-09150. The complaint is hereby ordered returned to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig
City for the determination of probable cause and the filing of the necessary information, if warranted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 180394. September 29, 2008.]

MARJORIE B. CADIMAS, by her Attorney-In-Fact, VENANCIO Z. ROSALES, petitioner, vs. MARITES CARRION and GEMMA HUGO,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98572. The appellate court set aside two orders 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 85,
Quezon City issued in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. HETDAa
The instant petition stemmed from the complaint 5 for accion reivindicatoria and damages filed by petitioner Marjorie B. Cadimas, through
her attorney-in-fact, Venancio Z. Rosales, against respondents Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-04-53581 and raffled to Branch 85 of the RTC of Quezon City.
In the complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent Carrion were parties to a Contract To Sell dated 4 August 2003, wherein
petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a town house located at Lot 4-F-1-12 No. 23 Aster Street, West Fairview Park Subdivision, Quezon
City for the sum of P330,000.00 to be paid in installments. According to petitioner, Carrion had violated paragraph 8 of said contract when
she transferred ownership of the property to respondent Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which authorized the latter
to manage and administer the property for and in behalf of respondent Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked respondent Carrion in writing
to explain the alleged violation but the latter ignored petitioner's letter, prompting petitioner to demand in writing that Carrion and Hugo
vacate the property and to cancel the contract. 6
On 28 October 2004, petitioner filed a Motion To Declare Defendant Marites Carrion In Default, 7 alleging that despite the service of
summons and a copy of the complaint, respondent Carrion failed to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period. DTEAHI
Respondent Hugo filed a Motion To Dismiss 8 on her behalf and on behalf of respondent Carrion on 18 November 2004, citing the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction to hear the case on the part of the RTC and estoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner. Respondent Hugo argued
that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over the complaint because ultimately, the sole issue to be
resolved was whether petitioner, as the owner and developer of the subdivision on which the subject property stood, was guilty of committing
unsound real estate business practices.
In the same motion, respondent Hugo averred that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Carrion for not
complying with Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on the proper service of summons on a non-resident defendant. However, attached
to the motion was a special power of attorney, whereby respondent Carrion had authorized respondent Hugo, among others, to manage
and administer the subject property and to prosecute and defend all suits to protect her rights and interest in said property. 9
After petitioner filed a comment on the motion to dismiss, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 10 on 21 March 2005, which denied the
motion to dismiss. The RTC held that the court's jurisdiction is not determined by the defenses set up in the answer or the motion to
dismiss. HAICcD
In the same omnibus order, the RTC ruled that summons was served properly, thus, the court had acquired jurisdiction over respondent
Carrion. The RTC noted that respondent Hugo's failure to disclose at the outset that she was equipped with a special power of attorney was
an act constitutive of misleading the court. Thus, the RTC declared respondent Carrion in default, directed petitioner to present evidence
ex-parte against respondent Carrion, and respondent Hugo to file an answer.
On 18 April 2005, respondent Hugo filed an answer on her behalf and as the attorney-in-fact of respondent Carrion. 11 The answer pleaded
a compulsory counterclaim for damages. The following day, petitioner presented evidence ex-parte against respondent Carrion. Thus, on
22 April 2005, respondent Hugo sought a reconsideration of the omnibus order, praying for the dismissal of the complaint, the cancellation
of the presentation of evidence ex-parte, the lifting of the order of default against respondent Carrion and the issuance of an order directing
the extraterritorial service of summons on respondent Carrion. 12
On 17 January 2007, the RTC issued an order, upholding its jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. Citing the interest of substantial
justice, the RTC lifted the order of default against respondent Carrion and set the pre-trial conference of the case. 13 HIaAED
However, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, praying that the Omnibus Order
dated 21 March 2005 and Order dated 17 January 2007 issued by Judge Teodoro T. Riel be reversed and set aside and that the complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On 27 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision granting respondents' petition for certiorari. The appellate
court set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In its Resolution
dated 9 November 2007, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following arguments: (1) based on the allegations in the complaint, the RTC has jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. Q-04-53581; (2) in any case, respondents have expressly submitted to or recognized the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing an
answer with counterclaim; and (3) respondents erroneously availed of a Rule 65 petition instead of filing a timely appeal from the order
denying their motion to dismiss. 14 cIHCST
Essentially, petitioner argues that based on the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs sought, the RTC has jurisdiction over the matter.
In any case, the compulsory counterclaim pleaded in the answer of respondents was an express recognition on their part of the jurisdiction
of the RTC over the complaint for accion reivindicatoria, petitioner adds.
The petition is meritorious.
The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the
time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and
not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. 15
An examination of Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344, 16 which enumerates the regulatory functions of the HLURB, 17 readily
shows that its quasi-judicial function is limited to hearing only the following specific cases: CTAIHc
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman.
The aforequoted provision must be read in the light of the statute's preamble or the introductory or preparatory clause that explains the
reasons for its enactment or the contextual basis for its interpretation. The scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the National
Housing Authority (NHA) [now HLURB] is indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide: aSTHDc
"WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems
and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances,
and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value ." 18
The boom in the real estate business all over the country resulted in more litigation between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers
with the issue of the jurisdiction of the NHA or the HLURB over such controversies as against that of regular courts. In the cases that
reached this Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts
between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual
and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in. 19 CSIcHA
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that it has jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations of the complaint. Nothing in the complaint
or in the contract to sell suggests that petitioner is the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There is nothing in the
allegations in the complaint or in the terms and conditions of the contract to sell that would suggest that the nature of the controversy
calls for the application of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D. No. 1344 insofar as the extent of the powers and duties of the HLURB is concerned.
Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344 as worded, where the HLURB's jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to paragraph (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices", the logical complainants
would be the buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and realtors), and not
vice versa. 20
The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot buyer. The contract to sell does not contain clauses which would indicate
that petitioner has obligations in the capacity of a subdivision lot developer, owner or broker or salesman or a person engaged in real estate
business. From the face of the complaint and the contract to sell, petitioner is an ordinary seller of an interest in the subject property who
is seeking redress for the alleged violation of the terms of the contract to sell. Petitioner's complaint alleged that a contract to sell over a
townhouse was entered into by and between petitioner and respondent Carrion and that the latter breached the contract when Carrion
transferred the same to respondent Hugo without petitioner's consent. 21 Thus, petitioner sought the cancellation of the contract and the
recovery of possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. HaTDAE
In Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Manila, 22 the Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for
accion publiciana and sum of money on the ground that the complaint did not allege that the subject lot was part of a subdivision project
but that the sale was an ordinary sale on an installment basis. Even the mere assertion that the defendant is a subdivision developer or
that the subject lot is a subdivision lot does not automatically vest jurisdiction on the HLURB. On its face, the complaint must sufficiently
describe the lot as a subdivision lot and sold by the defendant in his capacity as a subdivision developer to fall within the purview of P.D.
No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344 and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. 23
In their comment, respondents cite Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, 24 to bolster the argument that the HLURB has
jurisdiction over controversies involving the determination of the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot. Antipolo
Realty is not squarely applicable to the instant controversy. The issue in said case called for the determination of whether the developer
complied with its obligations to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of time, a case that
clearly falls under Section 1, paragraph (c) of P.D. No. 1344. IcCATD
In the instances where the jurisdiction of the HLURB was upheld, the allegations in the complaint clearly showed that the case involved
the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957, 25 or the complaint for specific
performance sought to compel the subdivision developer to comply with its undertaking under the contract to sell, 26 or the claim by the
subdivision developer would have been properly pleaded as a counterclaim in the HLURB case filed by the buyer against the developer to
avoid splitting causes of action. 27
The statement in Suntay v. Gocolay 28 to the effect that P.D. No. 957 encompasses all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums,
which was cited by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision, is a mere obiter dictum. As a matter of fact, the Court in Suntay nullified
the orders issued by the HLURB over the action for the annulment of an auction sale, cancellation of notice of levy and damages on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344 were not the applicable laws because the action was brought against a
condominium buyer and not against the developer, seller, or broker contemplated under P.D. No. 1344. The action likewise involved the
determination of ownership over the disputed condominium unit, which by its nature does not fall under the classes of disputes cognizable
by the HLURB under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344. TEcCHD
The Court of Appeals held that the provision in the contract to sell mandating membership of the buyer of the housing unit in a housing
corporation was a strong indication that the property purchased by respondent Carrion from petitioner was part of a tract of land subdivided
primarily for residential purposes. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the controversy because the
property subject thereof was part of a subdivision project.
Not every controversy involving a subdivision or condominium unit falls under the competence of the HLURB 29 in the same way that the
mere allegation of relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not
automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is
the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344. 30 Notably, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 31 the Court
upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for cancellation of the contract to sell of a subdivision house and lot because the case
did not fall under any of the cases mentioned in Section 1, P.D. No. 1344. In interpreting said provision, the Court explained, thus:
DHaEAS
On this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA) before and now
the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations.
For their part, respondents claim that the resolution of the case ultimately calls for the interpretation of the contract to sell and the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of committing unsound real estate business practices, thus, the proper forum to hear and
decide the matter is the HLURB. The argument does not impress.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary
consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss,
for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court
is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. 32 Thus, the allegations in respondents' motion to dismiss on the unsound real estate
business practices allegedly committed by petitioner, even if proved to be true, cannot serve to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over actions
for breach of contract and damages which has been conferred to it by law. SEIcHa
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the Decision dated 27 September 2007 and Resolution dated
9 November 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98572 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated 21 March 2005 and
17 January 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to resume the proceedings in and decide Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 with deliberate speed. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 20, 1998] →

Padua v. Ranada [G.R. No. 141949. October 14, 2002]

08AUG
FACTS
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments on Metro Manila
Skyway. It was thereafter published in newspapers of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks. However, there
was no hearing conducted for the matter. Deliberations were not even attended by Board Members except TRB Executive
Director Jaime Dumlao, Jr. Petitioners assail the validity of the resolution.

ISSUES
Whether or not Resolution No. 2001-89 is invalid on the ground that:

 (a) it was in violation of due process;

 (b) the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable; and,
 (c) TRB Executive Director Jaime Dumlao, Jr. alone authorized the provisional increase.
RULING
“(a) No. TRB clearly complied with the publication requirements. Also, the TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any
petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on
the merits of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion provisionally
grant.
“(b) No. This is obviously a question of fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in
determining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within the province of the TRB. The SC takes cognizance of the wealth
of jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this era
of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, is indispensable. Between the power lodged in an
administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former.”
“(c) No. It is not true that it was TRB Executive Director Dumlao, Jr. alone who issued Resolution No. 2001-89. The
Resolution itself contains the signature of the four TRB Directors. Petitioner Padua would argue that while these Directors
signed the Resolution, none of them personally attended the hearing. This argument is misplaced. Under our jurisprudence,
an administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive
evidence, conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure
is a practical necessity. Corollarily, in a catena of cases, the Supreme Court laid down the cardinal requirements of due
process in administrative proceedings, one of which is that “the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate.” Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the hearing
or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely rely on his recommendation but
instead shall personally weigh and assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered.”
 CASE DIGEST: Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA G.R. No. 88550 (184
SCRA 462) Case Digest
Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:

 Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the exploration
of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.

 IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a
Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC.

 IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the
RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that
the rights for the operation be granted back.

 Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed

 Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.

 RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.

 CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil
court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is
inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development
and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance

, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks.
Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of
the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal
blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied
by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies
"where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited
and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by
 the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have
the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of
mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when
apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

Original source and full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/apr1990/gr_88550_1990.html

CASE DIGEST: Leonardo Paat vs CA G.R. no. 111107 (266 SCRA 167)
Concept: Doctrine of Prior Resort

Facts:
 May19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver of the truck was not able to
produce the required documents for the forest products.

 Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), issued an order of confiscation of
the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to sumbit an explanation and the
order of the CENRO was enforced.

 The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin against the
Layugan. Layugan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s decision

Issue: W/ON the trial court has jurisdiction? Did the owner exhaust all admin remedies, and

Held. No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones
cause of action.

Source and Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997/111107.htm