Notes From Perlas-Bernabe Cases

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2019 BAR NOTES DIVERSITY
I.
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. ESTELA PERLAS-BERNABE, in her capacity as Presiding

Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH
142; BANCAPITAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; and
EXCHANGE CAPITAL CORPORATION,Respondents.
Reason for consolidation of cases
1. avoids multiplicity of suits,
2. guards against oppression and abuse,
3. prevents delay,
4. clears congested court dockets,
5. simplifies the work of the courts and
6. seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to litigants
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which materially states:
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of

law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or
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trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Generally, consolidation applies only to cases pending before the same

judge and not to cases pending in different branches of the same court or
in different courts.[46]
Yet in appropriate instances and in the interest of justice, cases

pending in different branches of the court or in different courts may
be consolidated, consistent with the rule in our jurisdiction that leans
towards permitting consolidation of cases whenever possible and
irrespective of the diversity of the issues for resolution.[47]
Exception:
Hence, consolidation of cases is proper
1. when the actions involve the same reliefs or the same parties and
basically the same issues,[RIP] or
2. when there is real need to forestall the possibility of conflicting

decisions being rendered in the cases,[49]
Exception to the exception:
provided that the measure
1. will not give one party an undue advantage over the other, or
2. prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.
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II.
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO

NACIONAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221425
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a "JOHN,"
"KONYONG" SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL @
"INONG" @ DIONISIO NACIONAL, Accused-Appellants.
As a general rule, appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to

the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court; 19 except when the CA imposed the penalty
of "reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in
which case, the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal
filed before the CA.20
In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly availed of a wrong

mode of appeal by filing a petition for review
on certiorari before the Court, despite having been sentenced
by the CA of reclusion perpetua.
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Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court

will treat their petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve
the substantive issue at hand with finality.
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following

elements must be established:
(a) that a person was killed;
(b) the accused killed him or her;
(c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances

mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed

with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance."
There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance,

namely:
(a) the existence of the subject firearm; and
(b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did
not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his
residence.
The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in

the Information lies with the prosecution.
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1. Whether the JBC has the authority to determine the existence of

integrity of candidates for appointment to the judiciary. YES
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is the central authority, which
determines the existence of the subjective qualification of “integrity”
of candidates for appointment to the Judiciary.
Section 7 (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states that “[a]
Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence.” [CIPI]
However, such characteristics are innately subjective terms.
The ponencia aims to impress that “integrity” is doing the right thing
in accordance with the law and ethical standards every time.
However, since the qualification is subjective, there is a need of a

central authority that would standardize the criteria to determine
whether or not a person possesses these subjective qualifications that
renders him/her eligible to be a Member of the Judiciary.
By deliberate constitutional design, the central authority is the Judicial

and Bar Council.
In Jardeleza v. Sereno (Jardeleza), this Court declared that: “the

purpose of the JBC's existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical
constitutional declaration that “[a) member of the judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.”
Section 8 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that

“[t]he [Judicial and Bar] Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary.”
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In line with its mandate, the JBC is necessarily tasked to “screen

aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the
nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best
for appointment.
In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the

possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.”
In Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council (Villanueva), the Court

held that the JBC's “discretion is freed from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention to ensure that [it] is shielded from any outside
pressure and improper influence.”
2. Whether the JBC has the flexibility to set the standards for
determining integrity. YES
In order to fulfill its constitutional mandate, “the JBC had to establish

a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant
meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the
qualities expected of him and his office.”
Thus, the JBC has to concretize these qualifications into operable

standards, through demandable submissions and institutional checks;
otherwise, their determination would be highly subjective and more so,
inexecutable because of their obscurity.
In Villanueva, this Court characterized the JBC’s authority to set the

standards as one which is flexible.
Accordingly, this mirrors the JBC’s observation that it is “not possible

or advisable to lay down ironclad rules to determine the fitness of those
who aspire to become a Justice [or] Judge.”
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In the same case, this Court described the JBC’s license to act as
“sufficient” but nonetheless, exhorted that the same is “not unbridled”.
Moreover, the Court ruled that “the JBC has the authority to determine
how best to perform [its] constitutional mandate”.
In Aguinaldo v. Aquino Ill, it was further declared that “[t]he JBC, as

a constitutional body, enjoys independence, and as such, it may change
its practice from time to time in accordance with its wisdom.”
The JBC relaxed the rules in its screening process by allowing

substantial compliance in the submission of the SALNs.
o Rule 4 of JBC-009 shows that the JBC implements a rigorous

screening process, which includes the conduct of a discreet
background check, as well as the receipt of written oppositions
and anonymous complaints against a candidate, if any.
o A perusal of Rule 4 of JBC-009 shows that the candidate’s

submission of a SALN was not required for the JBC to assess an
applicant’s integrity.
The submission of a SALN has, in fact, not been required in the

present iteration of the JBC Rules.
As Respondent herself points out, the JBC had separately

required the submission of a SALN for the first time in 2009 for
“candidates for appellate magistracy who were from the private
sector”; and also, in February 2011, the JBC required the
submission of the applicant’s SALNs for the past two (2) years.
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o Respondent was only able to submit her SALN for years 2009,
2010 and 2011, which were filed while she was serving as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
However, records show that a number of Respondent’s co-

applicants for the same position in 2012 were similarly unable to
submit all their previous SALNs while in government service.
Despite the JBC’s note regarding the submission of incomplete

or out of date documentary requirements, records bear out that
the JBC nonetheless adopted a policy of substantial compliance,
at least with respect to the SALN requirement.
o The JBC noted that Respondent did not submit her SALNs for a
period of 10 years from 1986 to 2006 when she was employed in
the UP College of Law.
Nevertheless, the JBC included Respondent’s name in the

shortlist of qualified nominees for the Chief Justice position
submitted to the President.
3. Whether the non-filing of SALN may discredit one’s integrity and

consequently render an applicant ineligible to be appointed to the
Judiciary.
It is within the JBC’s sphere of authority to determine if non-

compliance with the legal requirements on the filing of SALNs -
assuming that Respondent had indeed failed to file her SALNs as
prescribed by law - is per se determinative of one’s lack of "proven
integrity.”
While it is true that the 1987 Constitution states that “[a] public officer
or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as
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may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,

liabilities, and net worth,” it is not sufficiently clear that the solitary
breach of this requirement would virtually negate one's integrity as a
qualification for appointment to the Judiciary.
According to jurisprudence, the filing of a public official’s SALN is a

measure of transparency that is “aimed particularly at curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service.”
In line with this policy to exact transparency, the non-submission of

the SALN is penalized as a crime.
The non-filing of SALN, while criminal in nature, is malum

prohibitum.
As illumined by this Court in Dungo v. People, crimes which are

classified as mala prohibita are to be distinguished from crimes that
are mala in se in that the latter is inherently immoral or vile, while the
former is not but is only penalized by reasons of public policy.
There is a lack of established authority as well as rational soundness to

consider the non-filing of SALNs as in the same place of constitutional
or ethical non-negotiables.
True, non-compliance per se may result in penal or administrative

sanctions; however, I am unable to jump to the conclusion that the
filing of one’s SALN, being in the nature of malum prohibitum, should
be considered as a ground to per se obliterate the integrity of a
candidate to - or a duly appointed member of - the Judiciary.
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At the very least, should this Court make such a determination, then it
must first accord participation to the JBC in the proper proceeding
therefor.
This is not only in due deference to the JBC's role in our constitutional
order, it is also because the JBC in this case appears to have not
accorded strict compliance with the SALN requirement which thus,
tends to show that it was not that crucial in assessing the candidate's
subjective qualifications.
4. Whether impeachment is the sole mode of removing impeachable

officials. NO
The roots of the Philippine’s concept of impeachment - as was adopted

in the 1935 Constitution and carried over to the 1987 Constitution –
can be traced to the Constitution of the United States, which was, in
turn, borrowed from English law.
As manifested in the statements of the Founding Fathers, an

impeachment proceeding was intended to try offenses which are
denominated as “political” in character.
The grounds for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution are:
(1) culpable violation of the Constitution;
(2) treason;
(3) bribery;
(4) graft and corruption;
(5) other high crimes; and
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(6) betrayal of public trust.
Palpably, the common thread amongst these grounds is that they are all
serious political offenses that bear on one's fitness to continue with the
discharge of his or her public office.
As they are in the nature of “offenses,” they essentially presume intent

or negligence on the part of the wrongdoer, which need not obtain
when one fails to meet the minimum qualifications for eligibility as
prescribed by law.
Owing to both the political and offense-based nature of these grounds,

I am thus inclined to believe that impeachment is not the sole mode of
removing impeachable officials as it would be clearly absurd for any
of them to remain in office despite their failure to meet the minimum
eligibility requirements, which failure does not constitute a ground for
impeachment.
Sensibly, there should be a remedy to oust all our public officials, no

matter how high-ranking they are or critical their functions may be,
upon a determination that they have not actually qualified for election
or appointment.
While I do recognize the wisdom of insulating impeachable officials

from suits that may impede the performance of vital public functions,
ultimately, this concern cannot override the basic qualification
requirements of public office.
There is no doubt that qualification should precede authority.
5. Whether quo warranto is the proper remedy. NO
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Quo warranto is a prerogative writ used to inquire into the legality of

the claim which a party asserts to an office, and to oust him if the claim
is not well-founded.
By nature, it partakes of a direct attack to the title of one’s office.
The OSG failed to consider that the qualification being assailed, i.e.
proven integrity, is a subjective qualification that has been previously
determined based on certain criteria set by the JBC.
As may be gathered throughout this discourse - it could not have been

intended that the subjective qualifications of any judge or justice be
directly assailed before a court of law; otherwise, that court would be
basically supplanting the Council's determination thereof, and in so
doing, effectively assume the latter's role incongruous to and
disruptive of the current structure of the Constitution.
This is not to say that the JBC’s determination of an appointee's

integrity, competence, probity, and independence is completely
insulated from judicial intervention.
Again, in the proper scheme of things, the JBC’s official acts are
presumed to be valid and hence, assailable only on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion coursed through a petition for certiorari.
As per our existing procedural framework, grave abuse of discretion is

not an available ground under the rules on quo warranto; more so, the
Solicitor General had expressly admitted that it considers immaterial
the issue of grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, if grave abuse of discretion has not been asserted nor was it
attributed against the JBC, which was not even made a party to this
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case, then the qualification of Respondent, as embodied in her

shortlisting by the JBC, should be maintained.
For these reasons, the present petition for quo warranto is infirm.
6. Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. YES
The filing of a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.
o “Integrity,” as well as the other subjective qualifications of

“competence,” “probity,” and “independence,” are personal
qualities that are hardly determinable from the facts on record.
Unless they are first concretized into operable guidelines and

criteria the determination of the same would be clearly subject to
varied interpretation.
The nature of these subjective qualifications starkly contrasts

with the qualifications of age, natural-born citizenship, and years
of legal practice, which are inherently objective in nature.
o On the other hand, there is an unavoidable and imperative need

to set definable criteria before one may be able to establish the
presence or absence of a subjective qualification; in fact, the
enterprise of interpretation is intrinsically linked to the nature
of a subjective qualification.
This is because one cannot ascertain if a candidate is of proven

integrity, competence, probity or independence, unless these
personal qualities are first interpreted into demonstrable
standards therefor.
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Based on these premises, it is therefore my view that when the

JBC imposes a requirement that bears on an applicant’s
subjective qualification, such as integrity, it ineluctably engages
in the enterprise of interpretation.
In so doing, the JBC exercises an inherent policy function and

perforce, the treatment and application of said requirement -
being a concrete embodiment of the JBC’s interpretation - should
be deemed as “political questions,” which are generally non-
justiciable, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
o A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the

subjective qualifications of a Judiciary appointee.
This is because a Judiciary appointee’s subjective qualification

should always be determined relative to the interpretation,
treatment, and application of the standards employed by the JBC.
Being the body specifically tasked by the Constitution to

recommend appointees to the Judiciary, due deference should be
given to the JBC’s nomination of a particular candidate.
It is understood that when the JBC submits its shortlist of

candidates, it has screened those included therein and resolved
that they have presumably met all the minimum constitutional
requirements, including the subjective qualification of “proven
integrity.”
The screening and shortlisting of candidates for appointment are

all official acts of the JBC.
Thus, as in all official acts of government, a candidate’s full

qualification for appointment - which is manifested by his or her
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JBC nomination - should be accorded with the presumption of

validity hence, should prevail until nullified on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion duly raised in a petition for certiorari.
o Besides, a petition for certiorari is not only the proper mode of

invoking grave abuse of discretion against the act of any
instrumentality of government.
Based on recently decided cases, it is also the proper vehicle for

invoking the Court's supervisory power over the JBC.
o Guided by the cases of Jardeleza and Villanueva, should the JBC

(a) commit an obvious due process violation - for instance, by
clearly discriminating on the application of its promulgated rules
against a certain applicant in favor of others – or (b) issue a policy
that unquestionably transgresses the Constitution - for example,
by setting criteria that violates the equal protection clause or
perhaps by qualifying a candidate who undeniably lacks integrity
for committing egregious crimes or ethical violations (e.g.,
plunder, rape, murder, and the like) - then this Court, as it had in
the past, would not hesitate to wield its supervisory authority over
the JBC, much more its expanded power of judicial review, being
the institutional check against grave abuse of discretion
committed by any government instrumentality as mandated by
the Constitution.
o Unlike in those cases, the OSG in this case purports no due

process violation or any other serious constitutional violation on
the part of the JBC.
In fact, the Solicitor General has voluntarily admitted that the

JBC’s grave abuse of discretion is not at all an issue.
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This is further magnified by the fact that the JBC was not even
impleaded as a party to these proceedings.
7. Whether the Court should address the issue of misrepresentation

as allegedly committed by the Respondent not only in her
application before the JBC, but also with respect to the filing of her
SALNs.
NO
While the facts on record and Respondent’s own statements cast

shadows of doubt on her claim that she indeed faithfully filed all her
SALNs in full compliance with the law, the bottom line is that this
Court cannot altogether conclude - without the JBC as party to this case
- that Respondent's non-filing of her SALNs would have affected the
JBC’s determination as regards her integrity and perforce, result in her
non-inclusion in the shortlist of qualified appointees.
Misrepresentation is always relative to the fact being misrepresented;

hence, it is for the JBC to determine if indeed any misrepresentation
with respect to the filing of her SALNs (or for that matter, the
incomplete submission thereof before the Council) would have been
material to its appreciation of Respondent's “proven integrity.”
In fact, the need to ascertain the JBC's official take on the matter gains
greater force when one considers that the JBC had accorded substantial
compliance on the SALN requirement, which shows its liberal
treatment therefor.
This is not to say that the JBC has absolute free-will in resolving an
issue of misrepresentation.
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As the ponencia exclaims, it is beyond cavil that the JBC cannot

bargain away qualifications under the Constitution.
However, whatever would be its resolution on an issue of

misrepresentation, it remains imperative that the JBC be made a party
in a certiorari case duly filed for the purpose.
III.
August 8, 2017
G.R. No. 225442
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),*

JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO
BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS
REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself
and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR
JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by
MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,
result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall

under the void for vagueness doctrine;
(b)suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate

activities of minors during curfew hours fail to pass the strict
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scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing
means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes
1. the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also
2. "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions

for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government may be determined under the Constitution."27
It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the

remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued
a) to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a

tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also
b) to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
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Government, even if the latter does not exercise

judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the

second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cited above]."
It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when

an act is
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or
(2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice,

ill will or personal bias. "
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must

first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
a) certiorari,
b) prohibition,
c) mandamus,
d) quo warranto, and
e) habeas corpus.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)]

and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this
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Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and

important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in
the petition[.]"32
This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of

a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case.
Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question

involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the

exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c)the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case."
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the

traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual
case or controversy."35
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"[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict

of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.'
In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights

that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."36
According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its

expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement
is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is

the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged

has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a

prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action.
He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of

sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."
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"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the

determination of whether those assailing the governmental act
have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for
adjudication.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial

interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged
governmental act."40
"' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an interest

that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as
distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party

alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional

rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."42
"In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards
the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount
interest is involved.
Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the
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Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance

of the suit.
It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that

they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act."
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it

lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,

especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out

its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."48
The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process

considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.
In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional

uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty
cases."
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1) "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where

the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give
adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as
to provide proper standards for adjudication.
Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine.
This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with

the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is
no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are
"void-for-vagueness."50
It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of

the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."56
Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be read and

implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the

State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their
children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.
It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the

rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
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of moral character shall receive the support of the

Government.
"[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be

read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be

stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
[S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66
Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental

health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare
is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override
the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated

to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties.
State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,

complementary to parental supervision.
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.

AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court
explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale
of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily

apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
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protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations

not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for

being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only
to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is

that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation.
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is

unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the

rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests.
In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges

are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable
until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
The factor that motivates courts to depart from the

normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on
third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.
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The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence

may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression."
An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that

deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.82
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it

was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the
basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness.
Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to

violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are
raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of
freedom of expression."87
Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,

jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose

limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they:
(1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or

public health; and
(2) are provided by law.97
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3)

justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights.
These are:
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first, the peculiar vulnerability of children;
second, their inability to make critical decisions in an

informed and mature manner; and
third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:118
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial

scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications.122
1) The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either
(i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,

including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or
(ii) burdens suspect classes.123
2) The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification

does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but
requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on
gender and legitimacy.124
3) Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not
covered by the first two tests.125
Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults
because the state has a greater range of interests that justify
the infringement of minors' rights.
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Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that

interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.131
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the

classification
(1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State

interest, and
(2) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or

the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish
the interest.132
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include

constitutionally declared policies.133
This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's
mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae
constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the
State.134
It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some

individual liberties must give way.135
As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the

State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on
minors than on adults.
The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this

compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
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Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to

enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the
general welfare clause.140
In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have
not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate
legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect
to minors.
As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and

enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from
pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional
rights.
While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or

only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address
the State's compelling interest.
When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more

narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights,
then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer

usually in the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p]unishment
imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a
deliberate or negligent act."159
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Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine,

penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege -
assessed against a person who has violated the law."160
For one, the community service programs provide minors an

alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for
their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by
jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and

compliance with the law and legal orders.
More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become

productive members of society and thereby promote their
integration to and solidarity with their community.
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

(RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly
declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a
penalty."166
the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that

reprimand is a penalty,
A writ of kalikasan is a legal remedy under Philippine law which

provides for the protection of one’s right to “a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” as
provided for in the Constitution.
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It may be sought to deal with environmental damage of such

magnitude that it threatens life, health, or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.
IV.
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 230065
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MARCELINO CRISPO y DESCALSO alias "GOGO" and
ENRICO HERRERA y MONTES, Accused-Appellant
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as

to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
In People v. Jao,23 the Court eloquently summed up the effects of

the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities,24 as
follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon.
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As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the

accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
25
strictiore. "
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,

respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165.
Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused

charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution
must prove:
(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.29
Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal

Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish
the following elements to warrant his conviction:
(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as

a prohibited drug;
(b) such possession was not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.30
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the

identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty,
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considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of

the corpus delicti of the crime.
Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of

the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the
chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.31
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the

police officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order
to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.32
Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,33 the

apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after
seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from confiscation for examination.34
In the case of People v. Mendoza,35 the Court stressed

that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative
from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs), the evils
of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA]
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads
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as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and

confiscation of the[said drugs] that were evidence herein of
the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved

an unbroken chain of custody."36
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions,

strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 may not always be possible.37
In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165

- which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of
RA 1064038 - provide that the said inventory and photography may
be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and
that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items
so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team. 39
In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly

comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that:
(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
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(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.40
In People v.Almorfe,41 the Court explained that for the above-

saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless
been preserved.42
Also, in People v. De Guzman, 43 it was emphasized that the

justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds
are or that they even exist.44
V.
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage

under Article 3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than
a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family
Code, among others,34 include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
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There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.35
In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that

psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage);
(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of

the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and
(c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were

otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved).37
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation

and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of
the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted
hereunder.39
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court

established in Santos.40
39
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
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This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation."
It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. x x x
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(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"

cannot be accepted as root causes.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
To hark back to what has been earlier discussed,

psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.46
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. (Id. at 276-280.)
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that
therein respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
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personality which make her completely unable to discharge the

essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42
In the same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v.

Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner
therein "utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and
in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage,"
significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity."
In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that the
petitioner therein had not established that her husband "showed
signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has
preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet
his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical
illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified
medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that
the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature."44
VI.
July 25, 2017
G.R. No. 227757
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.,

REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE
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RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE,

REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES,
REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, and
REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO,Petitioners
vs.
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER
RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E.
SUAREZ, Respondents
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal,

corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when
it or he
a) unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, or
b) unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a

right or office or
c) which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy,

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."10
In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11 the Court

explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and
the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an
adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to
the performance of the act to be compelled.12
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Page 41 of 222
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Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House
of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem

necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives

shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership.
Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may

decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method
and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something
within its sole control.23
In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,24 which involved

a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th
Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that "[w]hile the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker
of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House].
All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.'
[As such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers
is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House of

Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. "25
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Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI26 of the Constitution

vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter
alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings."
These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the

imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity.
In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the

pleasure of the body adopting them.'
Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no

concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority
[of the House of Representatives]. "27
Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere

and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running
afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold x x x.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign

acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the
internal workings of the [House of Representatives]."28
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception.
While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an

act of the political departments of government, will not review the
wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will, however, strike
it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.29
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This stems from the expanded concept of judicial power, which,

under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly
"includes the duty of the courts of justice
1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and
2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government including Congress.
It is an innovation in our political law.
As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:30
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not

a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on

matters of this nature.31
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that
involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate
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cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or

department of the government."32
VII.
April 24, 2017
G.R. No. 189950*
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON

BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF LOURDES S.
BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF
NELLIE BILAG, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP,
SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., and MA.
TERESA A. RAMIREZ, Respondents
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is defined

as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a
case.
In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to

dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others,
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power

to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of
the court that it exists.
Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
only power it has is to dismiss the action." 23
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Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal should first

determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter
presented before it, considering that any act that it performs without
jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal
effects.
The Court's pronouncement in Tan v. Cinco,24 is instructive on this

matter, to wit:
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and

void and may be attacked anytime.
It creates no rights and produces no effect.1âwphi1
It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper

forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction is a total nullity.
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from

it have no legal effect. 25
VIII.
October 10, 2017
G.R. No. 229781
SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA
ROSA, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National
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Police, PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS, in his capacity as

Director, Headquarters Support Service, SUPT. ARNEL
JAMANDRON APUD, in his capacity as Chief, PNP Custodial
Service Unit, and ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR
CONTROL, SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION OR DIRECTION IN
RELATION TO THE ORDERS THAT MAY BE ISSUED BY THE
COURT, Respondents
SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual

on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an

instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the

notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary;

and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such

instrument or document.
While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular

notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to
that of a private document, which requires /roof of its due execution
and authenticity to be admissible as evidence,"37 the same cannot
be considered controlling in determining compliance with the
requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
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Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the petitions

for certiorari and prohibition must be verified and accompanied by
a "sworn certificate of non-forum shopping."
In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

states that "[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant
has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records."
"A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper

verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading."
Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete

statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or

claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed."
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"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be

curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."
In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification

and Certification against Forum Shopping in the presence of the
notary, she has likewise failed to properly swear under oath the
contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and
invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping.
The significance of a proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity

was elucidated in William Go Que Construction v. Court of
Appeals,39where this Court held that:
In this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification

against Forum Shopping attached to the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 was not accompanied
with a valid affidavit/properly certified under oath.
This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did
not indicate the pertinent details regarding the
affiants' (i.e., private respondents) competent evidence of
identities.
Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6,

2004, entitled the "2004 Rules on Notarial Practice" (2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice), a jurat refers to an act in which an individual
on a single occasion:
xxxx
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In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that

noncompliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein
"does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the

pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby."
"Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who

has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct."
Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification

requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private
respondents actually swore to the truth of the allegations in the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of
competent evidence of any of their identities.
Because of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents
swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt.
For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance

with the certification against forum shopping requirement.
In Fernandez, the Court explained that "non-compliance therewith

or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by
its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
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need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or

presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons."'
Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist - any
perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which
justifies the rules' relaxation.
At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents

certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is
pending in another forum.
xxxx
Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative."
On the other hand, "[t]he certification against forum shopping is

required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora."
The important purposes behind these requirements cannot be
simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying
their relaxation.
In this case, proper justification is especially called for in light of the

serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining
private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales.
Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions before it as

compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring
anew the submission of a proper verification/certification against
forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored settled
procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion.
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All things considered, the proper course of action was for it to

dismiss the petition.40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the

Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, there is no
assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the allegations
in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct,
and not merely speculative.
It must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a

meaningless formality.
Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience

or sheer caprice,41as what apparently happened in the present
case.
Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly

affixed her signature also negates a proper attestation that forum
shopping has not been committed by the filing of the petition.
Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned
pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this Court.42
In Salum bides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,43the Court held

thus:
The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance

with the requirement of verification and that of certification
against forum shopping.
A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned

pleading and thus produces no legal effect, subject to the
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discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied,

while the failure to certify against forum shopping shall be
cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, and is not curable by amendment of the initiatory
pleading. (Emphasis and italicization from the original.)
Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her

failure to sign the Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping in the presence of the notary.
There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the
petitioner's non-compliance therewith.
This Court had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief

of certiorari to observe the rules, since nonobservance thereof
cannot be brushed aside as a "mere technicality."44
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for
these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.45
Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of

action is to dismiss outright the present petition.
Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with

disfavor by this Court.46
It will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in

the lower courts.47
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of

courts is an important component of the orderly administration of
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justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary

reasons.48
The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs

of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify
an exception to the policy.
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,49the

Court explained the reason for the doctrine thusly:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the

hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to
be ignored without serious consequences.
The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court

from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the
Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs

of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify
an exception to the policy.
xxxx
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of
the evidence presented before them.
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They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which

may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution.
To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially

organized into regions and then into branches.
Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of

inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
presented before them.
In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial

jurisdiction, which properly present the "actual case" that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such
action.
The consequences, of course, would be national in scope.
There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at

their level would not be practical considering their decisions
could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court

that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts.
It is collegiate in nature.
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This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the

actions of the trial court.
But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over

most special civil actions.
Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope.
It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on

constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless
there are factual questions to determine.
This court (SC), on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking
new ground or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances
or in the light of some confusion of bench or bar - existing
precedents.
Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the
actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.50
These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent

vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined

exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the

following grounds are present:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be

addressed immediately;
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(2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel;
(4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this
Court;
(5) when time is of the essence;
(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional

organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public
welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice;
(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate

remedy.51
This admission against interest binds the petitioner; an

admission against interest being the best evidence that affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.56
It is based on the presumption that "no man would declare

anything against himself unless such declaration is true. "57
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It can be presumed then that the declaration corresponds with

the truth, and it is her fault if it does not.58
Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

requires the existence of "final judgments and orders of lower
courts" before the Court can exercise its power to "review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue," viz.:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of

any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court

is in issue.
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(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed

is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is

involved.
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail

themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different fora,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
a) the same transactions and the same essential facts and

circumstances; and
b) raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already

resolved adversely by some other court; or
c) for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a

favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another.
The rationale against forum-shopping is that a party should not

be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts,
for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which
a) tends to degrade the administration of justice,
b) wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and
c) adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the

courts.
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What is essential in determining the existence of forum-

shopping is the vexation caused the courts and litigants by a party
who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on
similar or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially
similar reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered upon the same issues.
We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the

rule against forum-shopping is the rendition by two competent
tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions.
To avoid any confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules

against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in
the dismissal of a case.
The acts committed and described herein can possibly constitute

direct contempt.70
Last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which

states that "[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
a) summary dismissal with prejudice and
b) shall constitute direct contempt as well as
c) a cause for administrative sanctions.
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is
a) whether the elements of litis pendentia, or
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b) whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in

the other.
Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements

are present:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same

interests in both actions;
Anent the first requisite,
1) there is an identity of parties when the parties in both

actions are the same, or
2) there is privity between them, or
3) they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the

commencement of the action litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity.72
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.71
Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where

the same evidence necessary to sustain the second cause of
action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if
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the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different from
each other.
If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2)
actions are considered the same within the rule that the
judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action;
otherwise, it is not.73
What is more, while Justice Caguioa highlights our pronouncement

in Jent excepting an "appeal or special civil action for certiorari"
from the rule against the violation of forum shopping, the good
justice overlooks that the phrase had been used with respect to
forum shopping committed through successive actions by a "party,
against whom an adverse judgment or order has [already] been
rendered in one forum."75
The exception with respect to an "appeal or special civil action

for certiorari" does not apply where the forum shopping is
committed by simultaneous actions where no judgment or order
has yet been rendered by either forum.
To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on the Motion to
Quash.
Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the RTC
are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions
for certiorari from the rule against forum shopping.
As this Court clarified in Quimvel v. People, 77 the designation of

the offense in the Information is a critical element required under
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the
accused of the offense being charged, viz.:
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The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the

designation of the offense as appearing in the Information.
The designation of the offense is a critical element required under

Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising
the accused of the offense being charged.
Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise

on the accused and to afford him of the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly.
Its import is underscored in this case where the preamble states

that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No.7610."
On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually
participated in the actual trafficking of dangerous drugs and had
simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so is non sequitur [an invalid
argument whose conclusion is not supported by its premises] given that the allegation
of conspiracy makes her liable for the acts of her co-conspirators.
As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable for a co-

conspirator to take a direct part in every act of the crime.
A conspirator need not even know of all the parts which the others
have to perform,81 as conspiracy is the common design to commit
a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution
of the crime. 82
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As long as the accused, in one way or another, helped and

cooperated in the consummation of a felony, she is liable as a co-
principal.83
In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered as only one of

the possible component acts of illegal trading which may be
committed through two modes:
(1) illegal trafficking using electronic devices; or
(2) acting as a broker in any transactions involved in the illegal

trafficking of dangerous drugs.
As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as 1916,

jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply a
middleman, negotiating contracts relative to property with which he
has no custody, viz.:
A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for

others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to
property with the custody of which he has no concern; the
negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own
name, but in the name of those who employed him; he is
strictly a middleman and for some purposes the agent of both
parties.84
For the Court, the primary occupation of a broker is simply

bringing "the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is
eventually made.
For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to prosper,

proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought together the
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buyer and seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices such as,
but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-
way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms" is
sufficient.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or

information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea
(before arraignment).
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made
a) with leave of court and
b) when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of

the accused.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal
case is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the

commencement of the action.
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not

transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies
a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether
the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking

government officials is not omnipotent.
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The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its

limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,97 which
amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.98
As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the

following:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions

of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
'27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxxx
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as

Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution;
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(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional

Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27'
and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with

other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive

original jurisdiction where the information:
(a) does not allege any damage to the government or any

bribery; or
(b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from

the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount
not exceeding One Million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).
The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan

primarily sits as a special anti-graft court pursuant to a specific
injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99
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Its characterization and continuation as such was expressly given

a constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the

Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by

public officers is not determined solely by the pay scale or by the
fact that they were committed "in relation to their office."
In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and

decide criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of
the criminal prosecution must likewise be considered.
well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored.
It is only accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so

repugnant that the two laws cannot be enforced.106
The presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of

two laws involved one is special and the other general.107
The mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law

prevails over a general law applies regardless of the laws'
respective dates of passage.
Thus, this Court ruled:
x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special

law prevails over a general law - regardless of their dates
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of passage - and the special is to be considered as

remaining an exception to the general.
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between

statutes.
If reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled

in that manner.
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and

the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to
warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the
other.108
Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3)
possible alternative actions when confronted with a Motion to
Quash:
1. Order the amendment of the Information;
2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or
3. Deny the Motion to Quash.
The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion
to quash is meritorious.
Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should
the Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation,
the trial court can order the amendment of the Information under
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which states:
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SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If

the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not

constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the
court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make

the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers
from the same defect despite the amendment.
The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the
Information curable by an amendment amounts to an arbitrary
exercise of power.
So, this Court held in Dio v. People:
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with
the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power.
In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division):
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity

and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be
cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to
quash and order the prosecution to file an amended
Information.
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Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information

to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be
corrected by an amendment.
In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically

quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution
the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment.
This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay.
By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment,

unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only
result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process

underpinnings of this rule.
As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just

like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court.
Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity

to amend an Information, where such right is expressly
granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again
in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the
State's right to due process.112
Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to

establish the venue - a matter of jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, the court a quo has the power to order the amendment
of the February 17, 2017 Information filed against the petitioner.
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This power to order the amendment is not reposed with this Court
in the exercise of its certiorari powers.
Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually

ordering the quashal of the Infonnation, the prosecution is not
precluded from filing another information.
An order sustaining the motion to quash the information would

neither bar another prosecution113 or require the release of the
accused from custody.
Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court can simply order that another complaint or information be filed
without discharging the accused from custody.
Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the

motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed except as provided in Section
6 of this rule.
If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be

discharged unless admitted to bail.
If no order is made or if having been made, no new information

is filed within the time specified in the order or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause, the
accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also
in custody for another charge.
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Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision,

prevents the re-filing of an information on only two grounds:
a) that the criminal action or liability has already been

extinguished, and
b) that of double jeopardy.
Neither was invoked in petitioner's Motion to Quash filed

before the court a quo.
The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion
to quash.
Even granting, for the nonce, the petitioner's position that the
trial court's issuance of the warrant for her arrest is an implied
denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy against this
court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition
for certiorari.
This Court in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this established

doctrine:
A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the

propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the
petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his
motion to quash.
In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash

filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court's

decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise
the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error
committed by the trial court but as an added ground to
overturn the latter's ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order

and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not
allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which

can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other
adequate, plain and speedy remedy.
The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order

is to proceed to trial as discussed above.114
Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.116
In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to

first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest.
There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support

the petitioner's claim.
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Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court117 required the

respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its
supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10)
days, viz.:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. –
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on

record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,

or a commitment order when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge

may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.
Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the

judge is required before a warrant of arrest may issue.
The Constitution123 and the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure124 command the judge "to refrain from making a
mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct
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his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by

both parties. "125
This much is clear from this Court's ruling in Soliven cited by the
petitioner, viz.:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and

personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
the existence of probable cause.
In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting

documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may

disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.126
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated
in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again what probable
cause means.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the

existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
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reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an

offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, 'must

satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet

tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation.
It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in

determining probable cause.
In Webb v. De Leon we stressed that the judge merely

determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the
accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de
novo hearing.
He simply personally reviews the prosecutor's initial

determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence."
xxxx
x x x [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the

prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of
a warrant of arrest.
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Obviously and understandably, the contents of the

prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that there
is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him
for trial.
However, the judge must decide independently.
Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the

prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own
findings on the existence (or non-existence) of probable
cause to issue an arrest order.
This responsibility of determining personally and

independently the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of
the land.
Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the

judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the
latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding
probable cause, but also so much of the records and the
evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his
personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a
warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the

case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judge.
We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to

examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for
the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused.
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What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient

supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of
the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity

in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn
gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we
repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden
duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer.128
Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the

issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is tasked to merely
determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the
accused.129
She is given wide latitude of discretion in the determination of

probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.130
A finding of probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not

require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction.131
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It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained

of constitutes the offense charged.132
Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled in Estrada v. Office of the

Ombudsman138that hearsay evidence is admissible during
preliminary investigation.
The Court held thusly:
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay

evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable

cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.139
Verily, the admissibility of evidence,140 their evidentiary weight,

probative value, and the credibility of the witness are matters that
are best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial,141 not during a
preliminary investigation where the technical rules of evidence are
not applied142 nor at the stage of the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to the conduct of trial on

the merits for the petitioner and the prosecution to present their
respective evidence in support of their allegations.
XV.
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November 29, 2017
G.R. No. 229335
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioner
vs.
BELLY H. NG, represented by ANNABELLE G. WONG,
Respondent
Under Section 10 of the IRR, the improvements and/or structures

on the land to be acquired shall be appraised using the
replacement cost method, thus:
Section 10. Valuation of Improvements and/or

Structures. –
Pursuant to Section 7 of [RA 8974], the Implementing

Agency shall determine the valuation of the improvements
and/or structures on the land to be acquired using the
replacement cost method.
The replacement cost of the improvements/structures is

defined as the amount necessary to replace the
improvements/structures, based on the current market prices
for materials, equipment, labor, contractor's profit and
overhead, and all other attendant costs associated with the
acquisition and installation in place of the affected
improvements/structures.
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In the valuation of the affected improvements/structures, the

Implementing Agency shall consider, among other things, the
kinds and quantities of materials/equipment used, the
location, configuration and other physical features of the
properties, and prevailing construction prices. (Emphasis
supplied)
The replacement cost method is premised on the principle of

substitution, which means that "all things being equal, a rational,
informed purchaser would pay no more for a property than the cost
of building an acceptable substitute with like utility."55
Accordingly, the Implementing Agency should consider:
(a) construction costs or the current market price of materials,

equipment, labor, as well as the contractor's profit and
overhead; and
(b) attendant costs or the cost associated with the acquisition

and installation of an acceptable substitute in place of the
affected improvements/structures.56
In addition, the case of Republic v. Mupas (Mupas)57 instructs

that in using the replacement cost method to ascertain the value of
improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant standards
provided under Section 558 of RA 8974, as well as equity consistent
with the principle that eminent domain is a concept of equity and
fairness that attempts to make the landowner whole.
Thus, it is not the amount of the owner's investment, but the "value
of the interest" in land taken by eminent domain, that is guaranteed
to the owner.59
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While there are various methods of appraising a property using the

cost approach, among them, the reproduction cost, the
replacement cost new, and the depreciated replacement
cost, Mupas declared that the use of the depreciated replacement
cost method60 is consistent with the principle that the property
owner shall be compensated for his actual loss,61 bearing in mind
that the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to
the property owner alone, but must likewise be just to the public
which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
The property owner is entitled to compensation only for what he

actually loses, and what he loses is only the actual value of the
property at the time of the taking.62
Hence, even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his

property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly
favor him to the prejudice of the public.63
XVI.
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family

as the basic social institution,33 and marriage as the foundation of
the family.34
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Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally

inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the

marriage under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.36
It should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical -

incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under
Article 6837 of the Family Code, among others,38 include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity, and render help and support.39
In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent

as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological

incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by:
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;
(b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of

the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
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(c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure

would be beyond the means of the party involved.42
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation

and application of Article 36
43
in Republic v. Molina (Molina) whose salient points are
footnoted below,44 that incorporated the basic requirements the
Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an

expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
(1) the totality of the evidence shows that psychological

incapacity exists and
(2) its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly

established.45
The evidence need not necessarily come from the allegedly

incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately
related to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who
could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's
condition at or about the time of the marriage.46
In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its

application calls for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity.47
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To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still establish

the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and
juridical antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein

respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be
equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or
sexual promiscuity.49
In Taring v. Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable

differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a
person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake the obligations
of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses."51
The Court equally did not consider as tantamount to psychological

incapacity the emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual
promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by the
petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v.
Encelan,53 Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to
name a few, and thus dismissed their petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
XVII.
August 1, 2017
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G.R. No. 186050
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO,

JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEVERLY
LONGID, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RON ALDO PUNO,
NORBERTO GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen.
JESUS VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir.
EDGARDO DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISA GANI CACHUELA,
Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio City,
PSS EUGENE MARTIN, and several JOHN DOES, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 186059
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY GILBERTO

TEODORO, SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN.
JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ.
GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA, and POL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE
MARTIN,Respondents*,
vs.
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO,
JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEYERL Y LONG
ID, Respondents.
As mentioned in the Court's June 21, 2016 Resolution, "archiving

of cases is a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer
the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected,
but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal.
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Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in

abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon
can be taken.
To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases,

provided that it is impelled by a valid cause, such as
(1) when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives
or
(2) to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court

from effectively hearing and conducting
the amparo proceedings x x x.
"Section 20 of A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, entitled "The Rule on the

Writ of Amparo,"21reads:
Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court

shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its
determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the
failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on
their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by

the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by
any party, order their revival when ready for further
proceedings.
The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to

prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice
to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
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XVIII.
G.R. No. 194247 June 19, 2013
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSA REYES, CENANDO, REYES and CARLOS
REYES, Respondents.
Motion for Summary Judgment19 (motion for summary

judgment), contending that there were no genuine issues left for
resolution, except for the amount of damages to be paid as just
compensation.
Under Section 2, Rule 4133 of the Rules of Court, there are two
(2) modes of appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction:
(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed

questions of fact and law, the proper recourse is an ordinary
appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule
44 of the Rules of Court; and
(b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the

appeal shall be to the Court by petition for review on certiorari
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary thereto, should a party raise only questions of law through

an ordinary appeal taken under Rule 41, Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be dismissed.34
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Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the

doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of
facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of
fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts.
The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of
"law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the
same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the
issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.35
In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the

question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts
are correct is a question of law.36
However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or

the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each
other, the issue is factual.37
Summary judgment is not warranted when there are genuine

issues which call for a full blown trial.
It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just

compensation can only be made after due ascertainment of the
requirements set forth under RA 8974 and not merely based on the
declarations of the parties.47
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the

Philippines,52 special and compelling reasons constitute
recognized exceptions to the rule on immutability of judgment,
viz:
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As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended

or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it
the highest Court of the land, rendered it.
In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to this

rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the
interest of substantial justice and where special and
compelling reasons for such actions.
XIX.
Section 2, Article III[32] of the 1987 Constitution mandates

that a search and seizure must be carried out through or
on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning
of the said constitutional provision.
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures,

Section 3 (2), Article III[33] of the 1987 Constitution
provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree.
In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable

searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding.[34]
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One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a

search may be effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a

lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed.
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant.
With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113

of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a
general rule - be complied with:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
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nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in

accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when
warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected.
These are:
(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal

knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed; and
(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving

final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
toanother.[36]
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential

that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled
with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be
nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search
incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance
with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.
In Pestilos v. Generoso,[37] the Court explained the requirement

of immediacy as follows:
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's

appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
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committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and

circumstances that the person to be arrested; committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts

or circumstance" under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances.
According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are

attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual

perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer
at the scene of the crime.
Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his
personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime,
he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of

facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered.
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This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure

that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time
frame.
This guarantees that the police officers would have no

time to base their probable cause finding on facts or
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very
limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement

of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid
warrantless arrest.[38] (gap from the commission of the crime to the
arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to
become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay.
On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed

under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of
probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they
were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement

of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
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circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid

warrantless arrest.[38]
In Caballes v. People,[39] the Court explained the concept of

warrantless searches on moving vehicles:
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent

mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.
Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have

over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
of practicality.
This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,

the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity.
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving

vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
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Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for

the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at
borders or "constructive borders" like checkpoints near
the boundary lines of the State.[40] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may

entail the setup of military or police checkpoints - as in
this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per
se for as long as its necessity is justified by the
exigencies of public order and conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists.[41]
Case law further states that routine inspections in checkpoints

are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable searches, and thus, permissible, if limited to
the following:
(a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a

vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;
(b) simply looks into a vehicle;
(c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or

body search;
(e) where the inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a visual

search or visual inspection; and
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(e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[42]
It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not

give police officers carte blanche discretion to conduct
warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive

search - as opposed to a mere routine inspection - such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as
the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.[43]
XX.
Closure of business is an authorized cause for

termination of employment, Article 298 (formerly, Article
283) of the Labor Code, as amended, reads:
ART. 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of

Personnel. - The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation
of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing
is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof. x x x.
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In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases

of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or to at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher.
A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered

one (1) whole year.
In this relation, jurisprudence provides that "[t]he

determination to cease operations is a prerogative of
management which the State does not usually interfere
with, as no business or undertaking must be required to
continue operating simply because it has to maintain its
workers in employment, and such act would be
tantamount to a taking of property without due process of
law.
As long as the company's exercise of the same is in good

faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of
circumventing the rights of employees under the law or a
valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld."44
Procedurally, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the

Labor Code, as amended provides for three (3)
requirements to properly effectuate termination on
the ground of closure or cessation of business
operations. These are:
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(a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the

DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of
termination;
(b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in

character; and
(c) payment to the employees of termination pay

amounting to one (1) month pay or at least one-half month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.45
Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an

employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.46
In Agabon, the Court pronounced that, where the

dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal,
or ineffectual.47
However, the employer should indemnify the employee for

the violation of his statutory rights.
Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the

employee nominal damages in the amount of
P30,000.00.48
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court

modified Agabon in the case of Jaka Food Processing
Corporation v. Pacot49 (Jaka) where it created a
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distinction between procedurally defective dismissals due

to a just cause, on the one hand, and those due to an
authorized cause, on the other.
In Jaka, it was explained that if the dismissal is based on

a just cause under Article 282 (now, Article 297) of the
Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the
notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him
should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in
effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article
283 (now, Article 298) of the Labor Code but the employer
failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction
should be stiffer because the dismissal process was
initiated by the employer's exercise of his management
prerogative.
Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an

authorized cause of retrenchment - as contradistinguished
from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just
cause of neglect of duty - the Court ordered the employer
to pay the employee nominal damages at the higher
amount of P50,000.00.50
G.J.T. Rebuilders Machine Shop v. Ambos:61
Notice of the eventual closure of establishment is a

"personal right of the employee to be personally
informed of his [or her] proposed dismissal as well as
the reasons therefor."
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The reason for this requirement is to "give the

employee some time in prepare for the eventual
loss of his [or her] job."62
XXI.

vs
ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE
JESUS, Accused-Appellants
Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance
of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceeding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and punished
by reclusion temporal.
"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following

elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying
circumstance;
(3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and
(4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.
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Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of

execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could
cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or
attendance."24
On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the RPC (the
controlling provision as the rapes were committed prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 835325 in 1997) read:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is

committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly

weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
xxxx
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are:
(a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
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(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of

force or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12)
years of age or demented.
The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the
use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime
will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher
penalty."26
XXII.
RIZALDO L. ORSOS, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. - Any person who shall

commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex,
under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.
There must be a confluence of the following elements before

conviction can be had for such crime:
(1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or

lewdness;
(2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances:
(a) through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;
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(c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

authority; and
(d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present; and
(3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.45
On the other hand, RA 7610 finds application when the victims of

abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children or those "persons
below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition."46
Section 5 (b) thereof provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. –
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any

other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
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(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of

age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the

victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period[.] (Emphases supplied)
The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7

610 are as follows:
(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or

subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of

age.47
"Lascivious conduct" is defined in Section 32, Article XIII of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7610, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of

the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
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any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent

to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.48
In Quimvel v. People,51 however, the Court clarified that "force

and intimidation" is subsumed under "coercion and influence," and
that "x x x lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's
free will.x x x
[T]he term 'influence' means the 'improper use of power or trust in

any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's
objective.'
Meanwhile, 'coercion' is the 'improper use of x x x power to compel

another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.’"
XXIII.
ROBERT and NENITA DE LEON, Petitioners,

vs.
GILBERT and ANALYN DELA LLANA, Respondents.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged")34 is a fundamental

principle of law which precludes parties from re-litigating issues
actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.35
It means that "a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court

of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in
the former suit."36
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Notably, res judicata has two (2) concepts.
The first is "bar by prior judgment" in which the judgment or

decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause
of action before the same or other tribunal, while the second
concept is "conclusiveness of judgment" in which any right, fact
or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.37
There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties,

subject matter, and causes of action between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to
be barred.38
There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where

there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action.39
In Allied Banking Corporation v. CA,40 citing Escarte v. Office

of the President,41 the Court defined "judgment on the merits" as
follows:
As a technical legal term, ‘merits’ has been defined in law

dictionaries as a matter of substance in law, as distinguished
from matter of form, and as the real or substantial grounds of
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action or defense, in contradistinction to some technical or

collateral matter raised in the course of the suit.
A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration

of the law to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based
upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings
and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives or
contentions.
a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal

determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with
respect to the causes of action and the subject matter.
The distinction between the two was discussed in Heirs of Intac

v. CA,48 viz.:
Articles 1345 and 1346 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative.
The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound
at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void.
A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person

and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real
agreement.
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If the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real
agreement, the contract is only relatively simulated and the
parties are still bound by their real agreement.
Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are

present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms
of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and
enforceable between the parties and their successors in
interest.
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no

substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it.
"The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the

apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce
legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the
parties."
"As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is

void, and the parties may recover from each other what they
may have given under the contract."49
XXIV.
ACE NAVIGATION COMPANY and VELA INTERNATIONAL

MARINE LIMITED, Petitioners,
vs.
SANTOS D. GARCIA, Respondent.
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,47 the Court

held that the company-designated physician is given a leeway of
an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to
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give the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a

declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability.
Thus, it is only upon the lapse of 240 days, or when so declared by

the company-designated physician, that a seafarer may be
deemed totally and permanently disabled, viz.:
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from

his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician
within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment.
For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120

days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is
totally unable to work.
He receives his basic wage during this period until he is

declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract [(SEC)] and by applicable
Philippine laws.
If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such

declaration is made because the seafarer requires further
medical attention, then the temporary total disability period
may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the
right of the employer to declare within this period that a
permanent partial or total disability already exists.
The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any

time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.
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As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only

becomes permanent when so declared by the company
physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon
the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment
period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the
existence of a permanent disability.
In the present case, while the initial 120-day treatment or

temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-
designated doctor duly made a declaration well within the
extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work.48
XXV.
PAZ CHENG y CHU, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period

to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
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In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties

which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be[.]
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,

money, goods or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property;
xxxx
The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows:
(1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal

property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same;
(2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or

property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property;
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(3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of

another; and
(4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.17
In the case of Pamintuan v. People,18 the Court had the

opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of the aforesaid
crime, as well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for the
same, to wit:
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or

conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the entity to whom a return should be made.
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of using

or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion

to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of
the property of another without right.
In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a

legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the
accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return
the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts. 19
XXVI.
FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
vs.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,RESPONDENT.
In Labao v. Flores (G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010,

634 SCRA 723, 730-732), the Court held that:
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period
of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution sought to be assailed.
The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any

unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
xxxx
However, there are recognized exceptions to their

strict observance, such as:
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not

commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately

paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or

negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules;
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(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely

frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
(9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence

without appellant’s fault;
(10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances

attendant to each case;
(11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by

all the attendant circumstances. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have a land

registered in his name has the burden of proving that he is its
owner in fee simple [a permanent and absolute tenure of an estate in land with freedom
to dispose of it at will, especially (in full fee simple absolute) a freehold tenure, which is the main type
of land ownership.], even though there is no opposition thereto.
As held in Republic v. Lee:25
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no

person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral
or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the
same, even though there is no opposition presented against
such registration by third persons. x x x
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In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall
be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the
benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued, the
burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute
owner, in fee simple."26 (Citation omitted)
Further, as the CA correctly pointed out, land registration

proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence, by virtue of the
publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the subject
property are deemed to be notified of the existence of a cadastral
case involving the subject lots.28
In this regard, petitioner cannot, therefore, take refuge on the lack

of any personal knowledge on its part previous to its application.
Case law dictates that a cadastral proceeding is one in rem and

binds the whole world.29
Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the

same issues already determined by final judgment.30
Moreover, as amply addressed by the CA, the RTC’s Amended

Order was issued in violation of the doctrine of judicial stability.
This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of competent

jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction.31
The rationale for the same is founded on the concept of

jurisdiction – verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the
case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate [equal in rank or
importance] courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and
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to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial

officers acting in connection with this judgment.32
Therefore, as the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in stark

[complete; sheer] contravention of this rule, the CA correctly
ordered its nullification.
Finally, while petitioner points out to the fact that respondent

belatedly filed its certiorari petition before the CA, it must be
observed that the CA had already exercised its discretion in giving
due course to the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the strict application of the rules on

filing a petition for certiorari may be relaxed, among others, in the
exercise of the sound discretion by the judge (or the CA) as guided
by all the attendant circumstances,33 as in this case.
Indeed, the Court can only commiserate [express or feel sympathy or pity;
sympathize.] with petitioner as it has already gone through the rigors of
proving its cause before the RTC only to fall short of its ultimate
objective.
Yet, the Court’s duty to uphold the principles of law and

jurisprudential pronouncements as herein discussed remains
staunch [Having a strong or substantial construction or constitution:] and unyielding.
Definitively, the Court cannot sanction the registration of the

subject lots when there stands an existing decision binding over
the same.
Neither can the Court allow the RTC to set aside the ruling of a co-
equal and coordinate court.
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Based on these reasons, the Court is therefore constrained to

sustain the nullification of the RTC Decision and Amended Order
as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of
petitioner.
Notably, this course of action is without prejudice to the re-filing of

another application for registration wherein petitioner can prove,
among others, that the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 does not affect
its title to the subject lots.
Petitioner may also choose to pursue any other remedy available

to it under the law.
XXVII.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee

vs.
NIÑO CALIBOD y HENOBESO, Accused-appellant
Calibod was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous

drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165.
In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused

charged with the said crime, the prosecution must prove:
consideration; and
Further, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be

proved with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug
itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
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Thus, in order to remove any unnecessary doubts on the identity of

the dangerous drug, the prosecution must show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same, accounting for each link thereof
from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.31
As held in the Dela Riva v. People,32 the chain of custody is

divided into four (4) links:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug

recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the

apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal

drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug

seized by the forensic chemist to the court.33
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the

procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the
seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.34
Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among

others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
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given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be

turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.35

that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the Department of
Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching,
'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted
the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were
evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have

preserved an unbroken chain of custody."37
Notably, the Court declared that while the chain of custody rule
demands utmost compliance from the police officers, strict
adherence with the prescribed procedure may not always be
possible under varied field conditions.38
In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA

9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage
of RA 1064039 - provide that the requisite inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless
seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not
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render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the
seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team.40
1. Simply put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply

with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR
does not ipso facto [by that very fact or act. "the enemy of one's enemy may be ipso facto
a friend"] render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that:
2.
3. (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
4.
5. (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
6.
7. In People v. Almorfe,42 the Court explained that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity
and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.43
8.
9. Moreover, in People v. De Guzman,44 it was emphasized that the
1. By and large, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed

by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militates [(of a fact or circumstance) be a powerful or conclusive factor in preventing.
"these fundamental differences will militate against the two communities coming together" Synonyms
tend to prevent, work against, resist, hinder, discourage, oppose, counter, cancel out, foil, prejudice,
operate/work/go/tell against, be detrimental to, be disadvantageous]
against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.49
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2. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a

matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment
to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.50
3.
4. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds
for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by
RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Calibod's acquittal is perforce
[necessarily] in order.
As a final note, it is fitting to mention that 'the Court strongly

supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against
those who would inflict this malediction [a magical word or phrase uttered with
the intention of bringing about evil or destruction; a curse.] upon our people, especially
the susceptible youth.
But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so

than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty
of every individual in the realm, including the basest [(of a person or a
person's actions or feelings) without moral principles; ignoble.] of criminals.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the

innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-
handedness [using power or authority without considering the feelings of others.] from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order.
For indeed, order is too high a price for the loss of liberty.'51
XXVIII.
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SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION (surviving entity

in a merger with Davao Fruits Corporation and other
Companies), Petitioners
vs.
BERNABE BAYA, Respondents
"To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy

of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court
or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred
upon it.
Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law."31
"In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed

[attribute something to (a cause)] to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."32
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that

the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC in reversing the LA ruling, as the LA's finding that
Baya was constructively dismissed from employment is
supported by substantial evidence.
"Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work,

because 'continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
or a diminution in pay' and other benefits.
Page 124 of 222
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Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to

dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive
dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on
the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him
except to forego his continued employment."33
In Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corp.,34 the Court held

that the burden is on the employer to prove that the transfer or
demotion of an employee was a valid exercise of management
prerogative and was not a mere subterfuge [deceit used in order to achieve
one's goal] to get rid of an employee; failing in which, the employer will
be found liable for constructive dismissal, viz.:
In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the

burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an
employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as
genuine business necessity.
Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive

dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to
the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.
Failure of the employer to overcome this burden of proof, the

employee's demotion shall no doubt be tantamount to
unlawful constructive dismissal.35
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that the top
management of both AMSFC and DFC, which were sister
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companies at the time, were well-aware of the lack of supervisory

positions in AMSFC.
This notwithstanding, they still proceeded to order Baya's return

therein, thus, forcing him to accept rank-and-file positions.
Notably, AMSFC and DFC failed to refute the allegation that Baya's
"end of secondment [assignment of a member of one organisation to another organisation
for a temporary period.] with DFC" only occurred after:
(a) he and the rest of AMSKARBEMCO officials and members were

subjected to harassment and cooperative busting tactics employed
by AMSFC and DFC; and
(b) he refused to switch loyalties from AMSKARBEMCO to

SAFFPAI, the pro-company cooperative.
In this relation, the Court cannot lend credence to the contention

that Baya's termination was due to the ARBs' takeover of the
banana plantation, because the said takeover only occurred
on September 20, 2002, while the acts constitutive of constructive
dismissal were performed as early as August 30, 2002, when
Baya returned to AMSFC.
Thus, AMSFC and DFC are guilty of constructively dismissing

Baya.
However, in light of the underlying circumstances which led to

Baya's constructive dismissal, it is clear that an atmosphere of
animosity [strong hostility] and antagonism now exists between Baya
on the one hand, and AMSFC and DFC on the other, which
therefore calls for the application of the doctrine of strained
relations.
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"Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of

separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or
viable.
On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what

could be a highly oppressive work environment.
On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly

unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it
could no longer trust."36
Thus, it is more prudent that Baya be awarded separation pay,

instead of being reinstated, as computed by the CA.
Further, and as aptly [in an apt manner : in a way that is fitting or

appropriate] pointed out by both the LA and the CA, the acts
constitutive of Baya's constructive dismissal are clearly tainted with
bad faith as they were done to punish him for the actions of his
cooperative, AMSKARBEMCO, and for not switching his loyalty to
the pro-company cooperative, SAFFPAI.
This prompted Baya to litigate in order to protect his interest and to

recover what is properly due him.
Hence, the award of moral damages and attorney's fees are

warranted.
Finally, Sumifru's contention that it should only be held liable for the
period when Baya stayed with DFC as it only merged with the latter
and not with AMSFC 37 is untenable.
Section 80 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines clearly

states that one of the effects of a merger is that the surviving
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company shall inherit not only the assets, but also the liabilities of
the corporation it merged with, to wit:
Section 80. Effects of merger or consolidation. - The

merger or consolidation shall have the following effects:
1. The constituent corporations shall become a single

corporation which, in case of merger, shall be the surviving
corporation designated in the plan of merger; and, in case of
consolidation, shall be the consolidated corporation
designated in the plan of consolidation;
2. The separate existence of the constituent corporations shall

cease, except that of the surviving or the consolidated
corporation;
3. The surviving or the consolidated corporation shall possess

all the rights, privileges, immunities and powers and shall be
subject to all the duties and liabilities of a corporation
organized under this Code;
4. The surviving or the consolidated corporation shall

thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights, privileges,
immunities and franchises of each of the constituent
corporations; and all property, real or personal, and all
receivables due on whatever account, including subscriptions
to shares and other choses in action, and all and every other
interest of, or belonging to, or due to each constituent
corporation, shall be deemed transferred to and vested in
such surviving or consolidated corporation without further act
or deed; and
5. The surviving or consolidated corporation shall be

responsible and liable for all the liabilities and obligations of
Page 128 of 222
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each of the constituent corporations in the same manner as if

such surviving or consolidated corporation had itself incurred
such liabilities or obligations; and any pending claim, action or
proceeding brought by or against any of such constituent
corporations may be prosecuted by or against the surviving or
consolidated corporation.
The rights of creditors or liens upon the property of any of such

constituent corporations shall not be impaired by such merger
or consolidation.
In this case, it is worthy to stress that both AMSFC and DFC are
guilty of acts constitutive of constructive dismissal performed
against Baya.
As such, they should be deemed as solidarily liable for the

monetary awards in favor of Baya.
Meanwhile, Sumifru, as the surviving entity in its merger with DFC,

must be held answerable for the latter's liabilities, including its
solidary liability with AMSFC arising herein.
Verily, jurisprudence states that "in the merger of two existing

corporations, one of the corporations survives and continues the
business, while the other is dissolved and all its rights, properties
and liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation,"38 as in this
case.
XXIX.

vs.
NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS, Accused-Appellant
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Here, Ano was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of

Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165.
In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with

Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove:
consideration; and
It is likewise essential for a conviction that the drugs subject of the

sale be presented in court and its identity established with moral
certainty through an unbroken chain of custody over the same.
In cases like this, the prosecution must be able to account for each
link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti.23
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the

chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers
must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their
integrity and evidentiary value are preserved.24
Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,25 the

apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure
and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and take
photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom such items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given
Page 130 of 222

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a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination purposes.26

that "[w]ithout the insulating [protect (something) by interposing material that
prevents the loss of heat or the intrusion of sound.] presence of the representative
from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils
of switching, ‘planting’ or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA]
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure
and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein
of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved

an unbroken chain of custody."28
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions,

strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21of RA9165
may not always be possible.29
In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA

9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage
of RA 1064030- provide that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under
justifiable grounds - will not automatically render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.31
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In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly

comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and
its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that:
(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
In People v. Almorfe,[[33]] the Court explained that for the

above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain
the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.34
Also, in People v. De Guzman,35 it was emphasized that the

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there are
substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items from
Año which were unfortunately, left unjustified, thereby putting into
question their integrity and evidentiary value.
While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was
established by the attached Inventory of Seized/Confiscated
Items,37 the records are glaringly silent as to the presence of the
required witnesses, namely, the representatives from the media
and the DOJ.
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To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, prior to its amendment

by RA 10640, as well as its IRR requires the presence of the
following witnesses during the conduct of inventory and
photography of the seized items:
(a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel;
(b) any elected public official; and
(c) a representative from the media and the DOJ.38
In their absence, the prosecution must provide a credible

explanation justifying the noncompliance with the rule; otherwise,
the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165 (and now, the
amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165) would not apply.
Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to

justify the procedural lapse.
It then follows that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody
of the items seized from Año, thereby militating against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which resultantly warrants his
acquittal.39
It is well-settled that the procedure under Section 21, Article II of

RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.40
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have

the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth
in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended.
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As such, they must have the initiative to not

only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations
from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court.
Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the

integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately,
the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue
regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this
Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to
ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied
with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation.
If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden

duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.
XXX.
DIONISIO DACLES,*Petitioner, v. MILLENIUM

ERECTORS CORPORATION AND/OR RAGAS
TIU, Respondents.
Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, G. R. No. 199388,

September 3, 2014, 734 SCRA 270, 277-282. See also Section I
(c), Rule XXIII (Termination of Employment), Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code [as amended by
DOLE Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997], which govern
termination of project employees states:
Section I. Security of tenure. - x x x.

Page 134 of 222
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xxxx
(c) In cases of project employment or employment covered by

legitimate contracting or sub-contracting arrangements, no
employee shall be dismissed prior to the completion of the project
or phase thereof for which the employee was engaged, or prior to
the expiration of the contract between the principal and
contractor, unless the dismissal is for just or authorized cause
subject to the requirements of due process or prior notice, or is
brought about by the completion of the phase of the project or
contract for which the employee was engaged.
Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised

in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction.
To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised
in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and
the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by
substantial evidence,34 "or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."35
Page 135 of 222

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Tested against these considerations, the Court finds that

the CA correctly granted respondents' certiorari petition
before it, since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that petitioner was a regular employee of MEC when
the latter had established by substantial evidence that
petitioner was merely a project employee.
On the other hand, there is no evidence on record to
substantiate petitioner's claim that he was employed as
early as 1998.
Article 29436 of the Labor Code,37 as amended,
distinguishes a project-based employee from a regular
employee as follows:
Art. 294. Regular and casual employment. - The

provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
Page 136 of 222

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Thus, for an employee to be considered project-

based, the employer must show that:
(a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific
project or undertaking; and
(b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the
time the employee was engaged for such project.38
Being assigned to a project or a phase thereof which
begins and ends at determined or determinable times, the
services of project employees may be lawfully terminated
at the completion of such project or phase.39
Consequently, in order to safeguard the rights of workers
against the arbitrary use of the word "project" to prevent
them from attaining regular status, employers claiming
that their workers are project employees should prove
that:
(a) the duration and scope of the employment was
specified at the time they were engaged; and
(b) there was indeed a project.40
In this case, records reveal that petitioner was adequately

informed of his employment status (as project employee)
at the time of his engagement for the NECC and RCB-
Malakas Projects.
This is clearly substantiated by the latter's employment
contracts41 duly signed by him, explicitly stating that:
(a) he was hired as a project employee; and
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(b) his employment was for the indicated starting dates

therein "and will end on completion/phase of work of
project."42
To the Court's mind, said contracts sufficiently apprised
petitioner that his security of tenure with MEC would only
last as long as the specific project or a phase thereof to
which he was assigned was subsisting.
Hence, when the project or phase was completed, he was
validly terminated from employment, his engagement
being co-terminus only with such project or phase.
Further, pursuant to Department Order No. 19, or the

"Guidelines Governing the Employment of Workers
in the Construction Industry," respondent duly
submitted the required Establishment Employment
Reports43 to the DOLE Makati/Pasay Field Office
regarding the "permanent termination" of petitioner from
both of the projects for which he was engaged (i.e., the
NECC and RCB-Malakas Projects).
As aptly pointed out by the CA, such submission is an
indication of project employment.
In Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC,44 the Court
elucidated:
Moreover, if private respondents were indeed employed as
"project employees," petitioners should have submitted a
report of termination to the nearest public employment
office every time their employment was terminated due to
completion of each construction project.
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The records show that they did not.

Policy Instruction No. 20 is explicit that employers of
project employees are exempted from the clearance
requirement but not from the submission of termination
report.
We have consistently held that failure of the employer to
file termination reports after every project completion
proves that the employees are not project employees.
Nowhere in the New Labor Code is it provided that the
reportorial requirement is dispensed [distribute, pass round, pass out,
hand out, deal out, dole out, share out, divide out, parcel out, allocate, allot, apportion, assign, bestow,
confer, supply, disburse, dish out] with.
The fact is that Department Order No. 19
superseding Policy Instruction No. 20 expressly
provides that the report of termination is one of the
indicators of project employment.
On the other hand, the records are bereft [deprived of or lacking

something, especially a nonmaterial asset.] of any substantial evidence to
support petitioner's claim that he had been continuously
rehired by respondent as a mason for 22 years45 as to
accord him with a regular employment status.
Petitioner proffered [offer, tender, present, extend, give, submit, volunteer, suggest,
propose, put forward, hold out] a bare and self-serving claim that he
has been employed by respondent since 1998.46
It is well-settled that a party alleging a critical fact must

support his allegation with substantial evidence as
allegation is not evidence.47
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Ultimately, nothing on record evinces [reveal, show, make clear, make

plain, make obvious, make manifest, manifest, indicate, display, exhibit, demonstrate, be evidence of,
evidence, attest to, testify to, bear witness to, convey, communicate, proclaim, impart, bespeak, disclose,
divulge, betray, give away, expose, lay bare]
the existence of an employer-
48
employee relationship between him and respondent prior
to his employment as a project employee in the NECC
Project.
At any rate, the repeated and successive rehiring of project

employees does not, by and of itself, qualify them as
regular employees.
Case law states that length of service (through rehiring)

is not the controlling determinant of the employment
tenure, but whether the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking, with its completion having
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee.49
While generally, length of service provides a fair

yardstick for determining when an employee initially hired
on a temporary basis becomes a permanent one, entitled
to the security and benefits of regularization, this standard
will not be fair, if applied to the construction industry
because construction firms cannot guarantee work and
funding for its payrolls beyond the life of each project as
they have no control over the decisions and resources of
project proponents or owners.50
Thus, once the project is completed it would be unjust to

require the employer to maintain these employees in their
payroll since this would be tantamount to making the
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employee a privileged retainer who collects payment from

his employer for work not done, and amounts to labor
coddling at the expense of management.51
XXXI.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF
ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING
IN THE RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE), FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry through an
appropriate adversary proceeding. 32
An adversary proceeding is defined as one "having opposing

parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,
one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it."33
Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court state:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in

the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition,

the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition.
Page 141 of 222
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The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having

or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two

(2) sets of notices to potential oppositors:
1) one given to persons named in the petition, and
2) another given to other persons who are not named in the petition
but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. 34
Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry

in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby. 35
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 36 the Court emphasized that

in a petition for a substantial correction or change of entry in the
civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil registrar,
as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest
that would be affected thereby be made respondents for the reason
that they are indispensable [absolutely necessary] parties.37
Thus, the Court nullified the order to effect the necessary changes
for respondent's failure to strictly comply with the foregoing
procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Page 142 of 222
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Citing Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 38 the Court held therein:
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other

indispensable parties should have been made respondents.
They include not only the declared father of the child but the
child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any,
as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby.
All other persons who may be affected by the change should

be notified or represented.
The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of

justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would
be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate."
Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and

embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate
filiation that she will bear thereafter.
The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was

published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court,
was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.
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If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous [not harmful

or offensive.] or harmless changes or corrections of errors which
are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as
to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper
proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby
become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights.
This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the

Civil Code. 39
Similarly, in Republic v. Uy,40 the Court nullified the trial court's

order to correct respondent's entry for the latter's failure to implead
and notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her parents
and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by
the changes or corrections sought.41
In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead

both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings. 42
Although he claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and

accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate
compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and
due process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses. 43
Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has

allowed the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to cure
the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties, such as when:
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(a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all

possible interested parties;
(b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;
(c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of

the interested parties; or,
(d) when a party is inadvertently [accidentally, by accident, unintentionally,

44
unwittingly, unawares, without noticing, in all innocence, by mistake, mistakenly] left out, these
exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing [achieving little or nothing; ineffective.]
in this case.
In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed

requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an
entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial
alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.
In Republic v. CA,45 the Court held that the proceedings of the trial
court were null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners
therein failed to implead the civil registrar, an indispensable party,
in the petition for correction of entry, viz.: >>
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to

the proceeding.
He is an indispensable party, without whom no final

determination of the case can be had.
As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice

of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void.
Page 145 of 222

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The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders

ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment.
xxxx
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the

civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice
by publication of the petition for correction of entry was
to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack
of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject
matter.46
XXXII.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, represented by its President, JANET C.
LEY,Petitioner,
vs.
MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business under the name
and style "LOLA TABA LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT
PALUTO SA SEASIDE,", Respondent.
Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,

entitled "AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," otherwise known as "THE JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980" (August 14, 1981),
as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) RA 7691, entitled
"AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
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COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980,'" approved on March 25,
1994), provides:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,

otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial

Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
x x x x
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of

interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property
in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items
exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
This had been amended by Section 5 of RA 7691 which
reads:
Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this

Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19 (3),
(4), and (8); and Sec. 33 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
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Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall

be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00):
Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted
after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or

possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and

tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. -All other actions may

be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the

defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property
of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be
commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff
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resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or

found.
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply
-
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise;

or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. (Emphases
supplied)
Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall -

as a general rule - lie with the court which has jurisdiction where
the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.33
As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict

the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.34
In Briones v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court explained:
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense

that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or
merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only
in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
As in any other agreement, what is essential is the

ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence

instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive.
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In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as

"exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue,"
"shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the
exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.36
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson,37 the Court held

that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding, provided
that:
(a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in

intent;
(b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and
(c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit.38
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all
these elements are present and that the questioned stipulation in
the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a valid venue
stipulation that limits the venue of the cases to the courts of Pasay
City. It states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any

terms and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be
liable for damages.1âwphi1 All actions or case[s] filed in
connection with this lease shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all
others.39 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to limit the
place where actions or cases arising from a violation of the
terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be instituted.
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This is evident from the use of the phrase "exclusive of all others"
and the specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where
such cases may be filed.
Notably, the fact that this stipulation generalizes that all actions or
cases of the aforementioned kind shall be filed with the RTC of
Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that
the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of
all other courts.
It is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not

subject to stipulation of the parties.40
Hence, following the rule that the law is deemed written into every
contract,41the said stipulation should not be construed as a
stipulation on jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits venue.
Moreover, "[t]he parties are charged with knowledge of the existing

law at the time they enter into the contract and at the time it is to
become operative."42
Thus, without any clear showing in the contract that the parties
intended otherwise, the questioned stipulation should be
considered as a stipulation on venue (and not on jurisdiction),
consistent with the basic principles of procedural law.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner's action was one for

collection of sum of money in an amount43 that falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.44
Since the lease contract already provided that all actions or cases
involving the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay
City, and that petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell
within the RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should
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have then followed the contractual stipulation and filed its complaint
before the RTC of Pasay City.
However, it is undeniable that petitioner filed its complaint with the

Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the
ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its refiling
in the proper court.
That respondent had filed several motions for extension of time to

file a responsive pleading, or that he interposed a counterclaim or
third-party complaint in his answer does not necessarily mean that
he waived the affirmative defense of improper venue.
The prevailing rule on objections to improper venue is that the

same must be raised at the earliest opportunity, as in an answer or
a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed waived.45
Here, respondent timely raised the ground of improper venue since

it was one of the affirmative defenses raised in his Answer with
Third-Party Complaint.46
As such, it cannot be said that he had waived the same.
Further, it should be pointed out that the case of Pangasinan

Transportation Co., Inc. v. Yatco (Pantranco) 47 cited in the
instant petition48 should not apply to this case, considering that the
invocation of the ground of improper venue therein was not based
on a contractual stipulation, but rather on respondent Elpidio O.
Dizon's alleged violation of the Rules of Court, as he filed his case
for damages before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV
(Quezon City), despite testifying that he was actually a resident of
Dagupan City.
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In that case, the Court ruled that the filing of a counterclaim

and third party-complaint, and additionally, the introduction of
evidence of petitioner Pantranco (respondent in the case for
damages) after the denial of its motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue, "necessarily implied a submission
to the jurisdiction of [the trial court therein], and, accordingly,
a waiver of such right as Pantranco may have had to object to
the venue, upon the ground that it had been improperly
laid."49
The rationale for the Pantranco ruling is that a party cannot

invoke a violation of a rule on venue against his counter-party,
when he himself is bound by the same rule, but nonetheless,
seeks his own relief and in so doing, violates it.
In contrast, the counterclaim of respondent was alleged to be a

compulsory counterclaim,50 which he was prompted to file only
because of petitioner's complaint for collection of sum of money,
else the same would be barred.51
"A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or

other relief, which a defending party may have against an
opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or
is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's
complaint.
It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the

jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in
the future if not set up in the answer to the
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complaint in the same case." (Cruz-Agana v. Santiago-

Lagman, 495 Phil. 188, 193-194 [2005
In fact, his counterclaim only sought reimbursement of his

overpayment to petitioner in the amount of ₱400,000.00, as well
as damages for the filing of a purported baseless suit.
Thus, his counterclaim is not covered by the venue stipulation,

since he is not asserting a violation of the terms and conditions
of the lease contract, but rather an independent right which
arose only because of the complaint.
The same goes for his third-party complaint, whereby he only

pleaded that the rental payments remitted to PNCC for the
period August 2011 to December 2011 be reimbursed to him in
the event that petitioner's complaint is found to be meritorious.
Since his counterclaim and third-party complaint are not covered

by the venue stipulation, respondent had, therefore, every right
to invoke the same whilst raising the ground of improper venue
against petitioner's complaint, which action was, on the contrary,
covered by the stipulation.
Thus, there is no inconsistency in respondent's posturing, which

perforce precludes the application of the Pantranco ruling, as
well as negates [nullify; make ineffective] the supposition that he had
waived the defense of improper venue.
XXXIII.
EDMUND BULAUITAN Y MAUAYAN,* Petitioner,
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
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Section 2,18 Article III of the 1987 Constitution

mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
said constitutional provision.
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2),19 Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.20chanrobleslaw
It must, however, be clarified that a search

warrant21 issued in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the
authorities limitless discretion in implementing the same
as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper
conduct of a search.
Section 8, Rule 126 of the aforesaid Rules, states that:
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SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be

made in presence of two witnesses. — No search
of a house, room or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof
or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
Under this provision, a search under the strength of a
warrant is required to be witnessed by the lawful
occupant of the premises sought to be searched.
It must be stressed that it is only upon their
absence that their presence may be replaced by two
(2) persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality.
In People v. Go,22 the Court held that a departure
from the said mandatory rule - by preventing the
lawful occupant or a member of his family from
actually witnessing the search and choosing two (2)
other witnesses observe the search - violates the spirit
and letter of the law, and thus, taints the search with
the vice of unreasonableness, rendering the seized
articles inadmissible due to the application of the
exclusionary rule, viz.:
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding
team categorically admitted that the search of the
upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the
recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu,
did not take place in the presence of either the
lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant
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(who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was

handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor).
Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses
prescribed by law are prevented from
actually observing and monitoring the
search of the premises, violates both the
spirit and letter of the law:
That the raiding party summoned two barangay

kagawads to witness the search at the second
floor is of no moment.
The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly
establishes a hierarchy among the
witnesses in whose presence the search of
the premises must be conducted.
Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the
search should be witnessed by "two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality" only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the
premises or any member of his family.
Thus, the search of appellant's residence clearly
should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go
who was present at the time.
The police officers were without discretion to
substitute their choice of witnesses for those
prescribed by the law.
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x x x x
The raiding team's departure from the

procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, taken together with
the numerous other irregularities attending
the search of appellant's residence, tainted
the search with the vice of
unreasonableness, thus compelling this
Court to apply the exclusionary rule and
declare the seized articles inadmissible in
evidence.
This must necessarily be so since it is this Court's
solemn duty to be ever watchful for the
constitutional rights of the people, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon.
In the oft-quoted language of Judge Learned
Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the
exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege.
In earlier times the action of trespass against
the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer.
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Only in case the prosecution which itself

controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong
be repressed.23 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In People v. Del Castillo,24 the Court similarly held that

the search of the premises must be witnessed by the lawful
occupant or the family members; otherwise, the search
become unreasonable, thus rendering the seized items
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
In this case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that

the policemen involved in the search of Bulauitan's
residence — as shown in their own testimonies - did
not conduct the search in accordance with Section 8,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As Justice Holmes [once said,] x x x 'I think it is less evil

that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble [not honorable in character or
purpose] part.'
It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a

law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is
the Constitution itself."32
XXXIV.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs.
ARLIC ALMOJUELA, Respondent.
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Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence

characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when

a breach of duty is flagrant [(of something considered wrong or immoral) conspicuously
or obviously offensive.] and palpable [(of a feeling or atmosphere) so intense as to seem almost
81
tangible.].
Misconduct has been defined as "a transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."79
Misconduct becomes grave if it "involves any of the additional

elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence."
It is well-settled that a formal or trial-type of hearing is not

indespensible in administrative proceedings, and a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process.74
Technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not

always apply.75
In Erece v. Macalingay et. al.,76 we affirmed the CA’s ruling finding

the petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service despite his contention that he had been
denied his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
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We held that the right to cross-examine the other party’s

witnesses is not an indispensable aspect of due process in
administrative proceedings.
Due process in these proceedings is not identical with "judicial

process;" a trial in court is not always essential in
administrative due process.77
Moreover, we have consistently held that in reviewing

administrative decisions, the findings of fact made must be
respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.78
But direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt

beyond reasonable doubt since circumstantial evidence, if
sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evideence.70
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce

a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While this provision appears to refer only to criminal cases, we

have applied its principles to administrative cases.71
To fulfill the third requisite, this Court in RE: AC NO. 04-AM-2002

(JOSEJINA FRIA V. GEMILIANA DE LOS ANGELES),72 an En
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Banc decision, required that the circumstantial evidence presented

must constitute an unbroken chain that leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the person accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person.
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings

(such as the BJMP investigation) is simply the opportunity to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.63
Where a party has been given the opportunity to appeal or

seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of,
defects in procedural due process may be cured.64
Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition

for review that does not comply with the required certification
against forum shopping is a ground for its dismissal.42
This certification must be executed by the petitioner, not by

counsel.
It is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose

professional services have been retained only for a particular
case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.
Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a

defective certification.
It is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement under

Section 4, Rule 45 and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal
of the petition.43
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In Pascual v. Beltran,44 we affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the

petition for certiorari before the appellate court because it was the
Solicitor General, not the petitioner, who signed the certification
against forum shopping.
However, there have been instances when the demands of

substantial justice convinced us to apply the Rules liberally by
way of compliance with the certification against forum
shopping requirement;45 the rule on certification against forum
shopping, while obligatory, is not jurisdictional.
Justifiable cirsumtances may intervene and be recognized,

leading the Court to relax the application of this rule.46
In People of the Philippines v. de Grano et. al.,47 for instance,

we permitted the private prosecutor to sign the certification in
behalf of his client who went into hiding after being taken out of the
witness protection program.
This is the case that the OSG invoked in the certification

against forum shopping signed by Associate Solicitor Millan-
Decano who stated in her footnote that "Pursuant to People
v. de Grano (G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009), the handling
lawyers of the OSG may sign verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping."48
A reading of People of the Philippines v. de Grano et. al., a

decision from the Third Division of the Supreme Court, shows that
it cannot be used to support the OSG’s conclusion.
De Grano affirms a long line of Supreme Court decisions

where the Court allowed the liberal application of the rules on
certification against forum shopping in the interest of
substantial justice.
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But to merit the Court’s consideration, the petitioner(s) must

show reasonable basis for its/their failure to personally sign
the certification.
They must convince the Court that the petition’s outright

dismissal would defeat the administration of justice.
One of the cases cited in Grano was City Warden of the

Manila City Jail v. Estrella, a case decided by the Second
Division of this Court, which allowed the Solicitor General to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
a petition before the CA or with this Court.
The decision held that certification by the OSG

constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules,
considering that the OSG is the legal representative of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
its agencies and instrumentalities.
In Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v. Pangandaman-Gania,49 an

En Banc decision, we clarified the application of City Warden of the
Manila City Jail v. Estrella,50 and held that this case does not give
the OSG the license to sign the certification against forum shopping
in behalf of government agencies at all times.
We explained that the reason we authorized the Solicitor

General to sign the certification against forum shopping is
because it was then acting as a ‘People’s Tribune,’ an
instance when the Solicitor takes a position adverse and
contrary to the Government’s because it is incumbent upon
him to present to the Court what he considers would legally
uphold government’s best interest, although the position may
run counter to a client's position; in this case, the Solicitor
General appealed the trial court’s order despite the City
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Warden’s apparent acquiesance [the reluctant acceptance of something

without protest] to it and in the process took a position contrary to
the City Warden’s.
The rule is different when the OSG acts as a government agency’s

counsel of record.
It is necessary for the petitioning government agency or its

authorized representatives to certify against forum shopping,
because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if
another case is pending before another court.
The reason for this requirement was succinctly [in a brief and clearly
expressed manner.] explained in Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v.
Pangandaman-Gania:
The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code
is the only lawyer for a government agency wanting to file a
petition or complaint does not automatically vest the OSG with
the authority to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum
shopping for a client office.
In some instances, these government agencies have legal

departments which inadvertently take legal matters requiring
court representation into their own hands without the OSG’s
intervention.
Consequently, the OSG would have no personal knowledge

of the history of a particular case so as to adequately execute
the certificate of non-forum shopping; and even if the OSG
does have the relevant information, the courts on the other
hand would have no way of ascertaining the accuracy of the
OSG’s assertion without precise references in the record of
the case.
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Thus, unless equitable [fair and impartial] circumstances which are

manifest from the record of a case prevail, it becomes
necessary for the concerned government agency or its
authorized representatives to certify for non-forum shopping if
only to be sure that no other similar case or incident is pending
before any other court.51
To be sure, there may be situations when the OSG would

have difficulty in securing the signatures of government
officials for the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping.
But these situations cannot serve as excuse for the OSG to

wantonly undertake by itself the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping.
If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and

certify the pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG
should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for
doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court allowed
the OSG to sign the certification.
In Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v. Pangandaman-Gania,

the Court dealt with this situation and enumerated the
following requirements before the OSG can undertake a non-
forum shopping certifications as counsel of record for a client
agency:
(a) allege under oath the circumstances that make

signatures of the concerned officials impossible to obtain
within the period for filing the initiatory pleading;
(b) append to the petition or complaint such authentic

document to prove that the party-petitioner or
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complainant authorized the filing of the petition or

complaint and understood and adopted the allegations
set forth therein, and an affirmation that no action or
claim involving the same issues has been filed or
commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency; and,
(c) undertake to inform the court promptly and

reasonably of any change in the stance of the client
agency.52
Under these principles, the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari

before this Court is defective for failure to attach a proper
certification against forum shopping.
In the certificate, the associate solicitor merely stated that she has
prepared and filed the petition in her capacity as the petition’s
handling lawyer, and citing People v. Grano, claimed that the
OSG’s handling lawyers are allowed to verify and sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping.
No explanation was given why the signatures of the CSC’s

authorized representatives could not be secured.
Despite this conclusion, we cannot turn a blind eye to the

meritorious grounds that the CSC raised in its petition, and to the
reality that the administration of justice could be derailed by an
overly stringent application of the rules.
Under the present situation and in the exercise of our discretion,

we resolve to overlook the procedural defect in order to consider
the case on the merits.
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We carefully note in doing this that our action does not substantially
affect the due process rights of the respondent, nor does it involve
a jurisdictional infirmity that leaves the Court with no discretion
except to dismiss the case before us.53
In other words, no mandatory duty on the part of the Court is

involved; we are faced with a situation that calls for the exercise of
our authority to act with discretion.
In the exercise of this discretion, we have deemed it more prudent,

as a matter of judicial policy in the present situation, to encourage
the hearing of the appeal on the merits rather than to apply the
rules of procedure in a very rigid, technical sense that impedes the
cause of justice.54
Our approach is a reminder that the rules of procedure are mere

tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application tending to frustrate, rather than

promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.55
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every

party litigant with a facially meritorious case the amplest
opportunity for the proper determination of his or her cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.56
It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties the review of a
meritorious case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on
technicalities and cause a grave injustice; the latter course of action
may give the impression of speedy disposal of cases, but can only
result in more delay and even miscarriage of justice.57
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Our liberal application of the Rules of Court in this case does not
however mean that the OSG can cite this Decision as authority to
verify and sign the certification for non-forum shopping in behalf of
its client agencies.
The OSG should take note of our decision in the cited Hon.
Constantino-David et. al. v. Pangandaman-Gania for the
requisites to be satisfied before it can verify and sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping for its client agencies.
Rather than an authority in its favor, this Decision should serve as

a case showing that the OSG had been warned about its observed
laxity in following the rules on the certification for non-forum
shopping.
Only the substantive merits of the CSC’s case saved the day in this
case for the OSG.
The CSC is the proper party to raise an
appeal against the CA’s amended petition
SJO2 Almojuela asserts that the CSC has no legal personality to

challenge the CA’s amended decision because it must maintain its
impartiality as a judge and disciplining authority in controversies
involving public officers. He implores the Court to reconsider its
ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,58 citing the
arguments from Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion.
More than ten years have passed since the Court first
recognized in Dacoycoy the CSC’s standing to appeal the
CA’s decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously
prejudicial to the civil service system.
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Since then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to

clarifications and qualifications,59 but the doctrine has
remained the same:60
the CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can

appeal the CA’s decisions modifying or reversing the
CSC’s rulings, when the CA action would have an
adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service.
As the government’s central personnel agency, the CSC

is tasked to establish a career service and promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service;61 it
has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action
is imposed on an erring public employee, and this stake
would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or
lightening the CSC-imposed penalty.
Further, a decision that declares a public employee not

guilty of the charge against him would have no other
appellant than the CSC.
To be sure, it would not be appealed by the public

employee who has been absolved of the charge against
him; neither would the complainant appeal the decision,
as he acted merely as a witness for the government.62
We thus find no reason to disurb the settled Dacoycoy

doctrine.
XXXV.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY
AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
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APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR

ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and

a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any

tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
x x x x
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the

proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
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and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy,

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein,
or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration

must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since
a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an

opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case.110
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and]

not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or
prohibition].
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A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will

promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency, x x x."111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the

general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration
before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which
exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.112 These
are:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a

quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in

the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of

the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for

reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there

is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest

is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable;
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(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity

for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the

petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or

where public interest is involved.113
Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings.
The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is

conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action.115
Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which

reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction

shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for

remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law. (the second paragraph of section 14
of RA 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL while
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the policy against the issuance of provisional

injunctive writs by the courts other than the SC to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the OMB under
the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED
INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as
part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued thereafter)
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a

prohibition against any court (except the Supreme
Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process

or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain
from doing a certain act.
It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy

for and as an incident in the main action."120
Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which

connotes a suspension of an action while the main case
remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this
paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional
kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive
relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there

is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction.
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The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority

over all elective and appointive officials of the government
and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with
the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.121
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to

investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted.122
Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over

certain administrative cases which are within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative
agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any
act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123
substantial evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1)

All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
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(1) New evidence has been discovered which

materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed

prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved
within three (3) days from filing:
Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when

supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of

public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,

directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office

of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
ex mero motu (on its own motion).
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As may be deduced from the various discourses

in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's
independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that

the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or
modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made;
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office

"may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or
dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically
decreased by officials of the political branches of
government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and

control, which means that those within the ranks of the
office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to

protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics."169
In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.

(Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a violation of
the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of
another."178
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In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when

there is impermissible
(a) interference with and/or
(b) assumption of another department's functions."179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the
Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately

pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action.
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on

Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as
"the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question
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belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority

which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"
In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as

follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be

taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals.189
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a
particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may
then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case,
which is called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all

other courts established by law, has been defined as the
"totality of powers a court exercises when it
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assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a

case."190
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it

includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the

expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987
Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the

traditional concept of judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by
law.
The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory,
to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary,
and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
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invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they

are tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse
of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.192
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum.
A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired

over a particular case conforms to the limits and
parameters of the rules of procedure duly
promulgated by this Court.
In other words, procedure is the framework within which

judicial power is exercised.
In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the

Court elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court
over the subject matter existed and was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began.
Procedure does not alter or change that power

or authority; it simply directs the manner in
which it shall be fully and justly exercised.
To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not

exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the

subject matter."194
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While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion

the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the
power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection

and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
A temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction both constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action.
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They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere

incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main
action.
It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary

restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be
heard.
They are usually granted when it is made to appear that

there is a substantial controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or threatening the
immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable
injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before
a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
In other words, they are preservative remedies for the

protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence,
not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main
suit.204
In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to

prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of
the parties.
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally

governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI.
A preliminary injunction is defined under Section

1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule
enumerates the grounds for its issuance.
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Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be

issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction under certain procedural
parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive

reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all
auxiliary writs, processes, and other means
necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into
effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.

- When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or
by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears
comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case

involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the
[Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided
or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power
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"should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate

jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter:"212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is

included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that; will preserve
the subject of the action, and to give effect to
the final determination of the appeal.
It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction
and to make the decisions of the court thereunder
effective.
The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has
authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction.
For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or
restrain the performance of any act which might
interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis
supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent

powers of a court endowed with subject matter
jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular

jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary
to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction.
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These should be regarded as powers which are

inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must
possess them in order to enforce its rules of
practice and to suppress any abuses of its
process and to defeat any attempted thwarting
of such process.
x x x x
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent

powers which may be said to be implied from a
general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them.
These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise
of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence,
dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to
the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
execution of their granted powers; and include
the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction
and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a

court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of
action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction,
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to
the administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This
includes the inherent power to issue injunctions.
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If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not

procedural.
If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right
then the rule deals merely with procedure.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a
penalty but only a preventive measure.
In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the

Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose
is to prevent the official to be suspended from using
his position and the powers and prerogatives of his
office to influence potential witnesses or tamper
with records which may be vital in the prosecution
of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction

between suspension as preventive
measure and suspension as penalty.
The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of
the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have
different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive
measure, a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.
The purpose of the suspension order is to
prevent the accused from using his position and
the powers and prerogatives of his office to
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influence potential witnesses or tamper with

records which may be vital in the prosecution of
the case against him.
If after such investigation, the charge is established and
the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting
his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed
or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact

explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)
and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a
punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is
considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis
supplied)
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under
preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual
penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV
provides:
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or
employee charged is placed under preventive
suspension shall not be considered part of the actual
penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee
found guilty.232(Emphases supplied)
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The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order

are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The

Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending
an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence
of guilt is strong, and
(a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the

case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman
but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the
Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that
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must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of

preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the

first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service;

or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may

prejudice the case filed against him.233Crary
With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the

core premise of condonation - that is, an elective
official's re-election cuts off the right to remove him for an
administrative offense committed during a prior term - was
adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely
because the legality of that doctrine was never tested
against existing legal norms.
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to

discipline, suspend or remove an elective local
official from office are stated in Section 60 of
Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local
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Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on

October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An

elective local official may be disciplined, suspended,
or removed from office on any of the r following
grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;crala

wlawlibrary
(b) Culpable violation of the
Constitution;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence, or dereliction of
duty;cralawlawlibrary
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral
turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision
mayor;cralawlawlibrary
(e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
working days, except in the case of members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang
barangay;cralawlawlibrary
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant
of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this
Code and other laws.
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An elective local official may be removed from office on the

grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the

LGC which states that those removed from office as a
result of an administrative case shall be disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons

are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
x x x x
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an

administrative case;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides

that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
holding public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain

Penalties. -
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it

cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding
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public office, and bar from taking the civil service

examinations.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that

the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute
a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that
the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty
and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein
states that the administrative liability therefor is
extinguished by the fact of re-election:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
x x x x
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the

unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six
(6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall
said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the
respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public

trust and the corollary requirement of accountability
to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped
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off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of

office, or even another elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an

administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to
support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term.
In this jurisdiction, liability arising from

administrative offenses may be condoned bv the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions

applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."
But while our decisions form part of the law of the

land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code
which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided."
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex

prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward.
The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive.
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The retroactive application of a law usually divests

rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations.
As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic

principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the

paramount public interest is involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires

formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading

review."314
XXXVI.
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE
MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF
THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA);
AND ABC,1 Respondents.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to

private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its
proximate cause was not their dating relationship.
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Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight

physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications

for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence
against women through physical harm, namely:
1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is

the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual
or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,[5] the Court enumerated the elements

of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
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2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or

series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.[6]
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual

or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be
applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred [deduce or conclude
(information) from evidence and reasoning rather than from explicit statements].
Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the

law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly,
the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between
the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism
in Ang and give credence [belief in or acceptance of something as true] to
petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the
sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner
using the rule of lenity[7] because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262
that would necessitate any construction.
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While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article

266[8] of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient
justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former.
Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe
sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm
women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship,
and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection
of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the
necessary elements of the crime, such as:
1) a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private
respondent;
2) the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and
3) the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense

is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the
RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:
SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as
a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and
their children under this law.
In the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the
complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order[9] of the RTC, giving the
prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the Information to
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reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the

petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the
motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint
or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
that an information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea.
In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the
amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to
quash the same.
“Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the
rule of lenity.
It is the doctrine that ‘a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal
statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.’”
Separate Opinion of CJ Corona in People v.Temporada, G.R.
No. 173473, December 17, 2008.
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.- The

crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical

injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from
one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period;
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2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure

when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not
prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor
require medical attendance;
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding
50 pesos when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without
causing any injury.
XXXVII.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS

JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V.
DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity
as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S.
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BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac,

Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and
SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
Pork Barrel” refers to an appropriation of government

spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative's district.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question

involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry,[117] namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the

exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity; and
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(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota [it is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to
be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.1] of the case.[118]
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one

which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.”[121]
In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights

that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence.”[122]
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is

the requirement of "ripeness,” meaning that the questions
raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
"A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being

challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.
It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished

or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action.”[123]
"Withal [in addition; as a further factor or consideration.], courts will decline to

pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions,
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bereft [deprived of or lacking something, especially a nonmaterial asset] as they are of

authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.”[124]
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the

paramount public interest is involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. [129]
[I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of

administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine
of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise
in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect

but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings.
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A political question refers to "those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not

legality, of a particular measure.”
In Estrada v. Desierto,[142] the expanded concept of judicial power

under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question
doctrine was explained as follows:[143]
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the

reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of

the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater

prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power
of doing nothing.
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"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges

such personal stake [prop up, tie up, tether, support, hold up, bolster up, brace, buttress,
reinforce, truss, stay] in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his

constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance,
he has no standing.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged”) and stare

decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which
means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal with
the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment.
The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a

previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the

doctrine created.
The principle, entrenched under Article 8[152] of the Civil Code,

evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied
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to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same,

even though the parties may be different.
It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any

powerful countervailing [offset the effect of (something) by countering it with
something of equal force] considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike.
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event

have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the
rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the
same issue.[153]
"Pork Barrel System” as the "collusion between the Legislative

and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum
public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse [generosity in bestowing
[156]
money or gifts upon others].”
They assert that the following elements make up the Pork

Barrel System:
(a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations

process to an individual officer;
(b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how
the funds will be used or expended;
(c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the

appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and
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(d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency

in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of
the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage [power of appointment,
right of appointment, favoritism, nepotism, partisanship, partiality, preferential treatment, the old boy
network] benefits.
Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and

practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including
its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum

discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein

defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of
the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment
measures and/or practices.
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein

defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization.
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of

powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another.
US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways:
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firstly, "[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly [too bad to

be allowed] with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function”;[171] and
"[a]lternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one
branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to
another.”[172]
In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there
is impermissible
(a) interference with and/or
(b) assumption of another department ‘s functions.
Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,[194] legislative

power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same.
In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states

that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.[195]
Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting

as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other.
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This premise [a previous statement or proposition from which another is inferred or

follows as a conclusion] embodies the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions
thereto would be:
(a) delegated legislative power to local governments which,

by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters;[196] and
(b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of

the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency,[197] or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
Government.[198]
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be

confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority
to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either
filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).[199]
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is

a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation”

calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of
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"the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the

subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty
of administering the law.”
x x x x
[Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that] [t]he rule-making

power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the

statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Power of appropriation involves
(a)the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public

revenue for
(b) a specified purpose.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the

President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms
part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures” for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.[204]
As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process
is the "submission [of the bill] to the President for approval.
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Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required

publication.”[205]
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its
relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court,
in Bengzon, explained that:[206]
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of

the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part
of the law-making power.
His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto,

is essentially a legislative act.
The questions presented to the mind of the Chief

Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature
must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a
broader point of view.
Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4),

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "'special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available
as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.”
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 25(6),

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall
be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may
be prescribed by law.”
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification

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budgeting system fosters the creation of a "budget within a

budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
As mentioned in Abakada,[222] congressional oversight may be

performed either through:
(a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation
and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power
to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments
and its power of confirmation;[223] or
(b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.[224]
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded

in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the
2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The
fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would,
in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept
of post- enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
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any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-

judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially

in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of

the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution[225] which states

that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to

opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
"An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of

Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
provision of law
(a) sets apart a determinate or determinable[240] amount of

money and
(b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem

from the very definition of the word "appropriation,” which means
"to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,”
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and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the

legislative intent to appropriate exists.
As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular

form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be 'made
by law,‘“ an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be” for as long as
the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means

the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public
purpose.
No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose,

if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.
To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or

determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of an "appropriation made by law” under
contemplation of the Constitution.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for

a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to
exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive[245] either for the purpose of
(a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or
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(b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,

referred to as contingent rule-making.[246]
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the

legislative guidelines for delegated rule- making are indeed
adequate.
The first test is called the "completeness test.”
Case law [the law as established by the outcome of former cases.Compare with common
law, statute law.] states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate.
On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient

standard test.”
Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard

when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.[247]
To be sufficient, the standard must
a)
specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
b)
announce the legislative policy, and
c)
identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.[248]
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As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service

Commission:[256]
[W]hile the manner of examining public records may be

subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent

[dependent, conditional, subject to, based on, determined by, hingeing on, resting on, hanging
on, controlled by] upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be

rendered nugatory [worthless, of no value, of no importance, unimportant,
inconsequential, of no consequence, valueless, trifling, trivial, insignificant, meaningless ] by
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion.
The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its

performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in
a proper case.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant

thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to

issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain
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legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative

duty of defendant to perform the act required.
The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required

act must be clear and specific.
Operative fact doctrine exhorts [urge, encourage, call on, enjoin, adjure, charge,
try to persuade, press, pressure, put pressure on, use pressure on, pressurize, lean on, push, egg on, spur,
incite, goad, bid, appeal to, entreat, implore, beseech, advise, counsel, admonish, warn]
the
recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and
respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.
As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,[266] the doctrine
merely "reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary is
the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not
a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may
have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity.
It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication.”[267]
"In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘“[268]
Conclusion
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The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has

persisted in the chronicles of our history.
In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel
System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates.
a)
To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield
[brandish, flourish, wave, twirl, display, flaunt, hold aloft, show off, swing, shake, use, put to use,
employ, handle, ply, manipulate, operate], in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post- enactment authority in vital areas of budget
execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers;
b)
insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds
from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle
of non-delegability of legislative power;
c)
insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items
are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted
[openly disregard (a rule, law or convention)] the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the
power to veto items;
d)
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called
to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally
impaired public accountability;
Page 219 of 222

idolb
e)
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite
the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise
subverted genuine local autonomy; and again,
f)
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as
other public funds under the broad classification of "priority
infrastructure development projects,” it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
"Log-rolling legislation refers to the process in which several

provisions supported by an individual legislator or minority of
legislators are combined into a single piece of legislation supported
by a majority of legislators on a quid pro quo basis: no one
provision may command majority support, but the total package
will.”
'The end does not justify the means.‘
No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an

act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply
irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still
be allowed.
The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass.
It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined

principles.
"The Constitution must ever remain supreme.
Page 220 of 222

idolb
All must bow to the mandate of this law.
Expediency [the quality of being convenient and practical despite possibly being improper or
immoral; convenience. "an act of political expediency"] must not be allowed to sap its
strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude [morally correct behavior
or thinking; righteousness].‘“
XXXVIII.
COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) and PETRON
CORPORATION,* Respondents.
XXXIX. SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION (surviving entity

in a merger with Davao Fruits Corporation and other
Companies), Petitioners
vs.
BERNABE BAYA, Respondents
Page 221 of 222

idolb
Page 222 of 222

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2019 BAR NOTES DIVERSITY

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,

HON. ESTELA PERLAS-BERNABE, in her capacity as Presiding

1. avoids multiplicity of suits,

2. guards against oppression and abuse,

4. clears congested court dockets,

5. simplifies the work of the courts and

Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which materially states:

Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of

Generally, consolidation applies only to cases pending before the same

Yet in appropriate instances and in the interest of justice, cases

Hence, consolidation of cases is proper

2. when there is real need to forestall the possibility of conflicting

Exception to the exception:

provided that the measure

2. prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO

G.R. No. 221425

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

As a general rule, appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to

In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly availed of a wrong

Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following

(a) that a person was killed;

(b) the accused killed him or her;

(c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances

(d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed

There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance,

(a) the existence of the subject firearm; and

The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in

1. Whether the JBC has the authority to determine the existence of

However, such characteristics are innately subjective terms.

However, since the qualification is subjective, there is a need of a

By deliberate constitutional design, the central authority is the Judicial

In Jardeleza v. Sereno (Jardeleza), this Court declared that: “the

Section 8 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that

In line with its mandate, the JBC is necessarily tasked to “screen

In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the

In Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council (Villanueva), the Court

In order to fulfill its constitutional mandate, “the JBC had to establish

Thus, the JBC has to concretize these qualifications into operable

In Villanueva, this Court characterized the JBC’s authority to set the

Accordingly, this mirrors the JBC’s observation that it is “not possible

In Aguinaldo v. Aquino Ill, it was further declared that “[t]he JBC, as

The JBC relaxed the rules in its screening process by allowing

o Rule 4 of JBC-009 shows that the JBC implements a rigorous

o A perusal of Rule 4 of JBC-009 shows that the candidate’s

The submission of a SALN has, in fact, not been required in the

As Respondent herself points out, the JBC had separately

However, records show that a number of Respondent’s co-

Despite the JBC’s note regarding the submission of incomplete

Nevertheless, the JBC included Respondent’s name in the

3. Whether the non-filing of SALN may discredit one’s integrity and

It is within the JBC’s sphere of authority to determine if non-

may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,

According to jurisprudence, the filing of a public official’s SALN is a

In line with this policy to exact transparency, the non-submission of

The non-filing of SALN, while criminal in nature, is malum

As illumined by this Court in Dungo v. People, crimes which are

There is a lack of established authority as well as rational soundness to

True, non-compliance per se may result in penal or administrative