Chavez VS Judicial Bar and Council
GR No. 202242 | July 17, 2012 Court and question the JBC composition for being
FACTS:
1994, instead of having only seven members,
an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC –
one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then,
the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of
Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent
and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers,
requires that both houses exercise their respective powers
in the performance of its mandated duty which is to
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,”
it should mean one representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further
argue that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning
the constitutionality of the JBC’s current composition.
The respondents also question petitioner’s belated filing
of the petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in
this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to
perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to
several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially
when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ coZntention
that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not
an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it
is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily
publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in
the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts over
the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the
nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is
an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a
stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a
bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of
each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the
case of JBC representation because no liaison between
the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire
legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.
Galicto vs Aquino III
GR No. 193978 | February 28, 2012
FACTS:
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed
anomalies in the financial management of the
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, the National
Power Corporation and the National Food Authority.
Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct
legislative inquiries on the matter of activities of GOCC
and issued Resolution No. 17 s. 2010, urging the
President to order the immediate suspension of the
unusually large and excessive allowances, bonuses,
incentives and other perks of members of the governing
boards of GOCC’s and government financial institutions
(GFIs). President Aquino issued E.O 7 strengthening the
supervision of compensation levels of GOCCs and GFIs
by controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances
and other benefits.
However, petitioner Jelbert Galicto allegedly questions
the constitutionality of E.O 7 in his capacity as a lawyer
and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional Office. As he
allegedly stands to be prejudiced by E.O 7 because it
suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grant of salary
increase and other benefits granted to the GOCC and GFI
officials. Moreover, he claims interest in making sure that
laws and orders by government officials are legally
issued and implemented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi
in bringing the petition before the Court
RULING:
No, the SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal
stance because petitioner is simply concerned about
his entitlement to future salary increases.
A public officer has a vested right only to salaries
already earned or accrued. Salary increases are a
mere expectancy volatile and dependent on various
variables in nature.
His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9
of E.O 7 of any future increase in petitioner’s
compensation will only depend on usual factors
considered by proper authorities was misleading
and incorrect due to the concept of injury as an
element of Locus standi. He only points out the
denial of a reasonable expectation which is not a
subject of harm to go against the law.
His membership of Philippine Bar and a PhilHealth
official does not suffice to clothe his legal standing.
Thus, Petitioner failed to satisfy irreducible
minimum condition to trigger the exercise of
judicial power.
STAT CON PRINCIPLE OF LOCUS STANDI
Locus Standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate
to the court sufficient connection to and harm from
the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case.
The party is directly subject to an adverse effect by
the statute or action in question, and the harm
suffered will continue unless the court grants relief
in the form of damages or a finding that the law
either does not apply to the party or that the law is
void or can be nullified. This is called the
"something to lose" doctrine, in which the party has
standing because they directly will be harmed by
the conditions for which they are asking the court
for relief. A person cannot bring a suit challenging
the constitutionality of a law unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that he/she/it is or will "imminently" be
harmed by the law.
Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff
"lacks standing" to bring the suit, and will dismiss
the case without considering the merits of the claim
of unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a law
unconstitutional, there must be a valid reason for the
lawsuit. The party suing must have something to
lose in order to sue unless it has automatic standing
by action of law
Del Mar vs PAGCOR
GR No. 138298 | June 19, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner del Mar filed a petition for prohibition
preventing PAGCOR from managing jai-alai since
its illegal and devoid of any basis either from the
Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
However,PAGCOR still entered in an agreement
with BELLE and FILGAME, hence, del Mar filed a
Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of the
agreement. Members of the House of
Representative also filed a petition stating
thatoperation of PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal
because it is not included in its scope. Respondents
then questioned the locus standi or legal standing of
petitioners filing as taxpayers and members of the
House of representatives. As stated by the Court,
they have legal standing to the case since it affects
public interest (involves taxes) and affects the
powers of the legislative
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have a locus standi or
legal standing to file the petition
RULING:
As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is
without an “oven ready” legal support. A party
suing as taxpayer must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence,
taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim
of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. The record shown under their
agreement is barren of evidence that the operation
and management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR
involves expenditure of public money. The Court
also holds that as members of the House of
Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to
file the petition at bar. The operation of jai- alai
constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the
legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise.
Hence, powers of Congress are being impared, so as
the powers of each of its member
NOTES:
As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is
without an “oven ready” legal support. A party
suing as taxpayer must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence,
taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim
of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
The record shown under their agreement is barren
of evidence that the operation and management of
jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of
public money. The Court also holds that as members
of the House of Representatives, petitioners have
legal standing to file the petition at bar. The
operation of jai- alai constitutes an infringement by
PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to
grant franchise. Hence, powers of Congress are
being impared, so as the powers of each of its
member
Biraogo vs Phil Truth Commission of 2010
GR No. 192935 | December 7, 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and
make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it
is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section
31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated
authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution
and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress because the President’s executive power
and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress
to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a
quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file
the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action which, to their mind, infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation
of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.” In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest”
rule. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in
public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public
right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public. He
has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest
in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason
in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of
the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant
to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power
to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised
and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of
the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission.
The amount that would be allocated to the PTC
shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.
Demetria vs Alba
GR No. 71977 | February 7, 1987
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition assails the first
paragraph of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977,
which provides: Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177 or The Budget Reform Decree of 1977,
paragraph 1: “The president shall have authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project
or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment”.
In particular, petitioners claim that the provision
violates the following constitutional provision:
Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
— No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
The petition additionally argues that:
• The provision infringes upon fundamental
law by authorizing illegal transfer of public
funds
• It is repugnant to the Constitution as it fails to
specify objectives and purposes for which
proposed transfer of funds are to be made
• It allows the President to override safeguards,
form and procedure prescribed by the
Constitution in approving appropriations
• It amounts to an undue delegation of
legislative powers to the executive
• The threatened, continuing transfer of funds
by the President and the implementation
thereof by the Budget Minister and the
Treasurer of the Philippines are without or in
excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
The defendants assert that:
 • Petitioners do not have legal standing;
• The petition asks for an advisory opinion of
the Court since there was no justiciable
controversy.
• Abrogation (abolition) of Section 16(5) of the
1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution of March 26, 1986, allegedly
rendering instant petition moot (debatable)
and academic.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the petitioners have standing to

question the constitutionality of paragraph 1 of
The Budget Reform Decree of 1977
2. Whether paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform
Decree of 1977 is unconstitutional in light of
Section 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution

RULING:
1. YES. The expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the state for unconstitutional acts and
purposes is a misapplication of funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Taxpayers
have sufficient interest in preventing illegal
spending of tax money and may question the
constitutionality of statutes concerned with
expenditure of public money.

2. In the 1973 Constitution, it is explicitly stated

that one cannot transfer an appropriation for one
item to another. However, it allowed enactment of a
law which authorized transfer of funds in order to
augment an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the govt. branch or constitutional
body concerned. This leeway is limited, and was
only granted to allow heads of govt. branches some
flexibility in the use of public funds and resources.
This limitation stems from the fact that the
PURPOSE and CONDITION for fund transferring
was required. Paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform
Decree of 1977 unduly overextends the privilege
granted in sec. 16(5) because the President can
indiscriminately transfer funds from the Executive
Dept.’s branches to any branch in the General
Appropriations Act without regard as to whether or
not 1) the funds are actually savings in the item
from which it is taken, 2) the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which the said
transfer is made. Although there is no complete
disregard of the standards in the fundamental law, it
goes beyond the tenor thereof. It puts the bypasses
the safeguards in Sec. 16 and 18 of Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution on the release of money from
the Treasury.