G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008 Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No.
ts-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES vs. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and
warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also
home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the
National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-
829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on
them.10
not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered
in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141
and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2)
these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the
coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty
(50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon
submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly
Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO
2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire
title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner
prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the
land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in
Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself Issues
recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the
Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
G.R. No. 167707
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their
to the CA.
occupied lands in Boracay Island.34

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
G.R. No. 173775
follows:

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING
the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands
they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR
AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo II.
issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for
OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE
a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-
FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
IMPERFECT TITLE?

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other
III.
landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their
"prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31 PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay
into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable
and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition.
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF
THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended
and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by
then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of
the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with
one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and
1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of
the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of
public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and
the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing
possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of
ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be
actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory
information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until
April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule
was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and
timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided
the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular
Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis
Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was
the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public
lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the
second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto
dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894.
However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was
last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land
applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from
the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No.
141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited
and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute,
or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have
the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It
should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner
through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the
land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no
power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time,
the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the
Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act
of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos
v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.
These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal
provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free
to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to
do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts
have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands
are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that
all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would
have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or
mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought
under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for
judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot
apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to
avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and,
by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification
was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-
agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the
presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect
that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact.
The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient
to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the
extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just
said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that
in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or
mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show
that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified
as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber
or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case,
having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe,
however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands
in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to
decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act
No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the
latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until
private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),
may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as
forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of
each case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated
in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did
not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s
land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land
the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was
supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized
to determine the property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No.
926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole
power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old
cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron
v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This
Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring
agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of
the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We
have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the
Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.
926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title
in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz
v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of
patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the
friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the
legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered
public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain
as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the
public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the
to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141.
stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority
destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
rather than a forest land.
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the Development.
island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry,
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify
do not negate its character as public forest.
Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation
the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not No. 1801.
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration
particularly instructive:
of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a
tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way the areas’ alienability.119
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64)
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes
it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is
as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island,
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the
land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing
Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent
tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to
disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on
alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably,
each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which
Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President
Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of
RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of
the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same
result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land
had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of
Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are
not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning
of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest
lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not,
and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for
forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA
No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified
land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of
1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second
element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our
present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already
alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation
No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private
claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants
were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince
this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of
the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a
tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right
which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land
they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private
claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay
Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes
that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess
now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements.
They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into
other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales
patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill
will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which
view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no
longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest
cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is
as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection
are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent
as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken,
and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of
any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are
emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman’s
decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 155450, August 06, 2008 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. 2, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND
VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, AND THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3] Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines' (petitioner) amended
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The
25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No.
381928[4] in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag),
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing
an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19
July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated
in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-1277,[6] issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of
100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the
private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office
No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree
No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of
the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance
of Decree No. 381928.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground
verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

The investigating team reported that:
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and
covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the
timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and
disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May
1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by
themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by
LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.[8]
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as
alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau
recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as
well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the
recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles[9] on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed
portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance
of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982
when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable.
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.[10] Private respondents
alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real
ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in
the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added
that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be
annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of
res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.[11] Private respondents also
stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an
effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest
was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private
respondents.[12]
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.[13]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. The Courtof Appeals declared:
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which
this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains
no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its
allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint
which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It
merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad.
151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19,
1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland
area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion
to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance
with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[14] (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer
available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended
complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a
tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings
changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First
Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still
deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.[15]
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had
the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not,
therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472
Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of
the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the
timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Philippine constitution.
x x x x
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs
and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the
then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the
said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio,
and of no force and effect whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul
Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject land,
specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land
and was not alienable and disposable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioner's failure
to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available."
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege
in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and
void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches.[18]
Since petitioner's complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action,
petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner's complaint were factual in
nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the
Public Land Act.[19]
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be
necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a
Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the
complete and proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we
shall decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the
disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was
issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the
subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930.
Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the
trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[20] Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the filing of the action.[21]
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
Government,[22] we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of
those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienableand, provided they are not
destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with
law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some
public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or
forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish
regime or thereafter. The land classification maps[24] petitioner attached to the complaint also
do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some
public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority,
dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and
classified as timber land.[25]

The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,[26] which
provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the
subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been
declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for
reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the
same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons,
suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on
which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification
requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that
during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or
mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial
courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that
the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874.
Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may
be claimed under any existing law at that time.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the judgment
of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the
application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest
land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the
land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then
vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The Court ruled:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the
Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have
become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and
recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874
which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these
applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land
registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of
an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that
the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and
exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the
land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied
for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928
in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the
disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial courtdetermined
that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the
decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in
the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial courtdeclaring the
subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
The finality of the trial court's decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development,
or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of
the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution."[29] When the Commonwealth
Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an
existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928
issued in 1930 by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines'
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
* As replacement of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna who is on official leave per Special Order No. 510.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Rollo, pp. 40-45. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate
Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
[3] Id. at 46-47. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices
Romeo A. Brawner and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
[4] CA rollo, p. 8. The case was docketed as Cadastral Case No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 437.
[5] Id. at 9.
[6] Id. at 10-11.
[7] Id. at 12-13.
[8] Rollo, p. 52.
[9] Id. at 48-54.
[10] Id. at 55-65.
[11] Section 38, Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated
in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and
registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
"To whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or
of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after the entry of the
decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration
of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section
shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be
opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal
hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons
not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such
decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any
other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrance for value.
[12] The certification from the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, attached
by petitioner as Annex "F," stated that it was issued "upon the request of Atty. Janette B. Chua."
LC Map 2465, attached by petitioner as Annex "G-1," also stated that it was issued "at the
request of Atty. Janette Bassig Chua of Tuguegarao, Cagayan." Private respondents maintained
that Atty. Chua is the daughter of Alfonso Bassig.
[13] Rollo, pp. 66-72. Petitioner only changed the title of the complaint from "annulment of
judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles" to "reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles."
[14] Id. at 44-45.
[15] Rules of Court, Section 2, Rule 47.
[16] Rollo, pp. 51-53, 69-71.
[17] 468 Phil. 900 (2004).
[18] Id. at 911.
[19] Section 101 of the Public Land Act provides:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain, or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper court, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
[20] Republic v. "G" Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, 22 November 2005, 475 SCRA 608.
[21] Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC, 326 Phil. 640 (1996).
[22] 13 Phil. 159 (1909).
[23] Id. at 165-166.
[24] CA rollo, pp. 16-18. Petitioner attached LC Map 2465 dated 22 June 1961 and LC Map
2999 dated 22 February 1982.
[25] Id. at 14. The certification from the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority
signed by USEC Jose G. Solis stated:
a. Area enclosed in red and marked 1 falls within Alienable or Disposable Block-I, LC Project No.
13 of the Provinces of Cagayan, Isabela and Mt. Province certified on February 27, 1923 per
Map LC No. 30-C; and
b. Area enclosed in red and marked 2 falls within Alienable or Disposable Block, LC Project No.
3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan certified on February 22, 1982 per Map LC-2999.
[26] Entitled "An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public Domain,
and for Other Purposes" which took effect on 1 July 1919. Also known as "The Public Land Act."
[27] G.R. No. 127245, En Banc Resolution dated 30 January 2001.
[28] Entitled "An Act Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Homesteading, Selling,
and Leasing of Portions of the Public Domain of the Philippine Islands, Prescribing Terms and
Conditions to Enable Persons to Perfect their Titles to Public Lands in said Islands, Providing for
the Issuance of Patents Without Compensation to Certain Native Settlers upon the Public Lands,
Providing for the Establishment of Town Sites and Sale of Lots therein, and Providing for the
Determination by the Philippine Courts of Land Registration of all Proceedings for Completion of
Imperfect Titles and for the Cancellation or Confirmation of Spanish Concessions and Grants in
said Islands, as Authorized by Sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
Entitled `An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government
in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes'" which took effect on 7 October 1903. Also
known as "The Public Land Act."
[29] Constitution (1935), Article XIII, Sec. 1.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of
Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the
25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued
to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and
certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912,
the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for
under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also
included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration
of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including
the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the
lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon
all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the
plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate
they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that
theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact,
belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the
defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had
therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six
years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in
a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land
court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that
question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens
system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa,"
to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for
the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16
Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding
upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs.
De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass.,
51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary
action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and
final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The
rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself
assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the
registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to
again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and
intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better
title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee
simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of
its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of
titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the
parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who
should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that
all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there
can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to
rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated,
even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system
can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice
to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system
has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has
been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System,"
at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter
certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2
Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs.
Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg
adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is
a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in
discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land
the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person
who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this
country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they
provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that
where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
"To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or
of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of
Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration),
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any
reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then
the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct
proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding
by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not
believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real
property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who
first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or
purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code
are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we
think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in
adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule
which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens
system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee.
He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of
Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he,
Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in
his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree
adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own
omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are
above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If
the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has
been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder
may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it
all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had
mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee?
That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby
is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such
circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions
and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was
the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can
not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-
defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in
1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry
of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own
omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is
located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the
absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment.
There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner
of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May
this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one
or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an
"innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or
interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule
the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of
the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule
that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496
indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor
would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by
virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a
right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce
such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the
present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold
the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said
sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original
certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to
the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent
purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same
is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the
same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are
both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and
effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first
original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the
public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so
recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser
is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact
which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin
on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio
State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500;
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7
House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good
faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains
any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule
of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of
real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and
606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In
the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been
recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were
interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of
its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a
purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea
that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide
in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule
that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law.
The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times,
shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory,
notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence
and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had
theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that
said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that
the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of
which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The
rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and
in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we
think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said
sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included
in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system,
the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land
included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had
never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the
appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could
his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the
appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting
from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We
are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the
rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later
certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case
of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been
guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be
permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith
and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the
second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if
any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from
double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do
we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the
registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the
record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will
be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the
second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and
authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where there
has been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the
majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that
an innocent purchaser claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the
original holder of the later certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of
the later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the
issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion
sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid
down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of
course of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is
applicable to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition
set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and
equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the
one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be
protected." The rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to
be a just and equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent
registered titles to the same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first
acquired registered title and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard
should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied
in cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as
stated in the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of
Land Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is
irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty
of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize
such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective
parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case
wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful
reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity
rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be
given the preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to
apply this equity rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when
any other equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and
may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of
double or overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail
so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier
certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier
certificate of title should not be heard to invoke the "just and equitable rule" as laid down in the
majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of
a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it appears that the holder of the
later certificate was wholly without fault, while the holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in
that he might have prevented its issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in
response to lawful summons personally served upon him in the course of the proceedings for
the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier
certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be
entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by
reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as
between the original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule should
prevail, because both such original parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being
equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning
whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder
of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an
attempt to demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers;
because, as it is said, negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so
that in no event can he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him
from the holder of a duly registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands
described in a certificate of title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the
various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a
purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of
the contents of each and every one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of
registry on file in the land registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not
ascertain that all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines
of any one of the thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears
an earlier date than the date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended
that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was
possible for him to discover that the land purchased by him had been made the subject of
double or overlapping registration by a comparison of the description and boundary lines of the
thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the
introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed
intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest
secure as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority
opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office
of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as
negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration,
instead of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of
avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and
registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase, will, in many
instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy
himself as to the validity of the title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens
system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to
facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective
purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than
the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot,
therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered
lands with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that
negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a
result of the lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to
avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been
made the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What
measures should he adopt in order to search out the information with notice of which he is
charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the record or the certificate
of title of the land he proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will
furnish him a clue as to the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration.
Indeed the only course open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of
double or overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive
comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land
he proposes to buy with those contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the
land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act
to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate, under penalty that a lack
of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as
negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which have been the
subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a
registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against
him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he
was served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of
Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land
Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual
notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as
his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to
enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title
registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and
inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There
is nothing in the new system of land registration which seems to render it either expedient or
necessary to relieve a holder of a registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title,
when he has actual notice that it is being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as
a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject to double or overlapping
registration, he should not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the later
certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while
he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that
"where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the
preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly
applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to
the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the
holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered
lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument
in favor of the holder of one or the other certificate in case of double or overlapping registration.
The problem is to determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision
of that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of
the registered title of the other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of
the whole system for the registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is
irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such
circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking into consideration all the conditions and
the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the
majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of
the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued,
or to cases in which he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings.
Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the
reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should
not be imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the
benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of publication in such cases having been duly
complied with, all the world is charged with notice thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that,
in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in permitting a default judgment to be
entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to defeat his
right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a holding would
have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder of a
certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su
casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the
majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such
certificate, which was not contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no
unreasonable burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes
culpable negligence to him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered
against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he
has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered
and despite the fact that he has been personally served with summons to appear and default his
title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it
seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an
innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of
an earlier certificate who permitted a default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual
notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in
cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public
policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the
earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown,
unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to
additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard
to such lands; while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the
purpose and object for which the land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden
upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those
rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being
challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is
reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his
claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor of the
holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to
increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered
titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered
against them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants,
despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this,
without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them
the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which
their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership
in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without
actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare
as to be practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in
relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case
wherein double registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal service of
notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute
requiring such notice to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for
which application for registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can,
even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful
conclusion without actual notice to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a
certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court
of Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus
purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the
holder of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered
against him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own
certificate of title in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired
title, and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings and was personally served with summons to appear and defends
his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the
respective merits of the equities of the parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in
favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land
owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other
proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility
and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands
generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of
Land Registration.
Carson, J., concurs.
DIVISION
[ GR No. 86787, May 08, 1992 ]
MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP v. CA AND SPS. MANUEL AND JESUSA SALANG +
DECISION
G.R. No. 86787
CRUZ, J.:
The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the same issue,
the answer will not change.
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales, with
a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the possession of the petitioners. The
entire parcel is registered in the name of the private respondents under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-29018.
On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of possession of
the lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered owners of the land. In their
answer, the defendents claimed that the lots were part of the public domain and could not have
been registered under the Torrens system. All alleged long and continuous possession of the
lots and produced tax declarations in their names. Two of them maintained that they had
acquired their respective lots by virtue of valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on
inheritance.
After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.[1] He held in part as follows:
The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in question, necessarily have
the lawful right to the physical possession of the land. The owner of a land has a right to enjoy
and possess it, and he has also the right to recover and repossess the same from any person
occupying it unlawfully.
Art. 428 - New Civil Code
"The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
"The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it."
There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in
question have also the corresponding right to the recovery and possession of the same. The
defendants who are in physical occupancy of the land belonging to the plaintiffs have no right
whatsoever to unjustly withhold the possession of the said land from the plaintiffs. The
defendants' occupancy of the land in question is unlawful and in violation of plaintiffs' right to the
recovery and possession of the land they owned. The evidence presented by the defendants
claiming as per certifications of the Bureau of Forestry that the land occupied by them is within
the alienable and disposable public land, deserves scant consideration as the said certification
are without basis in law. The moment the land in question was titled in the name of the plaintiffs,
it ceased to become a part of the public domain as the same became the private property of the
registered owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land made in the names of the
defendants are not evidence of title, it appearing that the land is already titled to the plaintiffs.
The registration of the land in the names of the defendants with the Assessor's Office for
taxation purposes and the payments of real property taxes by the defendants can not and does
not defeat the title of the plaintiffs to the land. The fact that the defendants have been in
occupancy of the land in question for quite a period of time is of no moment as prescription will
not ripen into ownership because the land is covered by a torrens title. Acquisitive prescription
will not be available to land titled under Art. 496.
PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and so holds that the
plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in question are entitled to the possession of the
same, and that the defendants who are occupying the land belonging to the plaintiffs in violation
of the right of the latter, are duty-bound to restore possession of the same to the titled owners,
the herein plaintiffs.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22, 1988. [2] Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then came to this Court, urging
reversal of the courts below.
They allege that:
1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been validly registered
under the Torrens system.
2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to the rights
granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.
The petition has no merit.
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original
Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now
incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The presumption of regularity applies to
the issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land subject of the
certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be
shown that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was
actual fraud in securing the title.[3] Neither of these requirements has beenestablished by the
petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in
question was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that this
deserved scant consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an
administrative body cannot prevail against a court decision declaring the land to be registrable.
Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any other
representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to the land registration
proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. No less importantly, an
action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of
one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration[4] and cannot now be resorted to by the
petitioners at this late hour. And collaterally at that.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must also
possess it does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the private respondents of
their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership
thereof or have lost it by such omission.
The second ground must also be rejected.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that
they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of
that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time
as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never
barred by laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and continuous
occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect contending that they have acquired
the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land
registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.[5]
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby: [6]
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put astop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of
the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with use and has
long become a settled rule of law.
In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot invoke the
status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the constructions they have
made on the lots in dispute.
A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he
builds on it.[7] This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very outset
that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain and even
submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land was in fact
registered under the Torrens system and such registration was constructive notice to the whole
world, including the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of checking
such registration. At any rate, the point is that, whether the land be public or private, the
petitioners knew they had no right to occupy it and build on it. The Court of Appeals was correct
in calling them squatters for having entered, without permission or authority, land that did not
belong to them.
In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are asking us to
overturn long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens system and the
indefeasibility of titles issued thereunder for the protection and peace of mind of the registered
owner against illegal encroachments upon his property. We are not disposed to take this drastic
step on the basis alone of their feeble arguments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
DIVISION
[ GR No. 68741, Jan 28, 1988 ]
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY v. IAC
DECISION
241 Phil. 391
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court* (now Court
of Appeals) dated January 31, 1984, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District, Branch III, and of the resolution dated August
28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration filed thereof.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate
Court are as follows:
On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo, as owners of a parcel
of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square
meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena
Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng
Bilihang Mabibiling Muli". This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6, 1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,
1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private res-
pondents for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the
instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan", after being credited with the P30,000.00
consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli", and the balance of P40,000.00 was to be
paid the moment that the certificate of title, is issued. From the execution of said Kasulatan, pri-
vate respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in
question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge
of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the
petitioner, National Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, requesting for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea
Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this casecovered by
OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property
in question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The petitioner was the highest
and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by
the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold the
subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner on
July 16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that private respondents learned that a title in the name
of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the same
property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena
Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of
the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the
petitioner refused to accept the payment. On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents
made a formal demand on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo to comply with their obligation under
the terms of the absolute deed of sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, the offer to pay the
balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On August 13, 1974 petitioner in its
reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is now the owner of the property in
question and has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject property were
asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against
private respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the petitioner and the spouses
Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of the property in
question and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the
owner of the said property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under
such terms and conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein) maintained that it was never a
privy to any transaction between the private respondents (plaintiffs therein) and the spouses
Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo; that it is a purchases in good faith and for value of the
property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is now indefeasible, hence, private
respondents' cause of action has already prescribed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22).
After due hearing, the trial court* rendered its decision on March 17, 1981, in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of said judgment reading as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in question by
virtue of its indefeasible title to the same;
"(2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National Grains Authority;
"(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P56,000.00 representing the amount paid pursuant to the Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan
marked Exhibit '3', with legal interest thereon from January 31, 1972 until the amount is paid, to
pay an additional amount of P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, an additional amount of
P10,000.00 as moral damages, another amount of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages
and to pay the costs of this suit." (Rollo, p. 35).
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 1984,
reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside and another
one is rendered ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of reconveyance
sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
75171 and the issuance of another title in the names of plaintiffs-appellants, and ordering
defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority
the sum of P78,375.00 (Exh. 3) within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the writ of execution.
No damages and costs." (Rollo, p. 19).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied.
(Rollo, p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 128). The memorandum for the petitioner
was filed on July 3, 1985 (Rollo, p. 129) while the memorandum for the private respondents was
filed on August 26, 1985 (Rollo, p. 192).
The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between
the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and private respondents, the buyers, to deliver the
certificate of title to the latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat
the title and right acquired by petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.
It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of private
respondents, namely: (a) the conditional sale with right to repurchase or the "Kasulatan Ng
Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was registered under Act 3344 and (b) the deed of absolute sale
or "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not registered; (2) the condition that the
Certificate of Title will be delivered to the buyers upon its issuance and upon payment of the
balance of P40,000.00 is contained in the deed of absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at
the time of the execution of both sales was not yet covered by the Torrens System of
registration.
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be
binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood to be without prejudice to third
party who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344). In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the
Torrens System and has obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of
absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on
the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.
In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among others, for two
alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be declared the owners of the property in question or (b) to
order the declared owner to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the Conditional
Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although unregistered under the Torrens
System allegedly transferred to them the ownership and the possession of the property in
question. In fact, they argue that they have been and are still in possession of the same openly,
continuously, publicly under a claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase
on December 2, 1971 (Rollo, p. 165). It is stressed that not until the month of July, 1974 did the
plaintiff learn that a title had been issued covering the property in question (Rollo, p. 15).
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to land
under the Torrens System is an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal notice to all
claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to deal with
and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree
or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated
within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or
akin a proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown (Moscoso
vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, et al., 19 Phil. 324,
337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is thus evident that respondents'
right over the property was barred by res judicata when the decree of registration was issued to
spouses Vivas and Lizardo. It does not matter that they may have had some right even the right
of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pur-
suance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances
except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting,
and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except
those mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title,
are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issue binds the whole
world, including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209 [1915];
Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if the purchaser is
the only party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles in the property registry, no
one except such purchaser may be deemed by law to be the owner of the properties in question
(Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions provided for
under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner herein.
Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real purpose of the Torrens System
is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. 'Once a title is regis-
tered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting on the 'mirador su casa', to avoid the possibility of losing his land'." An indirect or
collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed (Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs.
Manila Railroad, 62 Phil. 467).
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging
to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as
guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as
the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Angeles vs.
Samia, 66 Phil. 444 [1938], underscoring supplied).
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in procuring the
registration of the property in question. On the contrary, their application for registration which
resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with the complete knowledge and implied
authority of private respondents who retained a portion of the consideration until the issuance to
said spouses of a certificate of title applied for under the Torrens Act and the corresponding
delivery of said title to them. The question therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728
but in the breach of contract between private respondents and the Vivas spouses. Petitioner
NGA was never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at the
time of the execution of the mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of
absolute sale, much less of its violation. Nothing appeared to excite suspicion. The Special
Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT was in the name of the mortgagor and the
NGA was the highest bidder in the public auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an
innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgages under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and
later as innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land which was
not even in the possession of the supposed mortgagors, nor present any witness to prove its
allegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE to show its being a
mortgagee in good faith and for value (Rollo, p. 110).
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with
property covered by a torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on
the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in
the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 139
SCRA 545 [1985]).
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting a mortgage to
make an investigation of the title of the property being given as security (Phil. National
Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and where innocent third
persons like mortgagees relying on the certificate of title acquire rights over the property, their
rights cannot be disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 [1985]).
Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling that plaintiffs'
(private respondents herein) complaint insofar as it prays that they be declared owners of the
land in question can not prosper in view of the doctrine of indefeasibility of title under the Torrens
System, because it is an established principle that a petition for review of the decree of
registration will not prosper even if filed within one year from the entry of the decree if the title
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32).
The setting aside of the decree of registration issued in land registration proceedings is
operative only between the parties to the fraud and the parties defrauded and their privies, but
not against acquirers in good faith and for value and the successors in interest of the latter; as to
them the decree shall remain in full force and effect forever (Domingo vs. The Mayon Realty
Corp. et al., 102 Phil. 32 [1957]). Assuming, therefore, that there was fraud committed by the
sellers against the buyers in the instant case, petitioner NGA who was not privy therein cannot
be made to suffer the consequences thereof. As correctly declared by the trial court, the National
Grains Authority is the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title.
As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to reconvey or
transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that there is absolutely no reason
why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value, should reconvey the land to the private
respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, now
Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 167232, July 31, 2009 ]
D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER, VS.
RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO PANES, SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN, DONARDO
PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA AND HILARION MANONGDO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated October 25, 2004 which
reversed and set aside the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
216, dated November 8, 2001.
The Facts
Subject of this controversy is a parcel of land identified as Lot Plan Psu-123169,[4] containing an
area of Two Hundred Forty Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Six (240,146) square meters, and
situated at Barangay (Brgy.) Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City (subject property). The
property is included in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 200519,[5] entered on July 19,
1974 and issued in favor of B.C. Regalado & Co. (B.C. Regalado). It was conveyed by B.C.
Regalado to petitioner D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. (DBT) through a dacion en pago[6] for
services rendered by the latter to the former.
On June 24, 1992, respondents Ricaredo P. Panes (Ricaredo), his son Angelito
P. Panes (Angelito), Salvador Cea, Abogado Mautin, Donardo Paclibar, Zosimo P. Peralta, and
Hilarion Manongdo (herein collectively referred to as respondents) filed a Complaint[7] for
"Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and all Titles derived thereat (sic),
Damages, with Petition for the Issuance of Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order Ex-Parte, Etc." against B.C. Regalado, Mar-Bay Realty, Inc., Spouses Gereno Brioso and
Criselda M. Brioso, Spouses Ciriaco and Nellie Mariano, Avelino C. Perdido and Florentina
Allado, Eufrocina A. Maborang and Fe Maborang, Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura,
Spouses Oscar Ikalina and the Register of Deeds (RD) of Quezon City. Subsequently,
respondents filed an Amended Complaint[8] and a Second Amended Complaint[9] particularly
impleading DBT as one of the defendants.
In the Complaints, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant of the subject
property which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name, and assessed in the amount
of P2,602,190.00 by the City Assessor of Quezon City as of the year 1985. Respondents alleged
that per Certification[10] of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
National Capital Region (NCR) dated May 7, 1992, Lot Plan Psu-123169 was verified to be
correct and on file in said office, and approved on July 23, 1948.
Respondents also claimed that Ricaredo, his immediate family members, and the other
respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of the subject property,
and their possession preceded the Second World War. To perfect his title in accordance with Act
No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The
Property Registration Decree), Ricaredo filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 82 a case
docketed as LRC Case No. Q-91-011, with LRC Rec. No. N-62563.[11]
Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication requirements for the
Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was discovered by the
Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an overlapping of portions of the land subject of
Ricaredo's application, with the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by
then, already been conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT.
Ricaredo asseverated that upon verification with the LRA, he found that the subdivision plan of
B.C. Regalado was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the subject property. Respondents
claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the preparation of the subdivision plan did not
actually cover the subject property. They asserted that from the records of B.C. Regalado, they
gathered that TCT Nos. 211081,[12]211095[13] and 211132,[14] which allegedly included
portions of the subject property, were derived from TCT No. 200519. However, TCT No. 200519
only covered Lot 503 of the Tala Estate with an area of Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred
Fifteen (22,615) square meters, and was different from those mentioned in TCT Nos. 211081,
211095 and 211132. According to respondents, an examination of TCT No. 200519 would show
that it was derived from TCT Nos. 14814,[15] 14827,[16] 14815[17] and T-28.
In essence, respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado and DBT used the derivative titles which
covered properties located far from Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City where the subject
property is located, and B.C. Regalado and DBT then offered the same for sale to the public.
Respondents thus submitted that B.C Regalado and DBT through their deliberate scheme, in
collusion with others, used (LRC) Pcs-18345 as shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to
include the subject property covered by Lot Plan Psu-123169.
In his Answer[18] dated July 24, 1992, the RD of Quezon City interposed the defense that at the
time of registration, he found all documents to be in order. Subsequently, on December 5, 1994,
in his Motion[19] for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, with the Amended Answer attached, he
admitted that he committed a grave mistake when he earlier said that TCT No. 200519 covered
only one lot, i.e. Lot 503. He averred that upon careful examination, he discovered that TCT No.
200519 is composed of 17 pages, and actually covered 54 lots, namely: Lots 503, 506, 507,
508, 509, 582, 586, 655, 659, 686, 434, 495, 497, 299, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 493, 692, 776,
496, 785, 777, 786, 780, 783, 505, 654, 660, 661, 663, 664, 665, 668, 693, 694, 713, 716, 781,
779, 784, 782, 787, 893, 1115, 1114, 778, 669 and 788, all of the Tala Estate. Other lots
included therein are Lot 890-B of Psd 36854, Lot 2 of (LRC) Pcs 12892 and Lot 3 of (LRC) Pcs
12892. Thus, respondents' allegation that Lots 661, 664, 665, 693 and 694 of the Tala Estate
were not included in TCT No. 200519 was not true.
On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses
Tabangcura) filed their Answer[20] with Counterclaim, claiming that they were buyers in good
faith and for value when they bought a house and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C.
Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and registered owner thereof, on June 30,
1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses
Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97
which rendered a decision[21] in their favor.
On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of
the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in the former's
favor; that respondents were not real parties-in-interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant
whose rights over the property had yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed his
application for registration; that the other respondents did not allege matters or invoke rights
which would entitle them to the relief
prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the action inflicted a
chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.[22]
The RTC's Rulings
On June 15, 2000, the RTC through Judge Marciano I. Bacalla (Judge Bacalla), rendered a
Decision[23] in favor of the respondents. The RTC held that the testimony of Ricaredo that he
occupied the subject property since 1936 when he was only 16 years old had not been rebutted;
that Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years
in the concept of an owner vested in him equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an
approved plan, Psu 123169; that the subject property was declared under the name of Ricaredo
for taxation purposes;[24] and that the subject property per survey should not have been
included in TCT No. 200519, registered in the name of B.C. Regalado and ceded to DBT. The
RTC further held that Spouses Tabangcura failed to present satisfactory evidence to prove their
claim. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Certificate of Title No. 200519 and all titles derived thereat as null and void insofar as the same
embrace the land covered by Plan PSU-123169 with an area of 240,146 square meters in the
name of Ricaredo Panes; ordering defendant DBT Marbay Realty, Inc. to pay plaintiff
Ricaredo Panes the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000) pesos as attorney's fees plus
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On September 12, 2000, DBT filed a Motion[25] for Reconsideration, based on the grounds of
prescription and laches. DBT also disputed Ricaredo's claim of open, adverse, and continuous
possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years, and asserted that the subject
property could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession because it is covered by
TCT No. 200519.
While the said Motion for Reconsideration was pending, Judge Bacalla passed away.
Meanwhile, on January 2, 2001, a Motion[26] for Intervention and a Complaint in Intervention
were filed by Atty. Andres B. Pulumbarit (Atty. Pulumbarit), representing the Don Pedro/Don Hence, this Petition.
Jose de Ocampo Estate. The intervenor alleged that the subject property formed part of the vast
tract of land with an area of 117,000 hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. The Issues
779 issued by the Honorable Norberto Romualdez on March 14, 1913 under Decree No. 10139,
which belongs to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo. Thus, the Complaint[27] in
Intervention prayed that the RTC's Decision be reconsidered; that the legitimacy and superiority Petitioner raises the following as grounds for this Petition:
of OCT 779 be upheld; and that the subject property be declared as belonging to the Estate of
Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo.
I.
In its Order[28] dated March 13, 2001, the RTC, through Acting Judge Modesto C. Juanson
(Judge Juanson), denied Atty. Pulumbarit's Motion for Intervention because a judgment had
already been rendered pursuant to Section 2,[29] Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE PRESCRIPTION IN ITS ANSWER IS NOT A WAIVER
OF SUCH DEFENSE.
On April 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] stating that there appeared to be a need for a
clarificatory hearing before it could act on DBT's Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, a hearing II.
was held on May 17, 2001. Thereafter, supplemental memoranda were required of the
parties.[31] Both parties complied.[32] However, having found that the original copy of TCT No.
200519 was not submitted to it for comparison with the photocopy thereof on file, the RTC IT IS NOT ERRONEOUS TO REQUIRE THE PRODUCTION OF A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
directed DBT to present the original or certified true copy of the TCT on August 21, OF TCT NO. 200519 AFTER THE DECISION ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN RENDERED BUT
2001.[33] Respondents moved to reconsider the said directive[34] but the same was BEFORE IT BECAME FINAL.
denied.[35] DBT, on the other hand, manifested that a copy of TCT No. 200519, consisting of 17
pages, had already been admitted in evidence; and that because of the fire in the Office of the III.
RD in Quezon City sometime in 1988, DBT, despite diligent effort, could not secure an original or
certified true copy of said TCT. Instead, DBTsubmitted a certified true copy of Consolidated
Subdivision Plan Pcs 18345.[36] A REGISTERED LAND CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.

On November 8, 2001, the RTC, through Judge Juanson, issued an Order[37] reversing the
IV.
earlier RTC Decision and dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. The RTC held that
prescription does not run against registered land; hence, a title once registered cannot be
defeated even by adverse, open or notorious possession. Moreover, the RTC opined that even if
THE TESTIMONY OF ENGR. VERTUDAZO ON THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL
the subject property could be acquired by prescription, respondents' action was already barred
DESCRIPTION OF LOT 503 IN AN INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT IS UNRELIABLE.
by prescription and/or laches because they never asserted their rights when B.C. Regalado
registered the subject property in 1974; and later developed, subdivided and sold the same to
individual lot buyers. V.

On December 18, 2001, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[38] which the RTC
denied in its Order[39] dated June 17, 2002. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.[40] MR. PANES HAS NEVER BEEN IN OPEN, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[44]
The CA's Ruling
Distilled from the petition and the responsive pleadings, and culled from the arguments of the
parties, the issues may be reduced to two questions, namely:
On October 25, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated November 8, 2001
1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the
and June 17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The CA held that the
latter's Motion for Reconsideration?
properties described and included in TCT No. 200519 are located in San Francisco del Monte,
San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao, Quezon City while the subject property is located in
2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject property?
Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's
testimony that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not
disproved or refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when Our Ruling
he entertained issues and admitted evidence presented by DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration
which were never raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior to the rendition of the RTC
Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches and prescription clearly appeared to be an We answer the first question in the affirmative.
afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's Motion for Reconsideration was not based on
grounds enumerated in the Rules of Procedure.[41] It is true that in Dino v. Court of Appeals[45] we ruled:

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[42] which was, however, denied by the CA in its (T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription
Resolution[43] dated February 22, 2005. when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco
v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28,
1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA
529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss
(Sec. 1, [f] Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative
defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as
in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has
not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia
v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v.
Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez; 16
SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of
the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record;
either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, one of the inherent powers of courts is to amend and control its processes so as to
make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the right to reverse itself, especially
when in its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and adherence to its
decision would cause injustice.[46] Thus, the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001 could
validly entertain the defenses of prescription and laches in DBT's motion for reconsideration.
However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The RTC
failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for reconveyance but an action for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Verily, an action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for
reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud,
and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of
title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or
transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD
constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is
deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.[47]
However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property
as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the
property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for
reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action
that is imprescriptible.[48] Thus, in Vda. de Gualberto v. Go,[49] this Court held:
[A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes
in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Insofar as Ricaredo and his son, Angelito, are concerned, they established in their testimonies
that, for some time, they possessed the subject property and that Angelito bought a house within
the subject property in 1987.[50] Thus, the respondents are proper parties to bring an action for
quieting of title because persons having legal, as well as equitable, title to or interest in a real
property may bring such action, and "title" here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title
issued in favor of the person filing the suit.[51]
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless, that in some
instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed within the prescriptive
period provided by law. Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because respondents'
possession of the subject property has rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title
imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity,
acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to
avoid injustice. Laches will operate not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but
rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation.[52]
Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001, which dismissed
respondents' complaint on grounds of prescription and laches, may have been erroneous, we,
nevertheless, resolve the second question in favor of DBT.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the
rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[53]
Article 1126[54] of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46[55] of Act No. 496 (The Land
Registration Act), as amended by Section 47[56]of P.D. No. 1529 (The Property Registration
Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner but also against his hereditary successors. Possession is a mere consequence of
ownership where land has been registered under the Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity
of which must be protected. Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose
objective is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time
and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the
lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.[57]
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under
Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the
Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended
by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of
possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.[58]
Moreover, it may be stressed that there was no ample proof that DBT participated in the alleged
fraud. While factual issues are admittedly not within the province of this Court, as it is not a trier
of facts and is not required to re-examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence anew,
we have the authority to review and, in proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts
when the findings of fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court.[59] In
this regard, we reviewed the records of this case and found no clear evidence
that DBT participated in the fraudulent scheme. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[60] this Court
gave due importance to the fact that the private respondent therein did not participate in the
fraud averred. We accord the same benefit to DBT in this case. To add, DBT is an innocent
purchaser for value and good faith which, through a dacion en pago duly entered into with B.C.
Regalado, acquired ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must be protected
under Section 32[61] of P.D. No. 1529.
Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the
creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. It is a special mode of
payment where the debtor offers another thing to the creditor, who accepts it as an equivalent of
the payment of an outstanding debt. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion
en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale,
while the debt is considered as the purchase price.[62]
It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already been sold to third persons
who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value, relying on the certificates of
title shown to them, and who had no knowledge of any defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts
sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the subject
property.[63] To disregard these circumstances simply on the basis of alleged continuous and
adverse possession of respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of the
aforementioned titleholders, but would ultimately wreak havoc on the stability of the Torrens
system of registration.
A final note.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of registration of
titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of
his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title,
except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be sullied by
the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.[64] Thus, where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such
outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of
the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered
under the system will have to inquire in every instance on whether the title had been regularly or
irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.[65]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
dated October 25, 2004 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the respondents for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., and Peralta, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the private
respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case
is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the earlier
petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R.
No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S.
Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria
P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also
have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after
considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772
fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A
motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was
issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of
Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review
on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As
earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983.
The motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated
March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in
G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on
March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--
contend that the writs of possession and demolition issued in the
respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827
before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the
implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in
contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the
execution of the writs of possession and demolition and that petitioners are
entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in
the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo.
Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues
discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the
respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and
(2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate
Court was only intended not to render the petition moot and academic
pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to
DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take
cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly
DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of
the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108,
Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration
of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution
was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-
parte motion of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in
the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then
Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case
No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to
our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge
Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29,
1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No.
64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court
and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared
null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby
declared valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as
prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and
manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the
ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition,
Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which
remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte
motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds
to execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon.
Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to
register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432
Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same nature
filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same
to the Court Administrator for implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by
Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987
respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants
through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of
deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province
of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the
writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second
Division per its Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present motion is
hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby
ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as
prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance with the
order of this Court dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on
December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its order
dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within
the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days
from the date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of
petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate
shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
(pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private respondent The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is pendens on
in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the
the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens
following points: annotated thereon.

a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T- In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed
25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of
in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-
25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo — 4432)
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order
based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution dated
May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant or other disposition of the action such as to
xxx xxx xxx terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the
land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983
registered as provided in the preceding section, the
and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the
notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the
the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in
matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial
which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions
manner of disposal thereof."
upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of
this Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained by this
Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432) That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098,
T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil
Case No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals,
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6, 1986
entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto
and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring
Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
Respondents."
certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of
subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No.
the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or
15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new
proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside
its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens
was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to
Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere
order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of
cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendensin the new certificates of titles.
Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)

In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Regional Trial
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent
Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September
17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the
preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2,
Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of
1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No.
new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds
to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara
Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners
Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta
Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P.
Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate
of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October
24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent
Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Provido,
Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871
were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on
behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre
as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In
fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R.
No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent
Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and
her other co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary
to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution
proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the
same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long before Civil
Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in
filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in
G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings
involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party
causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could
rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice
of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should
keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the
results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v.
Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3,
citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case
necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil.
1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and
Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has
been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending
and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it
under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his
complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is
responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal
Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court
illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions
in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground
of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the
Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently
forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who
issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal
said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still
with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings
filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants
therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over
Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to
annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such
vs.
denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Vicente Llanes for petitioners.

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step
to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be
submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute
are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA
231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663)
The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must,
...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The
respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In
case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land
Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of
this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendensannotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never
have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression
that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties
claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court
which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate
copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed
of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the
terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the
parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-
thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise
not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances
on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by
Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion
of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of
Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu
thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in
interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion
of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No.
548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of
the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the
vendor ...

Republic of the Philippines Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.

EN BANC
 Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this
Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ...
and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all
rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional
memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been
issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto
Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of
Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I.
Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had
not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested
annotation.
transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not
so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens
registration would cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the action
taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the donation is
presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his
deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the
surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general
and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving
spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein — subject of course to the result of
future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the
property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on
its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-
thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say
more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to three
other parties.

Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221),
subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962.
wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in question are
With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner observed:
in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of
registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis
Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof pendens.
on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside
from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of
duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in
the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-
owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees
that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these Capistrano, J., took no part.
titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.ñet Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.

Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel Footnotes
annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act
496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any
*Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more persons.
voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the
Where two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in common, or
registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance
otherwise, one owner's duplicate certificate may be issued for the whole land, or a
with such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the
separate duplicate may be issued to each for his undivided share.
other copies of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one
whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three
vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in Republic of the Philippines
their favor was illegal or unauthorized. SUPREME COURT
Manila
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that there is
only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, EN BANC
such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient
authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably
issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration
Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent vs.
jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated
on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as
a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated
in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title
P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962
Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed
of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the
Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil
Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the
surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing
law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary
that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse
and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition
and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another
document ratifying this sale executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition
for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale
and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral
damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is
but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol)
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the
grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the
Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not
lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed
the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to compel
the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to
maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do
not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or
not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of
competent jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty
of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs.
Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their
registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for
denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid
instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to
know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their
existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice,
then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be
decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that
registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax
Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to
register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he
is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as
follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument
presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the
Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted
to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register
of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in
writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after
notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken
or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest
disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a
question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition
for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does not agree
with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds."
This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to
the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at
petitioner's cost.1äwphï1.ñët
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Sanchez, J., concurs in the result.

Footnotes

1In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228; Smith Bell
& Co., Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61; Register of Deeds, Pasig,
Rizal vs. heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31; Mendoza vs. Abrera, et al., L-
10519, April 30, 1959; Agricultural Credit Cooperative Association of Hinibiran vs. Yulo
Yusay, et al., L-13313, April 28, 1960; Dulay, et al., vs. Herrera, L-17084, August 30,
1962.