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Eugenio v.

Velez

Unaware of the death of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers, and sisters, filed a petition for habeas
corpus before RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence in
1987 and confined by Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite desire to
escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years old, single, and living with Eugenio.

Court issued writ of habeas corpus but writ was returned unsatisfied. Eugenio refused to surrender the
body of Vitaliana to the sheriff reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings. Eugenio then filed a motion to dismiss the petition further arguing that it is not applicable to
a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, Vargases were granted leave to amend their petition. Claiming to
have knowledge of death of Vitaliana only after filing the petition, they alleged that Eugenio was
wrongfully interfering with their duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the CC, Vargases
contended that, as the next kin in the PH, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of Vitaliana.

ISSUE: W/N the custody of the body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers and sisters or to
Eugenio

HELD:

Custody should be given to the full blood brothers and sisters.

As claimed by Eugenio, he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the CC, term spouse used
therein not being preceded by any qualification hence, absence to such qualification, he is the rightful
custodian of Vitaliana’s body. However, the Court does not agree.

Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside fact that such relationships are present in our society
and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exist in
case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that man and woman living together must
not in an way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, Eugenio has a subsisting legal marriage
thus disqualified from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
True, there is a law under Art. 332, RPC that the term spouse embraces common law relations for
purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling, and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. However, such cannot be applied in the case at bar.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial
shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989


Marcos v. Manglapus

FACTS:
Ferdinand Marcos and his family, after the fall of his dictatorship, flew to Hawaii as a form of forced exile.
Now, in deathbed, the family of Marcos is asking the court to order the issuance of their travel documents
to return to the Philippines. However, the present President at that time, Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from
various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

However, the Marcos family contends that under the provision of the Bill of Rights, the President cannot
impair their liberty of abode because only a Court may do so, “within the limits prescribed by law”.

ISSUE: W/N the Marcoses can be barred to enter the Philippines

HELD: Yes.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one’s country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter
one’s country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the “right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state” [Art. 13(l)] separately from the “right to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the “right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence” [Art. 12(l)] and the
right to “be free to leave any country, including his own.” [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by
such laws as “are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter
own country” of which one cannot be “arbitrarily deprived.” [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate
to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys different protection under the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, i.e., against being “arbitrarily deprived” thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014


Valino v. Adriano

FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario
Adriano. The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live
together as husband and wife. Despite such an arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to
Rosario and their children.

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending
Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to
shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her
husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family
of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried
and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, Rosario commenced suit against
Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and
that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot.

In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than twenty
(20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had
introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together, Valino admitted
that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took
good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. According to
Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the
Manila Memorial Park.

RTC dismissed the petition of Adriano opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long
time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into
consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the
trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino
who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably
presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum. On appeal, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the
expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter
the remains of the decedent in the family plot.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled of the remains of Atty. Adriano

HELD:

It is Rosario who has the legal right and duty to make funeral arrangements.

Under Article 305, CC to what is now Article 199 of the FC:


Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:


Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the body
of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve
upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;

From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.

Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her
husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario
had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for
the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like
any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection
between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that
human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member
joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic
pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of
December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino
and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at
the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of
such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the
form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that
should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the
wishes of the deceased shall be followed.
GR L-5426, May 29, 1953
JOAQUIN v. NAVARRO

FACTS:

While the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela
Joaquin, together with their three daughters and their son and the latter’s wife Adela Conde, sought refuge
in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their stay, the building was packed
with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three
daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance.

Joaquin Sr. and son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince
Angela Joaquin who refused to join them. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by
a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises
to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside,
presumably including Angela Joaquin. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and
stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but
unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.

Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his
mother.

ISSUE: W/N the son or the mother died first before the other

HELD:

In light of the circumstances, a fair inference can be arrived that Joaquin Jr. died before his mother. Under
Article 33, CC: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who
would inherit from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the
absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights
from one to the other shall take place.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was
the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15
meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and
unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have
perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had
tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from
leaving the place and exposing themselves to gunfire.
This presumption was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence on which civil cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship
may be direct, indirect, circumstantial or inferential.

Catalan v. Basa

FACTS:

On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his
mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16,
1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property through the execution
of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent. On
December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
which is formerly the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court.
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia
and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity
of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deedof Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the
property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property
to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving
valid consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals
dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deedof donation in favor
of Mercedes Catalan.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
2. Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally in
possession of the latter

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appealsand denied the
petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must
be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A person
suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property.
By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date
of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the
lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this condition continued to
exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell
the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that
Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in
question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for
the first time on appeal before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it
prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it
was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.

Mercado v. Espiritu

FACTS:

Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died the complaint was
amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the
deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all
surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis
Espiritu that Margarita died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in
Calumpit Bulacan.

The hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father
Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by
means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa
Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400 as opposed to the
assessed value of P3795.

Hence, an annulment of sale was sought by the plaintiffs asserting that two of the four parties were
minors and that they merely presented themselves to be of legal age upon signing deed of sale before
notary public.

ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale is a valid contract when the minors presented themselves that they were of
legal age.

HELD:

The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it was executed by minors, who
have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors
pretended that they had already reached their majority.

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction
are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.

Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law
on estoppels.

Whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another
party to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it. Furthermore, the sale of real estate made
by a minor who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact he is not, is VALID, and he will not be permitted to
excuse himself from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by him or to have it annulled. The
judgment that holds such sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him
does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minor’s property, nor the judicial rules established in
consonance therewith.

Bambalan v. Maramba

FACTS:

In 1915, Isidro Bambalan’s parents got a loan from German Maramba and Genoveva Muerong. In 1922,
Isidro Bambalan’s dad died and was left as the sole heir of their estate. Apparently, Mueros and Maramba
demanded for the payment of the loan that was given on 1915 thus they forced Bambalan to sell their
land as payment.

Muerong and Maramba threatened Bambalan by telling him that his mother will be imprisoned if he did
not pay the loan or if he did not sell the land. Thus, Bambalan signed it but under due force because of
fear that his mother will be imprisoned. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalan’s first cedula to have
the sale acknowledged. It was also said that the land Bambalan owned wasn’t registered in the Register
of Deeds. As provided in Section 50 of Act 496, sale of the land can’t be executed without registration to
the Register of Deeds.

ISSUE: W/N Sale of land to Maramba and Muerong was valid

Held:
No. Sale was invalid.

Isidro is incapacitated to enter into such contracts because he was a minor and also because the land
was not even registered in the Register of Deeds.

The Doctrine in Mercado v. Espiritu (Article 38, CC: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property
relations, such as easements.) cannot be applied because Bambalan did not pretend to be of age. Also,
defendants knew he was a minor.

Suan Chian v. Alcantara

A deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara ang his sons, one of them is a minor, conveying to Sia
Suan five parcels of land. Thereafter, the attorney of Alcantara informed the husband of Sia that Ramon
Alcantara is a minor and accordingly disavowed the contract. Ramon, however, executed an affidavit in
the office of the attorney of the husband of Sia, ratifying the sale and receiving P500 as payment. In the
meantime, Sia sold one of the lots to Azorez.
Ramon instituted an action for the annulment of the deed of sale at the CFI of Laguna, to which the court
granted, and thereby required Sia to pay Ramon the sum of P1,750 with legal interest and the
reconveyance of the property. Sia appealed by certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid.

HELD

Yes. Under the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs Espiritu (37 Phil 215) to bind a minor who
represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with a cash, as
long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Preexisting indebtedness is a valid
consideration which produces its full force and effect, in the absence of any other vice that may legally
invalidate the sale.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, Ramon informed Sia and her
husband of his minority, is of no moment, because Ramon’s previous misrepresentation had already
estopped him from disavowing the contract.
Braganza v. Villa Abrille

Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in
consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,000 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have not paid, Abrille sued them in
March 1949.

The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract
they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to
solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the
Braganza sons when they signed the contract.

They also averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note.

Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:

. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal
age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their incapacity, and if the
former, in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his money, then he should have
contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their desire
to acquire much-needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing
the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case,
pretended to be of legal age, in fact, they were not, they will not, later on, be permitted to excuse
themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al.
vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the minors are liable for the promissory note?
RULING:

No, in order to hold them liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his
mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the
basis of an action of deceit.

The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that he is of full
age must be actual, not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient.

However, the boys though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual
amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable
because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the
money received.
Atizado v. People

FACTS

Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged Danilo Atizado and Monreal with murder of
one Rogelio Llona y Llave April 1994. It was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one
Desder, where the victim was a guest and suddenly shot at Llona with their guns. Mirandilla, the common
law wife heard thundering steps as if people were running and then two successive gunshots. She saw
Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona.

Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. Defense showed that at the time of the
commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the house of a
certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo
had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that
the petitioners had been implicated only because of their being employed by their uncle
Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.

After the shooting, they fled. For their defense, the petitioners interposed that they were at their family
residence and drinking gin.The RTC convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder and
sentenced them with reclusion perpetua.

On appeal to the CA, the court affirmed the conviction in 2005. It is important to note that Salvador
Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
murder.What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, a minor during the time of the commission?

HELD/RATIO: Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended.
The witness positive identification of thepetitioners as the killers, and her declarations onwhat each of
the petitioners did when theymounted their sudden deadly assault against Llonaleft no doubt
whatsoever that they had conspiredto kill and had done so with treachery. Under Article 248 of the RPC,
the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA
correctlyimposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado. But reclusion per petua was not the
correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over15 but under 18 years of age.The RTC and the
CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of the commission of probably because his birth
certificate presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot be doubtedthat Monreal was a minor below 18
years of agewhen the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. His counter-affidavit, the police blotter
and trialrecords show that Monreal was a minor at the timeof the commission. Monreals minority was
legallysufficient, for it conformed with the normssubsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344.

People v. Rafanan

FACTS:
On February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
househelper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his
mother in the same. Policarpio was then married and had two children. On March 16, 1976, in the evening,
after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in which was located in front
of their house. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the
accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and
went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said that they should have
intercourse, Ronaya refused. The accused held a bolo and pointed it to the throat of the complainant
threatening her with said bolo should she resist. He then raped Ronaya in spite of her resistance and
struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to
her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise, he would kill her. In the evening of March 17, 1976, the
family of the accused learned what happened that night.

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. The trial court suspended the trial and
ordered appellant confined at the NationalMental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment.
In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976
and stayed there until 26 June 1978. On the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as
behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly
groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a
"much-improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."Trial of the case thus resumed.
The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two years
before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from
schizophrenia when he raped complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reason of insanity, in this case, is sufficient to relieve himself of criminal
liability through exempting circumstance.

HELD:
NO.
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that the acts
without the least discernment; or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.

For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should
absolutely deprived person of intelligence or freedom of will because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are
always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order
to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will is
proved.Schizophrenia pleaded by the appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by the inability to fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. the findings of the case, testimonies negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time
of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our case law, is critical if the defense of
insanity is to be sustained.
The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had
been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault.

In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the
exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.The law presumes every man to be sane. A person
accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.

Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the
accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed.
Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians which, however, did not purport to
characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to
circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of
broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia
Standard Oil Company of New York v. Juan Codina Arenas

FACTS:

Arenas and Lara del Pino, as prinicipals and Alipio Locso, Villanueva and Chinaman Siy Ho, as sureties
sign a bond in favor of plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of P3, 305.76 at three months from date,
with interest at P1.00 per month.

On 1909, plaintiff sued the debtors regarding the bond sign and was summoned, record showing that
summons was served on Villanueva. However, Villanueva did not appear and was declared in default.

Court of First Instance sentenced all defendants to pay plaintiff company the aforementioned sum with
interest thereon at 1% a month from Dec. 15, 1908 until complete payment of principal costs. While
judgment was in course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva appeared and alleged that Villanueva
was insane and that she was appointed guardian by the same court. She, as guardian was not aware of
the proceedings, had against Vicente and was only informed about it. Vicente only gave the bond when he
was already permanently insane (suffering from monomania of great wealth) and was in such state when
summoned and still continued to do so.

She petitioned court to relieve her husband from compliance and to reopen the trial for the introduction of
evidence on his behalf with respect to his capacity at the time of the bond’s execution.

Court granted the petition thus trial was reopened for introduction of evidence. Court decided that when
Vicente Villanueva executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly the nature and consequence of
the act performed by him. As a result of such findings, the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite
stay of execution of the judgment rendered in the case be denied and said execution be carried out. After
filing an exception to the ruling, a new hearing was requested with reference to the defendant Vicente S.
Villanueva and upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in support of said appeal.

ISSUE: Does the claim of defendant’s wife with respect to the defendant himself on being exempted from
court’s orders of paying jointly and severally with other defendants the sum and additional costs under
the basis that he is mentally insane (suffering from monomania of great wealth) and therefore without
capacity to enter such contracts stand as valid?

HELD:

SC affirmed the judgment of CA.

Villanueva possesses the capacity to act. No evidence that a person suffering from a monomania of
wealth is really insane and incapable of binding himself in a contract. Capacity to act must be presumed
to attach to every person who has not been previously declared to be incapable and to continue until the
contrary is proven.

It would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable
mental perturbation on the patient; that the bond executed was the result of such monomania and not the
effect of any other cause, that is, that there were not, or could there have been any other cause for the
contract than the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of wealth. That
the monomania existed on the date the bond in question.

Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable,
and such capacity is presumed to continue for so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at the
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind which, in the opinion of the court
was not been proved in this case.

Cordora v. Comelec

FACTS:
Cordora accused Tambunting of an election offense violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. To disprove
Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American:
upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June
2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship
through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii.

Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates
of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting
presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The
certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through
INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at
birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino
citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No.
9225.

ISSUE:

W/N Tambunting is a natural-born Filipino

HELD:

Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he
deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his
father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both
Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the
naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only
served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he
is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy
before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s volition.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship.

In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false
entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of
the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and
fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.

Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec

FACTS:

Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed
before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Reyes on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically:
(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;

(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas
which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P.
Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House
of Representatives;

(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July
1959 or 3 July 1960;

(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant4 of the United States of America; and

(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

In her answer, Reyes countered that while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman
Mandanas, there is no valid and binding marriage between them. As to her date of birth, the Certificate of
Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes
that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not
supported by evidence.

During the course of the proceedings, Tan filed a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered
evidence and amended list of exhibits among others:

1. A copy of an article published on the internet entitled “Seeking and Finding the Truth About
Regina O. Reyes with affidavit of identification and authenticity of document which provides
database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that Reyes is an American Citizen and a
holder of a U.S. passport;
2. (2) a Certification of Travel Records of the petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief,
Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner
used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.

Comelec First Division canceled Reyes’ COC.

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status
by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that the COMELEC
First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she is a
naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted in dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still,
petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public.

COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.

Four days thereafter, Reyes was proclaimed the winner of the elections. COMELEC En Banc issued a
Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and
executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation
with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution. Petitioner has yet to assume office.

ISSUE:

W/N Reyes is a Filipino citizen and therefore allowed to run as a candidate of the House of
Representatives.

HELD:

NO. The Court herein ruled that Reyes was not a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy. To be a candidate of the House of Representatives, an individual should be a Filipino citizen
at the time of his or her filing of the COC and must be resident thereof (of the municipality he or she will
be representing) for not less than 1 year. In the case at bar, petitioner Reyes failed to prove that she had
already renounced her American citizenship. Her contention that she already renounced the same cannot
be entertained. She stated that she already took her oath of allegiance when she was appointed as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque. However, the said oath taking was not in accordance with
present laws. For a former citizen to be considered as a Filipino citizen again, he or she must conform to
the rules stated in RA 9225. In this case, petitioner Reyes did not comply with the said requirements.
Moreover, her residency issue was also barring her candidacy. She failed to prove that she had intent to
establish her domicile in the Philippines. Her actions prove that she has no intention of leaving her
domicile in the United States. PETITION IS DISMISSED.

David v. Agbay

Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they built their house is public
land and part of the salvage zone.

Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.

The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.

An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted
to have been committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225.

RULING:

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary
to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A.
9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to
those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words,
Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which
clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.

Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already
a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC, therefore, did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document
under Article 172, paragraph 1.

Olaguer v. Purugganan

FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer who is an activist against the Marcos administration was the owner of
60,000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation with a total par value of P600,000.00. Anticipating the
possibility that petitioner would be arrested and detained by the

Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifeña had an unwritten agreement that, in the event, that
petitioner was arrested, they would support the petitioner’s family by the continued
payment of his salary. Oleguer executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), on 26 May 1979,appointing
as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileña for the purpose of selling or transferring petitioner’s
shares of stock with Businessday. The parties acknowledged the SPAbefore respondent Emilio
Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary
public for Quezon City. On 24 December 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military by virtue of
an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order and detained for allegedly committing arson.
In view of petitioner’s previous instructions, for such price and under such terms and conditions that the
agents may deem proper. When the petitioner was detained, respondent Locsin tried to sell petitioner’s
shares, but nobody wantedto buy them. Petitioner’s reputation as an oppositionist resulted in the poor
financial condition of Businessday and discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock. Respondent
Locsin decided to buy the shares himself.

Although the capital deficiency suffered by Businessday caused value of the shares to plummet below
par value, respondent Locsin, nevertheless, bought the shares at par value. The RTC found that
petitioner consented to have respondent Locsinbuy the shares himself, through his wife received from
respondent Locsin the amount of P600,000.00 as payment for the shares of stock.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA.

DECISION:
It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed; will be held to grant only those
powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney.
However, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose
of the power. If the language willpermit, the construction that should be adopted is that which will carry
out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment. Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant
to each other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in accordance with its general
intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument should always be deemed to give such
powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers.In the present case, limiting the
definitions of "absence" to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of "incapacity" under
Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd, if not
impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent standards that would justify the
appointment of a representative by a judge. Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no
agent has been appointed toadminister the property. In the present case, petitioner himself had already
authorized agents todo specific acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment
of one by the court. Likewise, limiting the construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity, imbecility, the
state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction," as provided under Article 38, would render
the SPA ineffective.
Petitioner received from respondent Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment payments for a
total of P600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or complaint. It was only four years
after 1982 when petitioner demanded the return of the shares. The petitioner’s claim that he did not
instruct respondent Locsin to deposit the money to the bank accounts of his in-laws fails to prove that
petitioner did not give his consent to the sale since respondent Locsin was authorized, under theSPA, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of the sale including the manner of payment. Moreover, had
respondent Locsin given the proceeds directly to the petitioner, as the latter suggested in this
petition, the proceeds were likely to have been included among petitioner’s properties which were
confiscated by the military. Instead, respondent Locsin deposited the money in the bank accounts of
petitioner’s in-laws, and consequently, assured that the petitioner’s wife received these amounts
.
Article 1882 of the Civil Code provides that the limits of an agent’s authority shall not
be consideredexceeded should it have been performed in a manner more advantageous to the principal
than that specified by him.

Umale v. ASB Realty Corporation

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land located in Amethyst Str., Ortigas Center, Pasig City which was
originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation, a company that is, in turn, wholly-owned by ASB Realty
Corporation.

Amethyst Pear executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB
Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl’s outstanding capital stock from ASB
realty making it the owner of the subject premises.

In 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Umale. ASB Realty
alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a pay-
parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720. Upon the contract’s expiration on
continued occupying the premises and paying rentals.

ASB Realty then served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay.
ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 2003. In asserting his right
to remian on the property based on the oral lessee contract with Amethyst Pearl, Umale interposed that
the lease period agreed upon was for a long period of time”. Umale further claimed that when his oral
lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended, they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed that
Umale did not have to pay with the sale over the property as it has already been perfected between them.

Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB
Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly appointed.
Under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), it is the
rehabilitation receiver that has the power to "take possession, control and custody of the debtor's
assets." Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that
should sue to recover possession of the same.

ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for Umale to have entered into a Contract of Lease with
Amethyst Pearl in 1999 because Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in 1996.

MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty had no
cause to seek Umale's ouster from the subject property because it was not Umale's lessor. MTC agreed
with Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file suit to recover ASB Realty's property.
Havingbeen placed under receivership, ASB Realty had no more personality to file the complaint for
unlawful detainer.

RTC reversed decision of the MTC. It found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it
was indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract withUmale. With respect to ASB Realty's
personality to file the unlawful detainer suit, the RTC ruled that ASB Realty retained all its corporate
powers, including the power to sue, despite the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the Interim
Rules, the RTC noted that the rehabilitation receiver was not granted therein the power to file
complaints on behalf of the corporation. Moreover, the retention of its corporate powers by the
corporation under rehabilitation will advance the objective of corporate rehabilitation, which is to
conserve and administer the assets of the corporation in the hope that it may eventually be able
to go from financial distress to solvency.

Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC denied
reconsideration of its Decision and granted ASB Realty's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.

Umale then filed his appeal with the CA insisting that the parties did not enter into a lease contract.

Pending the resolution thereof, Umale died and was substituted by his widow and legal heirs. CA
affirmed RTC decision in toto.

Issues:Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit
to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had
already been placed under rehabilitation?

The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers.There is no denying that ASB
Realty, as the owner of the leased premises, is the real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer
suit. Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file this suit
to recover a corporate property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed rehabilitation receiver.
Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file the instant suit.

Corporations, such as ASB Realty, arejuridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law,
the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or impliedly, in the law. Among
the general powers granted by law to a corporation is the power to sue in its own name. This
power is granted to a duly-organized corporation, unless specifically revoked by another law. The
question becomes: Do the laws on corporate rehabilitation —particularly PD 902-A, as amended and
its corresponding rules of procedure —forfeit the power to sue from the corporate officers and
Board of Directors?

Corporate rehabilitation is defined as "the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful


operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible
and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if
the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated." This concept of
preserving the corporation's business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called
debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. This means that the debtor corporation (the
corporation undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and corporate officers, remains in
control of its business and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation
receiver. The concept of debtor-in-possession is carried out more particularly in the SEC Rules, the rule
that is relevant to the instant case. It states therein that the interim rehabilitation receiver of the
debtor corporation "does not take over the control and management of the debtor corporation."
Likewise, the rehabilitation receiver that will replace the interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the
successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan. There is nothing in the concept of corporate
rehabilitation that would ipso facto deprive the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a
debtor corporation, such as ASB Realty, of control such that it can no longer enforce its right to
recover its property from an errant lessee.

To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation. The rules
enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of which involve some kind of
disposition or encumbrance of the corporation's assets) during the pendency of the rehabilitation
proceedings but none of which touch on the debtor corporation's right to sue.

While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover its
property and the back rentals from Umale, the necessity of keeping the receiver apprised of the
proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB
Realty, the rehabilitation receiver has to be notified of the developments in the case, so that these
assets would be managed in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan.

Heirs of Favis v. Gonzales

FACTS:
Dr. Mariano Favis was married to Capitolina Aguilar with whom he had seven children When
Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife
with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got
married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate
children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children.
Dr. Favis died intestate on 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed a
Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina,
petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation,
liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita
and their grandchildren as respondents.

RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. Trial Court found
that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his
mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation.

Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made as mandated by Article 151 of FC.

ISSUE: W/N CA gravely and seriously erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exert
earnest efforts towards a compromise.

HELD:

Yes.
CA committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. A failure to allege earnest but failed
efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. In the case at
hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners was
answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in
favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the
ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause
of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with
a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in
the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly
applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after
filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required
allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have
any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint. The
correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to
rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity.
The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide
us with any argument to have it reversed. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. Petition for review is

GRANTED.
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.

Jalosjos v. Comelec

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to Australia when he was
eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the Philippines
and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a
certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his
Australian citizenship.

Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private
Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration. COMELEC approved
the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This decision was affirmed at the
MCTC and at the RTC.
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for
the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).

COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to
the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this
reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD:

NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing
his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to
Zamboanga Sibugay.

The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least
one year before the elections. For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a
particulaar place, but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. To determine compliance with the


residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:

(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;

(b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city. When he acquired
Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On
the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother
in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile
for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance
to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the
loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of
law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere.

Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brother's house. A candidate is not required to have a
house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place. It is enough that he
should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To
insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification
for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical
presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically
present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and national
party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC. The court
also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Naldoza v. Republic

FACTS:
Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married. They begot two children. After a quarrel
between the spouses, Dionesio left the conjugal home and never returned. He allegedly swindled
Congressman Maglana and other persons.

The classmates of the two children were allegedly teased about their father being a swindler. Two
criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Zosima, on August 10, 1978, filed in the
CFI of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from
Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname. The trial court dismissed the petition.

Zosima appealed to this Court.


Issue: WON the children should be allowed to drop the surname of their father and be allowed to use the
mother’s surname?

Held: No.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. To allow the change of
surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that the
minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with
their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records.

As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of time must, know
of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for
himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he
should be the one to apply for a change of surname. See Anno., 53 ALR2d 914.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Yasin V. Sharia District Court


G.R. No. 94986, 23 February 1995

FACTS:
On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a
"Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments
to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules
of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not
properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the
petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely
a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after
marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the
motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would
result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and
the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition
for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.

RULING:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use
her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by
adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art.
370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the
case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or
divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to
revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not
obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but
only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's
surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the
husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the
respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do
so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of
divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

In re: Stephanie Garcia

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to
Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should
be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189
she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article
365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189
of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

Remo v. DFA

FACTS:
Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine
passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia”
as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied
for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her
request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of
Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use
her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name
has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules
of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her
maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling. The CA also
affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA
8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the
Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the
case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]

Issues:
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert
to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Held:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge
Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her
husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name
because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does
not conflict with this principle.

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from
using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden
name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport,
the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.
Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA
8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s
marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on
the severance of the marriage.
Yasin case not in point

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose
former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin
did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to
resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special
law prevails over a general law.

Implied repeals are disfavored

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as
possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.
This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her
present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the
use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which
is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s
constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity
and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains
at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long
as it is valid.