FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188315

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA,
Accused-Appellant. August 25, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.

On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 00726 finding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape.

In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the

commission of the crime and the age of the complainant, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.

03-081 to 03-261, appellant was accused of raping AAA,[2] allegedly committed as

follows:

That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting father of
complainant who was then _________ years of age, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of force
and intimidation and against the will of the complainant.[3]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial

conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts:

1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;

2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since
AAA was one and a half years old.[4]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The following facts are undisputed:

AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,[5] since she was just a few

months old.[6] BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6)

years.Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was
working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a

week.

Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself,

Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed

Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran).

The prosecutions version of the facts follows

In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping

inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA could see

appellants face as there was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally

surprised and she asked appellant why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not

answer but told her not to mention the incident to anybody. AAA then saw

appellant went back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA immediately went

back to sleep.

The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work,

appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist

but appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB.

Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she

suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at

AAAs neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly
parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Meanwhile, AAA

struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice

before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by

inserting his organ into AAAs vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at

least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when

she was 14 years old.After the last rape incident, AAA did not go home after

school and instead went to the house of her friend, Marvin.[7]

On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00

p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that

appellant would spank her for going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were

other things that appellant might have done to her, aside from spanking. At that

point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has been raped by appellant. Marvin

told AAA to file a complaint.[8]

AAA stayed at her mothers friends house and came back on 18 October

2002. She, together with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek

assistance.Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who

at that time, was trying to escape.[9]

PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Womens and Children Desk of

Makati Police Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA
and her friend, Marvin. She then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to

undergo medico-legal examination.[10]

P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination

on AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show

that the hymen is with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 oclock and shallow

healed laceration at 2 oclock positions at the time of examination. Said report

concluded that AAA is in a non-virgin state physically.[11] P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined

that the lacerations could have been caused by any solid object, like the penis

inserted at the genitalia.[12]

Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost

at 2:10 p.m. on 18 October 2002 when they were summoned by Barangay

KagawadRamon Espena. Acting on the complaint of AAA, they were directed to

proceed to the house of appellant to invite him for questioning. Duran saw

appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped the jeep and asked appellant to alight

therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant voluntarily went

with them.Appellant was then brought to the police station.[13]

Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a

strict father to AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the latter
would ran away, he denied raping AAA.[14] He alleged that AAA has the

propensity to make up stories and was even once caught stealing money from her

grandmother.Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked permission

to go out to buy a project. She never came home.[15]

On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused ISIDRO
FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE penalized
by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article
266-B par. 1. Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted
daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender is
the adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and
to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of
rape.[16]
The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of
the crime of rape through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed
straightforward, consistent and credible. The trial court also established that
appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a
minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies of witnesses, and admission
made by AAA.[17] Finally, the trial court dismissed appellants defense of denial as
self-serving and which cannot prevail over AAAs positive testimony.[18]
Upon denial of appellants motion for reconsideration, the case was initially

elevated to the Court of Appeals for its review pursuant to People v.

Mateo.[19] However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for

failure of appellant to file his appellants brief.[20] When the case was brought

before us on automatic review, we set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals

and remanded it back for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that

review by the Court of Appeals of the trial courts judgment imposing the death

penalty is automatic and mandatory.[21]

On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was

raped by appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts.

The fallo of the Decision reads:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as

follows:

1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to

03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the ground of reasonable doubt and is
hereby acquitted;

2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and

03-261 is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified
through the Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count.[22]
 The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last

incidents of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261, respectively, was

proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.[23] With respect to the other

incidents, according to the appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely

based on general allegations that she was raped on the average of three (3) times a

week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court

concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient to prove the other

charges of rape.[24]

On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of

Appeals Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the
parties to simultaneously submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their Manifestations
stating that they will no longer file any Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will
merely adopt their Appellants and Appellee's Briefs, respectively.[25]

Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the

alleged assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of AAA live only meters

away from her and the frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that

it was impossible for them not to notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the

appreciation of the circumstances of minority and relationship as basis for the

imposition of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent is not

included within the purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the

Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent may be

construed as similar to a parent, appellant argues that the term adopting parent

must be given a definite and technical meaning in that the process of adoption must

first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must have been issued.[26]

The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of

AAA that appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with the medico-legal report,

are more than sufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. Moreover, appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to

falsely accuse him of rape.[27]

The OSG insists that AAAs failure to report promptly the previous incidents of

rape does not dent her credibility. Appellants exercise of moral ascendancy over

AAA and that fact that she was under physical threat during those times, could

have instilled fear on AAA from reporting said incidents.[28]

The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion

perpetua without eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.[29]
After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the

decision of the Court of Appeals.

Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed

within the span of three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October

2002. We are in full accord with the acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of

rape. Stated otherwise, we agree with appellants conviction for two (2) counts of

rape.

In rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue. For

when a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show

that rape was committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the

accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[30]

Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The

RTC considered it straightforward and consistent on material points, while the

Court of Appeals described it as spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-

serious contradictions. Well-entrenched is the legal precept that when the

culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility of

witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial

court, when duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be

accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court and are not to be

disturbed on appeal.[31] We see no reason in this case to depart from the

principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the trial courts assessment of AAAs

credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her

demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.[32]

Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that when the offended party is of

tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what

transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to

which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. When a

girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is

necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her.[33]

Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was

only able to prove two counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia,[34] the

Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus:

As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260)

imputed against accused-appellant, We find him not guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she
was raped by the accused-appellant on the average of three (3) times a week from
February 1999 to 15 October 2002.AAAs bare statement is evidently inadequate
and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every charge of
rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of them must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that the
victim was raped three times a week is decidedly inadequate and grossly
 insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with the required
quantum of evidence.[35]

As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant

forced her to have sexual intercourse with him, thus:

Q: What happened after two (2) weeks?

A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head.
Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you
noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]?
A: At work, sir.
Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife.
xxxx
Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was
holding a knife?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that person?
A: Papa
Q: When you said Papa, you are referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko and he removed his shorts.
Q: At that time, what were you then wearing?
A: Pajama, sir.
Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then?
A: He undressed me.
Q: Which one did he remove?
A: My pajama.
Q: What about your upper garments?
A: He did not remove.
Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what
happened?
 A: He slowly parted my legs.
Q: And then?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that?
A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong.
Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time?
A: Hinampas ko po siya sa braso.
Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms?
A: Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko.[36]

Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man

having carnal knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years of age. At that time of

the commission of the first incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as

evidenced by her birth certificate.[37]

As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated:

Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until
when?
A: The last time was in October 15, 2002.
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again?
A: In our house.
Q: At about what time?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen?
A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and he
removed my shorts and he also undressed himself.
Q: Then?
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he left
the house.[38]
Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last

incident of rape, the applicable rule is Article 266-A(a) which states that rape is

committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or

intimidation.

AAAs testimony that she was defiled by appellant was corroborated by the medical

findings of the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep healed and shallow

healed laceration only confirms AAAs claim of rape.

In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code in imposing the penalty of death, which was later modified by the Court of
Appeals to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B
provides:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is

committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:

"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim;

xxxx

The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority

and relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the

established fact that AAA was still a minor when she was raped and on the

stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian. One of the instances wherein the

crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor AND the accused is

her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence,

we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance

of relationship.

Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the

guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider

guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. Circumstances that

qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of

stipulation.The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of

death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the

gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the

prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial

the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the

offender.[39]

Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal

relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed

was first enunciated in the early case of People v. De la Cruz.[40] The issue in said
case was whether the aunt of a rape victim could file a criminal complaint on

behalf of her niece, when the victims father was still living and residing in

the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended that the aunt was the legal

guardian of the victim, thus, was competent to sign the information. The Court

rejected this contention and ruled as follow:

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:

"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o

abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o
de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al
ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos." Without
passing at this time on the question whether the tutor (legal guardian)
may file a complaint in the temporary absence of the parents or
grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot
accept the view of the Government that an aunt who has the temporary
custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of a
tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article
344, supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil
Procedure.[41]

Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be

considered a guardian as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said

case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of

appellant, who is the live-in partner of the victims aunt. The issue of whether

appellant is considered a guardian in the contemplation of the amendment to the

law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with the
higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the

negative by the Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in

this discourse:

In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article

344 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the
offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the
sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime.
In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the
law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on
civil procedure.

xxxx

It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third
paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and
grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from
the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also
mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In
Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with the
power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of
four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of
the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the death
penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive
concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial
guardian, be required in the latter article.

The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in

Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive
on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant
circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the
Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the
law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be
determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state
"guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial
guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be
a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence
that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its
amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural
guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a
judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.

They did agree, however, that the additional attendant

circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be
considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to
the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of
the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111,
although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have
changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof
punishable by the higher penalty of death.

xxxx

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the

consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which
impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally
deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not
obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly
circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The
fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting
sanctions should he betray the trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the

guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced
by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the
"common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same
enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since
both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a
custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he
exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot
impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit
into that category.[42]
 People v. De la Cuesta[43] adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact

that the mother asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did

not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.[44]

Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar[45] where it was

held that the guardian envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a

person who has a legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged

for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an

11 year old child to at least two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed

to establish filiation albeit it considered accused as a de facto guardian. However,

this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the

ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term guardian in this manner:

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction

of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which
it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the
circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will
justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
"ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which
"guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this
description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person
who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established
either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption
(legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs
adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.[46]
 Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not

even mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant

was the adopting father of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to

establish.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship,

appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not

qualified rape.

We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity

from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00

to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.[47] The award of exemplary

damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 pursuant

to People v. Guillermo.[48]While no aggravating circumstance attended the

commission of rapes, it was established during trial that appellant used a deadly

weapon to perpetrate the crime.Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y

Lagua of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is

herebyAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape only and sentenced to suffer the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua for each count. He is also ordered, for each count of

rape, to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral

damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount

of P30,000.00.