1.
Whether the court is without power to compel him to become
SC grants Cebu lawyer’s bid to be delisted from ‘corrupt’
profession
CEBU CITY–The Supreme Court (SC) has granted the request of a
Cebuano lawyer to strip him of his title and functions to protest the
alleged corruption in the profession, particularly in the prosecution
service and the judiciary.
“Please take notice that the court en banc issued a resolution dated
January 31, 2017. The court resolved to grant the Petition for Voluntary
Delisting in the Roll of Attorneys filed by the petitioner,” said the High
Court’s Clerk of Court Felipa Anama in a Notice.
Lawyer Dionisio Cañete was elated upon receiving the Notice last
Wednesday.
“I have no regrets whatsoever. I am happy that I am now out of the
profession so that I will not be in the same association with corrupt
prosecutors and judges,” he said.
Cañete, 78, expressed dismay over the “unspeakable injustices” he
suffered while practicing the profession for 56 years.
He said he was extremely disappointed when nine of the 10 cases he
filed before the prosecutors’ office from 2014 to 2016 were “maliciously
dismissed” despite having presented strong evidence.
Three of the nine dismissed cases were overturned by the Regional
State Prosecutor.
When he returned to the prosecutors’ office, Cañete said the case
folders of these cases could no longer be found.
The actions of prosecutors and judges, he said, convinced him that the
criminal justice system in the Philippines is “like a spider’s web,
wherein only the mosquitoes and flies are caught, but the wealthy and
government officials simply go through it.”
“With all those cruel and brutal injustices heaped on me, I feel that
being a lawyer does not anymore deserve respect and courtesy from
his own brothers in the legal profession; that there is no more logical
and cogent reason for me to remain as a lawyer,” he added.
Cañete said he’s hoping that his voluntary resignation from the Roll of
Attorneys would lead to a meaningful reform and reorientation in the
prosecution service and the judiciary” in order to minimize corruption.
He said lawyers are very much aware of the ongoing corruption in the
prosecution service and the judiciary but have been silent or indifferent
toward it.
Cañete cited an example wherein a lawyer loses a case because the
opposing party had all the money to “buy” the prosecutor or the judge.
“Filing the petition was based on my disillusion, frustration, utter
disappointment as well as humiliation and embarrassment inflicted by
the highly unfair and brutally unjust actions of my brothers in the legal
profession who are members of the prosecution and judiciary…” he
said.
Cañete passed the Bar Examinations in 1960 and was a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) the next year.
In 1981, he was elected vice president of the IBP Cebu
Province Chapter. The following year, he assumed the presidency
when the elected president resigned and ran for an elective post.
In 1983, Cañete ran and was elected IBP President Cebu
Province Chapter—a position he held until 1985.
At present, he is the chairman-emeritus of the World Eskrima
Kali Arnis Federation. CDG
IN RE: EDILLON (1978)
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney
in the Philippines. On November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended to the Court the removal
of the name of Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding multiple due
notices sent to him.
ISSUES:
a member of the integrated bar of the Philippines.
2. Whether the provision of the court rule requiring payment of
a membership fee is void.
3. Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and
hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
4. Whether the power of sc to strike the name of a lawyer from
its roll of attorneys is valid.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote
or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s
public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities
holding such are legion.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered
to be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Letter of Atty. Cecilia Y. Arevalo Jr. Requesting Exemption from
Payment of IBP Dues BM No. 1370 May 9, 2005 En Banc
Facts:
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from
payment of his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00.
He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil
Service Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement. His
contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits
him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same
while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual
membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer.
His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due
process of the law.
Issues:
1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during
the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was
in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from
1986-2003?
2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a
deprivation of property without due process?
Held:
1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for
regulation. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated
Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of
implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in
the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in.
2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted
to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as
a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move. (Letter
of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of
IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005)
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay
540 SCRA 424
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident
of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege
to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires
it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from
this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
 the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
 the payment of professional tax;
 the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
 the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
IN RE EPIFANIO MUNESES (Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship) B.M. No. 2112
Keywords:
 Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses became a lawyer in 1966
but acquired American citizenship in 1981
 Restored citizenship in 2006 by virtue of RA 9225
 A Filipino lawyer who re-acquires citizenship remains to be a
member of the Philippine Bar but must apply for a license or
permit to engage in law practice.
On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines.
Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his privilege to
practice law when he became a American citizen in 1981. In 2006, he
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or the
“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003” by taking
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate in Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the Philippines
and if granted, to resume the practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the
practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice
of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-
acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be
a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the
Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
to engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the
practice of law, the OBC required, and incompliance thereof, petitioner
submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine
Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of
the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
6. Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues;
 7. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
8. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd
compliance period; and
9. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria
Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
10. University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his
compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,
particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were
satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all
the qualifications, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be
allowed to resume his practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby
GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's
Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
appropriate fees.
In re Marcos del Rosario
http://manilastandardtoday.com/news/-%20main-
stories/162235/sc-allows-dual-law-practice.html
Filipino lawyers who became naturalized American citizen can again
practice law in the country upon acquiring dual citizenship, according
to the Supreme Court.
In an en banc resolution promulgated September 23, 2014, but
released only this week, the Supreme Court granted the petition of
Marcos Del Rosario to practice his legal profession in the country after
losing his Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization as US
citizen.
“The Court resolved to allow petitioner Del Rosario to resume practice
of law in the Philippines, subject to the conditions that he re-takes his
lawyer’s oath on a date set by the Court,” the resolution stated.
The high court also required petition to pay “the appropriate fees, and
(submit) the original or certified true copy of the proof of payment of the
professional tax for 2013.”
The SC cited Article XII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which provides
that “the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.”
Before moving to the US, Del Rosario passed the Philippine Bar
exams after finishing his law degree from the University of the
Philippine in 1995.
He then obtained his Master of Laws in International Business from
Fordham University in New York, NY, U.S.A in 2003 and was admitted
to practice law in the State of New York and the US District Courts for
the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York after becoming a
naturalized American citizen.
Del Rosario filed the petition in the SC, saying he wanted to continue
practicing law in the country.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)
B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
TOPIC:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing
of the Roll of Attorneys
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7
May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he
found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll,
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably
just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado
justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition
be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter
lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for
his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of
a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from
the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said
action is not warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing
the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years;
that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a
member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a
competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact
when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance
record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. At
the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer.
However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of
the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also,
during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the
practice of law.
AGUIRRE VS RANA (2003)
Legal Ethics| Practice of Law| Signing of the Roll of Attorney’s|
Oath-Taking
FACTS:
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Examinations.
A day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examiners, petitioner Donna Marie Aguirre filed a complaint charging
Rana of unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of
law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
at the PICC, however, the respondent cannot sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent
passed the bar, took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has
not signed the Roll of Attorneys.
Petitioner alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel of a political candidate, signed pleadings as well as represent
himself as counsel in proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether Rana engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD:
Yes. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law”
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of
law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license.
It is true that the respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
Edwin Rana is denied Admission to the Philippine Bar.
In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
IN MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING
OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO
DOCTRINES:
 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character, with special education
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater
importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned.
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired
into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by
those who would seek admission to the bar must be a
necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected
from members of the general public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
possessed of good moral character.
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated at the time of the application for
permission to take the bar examinations and more
importantly at the time of application for admission to the bar
and to take the attorney's oath of office.
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged
with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of
severe physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as
part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993,
the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application was
granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2)
years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam.
He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take
the lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the
attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that
his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation
period did not last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of
attorney and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing
of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of
Camaligan from notice.
IN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a
successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was
previously involved with hazing which caused the death of Raul
Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but he was
convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was
sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he
applied a probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the
court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take
the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his probation
was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months
of the probation period before it was terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office
and admit him to the practice of law.
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who
possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining
the good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that
such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by
the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed
and has become a responsible member of the community through
sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law
profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath,
sign the Roll of Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal
profession.
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M.
CUEVAS, JR.
B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998
FACTS:
Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His oath-
taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which
permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition
that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The
conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites
of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA
COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence
inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted
probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and
his case considered closed and terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Cuevas has the moral fitness required to take
the lawyer’s oath?
HELD:
Petitioner is allowed to take the LAWYER’S OATH and sign the ROLL
OF ATTORNEYS. The Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Camaligan,
father of hazing victim Raul Camaligan, and condoles with the untimely
death of a son who is expected to become a lawyer and succeed his
father. In his comment submitted to the Court, Atty. Camaligan submits
petitioner’s plea to be admitted to the membershop to the Philippine
Bar, to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The deliberate
participation of Cuevas in the senseless beating of a helpless neophyte
which resulted to his death indicates that petitioner does not possess
the moral fitness required for admission to the Bar. However, petitioner
was discharged from probation without any infraction thereafter of the
conditions of the probation and the various certifications attesting to his
righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has
taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral
character and atone for the unfortunate death of Camaligan. The Court
then decides to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it
allowed AL ARGOSINO, petitioner’s co-accused to take the lawyer’s
oath.
(Note: In re: 2003 Bar two cases 2004 and 2009)
In re: 2003 Bar Examinations
B.M. No. 1222, February 4, 2004.
Per Curiam
FACTS:
On September 22, 2003, there was a rumored leakage in the bar
examination on the Mercantile Law subject. Investigation was lead
back to the office of Atty. Marcial O.T. Balgos, then Mercantile Law
Examiner, where the leakage started. Allegedly, Atty. Danilo de
Guzman (assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos and Perez) stole a copy
of Atty. Balgos’ file on Mercantile Law with the proposed test items, and
the former sent it to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda
Fraternity.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Balgos and Atty. de Guzman are guilty of gross misconduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar.
RULING:
Yes. De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity
brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Bar. As for Atty. Balgos’ negligence, if he had taken
those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers, nobody
could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity
of the bar examinations would not have been sullied by the scandal.
Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, Atty. Daniel de Guzman, B.M. No.
1722, April 24, 2009
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in
Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations
Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on
the subject.
With this, the court decided to nullify mercantile law examination and
hold another examination in place of this.
However, petitions were filed because of the emotional, physical and
financial burden to the barristers. The petitions were granted and the
court decided to just spread the percentage of the mercantile law exam
to the remaining 7 bar subjects.
The court appointed 3 retired justices into a Committee to investigate
the leakage issue. The Investigating Committee was tasked to
determine and identify the source of leakage, the parties responsible
therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions
against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would
have benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend
measures to the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar
examinations.
Cecilia Carbajosa, a bar examinee found the leakage when she
obtained a copy of the leaked questions and found that they were very
similar to the questions in the bar exam. Upon meeting with the
investigators, she provided a xerox of the leaked questions. The copy
was delivered to Justice Vitug, he found that 82% from examiner Atty.
Balgos was included in the leakage. He also received reports that Atty.
Danilo de Guzman was the source of the leakage, as he faxed the
questions to his fraternity brother, Ronan Gravida four days before the
bar exams.
Atty. Balgos, 71 years old, does not know how to use computer except
to type. His secretary Cheryl Palma formatted the test, printed it and
was also the keeper the Balgos’ computer password. Balgos didn’t
know his computer was linked to 16 computers of his employees.
Balgos interrogated Silvestre Atienza, who interconnected the
computers in the office. He, like Atty. De Guzman, is a member of the
Beta sigma Lambda fraternity.
It was proven that Balgos indeed prepared the questions and that they
came from his computer. His legal assistant, Atty. De Guzman, actually
admitted downloading the questions and faxing them to his frat
brothers Garvida, Arlan, and Erwin Tan. Garvida then faxed it to his
brothers in MLQU (Inigo and Bugain), who then passed copies to
another, and most illustrious brother, Ronald Collado who then spread
it to the MLQU brothers of the fraternity.
The following were alleged, with the recommendation of De Guzman’s
disbarment:
“Attorney Danilo De Guzman’s act of downloading Attorney Balgos’ test
questions in mercantile law from the latter’s computer, without his
knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of
intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of
Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal
knowledge.”
“Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of
Balgos’ right to privacy of communication and to security of his papers
and effects against unauthorized search and seizure—rights zealously
protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. He transgressed the
very first canon of the lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes.”
“By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some
members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary
profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in
the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or
dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is
violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:
“De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and
degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity
and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and
damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of
a law graduate’s academic preparedness to embark upon the practice
of law.”
Also, it was alleged that others were also liable, such as Balgos
himself, who was negligent and failed to prevent the leakage, as well
as the other fraternity brothers who took part in the leakage.
Issues:
1. Should De Guzman be disbarred? – YES
2. Is De Guzman the only one liable for the leakage? – NO
Held: (Recommendations of the Court)
1. Atty. De Guzman should be disbarred and should write a public
apology, as well as pay damages to the Supreme Court.
2. Atty. Balgos should be reprimanded and also made to issue a written
apology and FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman,
Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan,
Randy Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police,
with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-conspirators in
the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law.
Re: 1999 Bar Examinations
The crux of the case involving Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986
concerning Bar applicant Mark Anthony A. Purisima stemmed from a
Resolution issued by the Supreme Court on the April 13, 2000,
disqualifying the applicant from membership in the Bar after he
successfully passed the previous year’s bar examinations. Such
disqualification was based on the declaration by the Court that
Purisima’s examinations were null and void for two reasons: (1) that he
failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar
review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar
Examinations; and (2) that he committed a serious act of dishonesty
when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar
Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine
Law School (PLS) when, as certified by the school’s Acting Registrar,
no such course was offered there since 1967.
ISSUE: IS HE QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS MEMBER OF THE
BAR?
HELD: YES. There was only an honest mistake with respect to the
documents given to the Supreme Court for the application for bar and
He did not commit with any grave dishonesty that would amount him to
be disqualified for admittance to law. PRINICIPLES: every applicant for
admission into the practice of law, two qualifications of relevance to
this instant case the requests of educational qualifications and good
moral character.
G.R. No. 121180 July 5, 1996
GERARDO A. MOSQUERA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of Makati, Metro
Manila, HON. FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 65, City of Makati, Metro Manila, and MARK F.
JALANDONI, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of orders dated June 9, 1995
and July 19, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 64)
sustaining an order of the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 65) for the
reinstatement of the information for less serious physical injuries
against petitioner Gerard S. Mosquera, which the MeTC had
previously allowed to be withdrawn by the prosecution. The
reinstatement of the case was made on motion of the offended party.
The prosecution in the MeTC arose out of a physical encounter
between petitioner and private respondent Mark E. Jalandoni within the
premises of the Ateneo Law School on June 21, 1993. Petitioner is a
graduate of the law school and a member of a fraternity in that school.
On the other hand, private respondent was then a third-year student
enrolled in the lawschool. There is considerable dispute how the fight
took place. Petitioner's version was that he had gone to the law school
and happened to meet respondent Jalandoni. Because Jalandoni had
a previous altercation with another member of petitioner's fraternity,
petitioner tried to talk to Jalandoni, but the latter reacted belligerently
and the two had a fight. On the other hand, Jalandoni claimed that
petitioner and members of petitioner's fraternity simply attacked him
upon seeing him, for a remark which they claimed he (Jalandoni) had
made, which caused a female student to cry. The female student was a
friend of one of the fraternity members.
Be that as it may, as a result of the scuffle, a criminal complaint for
frustrated homicide was filed by private respondent against petitioner
and five others, namely, Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida,
Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr., Walter S. Ong, and Jayme A. Sy, Jr., before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
After the usual preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Herminio T. Ubana, Sr. recommended the filing of an
information for less serious physical injuries against petitioner, Gavino
R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida and Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr. and
the dismissal of the charges against Walter S. Ong and Jayme Sy, Jr.
The recommendation was approved by Rizal Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro M. Castro on January 10, 1994.
Accordingly, an information for less serious physical injuries was filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila on January
17, 1994 against petitioner and Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronaldo B.
Almeida and Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr. The case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 147366, was assigned to Branch 65 of the MeTC and tried in
accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure. The arraignment
was set on July 29, 1994, at 8:30 A.M., but petitioner filed a motion
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the reconsideration of
the resolution finding probable cause against him. As his motion was
denied by the Provincial Prosecutor, petitioner appealed to the
Department of Justice which, on July 20, 1994, directed the Provincial
Prosecutor to withdraw the information.
Accordingly, Second Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista filed a
motion to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 147366.
Private respondent in turn moved for reconsideration of the resolution
of the Department of Justice but his motion was denied.
In its order dated October 13, 1994,1 the MeTC, presided over by
respondent Judge Felicidad Y. Navarro-Quiambao, granted the motion
of the prosecution and considered the information against petitioner
withdrawn. The MeTC stated in its order:
Considering the time limit given by the Court to
said counsel in the order dated August 15, 1994
within which to pursue the motion for
reconsideration [of DOJ Resolution No. 525,
Series of 1994] and without said counsel having
informed this Court of the outcome of the same, 2 it
can safely be concluded that private counsel had
lost interest to further prosecute the case.
Moreover, Atty. Valdez acting as private counsel in
the prosecution of the instant criminal case is
under the direct control and supervision of the Trial
Fiscal, who by virtue of the Department of Justice
resolution was impliedly ordered to desist from
prosecuting the case for lack of probable cause. In
view thereof, the Court is of the opinion that the
motion of the Trial Fiscal should be accorded
weight and significance, as it was premised on the
findings that the filing of the information in
question has no legal basis.
On motion of private respondent, however, the MeTC reconsidered its
order . In its order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC said:3
After carefully weighing the arguments of the
parties in support of their respective claims, the
Court believes that the weight of the evidence and
the jurisprudence on the matter which is now
presented for resolution heavily leaned in favor of
complainant's contention. As held in the cases
recently decided by the Hon. Supreme Court, once
a case is filed in Court, the latter acquires
complete jurisdiction over the same without regard
to technicalities and personal beliefs.
That while there is merit in the accused Gerard A.
Mosquera's claim that the institution of a criminal
action depends upon the sound discretion of the
Fiscal who may or may not file the complaint' or
information, when in his opinion the evidence is
insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the same is true only
when the case is not in court yet because after the
case is already forwarded, raffled and assigned to
 a particular branch the Public Prosecutor loses
control over the case.
It required the parties to appear before it on January 20,
1995, at 9:00 A.M.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. 4 In its
order, dated April 24, 1995, the MeTC also set the arraignment of
petitioner and Meneses, Jr. on May 19, 1995.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The case, docketed as Special Civil
Case No. 95-718, was assigned to Branch 65, presided over by
respondent Judge Delia H. Panganiban.
Initially the RTC issued a temporary restraining order but, on June 9,
1995,5 it denied petitioner's application for preliminary injunction. The
RTC upheld the reinstatement of the information against petitioner and
the other accused. With its denial of injunction the RTC considered the
petition for certiorari and prohibition as having been rendered moot and
academic. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC
denied in its order of July 19, 1995.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari and for an order:
a. Reversing the Orders dated 09 June 1995 and
19 July 1995 (cf. Annexes "A" and "B") issued by
respondent Judge Panganiban;
b. Setting aside, as null and void, the Orders dated
29 December 1994 and 24 April 1995 (cf. Annexes
"R" and "T") issued by respondent Judge
Quiambao;
c. Making the preliminary injunction final;
d. Prohibiting respondent Judge Quiambao from
trying and hearing Criminal Case No. 147366; and
e. Declaring the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
147366 as final and executory in accordance with
the Order dated 13 October 1994 issued by
respondent Judge Quiambao.
Petitioner's contention is that, because the direction and control of
criminal prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, the motion
for reconsideration of the order of October 13, 1994, which the private
prosecutor filed without the conformity by the public prosecutor, was a
nullity and did not prevent the order of dismissal from becoming final.
Consequently, the MeTC gravely abused its discretion in afterward
reinstating the information.
Undoubtedly private respondent, as complainant, has an interest in the
maintenance of the criminal prosecution. The right of offended parties
to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due
process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that
they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the
accused in double jeopardy.6 recently had occasion to reiterate this rule
in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,7 where, through the Chief Justice, we
held:
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final
judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to
"any party," except when the accused is placed
thereby in double jeopardy.
In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court
ruled that the word "party" must be understood to
mean not only the government and the accused,
but also other persons who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding.
Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held
to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the
court which is derogatory to his right to demand
civil liability arising from the offense. The right of
the offended party to file a special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari from an [interlocutory]
order rendered in a criminal case was likewise
recognized in the cases of Paredes
v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)] and People
v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held
that "offended parties in criminal cases have
sufficient interest and personality as "person(s)
aggrieved" to file the special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the
liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order
to promote their object. . . .
Petitioner cites the following statement in Cabral v. Puno8 in support of
his contention that private respondent has no personality to file the
motion in question:
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San
Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the
running of the period for appeal [from the order of
dismissal of the information]. He did not have the
legal personality to appeal or file the motion for
reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a
criminal case through the private prosecutor is
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and
only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed
by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for
appeal.
The case of Cabral, however, differs materially from this case.
In Cabral, the offended party had lost his right to intervene because
prior to the filing of the criminal case, he had instituted a civil action
arising from the same act subject of the criminal case. On the other
hand, in the case at bar, the right of private respondent to intervene in
the criminal prosecution is well nigh beyond question as he had neither
instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do
so.9
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that private respondent has the
legal personality to file the motion for reconsideration in the trial court.
Beyond the personality of the private respondent to seek a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the MeTC, the central issue
in this case is whether in ordering the reinstatement of the information,
the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The MeTC invoked its authority under Crespo v. Mogul 10 to approve
the withdrawal of informations after they have been filed in court, thus:
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instruction of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
Petitioner argues that by its order of October 13, 1994, the MeTC
already exercised its authority under the Mogul doctrine to grant or
deny the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information and
was thereafter precluded from changing its mind in absence of a
motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor.
This argument is untenable. The court could have denied the public
prosecutor's 'motion for the withdrawal of the information against
petitioner, and there would have been no question of its power to do
so. If it could do that, so could it reconsider what it had ordered. Every
court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or
reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called
to any error or defect therein. 11 In this case, the motion for
reconsideration was timely filed by the private prosecutor who, as
already discussed, has the legal personality to do so.
Indeed, the MeTC must have realized that it had surrendered its
exclusive prerogative regarding the withdrawal of informations by
accepting public prosecutor's say-so that the prosecution had no basis
to prosecute petitioner. 12 Its order of October 13, 1994 was based
mainly on its notion that the motion of the Trial Fiscal should be
accorded weight and significance as it was premised on the findings [of
the Department of Justice] that the filing of the information in question
has no legal basis."
This certainly was not the exercise of discretion. As we said
in Martinez, "whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the
prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this
[under the Mogul ruling] . . . What was imperatively required was the
trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient
for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept
the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency." 13
Unfortunately, just as in allowing the withdrawal of the information by
the public prosecutor, the MeTC did not make an independent
evaluation of the evidence, neither did it do so in granting the private
prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. In its order dated December
29, 1994, the MeTC simply stated that it was reinstating the case
against petitioner because [a]fter carefully weighing the arguments of
the parties in support of their respective claims, the Court believes that
the weight of the evidence and the jurisprudence on the matter which
is now presented for resolution heavily leaned in favor of complainant's
contention" and that after a case has already been" forwarded, raffled,
and assigned to a particular branch, the Public Prosecutor loses
control over the case." The order contains no evaluation of the parties'
evidence for the purpose of determining whether there was probable
cause to proceed against petitioner. The statement that the "weight of
evidence . . . lean[s] heavily in favor of complainant's [Jalandoni's]
contention" is nothing but the statement of a conclusion.
Nor could the MeTC rest its judgment solely on its authority under the
Mogul doctrine to have the last word on whether an in formation should
be withdrawn. The question in this case is not so much whether the
MeTC has the authority to grant or not to grant the public prosecutor's
motion to withdraw the information it does but whether in the exercise
of that discretion or authority it acted justly and fairly. In this case, the
MeTC did not have good reason stated in its order for the
reinstatement of the information against petitioner, just as it did not
have good reason for granting the withdrawal of the information.
The matter should therefore be remanded to the MeTC so that it can
make an independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution
and on that basis decide whether to grant or not to grant the
withdrawal of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court are REVERSED and the orders of October 13,
1994 and December 29, 1994 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 65 are SET ASIDE and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati is
ORDERED within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision to
RESOLVE the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information in
Criminal Case No. 147366, stating in its order clearly the reason or
reasons for its resolution, after due consideration of the evidence of the
parties.
SO ORDERED.
(note: Villareal vs people has a 2012 and 2014 case)
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa) of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity).
On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and
brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation. The rites were scheduled to last for
three days.
The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation
rites." These rites included:
1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet
of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to
the neophytes;
2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the
floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs;
3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of
their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the
duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their
arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were
given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the
neophytes.
They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to
present comic plays, play rough basketball, and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they
would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans
revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation.
After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened.
The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon
and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to
additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of
physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk that he had to be carried
to the carport. The initiation for the day was officially ended. They then
slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by
Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and
Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm.
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35
Aquilans.
The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. The criminal case
against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and
modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
individual participation. One accused had by then passed away, so the
following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their
individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal
– were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding
of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each
accused according to individual participation (NO)
2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight
physical injuries (YES)
3) Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide (NO)
HELD:
1) NO. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply
because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a
writ of certiorari. Pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, the Court is
constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19
acquitted fraternity members.
A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the
merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
2) YES. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator
shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is
different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have
committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of
physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are
required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion. The accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical
injuries when actual death occurs.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their
acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is
contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of the
victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the
only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to
all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the
infliction of physical injuries on Lenny.
3) NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused
Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Instead, the Court adopts and
reinstates the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that
none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa.
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , Respondent.
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was pre-
requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had undergone
the process. After the initiation, Lenny’s condition worsened due to the
blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35
Aquilans. Four of the accused (Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty
of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the
Court of Appeals. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they
should be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead.
In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified
the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court to their criminal liability.
According to Tecson et. al., they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the
crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to
slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Hence,
they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the
cases against them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted
Applications for Probation for which the terms therein are already been
complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite
their appeal of conviction?
HELD:
Yes. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch
130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson
et. al. for the law requires that an application for probation be filed with
the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning
the court of origin (Branch 121). Hence, its grant of probation with
Tecson et. al. is void.
However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of
those who have appealed their conviction to probation, citing the then
recent case of Colinares vs. People that the Probation Law never
intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. Had the RTC done what was right and imposed the correct
penalty, he would have had the right to apply for probation. Moreover,
the Court was quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal
from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Antonio Carpio: The man on the bench
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/6187-antonio-carpio-the-man-
on-the-bench
'The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not
brilliance,' Justice Antonio Carpio had told a former associate, and that
explains his actuations in the Supreme Court
(Newsbreak wrote this profile on Supreme Court Associate Justice
Antonio T Carpio in a Dec 4, 2006 issue. We are republishing it now as
Carpio, being the most senior justice in the High Tribunal, becomes
acting chief justice, following the removal of Renato Corona. A PDF
version of the story as published on Newsbreak is embedded below.)
MANILA, Philippines - “Let us not…delude ourselves into believing that
a new constitution would immediately eradicate the ills that plague our
country. Nor can we expect that tinkering with the constitution will
totally purge it of its defects and make this nation great again…. One
thing we cannot afford to overlook nor downgrade is the importance of
the human element. A basically workable constitution or law can
become defective in the hands of enthroned rascals, as we are now
experiencing,” wrote Antonio Tirol Carpio.
No, this was not written recently but was penned by him when he was
a 20-year-old senior economics student of the Ateneo de Manila
University in 1969. Published in The Guidon, of which Carpio was then
editor in chief, the piece mirrored tumultuous times.
Before graduating in 1970, Carpio wrote in his last editorial about the
seeming inevitability of a revolution, given the pervasive and severe
inequity prevailing at the time. Yet he lamented the fragmentation of
revolutionary forces and their inability to overhaul the system. “A
revolution is something that cannot be left to accident. It has to be a
deliberate and organized action.”
A son of the First Quarter Storm, the first months of 1970 that were
marked by massive student protests against Ferdinand Marcos’s rule,
Carpio would become Supreme Court (SC) justice 31 years later on
Oct 22, 2001, and at 52, be the youngest appointee at that by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Today, he’s caught in the vortex of public opinion because of his biting
language in his ponencia on people’s initiative. But Carpio—according
to those who know him—is just being consistent. His decision on
Charter amendments via what appears to be a rushed and personal-
agenda-driven people’s initiative is not radically different from his early
views as a young student leader, they say.
The repressive Marcos years which he saw and experienced as a law
student at the University of the Philippines from 1970 to 1975 shaped
and left a deep imprint on him. After all, Edgar Jopson and Eman
Lacaba, student activists during Carpio’s time, were among the Ateneo
batchmates whom he lost to the “revolution.”
At UP, radicalism was predominant among students who organized
and joined often violent demonstrations against the Marcos regime.
Although student organizations were not recognized then, fraternities
became an outlet of rage and violence, and Carpio, as head of the
Sigma Rho fraternity during his time, got caught in the tides.
Dad's advice
Sigma Rhoans entangled with rival Alpha Phi Betans who, at the time,
were headed by Oscar Orbos, who would later become congressman
and then governor of Pangasinan. The ensuing rumble resulted in
casualties on both sides and, following command responsibility,
fraternity leaders Orbos and Carpio were suspended from law school
for a year. Orbos managed to have his suspension reduced to one
semester, however, and graduated on time in 1975.
Carpio, who was a year ahead of Orbos and was in third year when the
rumble erupted, ended up graduating in 1975 instead of 1974. “This
was part of the adventure of growing up,” says an Alpha Phi Beta
member who recalls events that happened at the time.
It was in UP, too, that Carpio was introduced by former beauty queen
and later activist Nelia Sancho to his future wife, Vietnamese Ruth
Nguyen, with whom he would have two children, now both college
graduates.
“It was useless to be a lawyer then,” Carpio told people he knew before
he was appointed to the SC, but he nevertheless pursued his law
studies “because his father wanted him to.” His father Bernardo
Carpio, who was former regional director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in Davao, wanted his youngest to be a lawyer like him.
When martial law was declared in 1972, Carpio was in his second year
in law school and like most law students, was reading the SC decision
on the case of “Javellana vs Executive Secretary,” of then Alejandro
Melchor. In that case, the High Court ruled that the 1973 Constitution
drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was ratified in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
What made the decision controversial at the time was the declaration
of martial law in the middle of the convention in 1972 and the absence
of real debates on the draft Constitution that Marcos wanted the people
to ratify through a plebiscite.
“It was a decision issued under the gun of the martial law regime,”
Carpio is quoted by an associate as having previously said. It was
precisely the repression of the period that left an indelible mark on the
man who would become SC justice. It would also explain some of the
important decisions he penned as a member of the High Court.
The path to FVR
“Tony would philosophize the needs of society,” says PR consultant
Antonio Abaya, who recalls that the night before EDSA 1 broke, he,
along with Carpio, were supposed to meet with Jesuit priest Joaquin
Bernas who had access to Corazon Aquino, the widow of slain Sen.
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. Already in private practice with the firm he
co-founded with partners F. Arthur “Pancho” Villaraza and Avelino
“Nonong” Cruz Jr., Carpio was ready to risk his firm and connect with
the mutinous Reform the Armed Forces Movement, says Abaya.
Years later, as the Aquino government remained vulnerable to coup
attempts—the most serious of which was the 1989 Makati siege—
Carpio joined the political fray as he got into the circle of Fidel Ramos,
whom he did not know personally although they were neighbors in the
posh Ayala Alabang subdivision. Abaya says it was the late Teodoro
Benigno Jr. who helped connect them directly with Ramos.
Regular meetings in Alabang followed in mid-January 1990 for
purposes of analyzing the prevailing political situation. These
eventually gave birth to Ramos’s Alabang Group which was a merger
of his Rotarians’ group and his neighbors’ circle. That Carpio and what
was then the Carpio Villaraza & Cruz (CVC) law firm would play a
major role in the Ramos presidency and become ascendant in the
process is already widely known.
In the 1992 presidential elections which Ramos eventually won, the
three partners of the firm had different political leanings but respected
each other’s preferences. While Carpio was for Ramos, Villaraza was
batting for Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco Jr., and Cruz was for Jovito
Salonga.
All three combined were a formidable team. While Villaraza was
“tactical,” Cruz was “strategic,” and Carpio, the most serious of the
three, was “more deliberate,” says Abaya. Carpio put his passion
behind whatever he targeted.
He took to sailing, hunting, and sharp shooting, believing that the latter
was the best protection he could possibly have.
What is not widely known is Carpio’s reason for leaving Ramos in
1996, four years after serving as his chief presidential legal counsel. As
legal counsel, he was instrumental in breaking up monopolies in the
telecommunications and shipping industries, the same stranglehold
which contributed to societal inequities, and which he already saw as a
college student
Against PIRMA
Early talk about constitutional amendments and the possibility of
extending the term of Ramos did not sit well with Carpio because he
thought it was not in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. And
it put him at loggerheads with its proponents. It marked a key policy
difference between him and his boss who did nothing to stop those
lobbying for it.
It was after Carpio’s departure that the People’s Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) was given an aggressive push by
then Budget Secretary Salvador Enriquez Jr. and spouses Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa, with the backing of then National Security Adviser
Jose T. Almonte. The efforts came to naught when brought to the SC,
however.
Publicist and Ramos media consultant Ed Malay describes Carpio as
having enjoyed the confidence of the former President. “Hindi political,
tahimik. He would not even exchange banter…. He did not smoke. He
would attend meetings and stay for a while; he rarely attended political
meetings.”
Malay says that despite the association with Ramos, Carpio showed
his independence from his former boss. One of his first decisions as
associate justice involved the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corp. deal, which the High Court voided in 2003.
Written by Carpio, the decision upheld the Constitution which prohibits
the sale of public lands to private corporations. The deal was first
negotiated under Ramos’s term and renegotiated under the
administration of Joseph Estrada. “Akala ko ba kakampi natin (I
thought he was with us),” Ramos is quoted as saying after the SC
released its decision.
“The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not
brilliance,” Carpio had told a former associate, and that explains his
actuations in the SC.
Out of the box
Before he joined government as Ramos’s chief legal counsel, Carpio—
perhaps taking after his mother Sol Tirol who was, at one time,
superintendent of the Department of Education—became a
professorial lecturer at the UP College of Law from 1983 to 1992.
Notwithstanding his one-year suspension, Carpio graduated cum laude
and valedictorian in 1975, and placed sixth in the Bar that same year.
He went into private practice before forming the firm in 1980 with
Villaraza and Cruz. While the three went their separate ways after law
school (the three are Sigma Rhoans), they promised to keep in touch
and get together when anyone felt he had gained sufficient wingspan.
It was Carpio who called Villaraza to tell him it was perhaps time to
come together.
They struggled to build a steady client base as they sought to create a
niche for a firm that they hoped would outlive them. While he was the
managing partner of the firm, Carpio took pains to travel to Diliman to
teach credit transactions and negotiable instruments, two subjects in
law. As professor, he was known for his clarity of thinking and easily
recruited to the firm the best and the brightest among his students.
To Lani Gomez Somera, one of Carpio’s former students who joined
him in the firm and later in Malacañang, Carpio is a bit standoffish and
is not inclined to smile. Her boss is even-tempered and the closest he
got to losing his cool was when he “took off his glasses and put them
on the table,” she recalls.
A known techie, the associate justice introduced his former firm to
computers as early as the 1980s when these were not yet widely used.
Believing that technology is both equalizing and liberating, he pushed
for an e-library for the judiciary, the “first Web-based searchable
electronic library in the Philippine government.”
“He is solution-oriented and likes to think out of the box. He is not
predisposed to a linear way of thinking; he likes branching out,”
Somera, who has since left the firm, adds. In discussions of cases, he
would always push with his characteristic, “And?” In the aftermath of
the SC ruling on people’s initiative, there was an abundance of loose
talk about the firm being behind the Carpio-penned decision and
supposed differences between Carpio and Villaraza over Executive
Order 464, which prevented Cabinet officials from appearing before a
congressional investigation. Despite seeming evidence to the contrary
—given the resignation of Cruz as defense secretary and the firm’s
other lawyers in government following suit—Villaraza declared that the
firm remains supportive of the Arroyo administration.
If there is anything that the three partners have in common, it is
political astuteness. How tactics, strategy, and deliberation will come
into play bears close watching. For Carpio however, his place is secure
for a good 13 more years—unless politicians in Congress try to
impeach him. - Rappler.com/First published in Newsbreak in
December 2006
UP Board of Regents vs Ligot-Teylan GR No 110280 12 October
1993
Facts: U.P. Board of Regents issued a Resolution establishing the
STFAP (Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program). All students
are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits. Applicants are required to
accomplish a questionnaire and at the end the application form, the
student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement –
University may send a fact-finding team to visit my home/residence to
verify the veracity of the information
Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law, availed of
STFAP. A team conducted a home investigation at the residence of
Nadal in Quezon City and found discrepancies between the report and
Nadal’s application form. Villanueva (head of the office of scholarship)
wrote Nadal informing him that he had failed to declare, not only the
fact that he had a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but
also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers. He
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June
1989, unless he could submit “proofs to the contrary.” Nadal was
required “to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees”.
Because of the discrepancies between Nadal’s application form and
the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal (SDT) that he willfully withheld and did not declare a car and
the income of his mother which acts of willfully withholding information
is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies
SDT rendered a decision exculpating Nadal of the charge of
deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form information that
he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of
deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother.
SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University
and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but
if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be “effected by
the University thru outside legal action.” SDT decision elevated to the
Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review which affirmed the
decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of
Regents (BOR). BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT; the penalty
was modified “from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension. Nadal filed a
MR of the BOR decision (guilty).
Nadal asked President Abueva not to issue any press release
regarding the case and filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a TRO against
President Abueva and the BOR. The lower court ruled that they are
temporarily restrained. Dispensing with the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an
injunction or temporary restraining order,
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her
discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction
thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty
it had imposed on Nadal.
Decision: The Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993.
The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court’s finding
that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on
Nadal “would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in
finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good
paying job.” Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal
without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own
making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it
has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom
which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher
learning.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to
due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the
charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process"
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition
of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due
process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the
meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to
equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the
March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not
require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases
are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive
of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board
of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent
complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and
special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation.
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not
given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon
which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge.
Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on
March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed
that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However,
Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was
"exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of
Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent
Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar
at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet
as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights
into the character of Nadal through the information that would be
obtained from the AdeMU.
The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a
mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned,
Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT"
who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that
she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of
another son. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that
Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and
irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires
to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all
costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their
student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the
seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the court
ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of
dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his
application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University,
the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction
may be invoked and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding that the
BOR did not violate Nadal’s right of due process.
The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for
mandamus.
David Yu Kimteng petitioner vs Atty Walter T. Young respondent
G.R. N0 210554
Facts:
“A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name.
A lawyer who appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred
lawyer's name commits indirect contempt of court.”
Through this Petition, petitioners ask that law firm, Young
Revilla Gambol & Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be
cited in contempt of court under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on December
2009 in an En Banc Resolution of the court in A.C. No. 7054
entitled Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr.
Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply to the
Opposition stating that the firm opted to retain Revilla's name in the
firm name even after he had been disbarred, with the retention serving
as an act of charity. Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the
appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat and stated that Atty.
Young could still appear for the liquidator as long as his appearance
was under the Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat. However, Young Law Firm does not exist.
On April 16, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File
Consolidated Reply. This was granted in the Resolution dated June 18,
2014. In the same Resolution, the court denied petitioners' Motion to
Consider Case Submitted without Comment from Judge Calo and
ordered the parties to await Judge Calo's comment.
Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention
Manifestation, informing this court that they have yet to receive a copy
of Judge Calo's Comment. No Comment was filed by Judge Calo.
Private respondents point out that the Balgos Law Firm is
derailing the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation by filing this
Petition for contempt because the Balgos Law Firm resents that its
nominee was not elected as liquidator. Private respondents add that
petitioners have continuously blocked Ruby Industrial Corporation's
unsecured creditors from obtaining relief, as shown by the number of
times that Ruby Industrial Corporation's cases have reached this court.
Moreover, Private respondents also raise the issue of forum
shopping in their Comment because petitioners allegedly filed a
disbarment Complaint against them before the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. One of the grounds for
disbarment cited by petitioners was the use of Revilla's name in their
firm name.
Petitioners argue that liability for contempt is separate from
disciplinary action; hence, no forum shopping was committed. Also,
petitioners did not address private respondents' allegations regarding
the delay in the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation.
Issues:
(a) Whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty.
Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in
contempt of court when they continued to use respondent
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.'s name in their firm name even after
his disbarment.
(b) Whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty.
Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in
contempt of court for deliberately allowing a disbarred
lawyer to engage in the practice of law.
(c) Whether private respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is in
contempt of court for continuing to practice law even after
disbarment.
(d) Whether public respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is in
contempt of court when she held that respondent Atty.
Walter T. Young can appear in court as long as it is under
the Young Law Firm, which is a non-existent firm.
(e) Whether the filing of the Petition despite the pendency of a
disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines constitutes forum shopping.
Ruling:
(a.) Respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan
Reynald R. Magat are found in contempt of court for using a disbarred
lawyer's name in their firm name and are meted a fine of P30,000.00
each.
Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt.
In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect
contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addition, respondents
disregarded the Code of Professional Responsibility when they
retained the name of respondent Revilla in their firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states:
Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading
or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a
deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all
its communications that said partner is deceased.
Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's
name is "no more misleading than including the names of dead or
retired partners in a law firm's name."
Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is
different from using a deceased partner's name in the firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner's name as
long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This
of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public
into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.
(b) The Complaint against Atty. Jovito Gambol
is DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to any disciplinary liabilities of
respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and
Judge Ofelia L. Calo.
(c) The counsels are ordered to make the necessary
amendments in relation to the use of the disbarred lawyer's name
including changes in their signage, notice of appearances, stationeries,
and like material within a period of five (5) days from receipt.
(d) The Complaint against respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo
is also ordered re-docketed as an administrative matter.
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 11. . . The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Also, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,
provides that the administrative functions of this court include
"disciplinary and administrative matters involving justices, judges, and
court personnel.
(e) As to the allegation of forum shopping, petitioners do not
deny that they filed a Complaint for disbarment. They argue, however,
that they did not mention the disbarment proceedings against
respondents in view of Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court,
which states that disbarment proceedings are private and confidential.
In addition, a Petition for contempt under Rule 71 and a
Complaint for disbarment are different from each other. The filing of a
Complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the filing of the Petition for contempt under Rule 71 do not
constitute forum shopping. Forum shopping has been defined as:
when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court. The elements of
forum shopping are:
i. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions.
ii. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts.
iii. The identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
The Supreme Court has explained that disbarment
proceedings are sui generis, and are not akin to civil or criminal
cases. A disbarment proceeding "is intended to cleanse the ranks of
the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts." Also, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines'
findings are recommendatory, and the power to sanction erring
members of the bar lies with Supreme Court.
PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. “ATTY.
PATRICK A. CARONAN”
A.C. No. 11316, 12 July 2016, EN BANC (Sereno, CJ)
FACTS:
On 2013, a complaint was filed by the real Patrick A.
Caronan against his brother Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan” before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In his complaint,
he stated that he and his older brother both completed secondary
education at the Makati High School and that he finished his college
education at the University of Makati. Thereafter, he applied and got a
job at a 7-11 convenience store in Muntinlupa City, working his way up
until he was promoted as its store manager. On the other hand, his
brother enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila and later
managed to enter the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City but
was discharged in 1993. The respondent Richard then moved to
Nueva Vizcaya with his wife and three children.
Patrick said he learned from Richard that he had enrolled at
St. Mary’s University’s College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
using Patrick’s name and college records from the UM and that he
passed the Bar exams in 2004.
But in 2009, he said he was ordered to report to the head
office of Philippine Seven Corporation, operator of 7-11, which
informed him that the National Bureau of Investigation had requested
his appearance in relation to its investigation of a certain “Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan” for qualified theft and estafa. Aside from using his name,
Patrick said he also learned that his brother was also facing charges
for gun-running and violation of Batas Pambansa 22 (Bouncing Checks
Law).
The respondent Richard denied the allegations but the SC
said that the identity of the real “Patrick A. Caronan” had been
established based on the probe conducted by the IBP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that:
(a) The name “Patrick A. Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys; and
(b) The name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being
admitted to the Bar.
HELD:
No. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and recommendations of the IBP. Since complainant - the real "Patrick
A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose
real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the
Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course. Clearly,
respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
The respondent’s false assumption of his brother's name,
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the
Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather,
it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. Respondent
made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
necessary qualifications to be a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming
the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A.
Caronan to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or
criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that: (1) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and
STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys; (2) respondent is PROHIBITED
from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as
a lawyer; (3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member
of the Philippine Bar in the future; ( 4) the Identification Cards issued
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or
REVOKED; and (5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to
CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of
the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard
A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine
Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity
of "Patrick A. Caronan.
A.C. No. 9464, August 24, 2016 - INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK,
PHIL., INC., REPRESENTED BY LUIS MARCO I. AVANCEÑA,
Complainant, v. ATTY. REBECCA S. FRANCISCO-SIMBILLO,
Respondent.
Facts: On March 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
received a letter from the attorney for complainant Intradent
Zahnetchnik Philippines, Inc. informing about several criminal cases
filed and pending against respondent Rebecca Francisco-Simbillo. The
criminal cases had been filed by the complainant to charge the
respondent with estafa and qualified theft in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Parañaque City (docketed as I.S. No. XV-12-INV-11-J-
03189), and with violation of Article 291 of the Revised Penal Code in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (docketed as I.S. No.
XV-03-INV-11-J-08553). The complainant pointed out that the charges
for estafa and qualified theft involved moral turpitude. At the time, the
results of the 2011 Bar Examinations had just been released, and the
respondent was among those who had passed. She was in due course
formally notified by the OBC of the letter of the complainant, and
thereby required to file her comment within 15 days from notice. The
OBC also informed her that she could join the mass oath taking for the
new lawyers, but she would not be allowed to enroll her name in the
Roll of Attorneys until the charges against her had been cleared. Upon
the advice of the OBC, she had the other option to sign the Roll of
Attorneys subject to the condition that the letter of the complainant
would be automatically converted to a disbarment complaint against
her. Choosing the latter, she signed the Roll of Attorneys on May 3,
2012.
The respondent stated that she had been employed by the
complainant for four years; that her employment had lasted until she
was illegally dismissed; that she instituted a labor case against the
complainant; that the criminal charges filed against her were intended
to malign, inconvenience, and harass her, and to force her to desist
from pursuing the labor case; and that at the time of the filing of her
comment, the criminal complaints brought against her had already
dismissed the criminal charge docketed as XV-12-INV-11-J-03189.
On February 18, 2015, the respondent filed a motion seeking the
resolution of this disbarment case, alleging that the DOJ had denied
the complainant's appeal in respect of XV-12-INV-11-J-03189; and that
as to the criminal charge docketed as XV-03-INV-11-J-08553, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had filed an information
against her in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City, but Branch
33 of that court had eventually dismissed the information upon the
Prosecution's motion for the withdrawal of the information with leave of
court.
Issue: May the disbarment complaint against the respondent prosper?
Ruling: No,
We observe that this administrative case started as a complaint to
prevent the respondent from being admitted to the Philippine Bar on
the ground of the existence of criminal charges brought against her for
crimes involving moral turpitude. Indeed, Section 2, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court requires that any applicant for admission to the Bar
must show that no charges against him or her for crimes involving
moral turpitude have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. However, this administrative case has since been
converted to one for disbarment but without the complainant, which
has all the while continued to actively participate herein, alleging any
ground for finding the respondent administratively liable except those
already averred in its letter to the OBC. The complainant has not also
shown that there were other criminal cases involving moral turpitude
filed against the respondent.
The complainant did not allege, much less prove, that the respondent
had been convicted by final judgment of any criminal offense involving
moral turpitude. On the contrary, the criminal cases that were the sole
bases for the complaint for disbarment had already been dismissed
after due proceedings.
Issue:
Is the termination from the service justified?
Ruling: No.
In this case, the act alleged to have caused the loss of trust and
confidence of petitioners in Simbillo was her Facebook post, which
supposedly suggests that Interadent was being “feasted on” by the BIR
and also contains insulting statements against a co-worker and hence
has compromised the reputation of the company.
According to petitioners, there was disclosure of confidential
information that gives the impression that Interadent is under
investigation by the BIR for irregular transactions. However, we agree
with the CA’s observation that the Facebook entry did not contain any
corporate record or any confidential information. Otherwise stated,
there was really no actual leakage of information. No company
information or corporate record was divulged by Simbillo.
Simbillo’s failure to substantiate her claim that the Facebook entry was
posted for a friend who consulted her on a predicament she has with
her company and that the term “b_i_r_” represents “bwitre” will not
weaken her case against petitioners. It must be emphasized at this
point that in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is upon the
employer to show that the employee’s dismissal was for a valid cause.
“The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence
and not on the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping
with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of
the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them.” The
Facebook entry did not mention any specific name of
employer/company/ government agency or person. Contrary to
petitioners’ insistence, the intended subject matter was not clearly
identifiable. As acknowledged by petitioners themselves, Simbillo’s
Facebook account contained a list of her former and present
employers. If anything, the entry would merely merit some suspicion on
the part of Interadent being the present employer, but it would be far-
fetched to conclude that Interadent may be involved in anomalous
transactions with the BIR.
Clearly, petitioners’ theory was based on mere speculations.
If at all, Simbillo can only be said to have acted “carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently” in making such a comment
on Facebook; however, such would not amount to loss of trust and
confidence as to justify the termination of her employment. When the
breach of trust or loss of confidence conjectured upon is not borne by
clearly established facts, as in this case, such dismissal on the ground
of loss of trust and confidence cannot be upheld. (Del Castillo, J., SC
2nd Division, Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc., et. al. vs.
Rebecca F. Simbillo, G.R. No. 207315, November 23, 2016).