Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 187725 January 19, 2011

BENJAMIN JESALVA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with
modification the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated November 18,
1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw4 (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts

On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a criminal complaint5 for
Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days thereafter, or on September 15, 1992, the complaint
was amended, charging petitioner with the crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo6 (Leticia) died
on September 14, 1992.7 After conducting a hearing on the bail application of petitioner, the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992, granted him bail.8 On January 11, 1993,
the MTC recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon.9

Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information10 dated January 26, 1993,
which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with treachery and evident premeditation with the use of
motor vehicle and during night time, did then and there [wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, manhandle and use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting upon the latter serious
and mortal wounds which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of
her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.11 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
 Version of the Prosecution

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as follows:

In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the victim Leticia Aldemo,
Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,12 Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nena’s place playing
mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 o’clock that night,
Gloria’s group left Nena’s place and boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo
Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia
drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.

After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who flagged down a tricycle,
once again boarded petitioner’s Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove them home. The
victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first,
followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from Leticia’s house. While at Gloria’s house,
petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next day because the
stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her
and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former
immediately accelerated his car and went to the direction of 6th Street instead of towards 7th Street
where Leticia’s house was situated.

At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1
Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon petitioner’s Isuzu [panel] in St.
Rafael Subdivision in [Our Lady’s Village] OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached
the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check what was
going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated in front of the
wheel so he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond,
immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite
his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters holding office at the
Bishop’s Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was walking from a
certain Lea’s house, he saw a woman naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway.
Her jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her
things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera
focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, "What is that?" Because he received no
response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back to check the
site later.

Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding that he even got
stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood
such that when De Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police
station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.

De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area but to no avail. On their
way back at about 1:15 o’clock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera
lost no time in identifying him to be the man he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the
allegation but professed innocence. He admitted he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police
found her.

Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the next day. However,
because the evidence pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was
conducted. He "surrendered" at one (1) o’clock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his
first cousin.13

The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner
was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that they should just remain as friends because she
was already married, and that she loved her handsome husband.14 Moreover, the prosecution
asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while conducting patrol in St. Rafael
Subdivision, 15 together with other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1
Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner
immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which was directly
opposite his residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendoza’s calls.16Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m.
of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to
the police station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia
jumped out of his vehicle.17 At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together
with other police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner identified
as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat.18

After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer
to Evidence,19 which the RTC, Branch 51, denied in its Order20 dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994,
the defense filed a Motion21for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of
Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 51, voluntarily
inhibited himself from taking any further action in the case;22 hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC,
Branch 52. Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Branch 52, denied the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense.23

Version of the Defense

In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that he killed Leticia. He testified that
he did not have any reason to kill her, and that he had many reasons why he should not kill her.24 The
prosecution manifested that it would not conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his
testimony was tantamount to pure denial.25 To prove that there was a broken chain of circumstantial
evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo de Vera. The CA narrated:

12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at about 12:30 a.m., he was driving his
tricycle en route to OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of the national road or
highway, he saw a man and a woman three meters from the edge of the road; he stopped his
tricycle and focused the headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he saw the woman leaning on
the left arm of the man while the man was on a squatting position; he asked them "what is
that?" and did not get any response; that the man was hiding his face and saw little blood on the
clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with clothes, a polo shirt and pants; he decided to
bring home his passenger home (sic) first and then returned to the scene but found no one
 there; he reported the matter to [SPO1] Balaoro, who immediately accompanied him to the
place; they searched for the man and woman but they could not find them; they checked the
Sorsogon Provincial Hospital but nobody had been brought there; then they proceeded back to
the junction and later to the Sorsogon town proper; upon reaching Barangay Tugos, they saw
[Lt.] Caguia talking with a man, whom he (De Vera) recognized as the man with the woman; [Lt.]
Caguia directed the man to go to Police Sub-Station 1; at the police Sub-Station 1, he came to
know the name of the man – Noel Olbes; he saw bloodstains on Olbes’ arms, hands, face and
nose; the police interrogated him about it and he replied that he just helped the woman.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known [petitioner] for a longtime; and he has good
relationship with him; [petitioner] was his bondsman in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession
of firearms and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his gratitude to
[petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the case.26

Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro and
Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows:

6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of September 9, 1992, Eduardo De
Vera reported to him at the Police Sub-Station 1 that he saw a man, who was in squatting
position, and a woman, who had blood on the upper right breast of her clothes, lean[ing]
against the man and that after De Vera brought his tricycle passenger home, he returned to the
site but he could not find the two anymore; upon receiving the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro),
together with SPO1 Sincua and De Vera, proceeded to the diversion road, at the junction going
to the hospital and Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to investigate; they searched the place and
went to the hospital but found nothing; on their way back, at around 1:15 [a.m.] they saw Noel
Olbes talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay Tugos; De Vera pointed to Olbes as the man he saw
with the woman at the crossing so they brought him to Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation;
Olbes told them that he saw the woman lying on the side of the road so he tried to lift her up
but when he saw the tricycle (De Vera’s) he became afraid as he might be implicated in the
crime so he brought her to Hazelwood, which is five meters away from the highway; at 2:25 a.m.
the patrol team found Leticia Aldemo, whom they found naked from the waist down; at the
garage of Hazelwood; they found the long pants of the victim lying beside her and noted that
her panty was still on one of her knees; the victim’s body appeared to have been laid down; they
did not find any blood in the garage except where the victim’s body was found outside the
garage, they saw the other pair of shoes of a woman and thick bloodstains; he (SPO1 Balaoro)
brought Olbes to Balogo station and entrusted him to their investigator.

7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters who are holding office at the
Bishop’s Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that on September 8, 1997, he went out with his
friends Danny, Oca and Ely in Almendras to drink a bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went to
downtown Sorsogon and roamed around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went to Bahay Kainan and at
about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food and took a bottle of beer; upon the
invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena and drank another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her
home at OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Lea’s house, he walked and upon reaching
the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying on her belly naked from the waist down; the woman
was just uttering guttural sound; her jeans and panty were just lying beside her; taking pity on
the woman and since it was raining that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in order
that she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the panty and the jeans to the
shed; he noticed that a tricycle stopped for a while and focused its headlight on them and
proceeded on its way; when he laid down the woman in the shed, he noticed that she was
bleeding and he was stained with her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and left; he
walked towards the Sorsogon town proper and after about forty-five minutes, two policem[e]n
apprehended him and brought him to the police station for investigation; while being
investigated, he was not apprised of his constitutional rights and made to sign the police blotter;
he was detained as he was a suspect for the injuries of the victim; after 7 or 8 hours, he was
released; and he executed a Sworn Statement and affirmed its contents.27

Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr.28 and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes) testified on the injuries
suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her death:

9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on September 9, 1992 a patient by the
name of Leticia Aldemo, who was in comatose state; she sustained the following injuries (1)
severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5 cm punctured wound, occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured
wound, parietal left area[;] (4) multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect deltoid left
area[;] (5) contusion hematoma 3rd upper left arm; (6) contusion hematoma left elbow[;] (7)
abrasion left elbow[;] (8) hematoma, 3rd left thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple
confluent abrasion right foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;] (12) abrasion right
elbow[;] (13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and (14) skull-segmented fracture parietal
bone with separation.

He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area (lower back of the skull) was
caused by a pebble which they recovered from said area; the punctured wound on the parietal
left area was caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough
surface; the first three findings could also have been caused by the punch made by the
perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a
strong grip; the fifth and the sixth findings could have been caused also by some of the above-
mentioned means; the eighth finding could have been caused by a fall or rubbing on a hard
object; the ninth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow while the
tenth finding could have been caused by a fall on a rough object and the knee rubbing on a
rough object; the eleventh finding could have been due to a fall or by being dragged; the twelfth
finding could be caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by fist blow and the thirteenth
finding could also be caused by a fall or fist blow.

He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he performed on her.

xxxx

14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes – He explained the different kinds of injuries sustained by the
victim. In addition, he stated that since there were wounds sustained by the victim in the
dorsum part of the foot and sustained injuries on both knees, upper portion of the back of the
hand, the victim could have been thrown off while unconscious.29

The RTC’s Ruling

On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The
RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery
was not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly
proven. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and considering that there was no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant thereto and
taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the
sum of ₱50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim, plus ₱42,755.45 for compensatory damages plus
₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees (People v. Aguiluz, March 11,
1992).

SO ORDERED.30

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.31

The CA’s Ruling

On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner could not point to Olbes as
the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw the former holding on to Leticia in a squatting position,
Olbes was in the act of lifting her in order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any
misdeed or omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring Leticia to a nearby hospital,
because his fear of being implicated in the crime clouded his better judgment. Thus:

All told, We find that the prosecution’s evidence suffice to sustain the accused-appellant’s conviction for
homicide.

As to the award of attorney’s fees, We find the award of ₱10,000.00 by the trial court meritorious, the
records reveal that services of private prosecutor was engaged.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. With the
attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of accused-appellant, the penalty reclusion
temporal is imposed in its minimum period. Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as
maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52 dated November 18, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 3243 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
the penalty.

Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.32

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,33 which the CA, however, denied in its
Resolution34dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

A) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE BASED ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE BOTH NOT IN ACCORD WITH
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH CAUTION AND THAT ALL
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND

B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS
THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT
HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN]
HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY.35

Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and where Leticia sustained
her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was responsible for her injuries. He refutes the
prosecution’s contention that, even if he took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street,
where Leticia’s house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been considered as a suspect
in this case, considering that he was the last person seen with Leticia when she was still alive. He avers
that the statements he made at the police station are not admissible in evidence, considering that he
was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver of his right to remain
silent.36 Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal injuries sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr.
Abrantes, are consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting petitioner’s innocence. Petitioner claims that the
evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place where Olbes spotted Leticia,
thereby suggesting that something worse than her jumping out of the vehicle might have happened.37

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG, argues that only questions
of law may be entertained by this Court, and that we accord great respect to factual findings of the trial
court especially when affirmed by the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTC’s ruling, did not
err in convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because the particular circumstances
enumerated by both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily meet the requirements of the rules and of
jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover, the OSG claims that the statements made by petitioner before
SPO4 Desder, in the presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and were not elicited on custodial
investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters that petitioner was not deprived of his rights since he was never
held for questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the police station and, besides, he was
accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona.38

Our Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Custodial investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." This
presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or a confession from him.39 The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions
which tend to elicit incriminating statements.40 The assailed statements herein were spontaneously
made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner,
together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the
statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992.41 The RTC
and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation
is not applicable in the instant case.

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted of the crime of
Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence,
which were credible and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner
committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to
petitioner as the culprit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may
draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are instances when, although a witness may not have
actually witnessed the commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is
insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in
secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.42

Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused,
to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.43

We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the circumstantial evidence proved by
the prosecution, when viewed in its entirety, points unerringly to [petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the
person responsible for the death of the victim Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the following combination of the
circumstances which comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to [petitioner] and
no other, as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:

1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting the victim Leticia Aldemo, and
whom the latter advised to stop as she was already married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six
other individuals left Nena Ables’ house at 10 p.m. of September 8, 1992 after playing mahjong
thereat. They rode in [petitioner’s] red panel.
2. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two others proceeded to Bistro Christina.
[Petitioner], together with other two male companions, consumed one bottle of Fundador, in
addition to the three bottles of beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group left the place.

3. After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin Jesalva, together with Leticia
Aldemo, proceeded to bring Gloria Haboc to her home, which was only twenty meters away
from Leticia’s residence.

4. After staying at Gloria Haboc’s house for five minutes, and denied another drink, Benjamin
Jesalva immediately accelerated his vehicle en route to 6th Street instead of the shorter and
direct route, the 7th street, where Leticia Aldemo’s house is located;

5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband Efren Aldemo;

6. At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police patrolling the St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision
saw the red panel thereat and when they approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw
Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who suddenly drove away in the direction of Sorsogon town
proper, opposite to where he lives. SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin Jesalva (whom he
had known since his teen-age years) to stop but the latter did not respond or heed his call;

7. At 12:30 o’clock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body of Leticia Aldemo sprawled on
her belly at the crossing/junction of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist
down. He lifted her up and brought the body at Hazelwood, which is about 10 meters away from
the highway.

8. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at around 2:15 a.m. of the same day,
and brought her to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital in comatose condition.

9. The police proceeded to inform the victim’s sister, who in turn informed the victim’s husband
of the incident.

10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at
the police station but was not able to find him.

11. At around 1:00 o’clock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin Jesalva, together with his first
cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose Jayona, presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon
headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the victim Leticia Aldemo was his passenger in
his vehicle at about 12:30 in the early morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael Subdivision
but upon reaching the crossing of OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial
Hospital, she jumped out of his vehicle. These declarations were recorded in the police blotter
by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction of SPO4 William Desder, the PNP Sorsogon Chief
Investigator.

12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together with [petitioner] and Asst.
Prosecutor Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision to conduct an ocular inspection. [Petitioner]
pointed to the police the place where he and the victim spent their time. The police
 photographed what appear[ed] to be bloodstains just two meters away from the place pointed
by [petitioner].

13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the occipital area was caused by
a pebble which he recovered from said area; the punctured wound in the parietal left area was
caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface, the cerebral
contusion, the punctured wound in the occipital and in the parietal area could also be caused by
a punch by the perpetrator. As to the multiple contusion hematoma anterior lateral aspect of
the deltoid left area was caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the contusion
hematoma on the upper left arm and left elbow could as well be similarly caused by a blunt
instrument or a punch or a strong grip. As to the abrasion on the right knee, the same could
have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow. The multiple confluent abrasion[s] on the
right foot could have been caused by a fall on a rough object. The abrasions on the right elbow
could have been caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by a fist blow. The same is true with
the contusion hematoma found on the victim’s right elbow.44

Petitioner’s mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his culpability
in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail
over the bare denials of an accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and
the CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioner’s defense of denial was weak, self-serving,
speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioner’s silence as to the matters that occurred during the time he
was alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet
the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We find that
the prosecution has met this quantum of proof in this case.45

All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which would warrant the modification
much less the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated October 17, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 185230 June 1, 2011

JOSEPH C. CEREZO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE
AFULUGENCIA,Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the July 11, 2008
Decision1 and the November 4, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088,
which reversed and set aside the October 24, 20063 and the February 26, 20074 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92.

The RTC Orders revived Criminal Case No. Q-03-115490, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Juliet
Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente Afulugencia," after the same was dismissed in an
earlier Order.

The Facts

On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet
Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).5

Finding probable cause to indict respondents,6 the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) filed the
corresponding Information against them on February 18, 2003 before the RTC.7

Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s
Evidence before the OP-QC.8

In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the
withdrawal of the Information.9 Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed
before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003,
respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a "not guilty" plea.10

In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed in its Order
dated March 17, 2004, viz.:

Settled is the rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public
Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. Being vested
with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do
so. x x x.

More so, the Court cannot interfere with the Public Prosecutor’s discretion to determine probable cause
or the propriety of pursuing or not a criminal case when the case is not yet filed in Court, as a general
rule. However, if the same criminal case has been filed in Court already, the Public Prosecutor can still
interfere with it subject to the approval of the Court. In the case of Republic vs. Sunga, et al., the
Supreme Court held that while it has been settled in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul that the trial court is
the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed after the complaint or information has
been filed in court, nonetheless any motion of the offended party for the dismissal of the criminal case,
even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal and only after
hearing should the court exercise its exclusive authority to dismiss or continue with the prosecution of
the case. The Court, therefore, after hearing and conferring with the fiscal, can dismiss the case if
convinced that there is [no] reason to continue with the prosecution [of] the same. As in this case, the
Court finds merit [in] the motion of the Public Prosecutor.11

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003
OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition
for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).12 The RTC deferred action on the said motion to
await the resolution of the DOJ.13

On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the
OP-QC’s November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for
libel.14

On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, thus:

Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the
Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. In the same manner as discussed in
arriving at its assailed order dated 17 March 2004, the Court gives more leeway to the Public Prosecutor
in determining whether it has to continue or stop prosecuting a case. While the City Prosecutor has
previously decided not to pursue further the case, the Secretary of Justice, however, through its
resolution on the Petition for Review did not agree with him.

The Court disagrees with the argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to the picture.
The order of dismissal as well as the withdrawal of the Information was not yet final because of the
timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court[,] therefore, can still set aside its order.
Moreover, there is no refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one. The case filed remains the same
and the order of dismissal was merely vacated because the Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration
meritorious.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious, the Order dated 17 March 2004 is
hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.

Let the arraignment of accused Oscar Mapalo and pre-trial [of] the other accused be set on 06
December 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.15

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTC’s second assailed Order
dated February 26, 2007.16

Relentless, respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC Orders violated their constitutional right
against double jeopardy.

Ruling of the CA

The appellate court found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of
the case. The CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders, ruling that all the elements of double jeopardy
exist. There was a valid Information sufficient in form and substance filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction to which respondents had pleaded, and that the termination of the case was not expressly
consented to by respondents; hence, the same could not be revived or refiled without transgressing
respondents’ right against double jeopardy.

The CA further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly took cognizance of the Petition for Review
because DOJ Department Order No. 223 mandates that no appeal shall be entertained if the accused
has already been arraigned or, if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the
same shall be dismissed.17

Petitioner interposed the instant appeal when his motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was
denied.18

The Issues

Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was Double Jeopardy, specifically
on the alleged existence of the requisites to constitute Double Jeopardy;

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that there was NO refiling of the
case nor the filing of a new one in arriving [at] its conclusion that Double Jeopardy sets in to the
picture;

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was 1.) a valid termination of the
case on the basis of the Order of the Trial Court dated 17 March 2004, and allegedly 2.) without
the express consent of the respondents.19

The assigned errors will be subsumed into this issue:

Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of double
jeopardy.

Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.

Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the
sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or
the Secretary of Justice.20 It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the
motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.21 While the
recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding
on courts.

In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that
the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to
hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of
the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor
when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and
irresolute on whether to indict respondents.

The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC
judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. This
is evident from the general tenor of the Order and highlighted in the following portion thereof:

As discussed during the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it depending
on the outcome of the Petition for Review. Considering the findings of the Department of Justice
reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for
Reconsideration.22

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary,
the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The
said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due
process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.23

This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the
case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information anew.1awphil

It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when
a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.24

Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with
grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal
or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the
accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double
jeopardy has not set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and the assailed July 11, 2008 Decision and the
November 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, and the October 24, 2006
and the February 26, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Quezon City RTC, Branch 92, for evaluation on
whether probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009

DAVID TIU, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO POSTANES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 29 October 2003 Decision2 and 24 February 2004
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. The Court of Appeals annulled the 6
November 2000 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 115, Pasay City on the ground of
violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. The RTC declared void the acquittal by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44, Pasay City, of respondent Edgardo Postanes for the crime of
grave threats.

The Facts

The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by respondent
Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, petitioner David Tiu
(Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes.

Consequently, an Information for Slight Physical Injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-412, and an
Information for Grave Threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-413, were filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City. The Informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 96-412 (Slight Physical Injuries)

That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Remegio Pasion, there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Edgardo
Postanes y Talara thereby inflicting physical injuries to the latter, which injuries required and will require
medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated and will incapacitate him
from performing his habitual work and/or activities during the same period of time.

Contrary to law.5

Criminal Case No. 96-413 (Grave Threats)

That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Edgardo Postanes y Talara, without
justifiable cause, by creating in the minds of the complainants Genes Carmen y Motita and David S. Tiu
that the threats will be carried out, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened to
inflict bodily harm on the latter’s person by poking a gun and uttering the following threatening words,
to wit:

"PUTANG INA NINYO MGA HINDOT KAYO PAGBABABARILIN KO KAYO."

Contrary to law.6

Upon motion of Pasion, Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated and jointly heard
before the MeTC of Pasay City, Branch 44.

During the trial, Postanes testified as a witness, together with his eyewitnesses Jose Aynaga (Aynaga)
and Aristotle Samson (Samson). Postanes’ testimony was also offered to prove his innocence as the
accused in Criminal Case No. 96-413, thus:

ATTY. VALDEZ: The purposes in presenting the testimony of this witness your Honor, is [sic] to affirm and
confirm his Affidavit or Sworn Statement earlier submitted to this Honorable Court as his direct
testimony pursuant to the Rules of Summary Procedure; second, to affirm and confirm his Affidavit or
his Sworn Statement as part of his controverting evidence on the counter charge on Criminal Case No.
96-413 also pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure; third, to identify the accused; and [fourth] to
prove that the accused is guilty of the crime charged; and [fifth] to prove that the witness Edgardo
Postanes is innocent in the charges in Criminal Case No. 96-413.7 (Emphasis supplied)

On 3 April 1997, Postanes formally offered his evidence, as the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
96-412. Postanes offered, among others, his affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, Aynaga and
Samson, which were correspondingly marked as Exhibits "A," "C," and "D."

On 17 April 1997, the MeTC admitted all of Postanes’ documentary evidences.

In Criminal Case No. 96-413, where he stood as the accused, Postanes adopted his testimony and his
witnesses’ testimonies which were formally offered and admitted in Criminal Case No. 96-412.
Accordingly, the MeTC issued an Order dated 13 October 1998, which pertinently states:

Atty. Paul Edwin D.S. Bautista, counsel for the accused manifested that the witness to be presented
today in the person of Norlie B Ubay cannot be located by Mr. Postanes. Atty. Bautista further
manifested that he is adopting the testimonies of their witnesses, Aristotle Samson and Jose Aynaga
in Criminal Case No. 96-412 for Slight Physical Injuries wherein Edgardo Postanes is the private
complainant against Remigio Pasion, Jr., their testimonies and other evidences introduced as evidence
for the accused.8(Emphasis supplied)

Postanes requested more time to submit a formal offer of evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-413.
However, Postanes’ counsel filed a formal offer of evidence belatedly. In its Order dated 22 December
1998, the MeTC denied Postanes’ motion to admit formal offer of evidence and ordered it expunged
from the records.9
In its Decision dated 26 January 1999,10 the MeTC dismissed both Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413.
The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the charge for Slight
Physical Injuries against Remegio Pasion, Jr. and the counter-charge of Grave Threats against Edgardo
Postanes DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.11

Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC in its Order dated 11 March 1999.

On 29 March 1999, Tiu, through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City.

On 6 November 2000, the RTC, Branch 115, Pasay City rendered a Decision declaring void the judgment
of the MeTC. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, granting certiorari, the Decision of Acquittal dated January 26, 1999 of the respondent
judge in Criminal Case No. 96-413, with respect to accused Edgardo Postanes, is declared NULL AND
VOID.

This case is remanded to the Court of origin for reconsideration of its Decision.12

Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 3 April 2001.13

On 22 May 2001, Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision
of the RTC which annulled the judgment of the MeTC dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413.

In a Resolution promulgated on 5 January 2001, the Court of Appeals directed respondents (Tiu and
Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of RTC Pasay, Branch 115) to file their Comment on the petition. The Court
of Appeals found no reason to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order.14

Meanwhile, Tiu, through his counsel, filed with the MeTC a Motion for Compliance asking the MeTC to
enforce the RTC decision. He also filed a motion to inhibit MeTC Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas.
Postanes, on the other hand, filed a motion to suspend the proceedings and an Opposition to the
motion for compliance.

On 3 September 2001, the MeTC issued an Order15 granting Postanes’ motion to suspend the
proceedings. Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas also inhibited herself from further hearing the case.

On 3 January 2002, Tiu filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss Petition16 on the ground of
forum shopping.

In a Resolution promulgated on 16 September 2003, the Court of Appeals stated that "action on the
Motion to Dismiss Petition filed by the private respondents, together with the petitioner’s Opposition
thereto, and private respondents’ Reply to Opposition shall be included in the preparation of the
decision in the present petition."17
On 29 October 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC Decision
and affirming the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated November 6, 2000 and the Order dated
April 3, 2001 of the public respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.18

On 24 February 2004, the Court of Appeals denied Tiu’s motion for reconsideration.19

Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC "has granted upon the State,
through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right
the government does not have."

The Court of Appeals stated that the prosecution had not been denied by the MeTC of its right to due
process. Hence, it was wrong for the RTC to declare the findings of the MeTC as having been arrived at
with grave abuse of discretion, thereby denying Postanes of his Constitutional right against double
jeopardy.

The Court of Appeals opined that the MeTC evaluated and passed upon the evidence presented both by
the prosecution and the defense. The MeTC, however, believed that the evidence of the prosecution
was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of Postanes, thus acquitted
him based on reasonable doubt.

The Issues

The main issues in this case are:

1. Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC; and

2. Whether there was forum shopping when Postanes filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in
the MeTC when the Court of Appeals already denied Postanes’ prayer for a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of the decision of the RTC.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General.
Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel.
Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the
Court of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the
Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the
petition must fail.

However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy to finally put an end to this
controversy.

The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and
had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.21

These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes
was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea;22 and (4) the MeTC
dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal
from which no appeal can be had.23Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to
reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional
proscription not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense."24 Further, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the
State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which
would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case.25

Tiu also contends that since the defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413 failed to submit a formal of
evidence, the defense in effect had no evidence to dispute the charge against Postanes. Tiu insists that
though Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated, the MeTC should not have considered
the evidence offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 to dismiss Criminal Case No. 96-413. In doing so, the
MeTC allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion rendering its dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413
(grave threats case) void.

Tiu’s arguments fail to convince us. There is nothing in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
prohibiting the MeTC from appreciating the evidence presented and formally offered in Criminal Case
No. 96-412 in resolving Criminal Case No. 96-413, inasmuch as these two criminal cases were properly
consolidated and jointly tried. In fact, the MeTC’s act of assessing the evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-
412 in deciding Criminal Case No. 96-413 is consistent with the avowed objective of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure "to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases" covered
by these Rules. Besides, the testimonies of Postanes, Aynaga,26 and Samson27 were properly offered at
the time when these witnesses were called to testify.28 Hence, while the affidavits as documentary
evidence were not formally offered, there were testimonial evidences supporting Postanes’ defense in
Criminal Case No. 96-413.

Contrary to the RTC’s finding, there is nothing capricious or whimsical in the act of the MeTC of
considering the evidence formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving the consolidated
Criminal Case No. 96-413. Therefore, the MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 96-413 for insufficient evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the forum shopping issue.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29 October 2003 Decision and 24
February 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 187728 September 12, 2011

CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod, Southern
Leyte, and PO1 RUDYARD PALOMA y TORRES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Order1 of
the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte (RTC), dated January 16, 2009, dismissing the criminal
case for rape against PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent), and the Resolution2 dated
March 16, 2009, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set aside.

The records reveal the following antecedent facts.

On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, executed a sworn statement before
an Investigator of the 8th Regional Office, Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban City, where she stated that she was raped by herein private
respondent on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A preliminary
investigation of the case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against private
respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered to the Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18, 2004 and
was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.

On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings on the motion commenced
on December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed to appear. Only private respondent presented evidence.
Thus, on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an Order allowing private respondent to post bail
set at ₱200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private respondent was released from confinement.

Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of criminal complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, records of the
subject case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Southern Leyte.3 The Prosecutor's
Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause against private respondent and,
accordingly, an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A warrant of arrest was immediately
issued against private respondent.

On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention4 and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC
issued an Order5 stating that accused had voluntarily surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court and
arraignment was set for July 31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private respondent filed a
Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008, the RTC
cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on said
motion for August 20, 2008. At said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on the motion, nobody
appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC issued the Order6 dated August 20, 2008 resetting the
arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that:

x x x this Court hereby orders the public prosecutor x x x and/or his assistant prosecutor x x x to appear
and prosecute this case on the next scheduled hearing from arraignment up to the termination of the
trial of this case otherwise this Court will order the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute or nolle
prosequi.7

On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, filed through her private counsel, a
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing,8 manifesting that Atty. Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the
authority to prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled arraignment on
October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of
venue before this Court. The authorized private prosecutor did not appear on said hearing date. The
hearing on October 31, 2008 proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its Order9 issued on the same day, that
unless restrained by a higher court, the mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not
sufficient reason to suspend the proceedings. Moreover, counsel for accused invoked the accused's right
to a speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned in the presence of the Provincial
Prosecutor who was designated by the RTC to represent the prosecution for the purpose of
arraignment. Pre-trial was set for November 13, 2008. Nevertheless, said schedule for pre-trial was
cancelled (per Order10 dated November 4, 2008) as the Presiding Judge of the RTC had to attend a
PHILJA Seminar, and pre-trial was reset to November 24, 2008. On November 24, 2008, the day of the
pre-trial itself, the private prosecutor again filed a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, again using as
justification the pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. The RTC issued an Order on even date,
reading as follows:

During the scheduled pre-trial conference of this case, the public prosecutors of Leyte, the private
prosecutor and the private complainant failed to appear despite proper notices sent [to] them. A motion
for cancellation of hearing was filed by the authorized private prosecutor, Pedro Felicen, Jr. for reasons
stated therein to which this Court finds to be not meritorious, hence, the same is denied. x x x the public
prosecutor as well as the counsel for the accused were directed to make their oral comments on the
first endorsement of the Hon. Deputy Court Administrator, regarding the motion to transfer venue of
this case to any of the RTC, at Tacloban City, x x x.

x x x Thereafter, the pre trial proceeded by discussing matters concerning the amicable settlement, plea
bargaining agreement, stipulation of facts, pre-marking of documentary exhibits, number of witnesses,
trial dates and nature of the defense. There being no other matters to discuss on pre-trial in order to
expedite the early disposition of this case, the pre-trial proper is now deemed terminated.11

The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial on the merits for December 12, 2008. On
December 12, 2008, no one appeared for the prosecution, prompting counsel for accused private
respondent to move for dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute. Private respondent's
motion to dismiss was denied per Order12 dated December 12, 2008, and hearing was reset to January
16, 2009.
Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing, the private prosecutor filed an Urgent Motion
for Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it

was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of the notice of the January 16, 2009 hearing
and he had to attend a previously scheduled hearing for another case he was handling, set for the very
same date. Thus, in the Order dated January 16, 2009, the RTC disposed, thus:

x x x Again notably absent are the private prosecutor, the two public prosecutors designated by the
Department of Justice to prosecute this case as well as the private complainant herself.

A last minute urgent motion to reset was filed by the private prosecutor, but the same is denied being in
violation of the three (3) day rule in filing written postponements. After hearing the arguments coming
from both the public prosecutor assigned to this Court and counsel for the defense, the Court deems it
proper to act on the urgency of the matter prayed for by the said counsel. Considering that the accused
has been languishing in jail since June, 2008 up to the present and to allow him to stay in jail for a single
minute, it is quite unreasonable and would violate his right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the accused to be based on grounds that are
meritorious, this Court pursuant to x x x the rule on speedy trial (RA 8433) [should be "8493"] hereby
orders this case dismissed for failure of the prosecution to prosecute or nolle prosequi.13

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same per Resolution dated March
16, 2009.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately dismissing the rape case
against private respondent. Respondents counter that there was no grave abuse committed by the trial
court and setting aside the dismissal of the rape case would put private respondent in double jeopardy.

The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.

Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In Garcia v. Miro,14 the Court,
quoting Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,15 ruled thus:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers
must strictly observe.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
On this point alone, the petition is already dismissible. However, on several occasions, this Court found
compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal,17 the
Court opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy, considered to
be one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Hence, the Court also finds
sufficient reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of double jeopardy,
necessitating a look into the merits of the petition.

Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private respondent too hurriedly,
despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), now
incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which
trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not
limited to the following:

xxxx

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts;

x x x x18

A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the time
limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning the accused.
The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from said
time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the time during which the
petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the
time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court.

The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in fact,
already been breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order19 dated November 24, 2008
on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2, 2008.20 This
means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said date was a Sunday
or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the prosecution's failure to appear at the
December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the RTC was
constrained to reset the hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day time limit.
Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly
observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with
the RTC's directives to commence presentation of their evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper
courtesy to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the hearing
and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on their motion. As set forth in the
narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying and trifling with court
processes.
Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their petition for transfer of
venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a pending
petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v. Hernandez,21 the Court held that "delay
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."22 The
trial court was then correct and acting well within its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners'
motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their petition for transfer of venue.

The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the case. The
Court's ruling in Tan v. People23 is quite instructive, to wit:

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on
the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice
denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in
criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period
to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the
Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated
in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state -

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift,
but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,
courts are to give meaning to that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay.1âwphi1 Different weights

should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining
whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following:
(a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay.

xxxx

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings
of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.24

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated from
November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an
Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned
beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6 months.
Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive.
Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him
great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal
case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where
there is no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against
herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in dismissing
the case against private respondent for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Associate Justice>

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 176169 November 14, 2008

ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rosario Nasi-Villar
assailing the Decision2 dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution3 dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of
Appeals. This case originated from an Information4 for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6
and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)

No. 80425 filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on 5 October 1998 for acts
committed by petitioner and one Dolores Placa in or about January 1993. The Information reads:

That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of
Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another through
fraudulent representation and deceitful machination, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully
and feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad[,] demand and receive the amount
of P6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as placement fee[,] the said accused being a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to engage in the recruitment of workers abroad to the damage and
prejudice of the herein offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos City, Davao del Sur found the
evidence presented by the prosecution to be more credible than that presented by the defense and thus
held petitioner liable for the offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, as amended.7 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment and, in accordance with the penalty
set forth under the Labor Code, as amended, said accused is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR YEARS as minimum to FIVE YEARS as maximum.

On the civil aspect of the case, there being no substantial proof presented to justify a grant of
civil damages, this Court makes no pronouncement thereon.
 With respect to accused Ma. Dolores Placa, who is still at large, the records of this case are
hereby sent to the archives to be retrieved in the event that said accused would be
apprehended. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the apprehension of said accused.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged error by the trial court in
finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of the trial court's appreciation of the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June 2005,9 following the principle that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, noted that the criminal acts alleged to have
been committed happened sometime in 1993. However, R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was
charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995 and took effect on 15 July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals
declared that petitioner should have been charged under the Labor Code, in particular Art. 13(b)
thereof, and not under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of the provisions of
the Labor Code and found petitioner liable under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b), and Art. 39 of the
Labor Code. The appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, decreeing in the
dispositive portion, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
11th Judicial Region, Br. 18, City of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur, finding Rosario Nasi-Villar
guilty beyond reasonable doubt o the crime of Illegal Recruitment
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Rosario Nasi-Villar is ORDERED to pay Nila Panilag the
sum of P10,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.10

On 28 November 2006, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.11

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No. 8042 cannot be
given retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto law. Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet exist in January 1993 when the
crime was allegedly committed, petitioner argues that law cannot be used as the basis of filing a criminal
action for illegal recruitment. What was applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 39, the violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment of not less than four (4)
years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 and not more than P100,000.00
or both. On the other hand, Sec. 7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment with a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a
fine not less than P200,000.00 nor more than P500,000.00. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment provided
in the Labor Code was raised or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner concludes that the charge and
conviction of an offense carrying a penalty higher than that provided by the law at the time of its
commission constitutes a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law and the retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042.
In its Comment12 dated 7 September 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Court of Appeals' conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is correct. While conceding that there
was an erroneous designation of the law violated by petitioner, the OSG stresses that the designation of
the offense in the Information is not determinative of the nature and character of the crime charged
against her but the acts alleged in the Information. The allegations in the Information clearly charge
petitioner with illegal recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, and
penalized under Art. 39(c) of the same Code. The evidence on record substantiates the charge to a
moral certainty. Thus, while there was an erroneous specification of the law violated by petitioner in the
Information, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's imposition of the penalty for simple illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code, the OSG concludes.

The petition is denied. We find no reversible error in the decision arrived at by the Court of Appeals.

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that the real nature of the crime charged is determined, not
from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have
been violated–these being conclusions of law–but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. What controls is not the designation but the description of the offense charged. From a
legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the body of the
information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever
may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.14

In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had performed
the acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of
the Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the Information. To prove illegal recruitment, two elements
must be shown, namely: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment
activities, or any of the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said
person does not have a license or authority to do so.15 Art. 13(b) defines "recruitment and placement"
as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising, or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons, is considered engaged in recruitment and placement."
The trial court found these two elements had been proven in the case at bar. Petitioner has not offered
any argument or proof that countervails such findings.

The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time of its commission.
Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found guilty under the Labor Code which was in force in 1993
when the acts attributed to her were committed. Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an Information
that erroneously designated the offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which
are punishable under the Labor Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she was
charged with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not under R.A. No. 8042.

There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive application of R.A. No.
8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which, among others, aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than it was when committed or changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.16 Penal laws and laws which, while not
penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their
violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are
favorable to the accused.17

R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a new definition of the crime of
illegal recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said
law, including the penalties provided therein, would take effect retroactively. A law can never be
considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only
offenses committed after and not before its enactment.18 Neither did the trial court nor the appellate
court give R.A. No. 8042 a retroactive application since both courts passed upon petitioner's case only
under the aegis of the Labor Code. The proceedings before the trial court and the appellate court did
not violate the prohibition against ex post facto law nor involved a retroactive application of R.A. No.
8042 in any way.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution dated 28
November 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 135080 November 28, 2007

ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, for and in behalf of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, Petitioner,
vs.
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., RAFAEL A. SISON, ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, BENJAMIN BAROT,
CASIMIRO TANEDO, J.V. DE OCAMPO, ALICIA L. REYES, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR., BIENVENIDO R.
TANTOCO, SR., FRANCIS B. BANES, ERNESTO M. CARINGAL, ROMEO V. JACINTO, and MANUEL D.
TANGLAO, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee), through Atty.
Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador), filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the
October 9, 1997 Resolution1 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428, dismissing the criminal
complaint against respondents on ground of prescription, and the July 27, 1998 Order2 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, which reads:

WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that "Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest";

WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "The right of the state to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel";

WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, and other forms of financial
accommodations granted, directly or indirectly, by government-owned and controlled bank or financial
institutions, at the behest, command, or urging by previous government officials to the disadvantage
and detriment of the Philippines government and the Filipino people;

ACCORDINGLY, an "Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS" is hereby created to be

composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential
 Commission on Good Government - Chairman

The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman

Representative from the

Office of the Executive Secretary - Member

Representative from the

Department of Finance - Member

Representative from the

Department of Justice - Member

Representative from the

Development Bank of the Philippines - Member

Representative from the

Philippine National Bank - Member

Representative from the

Asset Privatization Trust - Member

Government Corporate Counsel - Member

Representative from the

Philippine Export and Foreign

Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member

The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:

1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers
and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the
loans or who influenced the grant thereof;

2. Identify the borrowers who were granted "friendly waivers," as well as the government
officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers;

3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those loans, and
to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the
date hereof.

The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency,
instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such
assistance as it may need in the discharge of its functions.3
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were
subsequently expanded, viz.:

WHEREAS, among the underlying purposes for the creation of the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans is to facilitate the collection and recovery of defaulted loans owing government-owned
and controlled banking and/or financing institutions;

WHEREAS, this end may be better served by broadening the scope of the fact-finding mission of the
Committee to include all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-behest loans;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
power vested in me by law, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. The Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans shall include in its investigation, inventory,
and study, all non-performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-behest loans:

The following criteria may be utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan:

1. It is under-collateralized;

2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;

3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes;

4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;

5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;

6. Use of corporate layering;

7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and

8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.

Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both may involve
civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability.4

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan transactions
between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).

After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the Committee
determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order
No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President Ferdinand
Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was
granted.
Specifically, the investigation revealed that in 1978, PEMI applied for a foreign currency loan and bank
investment on its preferred shares with DBP. The loan application was approved on April 25, 1979 per
Board Resolution (B/R) No. 1297, but the loan was never released because PEMI failed to comply with
the conditions imposed by DBP. To accommodate PEMI, DBP subsequently adopted B/R No. 2315 dated
June 1980, amending B/R No. 1297, authorizing the release of PEMI’s foreign currency loan proceeds,
and even increasing the same. Per B/R No. 95 dated October 16, 1980, PEMI was granted a foreign
currency loan of $19,680,267.00 or ₱146,601,979.00, and it was released despite non-compliance with
the conditions imposed by DBP. The Committee claimed that the loan had no sufficient collaterals and
PEMI had no sufficient capital at that time because its acquired assets were only valued at
₱72,045,700.00, and its paid up capital was only ₱46,488,834.00.

Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr., Rafael A. Sison;
Rolando M. Zosa; Cesar C. Zalamea; Benjamin Barot, Casimiro Tanedo, J.V. de Ocampo, Bienvenido R.
Tantoco, Jr., Francis B. Banes, Ernesto M. Caringal, Romeo V. Jacinto, Manuel D. Tanglao and Alicia Ll.
Reyes.5

After considering the Committee’s allegation, the Ombudsman handed down the assailed
Resolution,6 dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed
with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint holding that the
offenses charged had already prescribed, viz.:

[W]hile apparently, PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the subject loans were entered into; the
financial accommodations were undercollateralized at the time they were granted; the stockholders and
officers of the borrower corporation are identified cronies of then President Marcos; and the release of
the said loans was made despite non-compliance by PEMI of the conditions attached therewith, which
consequently give a semblance that the subject Foreign Currency Loans are indeed Behest Loans, the
prosecution of the offenses charged cannot, at this point, prosper on grounds of prescription.

It bears to stress that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as originally enacted, provides that the prescriptive
period for violations of the said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10) years. Subsequently, BP 195, enacted on
March 16, 1982, amended the period of prescription from ten (10) years to fifteen (15) years

Moreover as enunciated in [the] case of People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, the computation of
the prescriptive period of a crime violating a special law like R.A. 3019 is governed by Act No. 3326
which provides, thus:

xxxx

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp., 50, ruled
that when there is nothing which was concealed or needed to be discovered because the entire series of
transactions were by public instruments, the period of prescription commenced to run from the date
the said instrument were executed.

The aforesaid principle was further elucidated in the cases of People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241,
1992, and People vs. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521, 1990, where the Supreme Court pronounced that when the
transactions are contained in public documents and the execution thereof gave rise to unlawful acts, the
violation of the law commences therefrom. Thus, the reckoning period for purposes of prescription shall
begin to run from the time the public instruments came into existence.

In the case at bar, the subject financial accommodations were entered into by virtue of public
documents (e.g., notarized contracts, board resolutions, approved letter-request) during the period of
1978 to 1981 and for purposes of computing the prescriptive period, the aforementioned principles in
the Dinsay, Villalon and Sandiganbayan cases will apply. Records show that the complaint was referred
and filed with this Office on October 4, 1996 or after the lapse of more than fifteen (15) years from the
violation of the law. [Deductibly] therefore, the offenses charged had already prescribed or forever
barred by Statute of Limitations.

It bears mention that the acts complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2,
1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the (sic) Section
11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.

Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978 and 1981 transpired
at the time when there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or categorizing
them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.

To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under
Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was
issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans.
Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses
committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Wilensky V. Fields, Fla, 267 So 2dl, 5, held
that "an ex-post facto law is defined as a law which provides for infliction of punishment upon a person
for an act done which when it was committed, was innocent."7

Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended that the instant case be
DISMISSED.

SO RESOLVED.8

The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.

Hence, this petition positing these issues:

 A. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS COMPLAINT.

B. WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE
EX-POST FACTO LAW[S].9

The Court shall deal first with the procedural issue.

Commenting on the petition, Tantoco, Reyes, Mapa, Zalamea and Caringal argued that the petition
suffers from a procedural infirmity which warrants its dismissal. They claimed that the PCGG availed of
the wrong remedy in elevating the case to this Court.

Indeed, what was filed before this Court is a petition captioned as Petition for Review on Certiorari. We
have ruled, time and again, that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper mode by which
resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reviewed by this Court.
The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65,10 not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we will treat this petition as one filed
under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature
given by the parties, determine the nature of the action.11 In previous rulings, we have treated
differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice,
equity, and fair play.12

Having resolved the procedural issue, we proceed to the merits of the case.

As the Committee puts it, the issues to be resolved are: (i) whether or not the offenses subject of its
criminal complaint have prescribed, and (ii) whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.

The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,13 thus:

[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day
of such commission.14

The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Ombudsman Desierto,15 wherein the Court explained:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution
that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could
not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no
person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.16

This is now a well-settled doctrine which the Court has applied in subsequent cases involving the PCGG
and the Ombudsman.17

Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, and since
discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was
created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.

Even the Ombudsman, in its Manifestation & Motion (In Lieu of Comment),18 conceded that the
prescriptive period commenced from the date the Committee discovered the crime, and not from the
date the loan documents were registered with the Register of Deeds. As a matter of fact, it requested
that the record of the case be referred back to the Ombudsman for a proper evaluation of its merit.

Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting
punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when done.

The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be
declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.19 Even this Court does not
decide a question of constitutional dimension, unless that question is properly raised and presented in
an appropriate case and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota presented.201âwphi1

Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,21 where the petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion
to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law.
The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject
administrative and memorandum orders.

In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post
facto laws.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates
a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.22 This Court added two (2)
more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.23

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of
penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.24 The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the
shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out
penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of
reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis
for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.

One final note. Respondents Mapa and Zalamea, in their respective comments, moved for the dismissal
of the case against them. Mapa claims that he was granted transactional immunity from all PCGG-
initiated cases,25 while Zalamea denied participation in the approval of the subject loans.26 The
arguments advanced by Mapa and Zalamea are matters of defense which should be raised in their
respective counter-affidavits. Since the Ombudsman erroneously dismissed the complaint on ground of
prescription, respondents’ respective defenses were never passed upon during the preliminary
investigation. Thus, the complaint should be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of
its merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of Ombudsman
in OMB-0-96-2428, are SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an
evaluation of the merits of the complaint against the herein respondents.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Acting Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, Jr., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO
RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, Jr., and
ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa – the victim in this case – on 10 February
1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.1 Due in large part to the brave efforts of his
mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death.
This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage members from making
hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.3 Moreover, the
law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the
conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.4

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.5 Within a year of his
death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged – those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University
of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.6

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation
of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice
system – "[N]o act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so by law."7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are
called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly
based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.

Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and
178080 (Villa v. Escalona).

Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)8 and the trial court,9 are as follows:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera,
Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then
subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to
the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs;
the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical
pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain
and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He
had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25. Adel Abas (Abas)

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)

4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11 On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.12

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the
26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.13 A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment,
or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.14

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court
in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De

Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of ₱ 30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱
50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱ 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.16 Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
9015318 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.19

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before
this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The
Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002
in CA-G.R. No. 15520 – first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt.20

While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death
of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel
thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the
death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 – Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA’s Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.21 Petitioner sets forth two
main issues – first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court’s forfeiture of
his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not
apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused."22

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon’s right to present evidence
during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused,
Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right
should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He
argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was
ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.

Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the
other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil
motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity.
He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites
"decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling…."24 Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows
inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny’s death."25 The Solicitor General
purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the
victim."26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lenny’s
father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon’s father, since the latter did not have a car, and
their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the
alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were
only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte – witness
Marquez – who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up…."27

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for
Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned
that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent
the latter’s chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a
sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is
contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victim’s well-being.

G.R. No. 154954 – People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated 10 January 2002
and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.)
and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.28 According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time
Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch
as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the
victim’s death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.29 The said article provides: "Criminal liability
shall be incurred… [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended."

Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor
General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
setting aside the trial court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the
accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 – Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA’s
Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and
90153.30 The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.

Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca,
Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340)
to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall
have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused
recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.

Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely,
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy
trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for
the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the
appellate court.

We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

Issues

1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process;

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;

3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;

4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

Discussion

Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took
note of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the
service of personal or imprisonment penalties,31while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,32 including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto).33 However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict
survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.34
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal
and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accused-
petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.35 The
Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have
not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their
evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be
construed as waiver to present evidence."36

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client –
Antonio General – would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.37 Because of this development and
pursuant to the trial court’s Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial
court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date – 25 August 1993 – instead of his
originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September
1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address
the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a
previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally
assigned to his clients.39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the
Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of
Court.40 Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a
waiver of that right.41

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court
forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993
hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not
supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that
he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask
for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present
evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating
the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.

The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.42 Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused … shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel…" This constitutional right includes the right to
present evidence in one’s defense,43 as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at
every stage of the proceedings.44

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense’s presentation of
evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in
the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division and upon the agreement of the
parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to
attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he
had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterday’s and today’s
scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus:

Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo’s non-
appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such
date only and not for the succeeding trial dates…

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver
of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear
and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily
waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed
the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called
upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right
to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of
another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally
in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned.
The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without
even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the
court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.46 (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993
as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of
counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused – General – had made a last-minute
adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not
scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for
the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done
was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizon’s testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all
his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present
evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce
an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.47 In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have
adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty
verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence on record.48
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar.
Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either
the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by
accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what
he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the
CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that
"all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the
initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."49 He even argues that "Dizon did not
request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned."50

For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to
another – at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the
reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case
has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary
to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been
dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She
points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against
them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-
accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to
Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not
be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may
require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals."51

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements
of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause
or justifiable motive.54 In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case.55 The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.56 Also to be considered
are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice
wrought upon the defendant.57

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the
accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.58 As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of
the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.59 As we have previously
discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.60 The rule on double
jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the
correctness thereof.61 Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of
jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.62

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held
thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors contributed
to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:

xxx xxx xxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecution’s
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the
same.

xxx xxx xxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of
the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been
utterly violated in this case x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact
that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution,
through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of
Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated
by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of
the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even
until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it
was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x
x x.

xxx xxx xxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by
both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the
case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.63(Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.64 On 29 November
1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.67 Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in
Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the
delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him;
and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the
instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade
already.68 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show
that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the
effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a
person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in
any other manner without the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again be charged with the
same or an identical offense.69 This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.70 It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England
and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.71 It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the
Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the
citizen,72 viz:

Article III – Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides
as follows:73

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse
the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same
Rules.74 The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or
information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the defendant’s express consent.75

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately
final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction,
from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty."76 We further stressed that
"an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal."77

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the
accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1)
where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process;78 (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion.80

The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.81 Here, the party asking for the review must show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent
and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.83 In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal
of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries,
both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were
denied due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b)
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioner’s Comment x x x."85 Allegedly, the CA
ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.86 The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well
as the appreciation of Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing.87

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion
cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence.89 Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant to the rule
on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted
fraternity members.

We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug – the four
fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state
seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.91 We have also recognized, however, that
certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.92 The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.

In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned
thus:

Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by
the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical
punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there
can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance
required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the
category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for
labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same
manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof
of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries
[People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is
constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are
only slight and not serious, in nature.93 (Emphasis supplied and citations included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa94 in finding that the four accused should be
held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there
can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance
required."95 The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the
accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victim’s injuries neither caused
incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.96Furthermore, he did not die.97 His injuries were
not even serious.98 Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries
and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.

On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely
for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four
accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such
initiation rites on the person of Villa."99 It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officer’s findings that the
antecedent cause of Lenny Villa’s death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the
initiation rites.100 Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa
was] serious in nature,"101 it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight
physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences
of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have
committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the
death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

The CA’s application of the legal framework governing physical injuries – punished under Articles 262 to
266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies – is therefore tantamount to a
whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to
the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be
based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246
to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned
provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with
each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death
occurs.102

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of themselves,
caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of the
victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,103 the only logical conclusion is that
criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated
in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to
suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due
course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional
infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article
4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.104

The CA modified the trial court’s finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no
conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing
during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused – Victorino et al. – were acquitted;
4 of them – Tecson et al. – were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 – Dizon and
Villareal – were found guilty of homicide.

The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a
felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with,
the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man – driven by his own desire to
join a society of men – pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals,
just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such
situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying
concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations
widely known as hazing.

Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.105 The classical theory posits that a
human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and
evil.106 It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free
will appears unimpaired.107 The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational
and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and
pain.108 They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of
possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.109 Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free
will and moral blame of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea – defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.111 Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits.112 In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of dolo or "malice."113

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.115 The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality
of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.116 The last element,
intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.117

The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying
an act, especially a forbidden act.118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a
person proceeds.119It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns
the result of the act.120 While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.121 On the other hand,
the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose.122 With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must
refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act.
Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus – that the act or omission be
done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought."123 The
maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.124 As is required of the other elements of a felony, the
existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.125

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code – which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" – is to be interpreted to
refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement"
connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is
unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design.126 Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack
of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.127 Verily, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by
means of culpa.128
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires
the existence of malice or dolo130 immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.131 Intent to kill – or animus interficendi – cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.132Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.134

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that, throughout history,
hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups to
indigenous tribes.136 Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during
which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.137 It is
believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,138 where young men recruited into the
military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare
the recruits for battle.139 Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of
ancient Greek civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a
"tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to
the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.141

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.142 The neophyte
period is usually one to two semesters long.143 During the "program," neophytes are required to
interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand
the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the
organization’s activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization,
and its active and alumni members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to
involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.145

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for
admission to an organization.146 In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" – or
any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person – is generally placed in
embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks
or activities.147 It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the organization.148 These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.149

The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our
national hero – Andres Bonifacio – organized a secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang
Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and
Daughters of the Nation).150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be
inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic
Church.151 The Katipunan’s ideology was brought home to each member through the society’s initiation
ritual.152 It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and
were asked a series of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. 153 They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon."154 It
would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to
endure a "matalas na punyal."155 As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to
sign membership papers with the his own blood.156

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the
late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States
was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.

Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting
physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable
foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.157 In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved
in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point.158

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the
shriner’s hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.159 The ritual
involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."160 It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which
the candidate was required to climb.161Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses
and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.162

In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen
performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte
paratroopers’ chests.163 The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the
spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.164

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi
invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.165 The fraternity members subjected the
pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and
the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy
book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to
the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in
the air and dropped them to the ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges through a
seven-station circle of physical abuse.167

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of the
Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.168 The hazing included the following: (1) having
to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and
vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits
and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce,
mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such
as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7)
"running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a
hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.169

In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim – Sylvester Lloyd – was accepted to
pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.170 He participated in initiation
activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.171

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing
activities during the fraternity’s initiation rites.172 Kenner and the other initiates went through
psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.173

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones – a university student in Florida – sought initiation into the campus
chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174 The pledge’s efforts to
join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together
with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.175 In
these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60
canings on his buttocks.176 During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The pledges
sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other candidates
passed out.179

The purported raison d’être behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the
pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.180 Some organizations even
believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to
establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the
organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit d’corp
associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.182

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.183 The hazing
of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of
military hazing, harmful or not.184 It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom."185

However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt
Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact
legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or
civil statutes proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and
carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.188 Only a few states with anti-
hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.189

Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great
bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a
term of not less than one year and not more than three years.191 Indiana criminal law provides that a
person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to
a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192

The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.193 As an element of a
Class C felony – criminal recklessness – resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category
of "serious bodily injury."194 A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of
between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.195 Pursuant to
Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the
student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.196 A Class C felony provides
for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.197

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.198 An individual adjudged guilty of
a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or
not less than 180 days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a
third-degree felony.200 A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to
imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.201 West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing
would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties
provided therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of
another.203 A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10
years, or both.204

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
statute.205 This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballou’s
family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South
Carolina until 1994.206

The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The presence of an ex ante situation – in this case, fraternity initiation rites – does not automatically
amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that
the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind – whether or not there is a contextual background or
factual premise – they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that – with the exception of
Villareal and Dizon – accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or
intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.

As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on
him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated
by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father’s parking space had been stolen by
the victim’s father.207 As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido
Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareal’s brother.208 The CA then
ruled as follows:

The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil
and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa,
appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held
liable for the crime of homicide.209(Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence
of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were
made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquez’s testimony:

Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi’s] room and we were briefed as to what to expect
during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were
also told about the fraternity song, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi’s] house and we were made to ride a van and we
were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda,
sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion Patay ka" and
the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks uttered
upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were the
voices or utterances that you heard?

Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of the van
which lasted for 5 minutes?

xxx xxx xxx

Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there any
utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging others who
were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed
looking us being pounded, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?

Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya
pa niyan."

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not really
pin point who uttered those words, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say that and I
quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of justifying him
in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then
after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his father stole the parking space of
my father," sir. So, that’s why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family have his
brother killed, what was your response?

Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he said that I
knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those
words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father stole the
parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?

Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx

Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villa’s father
was made?

Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny Villa’s
turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villa’s father?

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa’s thighs and sometime he stand up and he kicked
his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that accusations
made by Dizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this Honorable Court what
exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in
particular?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family who had
his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story that he
made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And
another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I
was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez, Marquez,
ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa
akin," sir.

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness That’s all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came around as
promised to you earlier?

Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there was a
briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect during the
initiation, did I hear you right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
initiation?

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked at, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the bruises
would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves, it
would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body but that
will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create
bruises to your body?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is psychological
in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning body
contact, is that correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare you,
correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify
you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?

Witness Sometimes sir, yes.

Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was supposed to
have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was an
NPA, do you remember saying that?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did not
believe him because that is not true, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have mentioned
before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things was
because he wanted to inflict injury.

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?

Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation by all
the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something
similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.

Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run on your
thighs, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only on you
but also on the other neophytes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered by one
master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another master
on the other neophyte, this is correct?

Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal
were "baseless,"213 since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation
calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as
testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part
of ‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites."214

We agree with the Solicitor General.

The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the
part of the CA – it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be
tolerated, especially because it was the CA’s primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill
Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to
Bienvenido Marquez’s testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations"
against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to
by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez’s] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez,
"[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa’s thighs
while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the testimony clarified,
we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.

As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and
contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness
Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological
pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They
heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi
ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that
effect.215 While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the former’s purported
NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villa’s father for stealing the parking space of Dizon’s father.
According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part
of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling
make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could "justify"
giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of
the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate
deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:

Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on why
we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."

xxx xxx xxx

So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or
neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian
roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his
desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a noose
on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth
floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several
times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building – these
are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or
fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in
some mental aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want
to prevent.217(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of
the fraternity’s psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether
the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the
veracity of Dizon’s threats. The testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view.
According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up…."218 Even the
trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative
acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part
of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."219 The Solicitor General shares the same view.

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should
not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.220 Instead, we adopt and
reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had
the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.221

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa.
Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused
fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code,222 the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in
se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical
integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions
are.223

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v.
People,225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and
thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In
reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus:
"Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility … [w]e are persuaded that she did not do
what she had done with criminal intent … the means she actually used was moderate and that she was
not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then
ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her
pupil." In People v. Carmen,226 the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of
Our Lady of Fatima – under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" – plunged the head of the victim into a
barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the
side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling through those
means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim.
Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability for murder under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.

Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused’s initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that
malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.227 What
persons do is the best index of their intention.228We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind
of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the
intent of the perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding
the death of Lenny Villa.

Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites,
they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the
whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were
subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the
"Auxies’ Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes’ arms and legs.

In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play
rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Late
in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals were
officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
"traditional" ritual – paddling by the fraternity.

During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected
the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to
inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.230 It was their regular duty to stop foul or
excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to
tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.

These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent.231 A few days before the "rites," he asked both his
parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that Lenny would go through an
initiation process and would be gone for three days.233 The CA found as follows:

It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the
initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given
briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such as
mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation
would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to
quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told
him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for his part,
admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden paddle
would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs…. Indeed, there can be no
fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.234 (Emphasis supplied)

Even after going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent,
we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the
specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done
voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in
the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to
tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of
Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation
rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which
were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict
injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation
of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of
malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of
"traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different
treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common
crimes.235 The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be
determined by Lenny’s continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even
after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:

Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical
injuries.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape
or acts of lasciviousness.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime
of hazing?

Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any
association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or
results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association
can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held
criminally liable.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death,
et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may
be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are
already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

Senator Lina. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let
us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a
wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the
act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities;
that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities
do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even
committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute
this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga
silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito
na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung
maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho
iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay
kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the
death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or
deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the
crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having
to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And
even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a
new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to
the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I
am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of
what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that
their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain.
Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters
or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or
maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime
of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if
they are separate offenses.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy or not anymore?

Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?

Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.

Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.

Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include
sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:

Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of
the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or without consent.

To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another
individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase "without
consent" for purposes of this section.

Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going
to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because
the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a
fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the consent of the
intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the
crime of hazing.

This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation which
may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless
of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and
therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that
there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity,
so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the
perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite
and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do
their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if
they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is
not something that the State should prohibit.

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered
into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the
neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the
neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of
the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill,
because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He
accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by
itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates
the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the
act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Lina. Thank you very much.

The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none;
the same is approved.237

(Emphasis supplied)

Realizing the implication of removing the state’s burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal
author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there
it is mala inse or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to
go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.238(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto.
Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma
faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing – unique as against typical crimes – cast a
cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at
the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny’s parents would not have consented239 to his participation in
Aquila Fraternity’s initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.

Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation’s very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of … hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing – or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering – has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law,
there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony.
And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial
court’s finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of
hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.242 In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an
act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack
of foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly
visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.246

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.247 If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.249 It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."250 The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.251

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic
injuries.252The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump
and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.253 In the present case, the victim’s heart
could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and
oxygen.254 The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory
system – including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries – to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of
Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.255 The multiple hematomas
were wide, thick, and deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained
by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.257 Repeated blows to those areas caused
the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly
diminished as to produce death. 258 The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas,
intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were
pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.259 It was concluded that
there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac
arrest or disease.260

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa’s arms and thighs, resulting from repeated
blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These
hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity.
According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed,
stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.261 They were also "paddled" at
the back of their thighs or legs;262 and slapped on their faces.263 They were made to play rough
basketball.264 Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine."265 The NBI
medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple
injuries suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:

Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of defense
counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously
marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not cause the death of the victim.
The question I am going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries
marked from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car
would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to interpret all those
injuries in whole and not in part.267

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the
initiation rites.268

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which
made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to
their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we rule
that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal
officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of
physical injuries.

It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least
mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity – accused Dizon and Villareal – restrained themselves
from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records
would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites – having in
mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities – the implication of the presence of alumni should be
seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members
were intoxicated during Lenny’s initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative
consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that
would increase the applicable penalties.

It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly – or unwittingly –impose the misery of hazing and
employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship."
A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the
benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.270 Another initiate did not give up, because he
feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.271 Thus, for
Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving
consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.

Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then,
these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable
by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when
Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found
that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.’s individual participation
in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.273As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was
totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-
Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical
injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

The accused liable to pay damages

The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of ₱ 50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and ₱ 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused
Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of ₱ 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid
by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.1âwphi1

Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.274 In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CA’s award of indemnity in the amount of ₱
50,000.

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.276 Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting
them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or
proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for
actual damages.277

The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victim’s
death.278This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."279 Thus, we hereby we affirm the
CA’s award of moral damages in the amount of ₱ 1,000,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 –
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under
Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly
and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ₱ 50,000, and
moral damages in the amount of ₱ 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact
of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 187912-14 January 31, 2011

JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5th DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Through this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,1 petitioner Joey P.
Marquez (Marquez) assails the 1] February 11, 2009 Resolution2 of the 5th Division of the
Sandiganbayan (SB-5th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905; and its 2] May 20, 2009
Resolution3 denying his motion for reconsideration.

In the assailed issuances, the SB-5th Division denied Marquez’s Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence
for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

From the records, it appears that as a result of the Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions and
Walis Ting-ting for the City of Parañaque for the years 1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special Audit
Team of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were discovered involving Marquez, then
City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee of Parañaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan
(Caunan), Head of the General Services Office of said city.

It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan secured
the procurement of several thousand rounds of bullets of different calibers that were grossly overpriced
from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and ammunitions dealer with either the
Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI).

Finding the transactions anomalous, the COA Special Audit Team issued Notices of Disallowances for the
overpriced ammunitions. Marquez and Caunan sought reconsideration of the findings of the team, but
their plea was denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the COA but their appeal was denied.

At the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), in answer to the charges filed against them, Marquez and
Caunan filed their Joint Counter Affidavit4 with the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of
said office. In the said affidavit, the two insisted on the propriety of the transactions and raised the
pendency of their appeal with the COA.
Having found probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
the OMB, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed three (3) informations5 against
Marquez and Caunan. The cases were raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB-4th
Division).

Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez sought
referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI and the
reinvestigation of the cases against him.6 These were denied by the OSP.

Before the SB-4th Division, to prove its case, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: 1]
COA State Auditor IV Fatima Valera Bermudez; 2] Elenita Pracale, Chief, Business Permit and Licensing
Office, Parañaque City; 3] Benjamin Cruz; 4] P/Insp. Rolando C. Columna, Legal Officer, PNP Firearms and
Explosive Division; and 5] Emerito L. Lejano, President, Guns Empire. Documentary evidence consisting
of disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests were also adduced.

On January 13, 2006, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence consisting of Exhibits "A" to
"FFFF," and their sub-markings. All of the evidence offered were admitted by the anti-graft court on
March 22, 2006.

After the prosecution rested, Caunan testified and partly presented evidence for her defense.

Marquez, on the other hand, in his Omnibus Motion dated April 1, 2008, moved, among others, for the
inhibition of Associate Justice Gregory Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate Justice Jose Hernandez (Justice
Hernandez) and for the referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization to
the NBI. Associate Justice Hernandez and Associate Justice Ong inhibited themselves but the request of
Marquez that the questioned documents be referred to the NBI was not acted upon.

On May 20, 2008, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez recused themselves from further participating in
the cases. The cases were then raffled to the SB-5th Division.

Thereafter, on July 4, 2008, Marquez filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for
Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. In his
motion, he again insisted that his purported signatures on the vouchers were forged.

By way of Comment/Opposition to the motion, the prosecution argued that its documentary exhibits
had already been formally offered in January 2006 and had been duly admitted by the anti-graft court.
The prosecution added that, when confronted with the questioned transactions during the COA audit
investigation, Marquez never raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he insisted on the propriety of the
transactions. He did not claim forgery either when he filed his Joint Counter-Affidavit with the OMB.
Also, in his verified Motion for Reconsideration dated May 29, 2003 and Supplemental Motion dated
July 1, 2003 filed with the COA, no allegation of forgery was made.

The prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court7 and posited that since
Marquez alleged in his pleadings that he had relied on the competence of his subordinates, there could
be no "palpable mistake," thus, he was estopped from alleging that his signatures on the subject
documents were forged. The prosecution accused Marquez of filing the motion merely to delay the
proceedings.8
In his Reply, Marquez insisted that he never admitted that his signatures on the disbursement vouchers,
purchase requests and authorization requests were his and that his motion was not intended to delay
the proceedings.

In its Rejoinder, the prosecution reiterated its earlier arguments and added that Caunan testified and
identified the signatures of Marquez in the subject vouchers. It further noted that Marquez moved to
refer the documents to the NBI only two and a half (2 ½) years after the formal offer of said documents.

In the subject February 11, 2009 Resolution, the anti-graft court denied the motion of Marquez. Citing
Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,9 it was of the view that while resort to the expert opinion of
handwriting experts would be helpful in the examination of alleged forged documents, the same was
neither mandatory nor indispensable, since the court can determine forgery from its own independent
examination.

The motion for reconsideration of Marquez was likewise denied.

Aggrieved, Marquez interposed this petition for certiorari raising this lone

ISSUE

THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN - 5th DIVISION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS
RESOLUTIONS RESPECTIVELY DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 AND MAY 20, 2009 DENYING THE
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO REFER PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE FOR EXAMINATION BY THE
QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS SECTION OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WHICH
DENIAL IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND HIS TWIN CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.

Those availing of the remedy of certiorari must clearly show that the trial court acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By grave abuse
of discretion, it means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In
sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical
exercise of power.10

Such circumstance exists in this case.

One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due process,
which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one’s defense. Under
Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that:

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
 nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis supplied)

In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court
or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the
accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.

While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it
means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are
to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable
opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is
warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.

In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the disbursement
vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery
cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence11 and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging forgery.12

Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures were
indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity
to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative force – the NBI. If he is
denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is
generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other examination result because the
signatures are on the original documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft
court.

At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court. It will still be subject to its
scrutiny and evaluation in line with Section 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be
deprived of his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the court, perceives his
defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he
should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not control how he will
defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules.

Contrary to the assertion of the prosecution, this move of Marquez is not a mere afterthought to delay
the prosecution of the case. From the records, it appears that as early as November 24, 2003, even
before arraignment, upon his alleged discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez already sought
referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI and
reinvestigation of the cases against him.13 At that stage, his plea was already denied by the OSP.

Apparently, he did not abandon his quest. In his Omnibus Motion dated April 1, 2008 filed with the SB-
4th Division, Marquez did not only move for the inhibition of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, but also
moved for the referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization to the NBI.
Since the latter was not acted upon, he filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for
Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation reiterating
his plea, this time with the SB-5th Division.

If this case has been delayed, it is because of the denial of the simple request of Marquez. If it was
granted in the first instance, the trial of the case would have proceeded smoothly and would have been
over by now. If the Court were to deny this petition and Marquez would be convicted for having failed to
prove forgery, he could not be prevented from crying that he was prevented from presenting evidence
in his defense.

The fact that Marquez did not raise this issue with the COA is immaterial and irrelevant.1âwphi1 His
failure or omission to do so may affect the appreciation and weight of his defense, but it should not bar
him from insisting on it during his turn to adduce evidence.

In denying said motion, the SB-5th Division offered no valid explanation other than the fact that, being
the trial court, it may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the
documentary evidence. While it is true that the appreciation of whether the signatures of Marquez are
genuine or not is subject to the discretion of the graft court, this discretion, by the very nature of things,
may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court.14 Only after evidence is
offered and admitted that the court can appreciate and evaluate it. The prosecution had already offered
its evidence on the matter. The court should not deny the same right to the defense.

The fact that the documentary exhibits were already formally offered and duly admitted by the anti-
graft court cannot preclude an examination of the signatures thereon by the defense. With proper
handling by court personnel, this can easily be accomplished by the NBI expert examiners.

In the conduct of its proceedings, a court is given discretion in maintaining the delicate balance between
the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State
to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other. Indeed, both the State and the accused are
entitled to due process. However, the exercise of such discretion must be exercised judiciously, bearing
in mind the circumstances of each case, and the interests of substantial justice.

Thus, for having denied Marquez the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence of his choice in
his defense, the SB-5th Division committed grave abuse of discretion warranting intervention from the
Court. The anti-graft court should allow him to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned
Documents Section of the NBI for examination at the soonest time possible and for the latter to
immediately conduct such examination and to submit the results to the court within a reasonable time.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11, 2009 and May 20, 2009 Resolutions of the 5th
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to allow the petitioner Joey P.
Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned Documents Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination as soon as possible and, after submission of the results to the
court and proper proceedings, to act on the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice