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People vs Felipe A.

GR No. L-6201; 20 April 1954


Felipe A. Livera was a provincial disbursing officer of the Constabulary in Roblon. As finance and
accountable officer, he took charge of paying the salaries and subsistence of the PC officers and
enlisted men of that region. On July 22, 1948, he came to Manila carrying some money, and, having
secured a Treasury Warrant from the finance officer at Camp Crame for more than P8,000, he
cashed the same. In November, 1948, an examination of his accounts was conducted by Major
Emilio Baldia, Chief of the Cash Examination and Inspection Branch of the Finance Service, who
found him with a net shortage of P9,597 unaccounted for. Days afterwards, a board of officers was
created formally to investigate the appellant. That board found him accountable for P9,597, and
recommended his prosecution before the civil courts for malversation of public funds. In Felipe
Livera’s defense, he admitted his financial liability but asserted that he had lost the money in Manila
on his way to North Harbor to board a vessel for Romblon. Counsel for the appellant also contends
that the CFI of Romblon had no jurisdiction over the case, arguing that that the alleged crime of
malversation of public funds occurred during the incumbency of the accused as an officer of the
Philippine Contabulary, and questions the constitutionality of Art. 217 of the RPC.

1. W/N the CFI of Romblon has jurisdiction over the case
2. W/N Art. 217 is unconstitutional


1. No merit. The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed
by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of military law and the public law. The first court to take
cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the other. The accused-appellant having been first
tried and convicted of the crime by the Court of First Instance of Romblon he cannot now claim that
the criminal action should have been brought before a court-martial.

2. No merit. There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience
of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of

Wherefore, as this appellant is guilty of malversation of public funds and as the penalty imposed on
him accords with the law, we hereby affirm the judgment with costs against him. So ordered.
Arsenia Garcia vs Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al.
GR No. 157171; 14 March 2016

On May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during in the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, Election Officer Arsenia Garcia, together with Romero, Viray and other Board
of Canvassers of Alaminos, conspiring together, willfully and unlawfully decreased the votes received
by senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. from 6,998 votes (as clearly disclosed in the total
number of votes in 159 precincts) to 1,921 votes.
During the trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed one who announced the
figure 1921 instead of 6998, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity
as the secretary of the board. Petitioner also admitted that she was the one who prepare the COC,
though it was not her task.
The trial court sentenced Garcia with indeterminate sentence and is to suffer disqualification to
hold public office. She is also deprived of her right of suffrage. Petitioner appealed before the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum penalty of 6 months to one year.

1. W/N the violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is under mala in se or mala prohibita

Mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code, while Mala Prohibita are
those deemed inherently immoral, even punished by special law. Section 27(b) of RA No. 6646
provides that Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases or decreases the votes received by the candidate in any election or any member of the
board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes. Clearly, the acts prohibited in the said RA are mala in se. Criminal intent is
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes.

The instant petition is denied. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s
conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year of six months is affirmed.
Hector Treñas vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 195002; 25 January 2012

In 1999, Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City. It was then mortgaged
with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended Hector Treñas to Elizabeth, who
was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the name of
Margarita. Hector informed Elizabeth of the expenses for the titling of the property. Thereafter,
Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt and prepared a Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt
worth P120,000. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were
fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the
P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. Hector issued in
favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from
P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. When the check was deposited with the PCI Bank,
Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
An information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which
rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA,
which also rendered a decision affirming that of the RTC.
Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that
₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile,
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in
Iloilo City. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to
him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any
direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things
happened according to the ordinary course of nature.


Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Ruling + Ratio:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein
by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed
by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed.

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution
to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the
documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its
elements, was committed.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city has no
jurisdiction over the case.

The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITION: There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of
that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
Raffy Brodeth, et. al. vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 197849; 29 November 2017

On 16 August 2001, petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court with violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. The charges against petitioners stemmed from an affidavit-complaint filed by Abraham G.
Villegas (Villegas), the Operations Manager of Vill Integrated Transportation Corporation. He alleged
that in the course of his company's operations, he transacted with Land & Sea Resources Phils. (L&S
Resources), Inc. by providing the latter equipment and tugboats for its own operations. After the
execution of the service contracts, L&S Resources started using the equipment and tugboats, and
even made partial payments to Vill Integrated. However, L&S Resources had not fully paid all of Vill
Integrated's billings and its officers only made promises to settle them but never did.

According to Villegas, among the payments made by L&S Resources were three (3) checks drawn
against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). Two (2) out of these three (3)
checks, are the subject checks in the instant case. When the subject checks were deposited to Vill
Integrated's account, they were dishonored as they were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF).

On 9 October 1999, and on 3 May 2000, due to L&S Resources' growing outstanding balance, its
refusal to comply with continued demand for payment, and on account of its checks that bounced, Vill
Integrated sent demand letters to settle the L&S Resources' account.

Despite the demands, L&S Resources did not settle its account; hence, the filing of the criminal
complaint against petitioners.

In his counter-affidavit executed on 8 May 2008, Brodeth alleged that L&S Resources' balance
pertaining to the subject checks were settled in cash duly received by Vill Integrated's officer. But,
only one (1) of the three (3) checks was returned. Upon inquiry, Brodeth was informed that the
outstanding accounts were not the obligations of L&S Resources but of one Noli Dela Cerna. 10 These
allegations were backed up by Onal's letter, explaining that Vill Integrated should bill Noli dela Cerna

Petitioners argue that the MeTC had no jurisdiction because Villegas' allegation that the subject
checks were issued in Manila was unsubstantiated. They explain that the lower courts should not
have relied on this allegation for being hearsay considering that Villegas had no firsthand knowledge
about the transaction between Vill Integrated and L&S Resources.

MeTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense charged.
RTC found no reversible error in the MeTC’s decision and affirmed in toto.
CA denied petitioner’s appeal and emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charges is the
issuance of a bouncing check regardless of the purpose why is was issued.

1. W/N the CA erroneously affirmed reliance on hearsay evidence to establish territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC of Manila

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein
the offense was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients took place. The fact as to
where the offense charged was committed is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or
A court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory, and if the evidence adduced during trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
It is well settled, however, that violations of B.P. [Blg.] 22 cases are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the
court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court-taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
From the foregoing, we can deduce that a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may
be filed and tried either at the place where the check was issued, drawn, delivered, or deposited. In
the present case, however, evidence on record is missing at any of these material places.

Again, the only factual link to the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is the allegation that the subject
checks were issued in Manila. In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the
crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is
not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an
allegation is not evidence and could not' be made equivalent to proof.

All said, since the prosecution failed to prove that the subject checks were issued in Manila nor was
any evidence shown that these were either drawn, delivered, or deposited in Manila, the MeTC has
no factual basis for its territorial jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The 17 May 2011 Decision and the 20 July 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33104 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila. Criminal
Case Nos. 371104-CR & 371105-CR are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Manuel Isip vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 170298; 26 June 2007

Petitioner Manuel Isip was charged with estafa before the RTC of Cavite City, after he
allegedly received from complainant, Atty. Jose, a seven - carat diamond men’s ring valued at P200,
000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the
sale thereof or return the same if not sold. Petitioner denied receiving the jewelry and failed to return
the ring or proceeds of the sale even after repeated demand.
On the other hand, petitioner’s wife, Marietta Isip, was indicted before the same court for 7
counts of Violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) after she issued checks in payment for assorted
pieces of jewelry she received from Atty. Jose which were subsequently dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. The complainant alleged that the foregoing transactions happened at his ancestral house in
Cavite while he was on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs.
In defense, petitioner averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because he and
his wife had transactions with the complainant at the latter’s residence located at Plaza Tower
Condominium in Manila as both of them were also Manila residents. Despite this, the trial court found
them guilty of the said allegations.
Upon appeal to the CA, Marietta Isip died before any decision could have been promulgated
thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability. However, the CA still affirmed Manuel Isip’s
conviction for estafa, hence this appeal.

1. W/N the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense imputed to petitioner and for which he
was convicted.

Yes. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction took place in his home in
Cavite. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove
otherwise. In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that
the transaction happened in Manila due to the following reasons:
a. Even if petitioner lives in Manila and the issued checks were drawn against banks in Manila or
Makati, it still does not prove that the transactions did not happen in Cavite. Distance will not prevent
any person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods he can sell to earn a living.
b. It is settled that when the RTC ’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. The concept of venue of actions in criminal
cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases:
a. The offense should have been committed; or
b. Any one of its essential ingredients should’ve taken place within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense committed outside that territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.

The decision and amended decision of the CA are affirmed.
Union Bank of the Phils., et. al. vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 192565; 28 February 2012

Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was
raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.

In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency".
The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the
Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the
facts do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City
Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case
against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of
the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They
also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction
should be in the place where the false document was presented".

The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v.
Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential
ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to address the
seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.

Issue: Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification was presented to the trial

Held: The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper venue for
the criminal action.
The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183
of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.'
The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The Court
ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art. 183 of the
RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that
time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through
false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
where the testimony under oath is given.

If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither

criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the
sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
People of the Philippines vs Roman Derilo
GR No. 117818; 18 April 1997

Roman Derilo and his company were charged with murder committed by a band before the CFI of
Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information alleges that the accused with treachery and evident
premeditation, with intent to kill, with the use of firearm and bolos, confederated and helped one
another did then and there shot and stabbed one Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting injuries which
caused her death. Only Baldimo was apprehended. In his arraignment he pleaded not guilty which he
later substituted with one of guilty.

I. Whether the plea of guilt of the accused constitutes an admission of all material facts in the
information including the aggravating circumstances alleged

II. Whether the penalty of death can be imposed upon the accused considering the peculiar
antecedents on the application of two penal laws

1. No. Qualifying and aggravating circumstance before being taken into consideration for the
purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty
and clearness as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal offense. It
is not only the central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying
or aggravating circumstance alleged to have been present and to have attended such killing, must
similarly be shown by the same degree of proof. There was no evidence adduced by the prosecution
to prove the supposed evident premeditation. Evident premeditation must be based on external facts
and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning.

As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of procedure, the plea of guilty of an accused
cannot stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for by said Section 3 of
Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the
attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the
prosecution should prove the exact liability of the accused.

2. Although Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Code by imposing a heavier
penalty for murder than that originally prescribed, the new penalty provided in Section 6 of said
amendatory statute being reclusion perpetua to death cannot be applied to the crime of murder
committed in 1982 based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the presumption is
that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied.
Prior thereto, the Constitution took effect and it is clear that any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Appellant, it will be recalled, was sentenced in 1986 to suffer
the death penalty as then provided under the Revised Penal Code. With the ratification of the
Constitution in 1987, that sentence should have been reduced to reclusion perpetua under such
constitutional fiat.
Albino Co vs Court of Appeals, et. al.
GR No. 160776; 18 October 1993

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his
share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to
the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank,
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The check was deposited on January 3,
1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's
conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty
(60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals which later affirmed the decision of the lower court.
This is a petition for certiorari from the appellee under the grounds that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22
or the Anti - Bouncing Check Law. In Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided
as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.
However this was later reversed in administrative circular was subsequently issued on
August 8, 1984.

Whether or not Co is guilty of violating BP 22 at the time of issuance of his check?

No. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983,
some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21,
1987, which the RTC's conviction was relied on, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement
made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
The new circular was delivered after almost one (1) year when Albino Co hand the
"bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
The Court merits this case under the maxims that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to
Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided,"
declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no
compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity,
and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.


The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set
aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with cost de
Neil Suyan vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 189644; 2 July 2014

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to
observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of
revocation of this privilege.


SUYAN was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. He pleaded
guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six years of prision
correctional. He filed his application for probation on the same day. RTC issued a Probation Order
covering a period of six years.

While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both for violations of Section
16 of RA 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him. Because of this, the Chief of the
Parole and Probation Office (ATTY. NAVARRO) recommended the revocation of his probation, citing
recidivism. NAVARRO also pointed out that SUYAN was no longer in a position to comply with the
conditions of his probation, in view of his incarceration.

The RTC ordered the revocation of SUYAN’s probation and directed him to serve his sentence.
SUYAN then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. He argued that he was not accorded
due process. Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. Thus, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.

The Parole and Probation Office filed a Violation Report where it stated that probationer SUYAN
showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drug activities
despite counseling and warning from the Office. The prosecution likewise filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence where it attached a certification from another court that SUYAN has already served his
sentence on the other drug charges against him. SUYAN filed his Comment but did not dispute the

After hearing, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. SUYAN appealed with the CA, but the
same was denied.

1. Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.


Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence
for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct
violation of the condition in his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11 of
the Probation Law. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense
shall render the probation order ineffective.

The Court’s discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.
People of the Philippines vs Roberto Estrada
GR No. 130487; 19 June 2000

In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the SThe cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00
A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the
front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center
of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the
Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant.

Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near
accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap
accused-appellant's hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Mararac was about to strike again when
suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his
left throat that eventually caused his death.

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