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Legal Separation (Art 55-67)

1) Ong vs Ong- Abusive Chinese husband, wife left

Issues: 1) WON Lucita proved the grounds for legal separation

2) WON the abandonment of Lucita is an act of giving grounds for legal separation

Held: 1) Yes

2) No. Abandonment justified

Facts:

-William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila. have three children

- 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
Code..Dagupan City..her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct

- Lucita claimed: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with
physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her

- causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business;

-1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back fromBacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit
her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent
down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the
house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and
brought to their parents house inDagupan;

-RTC and CA- Granted the decree

. She observed that [William] has an “explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very
violent.” She cited several instances which proved that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and
despicably, in words and deeds.

DEFENSE

- William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife

-William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and
ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real
properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio andDagupan,

only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucita’s parents and siblings while such
decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his
reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community

- William expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who
abandoned the conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995
Ratio:

-Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and her
children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the repeated
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner

-, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his
life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the
wrongdoings of their children.[23]

- Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness’s testimony as biased and
unworthy of credence[37] and a witness’ relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect
the veracity of his or her testimony.[38]

- What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at
the expense of her marriage?

-...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of
her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already
beyond her endurance

-. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year.[40] As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such
does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision

- proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings
of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.\

-, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which
provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation

2) Gandioco vs Penaranda- husband Gandioco complained re support

ISSUE: 1) WON Institution for criminal case fo concubinage will suspend the civil case of legal
based on the grounds of concubinage

2) WON the petitioner could refuse to support his wife?

HELD: 1) No.

2) No but he could ask the court to modify it

FACTS:

- May 1986, private respondent (FROILAN Gandioco), the legal wife (TERESITA Gandioco) of the
petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental

- the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.

-14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision
in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation.
-, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such
as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him the private respondent. cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the
civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1
hereof, the following rules shall be observed:

(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered. .

civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil
action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all
proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for
concubinage in the criminal case. Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano

RATIO:

-, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously
with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same
offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.

-governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil
actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged."
Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged.

-A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.

-Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no
proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support
pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he
can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same

3) Lapuz vs Eufemio- petitioner died for decree of legal separation was decided

Issue: WON Death of Carmen Lapuz, the petitioner for the legal separation would terminate the
case.

Alternative: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .

Held: Yes.
Facts: -Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440,..Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that
the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself.

-dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and
petitioner herein

- Allegations: 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio,
alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30
September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and
that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok

-before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31
May 1969

Defense

-1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in
Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

Ratio:

-An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal

-personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action
itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona

4) AM-02-11-11-SC – Rule on Legal Separation

Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife (Art 68-73)

1) Lacson vs San Jose Lacson-wife abandoned husband

Court cannot constrain the spouses to live together

Issue: 1) WON The compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI
grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law.

2) WON Court could compel spouses to live together

Held: 1) Yes

2) No
Facts:

-Alfonso Lacson (petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson (respondent spouse) were married
on February 14, 1953. To them were born four children

On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod
City, and.to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for custody of
all their children as well as support for them and herself

-spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement
respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of property. On April 27, 1963

-a) There will be separation of property

(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy such separate estate

(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa

custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner Alfonso
Lacson and the custody of the younger children named Gerrard and Ramon shall be awarded to
petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson.

(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance

(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of the other at
their respective residences

SC Held/Ratio:

-We hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement
are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership

In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art. 190,
emphasis supplied)

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval.

-inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their
financial and proprietary interests is manifest.

=Besides, this Court cannot the spouses to live together, as

[I]t is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. .. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouse to live under the same roof; and the experience of those countries
where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple shows that the
policy of the practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, 60).

. In this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (art. 109, new Civil Code).

of the custody and support of the children.

when the respondent spouse signed the joint petition on the same matter of custody and support of the
children and filed the same with the CFI of Negros Occidental, she in effect abandoned her action in
the JDRC.

-And the JDRC acted correctly and justifiably in dismissing the case for custody and support of the
children based on those grounds

-We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in depriving the mother, the respondent
spouse, of the custody of the two older children (both then below the age of 7).

"No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure." The rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code Commission
thus:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn away from her.

Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:

Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;

(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

2) Ty vs CA -Two marriages, compelled for moral damages

Note:

..no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife...she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their
marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. .., we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd..., our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]

ISSUES: WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage
can be entered into validly

Could the wife sue the husband for breach of marital obligations-no

HELD: Yes
FACTS:

-respondent (Edgardo Reyes) married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29,
1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared
null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties

-before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On
April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.

-, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his
marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when
they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna
Maria.

-Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage
was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990
issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A

-Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null
and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991

- CA: . The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and
defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;

2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00
to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and

3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

RATIO:

-Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential

A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code

Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11,
13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).[23]

3) Go vs CA- wedding tape erased/ sole liability of wife

Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts holding him jointly and
severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that
when his wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she was acting alone for her sole interest.
[12]

..Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant
case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private
respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages
awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who
execute them.[13]

ISSUES: WON Nancy Alex Go is solely liable for the damages to respondent spouses Hermogenes
and Jane Ong.

HELD: Yes. She entered into contract with the respondents solely because of her profession.

FACTS:- respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in
Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of
P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which
they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon

-, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be
delivered.

-private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch 33, Dumaguete City

judgment is hereby granted:

1. Ordering the rescission of the agreement entered into between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong and
defendant Nancy Go;

2. Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs
Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong for the following sums:

-the contract entered into is one of service, that is, for the video coverage of the wedding.

RATIO:

, it is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their
wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly,
petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that
private respondents were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that
they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the tape after the
lapse of thirty days was unjustified.

-Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that “those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.”

-Petitioners’ act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents’ wedding was
precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo
V. Property Relations (Article 74-148)

1) Matabuena vs Cervantes- common law spouses marrying

Issue: the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship

Held: Yes. Donation is void.But since they were married before the death of deceased, wife had a
share.

Facts:

Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; 2. That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; 3. That the donation of the land to
the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common-law relationship as
husband and wife between the defendant-donee and the now deceased donor and later said donor and
donee were married on March 28, 1962; 4. That the deceased FelixMatabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; 5. That the plaintiff (CORNELIA) claims the property by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon."

Lower Court: . They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the
deed of donation had been executed. FAVORABLE to Petronilla

Ratio: SC reverse Lower court decision

Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista,[7]interpreting a similar provision of the old
Civil Code[8] speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then
Justice J. B. L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice
deeply rooted in our ancient law

Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que
informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a lostribunales en la aplicacion de sus disposiciones."[10]

Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by
their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.[11]

[11] According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters
or their children to the other half. (953, 837a)."

2) Sumbad vs CA- second wife selling donated property, 1 st wife children opposed
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation executed by George Tait in favor of Maria Tait is valid
and effective

Held: Yes. No proof

Facts:

After the death of his wife, Agata B. Tait, in 1936, George K. Tait, Sr. lived in common-law relationship
with Maria F. Tait to whom on April 2, 1974 he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio
Sum-at, Bontoc

George K. Tait, Sr. himself passed away on December 24, 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait sold
lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of private respondents Eduard Okoren, Gregorio
Acoking, Evelyn Saclangan, Mary Atiwag, Jaime T. Fronda, Barbara Tallongen, Julia Piyes, Glen Paquito,
and Felicitas Alinao.

On July 24, 1989, petitioners Emilie T. Sumbad and Beatrice B. Tait brought an action for quieting of
title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents.

alleged that they are the children and compulsory heirs of the spouses George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata
B. Tait of Bondoc, Mountain Province; that said spouses died on December 24, 1977 and April 30, 1936,

Petitioners further alleged that from 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait, without their knowledge and consent,
sold lots included within the Sum-at property to private respondents; that prior to the sales transactions,
private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria F. Tait but to the heirs
of George K. Tait, Sr.; that this notwithstanding, private respondents proceeded to purchase the lots
warned about LAND DEFECT

-Atty. Angela D. Papa testified that she had been the register of deeds of Bontoc since February 16, 1987

- Felipa Piyes, a 61-year old businesswoman and resident of Loc-ong, Bontoc.., Racquel Tait forged
deed

she did not recall receiving a letter from Emilie T. Sumbad; and that she issued a certification, marked as
Exhibit F, to the effect that no deeds of sale between Maria F. Tait and Acoking, Arthur Atiwag, Blanza,
Glenn Paquito, Jaime Fronda, and Lolita Tolentino were registered in her office

alleged that the Sum-at property, covered by Tax Declaration No. 399, did not belong to the conjugal
partnership of George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Tait for the reason that the latter died more than thirty
(30) years before the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 399 in 1973; that the late Maria F. Tait, second wife
of George K. Tait, Sr., did not need the consent of petitioners

Ratio: - the deposition of Shirley Eillenger to the effect that she personally saw one Raquel Tait draft the
document and forge the signature of George K. Tait now appearing therein is incredible and grossly
unconvincing. For considerations difficult to pin down, the statements of the witness on the point
somehow does not ring true and appear to have been rehearsed. It is too pat to be credible.

- Third. Petitioners argue that the deed of donation contravenes Art. 133 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does
not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor.
Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing.

in view of our ruling in Matabuena v. Cervantes[32] that the prohibition in Art. 133 extends to common-
law relations. Indeed, it is now provided in Art. 87 of the Family Code:

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage. (Emphasis added).

This point is being raised for the first time in this Court. The records show that in the trial court,
petitioners’ attack on the validity of the deed of donation centered solely on the allegation that George K.
Tait, Sr.’s signature had been forged and that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do
so. But petitioners never invoked Art. 133 of the Civil Code as a ground to invalidate the deed of
donation.

- Petitioners are thus guilty of laches which precludes them from assailing the donation made by their
father in favor of Maria F. Tait. Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do
that which, by exerting due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.[34]

-plaintiffs have failed in the duty to prove their allegations in their complaint as required by the Rules of
Court. We find their evidence too inadequate to be considered as preponderantly in their favor

3) Rodriguez vs Rodriguez- fishpond

Issue: Is it the intention of the parties to circumvert the law regarding the prohibition on the inter-
spouse donation?

Held: No. Not supported by evidence.

Facts:

-Concepcion Felix (petitioner), widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with whom she had one
living child, Concepcion Calderon, contracted a second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo
Rodriguez, widower with four children by a previous marriage, named Geronimo (RESPONDENT),
Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed Rodriguez

-Concepcion Felix was the registered owner of 2 fishponds located in the barrio of Babañgad,
municipality of Bulacan, Bulacan province

-1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by the widow, Concepcion Felix, his children

- March 16, 1953, the above-named widow, children and grandchildren of the deceased entered into an
extra-judicial settlement of his (Domingo's) estate. properties listed as conjugal were the two
parcels of land in Bulacan, Bulacan, which, together with another piece of property

- contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow appeared to have leased from the Rodriguez children and
grandchildren the fishpond (covered by TCT No. 16660) for a period of 5 years commencing August 16,
1962,

-, it seemed that the relationship between the widow and her stepchildren had turned for the worse. Thus,
when she failed to deliver to them the balance of the earnings of the fishponds

-, plaintiff prayed that the deeds of transfer mentioned in the complaint be declared fictitious and
simulated; that the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate" be also declared null and void; that TCT No.
16660 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan be cancelled and another one be issued in the name of
plaintiff,

-. As counterclaim, they asked for payment by the plaintiff of the unpaid balance of the earnings of the
land

Ratio:

-We agree with the trial Court that the evidence is not convincing that the contracts of transfer from
Concepcion Felix to her daughter, and from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed through
violence or intimidation. The charge is predicated solely upon the improbable and biased testimony of
appellant's daughter, Concepcion C. Martelino

- duress being merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four
years after it has ceased;1 and the present action was instituted only in 1962, twenty eight (28) years
after the intimidation is claimed to have occurred, and no less than nine (9) years after the supposed
culprit died (1953). On top of it, appellant entered into a series of subsequent transactions with appellees
that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set aside. Therefore, this cause of action is clearly
barred.

-Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts the law against donations
between spouses make them simulated ones.

-What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that they were resorted to in order
to circumvent the legal prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article 1334,
paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing.

What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that they were resorted to in order
to circumvent the legal prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article 1334,
paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing

Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject matter or illegal causa,
Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non oritur
action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant is clearly as guilty as her husband
in the attempt to evade the legal interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code, already cited. Wherefore, her
present action to reivindicate the, conveyed properties was correctly repulsed by the Court below.

Art. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit consideration is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor, the
following rules shall be observed:

1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have given by virtue of the
contract, or enforce the performance of the undertaking of the other party;

That Article 1306 applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or the
purpose of the contract was expressly recognized by this Supreme Court in Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil.
449-450.2

Take Note: . In the circumstances, appellant's cause has become a stale demand and her conduct
placed her in estoppel to question the Validity of the transfer of her properties.

4) Ayala Investments and Development Corp vs CA and Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching

Issue: WON Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone are considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” which are chargeable against the
conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband
in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?

Held: No. Did not redound to family.

Facts: -Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As
added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC

-PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM
and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),

lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal

On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate
of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption
period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which was registered on August
9, 1983.

Ratio:

-“The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership to be held liable, the
husband must have contracted the debt ‘for the benefit of’ the partnership, thus:

‘Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership x x x.’

There is a difference between the phrases: ‘redounded to the benefit of’ or ‘benefited from’ (on the one
hand) and ‘for the benefit of’ (on the other). The former require that actual benefit must have been
realized; the latter requires only that the transaction should be one which normally would produce benefit
to the partnership, regardless of whether or not actual benefit accrued.”[8]

have contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.

Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of Cobb-Perez is not applicable in the case at
bar. This Court has, on several instances, interpreted the term “for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.”

Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the three other companion
cases, on the one hand, and that of Ansaldo, Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the former, the
husband contracted the obligation for his own business; while in the latter, the husband merely acted as a
surety for the loan contracted by another for the latter’s business.

. Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The reason for this is as lucidly explained by
the respondent court:

“The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine
Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees. Philippine
Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and separate from the family of petitioners-appellees - this
despite the fact that the members of the said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.”

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family would reasonably anticipate
were the following:

(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he would be entitled to
his monthly salary ofP20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the loan he guaranteed;

(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate if the PBM could be
rehabilitated through the loan obtained;

(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be boosted should PBM
survive because of the loan.

However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits
must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan
itself.

This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the
spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnership’s liability is to “the extent that the family is benefited.”[20]

These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits
any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property.[21] Thus, when co-
respondent Alfredo Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on, definitely put in peril the
conjugal property (in this case, including the family home) and placed it in danger of being taken
gratuitously as in cases of donation.

Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, hence the cited cases of
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger; G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CA do not apply in the
instant case. Signing as a surety is not embarking in a business.”[22]

5) Hagosojos vs CA- two marriages, land donated to child, compromise agreement

Issue: Could Anastacio donate the property in first marriage to son of second marriage?

Held: No. Compromise agreement states it is part of CPG of first marriage

Facts:

-Anastacio Hagosojos contracted two marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage on February 14,
1920 with Jacinta Jaucian..") produced three off-springs, namely: the petitioner, Luis Hagosojos, and the
two other private respondents, Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas.

- five years after the demise of Jacinta Jaucian on April 4, 1959, but without the conjugal partnership
assets of the first marriage having been partitioned and distributed, he got married a second time on
December 21, 1965, to Araceli Hian Out of the second marriage were born the other private
respondents, Fred, Heidi, and Henry, all surnamed Hagosojos.

- January 22, 1973, Anastacio donated to Henry, who was then only seven years young, ..a portion of
the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 which was part of the conjugal
partnership assets of the first marriage.

- May 29, 1974, to compel the partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership assets of the first
marriage, the petitioner, together with his two sisters, private respondents Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan
and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas, filed the corresponding complaint against their father, Anastacio.

- The parties tried to settle their conflict amicably during the course of the proceedings in the trial court. As
a result, Araceli Vda de Hagosojos, assisted by her counsel, drew up a compromise agreement
which she presented to the petitioner for approval. When Luis agreed, he and his stepmother, Araceli,
together with their lawyers, signed the Compromise Agreement.

-RTC denied petition, approve Compromise Agreement

- Court of Appeals, which, in a four-page decision promulgated on April 30, 1981, reversed the judgment
of the trial court

Ratio:

- We find the alleged mistake of respondent Araceli and of her lawyer not a mistake at all. It is more of
negligence, which is inexcusable, and certainly can not be inflicted on the petitioner and his sisters of
the full blood.

-Additionally, the private respondents' motion to set aside the Compromise Agreement is fatally defective,
because it is not verified and not accompanied with affidavits showing the mistake relied upon and the
facts constituting their good and substantial cause of action. On this score alone the trial court would have
been correct in dismissing their motion.

. Paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement explicitly provides that "on February 15, 1967, a liquidation
and partition of all the properties enumerated in paragraph, one (l) among the heirs of the first and second
marriage was made ..." 14 Among those specifically designated in favor of the heirs of the first marriage
was the whole property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 comprised of six lots including
lot No. 2736." 15 In view of that partition in 1967. Anastacio could no longer donate Lot No 2736 to
Henry on January 22. 1973 because it had already been adjudicated "

Considering that all the properties specified in the Compromise Agreement were described conjugal
partnership properties of the first marriage, it follows that upon the death of Jacinta, the conjugal
partnership evolved into a co-ownership between her surviving spouse Anastacio, and her three children,
the petitioner and the two other private respondents, Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes
Hagosojos-Nicolas. Anastacio became the owner of 5/8 of the mass of properties while each of the three
children, of 1/8. Thus, even in such a situation, and pending the partition of the properties owned in
common and the adjudication in his favor Lot No. 2736, Anastacio could not validly donate the same at
that time he claimed he did within the purview of the law on co-ownership.
6) Go vs Yamane- land, wife using land to pay attorney fees

presumption of conjugality of property acquired

Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in
nature. This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the
property is paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by
one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership

Issue: WON Respondent could subject the land, a conjugal property, to satisfy attorney’s fee of
Atty. De Guzman

Held: No. Presumption of conjugality and the suit is for Spouse Yamane’s exclusive benefit.

Facts: - of lot located at Res. Sec. ‘K’, Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife
of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent]

-Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman..subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney’s fees in the
amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981.

-[respondent] filed a Third-Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on
the ground that the subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for
the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale

Ratio:

- Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal, the
presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands.

- It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired during the marriage of respondent
and Muriel.

- The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:

“x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appears to
have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive
interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for
them.

-Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband’s
failure to deliver the needed sum;[51] when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the
wife by the courts[52] or by the husband;[53] or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.[54]
Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the present case means that the conjugal asset may
not be bound to answer for Muriel’s personal obligation

7) Naguit vs CA- BP 22, Makati condo

Issue: WON Sheriff could take the condo of Naguit to satisfy her husbands civil liability in BP 22

Held: No.Remand to court

Facts: -the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 133, found Rolando Naguit liable for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and ordered him to idemnify private respondent Osler U. Padua in the
amount of P260,000.00 and to pay the costs of the action (Criminal Case No. 90-2645). A writ of
execution was issued by said court on 23 June 1992 and pursuant thereto, respondent Sheriff Norberto
B. Magsajo levied upon a condominium unit in the City of Makati

Ratio:

- In addition to the filing of a “proper action,” the third-party claimant may also avail of the remedy known
as “terceria,” by executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property seized and
serving the same upon the officer making the levy and the judgment creditor. Thereafter, the officer shall
not be bound to keep the property, unless the judgment creditor or his agent indemnifies the officer
against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. An action for
damages may be brought against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
filing of the bond.

- abovementioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be resorted to by a third-party
claimant without availing of the others. Thus, the availment of the remedy of terceria is not a condition
sine qua non to the filing of a “proper action.” An independent action may be resorted to even before or
without need of filing a claim in the court which issued the writ.[8]

8) Pelayo vs Perez- implied marital consent

Issue: WON Sale of Pelayo to Perez void for not having the consent of Loreza Pelayo.

Held: there is consent nor fraud

Facts:

- David Pelayo (Pelayo),by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 11, 1988, conveyed to
Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of agricultural land (the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao which
are portions of Lot 4192, Cad. 276 covered by OCT P-16873.

- Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is illegible
witnessed the execution of the deed. Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space
provided for witnesses on account of which Perez’ application for registration of the deed

- Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but
she refused, hence, he instituted on August 8, 1991 the instant complaint for specific
performance against her and her husband Pelayo (defendants).

- defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of
action, citing Section 6 of RA 6656 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
which took effect on June 10, 1988 and which provides that contracts executed prior thereto shall
“be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after
the effectivity of this Act.”

- questioned deed having been executed on January 10, 1988, the defendants claimed
that Perez had at least up to September 10, 1988 within which to register the same, but as they
failed to, it is not valid and, therefore, unenforceable.
- Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo in consideration of
his services as his attorney-in-fact to make the necessary representation and negotiation with the
illegal occupants-defendants in the ejectment suit; and that after his relationship with defendant
Pelayo became sour, the latter sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Tagum requesting him not
to entertain any transaction concerning the lots title

- Art. 166 of the Civil Code which provides:

- Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or
is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent . . .it is null
and void.

- The trial court, finding, among others, that Perez did not possess, nor pay the taxes on
the lots, that defendant Pelayo was indebted to Perez for services rendered and, therefore, the
deed could only be considered as evidence of debt, and that in any event, there was no marital
consent to nor actual consideration for the deed, held that the deed was null and void

- We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed
of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the
contract of sale.

- Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be
express or implied.[7] A wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property does not
always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of
the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given.[8] In the present case, although it
appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness,
circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully
aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.

- Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns.[10] Petitioners did not even attempt to overcome the aforementioned presumption as
no evidence was ever presented to show that Lorenza was in any way lacking in her mental
faculties

- Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value
of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

- Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and
only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained.[11] In the
present case, despite respondent’s repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the
pages of the deed of sale, showing respondent’s insistence on enforcing said contract, Lorenza
still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale. It was only when respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance on August 8, 1991 when petitioners brought up Lorenza’s
alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense.

Ratio:
9) Francisco vs Gonzales- Ayala condo, mother in debt

Issue: WON Property of spouses donated to children could be executed by court to satisfy wife’s
debt.

Held: No. It did not redound to family.

Facts:

-Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Francisco are the minor children of Cleodualdo M.
Francisco (Cleodualdo) and Michele Uriarte Francisco (Michele). represented by Dra. Maida Uriarte

-2000, Parent (wanting to declare it null and void) entered into Compromise Agreement

(a) Title and ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot located in
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia
and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old, respectively,
subject to the following conditions:

-spouses Jorge C. Gonzales and PurificacionW. Gonzales (respondents) against George Zoltan
Matrai (Matrai) and Michele (mother), the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of MuntinlupaCity, Branch 80,
rendered a Decision dated May 10, 2001, ordering Matrai and Michele to vacate the premises leased to
them located in 264 Lanka Drive, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City… pay back rentals, unpaid
telephone bills and attorney's fees..pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorney's fees

-Ayala Alabang property (for children) auctioned- grandma complained.

- Petitioners argue that: (1) they are the rightful owners of the property as the Partial Decision issued by
the RTC of Makati in Civil Case No. 93-2289 had already become final; (2) their parents already waived
in their favor their rights over the property; (3) the adjudged obligation of Michele in the ejectment
case did not redound to the benefit of the family; (4) Michele's obligation is a joint obligation between
her and Matrai, not joint and solidary.[14]

Ratio:

-the RTC should not have ignored that TCT No. 167907 is in the name of “Cleodualdo M. Francisco,
married to Michele U. Francisco.” On its face, the title shows that the registered owner of the
property is not Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo, married to Michele. This describes the civil status
of Cleodualdo at the time the property was acquired

- Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele were married on June 12, 1986, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988. As such, their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on
conjugal partnership of gains.

- A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of
the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed
sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the
husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these
circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife's personal
obligation.[20] Considering that the foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case as
the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her
and her partner Matrai.--> Solely liable

- Similarly in this case, Michele, who was then already living separately from Cleodualdo,[28] rented the
house in Lanka Drivefor her and Matrai’s own benefit. In fact, when they entered into the lease
agreement, Michele and Matrai purported themselves to be husband and wife

- To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going against
the spirit and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-
being of the family as a unit.[31]

10) Malilin vs Castillo- separated spouses married each other, Superfreight Co.

Boy want more money, Art 148, FC

Issue: WON the property regime of Malilin and Castillo is of co-ownership

Held: Yes under Article 148, FC

Facts:

-On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint[2] for "Partition and/or
Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo.
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that
petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses,
cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During
their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president
and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer

- petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondent’s name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated

- She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in petitioner’s action
for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in
her name.

-respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim
a part of the subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides
that the rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties
are not in any way incapacitated to contract marriage

Ratio:

- Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the
Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are
incapacitated to marry each other. It states:

In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article,[16] only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

11) Agapay vs Palang- Hawaino marrying again, donate land to concubine

Issue: WON Deed of Sale between Miguel to concubine Erlinda Palang valid.

Held: No. Couldn’t prove her contribution in acquiring said property

Facts:

- Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private respondent
Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A
few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina’s only
child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.

-sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court
found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.[1] When he
returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in
Pozorrubio

-July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-
old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner.[2] Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe,
Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square meters

- October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter.[3] The parties therein agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.[4]

-Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint.[5] Two years
later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died

- July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession..sought to get back the
riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner.

-RTC- property not conjugal/CA-reversed and canceled Deed of Sale

-CA: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
another one entered:

1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;

2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein plaintiffs-
appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-
appellants.

Ratio:

-provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation
when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of
Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household,
are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income
or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and
no presumption of equal shares

-, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a
sari-sari store[10]but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland

-. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property,[11] there being no proof of the same

- Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.[13]
The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.

-The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article
87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,[15]
for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal
union.[16]