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ROSALINDA DE PERIO SANTOS, petitioner, vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CATALINO MACARAIG and SECRETARY RAUL MANGLAPUS, respondents.
G.R. No 94070 April 10, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed on July 24, 1986, President Cory to the position of Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and
other International Organizations with station in Geneva, Switzerland.

On April 6, 1987, petitioner sought a leave of absence from the home office to spend the
Easter Holidays in New York, U.S.A., with her mother, brothers and sisters at no expense
to the Government. She bought two (2) non-transferable, non-refundable discounted
tickets costing SFr. 1,597 for herself and her adopted daughter Pia.

Before they could take the trip however, petitioner was instructed to proceed to Havana,
Cuba to attend a UNCTAD conference as Philippine delegate. Petitioner is entitled for
official trip outside her station (Geneva) for the cost of airplane ticket costing to SFr.
2,996 for Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her Geneva-New York-Havana-New York-
Geneva trip. Instead of buying an economy roundtrip ticket, petitioner used for the
Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her trip the two (2) discounted tickets costing only
SFr. 1,597 for herself and her daughter Pia. They left Geneva for New York en route to
Havana on April 15, 1987. On the same day, the DFA approved her application for a leave
of absence with pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987. After the Havana Conference, she and
her daughter spent her vacation leave in New York before returning to Geneva (Ibid.).
Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr. 2,996, she requested, and received,
reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597 which she spent for the Geneva to New York, and New
York to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby effecting savings of SFr.1,399 for the
Government.

On September 16, 1987, the DFA ask her to explain why the Mission paid for plane ticket
of infant Pia de Perio-Santos (petitioner's daughter) Geneva-New York-Geneva when
petitioner was not authorized to accompany her adopting mother at government expense.

Petitioner replied that the air fare tickets were for her only and did not include her
daughter whose trip was paid from her personal funds

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On September 21, 1987, the DFA required her to refund the amount representing her
daughter's round-trip ticket since DFA received a copy of the "facture" from the travel
agency showing that the amount of SFr.1,597 was in payment her trip and that the sum of
SFr. 673 represented the cost of her daughter's portion of the ticket.

On October 5, 1987, her co-workers led by Deputy Armando Maglaque, and some
MISUNPHIL employees filed administrative charges against her for "incompetence;
inefficient; corrupt and dishonest activities; rude and uncouth manners; abusive and
high-handed behavior; irregular and highly illegal transactions involving funds of the
mission.7

On March 17, 1988, the Board of Foreign Service Administration (BFSA) constituted a
new 5-man investigating committee to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties. The
committee found her liable for misconduct only, and recommended dismissal of the other
charges. They also recommended that she be reprimanded and recalled to Manila.

In a letter-decision dated April 27, 1988, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs affirmed the
BFSA's recommendation declaring Petitioner guilty of the lesser offense of misconduct,
instead of dishonesty, meted to her the penalty of reprimand, and recalled her to the
home office.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that she was denied due
process when she was declared guilty of misconduct although it was not one of the charges
against her.

On March 30, 1989, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 finding
petitioner guilty of dishonesty (instead of misconduct) and imposed upon her the penalty
of reprimand, with recall to the home office.

Hence this petition for certiorari alleging that the President's "reprimand and recall
orders are not supported by substantial evidence and were issued with gross abuse of
discretion and serious error of law".

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was unjustly found guilty and whether her recall to Manila
was a valid exercise of power by the Secretary.

HELD:
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The petition has merit.

The general rule is that the factual findings of administrative agencies are binding on this
Court and controlling on the reviewing authorities if supported by substantial evidence.

A review of the records fails to yield any evidence of dishonesty on the part of the
petitioner, or an intent to cheat and defraud the government. Her failure to disclose the
fact that her discounted tickets included the fare for her child, was harmless and
inconsequential as the two (2) discounted Geneva-New York-Geneva tickets for herself
and her daughter were in fact inseparable, intransferable, non-cancellable and non-
refundable, in effect one whole fare only, for purposes of the discount. The mother and
daughter tickets were, in the words of the petitioner, "married to each other". One without
the other would not have been entitled to the discount. And if she left her daughter
behind, it would have made no difference in the fare because the ticket was not
refundable.

Using the discounted tickets was beneficial to the Government for they cost 50% less than
an economy roundtrip ticket that the petitioner was entitled to purchase for the same trip
if she travelled alone. She obviously saved money (SFr.1,399) for the government by using
her discounted tickets even if her daughter's fare was included therein.

Nevertheless, the Court is not disposed to disturb the order of the DFA and the Office of
the President recalling the petitioner to the home office. There is no merit in the
petitioner's contention that her tour of duty in Geneva was for four (4) years. The Court
held that under a secret Executive Order No. 168, provides that a person who has
completed a minimum of one year of service, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs can transfer
that person to Manila for reassignment and did not have to be explained and justified.
The Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, act with the implied imprimatur of the
President herself, unless the act is reprobated by her.

In consonance with the principle of separation of powers, and considering that the
conduct of foreign relations is primarily an executive prerogative, courts may not inquire
into the wisdom or unwisdom in the exercise thereof. The President is the 'sole organ of
the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with foreign nations.' The
assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for
her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may
from time to time dictate.
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The President is the 'sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole
representative with foreign nations.' The assignment to and recall from posts of
ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the
foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of


Justice, petitioner,

Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of
Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his
provisional liberty.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

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Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.
It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become
hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR 139465 (Jan. 18, 2000)

FACTS:

Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request for
the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to Commit
Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, False Statement, and Election
Contribution in Name of Another.

During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the
petitioner, Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S. government,
that he be given ample time to comment regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime.

The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP – US
Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S.
in any proceedings arising from an extradition request.

The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon. Ralph Lantion (presiding
judge RTC Manila Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the petitioner, the
Secretary of DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to the extradition of the respondent, for it
will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due process over
the government’s duties under a treaty?

RULING:
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Yes. According to the principle of “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, parties to a treaty should keep their
agreements to good faith. However, Sec. 2 of Art. 2 of the Constitution (incorporation clause) provides
that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land”.

Incorporation clause is applied when there is a conflict between the international law and
local/municipal law. However, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal court.

The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the land does not imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Rules of international
law are given an equal standing with, but not superior to, the national legislative enactment. The principle
of “Lex Posterior Derogat Priori” clarifies that a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a
treaty. And the Republic of the Philippines considers its Constitution as the highest law of the land,
therefore, both statutes and treaty may be invalidated if they are conflict with the constitution.

GOVT. OF HK vs. OLALIA

G.R. No. 153675 | 19 April 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE


REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR., and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ,
Justice,
vs. respondents
petitioner

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of Rules of CP, as amended, seeking to nullify the 2 Orders of RTC-Manila Branch 8,
presided by respondent Judge Olalia, issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.

-20-DEC-2001: Order allowing private respondent Muñoz to post bail;

-10-APR-2002: Order denying the Motion to Vacate the previous order filed by petitioner Govt. of HK, represented by DOJ.

Petition alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

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 30-JAN-1995: RP and HK (then a British Colony) signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused
and Convicted Persons,” which took effect on 20-JUN-1997. Then HK reverted back to People’s
Republic of China, and became the HK Special Administrative Region.
 Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the HK Court with 3 counts of the offense of “accepting
an advantage as agent.”
 13-SEP-1999: DOJ received a request for provision arrest of Muñoz, which was then forwarded to the
NBI, and was then filed with the RTC-Manila, Branch 19.
 23-SEP-1999: RTC issued an Order of Arrest, NBI arrested and detained Muñoz.
 14-OCT-1999: Muñoz filed with the CA, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with an
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity
of the Order of Arrest.
 9-NOV-1999: CA declared the Order of Arrest void.
 12-NOV-1999: DOJ filed with SC to reverse CA decision, which was granted –sustaining the validity of
the Order of Arrest, and became final and executory on 10-APR-2001.
 22-NOV-1999: Petitioner HK filed with RTC-Manila a petition for extradition of Muñoz, who then filed in
the same case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
 8-OCT-2001: RTC denied the petition for bail, and held that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases, and that Muñoz is a high “flight risk.”
 22-OCT-2001: RTC inhibited himself from further hearing the case. It was then raffled off to the branch
presided by respondent judge.
 30-OCT-2001: Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration (order for denying bail), which was granted by
respondent judge.
 21-DEC-2001: Petitioner HK filed an urgent motion to vacate the above order, but was denied by
respondent judge.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Constitution or statutory law provides that a potential extraditee has right to bail (the right
being limited

solely to criminal proceedings)

HELD: Yes. PETITION DISMISSED. Case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether Muñoz is entitled

to bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”

RATIO:

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 The Court affirmed the trends in international law:
o [1] the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the
20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
o [2] the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere;
o [3] the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and
o [4] the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition on the other.
 The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights.

 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while not a treaty, the principles contained therein are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.
 The Philippines, along with other members, is committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person; and such is enshrined in Sec. 2, Art. II of our
Constitution. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, i.e., Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty, and such remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

 In previous cases, the Court has admitted bail to persons not involved in criminal proceedings; in fact,
bail has been allowed to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings.

 Hence, the Court does not see any justification why bail cannot be granted in extradition cases.
Further, the UDHR applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue. Thus, the right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights.

 In his separate opinion in Purganan case, former CJ Puno, proposed that the standard termed as “clear
and convincing evidence” be used in the granting of bail in extradition cases. Since an extradition
proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the following standards: “proof beyond reasonable doubt” in criminal cases; “proof of preponderance
of evidence” in civil cases; nor the standard of “substantial evidence” used in administrative cases.

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Blackmer v. United States

United States Supreme Court


284 U.S. 421 (1932)

Facts
Harry M. Blackmer (defendant) is a United States citizen but a resident of Paris,
France. The United States government (plaintiff) issued two subpoenas requesting
Blackmer appear as a witness on its behalf at a criminal trial. Blackmer failed to
appear, and two separate contempt actions were instituted against him in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The contempt actions were based on
a United States statute which provides that “whenever the attendance at the trial
of a criminal action of a witness abroad, who is a citizen of the United States or
domiciled therein, is desired by the Attorney General, or any assistant or district
attorney acting under him, the judge of the court in which the action is pending may
order a subpoena to issue, to be addressed to a consul of the United States and
to be served by him personally upon the witness with a tender of traveling
expenses.” Additionally, upon issuance of the subpoena and failure of the witness
to appear, the court may issue an order requiring the witness to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt. Once the order is issued, the court may
seize the property of the witness to be held by the United States to satisfy any
judgment which might be rendered against the witness in the proceeding. Service
is affected through both personal service on the witness and through publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in the district where the court is sitting. If,
after a hearing, the charge against the witness is sustained, the court may find the
witness guilty of contempt and impose upon him a fine to be satisfied by the seized
property. Blackmer was found guilty of contempt on both counts, and a fine of
$30,000 was imposed in both cases. The fine was to be satisfied out of Blackmer’s
property which had been seized by the court. On appeal, Blackmer objected to the
statute supporting his contempt convictions on the ground that it violated the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Blackmer stated five arguments in
support of this contention. Most notably, he argued that the statute did not comply
with due process requirements under the United States Constitution. The court of
appeals affirmed the contempt decrees, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.

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Issue. Must there be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam?

Discussion. The statute was not found to be unconstitutional by the Court. Blackmer (D)
alleged that there was inadequate notice, but since he still retained his U.S. citizenship, he was
still subject to the U.S. authorities.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-2708 & L-3355-60. January 30, 1953.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEGUNDO M.
ACIERTO, Defendant-Appellant.
Segundo M. Acierto in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jesus A. Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. INTERNATIONAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COURT OVER CIVIL OFFENDERS IN


BASES. — Construction by the Judge Advocate General of the United States Military Law on its
jurisdiction over civil offenders is entitled to great respect. When its construction is a disclaimer
of jurisdiction under the Bases Agreement, the Philippine Government certainly is not the party
to dispute it. By the agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States
exercises jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine government retains not
only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The treaty expressly stipulates that
offenses included therein may be tried by the proper Philippine courts if for any special reason
the United States waives its jurisdiction over them.

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2. ID.; ID.; TEN-DAY PERIOD TO TURN OFFENDER OVER TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES. — The Bases
Agreement provides in Article XIII, paragraph 3, that in case the United States renounce the
jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this article, the officer holding the offender in
custody shall so notify the fiscal of the city or province in which the offense has been committed
within ten days after his arrest. The ten-day requirement is of directory character relating to
procedure, inserted merely for the convenience of the Philippine government. It can not and does
not pretend to diminish or impair the fundamental rights of jurisdiction reserved by the treaty for
this Government. It is on obligation imposed on the United States precisely with a view to enabling
the Philippine government the better to exercise its residual authority. The offender has no
interest in this clause of the treaty beyond the right to demand that whoever is to try him should
proceed with reasonable dispatch. To say that failure on the part of the United States to turn the
offender over the Philippine authorities within ten days works as a forfeiture of the Philippine
government’s jurisdiction is a paradox.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JEOPARDY. — Jeopardy did not attach where the court before which
the defendant was tried had no jurisdiction.
4. ID.; ID.; ACCUSED ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING JEOPARDY WHERE THE FORMER COURT
DISCLAIMED JURISDICTION UPON HIS INSISTENCE. — A party will not be allowed to make a
mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would result in brazen
deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and
good faith, for an accused to tell one court that it lacks authority to try him and, after he has
succeeded in his effort, to tell the court to which he has been turned over that the first has
committed error in yielding to his plea.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from two separate decisions, one in a case for falsification of a private
document and another in six cases for estafa. The charges for estafa are similar in all respects
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except as to the dates of the commission of the crimes and the amounts alleged to have been
swindled. In the cases for estafa, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four months
and one day of arresto mayor in each, to indemnify the United States Army in the amount of
P305.08, P353, P316.44, P221.08, P233.48 and P209.60, respectively, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed one- third of the principal penalty, and to
pay the costs. In the case for falsification, in which the defendant pleaded not guilty, he was
condemned to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and eight months to four years and
nine months, to indemnify the United States Army in the amount of $100.46, or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
On this appeal, the seven cases have been consolidated in the briefs and for decision, and
in all of them these questions are raised: (1) former jeopardy, (2) want of jurisdiction of the court
a quo, on both of which the Solicitor General sides with the appellant, and (3) sufficiency of the
evidence, besides others to be briefly mentioned in the latter part of this opinion.
For a background, it is well to state the pertinent facts.
Prior to August 23, 1947, the accused was employed by the Army of the United States as
court martial reporter on a salary basis in the Judge Advocate Section, Headquarters PHILRYCOM,
Camp Rizal, Quezon City. On that date, at his request, he was "dropped from the strength report
of this section" and became a reporter on piece-work arrangement. As piece worker he was paid
for so much work of reporting and transcribing as he performed. It was when he was working in
the latter capacity, in 1948, that he was said to have made false claims and received
compensation for services not rendered.
Charged with violation of the 94th Article of War, in the belief that defendant was still an
employee of, or serving with, the Army subject to its jurisdiction, on March 20, 1948, he was
placed under arrest by the United States Military authorities, detained in a United States Army
stockade, and brought to trial before a general court martial appointed and convened by the
Commanding General on April 7, 1948.
Before the court martial, the defendant, on arraignment, interposed a special plea to its
jurisdiction. But he was overruled, after which, trial proceeded on a plea of not guilty. On April 8,
1948, after trial, he was found guilty of all the specifications with which he stood charged, and
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sentenced to be confined at hard labor for sixty months. Immediately after the sentence was
promulgated, he was committed to the general prisoners branch by which, it is alleged, he was
subjected to hard labor like all other military prisoners.
On June 18, 1948, however, the Commanding General as reviewing authority disapproved
the above verdict and sentence in an order of the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the foregoing case of Segundo M. Acierto, a person accompanying and serving with
the Army of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the sentence
is disapproved upon the sole ground that this accused was not subject to military law and without
prejudice to his trial before a proper tribunal."cralaw virtua1aw library
Consequently, on June 19, he was conducted by a United States Military officer to the City
Attorney of Quezon City for prosecution under the penal laws of the Philippines, and the said City
Attorney, after conducting a preliminary investigation, filed the informations which initiated the
several cases now on appeal.
The appellant states in his brief that in all the above seven cases he set up the plea of
double jeopardy, a statement which is belied by the fact that in all the six cases for estafa he
pleaded guilty. However, the plea of double jeopardy is interwoven with the plea of want of
jurisdiction, in that the former is directly predicated on the proposition, now sustained by the
defendant, that the court martial had jurisdiction of the offenses and his person. Because of this
interrelationship between the two pleas, we may disregard, for the present, the fact that in the
six cases for estafa double jeopardy, which is a matter of defense, was not invoked.
The Bases Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States over
American Military bases signed on March 14, 1947, and effective upon its acceptance by the two
governments, in part provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE XIII
JURISDICTION
"1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise
jurisdiction over the following offenses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

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(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and
offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United
States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
United States in which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the United
States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
United States against the security of the United States.
"2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses
committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
"3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the
jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the offender in
custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in which the offense
has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the Philippines shall
exercise jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
Camp Rizal where the crimes in question were committed was, it is conceded, a military
base or installation in 1948. Since paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 1 refer to offenses "committed
outside the bases" by members of the armed forces, and since the accused was not, it is also
conceded, a member of the armed forces, these paragraphs may be eliminated from our inquiry
into the jurisdiction of the court martial.
Paragraph (a) is the provision in virtue of which the appellant disputes the authority of
the civil court to take jurisdiction of his offenses. He contends that he was an employee of the
Army of the United States, and was properly and legally tried by a duly constituted military court.
This is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at the military trial. As stated, he
there attacked the court martial’s jurisdiction with the same vigor that he now says the court
martial did have jurisdiction; and thanks to his objections, so we incline to believe, the
Commanding General, upon consultation with, and the recommendation of, the Judge Advocate
General in Washington, disapproved the court martial proceedings.

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The question that meets us at the threshold is: Was the defendant an employee of the
United States Army within the meaning of the United States Military law? Defense counsel at the
court martial, a United States Military officer, and Lt. Colonel Seymour W. Wurfel, Staff Judge
Advocate General of the Philippines Ryukus Command who appeared as amicus curiae in the
Court of First Instance and submitted a memorandum for the prosecution, were one in holding
that he was not. Both counsel thus described the nature of the defendant’s work and his relation
with the United States Army.
Defendant worked as he pleased and was not amenable to daily control and disciplines of
the Army. Upon the change of his status he ceased to be an integral part of the Army with the
corresponding loss of the rights and privileges he previously enjoyed and which accrue to regular
United States Army employees. While the Army could request him to record court martial
proceedings, in which event he was paid under Army regulations for so much work accomplished,
he could not in his status as piece worker be compelled to do so. He could act as reporter but
was not under any obligation to the United States Army to do so. He was not required to present
himself for work nor could he be marked absent for failure to appear regularly in his office. He
was remunerated for so much of his work of reporting and transcribing as he volunteered to
make. He was privileged to remain in his home except for the purpose of bringing his finished
report to the office. Then he was at liberty to depart once more. After his discharge as regular
employee he was in fact paid for records of trial prepared by him from a fund entirely different
from that set aside to pay regular employees’ salaries. His position was comparable to that of any
vendor who sells commodity to the Army as distinguished from employees who draw regular pay
from the organization. The last time he reported court martial proceedings was on December 13,
1947. Since that date he had not in any way performed any work for the Army, nor had he been
called upon to act in any case or to report in any section of the Headquarters of the Philippine
Ryukus Command for any purpose. Upon the circumstances set forth, he could not be considered
as serving with the Army.
Colonel Wurfel cited Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd ed., Vols. 1 and 2, page
100, which says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Page 15 of 27
"The article to be strictly construed. This article, in creating an exceptional jurisdiction
over civilians, is to be strictly construed and confined to the classes specified. A civil offender who
is not certainly within its terms cannot be subjected under it to a military trial in time of war with
any more legality then he could be subjected to such a trial in time of peace. As held by the Judge
Advocate General, the mere fact of employment by the Government within the theatre of war
does not bring the person within the application of the article. In several cases of public employees
brought to trial by court martial during the late war the convictions were disapproved on the
ground that it did not appear that at the time of their offenses they were ’serving with the army’
in the sense of this article. (Referring to Article of War 2, paragraph 2[d. ])"
Construction of the United States Military Law by the Judge Advocate General of the United
States Army is entitled to great respect, to say the very least. When such construction is a
disclaimed of jurisdiction under the Bases Agreement, the Philippine Government certainly is not
the party to dispute it; the fewer the rights asserted by the United States the more is enhanced
the dignity of the Philippines and its interest promoted.
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military authorities, the defendant was
estopped from demurring to the Philippine court’s jurisdiction and pleading double jeopardy on
the strength of his trial by the court martial. A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of
justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would result in brazen deception. It is
trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith, for
an accused to tell one court that it lacks authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his
effort, to tell the court to which he has been turned over that the first has committed error in
yielding to his plea.
From another angle, it seems immaterial whether or not the court martial had jurisdiction
of the accused and his crime under the terms of the Bases Agreement. Granting that it had, the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City nevertheless properly and legally took cognizance of the
cases and denied the defendant’s motion to quash.
By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that
the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty
Page 16 of 27
over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United
States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is
implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express
provisions of the treaty. The treaty expressly stipulates that offenses included therein may be
tried by the proper Philippine courts if for any special reason the United States waives its
jurisdiction over them.
The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting
parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by the treaty comes within the United
States jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is to a matter about which
the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words, the rights granted to the United States by
the treaty insure solely to that country and can not be raised by the offender. (Funk v. State, 208
S. W., 509.) By the same token, noncompliance with any of the conditions imposed on the United
States can not benefit the offender.
This brings up the last ground for the contention that the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City was without jurisdiction of the cases at bar. The Bases Agreement provides in Article XIII,
paragraph 3, that in case the United States renounce the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs
1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal of the
city or province in which the offense has been committed within 10 days after his arrest. The
Solicitor General invites attention to the fact that "appellant was arrested by the United States
Army on March 20, 1948, and confined until June 18, 1948, pending final decision of this case,"
and, like the appellant, he believes that "this delay of three months does not obviously comply
with the requirement of the foregoing section, which is explicit on its terms and provides for no
exceptions." In their opinion this delay was fatal.
The appellant and the Solicitor General labor, we believe, under a misapprehension as to
the purpose and meaning of the treaty provision just cited. This provision is not, and can not on
principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government.
Page 17 of 27
If anything, it is an emphatic recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the
bases and of the truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States and not exercised
by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for itself.
The ten-day requirement is of directory character relating to procedure, inserted merely
for the convenience of the Philippine Government. It can not and does not pretend to diminish or
impair the fundamental rights of jurisdiction reserved by the treaty for this Government. It is an
obligation imposed on the United States precisely with a view to enabling the Philippine
Government the better to exercise its residual authority. The offender has no interest in this
clause of the treaty beyond the right to demand that whoever is to try him should proceed with
reasonable dispatch. To say that failure on the part of the United States to turn the offender over
to the Philippine authorities within ten days works as a forfeiture of the Philippine Government’s
jurisdiction is a paradox. By the appellant’s and the Solicitor General’s theory, this Government
would be penalized by the fault of the other signatory to the treaty over whose action it has no
control. In effect, the idea is not much unlike divesting a lender of the ownership to his property
by reason of the borrower’s neglect to return it within the time promised. What is more serious,
offenses not purely military in character perpetrated in military or naval reservations would be
left unpunished where the military or naval authorities in appropriate cases fail or refuse to act.
Partly for the reasons already shown, the plea of double jeopardy is without any merit. If
the court martial had no jurisdiction, jeopardy could not have attached. This proposition is too
well established and too well known to need citation of authorities.
Even if it be granted that the court martial did have jurisdiction, the military trial in the
instant cases has not placed the appellant in jeopardy such as would bar his prosecution for
violation of the Philippine penal laws or, for that matter, a second trial under the Articles of War.
Although under Rev. Stat. sec. 1342, art. 2, it has been held that a former trial may be pleaded
when there has been a trial for the offense, whether or not there has been a sentence adjudged
or the sentence has been disapproved (Dig. JAG [1912] p. 167), the rule is and should be
otherwise when the disapproval was made in response to the defendant’s plea based on lack of
jurisdiction. (Ex parte Castello, 8. F. 2nd., 283, 286.) In such case the former trial may not be
pleaded in bar in the second trial.
Page 18 of 27
On the question of the sufficiency of the evidence in the case for falsification of a private
document, (which was the only case tried, in the six cases for estafa the defendant having entered
the plea of guilty), the court below found that on March 11, 1948, the defendant submitted a
voucher in which he falsely made it appear that he was entitled to collect $100.46 from the United
States Army for services allegedly rendered, forging in said document the signature of Captain
Eaton J. Bowers, and that by these fraudulent pretenses he succeeded in being paid the amount
itemized.
As the lower court said, the defendant did not introduce any evidence to disprove the
above findings, confining himself to raising questions of law.
Other legal theories are urged in the appellant’s brief but they were not raised in the court
below and, moreover, are obviously unmeritorious. It suffices to say that on the facts charged
and found by the court in case No. 1701 and established by the proof, the defendant was properly
prosecuted for falsification of a private document, even assuming, without deciding, that they
also constitute violation of other laws.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed with the modification that the maximum
duration of the appellant’s imprisonment shall not be more than threefold the length of the time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties, and that from the sentence as thus reduced
there shall be deducted one-half of the preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused.
The appellant will pay the costs of both instances.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and
Labrador, JJ., concur.

Page 19 of 27
MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

FACTS:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and
to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENR’s Water Quality Management
Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay
showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200 MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90.

The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of
the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to
clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also asserted that the cleaning of
the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA sustained RTC’s decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks
outside of their basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Page 20 of 27
(1) Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of
Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate
the Manila Bay.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a ministerial in
nature and can be compelled by mandamus.

Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is mandated
to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well
as other alternative garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDA’s duty in the area of
solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but
also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent
laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of
statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the clean up,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing
not to perform these duties. So, their functions being ministerial in nature can be compelled by
mandamus.

Page 21 of 27
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

231 SCRA 292

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

FACTS

 On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility
of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
 The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No.
1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
 The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could
considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling.
 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of
Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt,
stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.
 On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced
its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala
Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
 The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for
the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order
 In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City
to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
 On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ
Page 22 of 27
of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf,
from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan
from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until
further orders of the court.
 COURT OF APPEALS
 On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease
and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its
enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

ISSUE

 Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of
garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan
which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by
such open garbage dumpsite

SUPREME COURT

 Yes.
 As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.
 It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution.
 Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the

Page 23 of 27
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas.
 In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass
upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where
such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region.

ISSUE

 Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws

SUPREME COURT

 Yes.
 By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
 To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant
to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would
be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order
in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.
 The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests"
gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
 As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-
impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne
in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

Page 24 of 27
MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

FACTS:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and
to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENR’s Water Quality Management
Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay
showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200 MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90.

The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of
the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to
clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also asserted that the cleaning of
the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA sustained RTC’s decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks
outside of their basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Page 25 of 27
(1) Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of
Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate
the Manila Bay.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a ministerial in
nature and can be compelled by mandamus.

Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is mandated
to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well
as other alternative garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDA’s duty in the area of
solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but
also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.

Vinuya v. Romulo GR 162230 April 28, 2010

FACTS
 This is an original Petition for Certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of DFA and the OSG.
 Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, an organization established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.
 Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist them and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance
with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUES

Page 26 of 27
 WON respondents can be compelled to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals.

HELD
 NO. The authority for foreign relations matter is vested by the constitution to the political branches of
the government and not to the courts. Petitioners cannot assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
 It is well established that the conduct of foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative - the political - departments of the government, and
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision
 In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to
waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

Page 27 of 27