Stonehill v.

Diokno

Facts:

Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the corporations
of which they were officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the petitioners and/or
their premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized.

Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having contravened the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books and
things to be seized PARTICULARLY.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.

Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.

Held:

The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a) those found and seized in
the offices of the corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners.

The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This is
because corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
their officers, directors and stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal
cannot be availed by third parties.

As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and
(2) if the answer is no, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners.

The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches and seizure. Two points
must be stressed in connection to this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if
based upon probable cause determined personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and
(2) the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with particularly.

In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application. The averments of
the offenses committed were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine
the existence of probable cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the issuance
of a valid search warrant.

The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with particularity. This is to eliminate
general warrants.

The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of petitioners are null and
void.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the
return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
No.
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of
Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building
on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs.
State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized
did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.
People v. Baes

Facts:
Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged the accused
with an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a member of the “Church of Christ” to pass
through the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, belonging to said church and devoted to
the religious worship thereof. The parish priest opposed this, but through force and threats of physical
violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard.

Issue:
Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics,
thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

Held:
YES. The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be
thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the
accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question
of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not those of other
faithful ones. Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon the more
or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but should be gauged having in view
the nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance which should be
viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the
offense would hinge on the subjective characterization of the act from the point of view of a given
religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the application of the law would be partial and
arbitrary, withal, dangerous,
especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution.”

Article 133, RPC:

Offending the religious feelings.

–
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any
religious ceremoncy, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.