Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the
Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of
those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the
Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted
its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9,
1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s
protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier
resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the

Electoral Commission.Caltex vs. Palomar (G.R. L-19650, 09/29/1966)

FACTS:

In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme calculated to
drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”, which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specific period.
 Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for
the transmission of communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be
cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October
31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that
the contest does not violate the “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law”.

Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltex’s request stating that the contest
scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatex’s request for clearance.

Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the contestant, the
contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest
involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as “Gift Enterprise”, which was equally
banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?

Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law?

HELD:

I. By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the applicability to
invoke declaratory relief which states: “Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a
statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of
rights thereunder.

In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions:

There must be a justiciable controversy.

The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.

The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.

The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

With the appellee’s bent to hold the contest and the appellant’s threat to issue a fraud order if carried out, the contenders
are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and
stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be
said that merely the appellee’s “desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others” — which admittedly
does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case
at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.

Construction

– Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent. In
Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising
was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that
if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the
corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its
sales promotion plan.
II. Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery

– Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of gambling.

Three Essential Elements:

Consideration

Prize

Chance

No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a gratuitous
distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any services
be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is
go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for
the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it
as a lottery.

Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage be considered as a
consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?

No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest.
The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning and not
whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value for the distribution of the prize.

Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?

Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a consensus among
lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are
sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to win a
prize.

And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there is not sale of anything to
which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestant
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee’s products.

The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must be resolved upon the
particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.

In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding
non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.

Roderick Daoang and Rommel Daoang vs The Municipal Judge of San Nicolas (GR No. L-34568, 28 March 1988)
159 SCRA 369

Facts: On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. On 22 April 1971, the
minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an
opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt
under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

HELD: The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt,
are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant”, found in the
Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children”. The children thus mentioned have a clearly
defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that
a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be subjects of interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang , the
grandchildren of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the
Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the judgement of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte,declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the
children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal
obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and
Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed
with “Agonoy”, which is the family name of the petitioners, without pronouncements as to costs

Paat vs CA Admin Law Digest

Leonardo Paat vs Court of Appeals, et. Al. GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997 266 SCRA 167

FACTS

The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to
Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained
Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the
DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan
and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

HELD

The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s
cause of action.
 The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit
for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the
writ ordering the return of the truck.

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa G.R. No. L-2230 August 30, 1967 En Banc

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was
discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court
proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated
that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense,
the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must be acquitted because he is a secret
agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit that except as
thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms
or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts
of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the accused is not
exempted.

Del Mar v. PAGCOR G.R. No. 138298 / November 29, 2000

SUMMARY. PAGCOR requested legal advice from the Secretary of Justice if it’s authorized under its charter to operate
jai-alai games (a form of sport). The Secretary of Justice said that PAGCOR has the authority; hence PAGCOR has the
power under its charter to operate. Petitioner del Mar filed a petition for prohibition preventing PAGCOR from managing
jai-alai since its illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter. However,
PAGCOR still entered in an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME, hence, del Mar filed a Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement. Members of the House of Representative also filed a petition stating that
operation of PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in its scope. Respondents then questioned the locus
standi or legal standing of petitioners filing as taxpayers and members of the House of representatives. As stated by the
Court, they have legal standing to the case since it affects public interest (involves taxes) and affects the powers of the
legislative.

DOCTRINE. Locus Standi or Legal Standing to file a petition as taxpayers and member of the House of Representatives

FACTS.

 PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is authorized by its
Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country in relation to Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.

 The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or
gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR
amounts to a legislative franchise for the purpose.

 On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent PAGCOR from managing and/or
operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games on the ground that the act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis
either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.

 On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR entered into an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME wherein the latter
parties would provide all the required facilities and requirements for the establishment and operation of jai-alai.

 On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of the
agreement stating that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, authority, legislative franchise, or authority to enter into
such agreement for the operation and establishment of jai-alai games.

 A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction. A
Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal
because it is not included in PAGCOR’s scope.

 Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and intervenor Zubiri are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as the
members of the House of Representatives.

 Respondent questions the locus standi or the standing of the petitioners to file the petition at bar as taxpayers and
as legislators because the operation of jai-alai does not involve the disbursement of public funds.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition – YES.

As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is without an “oven ready” legal support. A party suing as taxpayer must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In
essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The record shown under their agreement is barren of
evidence that the operation and management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of public money. The Court
also holds that as members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file the petition at bar. The
operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise.
Hence, powers of Congress are being impared, so as the powers of each of its members.

DECISION.

Petitioners have legal standing to file the petition

NOTES.

The states issue is only a “procedural issue” questioning when can taxpayers file a suit.
The substantive issue concerns whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the right to manage and operate jai-
alai. It was ruled that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT to operate jai-alai because:

 It was not stated under its scope.

 In accordance with its historical creation, there is a separate Executive Order which controls the operating of Jai-
Alai (controlled by the Romualdezes) in Manila. PACGOR’s franchise was never given a franchise to operate jai-
alai.

 Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from each other.

 PAGCOR is engaged in the business affected with public interest.

CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180016 / APRIL 29, 2014 / PERALTA J. / ESTAFA / AABPAYAD

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari

PETITIONER Lito Corpuz

RESPONDENT People of the Philippines

FACTS.

• Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo
City sometime in 1990.

• Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that Tangcoy
had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.

• Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for
men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date.

• They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items,
within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces
of jewelry. When Tangcoy was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

• A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz.

• On the prosecution, it was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who
is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with Tongcoy.

• However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank
receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the
supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

• RTC and CA – accused is guilty of estafa.

ISSUE & RATIO.

1. WON the demand to return the subject the subject jewelry, if unsold, or remit the proceeds, if sold, is a valid
demand under one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC? – YES.
Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it
has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People:

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or
written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b),
thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would have stated
so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral
demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, we held
that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so
happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of
the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the
receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed
to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the
prejudice of the latter.

Caveat: There’s a discussion about the penalty for estafa, like need na daw sya i-amend. But the SC didn’t impose the
same kasi duty daw yun ng Congress. Basta, it’s long kasi kaya I didn’t include it here. Check nyo nalang powz.

DECISION.

Petition denied.

G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-
appellant.
FACTS:

Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, sent telegrams and a confirmation letter to the manager
of the Aparri branch of PNB, authorizing an extension of credit in favour of Puno y Concepcion, S. en C. in the amount of
P300,000.00. This special authorization limited the discretional power of the local manager of the Aparri branch to grant
loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which in certain cases, could be increased to P10,000. Pursuant to
this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000 was granted to Puno y Concepcion, S. en C., the only security required
consisting of six demand notes. This Puno y Concepcion, S. en C., in reality is a copartnership capitalized at P100,000
wherein, Venancio Concepcion’s wife owns half of the copartnership. Venancio Concepcion was found guilty by the CFI
for violation of Section 354 of Act 2747 which provides that: : "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant
loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership was a “loan” within the meaning of
Section 35 of Act No. 2747.

YES. The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed by a
lender that he will pay what he may promise. A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party
of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. The
concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit,"
 2. Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership was a “loan” or a “discount”.

LOAN. Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of an actual, live,
transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of loaning money, with, however, these distinctions:
(1) In a discount, interest is deducted in advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a
discount is always on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name paper.

Conceding, without deciding, the law covers loans and not discounts, yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand
notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but were mere evidences of
indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes fell due;
and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.

3. Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnershop was an “indirect loan” within the meaning
of Section 35 of Act 2747.

YES. In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a
director of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve
two masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is
shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to
partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition.

Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a conjugal partnership. (Articles 1315,
1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.) A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a
director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by the acknowledged fact that
in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit
the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.

Tanada v. Yulo
Case No. 288 No. 43575 (May 31, 1935) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11

FACTS: Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philippine Commission,
assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 birthday on
October 5, 1934, subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who
have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting
upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No.
3899.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office.

2. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission.

HELD: No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold
office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of
Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated.

No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction
grounded on original appointment.

HELD:

3. The natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No. 3899, leaves room for no other deducting
than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on
September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and to the date fixed for
cessation from office which was on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act.

A justice of the peace like the petitioner who became sixty-five years of age on October 5, 1934, was not included in a law
which required justice of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.

2. It is to be deduced that according to the United States Supreme Court, the transfer simply amounted to an enlargement
or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment and thus did not require a new appointment. Whatever our
view is might have been to the contrary, it now becomes our duty to follow the decision of the higher court. It also seems
evident that a transfer as applied to officers amounts merely to a change of position or to another grade of service.

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
Facts

Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice
Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any
public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of
the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the
Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

Issue(s)

Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
constitutional?

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive and well considered
decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge
Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was
in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. On the issue of whether Section
13 of Republic Act No. 590 is constitutional, the court believes that this is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiat as enunciated in
section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The court reiterates the
doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a
judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Further, the court holds that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department,
and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may
not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section 13, Republic
Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered “not to be a diminution of
his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law”, constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the
judiciary. In this sense, the court is of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the
fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges
salaries, dissenting opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to the Income
Tax Law prevailing. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect. Hence, court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of
imposing income tax on judges’ salaries.

NPC v. Province of Lanao del Sur

Case No. 187
G.R. No. 96700 (November 19, 1996)
Chapter III, Page 122, Footnote No.232

FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its tax exempt status was revoked by P.D.
1931. Because of the Petitioner’s failure to pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole
bidder. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. With the Resolutions issued by the
Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the tax exemption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However,
Respondent contends that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the
Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to restore tax exemptions and that the said
Board can only recommend to the President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given
exemptions. Note however, that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs. Macaraig case stating that
the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of
Finance. In the present case, the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by the Minister of
Finance.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against, and thereafter sell at
public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such
taxes.
2. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges,
including its exemption from payment of RPT.

HELD:
The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status, but its privileges were only suspended. Thus, the Respondent cannot
assess deficiency RPT against the Petitioner. Furthermore, since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT, the
subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioner’s assets is also considered void.

Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo

Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Facts:

Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in
Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation
proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property.
The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied,
Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and
the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The
SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940,
which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental
importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.

Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply
invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably
devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public.
To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the
State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner.
What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking

Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is
that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is
because the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for
the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value
of the property at the time it is taken.

Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case

No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula
for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying
interpretation of economic policies – a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and
equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence

Velasco Dissent:

The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process of law. As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings
should lead to failure of taking an individual’s property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the
complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss thereof.

For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time the property owners filed
the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of
expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue
condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking
private property.

Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was
deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from
the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together
and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once
during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction.
Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will
never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed
is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
 Co vs Court of Appeals Case Digest
G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3,
1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A
criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the
promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are
also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward.
The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v.
People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and
other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the
scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

LAZATIN V. DESIERTO G.R. 147097

Facts: The Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint Affidavit against petitioners
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID, and ANGELITO A. PELYAO with Illegal Use of
Public Funds.

The complaint alleged irregularities in the use of Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF).
Main reason: He was both the proponent and implementer of the projects funded by CDF, signed the vouchers and
supporting documents pertinent to disbursement and he also was the one who received such. It was alleged that
petitioner, together with the help of Morales, David, and Pelayo was able to convert his CDF into cash.

After preliminary investigation, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) recommended filing 14 counts of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section (e) of R.A.No. 3019. Said resolution was approved by Ombudsman,
thus 28 Informations were filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner submitted reconsideration, it was granted by the Sandiganbayan who ordered reinvestigation. Office of the
Special Prosecutor’s (OSP) recommended dismissal for lack or insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman however
ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP resolution. OLA recommended to proceed with the trial.
Ombudsman adopted OLA’s resolution.

Petitioner’s main allegation is that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn OSP’s resolution because of lack of
authority to do so. They alleged that base on the constitution, the Ombudsmanand OSP are separate entities and thus the
prior does not have the power to overturn any decision made the latter. Second, checks were issued to Lazatin as
reimbursement for advances he made.

Decision of lower courts/CA: Directly filed with SC from Sandiganbayan/Ombudsman.

Issue: Whether Ombudsman has the authority to overturn the OSP.

Ratio: This Court held that giving the prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as
paragraph 8, 13, Article IX provides that the Ombudsman shall “exercise with other functions or duties as may be provided
by law.” Thus, the Legislature passed R.A. No. 6770, which contains Section 3, placing the OSP under the Ombudsman
was upheld by this court. Section 7 of Article IX expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be

Constitutional Law Case: RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office
of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration
of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of
the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of
the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-
list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made
against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and
rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased
to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of
Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during rallies were valid?

3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?

4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?

5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are
used?

Ruling:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.")

(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the
part of the police or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires andunconstitutional. The
Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the
PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form
of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles
for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury”
resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best
assurance that due process of law would be observed.

Pelaez vs. Auditor General (G.R. No. L23825) - Digest

FACTS:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
The third paragraph of

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or
by Act of Congress.

Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan

ISSUE:

W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities

RULING:

On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new
municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to
fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power”

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law,
but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by
the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and,
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality
and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus,
by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel
local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.

Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested
in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments,
bureaus or offices.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders
or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Facts

 The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring all employers in computing
premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of
other media remuneration.

 The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as it is contrary to a previous Circular
No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
  Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and the employees’
respective monthly premium contributions.

 The counsel questioned the validity of the circular

 Social Security Commission overruled the objections

 Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

Issue

Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering
the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act”

Held

Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All remuneration for employment include the cash
value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash. Except:

 that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month;

 bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and

 dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment
include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in
excess of P500.00 received during the month.

Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned with the interpretation of the law as
amended which was Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce. The Commission simply stated their opinion as to how
the law should be construed and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official
Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Administrative interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.G.R. NO. 164171. FEBRUARY 20, 2006

ACTS:

On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156 entitled"Providing for a
comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicledevelopment program and its implementing
guidelines." The said provision prohibitsthe importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the Subi
c BayFreeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions. Consequently, three separateactions for declaratory
relief were filed by Southwing Heavy Industries Inc., Subic
IntegratedMacro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc.praying that judgment
be rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutionaland illegal.The RTC rendered a summary
judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutesan unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by
the Constitution with Congress and thatthe proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA7227) or the Bases
Conversionand Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport.Appeal in the
CA was denied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Executive Order banning the importation of used vehicles through the FreeTrade Zone is valid.
HELD:

NO. EO 156, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on theimportation of used cars to the
Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreignterritory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to
protect is actually the "customs territory"which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 which
states: "theportion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code ofthe Philippines
and other national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect."

LAGCAO V. LABRA
October 13, 2004 | Corona, J.

FACTS:

The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners Diosdado, Doroteo and Ursula Lagcao. In 1964, Province of
Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which is the lot 1029. 1965, petitioners purchased said lot on
installment but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the Province of Cebu. The latter tried to annul sale which resulted
to the filing of the case of the petitioners. RTC and CA ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was executed and a
TCT was issued in their favor. When they tried to take possession of the land, they found out that it was occupied by
squatters. Thus, they instituted ejectment proceedings which was later on granted by the MTCC and affirmed by RTC.
However, Mayor Garcia wrote letters requesting the deferment of the demolition since the city was still looking for a
relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During the suspension the Sang. Panlungsod of Cebu passed a
resolution and 2 ordinances (all about the lot 1029). Ord. No. 1843likewise appropriated the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the
payment of subject land; this was approved by the Mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case at bar.

HELD:

NO, it is NOT VALID. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of public character. Govt. may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the
city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance no. 1843 stated no reason for the
choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized housing project. Moreover, under RA 7279, private lands rank last
in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings maybe resorted to
only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Thus, the ordinance in question is likewise null because: (1) it
is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of RA 7279 and 7160 (LGC); (2)the precipitate manner in which it was enacted
was plain oppression masquerading as pro-poor ordinance; (3) the fact that the land was singled out
manifests partiality against petitioners; (4) it failed to show that there was reasonable relation bet. the end
sought and the means adopted.