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De Castro vs JBC Gr No.

191342, April 20, 2010


Chief Justice Reynato Puno was about to retire on May 17,
2010. Meanwhile, there was an upcoming Presidential Election
on May 10, 2010.
On the decision dated March 17, 2010, the Court directed the
Judicial and Bar Council
(1) to prepare a short list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice to be submitted to incumbent President Gloria
Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010; and
(2) to continue proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and to fill other
vacancies in the Judiciary, and to submit to the President the
short list of nominees corresponding thereto.
Various motions for reconsideration assailing the Constitutional
ban for midnight appointments were filed and consolidated in
this proceeding.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the Constitutional ban to midnight
appointments as written in Section 15 Article VII apply to the
judiciary? No.
2) Whether or not the Valenzuela decision is controlling? No.
Ruling: Motions for reconsideration dismissed.
1) The Constitutional ban to midnight appointments as
written in Section 15 Article VII do not apply to the
judiciary.
Section 15 Article VII of the Constitution provides
​Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The Supreme Court ruled that this ban does not apply to the
judiciary because referring to the records of the Constitutional
Commission, any reference to the Judiciary was removed from
the proposal in the provision regarding nepotism (Sec 13, Article
VII). Therefore, Sec 15, Article VIII is likewise was not
intended to apply to the judiciary.
Furthermore, the Constitutional ban in Section 15, Article VII
was not compatible with Section 4(1) and Section 9 paragraph 2
of Article VIII and which provides
​Sec 4 (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
​Sec 9 par 2. XXX For lower courts, the President shall
issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
As explained in the decision dated on March 17, 2010, “Had the
framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4(1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or
Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.”
2) The Valenzuela decision is not controlling.
Section 4(3) Article VIII provides:
(3) XXX Provided that no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
The principle of stare decisis only binds the lower courts
and guides the highest court. The Court, especially with a new
membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification.
Hence, to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed,
or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if
not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid or
rationality and foundation.

Vidal vs COMELEC G.R. No. 20666, Jan 21, 2015


On September 12, 2007, Former President Estrada has been
convicted for the crime of plunder with a penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On
October 25, 2007, former President Gloria Arroyo granted the
former pardon:
PARDON
XXX
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to
no longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred
upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency
to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
XXX
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect. XXX
Estrada "received and accepted" the pardon.
In 2010, Estrada ran for presidency. Petitions to disqualify
Estrada were dismissed by the COMELEC who ruled that the
pardon granted to Estrada restored his right to vote and be voted
for a public office.
On October 2, 2012, Estrada ran for mayor of Manila City.
Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration was again
dismissed by the COMELEC. The case was elevated to this
court. Pending decision, Estrada was voted into office. Lim,
being the second placer, intervened in this case.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted
for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo? No.
a) Whether or not the right to seek public office is included in
Estrada’s pardon? Yes
b) Whether or not Estrada is disqualified to hold office based on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code despite pardon? No
b) Whether or not the pardon granted to Estrada is absolute? Yes
Ruling: Petition is dismissed.
a) Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary
in character, as the term "political rights" adverted to has a
settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
Article 36 and Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the right to hold public office should be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon. However, the pardoning
power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action
based on the constitution and legislative history.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of
the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardon limited
only to (1) impeachment cases, (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction, and (3) cases involving
violation of election laws:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
Furthermore, this doctrine of non-diminution or non-
impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of
Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly
adhered by the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they
refused to make graft and corruption non-pardonable within
the parameters of legislation.
Hence, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be
construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive
clemency granted by the President, instead of in an overly strict
interpretation that may impair the same.
Furthermore, both law, such as Sec 5 of R.A. No. 9225, and
jurisprudence, such as Sobejana-Condon vs COMELEC,
recognizes that the right to seek public elective office falls
under civil and political rights.
b) The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him.
Sec. 40, Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
XXX
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a)
of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon
or amnesty. Thus, any person, who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, is allowed to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
b) The pardon granted to Estrada is absolute. The clause
“WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to
no longer seek any elective position or office,” is a preamble. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can
neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over
its text.
Furthermore, former President Arroyo’s silence on former
President Estrada’s decision to run for President in the May
2010 elections speaks volume of her intention to restore him to
his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.

Monsanto vs Factoran Gr No. 78239, Feb 09, 1989


Facts:
On March 25, 1983, Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) was convinced of the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was
sentenced with prison correccional as the minimum, and prison
mayor as the maximum, and to indemnify the government for
actual damages. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but
while said motion was pending, she was extended absolute
pardon on December 17, 1984.
Petitioner requested automatic reinstatement, which the Finance
Ministry granted. However, backpay was not granted and she
was required to fulfil the civil liabilities incidental to the
conviction. She filed a motion for reconsideration which was
elevated to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. then held that (1) the
petitioner is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the
basis of the absolute pardon (2) the petitioner must secure
reappointment to resume office and (3) the petitioner is liable for
the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.
Issue:
1) Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment? No
2) Whether or not she is liable for the civil liabilities
concomitant to her previous conviction? Yes
Ruling: Ruling of Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran, Jr, is
affirmed.
1) While full pardon restores Monsanto’s eligibility for
appointment to office, such pardon does not necessarily restore
her to public office.
A pardon is an act of grace by the chief executive which
exempts the individual from the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities in
cases of full pardon. Pardon does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not
wash out the moral stain.
Hence, to regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she
must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment. However, since public offices are intended
primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the
common good, a pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude
the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
Furthermore, a pardon looks to the future and is not
retrospective thus precluding the petitioner from receiving
backpay.
2) Monsanto is liable for the civil liabilities concomitant to her
previous conviction.
The Revised Penal Code expressly provides that "a pardon shall
in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence." (Art. 36, par. 2).
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of
the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

*Side note: The amendment of the 1973 Constitution on April


7, 1981 had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be
extended only upon final conviction; this has been restored in
the 1987 Constitution.
​The President may, except in cases of impeachment,
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.
*Side note: The Garland case (1866) stated that full pardon
releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt of
the offender, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. This is now
rejected by modern authorities.

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