Chief Justice Reynato Puno was about to retire on May 17, 2010. Meanwhile, there was an upcoming Presidential Election on May 10, 2010. On the decision dated March 17, 2010, the Court directed the Judicial and Bar Council (1) to prepare a short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be submitted to incumbent President Gloria Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010; and (2) to continue proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary, and to submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto. Various motions for reconsideration assailing the Constitutional ban for midnight appointments were filed and consolidated in this proceeding. Issues: 1) Whether or not the Constitutional ban to midnight appointments as written in Section 15 Article VII apply to the judiciary? No. 2) Whether or not the Valenzuela decision is controlling? No. Ruling: Motions for reconsideration dismissed. 1) The Constitutional ban to midnight appointments as written in Section 15 Article VII do not apply to the judiciary. Section 15 Article VII of the Constitution provides Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The Supreme Court ruled that this ban does not apply to the judiciary because referring to the records of the Constitutional Commission, any reference to the Judiciary was removed from the proposal in the provision regarding nepotism (Sec 13, Article VII). Therefore, Sec 15, Article VIII is likewise was not intended to apply to the judiciary. Furthermore, the Constitutional ban in Section 15, Article VII was not compatible with Section 4(1) and Section 9 paragraph 2 of Article VIII and which provides Sec 4 (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Sec 9 par 2. XXX For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. As explained in the decision dated on March 17, 2010, “Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.” 2) The Valenzuela decision is not controlling. Section 4(3) Article VIII provides: (3) XXX Provided that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. The principle of stare decisis only binds the lower courts and guides the highest court. The Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. Hence, to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid or rationality and foundation.
Vidal vs COMELEC G.R. No. 20666, Jan 21, 2015
On September 12, 2007, Former President Estrada has been convicted for the crime of plunder with a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, former President Gloria Arroyo granted the former pardon: PARDON XXX WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office, IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights. XXX Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect. XXX Estrada "received and accepted" the pardon. In 2010, Estrada ran for presidency. Petitions to disqualify Estrada were dismissed by the COMELEC who ruled that the pardon granted to Estrada restored his right to vote and be voted for a public office. On October 2, 2012, Estrada ran for mayor of Manila City. Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada and the subsequent motion for reconsideration was again dismissed by the COMELEC. The case was elevated to this court. Pending decision, Estrada was voted into office. Lim, being the second placer, intervened in this case. Issues: 1) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo? No. a) Whether or not the right to seek public office is included in Estrada’s pardon? Yes b) Whether or not Estrada is disqualified to hold office based on Section 40 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code despite pardon? No b) Whether or not the pardon granted to Estrada is absolute? Yes Ruling: Petition is dismissed. a) Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political rights" adverted to has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence. Article 36 and Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the right to hold public office should be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. However, the pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action based on the constitution and legislative history. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardon limited only to (1) impeachment cases, (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction, and (3) cases involving violation of election laws: Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. xxxx Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission. Furthermore, this doctrine of non-diminution or non- impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered by the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they refused to make graft and corruption non-pardonable within the parameters of legislation. Hence, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of in an overly strict interpretation that may impair the same. Furthermore, both law, such as Sec 5 of R.A. No. 9225, and jurisprudence, such as Sobejana-Condon vs COMELEC, recognizes that the right to seek public elective office falls under civil and political rights. b) The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him. Sec. 40, Local Government Code provides: SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; XXX Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code provides: Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. Thus, any person, who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, is allowed to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position. b) The pardon granted to Estrada is absolute. The clause “WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,” is a preamble. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Furthermore, former President Arroyo’s silence on former President Estrada’s decision to run for President in the May 2010 elections speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Monsanto vs Factoran Gr No. 78239, Feb 09, 1989
Facts: On March 25, 1983, Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) was convinced of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was sentenced with prison correccional as the minimum, and prison mayor as the maximum, and to indemnify the government for actual damages. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended absolute pardon on December 17, 1984. Petitioner requested automatic reinstatement, which the Finance Ministry granted. However, backpay was not granted and she was required to fulfil the civil liabilities incidental to the conviction. She filed a motion for reconsideration which was elevated to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. then held that (1) the petitioner is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon (2) the petitioner must secure reappointment to resume office and (3) the petitioner is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. Issue: 1) Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment? No 2) Whether or not she is liable for the civil liabilities concomitant to her previous conviction? Yes Ruling: Ruling of Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran, Jr, is affirmed. 1) While full pardon restores Monsanto’s eligibility for appointment to office, such pardon does not necessarily restore her to public office. A pardon is an act of grace by the chief executive which exempts the individual from the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities in cases of full pardon. Pardon does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. Hence, to regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. However, since public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good, a pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. Furthermore, a pardon looks to the future and is not retrospective thus precluding the petitioner from receiving backpay. 2) Monsanto is liable for the civil liabilities concomitant to her previous conviction. The Revised Penal Code expressly provides that "a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence." (Art. 36, par. 2). Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
*Side note: The amendment of the 1973 Constitution on April
7, 1981 had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction; this has been restored in the 1987 Constitution. The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. *Side note: The Garland case (1866) stated that full pardon releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt of the offender, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. This is now rejected by modern authorities.