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Iran hostage crisis - Wikipedia

Iran hostage crisis

The Iran hostage crisis was a diplomatic standoff between Iran and the United States of America. Fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444 days from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981, after a group of Iranian college students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, who supported the Iranian Revolution, took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. [3] It stands as the longest hostage crisis in recorded history. [4]

The crisis was described by the Western media as an "entanglement" of "vengeance and mutual incomprehension". [5] President Jimmy Carter called the hostages "victims of terrorism and anarchy" and said:

"The United States will not yield to blackmail." [6] In Iran it was widely seen as a blow against the United States and its influence in Iran, including its perceived attempts to undermine the Iranian Revolution and its longstanding support of the recently overthrown Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had led an autocratic regime. "4 November 1979 is a date I will never forget," said Jimmy Carter. [7]

Pahlavi was admitted to the United States for cancer treatment. Iran demanded that he be returned to stand trial for crimes he was accused of committing during his reign. Specifically, Pahlavi was accused of committing crimes against Iranian citizens with the help of his secret police, the SAVAK. Iranians saw the decision to grant him asylum as American complicity in those atrocities; the Iranian demands were rejected by the United States. The Americans saw the hostage-taking as an egregious violation of the principles of international law, which granted diplomats immunity from arrest and made diplomatic compounds inviolable. [8][9][10][11]

his

in

The crisis reached a climax after diplomatic negotiations failed to win release for the hostages. United States President Jimmy Carter ordered the United States military to attempt a rescue operation using warships— including the USS Nimitz and USS Coral Sea—that were patrolling the waters near Iran. On April 24, 1980, the attempt, known as Operation Eagle Claw, failed, resulting in the accidental deaths of eight American servicemen

 

Iran–United States Hostage Crisis

Crisis Part of Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution Iranian students crowd the U.S. Embassy in Tehran

Iranian students crowd the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (November 4, 1979)

Date

November 4, 1979 – January 20, 1981 (444 days or 1 year, 2 months, 2 weeks and 2 days)

Location

Tehran, Iran

Result

Hostages released by Algiers Accords

 

Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and his cabinet resigned Mehdi Bazargan and his cabinet resigned

 
 
 

Belligerents

 
Iran   United States
 
Iran   United States
Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line
 
People's  
 
 
 

Commanders and leaders

 
Ruhollah Khomeini  
 
Ronald Reagan
Mohammad (January 20, 1981)

(January 20, 1981)

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and one Iranian civilian, as well as the destruction of two

helicopters. Six American diplomats who had evaded

by a joint CIA-Canadian effort on January 27, 1980. Jimmy Carter (Until January 20, 1981) Casualties

January 20, 1981)

Casualties and losses

1 Iranian civilian and 8 American servicemen killed during an attempt to rescue the hostages.

Shah Pahlavi left the United States in December 1979 and

was ultimately granted asylum in Egypt, where he died

from complications of cancer on July 27, 1980. In September 1980 the Iraqi military invaded Iran, beginning the

Iran–Iraq War. These events led the Iranian government to enter negotiations with the U.S., with Algeria acting as a

The crisis is considered a pivotal episode in the history of Iran–United States relations. [12] Political analysts cite it as a

major factor in the downfall of Jimmy Carter's presidency and his landslide loss in the 1980 presidential election. [13]

In Iran the crisis strengthened the prestige of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the political power of theocrats who

Contents

Background 1953 coup d'état Carter administration

Prelude First attempt Second attempt Takeover Motivations

The 444-day crisis Hostage conditions Impact in the United States Canadian rescue of hostages Negotiations for release Rescue attempts First rescue attempt Planned second attempt

Release

Aftermath Iran–Iraq War Consequences for Iran Consequences for the United States Diplomatic relations

Hostages Diplomats who evaded capture Hostages released November 19, 1979 Hostages released November 20, 1979 Hostage released July 1980 Hostages released January 1981 Civilian hostages Hostages honored Notable hostage-takers, guards, and interrogators

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October Surprise conspiracy theory

In popular culture

See also

Notes

References

Further reading

External links Declassified documents

Background

1953 coup d'état

In February 1979, less than a year before the crisis, the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown during the Iranian Revolution.

For several decades before that, the United States had allied with and supported the Shah. During World War II, Allied

powers Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran to force the abdication of first Pahlavi monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi,

in favor of his eldest son, Crown Prince Mohammad. [16] The Allies feared that Reza Shah intended to align his

petroleum-rich country with Nazi Germany, but Reza Shah's earlier declaration of neutrality, and his refusal to allow

Iranian territory to be used to train or supply Soviet troops against Germany, were the strongest motives for the Allied

invasion of Iran. Because of its importance in the Allied victory, Iran was subsequently called "The Bridge of Victory"

1953, the British and American spy agencies helped Iranian royalists depose Mosaddegh in a military coup d'état

codenamed Operation Ajax, allowing the Shah to extend his power. The Shah appointed himself an absolute monarch

rather than a constitutional monarch, his position before the 1953 crisis, with the aim of assuming complete control of

the government and purging the disloyal. [19][20][21] The U.S. continued to support and fund the Shah after the coup,

with the Central Intelligence Agency training the government's SAVAK secret police. In the subsequent decades of the

Cold War, various economic, cultural, and political issues united opposition against the Shah and led to his

overthrow. [22][23][24]

Carter administration

Months before the revolution, on New Year's Eve 1977, President Carter further angered anti-Shah Iranians with a

televised toast to Pahlavi, declaring how beloved the shah was by his people. After the revolution culminated in

February 1979 with the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from France, the American Embassy was occupied and

its staff held hostage briefly. Rocks and bullets had broken so many of the embassy's front-facing windows that they

had been replaced with bulletproof glass. The embassy's staff was reduced to just over 60 from a high of nearly one

thousand earlier in the decade. [25]

The Carter administration tried to mitigate anti-American feeling by promoting a new relationship with the de facto

Iranian government and continuing military cooperation in hopes that the situation would stabilize. However, on

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it. [27][28][29]

The Shah's admission to the United States intensified Iranian revolutionaries' anti-Americanism and spawned rumors

of another U.S.–backed coup that would re-install him. [30] Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been exiled by the shah for 15

years, heightened the rhetoric against the "Great Satan", as he called the United States, talking of "evidence of American plotting". [31] In addition to ending what they believed was American sabotage of the revolution, the hostage takers hoped to depose the provisional revolutionary government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, which they believed was plotting to normalize relations with the United States and extinguish Islamic revolutionary order in Iran. [32] The occupation of the embassy on November 4, 1979, was also intended as leverage to demand the return of the shah to stand trial in Iran in exchange for the hostages.

A later study claimed that there had been no American plots to overthrow the revolutionaries, and that a CIA

intelligence-gathering mission at the embassy had been "notably ineffectual, gathering little information and hampered by the fact that none of the three officers spoke the local language, Persian." Its work, the study said, was "routine, prudent espionage conducted at diplomatic missions everywhere." [33]

Prelude

First attempt

On the morning of February 14, 1979 – the same day that the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped and fatally shot by Muslim extremists in Kabul [34] – the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took a Marine named Kenneth Kraus hostage. Ambassador William Sullivan surrendered the embassy to save lives, and with the assistance of Iranian Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi, returned the embassy to U.S. hands within three hours. [35] Kraus was injured in the attack, kidnapped by the militants, tortured, tried, and convicted of murder. He was to be executed, but President Carter and Sullivan secured his release within six days. [36] This incident became known as the Valentine's Day Open House. [37]

Second attempt

The next attempt to seize the American Embassy was planned for September 1979 by Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, a student

at the time. He consulted with the heads of the Islamic associations of Tehran's main universities, including the

Asgharzadeh later said there were five students at the first meeting, two of whom wanted to target the Soviet Embassy because the USSR was "a Marxist and anti-God regime". Two others, Mohsen Mirdamadi and Habibolah Bitaraf, supported Asgharzadeh's chosen target: the United States. "Our aim was to object against the American government by going to their embassy and occupying it for several hours," Asgharzadeh said. "Announcing our objections from within the occupied compound would carry our message to the world in a much more firm and effective way." [41] Mirdamadi told an interviewer, "We intended to detain the diplomats for a few days, maybe one week, but no more." [42] Masoumeh Ebtekar, the spokeswoman for the Iranian students during the crisis, said that those who rejected Asgharzadeh's plan did not participate in the subsequent events. [43]

The students observed the procedures of the Marine Security Guards from nearby rooftops overlooking the embassy. They also drew on their experiences from the recent revolution, during which the U.S. Embassy grounds were briefly occupied. They enlisted the support of police officers in charge of guarding the embassy and of the Islamic

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According to the group and other sources, Ayatollah Khomeini did not

know of the plan beforehand. [45] The students had wanted to inform him,

would use the police to expel the students as they had the occupiers in

February. The provisional government had been appointed by Khomeini,

and so Khomeini was likely to go along with the government's request to

restore order. On the other hand, Khoeiniha knew that if Khomeini first

saw that the occupiers were faithful supporters of him (unlike the leftists in

the first occupation) and that large numbers of pious Muslims had

gathered outside the embassy to show their support for the takeover, it

would be "very hard, perhaps even impossible", for him to oppose the

takeover, and this would paralyze the Bazargan administration, which

Khoeiniha and the students wanted to eliminate. [46]

Supporters of the takeover stated that their motivation was fear of another

American-backed coup against their popular revolution. They claimed that

in 1953, the American Embassy had acted as a "den of spies" from which

the coup was organized. Documents were later found in the embassy

suggesting that some staff members had been working with American

intelligence agencies. After the Shah entered the United States, Ayatollah

Khomeini called for street demonstrations.

Anticipating the takeover of the embassy, the Americans tried to destroy classified documents in a
Anticipating the takeover of the
embassy, the Americans tried to
destroy classified documents in a
furnace. The furnace malfunctioned
and the staff was forced to use
cheap paper shredders. [38][39]
Skilled carpet weavers were later
employed to reconstruct the
documents. [40]

Takeover

On November 4, 1979, one of the demonstrations organized

by Iranian student unions loyal to Khomeini erupted into an

all-out conflict right outside the walled compound housing

the U.S. Embassy.

Two American hostages during the siege of the U.S. Embassy.
Two American hostages during the siege of the
U.S. Embassy.

Around 6:30 a.m., the ringleaders gathered between three

hundred and five hundred selected students and briefed them

on the battle plan. A female student was given a pair of metal

cutters to break the chains locking the embassy's gates and

hid them beneath her chador. [47]

At first, the students planned a symbolic occupation, in which

they would release statements to the press and leave when

government security forces came to restore order. This was

reflected in placards saying: "Don't be afraid. We just want to

sit in." When the embassy guards brandished firearms, the

protesters retreated, with one telling the Americans, "We don't mean any harm." [48] But as it became clear that the

guards would not use deadly force and that a large, angry crowd had gathered outside the compound to cheer the

occupiers and jeer the hostages, the plan changed. [49] According to one embassy staff member, buses full of

demonstrators began to appear outside the embassy shortly after the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line

broke through the gates. [50]

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As Khomeini's followers had hoped, Khomeini supported the takeover. According to Foreign Minister Yazdi, when he

went to Qom to tell Khomeini about it, Khomeini told him to "go and kick them out." But later that evening, back in

Tehran, Yazdi heard on the radio that Khomeini had issued a statement supporting the seizure, calling it "the second

revolution" and the embassy an "American spy den in Tehran". [51]

The occupiers bound and blindfolded the Marines and staff at the embassy

and paraded them in front of photographers. In the first couple of days,

many of the embassy workers who had sneaked out of the compound or

had not been there at the time of the takeover were rounded up by

Islamists and returned as hostages. [52] Six American diplomats managed to

avoid capture and took refuge in the British Embassy before being

transferred to the Canadian Embassy. Others went to the Swedish Embassy

in Tehran for three months. In a joint covert operation known as the

Canadian caper, the Canadian government and the CIA managed to

smuggle them out of Iran on January 28, 1980, using Canadian passports

and a cover story that identified them as a film crew. [53]

A two-minute clip from a newsreel regarding the hostage crisis (1980)
A two-minute clip from a newsreel
regarding the hostage crisis (1980)

A State Department diplomatic cable of November 8, 1979, details "A

Tentative, Incomplete List of U.S. Personnel Being Held in the Embassy Compound". [54]

Motivations

The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line demanded that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi return to Iran for

trial and execution. The U.S. maintained that the Shah—who was to die less than a year later, in July 1980—had come

to America for medical attention. The group's other demands included that the U.S. government apologize for its

interference in the internal affairs of Iran, including the overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh in 1953, and that

Iran's frozen assets in the United States be released.

The initial plan was to hold the embassy for only a short time, but this changed after it became apparent how popular

the takeover was and that Khomeini had given it his full support. [50] Some attributed the decision not to release the

hostages quickly to President Carter's failure to immediately deliver an ultimatum to Iran. [55] His initial response was

Bazargan, and his cabinet resigned under pressure just days after the takeover.

The duration of the hostages' captivity has also been attributed to internal Iranian revolutionary politics. As Ayatollah

Khomeini told Iran's president:

This has united our people. Our opponents do not dare act against us. We can put the constitution to the

people's vote without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections. [57]

Theocratic Islamists, as well as leftist political groups like the socialist People's Mujahedin of Iran, [58] supported the

taking of hostages as a counterattack against "American imperialism". According to scholar Daniel Pipes, writing in

1980, the Marxist-leaning leftists and the Islamists shared a common antipathy toward market-based reforms under

the late Shah, and both subsumed individualism, including the unique identity of women, under conservative, though

contrasting, visions of collectivism. Accordingly, both groups favored the Soviet Union over the United States in the

early months of the Iranian Revolution. [59] The Soviets, and possibly their allies Cuba, Libya, and East Germany, were

suspected of providing indirect assistance to the participants in the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The PLO

under Yasser Arafat provided personnel, intelligence liaisons, funding, and training for Khomeini's forces before and

after the Revolution, and was suspected of playing a role in the embassy crisis. [60] Fidel Castro reportedly praised

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Barry Rosen, the embassy's press attaché, was among the hostages. The man on the right
Barry Rosen, the embassy's press
attaché, was among the hostages.
The man on the right holding the
briefcase is alleged by some former
hostages to be future President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, although
he, Iran's government, and the CIA
deny this.

later

President

Khomeini as a revolutionary anti-imperialist who could find common

cause between revolutionary socialists and anti-American Islamists. Both

expressed disdain for modern capitalism and a preference for authoritarian

collectivism. [61] Cuba and its socialist ally Venezuela, under Hugo Chávez,

would later form ALBA in alliance with the Islamic Republic as a counter to

neoliberal American influence.

Revolutionary teams displayed secret documents purportedly taken from

the embassy, sometimes painstakingly reconstructed after shredding, [62] to

buttress their claim that "the Great Satan" (the U.S.) was trying to

destabilize the new regime and that Iranian moderates were in league with

the U.S. The documents – including telegrams, correspondence, and

reports from the U.S. State Department and CIA – were published in a

series of books called Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den (Persian:

ﺎﻜﯾﺮﻣا ﯽﺳﻮﺳﺎﺟ ﮫﻧﻻ دﺎﻨﺳا). According to a 1997 Federation of American Scientists

bulletin, by 1995, 77 volumes of Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den

had been published. [63] Many of these volumes are now available online. [64]

By embracing the hostage-taking under the slogan "America can't do a

thing", Khomeini rallied support and deflected criticism of his

controversial theocratic constitution, [65] which was scheduled for a

referendum vote in less than one month. [66] The referendum was

successful, and after the vote, both leftists and theocrats continued to use

allegations of pro-Americanism to suppress their opponents: relatively

moderate political forces that included the Iranian Freedom Movement,

the National Front, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, [67]

reports

discovered at the embassy and released by the hostage-takers led to the disempowerment and resignation of moderate

and

In

particular,

carefully

selected

diplomatic

dispatches

and

figures [68] such as Bazargan. The failed rescue attempt and the political danger of any move seen as accommodating

America delayed a negotiated release of the hostages. After the crisis ended, leftists and theocrats turned on each

other, with the stronger theocratic group annihilating the left.

The 444-day crisis

Hostage conditions

The hostage-takers, declaring their solidarity with other "oppressed

minorities" and "the special place of women in Islam", released one woman

and two African Americans on November 19. [69] Before release, these

hostages were required by their captors to hold a press conference in which

Kathy Gross and William Quarles praised the revolution's aims, [70] but four

further women and six African-Americans were released the following

day. [69] The only African-American hostage not released that month was

was later diagnosed as multiple sclerosis. The remaining 52 hostages were

held until January 1981, up to 444 days of captivity.

An anti-Iranian protest in Washington, D.C., in 1979. The front of the sign reads "Deport
An anti-Iranian protest in
Washington, D.C., in 1979. The front
of the sign reads "Deport all
Iranians" and "Get the hell out of my
country", and the back reads
"Release all Americans now".

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The hostages were initially held at the embassy, but after the failed rescue mission, they were scattered around Iran to

make a single rescue impossible. Three high-level officials – Bruce Laingen, Victor L. Tomseth, and Mike Howland –

were at the Foreign Ministry at the time of the takeover. They stayed there for some months, sleeping in the ministry's

formal dining room and washing their socks and underwear in the bathroom. At first, they were treated as diplomats,

but after the provisional government fell, their treatment deteriorated. By March, the doors to their living space were

kept "chained and padlocked." [72]

By midsummer 1980, the Iranians had moved the hostages to prisons in Tehran [73] to prevent escapes or rescue

attempts and to improve the logistics of guard shifts and food delivery. [74] The final holding area, from November

1980 until their release, was the Teymur Bakhtiar mansion in Tehran, where the hostages were finally given tubs,

showers, and hot and cold running water. [75] Several foreign diplomats and ambassadors – including former Canadian

ambassador Ken Taylor – visited the hostages over the course of the crisis and relayed information back to the U.S.

government, including dispatches from Laingen.

A headline in an Islamic Republican newspaper on November 5, 1979, read "Revolutionary occupation of
A headline in an Islamic Republican newspaper
on November 5, 1979, read "Revolutionary
occupation of U.S. embassy".

Iranian propaganda stated that the hostages were "guests"

and were treated with respect. Asgharzadeh, the student

leader, described the original plan as a nonviolent and

symbolic action in which the "gentle and respectful

treatment" of the hostages would dramatize to the world the

offended sovereignty and dignity of Iran. [76] In America, an

Iranian chargé d'affaires, Ali Agha, stormed out of a meeting

with an American official, exclaiming: "We are not

mistreating the hostages. They are being very well taken care

of in Tehran. They are our guests." [77]

The actual treatment was far different. The hostages

described beatings, [78] theft, [79] and fear of bodily harm. Two

of them, William Belk and Kathryn Koob, recalled being

paraded blindfolded before an angry, chanting crowd outside

the embassy. [80] Others reported having their hands bound "day and night" for days [81] or even weeks; [82] long periods

of solitary confinement; [83] and months of being forbidden to speak to one another [84] or to stand, walk, or leave their

space unless they were going to the bathroom. [85] All of the hostages "were threatened repeatedly with execution, and

took it seriously". [86] The hostage-takers played Russian roulette with their victims. [87]

The most terrifying night for the hostages came on February 5, 1980, when guards in black ski masks roused them

from their sleep and led them blindfolded to other rooms. They were searched after being ordered to strip naked and

keep their hands up. They were then told to kneel down, still wearing blindfolds. "This was the greatest moment," one

hostage said. Another later recalled, "It was an embarrassing moment. However, we were too scared to realize it." The

guards cocked their weapons and readied them to fire, but finally ejected their rounds and told the prisoners to get

dressed. The hostages were later told that the exercise had been "just a joke," something the guards "had wanted to

do." [88]

One, Michael Metrinko, was kept in solitary confinement for months. On two occasions, when he expressed his

opinion of Ayatollah Khomeini, he was punished severely. The first time, he was kept in handcuffs for two weeks, [89]

and the second time, he was beaten and kept alone in a freezing cell for two weeks. [90]

Another hostage, U.S. Army medic Donald Hohman, went on a hunger strike for several weeks, [91] and two hostages

attempted suicide. Steve Lauterbach broke a water glass and slashed his wrists after being locked in a dark basement

room with his hands tightly bound. He was found by guards and rushed to the hospital. [92] Jerry Miele, a CIA

communication technician, smashed his head into the corner of a door, knocking himself unconscious and cutting a

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deep gash. "Naturally withdrawn" and looking "ill, old, tired, and vulnerable," Miele had become the butt of his guards'

jokes, and they had rigged up a mock electric chair to emphasize the fate that awaited him. His fellow hostages applied

first aid and raised the alarm, and he was taken to a hospital after a long delay created by the guards. [93]

Other hostages described threats to boil their feet in oil (Alan B. Golacinski), [94] cut their eyes out (Rick Kupke), [95] or

kidnap and kill a disabled son in America and "start sending pieces of him to your wife" (David Roeder). [96]

Four hostages tried to escape, [97] and all were punished with stretches of solitary confinement when their attempts

were discovered.

Queen, the hostage sent home because of his multiple sclerosis, first

developed dizziness and numbness in his left arm six months before his

release. [98] His symptoms were misdiagnosed by the Iranians at first as a

reaction to drafts of cold air. When warmer confinement did not help, he

was told that it was "nothing" and that the symptoms would soon

disappear. [99] Over the months, the numbness spread to his right side, and

the dizziness worsened until he "was literally flat on his back, unable to

move without growing dizzy and throwing up." [100]

The cruelty of the Iranian prison guards became "a form of slow

torture." [101] The guards often withheld mail – telling one hostage, Charles

W. Scott, "I don't see anything for you, Mr. Scott. Are you sure your wife

has not found another man?" [102] – and the hostages' possessions went

missing. [103]

A group photograph of the fifty-two hostages in a Wiesbaden hospital where they spent a
A group photograph of the fifty-two
hostages in a Wiesbaden hospital
where they spent a few days after
their release.

As the hostages were taken to the aircraft that would fly them out of Tehran, they were led through a gauntlet of

students forming parallel lines and shouting, "Marg bar Amrika" ("death to America"). [104] When the pilot announced

that they were out of Iran, the "freed hostages went wild with happiness. Shouting, cheering, crying, clapping, falling

into one another's arms." [105]

Impact in the United States

In the United States, the hostage crisis created "a surge of patriotism" and

left "the American people more united than they have been on any issue in

two decades". [106] The hostage-taking was seen "not just as a diplomatic

affront", but as a "declaration of war on diplomacy itself." [107] Television

news gave daily updates. [108] In January 1980, the CBS Evening News

anchor Walter Cronkite began ending each show by saying how many days

the hostages had been captive. [109] President Carter applied economic and

diplomatic pressure: Oil imports from Iran were ended on November 12,

1979, and with Executive Order 12170, around US$8 billion of Iranian

A heckler in Washington, D.C., leans across a police line toward a demonstration of Iranians
A heckler in Washington, D.C.,
leans across a police line toward a
demonstration of Iranians in August
1980.

During the weeks leading up to Christmas in 1979, high school students

made cards that were delivered to the hostages. [5] Community groups across the country did the same, resulting in

bales of Christmas cards. The National Christmas Tree was left dark except for the top star.

The two Trenton, N.J., newspapers at the time, The Trenton Times and the Trentonian and perhaps others around the

country, printed full-page color American flags in their newspapers for readers to cut out and place in the front

windows of their homes as support for the hostages to be left in their windows until the hostages were brought home

safely.

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A severe backlash against Iranians in the United States developed. One Iranian American later complained, "I had to

hide my Iranian identity not to get beaten up, even at university." [110]

According to Bowden, a pattern emerged in President Carter's attempts to negotiate the hostages' release: "Carter

would latch on to a deal proffered by a top Iranian official and grant minor but humiliating concessions, only to have it

scotched at the last minute by Khomeini." [111]

Canadian rescue of hostages

On the day the hostages were seized, six American

diplomats evaded capture and remained in hiding at the

home of the Canadian diplomat John Sheardown, under the

protection of the Canadian ambassador, Ken Taylor. In late

1979, the government of Prime Minister Joe Clark secretly

issued an Order in Council [112] allowing Canadian passports

to be issued to some American citizens so that they could

escape. In cooperation with the CIA, which used the cover

story of a film project, two CIA agents and the six American

diplomats boarded a Swissair flight to Zurich, Switzerland,

on January 28, 1980. Their rescue from Iran, known as the

Canadian caper, [113][114][115] was fictionalized in the 2012

film Argo.

Negotiations for release

Rescue attempts

Americans expressed gratitude for Canadian efforts to rescue American diplomats during the hostage crisis.
Americans expressed gratitude for Canadian efforts
to rescue American diplomats during the hostage
crisis.

First rescue attempt

hostages. [116] Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, who attended the meeting in Vance's place, did not inform

Vance. [116] Furious, Vance handed in his resignation on principle, calling Brzezinski "evil". [116]

Late in the afternoon of April 24, 1980, eight RH53D helicopters flew from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz to a remote

road serving as an airstrip in the Great Salt Desert of Eastern Iran, near Tabas. They encountered severe dust storms

that disabled two of the helicopters, which were traveling in complete radio silence. Early the next morning, the

remaining six helicopters met up with several waiting Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport aircraft at a landing site and

refueling area designated "Desert One".

At this point, a third helicopter was found to be unserviceable, bringing the total below the six deemed vital for the

mission. The commander of the operation, Col. Charles Alvin Beckwith, recommended that the mission be aborted,

and his recommendation was approved by President Carter. As the helicopters repositioned themselves for refueling,

one ran into a C130 tanker aircraft and crashed, killing eight U.S. servicemen and injuring several more. [117]

In May 1980 the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned a Special Operations review group of six senior military officers,

led by Adm. James L. Holloway III, to thoroughly examine all aspects of the rescue attempt. The group identified 23

issues that were significant in the failure of the mission, 11 of which it deemed major. The overriding issue was

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operational security—that is, keeping the mission secret so that the arrival of the rescue team at the embassy would be a complete surprise. This severed the usual relationship between pilots and weather forecasters; the pilots were not informed about the local dust storms. Another security requirement was that the helicopter pilots come from the same unit. The unit picked for the mission was a U.S. Navy mine-laying unit flying CH-53D Sea Stallions; these helicopters were considered the best suited for the mission because of their long range, large capacity, and compatibility with shipboard operations.

Two hours into the flight, the crew of helicopter No. 6 saw a warning light indicating that a main rotor might be cracked. They landed in the desert, confirmed visually that a crack had started to develop, and stopped flying in accordance with normal operating procedure. Helicopter No. 8 landed to pick up the crew of No. 6, and abandoned No. 6 in the desert without destroying it. The report by Holloway's group pointed out that a cracked helicopter blade could have been used to continue the mission and that its likelihood of catastrophic failure would have been low for many hours, especially at lower flying speeds. [118] The report found that the pilot of No. 6 would have continued the mission if instructed to do so.

When the helicopters encountered two dust storms along the way to the refueling point, the second more severe than the first, the pilot of No. 5 turned back because the mine-laying helicopters were not equipped with terrain-following radar. The report found that the pilot could have continued to the refueling point if he had been told that better weather awaited him there, but because of the command for radio silence, he did not ask about the conditions ahead. The report also concluded that "there were ways to pass the information" between the refueling station and the helicopter force "that would have small likelihood of compromising the mission"—in other words, that the ban on communication had not been necessary at this stage. [119]

Helicopter No. 2 experienced a partial hydraulic system failure but was able to fly on for four hours to the refueling location. There, an inspection showed that a hydraulic fluid leak had damaged a pump and that the helicopter could not be flown safely, nor repaired in time to continue the mission. Six helicopters was thought to be the absolute minimum required for the rescue mission, so with the force reduced to five, the local commander radioed his intention

to abort. This request was passed through military channels to President Carter, who agreed. [120]

After the mission and its failure were made known publicly, Khomeini credited divine intervention on behalf of Islam, and his prestige skyrocketed in Iran. [121] Iranian officials who favored release of the hostages, such as President Bani Sadr, were weakened. In America, President Carter's political popularity and prospects for being re-elected in 1980 were further damaged after a television address on April 25 in which he explained the rescue operation and accepted responsibility for its failure.

Planned second attempt

A second rescue attempt, planned but never carried out, would have used highly modified YMC-130H Hercules

Shiroudi football stadium near the embassy, were modified under a rushed, super-secret program known as Operation Credible Sport. One crashed during a demonstration at Eglin Air Force Base on October 29, 1980, when its braking rockets were fired too soon. The misfire caused a hard touchdown that tore off the starboard wing and started a fire, but all on board survived. After Carter lost the presidential election in November, the project was abandoned.

The failed rescue attempt led to the creation of the 160th SOAR, a helicopter aviation Special Operations group.

Release

With the completion of negotiations, the hostages were released on January 20, 1981. That day, at the moment President Reagan completed his 20minute inaugural address after being sworn in, the 52 American hostages were released to U.S. personnel. [122][123] There are theories and conspiracy theories regarding why Iran postponed the release until that moment. [124][125][126] (See also: October Surprise conspiracy theory) They were flown from Iran to

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Vice President George H. W. Bush and other VIPs wait to welcome the hostages home.
Vice President George H. W. Bush
and other VIPs wait to welcome the
hostages home.

Algeria as a symbolic gesture of appreciation for the Algerian government's

help in resolving the crisis. The flight continued to Rhein-Main Air Base in

West Germany and on to an Air Force hospital in Wiesbaden, where former

President Carter, acting as emissary, received them. After medical check-

ups and debriefings, the hostages made a second flight to a refueling stop

in Shannon, Ireland, where they were greeted by a large crowd. The ex-

days, receiving a heroes' welcome all along the route. Ten days after their

release, they were given a ticker tape parade through the Canyon of Heroes

in New York City.

The hostages disembark Freedom One, an Air Force Boeing C-137 Stratoliner aircraft, upon their return.
The hostages disembark Freedom
One, an Air Force Boeing C-137
Stratoliner aircraft, upon their return.

Aftermath

Iran–Iraq War

The Iraqi invasion of Iran occurred less than a year after the embassy

employees were taken hostage. The journalist Stephen Kinzer argues that

the dramatic change in American–Iranian relations, from allies to enemies,

helped embolden the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and that the United

States' anger with Iran led it to aid the Iraqis after the war turned against

them. [127] The United States supplied Iraq with, among other things,

"helicopters and satellite intelligence that was used in selecting bombing targets." This assistance "deepened and

widened anti-American feeling in Iran." [127]

Consequences for Iran

The hostage-taking was unsuccessful for Iran in some respects. It lost

international support for its war against Iraq, and the negotiated

settlement was considered almost wholly favorable to the United States

because it did not meet any of Iran's original demands. [128] Nevertheless,

the crisis strengthened Iranians who had supported the hostage-taking.

Anti-Americanism became even more intense. [129] Politicians such as

Khoeiniha and Behzad Nabavi [130] were left in a stronger position, while

those associated with – or accused of association with – America were

removed from the political picture. A Khomeini biographer, Baqer Moin,

described the crisis as "a watershed in Khomeini's life" that transformed

him from "a cautious, pragmatic politician" into "a modern revolutionary

single-mindedly pursuing a dogma". In Khomeini's statements,

imperialism and liberalism were "negative words", while revolution "became a sacred word, sometimes more

important than Islam". [131]

A protest in Tehran on November 4, 2015, against the United States, Israel, and Saudi
A protest in Tehran on November 4,
2015, against the United States,
Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

Some have suggested that the greatest benefit of the takeover of the American Embassy was the acquisition of

intelligence contained within the embassy, including the identity of informants to the U.S. government, which the new

Islamist government could use to remove potential dissenters and consolidate its gains.

streets of Tehran. When the authorities encouraged them to chant "death to America," the protesters instead chanted

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The November 2015 protest in Tehran.
The November 2015 protest in
Tehran.

Consequences for the United States

Simulation of the first day of the event, 3 November 2016, Tehran
Simulation of the first day of the
event, 3 November 2016, Tehran

Gifts, including lifetime passes

game, [133]

were showered on the hostages

upon their return to the United

States.

In 2000 the hostages and their families tried unsuccessfully to sue Iran

under the Antiterrorism Act of 1996. They originally won the case when

Iran failed to provide a defense, but the State Department then tried to end

the lawsuit, [134] fearing that it would make international relations difficult.

As a result, a federal judge ruled that no damages could be awarded to the hostages because of the agreement the

United States had made when the hostages were freed. [135]

The former U.S. Embassy building is now used by Iran's government and affiliated groups. Since 2001 it has served as

a museum to the revolution. Outside the door, there is a bronze model based on the Statue of Liberty on one side and a

statue portraying one of the hostages on the other. [136]

The Guardian reported in 2006 that a group called the Committee for the Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global

Islamic Campaign had used the embassy to recruit "martyrdom seekers": volunteers to carry out operations against

Western and Israeli targets. [137] Mohammad Samadi, a spokesman for the group, signed up several hundred

volunteers in a few days. [137]

Diplomatic relations

The United States and Iran broke off formal diplomatic relations over the

hostage crisis. Iran selected Algeria as its protecting power in the United

States, transferring the mandate to Pakistan in 1992. The United States

selected Switzerland as its protecting power in Iran. Relations are

maintained through the Iranian Interests Section of the Pakistan Embassy

and the U.S. Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy.

Hostages

Iran hostage crisis memorial
Iran hostage crisis memorial

There were 66 original captives: 63 taken at the embassy and three captured and held at the Foreign Ministry offices.

Three of the hostages were operatives of the CIA. [33]

Thirteen hostages were released November 19–20, 1979, and one was released on July 11, 1980.

Diplomats who evaded capture

Robert Anders, 54—consular officerwas released on July 11, 1980. Diplomats who evaded capture Mark J. Lijek, 29—consular officer Cora

Mark J. Lijek, 29—consular officerwho evaded capture Robert Anders, 54—consular officer Cora A. Lijek, 25—consular assistant Henry L. Schatz,

Cora A. Lijek, 25—consular assistant54—consular officer Mark J. Lijek, 29—consular officer Henry L. Schatz, 31—agriculture attaché Joseph D.

Henry L. Schatz, 31—agriculture attaché29—consular officer Cora A. Lijek, 25—consular assistant Joseph D. Stafford, 29—consular officer Kathleen F.

Joseph D. Stafford, 29—consular officerassistant Henry L. Schatz, 31—agriculture attaché Kathleen F. Stafford, 28—consular assistant

Kathleen F. Stafford, 28—consular assistantattaché Joseph D. Stafford, 29—consular officer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis 13/24

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Hostages released November 19, 1979

Kathy Gross, 22—secretary [ 6 9 ] [69]

Sgt Ladell Maples, USMC, 23—Marine Corps embassy guardNovember 19, 1979 Kathy Gross, 22—secretary [ 6 9 ] Sgt William Quarles, USMC, 23—Marine Corps

Sgt William Quarles, USMC, 23—Marine Corps embassy guard] Sgt Ladell Maples, USMC, 23—Marine Corps embassy guard Hostages released November 20, 1979 Sgt James

Hostages released November 20, 1979

Sgt James Hughes, USAF, 30—Air Force administrative managerCorps embassy guard Hostages released November 20, 1979 Lillian Johnson, 32—secretary Elizabeth Montagne,

Lillian Johnson, 32—secretaryJames Hughes, USAF, 30—Air Force administrative manager Elizabeth Montagne, 42—secretary Lloyd Rollins,

Elizabeth Montagne, 42—secretaryForce administrative manager Lillian Johnson, 32—secretary Lloyd Rollins, 40—administrative officer Capt Neal (Terry)

Lloyd Rollins, 40—administrative officerJohnson, 32—secretary Elizabeth Montagne, 42—secretary Capt Neal (Terry) Robinson, USAF, —Air Force military

Capt Neal (Terry) Robinson, USAF, —Air Force military intelligence officer42—secretary Lloyd Rollins, 40—administrative officer Terri Tedford, 24—secretary MSgt Joseph Vincent, USAF,

Terri Tedford, 24—secretaryRobinson, USAF, —Air Force military intelligence officer MSgt Joseph Vincent, USAF, 42—Air Force administrative

MSgt Joseph Vincent, USAF, 42—Air Force administrative managermilitary intelligence officer Terri Tedford, 24—secretary Sgt David Walker, USMC, 25—Marine Corps embassy guard Joan

Sgt David Walker, USMC, 25—Marine Corps embassy guardJoseph Vincent, USAF, 42—Air Force administrative manager Joan Walsh, 33—secretary Cpl Wesley Williams, USMC,

Joan Walsh, 33—secretarySgt David Walker, USMC, 25—Marine Corps embassy guard Cpl Wesley Williams, USMC, 24—Marine Corps embassy guard

Cpl Wesley Williams, USMC, 24—Marine Corps embassy guard25—Marine Corps embassy guard Joan Walsh, 33—secretary Hostage released July 1980 Richard Queen , 28—vice consul

Hostage released July 1980

Richard Queen , 28—vice consul Richard Queen, 28—vice consul

Hostages released January 1981

Operation Eagle Claw remnant in the former embassy
Operation Eagle Claw remnant in
the former embassy

Thomas L. Ahern, Jr.—narcotics control officer (later identified as CIA station chief) [ 1 3 8 ] [ 1 3 9 ] [138][139]

Clair Cortland Barnes, 35—communications specialistas CIA station chief) [ 1 3 8 ] [ 1 3 9 ] William E.

William E. Belk, 44—communications and records officer9 ] Clair Cortland Barnes, 35—communications specialist Robert O. Blucker, 54—economics officer Donald J. Cooke,

Robert O. Blucker, 54—economics officerWilliam E. Belk, 44—communications and records officer Donald J. Cooke, 25—vice consul William J. Daugherty,

Donald J. Cooke, 25—vice consulrecords officer Robert O. Blucker, 54—economics officer William J. Daugherty, 33—third secretary of U.S. mission

William J. Daugherty, 33—third secretary of U.S. mission (CIA officer [ 1 4 0 ] ) [140] )

LCDR Robert Englemann, USN, 34—Navy attachésecretary of U.S. mission (CIA officer [ 1 4 0 ] ) Sgt William Gallegos, USMC,

Sgt William Gallegos, USMC, 22—Marine Corps guard4 0 ] ) LCDR Robert Englemann, USN, 34—Navy attaché Bruce W. German, 44—budget officer IS1

Bruce W. German, 44—budget officerattaché Sgt William Gallegos, USMC, 22—Marine Corps guard IS1 Duane L. Gillette, 24—Navy communications and

IS1 Duane L. Gillette, 24—Navy communications and intelligence specialist22—Marine Corps guard Bruce W. German, 44—budget officer Alan B. Golacinski, 30—chief of embassy security,

Alan B. Golacinski, 30—chief of embassy security, regional security officer regional security officer

John E. Graves, 53—public affairs officer30—chief of embassy security, regional security officer CW3 Joseph M. Hall, USA, 32—Army attaché Sgt Kevin

CW3 Joseph M. Hall, USA, 32—Army attachésecurity officer John E. Graves, 53—public affairs officer Sgt Kevin J. Hermening, USMC, 21—Marine Corps guard

Sgt Kevin J. Hermening, USMC, 21—Marine Corps guardaffairs officer CW3 Joseph M. Hall, USA, 32—Army attaché SFC Donald R. Hohman, USA, 38—Army medic

SFC Donald R. Hohman, USA, 38—Army medicSgt Kevin J. Hermening, USMC, 21—Marine Corps guard COL Leland J. Holland, USA, 53—military attaché Michael

COL Leland J. Holland, USA, 53—military attachéCorps guard SFC Donald R. Hohman, USA, 38—Army medic Michael Howland, 34—assistant regional security officer

Michael Howland, 34—assistant regional security officermedic COL Leland J. Holland, USA, 53—military attaché Charles A. Jones, Jr., 40—communications specialist,

Charles A. Jones, Jr., 40—communications specialist, teletype operatorMichael Howland, 34—assistant regional security officer Malcolm K. Kalp, 42—commercial officer Moorhead C.

Malcolm K. Kalp, 42—commercial officerJr., 40—communications specialist, teletype operator Moorhead C. Kennedy, Jr., 50—economic and commercial

Moorhead C. Kennedy, Jr., 50—economic and commercial officer [ 1 4 1 ] [141]

William F. Keough, Jr., 50—superintendent of the American School in Islamabad (visiting Tehran at time of embassy seizure) American School in Islamabad (visiting Tehran at time of embassy seizure)

in Islamabad (visiting Tehran at time of embassy seizure) Keough, the final superintendent (principal) of the

Keough, the final superintendent (principal) of the Tehran American School (TAS), was shipping out the TAS' students' transcripts; the transcripts were not sent. [142]

Cpl Steven W. Kirtley, USMC—Marine Corps guardtranscripts; the transcripts were not sent. [ 1 4 2 ] Kathryn L. Koob, 42—embassy cultural

Kathryn L. Koob, 42—embassy cultural officer (one of two unreleased female hostages)1 4 2 ] Cpl Steven W. Kirtley, USMC—Marine Corps guard Frederick Lee Kupke, 34—communications officer

Frederick Lee Kupke, 34—communications officer and electronics specialistcultural officer (one of two unreleased female hostages) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis 14/24

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L. Bruce Laingen , 58—chargé d'affaires L. Bruce Laingen, 58—chargé d'affaires

Steven Lauterbach, 29—administrative officer- Wikipedia L. Bruce Laingen , 58—chargé d'affaires Gary E. Lee, 37—administrative officer Sgt Paul Edward

Gary E. Lee, 37—administrative officerSteven Lauterbach, 29—administrative officer Sgt Paul Edward Lewis, USMC, 23—Marine Corps guard John W.

Sgt Paul Edward Lewis, USMC, 23—Marine Corps guardofficer Gary E. Lee, 37—administrative officer John W. Limbert, Jr. , 37—political officer Sgt James M.

John W. Limbert, Jr. , 37—political officer John W. Limbert, Jr., 37—political officer

Sgt James M. Lopez, USMC, 22—Marine Corps guardCorps guard John W. Limbert, Jr. , 37—political officer Sgt John D. McKeel, Jr., USMC, 27—Marine

Sgt John D. McKeel, Jr., USMC, 27—Marine Corps guardofficer Sgt James M. Lopez, USMC, 22—Marine Corps guard Michael J. Metrinko, 34—political officer Jerry J.

Michael J. Metrinko, 34—political officerguard Sgt John D. McKeel, Jr., USMC, 27—Marine Corps guard Jerry J. Miele, 42—communications officer SSgt

Jerry J. Miele, 42—communications officerCorps guard Michael J. Metrinko, 34—political officer SSgt Michael E. Moeller, USMC, 31—head of Marine Corps

SSgt Michael E. Moeller, USMC, 31—head of Marine Corps guard unitofficer Jerry J. Miele, 42—communications officer Bert C. Moore, 45—administration counselor Richard

Bert C. Moore, 45—administration counselorE. Moeller, USMC, 31—head of Marine Corps guard unit Richard Morefield , 51—consul general Capt Paul

Richard Morefield , 51—consul general Richard Morefield, 51—consul general

Capt Paul M. Needham, Jr., USAF, 30—Air Force logistics staff officercounselor Richard Morefield , 51—consul general Robert C. Ode, 65—retired foreign service officer on

Robert C. Ode, 65—retired foreign service officer on temporary duty in TehranNeedham, Jr., USAF, 30—Air Force logistics staff officer Sgt Gregory A. Persinger, USMC, 23—Marine Corps guard

Sgt Gregory A. Persinger, USMC, 23—Marine Corps guardforeign service officer on temporary duty in Tehran Jerry Plotkin, 45—civilian businessman visiting Tehran MSG

Jerry Plotkin, 45—civilian businessman visiting TehranSgt Gregory A. Persinger, USMC, 23—Marine Corps guard MSG Regis Ragan, USA, 38—Army soldier, defense

MSG Regis Ragan, USA, 38—Army soldier, defense attaché's officeJerry Plotkin, 45—civilian businessman visiting Tehran Lt Col David M. Roeder, USAF, 41—deputy Air Force attaché

Lt Col David M. Roeder, USAF, 41—deputy Air Force attachéRagan, USA, 38—Army soldier, defense attaché's office Barry M. Rosen, 36—press attaché William B. Royer, Jr.,

Barry M. Rosen, 36—press attachéLt Col David M. Roeder, USAF, 41—deputy Air Force attaché William B. Royer, Jr., 49—assistant director

William B. Royer, Jr., 49—assistant director of Iran–American SocietyAir Force attaché Barry M. Rosen, 36—press attaché Col Thomas E. Schaefer, USAF, 50—Air Force attaché

Col Thomas E. Schaefer, USAF, 50—Air Force attachéJr., 49—assistant director of Iran–American Society COL Charles W. Scott, USA, 48—Army attaché CDR Donald A.

COL Charles W. Scott, USA, 48—Army attachéCol Thomas E. Schaefer, USAF, 50—Air Force attaché CDR Donald A. Sharer, USN, 40—Naval attaché Sgt

CDR Donald A. Sharer, USN, 40—Naval attachéForce attaché COL Charles W. Scott, USA, 48—Army attaché Sgt Rodney V. (Rocky) Sickmann, USMC, 22—Marine

Sgt Rodney V. (Rocky) Sickmann, USMC, 22—Marine Corps guardattaché CDR Donald A. Sharer, USN, 40—Naval attaché SSG Joseph Subic, Jr., USA, 23—military police, Army,

SSG Joseph Subic, Jr., USA, 23—military police, Army, defense attaché's officeRodney V. (Rocky) Sickmann, USMC, 22—Marine Corps guard Elizabeth Ann Swift, 40—deputy head of political section

Elizabeth Ann Swift, 40—deputy head of political section (one of two unreleased female hostages)23—military police, Army, defense attaché's office Victor L. Tomseth , 39—counselor for political affairs

Victor L. Tomseth , 39—counselor for political affairs Victor L. Tomseth, 39—counselor for political affairs

Phillip R. Ward, 40—CIA communications officerVictor L. Tomseth , 39—counselor for political affairs Civilian hostages A small number of hostages were

Civilian hostages

A small number of hostages were not connected to diplomatic staff. All were released by late 1981.

Jerry Plotkin—American Businessman released January 1981. [ 1 4 3 ] [143]

Mohi Sobhani—Iranian American engineer and member of the Bahá'í Faith . Released February 4, 1981. [ 1 4 4 ] [ 1 4 Bahá'í Faith. Released February 4, 1981. [144][145]

Zia Nassry—Afghan American. Released November 1982. [ 1 4 6 ] [146]

Cynthia Dwyer—American reporter, charged with espionage and expelled February 10, 1981. [ 1 4 7 ] [147]

Paul Chiapparone and Bill Gaylord—Electronic Data Systems employees, returned by Ross Perot –funded flight in —Electronic Data Systems employees, returned by Ross Perot–funded flight in

1979.

Four British missionaries, including Dr. Canon John Coleman; his wife, Audrey Coleman; and Jean Waddell; released in late 1981 [ 1 4 8 ] [148]

Hostages honored

All State Department and CIA employees taken hostage received the State Department Award for Valor. Political

Officer Michael J. Metrinko received two: one for his time as a hostage and another for his daring rescue of Americans

who had been jailed in Tabriz months before the embassy takeover. [149]

The U.S. military later awarded the 20 servicemen among the hostages the Defense Meritorious Service Medal. The

only hostage serviceman not issued the medal was Staff Sgt Joseph Subic, Jr., who "did not behave under stress the

way noncommissioned officers are expected to act" [150] – that is, he cooperated with the hostage-takers, according to

other hostages. [151]

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The Humanitarian Service Medal was awarded to the servicemen of Joint Task Force 1–79, the planning authority for

Operation Rice Bowl/Eagle Claw, who participated in the rescue attempt.

The Air Force Special Operations component of the mission was given the Air Force Outstanding Unit award for

performing their part of the mission flawlessly, including evacuating the Desert One refueling site under extreme

conditions.

Notable hostage-takers, guards, and interrogators

Abbas Abdi— reformist, journalist, self-taught sociologist, and social activist. Abbas Abdi—reformist, journalist, self-taught sociologist, and social activist.

Hamid Aboutalebi— former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations. Hamid Aboutalebi—former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations.

Ebrahim Asgharzadeh —then a student; later an Iranian political activist and politician, member of Parliament Ebrahim Asgharzadeh—then a student; later an Iranian political activist and politician, member of Parliament (1989–1993), and chairman of City Council of Tehran (1999–2003).

Mohsen Mirdamadi— member of Parliament (2000–2004), head of Islamic Iran Participation Front . Mohsen Mirdamadi—member of Parliament (2000–2004), head of Islamic Iran Participation Front.

Masoumeh Ebtekar —interpreter and spokeswoman for the student group that occupied the embassy; later a Masoumeh Ebtekar—interpreter and spokeswoman for the student group that occupied the embassy; later a scientist, journalist, first female Vice President of Iran, and head of Environment Protection Organization of Iran.

Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha —spiritual leader of the hostage-takers. Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha—spiritual leader of the hostage-takers.

Hussein Sheikholeslam —then a student; later a member of Parliament and Iranian ambassador to Syria. Hussein Sheikholeslam—then a student; later a member of Parliament and Iranian ambassador to Syria.

October Surprise conspiracy theory

Persian Gulf on the Carter administration's National Security Council, claimed in his book October Surprise:

America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan [152] that CIA Director William Casey and possibly Vice

President George H. W. Bush went to Paris to negotiate such a delay. Many others have made the same allegations.

In popular culture

Laurie Anderson 's surprise 1982 UK #2 hit " O Superman (For Massenet) " is Laurie Anderson's surprise 1982 UK #2 hit "O Superman (For Massenet)" is a reference to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw at the peak of the crisis. [153]

The Academy Award –winning movie Argo was based on the taking of hostages by Iranian revolutionaries. Academy Award–winning movie Argo was based on the taking of hostages by Iranian revolutionaries. The movie was criticized for changing the story considerably, including by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter:

90% of the contributions to the ideas and the consummation of the plan was Canadian. And the movie

gives almost full credit to the American CIA. And with that exception, the movie is very good. But Ben

Affleck's character in the film was

only in Tehran a day and a half. And the main hero, in my opinion,

was Ken Taylor, who was the Canadian ambassador who orchestrated the entire process. [154]

The song "Storm the Embassy" by The Stray Cats is loosely based on the Iran hostage crisis. The Stray Cats is loosely based on the Iran hostage crisis.

See also

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11/3/2018 Iran hostage crisis - Wikipedia Nightline : This ABC News program named "The Iran Crisis:

Nightline: This ABC News program named "The Iran Crisis: America Held Hostage" got its start as a method for informing viewers of the latest developments during the crisis. The current title premiered March 24, 1980 with Ted Koppel as anchor.

Notes

1.

Mark Edmond Clark (2016), "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalid", in David Gold, Microeconomics, Routledge, pp. 66–67, ISBN 1317045904, "Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action."

2.

James Buchan (2013). Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences. Simon and Schuster. p. 257. ISBN 1416597778.

3.

4.

Köhler, Michael; 'Two Nations, a Treaty, and the World Court – An Analysis of United States-Iranian Relations under the Treaty of Amity before the International Court of Justice'; Wisconsin International Law Journal, 18 (Winter 2000), p. 287

5.

6.

7.

8.

"Doing Satan's Work in Iran" (https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1979/11/06/111115000.pdf) (PDF). The New York Times. November 6, 1979. Retrieved January 4, 2016.

9.

Kinzer, Stephen. (2003). All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

10.

Nalle, David. (2003). "All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror"; Middle East Policy, Vol. X (4), 148–55.

11.

Pryce-Jones, David. (2003). "A Very Elegant Coup." National Review, 55 (17), 48–50.

12.

13.

14.

Mackey, Sandra, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation, New York: Dutton, c. 1996 (p. 298)

15.

16.

Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, (1982), p. 164

17.

18.

(p. 52 poverty p. 54 Postwar Brit, p. 63 acceptance of 50:50 split, demand for $50 million in damages & back revenues, The Persian Puzzle, Kenneth M. Pollack. New York: Random House, 2004.)

19.

O'Reilly, Kevin (2007). Decision Making in U.S. History. The Cold War & the 1950s. Social Studies. p. 108. ISBN 1560042931.

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21. Iran by Andrew Burke, Mark Elliott, p. 37

25. Bowden 2006, p. 19

2016-05-05.

31. Moin Khomeini, (2000), p. 220

32. Bowden 2006, p. 10

38. Bowden 2006, p. 30

39. Farber, Taken Hostage (2005), p. 134

40. Bowden 2006, p. 337

42. Molavi, Afshin, The Soul of Iran, Norton, (2005), p. 335

43. "Iran Negah" (http://irannegah.com/Video.aspx?id=579). Iran Negah. Retrieved 2016-05-05.

44. Bowden 2006, pp. 8, 13

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46. Bowden 2006, p. 12

48. Bowden 2006, pp. 40, 77

49. Bowden 2006, pp. 127–28

50. Bowden 2006

51. Bowden 2006, p. 93

52. Bowden 2006, pp. 50, 132–34

55. Moin, Khomeini (2001), p. 226

56. Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p. 221; "America Can't do a *** Thing" by Amir Taheri New York Post, November 2, 2004

57. Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p. 228

58. Abrahamian, Ervand (1989), The Iranian Mojahedin (1989), p. 196

60. Bergman, Ronan (2008). The Secret War with Iran: the 30-Year Clandestine Struggle against the World's Most Dangerous Terrorist Power (1st ed.). New York: Free Press. pp. 30–31. ISBN 9781416577003.

65. Arjomand, Said Amir, Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran by Said Amir Arjomand, Oxford University Press, 1988 p. 139

66. Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 227

67. Moin, Khomeini (2000), pp. 229, 231; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, (1984), pp. 115–16

68. Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, (1984), p. 115

69. Efty, Alex; 'If Shah Not Returned, Khomeini Sets Trial for Other Hostages'; Kentucky New Era, November 20, 1979, pp. 1–2

70. Farber, Taken Hostage (2005), pp. 156–57

71. "Black Hostage Reports Abuse" (https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/27/us/no-headline-240600.html). The New York Times. January 27, 1981. Retrieved January 4, 2016.

72. Bowden 2006, pp. 151, 219, 372

73. Bowden 2006, p. 528

74. Bowden 2006, pp. 514–15

75. Bowden 2006, p. 565

76. Bowden 2006, p. 128

77. Bowden 2006, p. 403

78. Rick Kupke in Bowden 2006, p. 81, Charles Jones, Colonel Dave Roeder, Metrinko, Tom Ahern (in Bowden 2006, p. 295)

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79.

Hall in Bowden 2006, p. 257, Limbert in Bowden 2006, p. 585

80.

in Bowden 2006, p. 267

81.

Bill Belk in Bowden 2006, pp. 65, 144, Malcolm Kalp in Bowden 2006, pp. 507–11

82.

Queen, in Bowden 2006, p. 258, Metrinko, in Bowden 2006, p. 284

83.

Bowden 2006, pp. 307, 344, 405, 540

84.

Bowden 2006, pp. 149, 351–52

85.

Bowden 2006, p. 161

86.

Bowden 2006, p. 203

87.

88.

Bowden 2006, pp. 346–50

89.

Bowden 2006, p. 284

90.

Bowden 2006, p. 544

91.

Bowden 2006, p. 335

92.

Bowden 2006, p. 345

93.

Bowden 2006, pp. 516–17

94.

Bowden 2006, p. 158

95.

Bowden 2006, pp. 81–83

96.

Bowden 2006, p. 318

97.

Malcolm Kalp in Bowden 2006, pp. 507–11, Joe Subic, Kevin Hemening, and Steve Lauterbach, in Bowden 2006, p. 344

98.

December 1979

99.

Bowden 2006, p. 258

100.

Bowden 2006, p. 520

101.

Bowden 2006, p. 397

102.

Bowden 2006, p. 354

103.

'Hall's apartment ransacked' in Bowden 2006, p. 257, Roeder's in Bowden 2006, p. 570

104.

Bowden 2006, p. 584

105.

Bowden 2006, p. 587

106.

107.

"Doing Satan's Work in Iran", New York Times, November 6, 1979.

108.

The ABC late-night program America Held Hostage, anchored by Ted Koppel, later became a stalwart news magazine under the title Nightline.

109.

Zelizer, Julian E. Jimmy Carter: the 39th President, 1977–81. New York: Times, 2010. Print.

110.

111.

Bowden 2006, p. 401

112.

113.

114.

115.

"The Talk of the Town". The New Yorker. 56 (3): 87. May 12, 1980.

116.

117.

Holloway 1980, pp. 9–10.

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118. Holloway 1980, p. 44.

119. Holloway 1980, p. 45.

121. Mackey, Iranians, (2000), p. 298

128. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Keddie, Nikki, Yale University Press, 2003, p. 252

129. Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, (1984), p. 236

130. Brumberg, Daniel Reinventing Khomeini, University of Chicago Press (2001), p. 118

131. Moin, Khomeini, (2000) p. 229

2016-01-05.

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151. Bowden, Mark Guests of the Ayatollah, Grove Press, 2006, p. 374

152. Sick, Gary (1991). October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. New York:

Random House.

References

Bakhash, Shaul (1984). The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution . Basic Books . The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution. Basic Books.

Sick, Gary (1991). October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan . New York: October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. New York:

Harris, Les (1997). 444 Days to Freedom: What Really Happened in Iran . DVD UPC 033909253390 444 Days to Freedom: What Really Happened in Iran. DVD UPC 033909253390

Bowden, Mark (2006). Guests of the Ayatollah : The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle Bowden, Mark (2006). Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America's War with Militant Islam. New York: Grove Press. ISBN 0871139251

Ebtekar, Massoumeh; Reed, Fred (2000). Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture . Burnaby, BC: Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture. Burnaby, BC: Talonbooks. ISBN 0889224439

Moin, Baqer (2000). Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah . Thomas Dunne Books . Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. Thomas Dunne Books.

Further reading

Stewart, James (1983). The Partners : Inside America's Most Powerful Law Firms . New York: Stewart, James (1983). The Partners: Inside America's Most Powerful Law Firms. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0671420232.

Engelmayer , Sheldon D. (1981). Hostage: a Chronicle of the 444 Days in Iran . Engelmayer, Sheldon D. (1981). Hostage: a Chronicle of the 444 Days in Iran. New York: Caroline House Publishing. ISBN 0898030846.

External links