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HAZARD AND

OPERABILITY STUDY

• Brainstorming, Multidisciplinary Team Approach


• Structured Using Guide Words
• Problem Identifying
• Cost Effective
When to Use?
Optimal from a cost viewpoint
1. when applied to new plants at the point
where the design is nearly firm and
documented or
2. to existing plants where a major redesign is
planned.

It can also be used for existing facilities.


Results
Types: The results are the team findings.
Which include: (1) identification of hazards
and operating problems, (2) recommended
changes in design, procedure, etc., to
improve safety; and (3) recommendations
for follow-on studies where no conclusion
was possible due to lack of information.
Nature: Qualitative.
Requirements
Data: The HazOp requires detailed plant
descriptions, such as drawings, procedures, and
flow charts. A HazOp also requires considerable
knowledge of the process, instrumentation, and
operation, and this information is usually provided
by team members who are experts in these areas.
Staff: The HazOp team is ideally made up of 5 to 7
professionals, with support for recording and
reporting. For a small plant, a team as small as two
or three could be effective.
Time and Cost
The time and cost of a HazOp are directly related to
the size and complexity of the plant being
analyzed. In general, the team must spend about
three hours for each major hardware item. Where
the system analyzed is similar to one investigated
previously, the time is usually small. Additional
time must be allowed for planning, team
coordination, and documentation. This additional
time can be as much as two three times the team
effort as estimated above
HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design Existing Plant


Design or Project Engineer Plant Superintendent
Process Engineer Process Supervisor (Foreman)
Commissioning Manager Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Design Engineer Instrument Engineer
Chemist Technical Engineer
Principles of HAZOP
Concept
•Systems work well when operating under design conditions.
•Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur.

Basis
•a word model, a process flow sheet (PFD) or a piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID)

Method
•use guide words to question every part of process to discover what deviations
from the intention of design can occur and what are their causes and
consequences may be.
PRINCIPLES OF HAZOPS

CAUSE DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES


(from standard (trivial, important,
condition catastrophic)
or intention) -hazard
-operating difficulties
*COVERING EVERY PARAMETER RELEVANT TO THE SYSTEM
UNDER REVIEW:
i.e. Flow Rate. Flow Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Viscosity, Components
STUDY NODES
The locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated
for deviations. These nodes are points where the process parameters (P, T, F etc.) have
an identified design intent.

INTENTION
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations at
the study nodes.

DEVIATIONS
These are departures from the intension which can be discovered by systematically
applying the guide words.

•Process conditions
•activities
•substances
•time
•place
GUIDE WORDS

Guide Words Meaning


No, None Negation of Intention
More Of Quantitative Increase
Less Of Quantitative Decrease
As Well As (More Qualitative Increase
Than) Qualitative Decrease
Part Of Logical Opposite of Intention
Reverse Complete Substitution
Other Than
Deviations Generated by Each Guide Word
Guide word Deviations

REVERSE: reverse flow


B A B

EXAMPLE
C
The flowsheet shows that raw material streams A and B are transferred by
pump to a reactor, where they react to form product C. Assume that the
flow rate of B should not exceed that of A. Otherwise, an explosion may
occur. Let’s consider the flow of A in line 1:

NONE No flow of A
MORE Flow of A greater than design flow
LESS Flow of A less than design flow
AS WELL AS Transfer of some component additional to A
PART OF Failure to transfer a component of A
REVERSE Flow of A in a direction opposite to design direction
OTHER THAN Transfer of some material other than A
Beginning

1 Select a vessel

2 Explain the general intention of the vessel and its lines

3 Select a line
Explain the intention of the line
4
Apply the first guide words
5
Develop a meaningful deviation
6
Examine possible causes
7
Examine consequences
8
Detect hazards
9
1 Make suitable record
0 Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations derived from first guide words
1
1 Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words
1
2 Mark line as having been examined
1
3 Repeat 3-13 for each line
1
4 Select an auxiliary system (e.g. Heating system)
1
5 Explain the intention of the auxiliary system
1
6 Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary system
1
7 Mark auxiliary as having been examined
1
8 Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries
1
Explain intention of the vessel
9
2
Repeat 5-12
0
2 Mark vessel as completed
1
2 Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flow sheet
2
2 Mark flow sheet as completed
3
2 Repeat 1-24 for all flow sheets
4 Figure 8.9 Hazard and operability studies : detailed sequence of examination
2
5 (Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977 Item 6)
End
HAZOP DISPLAY
EXAMPLE
An alkene/alkane fraction containing small amounts of
suspended water is continuously pumped from a bulk
intermediate storage tank via a half-mile pipeline into a
buffer/settling tank where the residual water is settled out prior
to passing via a feed/product heat exchanger and preheater to the
reaction, is run off manually from the settling tank at intervals.
Residence time in the reaction section must be held within
closely defined limits to ensure adequate conversion of the
alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer.
Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

(1)
Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

(2)
Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

(3)
C
HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES
Preplanning issues addressed in a typical refinery unit HAZOP include the
following:
• Verification of as-built conditions shown on the P&IDs
• Line segment boundaries set; markup of P&IDs
• List of support documents compiled
• P&IDs (base study document)
• Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
• Process description
• Operating manuals/procedures
• Processing materials information
• Equipment and material specifications
• Tentative schedules of time to be spent per P&IDs sheet
• Recording technique (computer program or data sheet) determination
• List of standard abbreviations and acronyms compiled
• Criticality rankings devised
• HAZOP training given to all team members (one day)
• Arrange for system or process briefings for team before work begins.
HAZOP STUDY LOGISTICS

Logistical development of this refinery unit HAZOP included the


following:
• Preplanning issues were addressed the prior week.
• The team include three core team members and four part-time members.
• The study included 16 moderately busy P&Ids.
• The study took three and one-half weeks.
• The team met 4 hours per day in morning review sessions and spent 2 hours
per day on individual efforts for reviews, follow-ups, and field checks.
• Dedicated space was required for storing the large number of documents.
• The study resulted in 170 data sheets.
• The team recorder used a personal computer to record, sort, and retrieve data.
The Stone & Webster proprietary program PCHAZOPa was used.
• The plant operator was the key contribution plant member of the team.
• Key operating procedures were reviewed relative to the P&Ids and safe
engineering practices.

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