People of the Philippines Vs. Jaime “Jimmy” Agustin, Et Al.
not stand for there were no other evidence linking him of the crime
G.R. No. 110290 – January 25, 1995
Facts:
 There were five separate information filed with the court wherein
the accused were charged with Murder, Frustrated Murder and
Attempted Murder. The crime resulted to the death of Dr.
Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Francisco, and the wounding of
Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen and Danny Ancheta.
 The information in the murder case charged that the accused acted
in conspiracy and alleged the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation as aggravating circumstances.
 Respondents, pleaded not guilty
 The Trial Court acquitted the accused on the frustrated and
attempted murder charges due to insufficiency of evidence but
convicted him as guilty for two counts of murder.
 The conviction of the Trial court was base on the extrajudicial
confession made by the respondent with the city Fiscal.
 The respondent insist that his extrajudicial confession was taken in
violation of his rights under Section 11 Article III if the
constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him was not of
his own choice but was foisted upon him by the city Fiscal, and
that it was only conferred with him in English and tagalog
although he only understood only Ilocano. Also he mentioned that
the lawyer who assisted him was a law partner of the private
prosecutor and had only conferred to him briefly and when he was
interrogated by the fiscal, the later was with his military escorts.
 Respondent asserts that the lawyer who assist the suspect under
custodial investigation should be of the latters choice and not
foisted on him by police investigators or other parties, and that
there were doubts on the voluntariness of his extrajudicial
confession and it was inadmissible, and that his conviction should
charge.
Issue: W/N the Extrajudicial confession of the respondent should be
considered by the court at the case at bar as an admissible evidence?
Ruling: No
 Confession is an acknowledgement in express terms by the party in
a criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged, while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to prove his guilt.
 Admission is something less than a confession. It tends only to
establish ultimate facts.
 Nothing in the extrajudicial statement of the respondent indicates
that he expressly acknowledge his guilt, he merely admitted some
facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which can only tend to establish the
ultimate facts of guilt.
Order of the Lower Court was reversed.
 Confession or admission obtained in violation of the constitution
shell be inadmissible in evidence.
 Respondent’s extrajudicial statement is inadmissible in evidence
because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 Article II of the
constitution. Since it was only evidence which links him to the
crime of which he was convicted, he must then be acquitted.
Tuazon v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 113779-80, February 23, 1995)
FACTS: Madarog, Cipriana Torres‘ maid, was often left alone in Cipriana‘s
house. The incident happened when somebody pretended to buy ice in their
residence. When Madarog was about to hand over the ice to the buyer, one
of the robbers jumped in the house and pointed a gun on Jovina. Four of the
assailants then went inside the house and demanded the keys to the car and
vault. Petitioner Ochoa was their lookout. While ransacking the house, they
were able to find the keys to the car as well as valuable items. They then
escaped using Cipriana‘s car. Madarog then cried for help and the
neighbours, Quintal and Garcia responded and told Cipriana what
happened. Cipriana then reported the robbery to the police. Madarog and
Quintal described the features of the robbers to the NBI. Subsequently,
Ochoa was then arrested and was pointed by Madarog and other witnesses
namely Quintal and Barbietoas one of the perpetrators. Quintal says that she
saw petitioner allegedly among the three (3) men whiling away their time in
front of Alabang's store some time before the crimes were committed.
Quintal is a neighbouring maid. Barbieto likewise declared that she saw
petitioner allegedly with several companions standing-by at Torres' house
that morning of July 19, 1988. She is a teacher and lives within the block
where the crimes were committed. Ochoa anchored his defence on alibi and
insufficiency of identification by the prosecution. The court however
rendered a decision convicting Ochoa. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in convicting Ochoa based on
thewitnesses?
HELD: No. evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth
of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court
and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of
prosecution witness Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door
of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated in the
robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the
identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt
and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of petitioner. Firstly, it must be
emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid
Madaraog actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at
bench. Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw petitioner at
the vicinity of the crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious
doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner.
At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner as 5'3" tall and
with a big mole between his eyebrows.As it turned out, petitioner has no
mole but only a scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3"
tall. There is a big difference between a mole and a scar. A scar is a mark
left in the skin by a new connective tissue that replaces tissue injured. On
the other hand, a mole is a small often pigmented spot or protuberance on
the skin.
Second, the court resulted to wild guess work when it mentioned that Ochoa
could have covered up the scar to make it look like a mole. This is a grave
error. The trial court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction
that is irrational because it is not derived from an established fact. The
records do not show any fact from which the trial court can logically deduce
the conclusion that petitioner covered up his scar with black coloring to
make it appear as a mole. And thirdly, corroborating witness Barbieto has
serious lapses in her testimony that diluted her credibility. she and Quintal
merely testified they saw petitioner within the vicinity where the crimes
were committed. By itself, this circumstance cannot lead to the conclusion
that petitioner truly committed the crimes at bench. Petitioner, we note,
lives in the same vicinity as the victim. To use his words, he lives some six
(6) posts from the house of Torres. His presence in the said vicinity is thus
not unnatural. The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this
claim of petitioner as self-serving. Again, the ruling misconstrues the
meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be literally
taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of
evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one
time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is
excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the
consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to
fabrication of testimony.
Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply
G.R. No. 127553
November 28, 1997
J. Puno
FACTS: Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and
Joel Rea were employed as drivers at N.C. Construction Supply owned by
private respondents Johnny Lim (Lao Ching Eng) and Anita Sy.
On June 3, 1995, the security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio
Guevara, a company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper ("pahinante"), taking
out from the company premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00
without authority. Calso was brought to the Pasig Police station for
questioning. During the investigation, Calso named seven other employees
who were allegedly involved in a series of thefts, among them petitioners
Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.
Petitioners then received separate notices from company informing them
that they were positively identified by their co-worker, Jay Calso, as
perpetrators of the series of thefts committed at respondent company. They
were thus invited to the Pasig police station for investigation regarding their
alleged involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf
an investigation regarding petitioners' involvement in the theft. Atty. Reyes
interrogated the petitioners on their alleged participation in the series of
thefts committed at respondent company. Petitioners initially denied the
charge. However, after being positively identified by Jay Calso, petitioners
admitted their guilt and offered to resign. Petitioners Bana and Rea filed
separate resignation letters while petitioners Manuel and Pagtama, Jr.
tendered their resignations orally.
Atty. Reyes accepted petitioners' resignation effective June 5, 1995. On July
17, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal
dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not informed of the charge
against them nor were they given an opportunity to dispute the same. They
also alleged that their admission made at the Pasig police station regarding
their involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not voluntary
but were obtained by private respondents' lawyer by means of threat and
intimidation.
LA ruled in favour of petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. He
held that private respondents failed to show a just cause for the termination
of petitioners' services. He declared that petitioners' admission regarding
their involvement in the theft was inadmissible in evidence as it was taken
without the assistance of counsel, in violation of Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and ruled that petitioners were dismissed for
a just cause. It further stated that such admission may be admitted in
evidence because Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to criminal
proceedings but not to administrative proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the admission may be admitted in evidence
HELD: NO. We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that such
admission was obtained by means of threat or intimidation as such
allegation is couched in general terms and is unsupported by evidence.
We also reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as
evidence against them under Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry
out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only
upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (3) Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course
of the investigation conducted by private respondents' counsel to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to terminate their employment.
Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they were not yet
accused by the police of committing a crime. The investigation was merely
an administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal
investigation. The questions were propounded by the employer's lawyer, not
by police officers. The fact that the investigation was conducted at the
police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial
investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental.
Hence, the admissions made by petitioners during such investigation may
be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
We likewise agree that employees were dismissed for a just cause.
Petitioners' culpability in the instant case was sufficiently proved by private
respondents. Jay Calso, an employee of respondent company who has
personal knowledge about the series of thefts that has been going on at
respondent company, positively identified petitioners. In addition,
petitioners admitted their participation in the theft during an investigation
conducted by private respondents' lawyer.
However, the employer failed to observe due process in terminating the
employment of petitioners. The TWO-NOTICE requirement was not
complied with.
People v. Solayao [GR 119220, 20 September 1996]
Facts:
On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were
conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed
persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. In Baragay Onion, they
met the 5-man group of accused Nilo Solayao, who was also wearing a
camouflage uniform. His companions, upon seeing the government agents,
fled. SPO3 Niño told Salayao not to run away and introduced himself as
"PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was
carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally
known as "latong." When he asked Salayao who issued him a license to
carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess
the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently
investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
Salayao did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this
was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining,
when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves, which they were using the
coconut leaves as a torch. Salayao’s claim was corroborated by one Pedro
Balano.
On 15 August 1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found Salayao
guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and
imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.
Salayao appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Solayao’s admission that he had no permission to possess the
firearm is sufficient to convict him of illegal possession of firearms
Held:
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does
not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession
of firearm that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same.It does not even
establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution
but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
". . . By its very nature, an "admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact
or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to
incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." In
other words it is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to
issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to
prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction."
From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal
cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of
the crime charged.
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized
by the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter being able
to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not
conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such
firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its
duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear
and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency
concerned."[24]
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a
plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means
of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the
burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative." [25]
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of
the Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a
firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm.
G.R. No. 128046. March 7, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMON
CHUA UY, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Facts:
 Accused-appellant Chua Uy was guilty of violating Sections 15
and 16 of Article III, R.A. No. 6425,as amended, for the illegal
sale of 5.8564 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu," and possession of 401 grams of the same drug
 After obtaining a tip from an informant regarding the accused
illegal activity a team from the Anti-Narcotics Division planned an
entrapment operation where one of the police officers will act as a
poseur-buyer. The sale was consummated and the police yielded
more packets of shabu from the attaché case of the Chua.
 Chua was arrested and brought to the police station. Subsequent
search in his house yielded more packets of the illegal substance.
Issue: Did the trial court err in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the evidence for the defense?
Held: No.
 Trial Court: gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and
testimony of witnesses despite the non-presentation of the NBI
forensics chemist who tested and confirmed that substance found
in the accused possession is indeed shabu.
 Accused: submitted that without the testimony of NBI Forensic
Chemist, the prosecutions case "falls to pieces."
 Accused: Bravo’s testimony cannot be waived since only he could
say whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed shabu, and
also determine its actual weight upon which depends the penalty to
be imposed. Thus, whatever he said in his report is hearsay and
hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value.
 Accused: insisted that at the pretrial he did not waive the
testimony of the chemist but only "stipulated on the markings of
the prosecutions evidence interposed the defense of frame-up and
alleged that the evidence was merely ‘planted.’
 OSG: argued that Bravo’s finding that the drugs seized from
RAMON were indeed the regulated methampethamine
hydrochloride or shabu, is not hearsay. Bravo did not testify
anymore because the parties agreed during the pre-trial to dispense
with his testimony. RAMON never objected to the order. Neither
did he move to reconsider it. The facts thus stipulated and
incorporated in the pre-trial order bound him. Moreover, at the trial
RAMON never raised the question of the non-presentation of the
forensic chemist; what his counsel objected to was with respect to
the presentation and identification of the shabu wherein defense
objected to the irregular act of showing the confiscated drug to
SPO1 Nepomuceno without laying the basis therefore. The defense
counsel did not also object to the direct examination of SPO4
Regalado concerning the whereabouts and identification of the
subject shabu.
Ratio:
It may at once be noted that neither Chua nor his counsel made
express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as
Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" contain
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
People v. Cepeda
That Chua agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic G.R. No. 124832 | February 1, 2000
Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the
Nature
portion of the Joint Order, it is clear that Chua and his counsel merely
agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause "thereby dispensing
with the testimony of forensic Chemist Loreto E. Bravo" must be Facts:
understood in that context. 1.
Even if Chua admitted during the pre-trial the abovementioned 2.
Exhibits, still, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him
because Chua and his counsel did not sign the Joint Order. Section 4 of
3.
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:
4.
SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No
agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless
reduced to writing and signed and his counsel. 5.
To bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by
him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further
safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized
agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered into without
his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial
conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the
facts agreed upon.
Nevertheless, Chua cannot take advantage of the absence of his
and his counsel’s signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution
formally offered in evidence what it had marked in evidence during the pre-
trial, he did not object to the admission of Bravos Preliminary Report.
Disposition: Appealed decision of RTC was affirned.
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
Conchita Mahomoc went to the PNP Station to complain that she
was raped by Dante Cepeda (signed her complaint the day after)
She claims that 2 days prior, in the afternoon, Dante Cepeda went
to her house and asked her to go to his house to massage his wife
who was suffering from stomach ache
Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house and she asked her to
go with her
Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house
a. He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim,
would get angry if there were many many people in their
home
Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom
a. At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a figure
covered by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda’s
wife
b. At that instance, accused immediately placed his left arm
around her shoulders and ponted a knife at the pit of her
stomach saying: “Just keep quiet, do not make any noise,
otherwise I will kill you.”
c. She elbowed him, stooped and shouted “Help!”
d. But, Cepeda carried her to the room
e. There, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to
remove her pany and lie on the bed
f. Afraid, she did as ordered and accused also removed his
pants and brief
g. He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with his
legs, inserted his penis inside her vagina and had sexual
intercourse with her
h. After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen with
Cepeda chasing her
6. Regina Carba confirmed this narration of the claimant
a. Also said that Conchita had been a masseuse
7. A certain Veronica Delmiguez declared that in the afternoon of
said date, she heard a shout for help from the house of Cepeda
a. She looked and saw that the windows were closed
8. The charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and Conchita
are lovers
a. He came to know her as he passes by her house in going
to his place of work
b. The complainant has gone to their house a couple of times
c. On one time, he courted her by saying: “Sing, I knew that
you like me and I like you.”
i. Then they had sexual intercourse (which
happened several times)
d. On a certain day, she asked him to leave his wife to elope
with her as she would also leave her husband
i. He rejected this proposal because he loved his
wife and Conchita had 3 daughters
ii. Conchita, according to him, was displeased
because he would not elope with her
e. On the day when it was alleged that complainant was
raped, he alleged that Conchita again came to his house
and while they were petting, somebody outside his house
said: “You there, what are you doing?”
i. At this Conchita left his house and went home
ii. In the evening, he was arrested
9. The accused’s wife, Dory Cepeda, testified that indeed the
complainant has gone to their house several times
10. Trial Court Decision
a. Rendered judgment against accused Dante Cepeda
11. Insisting on his innocence, accused claims in his defense that he
and private complainant were carrying on an adulterous love affair
a. Per him, his request to private complainant that the latter
massage his allegedly ill wife is a pre-arranged lie
between the accused and private complainant in order to
mislead Regina Carba
b. He asserts that the charge of rape was a contrivance or an
afterthought rather that a truthful plaint of redress of an
actual wrong
Issue:
WON Cepeda guilty of rape
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the appealed decision.
1. Court provides that Accused-appellant’s allegation of an illicit
amorous relationship is too shopworn to deserve serious
consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect
scrutiny of the record discloses that the ‘illicit love affair’ angle
appears as a fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative
defense, the alleged ‘love affair’ needs convincing proof. Having
admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant
several times, accused-appellant bears the burden of proving his
defense by substantial evidence. The record shows that other than
his self-serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the
claim that accused-appellant and private complainant were in love.
2. It must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant
are both married and are living together with their respective
spouses. In this case, other than accused-appellant’s self-serving
testimony, no other evidence like love letters, mementos or
pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship
with private complainant. Neither was there any corroborative
testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If accused-
appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she
would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action
which inevitably exposed her to humiliation of recounting in
public the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would not
have implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the
perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open their
illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to mention the
ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her
children were it not the truth.
3. Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source
but must also be credible in itself such as one that the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. The Court has taken judicial cognizance
of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by custom and
tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great
caution is observed so that their reputation remains untainted. Such
 circumspection must have prompted the victim to request Regina
Carba to accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused-
appellant’s house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by
accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who was a Muslim
was averse to having too many people in their house.
4. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that acused-appellant and
private complainant were indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact
alone will not extricate him from his predicament. The mere
assertion of a love relationship’ would not necessarily rule out the
use of force to consummate the crime. It must be stressed that in
rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will or without her consent. Thus, granting
arguendo that the accused and the victim were really lovers this
Court has reiterated time and again that “[A] sweetheart cannot be
forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot
demand sexual-gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ
violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for
lust”
5. As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza, a married woman with
a husband and three (3) daughters would not publicly admit that
she had been criminally abused unless that was the truth. Similarly,
it defies reason in this case why a mother of four (4) would
concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her
motive were other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice
the person who defiled her.
6. In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established
the following doctrinal guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will
not disturb the findings of the lower court unless there is a showing
that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the
result of the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining
to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even
finality since it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor as
they testified on the witness stand; and third, a witness who
testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness.
7. To restate what had been said earlier, it is highly inconceivable
visàvis the prevailing facts of the case for the victim to conjure a
tale of ravishment and, in the process, subject herself and her
family to the disgrace, social humiliation and trauma attendant to a
prosecution for rape as well as the stigma of a lifetime of shame
incident thereto. Furthermore, the conduct of the victim
immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance
so as to establish thetruth or falsity of the charges of rape. In this
case, we find the private complainant’s prompt report of her
defilement to her husband as well as the authorities as convincing
indications that she has been truly wronged. A complainant’s act
in immediately reporting the commission of rape has been
considered by this Court as a factor strengthening her credibility.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERTO
LASE, alias "BERT", Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 97957 March 5, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Nature of the Case
Accused-appellant appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Masbate convicting him of the crime of murder for the death of Dante
Huelva on 18 May 1987 in Barangay Pia-ong, Dimasalang, Masbate.
Facts:
Two days after the death of Dante Huelva, the Acting Station Manager of
the National Police of Masbate filed a murder case with MTCT. The Judge
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused.
Accused-appellant was arrested on 20 May 1987 and was released the
following day after posting the required bond.
Having failed to submit his counter-affidavit for purposes of the preliminary
investigation, the MCTC considered him as having waived the second stage
of the preliminary investigation and ordered the records of the case Q. You mean that he wanted to settle this case but you
forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate. refused?

Accused-appellant then sought a reinvestigation of the case; this request A. Yes, sir.
was consequently granted. The provincial prosecutor dismissed the
investigation for insufficiency of evidence against the accused. On appeal to Q. How much were they offering you for this case to be settled?
the Department of Justice by the offended party, however, the abovecited
A. About ten thousand."
resolution was reversed by the then Secretary of Justice.
Accused version of the incident:
On 9 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate an Information. Accused-appellant Alberto Lase testified that on May 18, 1987, at
around 5:30 in the afternoon, he was with Miguel Andueza at the
Upon being arraigned on 1 September 1989, accused-appellant entered a
house of Kagawad Marcelo Tamayo. They waited for Artemio
plea of not guilty.
Andueza who was then drunk. At around 7:00 in the evening, they
Prosecution’s Version of the Incident: were fetched by Mrs. Andueza who informed them that something
happened in Piaong.
On May 18, 1987, at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening, Domingo
(sic) Pangantihon was on his way home from Piaong, Dimasalang, The charges levelled against him is (sic) not true. In fact, after
Masbate, when appellant Alberto Lase and Ramon Sayson passed preliminary investigation by the fiscal, the case against him was
him by. At that moment, Dante Huelva was about six meters ahead dismissed. The reason why he was implicated in this case was
of them and was urinating by the roadside. Appellant proceeded because Ramon Sayson told the policeman that Dante Huelva's
directly to the back of Dante Huelva and without any warning assailant was tall and that victim's (sic) parents wanted to be paid
stabbed him once with a 7-inch long Batangas knife in the for the death of the victim."
stomach. Afterwards, appellant ran away. Dante Huelva shouted
In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this
for help. Ramon Sayson came to his rescue and brought him
offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated that he could offer a
towards the Poblacion.
higher amount:
In her rebuttal testimony, Godofreda Huelva testified that
Q. Mrs. Huelva testified here that you are offering in this case for
accused-appellant offered to settle the case for the sum of
P10,000, is that true. (sic).
P10,000.00.
WITNESS:
Q. Now the accused also testified that you filed this case against
him because you wanted him to be paid about (sic) the death of A. I did not say that. If that is true even P50,000 I am going to pay
the victim? them."
A. He wanted to pay me but I did not agree.
 The defense also sought to discredit the testimony of Dominico
Pangantihon because it was months after the incident, and only
after Ramon Sayson failed to testify, that he decided to come out
and testify as an alleged eyewitness to the killing.
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and
disregarded the defense of alibi in view of the positive identification of the
accused-appellant and the possibility of his being at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission.
Issue:
Whether the accused offer to settle can be used against him?
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of Cpl. Mitra
relate to minor, if not inconsequential, matters. The rule is settled that minor
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary,
they may even heighten their credibility.
Then too, accused-appellant offered to compromise the case for the sum
of P10,000.00. The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that:
"In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt."
The accused merely provided alibi as a defense wherein he was identified
positively, there is no motive against him. The testimony of the witness are
given respect since credibility of the witness are left with the trial court to
be observed and respected by this Court except if there are apparent mistake
in the interpretation or appreciation of the testiomony.
The penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty which
consists of three (3) periods. 39 There being neither generic aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances present, the imposable penalty is the medium
period of the prescribed penalty - reclusion perpetua. 40 The trial court is
therefore correct. However, conformably with the prevailing jurisprudence,
the indemnity should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, except for the above observations with respect to the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime, and the modification of the
indemnity which is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, the
challenged Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate in
Criminal Case No. 5557 finding the accused-appellant ALBERTO LASE,
alias "BERT" guilty of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner, vs.The
COURT OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED BANK, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
 petition for review on certiorari (reversal of the decision of respondent
court)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner applied for and was granted several financial accommodations
by respondent Associated Bank, which were secured by 4 PNs, a REM
(three parcels of land) and a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock and
inventories.
2. Unable to settle, petitioner requested, and was granted by respondent
bank, a restructuring of the remaining indebtedness. To secure, 3 new
PNs were executed by Trans-Pacific as follows: (1) Promissory Note
No. TL-9077-82 for the amount of P1,050,000.00 denominated as
 working capital; (2) Promissory Note No. TL-9078-82 for the amount of
P121,166.00 denominated as restructured interest; (3) Promissory Note
No. TL-9079-82 for the amount of P42,234.00 denominated similarly as
restructured interest.
3. The released parcels of land were sold and the proceeds were applied to
Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Respondent bank returned the
duplicate original copies of the 3 PNs to Trans-Pacific with the word
"PAID" stamped thereon.
4. Despite the return of the notes, Associated Bank demanded from Trans-
Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued
interest on PN No. TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the promissory
note PNs were erroneously released.
5. Trans-Pacific initiated an action before the RTC praying that the
mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its stock
inventory be lifted and that its obligation to the bank be declared as
having been fully paid.
6. RTC ruled in favor of Trans-Pacific. On appeal, CA reversed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has indeed paid in full its obligation to respondent
bank.
HELD:
No.
Respondent court is of the view that:
Art. 1271 (NCC) The delivery of a private document
evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor to the
debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which the former
had against the latter.
must be construed to mean the original copy of the document evidencing
the credit and not its duplicate.
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It
is undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are
therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent
bank itself did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate
copies submitted by petitioner. A duplicate copy of the original may be
admitted in evidence when the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent bank.
This notwithstanding, we find no reversible error committed by the
respondent court in disposing of the appealed decision. The presumption
created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but
merely prima facie. If there be no evidence to the contrary, the presumption
stands. Conversely, the presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of
proof or evidence to the contrary. In the case before us, we find sufficient
justification to overthrow the presumption of payment generated by the
delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a
presumption, not of payment, but of the renunciation of the credit where
more convincing evidence would be required than what normally would be
called for to prove payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of
renunciation in the delivery of a private instrument is that, unlike that of a
public instrument, there could be just one copy of the evidence of credit.
Where several originals are made out of a private document, the intendment
of the law would thus be to refer to the delivery only of the
original original rather than to the original duplicate of which the debtor
would normally retain a copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271 were
to be applied differently.
(Relevant to the topic)
That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to the
Associated Bank finds more than ample confirmation and self-defeating
posture in its letter dated December 16, 1985, addressed to respondent
bank, viz.:
we propose that you permit us to fully liquidate the
remaining obligations to you of P492,100 through a
payment in kind (dacion en pago) arrangement by way of
the equipments (sic) and spare parts under chattel
mortgage to you to the extent of their latest appraised
values."
Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which reads:
We have had a series of communications with your bank
regarding our proposal for the eventual settlement of our
remaining obligations . . .
we have always been conscious of our obligation to
you which had not been faithfully serviced on account of
unfortunate business reverses. …. But because of interest
and other charges, we find ourselves still obligated to you
by P492,100.00. . . .
. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid (sic)
situation… Principally for this reason, we had proposed
to settle our remaining obligations to you by way of
dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and spare parts
mortgaged to you to (the) extent of their applicable loan
values.
Petitioner claims that the offer of settlement or compromise is not an
admission that anything is due and is inadmissible against the party making
the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an
iron-clad rule.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to
compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party
making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence
of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and
avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course
thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness
combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission
is admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement is
an effective admission of a borrower's loan balance. Exactly, this is what
petitioner did in the case before us for review.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
Vevina Buemio
FACTS:
1. Herein accused Buemio was charged with several information on
illegal recruitment and estafa.
a. She is charged with illegal recruitment by several people.
Her modus is that she would tell the victims that she can
help them place jobs in Japan, earning 10,000 yen per
day. She would collect 60k as placement fee, and when
the time comes, they would get a ticket to Korea instead,
Buemio claiming that it’s “easier” to get into Japan if they
are in Korea.
b. However, this would turn out to be a hoax as the victims
would never go to Japan and would be forced to use their
return tickets. Buemio would also fail to return the money
they paid even though she promised to do so.
2. Hence, her victims filed a complaint with the NBI, who later found
probable cause.
3. RTC found her GUILTY. SC AFFIRMED.
4. Based on the facts, some of those complainants were never
mentioned in the award of damages.
5. SC found that the reason why RTC did not mention the other
complainants was due to an affidavit of desistance they filed.
ISSUE: W/N the complainant’s affidavits of desistance would be
enough to exonerate the accused of the crime charged
Ruling: NO.
 Ratio: Generally, the court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of
desistance, especially when it is executed as an afterthought. Some of the
complainants may have had a change of heart as the offense on their person
is concerned, but this will not affect the public prosecution of the offense
itself.
the victim who had undergone a surgical operation conducted by another
doctor. At that time, the major organs of the victim were no longer
functioning normally, while his pancreas was likewise injured due to the 2
gunshot wounds at his back. The victim was admitted at 10:45PM but
expired the following evening at 10PM. According to Dr. Pialago, even
with immediate medical attention, the victim could not survive the wounds
he sustained.

2. Another witness testified, PO Mangubat, a police officer , who interviewed

The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes
that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instantly charged by
the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend
the interest of the community
The cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the power to
prosecute and punish crimes should not be overlooked since a criminal
offense is an outrage to the sovereign State.
3.
the victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat testified
that he saw the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for
transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and
the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query
why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was
shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about
to die. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of the victim and
made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of his own blood in the
presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.
Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera
both desisted from further prosecution of the case. the former because of the
"financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter
because Segundina had already "consented to the amicable settlement of the
case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima
facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.

4. The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante
mortemstatement to Police Officer Mangubat positively identifying
accused. The dying declaration was deemed sufficient to overcome the
People vs. Amaca
accused’s defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the
GR No. 110129 August 11, 1997
victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.
Offer of compromise in Criminal Cases; Res Gestae
Issue: 1) Whether or not offer of compromise is admissible against the
accused
Facts:
YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be
1. Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting
deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's criminal liability. The
Wilson Vergara. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar
victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the
Pialago, a resident physician on duty when the victim was brought to the
"financial help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant.
hospital after the shooting. The doctor testified that he was able to attend to

It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's complaining
mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it
does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in
effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil
liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any
civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is
bolstered by the fact that neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf
appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civil liability. But
the heirs, if there are any may file an independent civil action to recover
damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.
FELICIANO B. GARDINER, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN, Judge
of First Instance of Pampanga, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 48185. August 18, 1941
PETITION: Petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
judge to admit the testimony of Catalino Fernandez, one of the accused, to
prove the alleged conspiracy between him and his five co-accused.
FACTS: Gardiner, filed an information against the Catalino Fernandez and
respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno
Icban, and Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired together to
kill, and that they did kill, Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five co-
accused, not guilty. At the trial of the latter, Catalino was called by the
fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy. Upon
objection of counsel for the defense, the Respondent Judge Magsalin did
not permit the witness Catalino Fernandez to testify against his co-accused,
on the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or declaration is not
admissible against his co-conspirators until the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Catalino can validly testify to the conspiracy.
YES.
RULING:
SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given
in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to an
extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator — not to his testimony by way of
direct evidence.
For illustration, let us suppose that after the formation but before the
consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez and
his five co-accused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that
he and his co-accused were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and
declaration of Fernandez could not be given in evidence against his co-
accused unless the conspiracy be proven first. The testimony of
Fernandez’s friend to the effect that Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told
him that he (Fernandez) and his co-accused were going to kill Gaudencio
Vivar would be admissible against Fernandez, but not against his co-
accused unless the conspiracy between them be proven first. But, without
proof of conspiracy, it is not admissible against Fernandez’s co-accused
because the act and declaration of Fernandez are res inter alios as to his
co-accused and, therefore, cannot affect them. But if there is conspiracy,
each conspirator is privy to the acts of the others; the act of one conspirator
is the act of all the coconspirators.
DISPOSITION: Let the writ of mandate issue as prayed for by the
petitioner.
People vs Condemena
Facts:
On October 6, 1962, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, Barcelisa Lamoste
was sitting by the side of the cradle of her child facing her husband Fermin
Lamoste who was on the yard of the house. Their eldest daughter,
Esmeralda Lamoste, 14 years old at that time, was at the door of their house
together with her younger brothers and sisters. Suddenly, four men arrived
at their house. That Simplicio Aniel and Casamero Patino were armed with
guns, and Pelagio Condemena and Ricarido Causing were armed with bolos
when these four men arrived in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon. That upon their arrival, Simplicio Aniel rushed
towards her and pointed the gun, about one foot long, at her face, telling her
the following words: "Do not shout. If you shout. I will kill you." Barcelisa
Lamoste, out of fear, did not in fact shout. While Simplicio Aniel was thus
pointing the gun at her, the three other men went directly towards where her
husband was. Two of them, Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing, each
held the hands of her husband and when resistance from Fermin Lamoste
was already impossible, Pelagio Condemena, with the use of his bolo,
stabbed her husband on the right side of the breast. Upon being hit with the
bolo-stab, she heard her husband said: "Dong, why did you stab me when I
did not commit any wrong?" After Fermin Lamoste was stabbed, Pelagio
Condemena, Ricarido Causing and Casamero Patino dragged her husband
towards the kitchen of the house. Pelagio Condemena stayed outside while
Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing went up the house through the
kitchen and took the amount of P200.00.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant Simplicio Aniel has been sufficiently identified as
one of the four men who participated in the commission of the crime
charged?
Held: YES.
Well settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is weak where the
prosecution witnesses positively identified the accused. To prosper such a
defense, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence and not
merely supported by witnesses who bear close ties of relationship to the
accused. The degree of the evidence trust be such as to preclude any doubt
that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.
The positive identification of appellant Simplicio Aniel was further
bolstered when Pelagio Condemena and Casamero Patino, in their sworn
statements Exhibits "B" and "C", named Simplicio Aniel as one of them in
the group when they killed Fermin Lamoste and robbed the house of
P200.00 on October 6, 1962, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Extrajudicial confessions, independently made without collusion, which are
identical with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by
other evidence on record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against
the person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual
participation in the commission of the crime. As this Court has said:
While confession of a co-conspirator are not ordinarily admissible
as evidence against another co-conspirator, the fact that they
implicate the latter and were made soon after the commission of
the crime, is circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
their co-conspirator having actually participated therein. (People
vs. Lumahang et al., L-6357, May 7, 1954.)
The appellant Simplicio Aniel is liable as principal because the evidence
does not show that he had attempted to prevent the assault and the killing of
Fermin Lamoste. (People vs. Garduque, et al., L-10133, July 31, 1958.)
PEOPLE vs PROVO
GR L-28347 | January 20, 1971
Ponente: J. CONCEPCION
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
CFI decision.
FACTS:
 On October 9 1958, MATIGNAS SERRANO,a security guard in a
guard post in “Pisok” (a small plateau) near Clark Airfield, was
forcibly taken by FIVE men shortly after dusk. The security guard
was then found dead two days later in a sugarcane plantation near
the post, with a broken jaw and spine.
 On December 2 1958, an Information was filed charging (1) Jose
Messina, (2) Leonard David, (3) PAN PROVO, and two other John
Does for the offense of kidnapping with murder.
 The prosecution presented the testimony of Armstrong, the
superintendent of the police at CLARK AIRFIELD, and some
other people, including the testimony of the victim’s brother
Anastacio, and the victim’s wife Benita (the testimony of the
second group were lumped together).
o ARMSTRONG testimony –
 Clark Airfield used to maintain communications
with Camp O’Donnel by radio and underground
cables. To protect the installation of the cables,
the US engaged the PH Scouts and a non-
Christian Tribe (the BALUGA, of which the
victim Serrano is a member).
 Early 1958, the comms were experiencing
technical difficulty, due to the pilferage of
cables.
 He saw Pan Provo conversing with Jose Messina
on several occasions.
 Pan Provo is another BALUGA chief in the
region, and that Provo asked Armstrong to
engage the services of Matignas Serrano as
sentry.
o Second group’s testimonies –
 Anastacio claimed that Jose Mesina once went to
him with 3 other people on the morning of that
fateful day, and after having lunch, asked
Anastacio to let him get some “pipes” (referring
to the cables) near the area guarded by his
brother.
 Anastacio refused, to which Jose Messina
remarked that “if you don’t know how to talk
with people, you will not live long”. Mesina left
at 3PM
 Benita claimed that she gave a flashlight to her
husband just after sunset. Afterwards, Jose
Mesina arrived with four other masked men, and
asked for a light for his cigarette from Matignas,
and then grabbed hold of Matignas’ rifle and
dragged him down the hill.
 Benita screamed for help, and her nephew called
Anastacio, who reported the kidnapping to the
Air Base. The next morning a search team
looked for clues.
 The story of the search team’s efforts were
relayed by LAXAMANA. Apparently, Jose
Mesina joined the search team. At a certain
juncture, he implored the team to go a left
(despite Laxamana wanting to turn right to
follow a small set of footprints), at which point
the team found nothing. Upon their return,
Benita for the first time claimed Jose Mesina
is the one who kidnapped Matignas.
 The defense presented these testimonies:
o Leonard David claimed his brother Federico, was the one
who urged him to come with Jose Mesina. His brother
was the one who apparently held Matignas on the
shoulder before wresting the Carbine rifle from the
victim. Matignas was then led to the bottom of the hill
and hit with fist blows and the butt of the rifle until he
was unconscious. This was subscribed and sworn before
the Justice of Peace in Pampanga.
o Emilio Provo, the son of the accused PAN PROVO, in his
statement before the Fiscal of Tarlac at the preliminary
investigation, claimed that Jose Mesina frequently met
with his father Pan Provo. Apparently In 1958, Pan Provo
was the supervisor in the digging of cables in Clark
Airfield, along with Jose Mesina and Emilio, and that
they were selling the stolen cables to a Chinaman in
Pampanga.
 ON the fateful day, just after twilight, Emilio and
Pan Provo went to the house of Jose Mesina,
 whom the latter invited to go to “Pisok”, the area
guarded by Matignas; that on the way thereto,
Federico David, alias "Pedring," and Leonardo
David, alias "Benaring," joined them; that before
reaching the place, Emilio's companion said that
they would get Matignas Serrano, the guard in
that place, "because of the tubes" they were
taking "and that one that was enclosed in a tank
which were being guarded by Matignas Serrano.
Then the kidnapping and killing of Matignas was
again narrated. Afterwards, Emilio and Pan
Provo fled to the mountains after the body of
Matignas was found.
 Emilio Provo DENIED however that this
testimony in the lower court, and merely claimed
he gave it upon the instructions of an Angel
Manipon who assured him he would free after
giving the same.
o Jose Messina claimed he did go to Anastacio’s house on
the fateful day, but claimed he attended religious service
with the INC which lasted until 8PM that day. At about
8:30 p.m. he and Ruben Villas attended a barrio meeting
called by barrio lieutenant Remigio Ocampo; that, upon
adjournment of the meeting, around 10:00 p.m., they
returned to the house of Mesina and then went to bed.
 RTC acquitted Leonard David and Pan Provo based on reasonable
doubt, but CONVICTED Jose Mesina.
 Jose Mesina filed the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mesina’s case can be harmed by the
admissions/confessions of David and Provo.
HELD: YES. The circumstantial evidence of the David and Provo
admissions are admissible against Mesina.
RULING:
It should be noted that, although extrajudicial confessions are in general
admissible only against those who made the same, this rule is subject to an
exception.
Extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusion, which are
identical with each other in their essential detailsand are corroborated by
other evidence on record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against
the person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual
participation in the commission of the crime.
The applicability of the foregoing exception — which has been repeatedly
acknowledged and applied by this Court — to the case at bar becomes
apparent when we bear in mind that the statements contained in the
statements of Leonardo David and Emilio Provo were made — obviously
without collusion and independently of each other — for the purpose of
establishing the guilt of Federico David and Pan Provo, respectively, and
that they corroborate one anotherand the testimony of Benita Mayuyu,
Anastacio Serrano and Kudiaru Laxamana with respect to the fact that
Matignas Serrano was dragged away from his guard post in the evening of
October 9, 1958, by Mesina and several other persons — apparently for not
allowing them to steal and take away electric cables from Clark Field Air
Base — and then killed. Hence, said Exhibits were properly admitted as
circumstantial evidence tending to show the probability of the participation
of appellant in the commission of said offense, as testified to by said
witnesses for the prosecution.
Furthermore, this is coupled with the weak defense of the appellant, which
cannot stand as against the evidence stacked against him by the prosecution,
namely the positive identification by the wife, and corroborated by the
extrajudicial admissions/confessions.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the Decision of the Court of FIRST
INSTANCE is AFFIRMED, with modification on the indemnity.
People v. Puesca (87 SCRA 761)
Nature of the case: Automatic review of the judgment
Facts:
 Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, Montano (6 in all)were
charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not
guilty. Sgt. Lucio Bano, testified as a prosecution witness regarding the
extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused Arcadio Puesca. He
said that Puesca, aside from admitting his participation in the commission
of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to
commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them.
Following up to the testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to
mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for
the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground
that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients
were concerned. The judge resolved the objection directing the witness to
answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the
accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was
allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those
who had raised the objection. The prosecution filed a certiorari to allow the
witness to answer in full.
ISSUES:
WON Sgt. Bano should be allowed to mention all the names of the alleged
conspirators
RULING:
Yes, he should be allowed.
RATIO:
- Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while
the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if
intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was
made.
People of the Philippines VS. Marcelino Cedon
G.R. No. 101117 – June 15, 1994
Facts:
 The Respondent Accused, who being a member of a terrorist group
and armed with assorted firearms, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another with other
individuals who are still at large, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap and carry away the
person of Felimon Gerona from his house to an unknown island
and kept the same under heavy guard to better secure the consent
of the victim through fear the ransom in the amount of 5,000 pesos.
 Felimon while having lunch in his house, several armed men
ordered him to go down his house. His hands were bound and he
recognize some of them as Teofilo Bulan and Ruben Bolito who
belong to a gang of robbers called “Sabarra”. He also noticed
appellant standing on the concrete pavement near the beach.
 Felimon was being accussed by the perpetrators on being an
intelligent agent which he denied, and he was taken eventually to
Aripuyok island known as the killing fields.
 Felimon agreed to give 5,000 pesos and he was taken back to his
Barangay. When they arrived on the said barangay he again saw
the respondent sitting on the concrete fence near the beach.
 Felimon withdrew the ransom money and had his wife sent it to
Bulan.
 Felimon did not immediately report the incident to the police
authorities but informed the same only after the town people had
organized the “alsa masa” as a counter insurgency movement. He
also enlisted as a CAFGU as a means to retaliate against the
extortionist.
  Respondent was later on arrested by Felimon. Respondent claimed
his innocence and that he was force by Bulan to come with them
for fear of his life.
 Respondent assert that he was only apprehended by Felimon for
the latter wanted him to testify against Bulan, from which he
refused.
 RTC find the respondent guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom
Issue: W/N Respondent should be held liable as conspirator for the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom in relation to the testimony for Felimon Gerona and
Pedro Comeque?
Ruling: No
 Testimony of Felimon cas doubt as to whether respondent was
really an active participant on the said crime.
 Comeque’s testimony had an admission that his testimony that
respondent was a member of the group of Bulan was based on
heasay.
 Another witness (Rudito Basilan) supports the respondent’s
protestation of innocence. According to him he was also forced to
go to the said barangay by Bulan to gather bamboo.
 If respondent’s culpability was based on the sole fact that he was
seen near the house of Felimon when the latter was kidnapped,
then Basilan should have been indicted also for he was also in the
crime scene.
 Conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court
does not find respondent to be a conspirator for his was a passive
presence in the scene of the crime. Mere presence of the accused at
the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy.
 The prosecution failed to prove any overt act showing that
respondent joined the gang of Bulan to perpetrate the crime. Mere
knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent an
active participation in the commission of the crime.
SC reverse decision of the lower court and Acquit the accused.
People v. Camiling (424 SCRA 698)
FACTS:
Masterline Grocery was robbed by men with firearms. Upon escaping they
killed a cop and wounding the owner of a nearby bread store. When an
investigation was being conducted after the apprehension of theaccused
robbers, one NatyPanimbaan testified that she was present when all the
other robbers were planning the heist. Camiling, among the robbers, denied
liability and impugned the credibility of Naty, as she was allegedly a
polluted source, hence making her testimony inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether Naty‘s testimony is admissible?
RULING:
The rules on Admission by Conspirator prescribe that any declaration made
by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone
but not against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by
other independent evidence. However, such rule only applies to
extrajudicial declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the
witness stand where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. Naty made the testimony in open court
sooo....alamna.
US v. Bay
G.R. No. L-9341
August 14, 1914
J. Carson
FACTS: The information in this case charges the appellant, Servando Bay,
with the crime of rape committed against Florentina Alcones.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially as
follows: That the complaining witness and the accused are neighbors: that
about 7 o'clock in the evening of June 7, when turning from her rice field
she was joined by the accused, and that a short distance from the mouth of
Subaan River he caught hold of her, picked her up, and carried her to the
edge of some thickets, where he threw her on the ground and attempted to
have carnal intercourse with her; that angered by her resistance he drew his
dagger, and forced her under threat of her life to accede to his desires; that a
party who were passing near the place where the crime was committed
heard her cries, and put into shore; that one of the parties stepped ashore,
and seeing the accused get up from the place where the woman claims the
crime was committed, asked "What's this?"; that the accused made no
explanation of his conduct or his presence there, and left the place
forthwith; that immediately thereafter the woman, accompanied by some of
the party from the boat, went to the councilman of the barrio and made the
complaint; that the accused, having been brought before the councilman and
asked had he committed the crime of which he was charged, admitted that
he had; that thereafter the accused was sent to the justice of the peace, who
held him for trial.
Counsel for appellant lays great stress upon certain apparent contradictions
and inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the witnesses for the
prosecution, and vigorously contends that the trial court erred in accepting
as true the testimony of the complaining witness and of the witnesses called
by the prosecution to corroborate her. He emphasizes what he calls the
inherent improbability of the story told by the offended woman, and points
to the facts that she appears to be much more than twice the age of the
accused, and anything but attractive in her personal appearance . His
contention is that the charge of rape is a pure fabrication, and that it was
brought by the woman for the sole purpose of wreaking her vengeance and
spite upon the accused, with whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of
one of his carabaos on her land.
ISSUE: Whether the conduct of the accused on the day he was brought to
the councilman showed his attempt to establish his innocence
HELD: NO. It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the ignorant witnesses called for
the prosecution, and that it is somewhat difficult to understand how the
accused, a young married man, could have been so lost to all sense of right
and decency as to assault a woman so much older than himself, a neighbor,
and an old friend of his family. But her evidence, supported by that of other
witnesses for the prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive that we are
forced to believe that he did it in fact commit the atrocious crime with
which he is charged.
It conclusively appears that the offended woman sought assistance and
made formal and official complaint immediately after the commission of
crime under such conditions as practically to preclude the possibility of a
conspiracy between herself and the other prosecuting witnesses to press a
false charge against the accused.
There can be no possible doubt that the party passing in a boat the deserted
place where the crime was committed was attracted by her cries and
complaints, and that the arrival of those aboard was a fortunate coincidence
which she could not well have anticipated, had she planned the filing of
false charges against the accused. There can be no question also that she
went immediately to the councilman of her barrio to make complaint
against the accused, accompanied by some of the passengers on the boat.
And there can be no question also that as a result, these proceedings were
instituted forthwith in the court of the justice of the peace.
There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether the accused, when
the complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or did not
admit his guilt, and this evidence is so contradictory that it would be
difficult if not possible to make an express finding on this point. But
whatever be the truth as to these alleged admissions of his guilt, the
evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the moment when the
party in the boat came upon him in company with his victim nor when he
appeared before the councilman upon her complaint did he claim, as he
does now, that her charge that he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication,
invented for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him.
Under such circumstances, we are convinced that an innocent man would
instantly and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt there and
then to establish his innocence, explaining how he came to be there present
with the woman, and the conditions under which she had made the false
charge.
The witnesses called both for the prosecution and the defense go into
considerable detail as to all that occurred at the time when the party on
board the boat responded to the calls of the woman and immediately
thereafter, and yet there is not the slightest indication in the evidence that
there was on the part of the accused any such indignant denials and protests
as would be expected from an innocent man suddenly confronted with such
a charge under such circumstances. Indeed his conduct at that time was, to
our minds, wholly at variance with that which might fairly be expected from
him, granting the truth of his testimony and that of the other witnesses for
the defense.
G.R. No. L-59551 August 19, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,laintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL
NAVOA y MARTINEZ and BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ alias
"Jack Robertson," alias "Lim Ming Tak," alias "Christopher Kelly,"
Defendants-Appellants.
This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXX convicting
defendants-appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim of the crime of
Arson.
Allegedly, Navoa and his companions, set fire to and burn the MANILA
CINEMA BUILDING with the use of gasoline, which resulted to
substantial loss of property and the death of fourteen (14) victims
Defendant-appellant Bernardo Lim informed the latter that it was Manuel
Navoa who was responsible for the fire that destroyed Manila Cinema 1 and
2.
Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and without first securing
a warrant of arrest, Corporals Palmon and Harrison Tolosa arrested
appellant Manuel Navoa. At the police headquarters, appellant Navoa
allegedly executed statements waiving his constitutional rights to silence
and to counsel and giving an extra-judicial confession
Appellant Bernardo Lim likewise executed a waiver of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel and also gave an extra-judicial confession
Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of both defendants-
appellants the trial court rendered the appealed judgment of conviction.
Thus, both defendants appealed to the Supreme Court
Issue:
Whether the defendants’ extra judicial confession is sufficient to sustain a
conviction
Ruling:
No. The main thrust of the defendants-appellants' arguments on appeal is
that they were not afforded the opportunity to avail of their rights under
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution; that there was no intelligent
waiver of their rights, and as such, their extra-judicial confessions are
inadmissible against them.
The records show that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused
formed the only basis for the judgment of conviction. The confessions
were taken without the assistance of any counsel for the accused. The
confessions were preceded by waivers of the right to counsel. During the
trial, accused Navoa repudiated the waivers and the confessions. He
testified that the police investigators employed force and intimidation,
including outright torture to secure his confession. Navoa's confession was
far from being the product of his free will. Assuming there was no torture,
there was, at the very least, improper pressure and intimidation.
The written waiver of appellant Navoa purportedly waiving his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel should have been excluded by
the trial court.ch In the case at bar, there was no such voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent waiver. Exhibit "O" is so pat and aptly worded, so contrived
as to be exactly suited to meet legal objections that it could have been
prepared only by a veteran police investigator and not by an ordinary
layman like appellant Manuel Navoa.
When Navoa waived his right to counsel and executed the extra-judicial
confession, he was alone in the company of the police interrogators,
deprived of outside support. The Supreme Court is far from satisfied that
the waiver of counsel and the subsequent confession were indeed products
of Navoa's free will.
Further, the alibi of Navoa is well-supported by the collective testimonies
of his teachers who categorically testified that on those dates, he was
present in their classes based on their recollections and evidenced by their
class records.
aIn this particular case, the police should have been more aware of the
protections afforded by Article IV, Section 20 of the Bill of Rights to
persons undergoing custodial interrogation. In the belief that the
extrajudicial confession and the re-enactment, taken without the required
constitutional safeguards, were enough to sustain conviction, determined
efforts to apprehend the six other arsonists or to get admissible and more
convincing evidence were no longer taken.
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim are ACQUITTED of
the crime charged on grounds of reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 69971. July 3, 1992.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNESTO
LUVENDINO y COTAS, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
 Lifeless body of Rowena Capcap was found in a grassy vacant lot
within the Deva Village Subdivision, Autopsy report stated that the
victim’s death was due to asphyxia by manual strangulation.
 An information has been filed in the trial court charging Luvendino
, Borca and de Guzman with the crime of rape with murder.
Warrants of arrest were issued against all the accused. Luvendino,
who was apprehended, pleaded not guilty at the arraignment where
his counsel, Atty. Sardillo, assisted him.
 TC - found Luvendino guilty and sentenced him to death.
 Luvendino contends that TC committed grievous error in admitting
and giving credence to the evidence of re-enactment and admission
of guilt, both of which were uncounseled.
Issue: Did the court err in holding that his "demonstration" or re-enactment
of the crime as well as his confession and subsequent written admission of
guilt as admissible for having been made without the benefit of counsel.
Held: For the re-enactment of the crime – Yes.
 Appellant Luvendino: contends that the "demonstration" or re-
enactment and his extrajudicial confession were effected and
secured in the absence of a valid waiver by him of his
constitutional rights and that the re-enactment and the confession
should be held inadmissible in evidence because they had been
involuntarily made.
 TC: records indicate that immediately after his apprehension, the
police officers brought him to the Deva Subdivision where he
demonstrated how the victim was boxed, dragged and taken to the
 vacant lot, where she was raped and throttled to death. According
to the evidence for the prosecution, Luvendino in the re-enactment,
had not only admitted his presence in the commission of the crime
but had likewise admitted he was with Borca in abusing Rowena.
Significantly, the evidence for the prosecution in this regard was
not rebutted nor denied by the accused.
 TC: found that the accused was informed of his constitutional
rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police
headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" 11 of appellant
Luvendino.
For the extrajudicial confession of Luvendino – No.
 Appellant Luvendino: claimed first of all that the extrajudicial
confession had been extracted from him by means of a beating
administered by many policemen at the police station and that a
chain had been wrapped around his neck.
 TC: disbelieved and rejected Luvendino’s claim that he had been
beaten into making his confession. In an extra-judicial
confession, the confessant carries the burden of convincing the
court that his admissions are involuntary and untrue. (People
v. Manabo, 18 SCRA 30). This Luvendino had failed to do.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court declined to uphold the admissibility of
evidence relating to the re-enactment. The decision of the trial court itself,
however, states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was
brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that before
the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his
constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he
had waived such right before proceeding with the demonstration.
The presumption of the law is one of spontaneity and voluntariness
of an extrajudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, for no person
of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to being the
perpetrator of a crime, especially a heinous crime, unless prompted by truth
and conscience.
Court has ruled that where the confessant failed to present any
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person for purposes of
extracting a confession; where he failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths, such as the Fiscal in this case; where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where he did not have himself examined by a
reputable physician to buttress his claim of maltreatment; and where the
assailed confession is replete with details which could not have been known
to the police officers if they merely concocted the confession, since the
statements were inculpatory in character, the extrajudicial confession may
be admitted, the above circumstances being considered as factors
indicating voluntariness.
Disposition: The decision of TC was modified changing the enforceable
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua; Luvendino was required to pay
heirs of Rowena Capcap actual and moral damages.
People v. Agustin (People v. Jaime “Jimmy Agustin, Wilfredo “Sonny”
Quiano, Manuel “Jun” Abenoja, Jr., and Freddie “Boy” Cartel, accused.
Jaime “Jimmy” Agustin, accused-appellan)
G.R. No. 110290 | Janaury 25, 1995
Davide, Jr., J.:
Nature:
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
Facts:
1. Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony;
Anthony’s girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter,
Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way
aboard their Brasilia to the doctor’s residence from his clinic
a. Anthony as driving the car
2. While they were cruising, near a Baptist Church, a man came out
from the right side of a car parked about 2 meters to the church
a. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle
through its window, and fired at the passengers
b. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence
c. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car
which then sped away
3. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayqueen and Anna Theresa
died on the spot
a. Dominic was able to get out of the Brasilia to run to the
Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother and told
her what had happened
b. Later, she and her mother brought her father and Anthony
to the hospital
c. Danny Ancheta went home and was then brought to the
Notre Dame Hospital for treatment
d. Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor
4. The police later arrived at the crime scene and conducted an
investigation
5. Later, accused Wilfredo “Sonny” Quiano, an alleged former
military agent or asset who had been picked up by the police
authorities, confessed during the investigation that he was the
triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayqueen and Anna
Theresa Francisco
a. He implicated Manuel “Jun” Abenoja, Jr., allegedely a
fellow military agent and the “bagman” who engaged him
to kill Dr. Bayqueen for a fee, Freddie “Boy” Cargel, who
provided the armalite, and certain “Jimmy.”
6. Subsequently, “Jimmy,” who turned out to be appellant Jaime
Agustin, was picked up by military personnel and was investigated
in connection with the crime
7. The defense presented the appellant and his wife
a. The appellant impugned the validity of his extrajudicial
statement
b. He alleged that on the day of the crime, he went to buy
some fertilizer and upon his return he was met by 2 armed
men who took him to their car where 2 other companions,
armed with armalites, were waiting
c. Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and
he answered that he did not
d. He was also made to kneel at gunpoint in order to force
him to admit his involvement in the shooting, which he
finally did out of fear
e. While giving his statement at the fiscal’s office, the armed
men stayed with him and their presence deterred him
from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being
threatened
f. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer
to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is
a lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom,
assisting counsel, interviewed him for only 2 minutes in
English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands
g. He eventually asserted that he was promised by his
captors that he would be discharged as a state witness if
he cooperates, but the plan did not push through because
his co-accused, Quiano, escaped
8. Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband’s story
9. The Trial Court admitted the appellant’s extrajudicial statement
and gave scant consideration to his claim of force, intimidation,
and other irregularities
10. The trial court then concluded that there was conspiracy and the
accused was a direct participant in the crime, and that while he
tried to minimize his culpability, his extrajudicial confesion shows
that he was in on the plan, and even expected to be paid, to be
rewarded monetarily; and that he decided to give a statement only
when he was not given the money
a. Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court was established by the
prosecution’s evidence, it found his conviction for murder
inevitable
11. On appeal, the appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession
was taken in violation of his rights under Section 11, Article III of
the Constitution
a. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty.
Reynaldo, was not of his own choice but was foisted upon
him by the City Fiscal
 b. Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private
prosecutor and conferred with him in English and Tagalog
although he understood only Ilocano.
Issue:
WON accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are admissible
as evidence to warrant conviction
Held:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged decision of the
RTC and acquitted Jaime “Jimmy” Agustin.
1. Contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court and the
characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed
extrajudicial statement is not an extrajudicial confession. It is only
an extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to once more
distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and 33, Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court clearly show such a distinction. In a confession,
there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied
in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not
directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of
the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged
2. Wharton defines a confession as follows: “A confession is an
acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of
his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by
the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and
tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt.
In other words, an admission is something less than a confession,
and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which
in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends
only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.”
3. It was examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the
appellant, and we are satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he
expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some facts
or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize
a conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact
of guilt. Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of
admissibility in evidence under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph thereof
expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus: “(3) Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.”
4. Thefirst two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present
Constitution have broadened the aforesaid Section 20 in these
respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any counsel, but a
“competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice”; (2) the right to remain silent and to counsel can only be
waived in writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule
on inadmissibility expressly includes admissions, not just
confessions.
5. Theright to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates “the transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.” It is not enough for the investigator to
merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12,
Article III of the present Constitution; the former must also explain
the effects of such provision inpractical terms, e.g., what the
person under investigation may or may not do? and in a language
the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries
with it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to
explain, and contemplates effective communication which results
in the subject understanding what is conveyed. Since it is
comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the
education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances
of the person undergoing the investigation.
6. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the
subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked if he
wants to avail of the same and should be told that he can ask for
counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his
request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of
one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his
right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be
made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a
lawyer.
7. Thewaiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. Consequently, even if the confession of an accused
speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it
 is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.
8. Theextrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-
two pages of yellow pad, does, indeed, appear to be signed by him
and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. What we find in these yellow pads
are stenographic notes. These were transcribed by the stenographer
who took down the stenographic notes, but for reasons not
explained in the records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit “C”),
9. Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been
voluntarily and intelligently “accepted” by the appellant as his
counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty. Cajucom’s
presence in the Office of the City Fiscal at the time the appellant
was brought there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two
possibilities may explain it: it was a mere coincidence in the sense
that he happened to be attending to some professional matter, or he
was earlier called by the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free
legal aid to the appellant, These possibilities are not remote but
whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us that Atty. Cajucom
was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the
abovequoted portion of Exhibit “C,” the City Fiscal immediately
suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom without first distinctly
asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own choice and if he
had one, whether he could hire such counsel; and if he could not,
whether he would agree to have one provided for him; or whether
he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel.
In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by
counsel, the City Fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately
informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. While it
is true that in custodial investigations the party to be investigated
has the final choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen
for him by the investigator and ask for another one, the
circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation of the
appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do so. For
as earlier stated, he was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his
own choice and whether he could afford to hire such lawyer; on the
other hand, the CityFiscal clearly suggested the availability of
Atty. Cajucom.
10. Then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and Sgt.
Roberto Rambac, military officers of RUCI, who brought him to
the City Fiscal’s Office for investigation in the afternoon of the
day when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan.
Along Kennon Road, on the way to Baguio City, he was coerced
and threatened with death if he would not admit knowing “Jun”
and “Sonny” and his participation in the crime. This testimony was
unrebutted by the prosecution. The presence of the military officers
and the continuing fear that if he did not cooperate, something
would happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated
his free will.
G.R. No. 98060. January 27, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SATURNINA
SALAZAR y PALANAS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal seeks the reversal of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 925 of
the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 13, finding appellant
Saturnina Salazar y Palanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, and imposing upon her
the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of P20,000.00 as fine, with
costs.
The Facts
In a buy-bust operation, the accused Salazar sold and delivered to a
NARCOM Agent posing as a buyer, marijuana sticks and leaves. Found in
Salazar’s possession was the 5.00 marked bill and marijuana. Salazar was
then arrested.
At the PC headquarters in Camp Naranjo, Sgt. Cubillan interrogated
appellant while Cpl. de Guzman took her bio-data. Her fingerprints were
also taken. Thereafter, Cpl. de Guzman made her sign her bio-data and the
paper containing her fingerprints. It was Sgt. Cubillan who instructed her to
sign the piece of bond paper which was used to wrap the marijuana sticks
before they were submitted to the laboratory for examination.
The Trial court find the accused, Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
selling a prohibited drug without being authorized by law, she is hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
The accused appeal that arguing the her right to counsel has been violated.
Issue
Whether the right of the accused to counsel has been violated, hence any
confession made by her is inadmissible.
Ruling:
Yes. But there is still enough evidence to convict the accused
Ratio:
Violation of Appellant's Right to Counsel
We find appellant's claim that she was not informed of her right to
counsel during custodial investigation to be correct. Moreover, the
NARCOM agent's admission that they made her sign and thumbmark
the bond paper which they used to wrap the marijuana found in her
possession was violative of her constitutional right to counsel. While the
bond paper does not appear to have been considered as a pivotal piece of
evidence against appellant, such act of the NARCOM agents is worth
noting if only to provide guidance to law enforcement operatives. In People
vs. Simon, where the accused was made to sign the booking sheet and arrest
report stating that he was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected
marijuana and the receipt for the seized property, the Court said:
"x x x. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations
against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were
obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in
the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although appellant
manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to
counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of
counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be
extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in
evidence. Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can
easily be concocted to implicate a suspect."
Prosecution's Other Evidence
Sufficient for Conviction
Appellant's contention that she could not have taken the risk of selling the
five (5) marijuana sticks for only five pesos and therefore the contraband
was "planted," is totally baseless. She herself did not bring out this alleged
irregularity in the performance of the NARCOM agents' duty at the witness
stand. On the other hand, the testimony of the two (2) peace officers carried
with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions.
Appellant claims that the prosecution evidence is weak because Sgt.
Cubillan was allegedly caught lying on the witness stand. She alleges that
the prevarication of said witness was reflected by his testimony that after
arresting appellant, they proceeded to the PC headquarters. Later, he
testified that they still dropped by Bayotas' residence to arrest her. This
alleged change in testimony which was explained by the witness himself,
[43] is too inconsequential to dent the prosecution's compelling evidence on
the fact of sale of illegal drugs.
The Court also finds too preposterous to merit scrutiny appellant's
contention that in convicting her, the trial court relied on her previous
conviction for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Her being under
probation was not alleged in the Information. It was brought out in the trial
where she herself admitted that she was on probation when she committed
the offense in this case. However, while the trial court mentioned that fact
in the Decision of March 1, 1991, it based its findings on evidence
presented by both the prosecution and the defense and not on the fact that
appellant was a probationer convicted of engaging in the abominable trade
of illegal drugs when she committed the offense.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision convicting appellant Saturnina
Salazar y Palanas of the crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act. No 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUTROPIO
TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Presidential Decree
1866, (possession, custody and control one .38 cal. revolver, marked
Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without
authority of law), which firearm was used with treachery and evident
premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused
death. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
2. The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of P.D.
1866 and Murder qualified by treachery.
3. Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision which,
however, was denied.
4. The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows: That in the
evening of February 24, 1989, while Rosalina and her husband
(Leonardo Bolima) were sleeping inside their house, they were
awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Her husband opened the
door and they saw that the person who was knocking was their "Pareng
Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who
appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house; she saw the
accused showing a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it;
she took a few steps away from the two, however, when she looked
back to the place where her husband and the accused was, she found
out that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after she had
heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their
door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shoot (sic)
her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya";
accused extended his help by helping them in carrying the victim
towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind
and put down the victim; accused reasoned out that the victim was
already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's help,
they were able to reach the main road; thereafter, Kalookan policemen
arrived and so she caused the arrest of the accused.
5. The version of the defense: That while passing infront of the house of
Nardo, his Pareng Nardo called him up; when he was about to enter the
door of the house of the victim, the latter, poked a gun at him; he
grabbed the gun from his Pareng Nardo and at that instance, Rosalina
Bolima emerging from her room, saw him holding the gun; he returned
the gun to his Pareng Nardo and the latter tucked it in his waistline;
accused was left behind to answer the call of nature; while in the act of
urinating, he heard two successive gunshots; he followed the victim and
he saw the latter already sprawled on the ground; he inquired from his
Pareng Nardo as to what had happened to him, "Pareng Nardo, ano ang
nangyari sa iyo? and the victim's replied (sic) was "Pare, binaril ako",
6. In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a
quo relied on circumstantial evidence because the prosecution failed to
present an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual
shooting incident. It considered seven circumstances, including the
following:
6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately
after the shooting incident took place admitted to her
having accidentally shoot (sic) the victim is admissible
evidence against the accused declarant since this is
covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an exception
to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae — Statement made by a person
while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior tor (sic) subsequent thereto with
 respect to the circumstance thereof, may be given in
evidence as a part of res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule 130,
Revised Rules of Court, as amended).
7. In support of the assigned error accused-appellant submits, among
others, that:
(d) The testimony of the wife of the victim that after
hearing two successive gunshots accused-appellant went
back to her house and informed her that he accidentally
shot her husband, should not have been considered by the
trial court as part of the res gestae.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of
the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot
the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae
HELD:
No. The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were
duly established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else,
shot and killed the victim. We do not, however, agree with the additional
observation of the trial court, in respect to the sixth circumstance, that the
statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim
immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim
is covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in
the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are among the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to
those facts which he knows of or his own knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perceptions.17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness
as to what he heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be
admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions to
this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section
36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that
the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence.
Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be deemed as part of the res
gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be received as part of
the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the
victim is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told
her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her.
The accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part
of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did
in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a
statement allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia Macaraeg
that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and
which Natalia repeated in her testimony in open court was merely an
"oral confession" and not part of the res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the
alleged statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred
from questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time
the testimony was given.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject
decision of the trial court, and as Modified, FINDING the accused-appellant
EUTROPIO TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the
crime of HOMICIDE, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code… be given full credit for the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
People vs. Tujon
[G.R. No. 66034. November 13, 1992.]
Facts:
Tujon, Parola and Paredes were charged with Robbery with Homicide.
Paredes remained at large. Tujon and Parola were convicted. They allegedly
robbed and killed a taxi driver.
There is no eyewitness for the prosecution. To establish the case against the
accused, the prosecution relied mainly on the extra-judicial confession of
Tujon and Parola. The confessions were signed by police detective and by
the accused.
During trial, Tujon denied the charges against him. He testified that he
came from the province and looked for a job in Manila. He was arrested for
unknown reasons. He also testified that he did not know his other co-
accused. The policemen asked him to sign a paper the contents of which he
did not know.
Issue:
WON the confession is admissible
Held: No.
Ratio:
This Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be valid,
must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Extra-judicial confessions
taken without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence (People
v. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 [1987]). Hence, while the right to counsel may
be waived, such waiver must be done voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently, and made in the presence of the accused’s lawyer. If the
records do not show that the accused was assisted by counsel in making his
waiver, this defect nullifies and renders inadmissible in evidence his
confession (People v. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623, [1988]). In the case of
People v. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760 {1988}, this Court, citing the procedure
laid down in the case of People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]), ruled that
the suspect must be informed that he has a right to the assistance of counsel
and assured that he will be provided with one for free. While he may choose
to waive the right, such waiver must be a knowing and intelligent one and in
any case must be made only with the assistance of counsel. Any waiver
made without observance of these requirements is null and void. Indeed, the
ban against uncounselled confessions is even more pronounced under Sec.
12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the absence of
counsel de parte or de oficio and the waiver of counsel, if made at all, was
not made with the assistance of counsel as required.
It is not clear that the accused were actually offered the services of a lawyer
and they refused. In any event, it is undisputed that the waiver of the
accused of their right to counsel was made without the assistance of
counsel.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to
counsel to be valid, must be in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Extra-judicial confessions taken without the assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence
PEOPLE VS. MACAM
Facts:
Prosecution’s version:
On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr.,
Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam
(uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival
of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his
maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting
in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered
the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had
taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam
and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the
wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and
brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the
bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro.
Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value
of the items taken was P536, 700.00.
Defense’s version:
Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to
Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a
calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day.
Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch.
Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio
Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather
some things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins
inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan
patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing
such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified
that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no
way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with
his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father
of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother
was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police
headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things.
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore
contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during
investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each
surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan
was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case.
Issue:
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest
was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.
Held:
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of
prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a “critical”
stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused
made in a police line-up is inadmissible. After the start of the custodial
investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police
line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where
the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was
held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the
minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants
were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces. However, the
prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at
the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission
in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not be
applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution
witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at
the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not
object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In
the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that said
identifications were of independent origin
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. However, they are
estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not
moved to quash the said information and any irregularity attendant to their
arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by
participating in the trial
The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while
remaining outside the house served as a looked out.
Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto
Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of
the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVAREZ,
JR., and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants.
G.R. No. 77865. December 4, 1998

FACTS: A case for robbery with homicide committed during the season of
yuletide.
Prosecution witness Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he took the
statements of appellant Rafael Olivares, Jr. and Purisimo Macaoili and
verbal investigation of appellant Danilo Arellano because the latter refused
to give any statement.
Prosecution witness Cpl. Tomas Juan testified that in the morning of
December 28, 1981, he was assigned by his station commander to follow-up
the robbery with homicide that took place at Tanada Subdivision. He
learned from Patrolman Bote that a regular employee of the Cardinal Plastic
Industries (where the crime was committed) had not yet reported for work.
With that information, Cpl. Juan and others proceeded to the business
establishment and were able to confirm from the workers that appellant
Danilo Arellano failed to report for work since the commission of the crime.
elchor Salle (cousin of appellant Arellano) volunteered to bring them to
Danilo Arellano, in a factory situated in San Juan. Melchor Salle was able
to secure information from the barkada of appellant Arellano who turned
out to be appellant Olivares, Jr. Appellant Olivares accompanied them to
Broadway where they found appellant Arellano. After being asked about the
incident that took place at the Cardinal Plastic Industries, appellant Arellano
readily admitted to the police authorities his participation in the commission
of the crime. Thereafter, appellant Arellano was invited to the police station.
On further direct examination, Cpl. Juan identified in open court the Sanyo
cassettes, the tapes and the wristwatch they recovered from the place where
appellant Arellano pointed to them.
Prosecution witness Purisimo Macaoili testified that he found the dead body
of Mr. Sy in the morning of December 26, 1981 inside the building where
the business establishment is situated. Mr. Sy was residing alone inside his
room because at that time his wife was in Hongkong. Some of the workers
also reside inside the business establishment. Mr. Macaoili also saw the
dead body of the father of Mr. Sy in the same building. is companion
Erning phoned Mr. Sys brother. The same brother asked for the assistance
of the police who arrived at the scene of the crime and who conducted on-
the-spot investigation.
Mr. Macaoili testified that he came to know that the wristwatch, the
cassettes, and other personal items of the victims were missing when
appellants were apprehended. He knew the cassette and the wristwatch
because said items had been used by the victim. He knew appellant
Arellano because he is his barriomate at Tuburan, Iloilo. He also knew
appellant Olivarez, Jr. as they are also barriomates. He testified that
appellant Olivarez, Jr. twice visited the factory and saw him two or three
weeks before said date
Prosecution witness, Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he conducted an
investigation on the person of Rafael Olivarez, Jr. Sgt. Marcelo apprised
him of his constitutional rights. When informed, appellant Olivarez, Jr.
declined any assistance of a lawyer during the investigation considering
that he will tell the truth about the incident. Mr. Melchor Salle and the chief
of Sgt. Marcelo were present during the police investigations. Sgt. Marcelo
prepared a statement signed by appellant Olivarez, Jr. relative to the
investigation.
For the death of the two victims and the loss of some items, appellants were
charge with the complex crime of robbery with double homicide. In the
commission of the said crime, other aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and unlawful entry were present.
LOWER COURT DECISION: Lower court rendered a decision
convicting appellants of the crime charged, sentenced them to suffer the
death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confessions obtained from the accused are
admissible in evidence. NO
RULING: Initially, the categorization by the prosecution of the crime of
robbery with double homicide is erroneous because the word homicide in
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code should be taken in its generic sense
absorbing not only acts which results in death but also all other acts
producing anything short of death. The indictable offense is the complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
The essential elements of which are:
a.) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person;
b.) the property thus taken belongs to another;
c.) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
d.) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide was committed.
In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and; thus,
no direct evidence points to appellants criminal liability. The prosecutions
principal evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the
police officers who arrested, investigated and subsequently took their
confession. Such evidence when juxtaposed with appellants
constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of confessions leads
to a conclusion that they cannot be held liable for the offense charged
despite the inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not
because they are not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them
are inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
First, appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and their
arrest cannot even be justified under any of the recognized exceptions for a
valid warrantless arrest. At the time appellants were apprehended, two days
have already lapsed after the discovery of the crime they were not doing nor
have they done any criminal act. Neither were they caught in flagrante
delicto or had escaped from confinement. Probably aware of the illegality of
the arrest they made, the arresting officers testified that appellants were
merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however, when
construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an
arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an interrogation. Mere
invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is
intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation. Thus, any
evidence obtained in violation of their right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. By virtue of said constitutional protection, any
evidence obtained, including all the things and properties alleged to be
stolen by appellants which were taken by the police from the place of the
illegal arrest cannot be used as evidence for their conviction.
Even assuming arguendo that by entering a plea without first questioning
the legality of their arrest, appellants are deemed to have waived any
objection concerning their arrest, yet the extrajudicial confession of
appellant Olivares, Jr. on which the Under the Constitution, any person
under investigation for the prosecution relies, is likewise inadmissible in
evidence. commission of an offense shall have the right among others, to
have a counsel which right can be validly waived. In this case, the said
confession was obtained during custodial investigation but the confessant
was not assisted by counsel. His manifestation to the investigating officer
that he did not need the assistance of counsel does not constitute a valid
waiver of his right.
Consequently, the invalid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal obtained in violation thereof as also inadmissible in evidence.
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be:
1.) express and categorical;
2.) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realized
the legal significance of his act;
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel;
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood by
the confessant; and
5.) signed, or if the confessant does not know now to read and
write, thumbmarked by him.
In this case, the absence of the third requisite above makes the confession
inadmissible. The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession
even by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false. What is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very
mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an
offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict
him.
With the inadmissibility of the material circumstantial evidence which were
premised on the likewise extrajudicial confession upon which both the
prosecution and the lower court relied to sustain appellants conviction, the
remaining circumstances cannot produce a logical conclusion to establish
their guilt. In order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, it is necessary that the same satisfies the following elements:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the fact from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, appellants conviction is herein
REVERSED and both are ACQUITTED for the crime charged. The person
detaining them is ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE appellants
UNLESS they are held for some other lawful cause.
PEOPLE V. MAGPAYO 1993
SUMMARY:
- It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness free from
any signs of impropriety or falsehood is sufficient to convict an
accused even if uncorroborated.
- Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to
warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation as been inaccurate.
- As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to
show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime
wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not
competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature
for the purpose of showing that he committed the crime charged in
the complaint or information.
- An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to
establish the particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove
the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.
- The evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove the
other but only to show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the
offender.
- It is well-settled that for a conviction to occur, absolute certainty of
guilty is not demanded.
FACTS:
Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery,
Robbery with Hold-up and Forcible Abduction with Rape before the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4) separate complaints and
informations. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all
the charges. After trial, he was found guilty of all the offenses charged in a
joint decision rendered by the trial court. Appellant appeals from the
aforementioned joint decision of the court a quo.
At 9:30 in the morning of April 10, 1988, the 10-year old complainant
Lilibeth Bobis, went to the Malabon market to get money from her parents
to buy milk for her younger sister. After receiving P26.00 from them, she
proceeded to the store near their house but before reaching it, she paused in
front of Betsy's Restaurant near the municipal building. There she was
approached by appellant, who accused her of involvement in a theft of
coffee. Lilibeth denied the accusation but appellant told her that the thief
had a tattoo on the back (tsn, July 25, 1988, pp. 2-3). Appellant then
demanded threateningly that she go with him as they would look at some
boxes and broken bottles, and for her to tell fully that she had nothing to do
with the theft.
They proceeded to the San Bartolome Church, which they circled twice, and
then entered the cemetery beside the church. Once inside, Lilibeth, upon the
prodding of appellant, raised her blouse to show that she had no tattoo. But
appellant said: "Ano ang gusto mo, kakantutin ka o makakauwi ka ng
buhay." For fear of her life, Lilibeth pleaded with appellant not to kill her.
Then appellant removed his shorts and inserted his organ into her mouth
while she was seated on the ground. He removed Lilibeth's shorts and panty
and she was made to sit on a bench. Appellant parted her legs and inserted
his organ into hers while he was in a standing position.
After his coitus with her, appellant took the P26.00 of Lilibeth and warned
her to keep quiet as he was not alone and that she should not leave until he
has gotten out of the cemetery. Lilibeth told appellant to leave and that she
would not complain to the police (Ibid., pp. 4-7).
When she was certain that appellant had already left, Lilibeth put on her
clothing and went back to her mother at the market, to whom she told that
she was raped. Thereafter, both of them informed her father of the matter
and they all proceeded to the police station, where they were advised to go
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to have Lilibeth examined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting him in all charges?
HELD: No, he is guilty and judgment affirmed.
RATIO:
- In resolving whether or not rape was committed, the evidence for
conviction must be clear and convincing to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence
- Appellant vehemently questions the trial court's decision finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution
witnesses allegedly failed to positively identify him
- He avers that when he was arrested to answer for an alleged
wrongdoing on May 22, 1988, complainants were hesitant to point
at him and kept on looking at their parents.
- However, the Court is of the opinion that the lingering shock
caused by such harrowing experience at the hands of appellant
could have caused the minor complainants to hesitate in directly
identifying him.
- Hence, the fact that complainants kept on looking at their parents is
of no moment. They were simply scared, looked at their parents for
assurance, and such initial hesitation could by no means indicate
that complainants were guilty of fabrication.
- Also, although Lilibeth Bobis admitted that she was not able to
immediately identify the appellant at the police station after his
arrest, she declared that she thought it over very carefully if the
appellant was indeed the offender
- Also, what is important is that Bobis remembered the square shape
of appellant's face, his eyes to be "singkit" and his nose as
"matangos" Indeed, familiarity with the physical features,
particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to identify
the person
- Furthermore, It is well settled that the testimony of a single
witness, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, is
sufficient to convict an accused, even if uncorroborated.
- In the instant case, the testimonies of eight-year old Daniel and the
pedicab driver would have been merely corroborative.
Furthermore, there is no showing that the privilege to present
Chico's brother and the pedicab driver was withheld from
appellant. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to
present as many witnesses it deems proper and the non-
presentation of some does not militate against the State for the
number of such witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of
the prosecuting officers.
NELLY LIM vs CA, Juan SIM
GR 91114 | September 25, 1992
Ponente: J. DAVIDE, Jr.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review of Certiorari assailing the
CA resolution denying due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial
court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an
expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
FACTS:
 Nelly Lim and Juan Sim are married to each other.
 Juan Sim filed a petition to declare the nullity of the the marriage
on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code, for schizophrenia
before, during, and after the marriage and until the present.
 At a certain point in the trial, Juan Sim’s counsel announced he
would present as witness the Chief of the Female Services of the
National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry, and sought a subpoena to
have the doctor testify.
 Nelly Lim’s counsel opposed on the ground that the testimony
sought to be elicited from the witness is privilegedsince the latter
 had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
 The trial court denied the opposition and isued the subpoena.
 Nelly Lim’s counsel filed an omnibus motion to quash the
subpoena and hold the proceedings in abeyance pending such
resolution.
 The next day, the doctor appeared in court, and the court held a
hearing on the motion before the doctor could testify. Nelly Lim’s
counsel reiterated their objection arguing it was privileged. Juan
Sim’s counsel however merely averred that the doctor was being
presented as an EXPERT WITNESS, and was going to be asked
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS about her field of specialization.
 The RTC then allowed her to testify as an expert witness only. The
court further advised Nelly Lim’s counsel to object as soon as it
becomes apparent that privileged information might be disclosed.
o On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary
(sic) questions to qualify her as an expert in psychiatry;
she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of
illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked
to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts
respecting certain behaviours of a person; and finally she
admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never
revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic);
nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor
(sic) the medicines she prescribed
 Upon a R65 petition to the CA, the CA dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Acampado can testify as an expert witness.
HELD: YES.
RULING:
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and
make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of
all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness
stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be
enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy
and is for the general interest of the community.
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity
when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the
physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of
the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the
subject communicated is not stated."
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity;
and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken
the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions
necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of
certain communications, to wit:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation.
Nelly Lim’s counsel has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
information is covered by the privilege. In the first place, Dr. Acampado
was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of
her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the
facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and
had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained
while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr.
Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the
hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the
petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever
information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired
by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an
expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the
petitioner was never interviewed alone. Said interviews were always
conducted in the presence of a third party. She was first accompanied by her
husband during the consultations, and then afterwards always with Nelly
Lim’s father. There is authority to the effect that information elicited during
consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such
information from the mantle of the privilege.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
People v. Galleno (291 SCRA 761)
Nature of the case: Automatic review of the judgment
Facts:
Joeral Galleno was charged with staturory rape committed againt
Evelyn Obligar, a five year old girl. The prosecution presented three expert
witnesses namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lanada and Dr.
Michael Toledo. Those testimonies convinced that the trial court that rape
was committed against Obligar. Galleno contented that he should be
acquitted since the expert testimonites were not impeccable considering that
the doctors found that there was no presernce of spermatozoa and that there
were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the victims vagina.
ISSUES:
WON the lacking testimonies of the expert witnesses should result to the
acquittal of the accussed
RULING:
The trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of
doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim’s laceration, but also the
testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. It did not rely solely
on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. The fact that experts enumerated various possible causes
of the victim’s laceration does not mean the trial court’s interference is wrong. The absence of
spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which
was inserted in the victim’s vagina. In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of
semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. The victim as a child is
confused as well as to the object that was inserted in her organ.
RATIO:
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or
give opinions. It is the courts duty to draw conclusions from the evidence
and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and
opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to
expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special
skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the
subject matter under observation, for other reasons, the testimony will aid
the court in reaching a judgement.
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering works VS William Lines Inc and
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Company Inc.
G.R. No. 132607 – May 5, 1999
Facts:
 Petitioner Cebu Shipyard is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of dry-docking and repairing of marine vessels. Private
 respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc, is a domestic
corporation engaged in the non-life insurance business. Private
Respondent William Lines Inc is in the shipping business and
owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel which
would be the main topic of the issue of this case.
 William lines brought its vessel (M/V Manila) to the Cebu
Shipyard for annual dry-docking and repair.
 When The Vessel M/V Manila City was transferred to the docking
quay, it caught on fire and sank, resulting to its eventual total loss.
At the time of the unfortunate occurrence, subject vessel was
insured with Prudential for hull and machinery.
 William lines filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
alleging that the fire broke out in the vessel was caused by
Petitioner’s negligence and lack of care. Later on the complaint
was amended to implede Prudential Guarantee after the later had
paid for the insurance value with William Lines. Prudential was
subrograted to the claim of William Lines.
 Trial court decided against Cebu Shipyard and in favour of
William lines and Prudential.
 A partial dismissal was ordered by the CA due to the amicable
settlement of the parties. CA also affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
Issue: W/N the Court erred on the inadmissibility of the expert testimonies
presented by the petitioner, that introduced the cause and origin of the fire.
Ruling: No
 Courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witness.
 Although they have probative value. The reception of evidence of
expert witness is within the discretion of the court.
 Under section 49 of Rule 30 it provides that opinion of expert
witness, maybe received in evidence.
 The word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an expert
witness as evidence is a prerogative of the court. It is never
mandatory for the judge to give substantial weight to expert
testimonies.
 If from facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily
ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to resort to expert
opinion evidence.
 In the case at bar, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the
only available evidence on the probable cause and origin of the
fire. There were witnesses who were actually on board the vessel
when the fire occurred.
 Between the testimonies of the fire expert who merely based their
findings and opinions on interviews and testimonies of those
present during the fire, the latter are of more probative value.
 The trial court did not err in giving more weight to said testimonies
Petition denied
People v. Soliman (101 SCRA 767)
FACTS:
Ernesto Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin proceed toward the head of Ernesto
Basa and was held by the latter by the shoulder at which moment his
companion Geronimo Soliman approached Ernesto Basa and stabbed him
many times with a balisong. Thereafter, the assailants ran away, and the
victim died. The two appellants are charged with a very serious crime as in
fact they were sentenced to the extreme penalty of death. It is therefore
important that the evidence on which the conviction is made to depend is
credible. In this case, the conviction is mainly predicated on the testimonyof
one eyewitness supported by some circumstantial evidence. This witness is
Ernesto Balaktaw. Whether this witness has told the truth or not in narrating
the aggression which led to the death of the victim, much depends upon the
degree of his credibility.
ISSUE:
WON character evidence for murder applies in the case at bar?
HELD:
NO. The trial court was right in not allowing the defense to prove that the
deceased had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character. While good
or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such
is not necessary in crime of murder where the killing is committed through
treachery premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed
in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that
a prompt defensive action was necessary." This rule does not apply to cases
of murder.