PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ - Dr.
- Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and
G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
FACTS:
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before
the RTC of Malolos Bulacan with the crime of robbery with homicide; stealing away
two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1) piece of earring worth 550 pesos, belonging
to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac; then subsequently
killing Eulalia by stabbing and hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her
body with pointed instrument.
At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged.
In appeal appellant asserted that lower court hasn’t proven his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Solgen has summarized what transpired as follows:
- spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their
ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother,
Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan.
- Both spouses are teachers by profession. *Arnedo in Elementary *Herminia
in Intermediate
- In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia left for school and her
mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set.
Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock.
- At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses
Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went
out of the former's house to visit a friend.
- While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the
Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a
bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's.
- When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying
down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag
and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what
happened?".
- Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying
these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away.
- Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because
she was drenched with her own blood.
- Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched
in her own blood."
xxx
examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse
had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why
her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia
requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead
immediately left.
- Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were
missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing.
- Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the
wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was
missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed.
xxx
- Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the
cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where
the victim was lying prostrate.
- She was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as
the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to
Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she
saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter.
- Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second
day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter
the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house.
- a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per
examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock, secondary to
punctured wound neck situated at the right side of the neck, just below the right ear
wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one
side of the neck to the opposite side.
- In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led
to the judgment of conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the
decision of the trial court, were the following:
Trial Court convicted de joya based on:
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia
a 10-year old boy: "Si Paqui";
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased
victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and homicide, between the
appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took
from the Valencia's house without the consent of the victim;
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to
Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the
body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had
given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of
31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and
doing nothing;
5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day
wake.
ISSUE: Is the dying declaration of Eulalia complete and admissible? No daw pero
pota sino pa ba pumatay
HELD: When the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his grandmother who was
sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, what
happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words,
she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de
Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute
by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been intended to
designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they
had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was
uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb,
we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si
Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what
happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in
itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite
everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that
his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to
say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The doctrine of completeness
has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as
offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant;
it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair
of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished
or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts
short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person
wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended
whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the
fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no
objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell.
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if
admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by
death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say
might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making.
That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was
incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could
convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply
assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name
the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck
just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what
the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We
are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the
appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
OTHER CIRUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: The other elements taken into account by the
trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are
examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to
the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. - -
quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two
weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a
motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent and gory
manner.
-testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or
under the cabinet in the living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be
regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same
pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of
Herminia's husband
- And even if conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it is
assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those very slippers on that
fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and directly
connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption,
the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused
had gone to the house of the Valencias and there mislaid that slipper.
- testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31
January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a
bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that
would show that appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The
behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for
supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old
woman by skewering her through the neck and had ransacked both floors of the
Valencia house.
- Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her
immediate family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that
appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had
been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as
already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse
was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several
other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is not
necessarily a sign of guilt.
- There was also an attempt on de joya through his counsel to settle; (so upon cross
examination, the apo said that atty aguilar the lawyer of accused wanted to talk to
him in the jail; “Q Did he tell you he can settle this? A He was very certain that he
can settle this, the very reason why he told me because I was very certain as to
what happened” ; accused de joya was just 1/2 meters away.
Court held though: We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive
so far as a supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a
compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are aware of the provision of
Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that

Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an

admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person
making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.

We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a
member of the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of
compromise" had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of
guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case.

The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the
crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.PACIFICO DUNIG y RODRIGUEZ,
G.R. No. 101799 November 6, 1992
FACTS:
Pacifico Dunig was formally charged with the murder of Marilyn Canatoy, then 14
years old, in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The
allegation was that on April 5, 1990, in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, he repeatedly
stabbed and thus killed the said girl, the attack being accompanied with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented three witnesses, besides the doctor
who testified on the cause of the victim's death. These were Maylin Montes, her
sister, Katherine Montes, and their mother, Teresita Montes.
Maylin Montes, who was ten years old at the time of the trial, said that at about 7
o'clock in the evening of April 4, 1990, she, Katherine, a certain Flory, and her Ate
Marilyn went to sleep at the resthouse belonging to one Atty. Andrade. Marilyn slept
in a bamboo bed, and the rest of them slept under the bed. Maylin said that at
about 3 o'clock in the morning, she saw Dunig stab Marilyn in the neck three times.
The three girls ran to Andrade's house about 8 meters away where her father and
mother were staying. Marilyn did, too, and collapsed at the door.
Katherine Montes, thirteen years old at that time, corroborated her sister's
testimony. She said she also saw Dunig running away after she heard her Ate
Marilyn screaming. She said she ran to the house ahead of Marilyn and she heard
the stricken girl say, "Nanay, nanay, sinaksak ako ni Pico." "Pico" is Dunig's
nickname.
Teresita Montes, the girls' mother, declared on the stand that at about 9 o'clock in
the morning of April 4, 1990, she saw Pico and her niece Marilyn quarreling. At
about 3 o'clock the following morning, she was awakened when Marilyn knocked at
her door. Marilyn's neck was bleeding, and she cried to her: "Nanay, nanay, bigyan
ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil sinaksak ako ni Pico." A minute later, she died.
Behind Marilyn were Maylin, Katherine and Flory.
Dr. Nicanor Cruz informed the court that Marilyn died of hemorrhage due to multiple
stab and incised wounds in the neck. He opined uncertainly that the victim might or
might not have been able to speak or run to the house after the stabbing.
Dunig's defense was alibi. He said that on the night in question, he was alone in a
nipa hut in Matinbubong, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, where he went to sleep at 9 p.m.
and awoke the following morning at 6 o'clock. He swore he was not in the resthouse
where, and at the time, Marilyn was killed.
Judge Amado M. Calderon, disbelieving him, found him guilty as charged. This
Court, after considering the evidence, holds that the conviction cannot stand.
ISSUE: W/N the dying declaration of Marilyn is enough to convict Dunig?
HELD: No.
Alibi is unquestionably a weak defense (plus no wintess presented), and it is clearly
so in the case at bar. However, we have repeatedly stressed that a person's
conviction must rest not on the weakness of his defense but on the strength of the
prosecution. The accused can rely on the constitutional presumption of his
innocence. It is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption with convincing
proof that the accused is guilty; otherwise, he must be absolved. In the case at bar,
we find that the prosecution has not proved its case.
The testimonies of the two alleged eyewitnesses to the killing are not believable.
While insisting that she saw Dunig stab Marilyn, Maylin also admitted that it was
pitch dark when they awoke and there was not a single light in the resthouse or
nearby. (Or from the moon either, for that matter.) Katherine said she only saw
"what looked like a shadow" and concluded it was Dunig. Assuming the sisters did
wake up when Marilyn screamed, it would have taken some time before their eyes
could get accustomed to the darkness. Yet both said they immediately recognized
the accused-appellant.
If there was anything certain about their testimonies, it was their certainty that the
resthouse was dark when they allegedly saw Dunig stabbing their cousin.
Atty. Ramirez:
Q This resthouse where you and Marilyn, Flory and Katherine were sleeping, there
was no inside light in that early morning of April 5, 1990?
A None, sir.
Q There was no outside light in that resthouse?
A None, sir.8
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Ramirez:
Q It was dark inside the resthouse?
A Yes, sir.
Q It was so dark inside that resthouse that early morning that you could not see
anyone who would enter the resthouse itself?
A Yes, sir.
Q It was so dark that you could not even see or you could not recognize anyone
who could enter the resthouse?
A Yes, sir.
Katherine demurred, saying "it was not too dark."
Q You want to impress upon us that immediately before your Ate Marilyn was
stabbed, you had seen Dunig?
A Yes, sir.
Xxx
Q It was pitch dark because you could not see anyone or recognize anyone?
A It was not too dark and a shadow passed by me, sir.
Q You mean to tell us that you actually saw a shadow that passed?
AS TO THE DYING DEC: "Nanay, nanay, bigyan ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil
sinaksak ako ni Pico."
If it is true that the victim did make the statement before she died, it should qualify
as a dying declaration and so can be considered an exception to the hearsay rule.
Nonetheless, it cannot be automatically accepted as a truthful accusation and is still
subject to the test of credibility.
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence on the theory that a person A life has been taken and justice demands that the wrong be redressed. But the
who knows he is on the verge of death is not likely to make a false accusation. same justice that calls for retribution cannot convict the prisoner at bar whose guilt
However, the declaration, albeit presumably in good faith, may still be based on an has not been proved. Justitia est duplex, viz., severe puniens et vere praeveniens.
erroneous identification of the declarant's killer. Even as this Court may punish, so too must it protect. Conceivably, the conviction of
the accused-appellant could add another victim in this case.
In the case at bar, it has been established by the testimonies of the Montes sisters
that the resthouse was dark, if not, indeed, completely dark. Like the other there
girls who were sleeping with her, Marilyn could not possibly have seen the person
who was attacking her. At best, she could probably only surmise it was Dunig, but
that was a most uncertain identification. A surmise is not evidence. A man's honor
and liberty cannot be forfeited because the victim supposedly pointed to him as her
killer although she could not possibly have seen the person who was stabbing her in
the dark.

At that, we cannot even be certain that the dying Marilyn really made that
declaration against Dunig. By corroborating their mother's testimony, Maylin and
Katherine may have instead enfeebled it because their own credibility regarding
what they said they saw in the dark resthouse is also suspect. It must also be noted
that the doctor who autopsied the victim's body was not sure if Marilyn would have
been able to speak at all after she was stabbed because of the severity and location
of her wounds. 11 Significantly, the statement she supposedly made to Teresita was
strenuously long for a person who died a minute later.

It would seem that the mother and her daughters have put two and two together
and come out with a sum of five. Teresita makes much of the quarrels of Marilyn
and Pico to bolster her belief that Dunig is the girl's killer. Such quarrels, if true,
may be evidence of motive but not necessarily of murder. In fact, Katherine said
that the day before Marilyn was killed, Dunig was in the resthouse and apparently in
good spirits, as he was strumming his guitar and singing.

It is noteworthy that Katherine, seeing what looked like a shadow ("parang

shadow") pass by her in the dark that morning, immediately concluded it was Dunig
who had stabbed Marilyn. As for Maylin, she was sure Dunig was the killer for the
preposterous reason that he was in the resthouse in the afternoon of April 4, 1990.

Q You stated, Maylin, that it was Pacifico Dunig who stabbed Marilyn. And you also
said that there was no light whatsoever at that time. How did you know that it was
Pacifico Dunig who stabbed Marilyn?
A Because in the afternoon, he was already there, Your Honor.
Q Where was he?
A He was seated in the pavement, Your Honor.
Q Pavement of what?
A This is a bamboo and it was encircled with cemented seat, Your Honor.
Q Is that the only basis in saying that it was Pacifico Dunig who stabbed Marilyn?
A Yes, Your Honor. 12
The evidence of the prosecution is a slender reed. It cannot sustain a conviction.
The defense is weak, but the prosecution is even weaker, based as it is mainly on
the narration of the alleged eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the killing, one
in total darkness and another in near total darkness that enabled her to see a
shadow that passed by her. The tales are implausible. We cannot accept them. The
Court has no choice but to exonerate the accused-appellant because his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE and JOHN
DOE @ OGANG, EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE G.R. No. 110129. August 12,
1997
FACTS: On December 17, 1990, an Informationwas filed by Bais City Prosecutor
Epifanio E. Liberal, Jr. against Appellant Amaca and one known only by his alias
Ogang, charging them as follows:
That on October 1, 1990 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, in
Purok Liberty Hills, Barangay Mabigo, Canlaon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused mutually helping one another and with evident premeditation and at
nighttime did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shot with the use of a firearm one Wilson Vergara who, as a result thereof, suffered
fatal gunshot wound as reflected in the medical, Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was issued on January 16,
1991.[4] However, this was returned unserved on two different occasions for the
reason that the subject had already changed address and his whereabouts [were]
unknown. Jurisdiction over the person of appellant was acquired by the said court
only on July 1, 1991 when he was arrested by police authorities.
Arraigned on September 25, 1991, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Ondoy,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The trial court synthesized the facts, based on the testimonies of witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense, as follows:
To prove the injuries sustained by the victim, Wilson Vergara, and his cause of
death, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar P. Pialago, a resident physician of the
Guihulngan District Hospital, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, who testified that on
October 2, 1990, he was on duty at the aforesaid hospital, and was able to attend to
victim Wilson Vergara who had just undergone a surgical operation conducted by
another doctor, Dr. Gonzaga. The major organs of the victim, namely, the heart,
lungs and kidney, were no longer functioning normally, and thus, he was suffering
from multiple organ system failure. Furthermore, there was injury in the pancreas,
causing a leak of the pancreatic juice. Victim suffered two gunshot wounds at the
back, and x-ray revealed two (2) bullets inside the body, and there was no exit
wound. The patient was admitted at 10:45 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and
died at 7:00 in the evening of the following day. He identified the death certificate
(Exh. A), and the data sheet of the victim and the final diagnosis. (Exh. B) Even
with immediate medical attention, the victim could not have survived with the
wounds he sustained.
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City,
testified that as a police investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him
from his residence at about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed
him of a shooting incident, where the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which
was near his residence. Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim
already on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He
inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot
by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not
know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim
said that he was about to die. (TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the
victim identified himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing
the declaration of victim Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark
with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of
the City Mayor. (Exh. C)
Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused corroborated (by) his witnesses,
namely, Felix Ponting, and Alfredo Gabucero, portrayed the following scenario: Felix
Ponting and Alfredo Gabucero were members of the CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit) and accused as member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization
(CVO) with station at Barangay Lumapao, Canlaon City. On October 1, 1990, the
accused together with his companion Felix Ponting were on duty at the said station
from 6:00 oclock in the evening to 8:00 oclock that same evening. After their duty
at 8:00 oclock, they went to sleep at the detachment, and were relieved by Alfredo
Gabutero, whose duty covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that same evening.[10]
Prosecution Witnesses Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law
Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case; the former because
of the financial help extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because
Segundina had already consented to the amicable settlement of the case. This
notwithstanding, the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima
facie case based on the victims ante mortem statement.[11]
The Trial Courts Ruling: deemed the victims statement to Police Officer
Mangubat, positively identifying Appellant Amaca, a dying declaration sufficient to
overcome the latters defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of
the victims mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to
make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.
ISSUE: W/N trial court erred in finding accused Edelciano Amaca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder on the sole basis of the alleged dying
declaration of the victim to Police Officer Bernardo Mangubat. – sufficient but
homicide not murder
HELD: Appellant is guilty only of homicide, not murder, and civil indemnity shall not
be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.
Dying Declaration Sufficient to Identify Assailant
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is
aware of his impending death to accuse falsely or even carelessly anyone of being
responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, when a person is at the point of
death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful consideration to speak the truth.
This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are:
(1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death;
(2) the declarant would have been a competent witness had he survived;
(3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death;
(4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarants death is the
subject of inquiry; and
(5) the declaration is complete in itself.All these concur in the present case.
Declarant a Competent Witness
The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a
competent witness to identify his assailant. He emphasizes that the victim was shot
twice at the back at nighttime and that x x x the witness/victim based on the
foregoing circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants x x x.
Court is not persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two
bullets. But as the prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not lose
consciousness upon being shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates
that he was able to see and recognize who shot him. In this light, appellant is
assailing the credibility, not the competency, of the victim. Competency of a witness
to testify requires a minimum ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as
well as an understanding of the duty to tell the truth.[16] Appellant does not dispute
that the victim was capable of observing and recounting the occurrences around
him; appellant merely questions whether the victim, under the circumstances of this
case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, appellant challenges merely
the credibility of the victims ante mortem statement. We hold that the serious
nature of the victims injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said
injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to
perceive and to identify his shooter. The Court had occasion in the past to rule on a
similar issue as follows:
x x x() The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after
receiving a given wound,() according to Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical
Jurisprudence, p. 212), is always one that must be decided upon the merits of a
particular case. They cited a case from Viberts Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed., p. 286,
where a man after being shot in the chest threw a lamp at his adversary. The lamp
started a fire; and to extinguish the fire, the wounded man fetched a pail of water
from the courtyard. When the fire was extinguished, the man lay down in bed and
died. Vibert performed the autopsy, and found that the left ventricle of the heart
had been perforated by the revolvers bullet. It is evident from the foregoing that Dr.
Acostas assertion that the victim of a gunshot wound would immediately lose
consciousness, after infliction of the wound, may not be true in all cases. x x x [17]
Appellant also argues that the declarant could not have seen who shot him because
the actual shooting occurred at 7:00 oclock in the evening.[18] This statement is
bereft of factual basis. The record shows that Police Officer Mangubat was fetched
from his house at 7:00 p.m. to investigate the shooting. He was informed that the
victim had already been brought to the clinic of Dr. Cardenas.[19] It may thus be
inferred that the shooting occurred sometime before the victim was found, brought
to the clinic, and before Mangubat was fetched from his house. Thus, a considerable
period of time must have elapsed from the time of the actual shooting until the
policeman was fetched from his house around 7:00 p.m. That he was shot way
before 7:00 p.m. does not lead to the inference that it was pitch black at the time of
the shooting. Indeed, from the foregoing, it is reasonable to assume that the crime
was committed before nightfall and that there was sufficient daylight to enable the
victim to identify his assailant. At any rate, there are no indicia in the record that
lighting conditions made it impossible for declarant to identify his
assailant. Ineluctably, the positive assertion of the declarant that he did recognize
his shooter has greater persuasive value than the baseless negative speculation of
the defense that he did not.
Genuineness of the Dying Declaration
The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration by
suggesting that since the relationship between CAFGU and the PNP is marred by
jealousy, suspicion and general dislike for one another,[20] Police Officer Mangubat
had enough motive to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU member. The
defense also asks: Why was the alleged dying declaration of the victim merely
thumbmark (sic) when in fact he was still coherent, conscious and very capable of
writing his name at that time?[21] Additionally, the defense questions why Wagner
Cardenas who signed the ante mortem statement as witness was not presented as
such by the prosecution.[22]
The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. Clearly, it does not
destroy the genuineness of the ante mortem statement. Police Officer Mangubat is
presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty.There is nothing in
the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any
semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Appellant
Amaca. As aptly noted by the trial court, even appellant testified that he had no
previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why
the latter would falsely testify against him.[23] This dismal failure of the defense to
show any ill motive on the part of said police officer adds credence to Mangubats
testimony.[24]
Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his
thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient to sustain the genuineness and veracity
thereof. This manner of authentication is understandable in view of the necessity
and urgency required by the attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be
indicative of any ulterior motive on the part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have
clearly ruled that an ante mortem statement may be authenticated through the
declarants thumbmark imprinted with his own blood, and serve as evidence in the
form of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his death.[25] Verily, such
declaration need not even be in writing and may be proven by testimony of
witnesses who heard it.
Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during the trial is not
fatal, as his testimony would have been merely corroborative of Mangubats. In
addition, the presumption that evidence omitted by a party would be adverse if
presented does not obtain in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and
could have been called to the witness stand by accused-appellant. Besides, it is the
prosecutors prerogative to choose his own witnesses to prove the Peoples cause.[26]
Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when considered as
part of the res gestae, another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided
specifically under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The requisites for the
admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is
spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before, during or after a startling
occurrence; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence.[27] These
requirements are obviously fulfilled in the present case where the statement,
subject of this discussion, was made immediately after the shooting incident and,
more important, the victim had no time to fabricate.
An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and
as part of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the
advantage of ensuring the statements appreciation by courts, particularly where the
absence of one or more elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in
issue. In this manner, the identification of the culprit is assured.[28]
victims two gunshot wounds at the back were self-inflicted. Well-settled it is that
the desistance of the victims complaining mother does not bar the People from
prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to
pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action
to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be
awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution.[44] This waiver is
bolstered by the fact that neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf
appealed the trial courts refusal to include a finding of civil liability.

Other doctrines (not on dying dec)

Alibi Debunked

The defense also contests the trial courts finding that the alibi interposed by the
accused miserably fall short of exculpation. Appellant insists that, since the dying
declaration was unreliable and since there was no positive identification aside from
this declaration, the defense of alibi gained strength.[30]

There is no basis for this contention for, as previously discussed, the ante
mortem statement met all requirements for its admissibility either as a dying
declaration or as part of the res gestae or both.[31] It must be remembered that alibi
is inherently weak and the facts in the case at hand show that it was not at all
impossible, considering the circumstances of time and place, for the accused-
appellant to have been present at the crime scene at the time of its
commission.[32] The military detachment at Barangay Lumapao, where appellant
allegedly slept, is a mere seven kilometers away from Barangay Mabigo, Purok
Liberty Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, the able-bodied
appellant was only an hours walk and a short fifteen-minute tricycle ride from
the locus criminis.[33] As correctly argued by the trial court, (i)t would not have been
impossible for the accused to be at Purok Liberty Hills, and shoot the victim, and
come back to his detachment in a matter of thirty (30) minutes, the time testified
by the defense witness Gabutero as to going to and coming back from these two
places. (TSN, p. 17, July 15, 1992)[34] The alibi of appellant cannot overcome,
therefore, the very persuasive declaration of the victim.[35]

Based on the foregoing discussion, the Courts conscience rests easy with the moral
certainty that indeed accused-appellant committed the crime charged. His pretense
at innocence is futile in view of the overwhelming evidence presented against
him. Even his flight -- eluding the police for almost six months after the issue of the
warrant for his arrest -- clearly bespeaks his guilt.[36]

Murder or Homicide?We agree murder only. The Information readily reveals that
the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation.

Non-Award of Indemnity: The facts of this case show that the victims mother
desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the financial help extended to
her family by the accused-appellant. Such financial help when viewed as an offer of
compromise may also be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellants
criminal liability.[43]Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her sons death was
an accident attributable to the latter, has no basis. It is inconceivable that the
G.R. No. 109617 August 11, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR," JOHNNY
JUGUILON, EDONG SION, FELIX SION @ "ELLET," and FEDERICO DISU @
MIGUEL," FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR" and FEDERICO DISU @ "MIGUEL,"
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for Murder on 19 November 1991 (Province of Pangasinan),
charged Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and "four (4) other
John Does." After appropriate preliminary examination, Judge Sergio Garcia of said
court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused with no bail fixed for their
temporary liberty.However, the warrant was served only on appellant Disu, while
the rest then remained at large.
On 21 January 1992, an Information 10 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
First Judicial Region, in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, against appellants Sion and Disu
and Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias"Ellet," and four (4) unidentified
persons (designated as John, Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the
crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday, municipality of
San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with stones and a bladed
weapon conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to
kill with treachery and evident premeditation did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously hurl with stones, attack and stab Fernando Abaoag inflicting upon
him injuries which caused his instant death, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs, CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.
On 2 June 1992, accused Sion was arrested. 11 Then on 10 June 1992, the RTC
annulled and voided the bail earlier granted to appellant Disu by the MCTC Judge
Sergio Garcia for lack of proper hearing, denied the motion for bail filed by appellant
Sion, and ordered their detention in jail.Since only appellants Sion and Disu were
arrested, the case proceeded against them only. Upon arraignment, both pleaded
not guilty to the charge and waived pre-trial.
The prosecution's witnesses were Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother and the
wife of the victim, respectively; Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian Municipal Health
Officer; Rosendo Imuslan, barangay captain of Barangay Binday; and SPO1 Ricardo
Abrio. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witness appellant Disu;
appellant Sion; Corazon Sion, wife of appellant Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo.
The evidence for the prosecution as established by the testimonies of its witnesses
is partly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the
Appellee, as follows:
- On or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag
was at the barangay road in front of his house situated in Binday, San
Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder brother Carlos Abaoag and
Ricardo Manuel when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from
the west complaining that he was being chased by Felipe Sion and Johnny
Juguilon.
- On that same occasion, Fernando Abaoag also arrived at the scene. He said
to Ronnie, "why Ronnie, you are making trouble again." The latter
answered, "I am not making trouble uncle because while I was inside the
house of Eling Alcantara, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to
stab me.
- Seconds later, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon appeared and started
throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told them to stop throwing stones but
before they desisted and left, one of them uttered "even you Andong, you
are interfering, you will also have your day, vulva of your mother, you
Abaoag[s]"
- Apparently, the utterance was directed against Fernando Abaoag whose
nickname is Andong.
- At about 9:00 o'clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag while inside his
house lying down on his bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the
nearby house of his brother Fernando. He went out to see who were
throwing stones
- When already near the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw his
brother Fernando already outside his house. He also saw Johnny Juguilon,
one of the members of the group of stone throwers, hurl a big stone
against Fernando. Upon being hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his
back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also
throwing stones towards his direction.
- On the other hand, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, with a
very sharp double bladed dagger, stabbed Fernando, first on the left side
just below the armpit, then on the left waistline and finally on the right side
of the neck below the jaw.
- Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on
him which landed on his right side below the armpit. When he heard Felipe
Sion shouting to his companions saying, "we will also kill Cesar," Cesar
desisted in helping brother Instead, he ran to his brother's house and
informed Felicitas, the wife, about the helpless condition of Fernando
- Upon being informed, Felicitas accompanied by Carlos Abaoag, went to the
place of the incident. The assailants were no longer there. She only saw
her husband lying prostate on the ground very weak in the state of dying.
When she inquired what happened, Fernando answered "naalaak" which in
English means "I was hit"
- Fernando told his wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu,
Edong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion
- The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he was
pronounced dead on arrival
- Dr. Manalo further testified that the stab wounds were caused by a sharp-
pointed instrument, possibly a dagger, with the first wound hitting the
lower lobe of the left lung causing severe bleeding and its eventual
collapse. He determined the cause of death to be hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds.
- Barangay Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando
Gatchalian, on the night of the incident, found a small bolo and a bloodied
double-bladed weapon (dagger) near the scene of the crime.
DEFENSES:
Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong19 Sion and Felix Sion alias "Ellet,"
respectively, admitted that on the night in question, he participated in a stone-
throwing incident and "free-for-all rumble" between his group (the Sions and Johnny
Juguilon) on one hand, and the Abaoags and Manuels, on the other. However, he
professed his innocence, claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny
Juguilon who stabbed the victim.20His version of the incident was summarized by
the trial court.
In his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no
participation in the killing of Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole night of 16
October 1991, while the quarrel, stoning and stabbing incidents in question were
taking place, he was resting and sleeping in the house of his employer, Felicidad
Gatchalian, after driving the latter's jeepney the entire day. However, before
proceeding home from work that afternoon, he went to the store of Oping Juguilon
to buy cigarettes and dropped by the house of appellant Sion where he stayed for
about five minutes. He only learned about the killing the following morning when he
was told that he was one of the suspects. He was arrested about a month after the
incident.
TRIAL COURT: The defense of accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu and Felipe
Rodriguez Sion, Jr. deserve scant consideration. Gave more credence to Cesar’s
testimony bolstered by Dr. Manalos findings.
MORE IMPORTANTLY: Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando
Abaoag in the presence of Felicitas Abaoag, to wit: "naalaak, which means, I was
hit, take note of this because I cannot survive these injuries of mine". Fernando
Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon
and Felix Sion stabbed him. This is a dying declaration because it was made under a
consciousness of impending death (Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the
prosecution. Appellants, through counsel, seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the statement of victim has met the requirements of a dying
declaration to be admissible as evidence?
HELD: YES.
Accused contends that Felicitas Abaoag's testimony on her husband's alleged dying
declaration was "not specific" as far as the assailant's identities were concerned
because the victim merely said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without identifying appellant
Sion as the one who stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband identified all the
five (5) accused as the ones who "stabbed" him was "an impossibility."
The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the
declaration made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly
characterized this as a "dying declaration," having been made under the
consciousness of impending death. The victim was already weak his wife saw him
and he knew that he would not survive the injuries he sustained; he even died a few
minutes later while on the way to the hospital.When Felicitas saw her husband, he
told her what had happened to him, who caused his injuries and that he did not
expect to live, thus:
Q What happened next after that when you met your husband?
A Immediately asked him what happened to him.
Q And what was the answer of Fernando Abaoag?
A He said, "naalaak," which means, I was hit.
COURT:
Q Did you ask him why he said "naalaak"?
A He said he was stabbed and he was injured.
Q What do you mean by word "naalaak"?
A I was hit.
Xxx
PROSECUTOR DUMLAO:
Q Do you know the reason why he was hit?
A What I understand is that in the course of his pacifying the trouble between his
nephew and the rest, he was stabbed, sir.
Q Aside from the statement of your husband Fernando Abaoag that he was hit, what
else did he say, if you know?
A He said, take note of this because I know I cannot survive with these injuries of
mine.
COURT:
Q What else did he tell you aside from that?
A He said, remember that in case I cannot survive with the injuries that I sustained,
the men who stabbed me are Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon
and Felix Sion, sir.
We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites
of a dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a)
death is imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary
facts which bring the declaration within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the
declaration relates to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or
death; and (d) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he
survived.41 Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the
declarant's death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often
happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime;
and trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is
silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth. We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the declarations
of her husband.
OTHER NOTES:
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two
meters away when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover,
there was a light illuminating the place of the incident coming from the houses of
Marta Soriano and Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger,
Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu, throwing
stones at the victim. He was definite, however, that it was only accused Johnny
Juguilon who was able to hit the victim at the left eyebrow.
Furthermore, Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to forthwith inform Felicitas of
this fact. At that time, Cesar himself was running away from the accused who had
hit him with a stone. His pressing concern then was to get someone to help his
wounded brother; besides, he was scared of accused Felix Sion, uncle of appellant
Sion, who was a "notorious" character in their neighborhood.35 It is settled that
delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained,
does not impair the credibility of the witness nor destroy its probative value.
We likewise find to be without basis appellants' claim that all the prosecution
witnesses were biased due to their relation to the victim's family.
Neither was the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, such as those
mentioned by the appellants, fatal to the cause of the People. It is well-settled that
the decision as whom to present as witnesses for the prosecution is addressed to
the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case and the non-presentation
of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense.
The trial court correctly rejected appellant Sion's defense that it was not he who
stabbed the victim, but his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, both of whom
fled after the incident. Constituting a mere denial of Cesar Abaoag's positive
testimony that it was appellant Sion who stabbed the victim, such must fail in light
of the settled rule of evidence that positive testimony is stronger that negative
testimony. He raised this claim for the first time only during his testimony in court
almost one (1) year after the stabbing incident.
That appellant Sion did not flee, unlike his brother Edong and Johnny Juguilon,
neither proved his innocence. Non-flight — unlike flight of an accused which validly
serves as a badge of guilt — is simply inaction which may be due to several factors;
hence, it should not be construed as an indication of innocence.
ALIBI: In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu's alibi must
fail. It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it
cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by
credible witnesses that an accused perpetrated the crime.
CONSPIRACY: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.58 Direct proof of a
previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary; it may be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from acts of
the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose design, concerted action
and community of interest.59 Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the
act of all.60
In this case, appellants and the other accused were already at the barangay road of
Binday, near the houses of Lolly Galdones and Marta Soriano, when Fernando
Abaoag, who was looking for the persons who just stoned his house several times,
and Cesar Abaoag, arrived. Immediately, Johnny Juguilon threw a stone at
Fernando hitting him on the left eyebrow; then, Edong, and Felix Sion and appellant
Disu, "simultaneously" threw stones, also at Fernando. As Fernando turned away
from his assailants, appellant Sion "rushed" and stabbed the victim three (3) times,
even as the latter raised his arms saying, "I will not fight back." When Cesar Abaoag
tried to help his brother Fernando, appellant Disu threw and hit Cesar with a stone.
Appellant Sion then commanded his companions to also kill Cesar, prompting the
latter to run away. Then the assailants fled, leaving behind a small bolo and a
dagger. The confluence of their acts indubitably manifested a community of interest
and unity of purpose and design to take Fernando Abaoag's life.
We also find to be unsupported by evidence appellant's claim, through the
testimony of appellant Sion, that the fatal stabbing of Fernando Abaoag was a result
of a "free-for-all rumble," thereby possibly tempering their liability to that of causing
death in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, which
carries a penalty lower than that for homicide.61 In this case, it was ascertained
beyond doubt that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal stab wounds; hence, this claim
must be rejected.
Having resolved appellants' liability for Fernando Abaoag's death, we now rule on
the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.
We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding as regards the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Under the law, there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly or specifically to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.63 We find no clear and convincing evidence of treachery.
Moreover, in light of the absence of clear details showing conclusively that the
stabbing was inflicted from behind or the victim was entirely helpless when stabbed,
we are not prepared to conclude that the attack was "so sudden and unexpected" as
to render the victim entirely defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to
murder when the victim was forewarned of the attack by the assailant, or when the
attack was frontal, or the attack was not so sudden as to have caught the deceased
completely unaware.66 Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by appellants.
Absent then of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed was homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating against appellants the generic
aggravating circumstance of cruelty,67based solely on the fact that the victim was
stabbed thrice, with the first stab wound hitting the lower left lung causing severe
bleeding and its collapse. In fact, appellee concedes this error of the trial court. In
the instant case, the evidence only shows that the three (3) stab wounds were
delivered in succession, nothing more.
We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires that "the offender
voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority."
We disagree with Appellee's submission that there was no voluntary surrender
because appellant Sion surrender to a mere barangay "Kagawad" or Sangguniang
Barangay member, and not to the police authorities, implying that the former is not
a person in authority.76 This ignores Section 388 of the Local Government Code of
1991 which expressly provides, in part, that "[f]or purposes of the Revised Penal
Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in
their jurisdictions . . . ."
RULE 130 SECTION 38 – Declaration against Interest
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE, G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997
FACTS:
- Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose
identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime
of kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, under an information dated July 13, 1992
- That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and cooperating
together and helping one another, and by means of force, violence,
intimidation and threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and
kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor
with his friends at Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and
carried away using a PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr.,
thereby depriving the said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his
will.
- A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment,
trial ensued.
o The prosecution presented four witnesses.On the other hand,
Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.
- The material facts and events as found by the court a quo are:
o At around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and
Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal,
who was passing by, to join them.
o After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently
because he was going to fetch his child.
o Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked
the latter if he was Payat.[3] When he said yes, one of them
suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him
and told him not to run because they were policemen and because
he had an atraso or a score to settle with them. They then hastily
took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda,
Jr. and informed the latters mother of the abduction.
- The theory of the prosecution is that Openda Jr. had an illicit affair with
Bernals wife and this was the motive behind the formers kidnapping. Until
now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
o The defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested
by the police on and hence, was never kidnapped.[4]
TC: Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the
abduction and disappearance of Openda, Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his mother
Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral
suffering.[6]
ISSUE/s: W/N Bernal is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt - YES
RULING:
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been
found. This, however, does not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the
case. In kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of
seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an
accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid
punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victims bodies.
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victims liberty, which
is the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar,
Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals as
shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of
purpose.[7] Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances only.[8] The circumstances present in this case sufficiently
indicate the participation of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.
The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal,
together with his two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A
certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified on
the incident.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao
City who knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor
and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim were drinking at Tarsings Store
on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few
minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the store and asked
for Payat. When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was
handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that
sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife
Naty were having an affair. Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample reason for
Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it
may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction.[10] Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding
his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section
38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants
own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded
to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal.[11]
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to
wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true.[12]

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to
testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest,
since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence[13] because
no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.[14]

RULE 130 SECTION 42 - PART OF THE RES GESTAE

People v Amaca (Please refer to 3 cases before this same. Doctrine is also
there in re: res gestae)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the
G.R. No. 89823, June 19, 1991 latter's help, they were able to reach the main road; afterwhich,
some of her neighbors arrived bringing with them lights;
FACTS: thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the
arrest of the accused; she spent about P100,000.00 in connection
- In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City,
with burial and wake of her husband.
accused-appellant was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866
- Forensic chemist from the NBI Edwin Purificando testified that the paraffin
(illegal possession of firearms) as amended, committed as follows:
test he conducted on the dorsal aspect of the left and light hands, that is,
o That on or about the 24th day of February 1989 in Kalookan City,
from the wristbones to the fingertips, of the deceased, gave negative result
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
on the presence of nitrates (Exh. "I"). Likewise, the paraffin test he
the above-named accused, without any lawful motive or purpose,
conducted on the dorsal aspects of the left hand and right hand of the
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
accused yielded negative results on the presence of nitrates (Exh. "J").
possession, custody and control one .38 cal. revolver, marked
Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions
- On the other hand, the version of the defense as testified to by the accused
without authority of law, which firearm was used with treachery
is as follows:
and evident premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y
Mesia, which caused death.1
o That at about 11:30 in the evening of February 24, 1989 accused
- Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Pre-trial was
on his way home, after coming from his work, passed by the
conducted and thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the
house of his Pareng Nardo, the victim herein;
parties.
o after they were able to buy some more bottles of beer, victim
- TC: the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty.
carried the same and left ahead of the accused; accused was left
o Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision4 which,
behind to answer the call of nature; while in the act of urinating,
however, was denied by the court. Accused-appellant filed a
he heard two successive gunshots;
Notice of Appeal.6 Hence, the case is now before Us.
o he followed the victim and he saw the latter already sprawled on
- The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows:
the ground; he inquired from his Pareng Nardo as to what had
o That at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 24, 1989,
happened to him
while she and her husband were sleeping inside their house, they
o moved by his desire to bring the said gun to the wife of the victim,
were awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Her husband
he picked the same, but after he got hold of the gun, he suddenly
opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking
realized that the policemen might see him holding it, so he threw
was their "Pareng Troping", accused herein;
the very same gun to the grassy area;
o her husband invited the accused, who appeared to be very drunk,
o he then ran towards the house of the victim and he informed the
to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat
wife of the latter that his Pareng Nardo was shot to death;
down and the two (accused and victim) exchanged pleasantries;
o when the policemen arrived he was ordered to go with them at the
she even saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and the
Kalookan Police Headquarters; when he was asked by the
latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by her husband's
policemen as to who shoot (sic) the victim, his answer was, he did
playing with the gun, so she took a few steps away from the two,
not see the actual shooting incident; never did he declare nor
however, when she looked back to the place where her husband
utter before her Mareng Lina or before any police authorities that
and the accused was, she found out that the two had already left;
he accidentally shoot (sic) the victim. However, he admitted that
o five minutes later and/or after she had heard two successive
it was him who accompanied the policemen in retrieving the fatal
gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the
gun at the grassy area at the back of his house.
same time informing her that he accidentally shoot (sic) her
- TC: In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a
husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya"
quo relied on circumstantial evidence because the prosecution failed to
o she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was full of
present an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting
bloodstains so she pushed him away from her; she immediately
incident. It considered the following circumstances which it deemed
went to her sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of them
sufficient to convict the accused-appellant pursuant to Rule 133, Section 5,
proceeded to the house of the accused; thereat, they saw the
of the Revised Rules of Court:
victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's pulse and
- The TC ruled that The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately
when she still felt some warmth on his body, she sought help that
after the shooting incident took place admitted to her having accidentally
her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his
shoot (sic) the victim is admissible evidence against the accused declarant
help by helping them in carrying the victim towards the main
since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an exception to the
road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put
hearsay rule.
down the victim; accused reasoned out that the victim was
ISSUE/s: Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged
statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning
We are now called upon to determine whether, on the basis of the evidence its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony was
adduced, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed or the accused-appellant given. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Rosalina Magat
be acquitted. vda. de Bolima, wife of the victim, clearly shows the absence of an objection,
RULING: Our painstaking review of the records and the evidence fails to disclose that the
prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant was not
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the court a quo that more than one
authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information. And, contrary to the
circumstantial evidence were duly proved and that these circumstances point,
finding of the trial court, there was no sufficient evidence to prove the presence of
beyond reasonable doubt, to the accused-appellant as the one who shot and killed
treachery.
the deceased Leonardo Bolima y Mesia. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to convict an accused, it is necessary that the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) there must be more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.14 Or, as
jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,15 i.e., the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty.16

The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly
established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim.

Res gestae

The statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately
after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is NOT covered by
the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case.

Statements as part of the res gestae are among the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his
own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions.17 Accordingly,
a testimony of a witness as to what he heard other persons say about the facts in
dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is
not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told her, not what any
other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's
statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily
deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.

In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a statement

allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia Macaraeg that "we killed him"
(referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in her
testimony in open court was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res
gestae.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE NARANJA
G.R. No. L-13288 June 30, 1960
FACTS:
- The accused was charged with and convicted of murder under the following
information filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan:
o 28th day of December, 1956, at night, in barrio Caraol-Malimpin,
municipality of Dasol, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to
kill and armed with a blunt instrument, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, and beat to
death one MAMERTO SIGNEY, alias Berto, with the use of the said
blunt instrument.
- The accused has appealed, contending that the alleged crime has not been
established, particularly because there is no evidence (1) as to the kind of
blunt instrument that killed the deceased; (2) as to the position of the
assailant when he allegedly killed the deceased; (3) as to the possession of
a blunt instrument by the accused on the night of the crime, and (4) as to
the cause of the death of the victim. The accused considers the testimony
of Maria Diaz, wife of the deceased mainly relied upon by the trial court, as
weak, uncorroborated, self-serving, unnatural and not direct.
- According to Maria Diaz, it appears that in the afternoon of December 28,
1956, while she was pounding rice in her yard, the accused arrived and
was thereupon told by her to stop coming to her house because her
husband (the deceased) knew that she and the accused had been carrying
on illicit relations; that the accused had asked her to leave her husband
and, as she refused, he indicated that he would seek means to separate
her from her husband; that before leaving in that afternoon of December
28, 1956, the accused told her to wait for him in the evening; that, when
she required about this purpose, the accused answered that he would kill
his compadre (the deceased) who was then harvesting palay in the farm;
that in the evening of December 28, 1956, as the dogs were barking, her
husband went out of the house and proceeded to the place where there
was stocks of palay; that, becoming impatient for her husband's return,
she went to the kitchen where she saw the accused at the stairs; that the
accused confessed to her that he had killed her husband whose dead body
she ought to take and bury; that cautioning her not to tip anyone, the
accused informed that her husband lay dead at the creek east of the
house;
RULING:
Maria Diaz displayed courage in admitting having had illicit relations with the
accused and thereby dishonoring and humiliating herself, obviously to bring out the
truth and let justice prevail. Her testimony is not self-serving because she has not
gained any beneficial interest. There is no point in the allegation that she was
jealous as the accused had taken for himself another woman. The accused already
had a common-law wife before the crime was committed; and if Maria Diaz was in
fact jealous, she would have wanted to eliminate the other woman, not the accused.
Res gestae
As regards the contention that the elements of the crime have not been shown,
suffice it to say that the confession of the accused to Maria Diaz is strong evidence
falling under the res gestae rule.
SEC. 33, Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance may be received as a part of the res gestae. (Rule 123,
Rules of Court.)
Quoting Professor Greenleaf, Chief Justice Moran, in his Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1957 Ed., Vol. III, pp. 348-349, explains the res gestae rule as follows:
There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being
distinguished from hearsay by their connection with the principal fact under
investigation. The affairs of men consist of a complication of circumstances so
intimately interwoven as to be hardly separable from each other. Each owes its birth
to some preceding circumstances, and in its turn becomes the prolific parent of
others, and each, during the existence, has its inseparable attributes and its kindred
facts, materially affecting its character, and essential to be known for a right
understanding of its nature. These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts of
the res gestae, may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact and
their admissibility is determined by the judge according to the degree of their
relation to that fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion: it being extremely
difficult, if not impossible to bring this class of cases within the limits of a more
particular description.
Maria Diaz made reference to what the accused intended to do with the deceased;
and the implementation of his evil design is borne out by the actual and physical
facts of the case. The testimony of Santiago Balderas to the effect that, when Maria
Diaz came to his house for help, she told him that her husband was dead and could
be found at a certain place, amply proves the fact of the crime as confessed by the
accused. The presence of the bluish black spot at the nape of the deceased,
Mamerto Signey, and the opinion of Dr. Valera that a blow delivered right on the
medulla oblongata could have caused instantaneous death, confirm the admission of
the accused to Maria Diaz.
The defense of alibi is miserably weak. The testimony of defense witness Bisquera is
incredible. While she could recall the events of December 28, 1956, the date of the
crime, she could remember nothing about other days, not even Christmas.
Moreover it is not impossible, much les improbable, that even if the accused was
with his common-law wife and others harvesting at the ricefield of Regino Naranja,
he still could have gone in the afternoon to the house of Maria Diaz and killed the
latter's husband in the evening, considering that Maria's place was only about one
kilometer away.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES,
ANTHONY BALTAZAR PALMONES
G.R. No. 136303. July 18, 2000
FACTS:
- This is an appeal by accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and
Anthony Baltazar Palmones from the decision[1] of Branch 17 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato, 12th Judicial Region,
convicting them of the crime of murder[2]
- The information[3]dated June 4, 1997 charging accused-appellants of the
crime of murder reads as follows:
o That in the evening of April 27, 1997 at Barangay Magsaysay,
Municipality of Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a gun, did
then and there, willfully, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, unlawfully, feloniously and with treachery,
attack, assault, and shot the person of SPO2 ASIM MAMANSAL,
thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on
the vital parts of his body which is the cause of the death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
- Both accused were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the charge
against them. Thereafter, trial on the merits commenced.
- The prosecution first presented Sonny Boy Redovan, a 28 year-old farmer
who was the nephew of the victim. He testified that at around 10:00 in the
evening of April 27, 1997, his mother and elder brother informed him that
something had happened to his uncle SP02 Asim Mamansal. They then
rushed to the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital and proceeded to the emergency
room. Upon seeing his uncle, the witness went near him and asked him
what had happened to him. His uncle answered that he had been
waylaid. The witness then asked the victim who the perpetrators were and
the victim answered that it was Juany and Tony Palmones which were the
nicknames of the two accused-appellants.[4] He claimed that while he was
talking with his uncle, there were attendants, nurses, and other bystanders
whom he did not know present inside the emergency room. A few minutes
after he talked with the victim, a certain Dr. Aguayo arrived and examined
the wounds of his uncle. About and hour later, he saw Police Inspector
Alexander Tagum arrive and he heard him ask his uncle who had shot
him. The witness then heard his uncle positively answer the policeman that
his assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones.[5]
- On cross-examination, he testified that he was able to talk with his uncle
for about one hour and that the most important part of their conversation
was the identification of his uncles assailants.[6] He stated that it did not
occur to his mind to immediately report to the police what his uncle had
told him as his mind was troubled at that time. It was only after the burial
of his uncle on April 28, 1997 that he told Insp. Tagum that it was Tony
and Juany Palmores who had shot his uncle.[7]
- The prosecution next presented Dr. Hazel Mark Aguayo who testified that
he was the surgeon-on-duty on the day that SP02 Mamansal was shot. He
stated that before he operated on the victim, he interviewed Mamansal and
one of the questions he asked is whether the victim had known who had
shot him. He claimed that Mamansal told him that he did not know who
had shot him.[8] He did not pursue this line of questioning further as he was
told by a companion of the victim that the area where the victim was shot
was dark.[9] He testified that he operated on the victim at around 12:00 in
the evening. He operated for around four (4) hours but the victim
developed cardio respiratory arrest at around 8:30 the following morning
and thereafter, the victim died in the ward.[10]
- The third witness for the prosecution was Police Inspector Alexander
Camilon-Tagum. He testified that on the night of April 27, 1997, he was at
the Kidapawan, Cotabato Police Outpost. After receiving a radio report, he
proceeded to Brgy. Magsaysay, Kidapawan where he discovered that one of
his men, SP02 Mamansal, was shot.[13] After conducting an initial
investigation of the crime scene, he sent his men towards different
directions to look for suspects. He then told his men to continue pursuing
the assailants and after exhausting all efforts, he proceeded to the
Kidapawan Doctors Hospital. He confronted the victim in the emergency
room and asked him about his assailants. The victim answered that it was
Juany and Tony Palmones.[17] At that time, he claimed that Dr. Aguayo and
two other medical ladies were inside the room.
- The prosecution next presented Asmyra Mamansal, the daughter of the
victim. She testified that on the night of the incident, she was at her aunts
house where she was informed about the shooting of her father. She
immediately proceeded to the hospital where she saw her father lying on a
bed calling her name. Her father then told her to take down the name Alice
Villamor whom she knew as the name of her fathers mistress.[21] She was
able to talk with her father for about thirty minutes.
- For their part, accused-appellants presented ten (10) witnesses to support
their case.
- TC: rendered its questioned decision finding accused-appellants guilty of
the crime of murder.
o Accused-appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[45] of this
decision but the trial court, in an Order dated 26 October 1998 [46],
denied the same for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal where
accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
ISSUE: W/N the CRIME was proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Brief[47] where it recommended that the accused-appellants be acquitted of the
crime charged against them. In this Manifestation, the OSG reasoned that the
identity of the assailants was not sufficiently established by the evidence of the
prosecution and that the trial court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration A: Yes, sir.
of the victim as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Q: What did you do after that?
From the records of the case, the conviction of the two accused-appellants was
based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to two witnesses A: Upon seeing his condition I went near him and whispered Ano ba ang nangyari sa
of the prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense of alibi. It behooves yo? meaning What happened to you?
us therefore to determine the admissibility of the alleged oral dying declaration of
Q: What was the answer, if any?
the deceased Asim Mamanal as testified to by prosecution witnesses Sonny Boy
Redovan and Police Investigator Alexander Tagum. A: His answer (sic) that he was waylaid.
Dying declaration Q: What else did he tell you?
As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence. [48]
This is A: I was worried after saying those words, I asked him who are the perpetrators.
pursuant to Rule 130, section 30 of the Rules of Court which states:
Q: What was the answer?
Sec. 30. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge; that A: And he said Its Juany and Tony Palmones.
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules. Q: When those words uttered to you (sic) where there other persons inside the
room?
There are several exceptions however to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay
evidence, the first one of which is the admissibility of dying declarations given under A: Attendants, nurses, ususero, I do not know the others.[50]
the circumstances specified in Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
In a similar vein, Police Investigator Alexander Tagum likewise testified that the
Sec. 31. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a victim named the two accused as his assailants prior to the victims death. Thus:
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein
Q: What did you do at the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital?
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death A: I immediately went to the room wherein SPO1 Mamansal was lying.
As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: Q: What did you do while you were inside the room where SPO1 Mamansal was
(a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants lying?
death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the A: I immediately confronted him sir and immediately asked the question: Who shot
declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, murder or parricide win which you?
the decedent was the victim.[49]
Q: What was the answer?
As testified to by prosecution witness Sonny Boy Redovan, the supposed dying
declaration of the victim was made as follows: A: SPO1 Mamansal answered sir, it is Juany and Tony Palmones.

PROS. DE GUZMAN: XXX

Q: Did you reach the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital, Inc.? Q: Can you remember who were your companions (sic) inside the room where SPO2
Mamansal was lying?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I noticed two (2) ladies medical orderly (sic) and Dr. Aguayo.[51]
Q: What did you discover?
In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be
A: Upon arrival, I immediately proceeded to the emergency room. proven that that the declaration was made under a consciousness of impending
death which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going
Q: What did you do in the emergency room? to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete
conviction that death is at hand, or there must be a settled hopeless expectation.[52]
A: I saw my uncle there lying.
In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of
Q: Are you referring to SPO2 Asim Mamansal?
the declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death
were made under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for
ever presented by the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.
or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim whether he believed that he
was going to die out of his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny Boy
Redovan claimed that he was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the
only thing he revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification of the
victim of his two assailants.[53] For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only
question he asked of the victim was if the victim knew who had shot him.[54]

While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his
perception that he has given up the hope of life[55], the circumstances surrounding
his declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending
death.[56] In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of
the seriousness of his condition. As testified to by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the vital signs
of the victim, prior to his operation, were quite stable.[57]Moreover, from the time
the victim was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00
midnight, he was still able to talk intelligently with at least four (4) other persons on
various matters. The fact that his vital signs were strong and that he still had
strength to converse with these four (4) witnesses belie the conclusion that the
victim was under the consciousness of death by reason of the gravity of his wounds.

Res gestae

Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of
the res gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during,
or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.[58]

In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of
spontaneity is critical. The following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have
been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the
act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the
statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the
statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and
circumstances of the statement itself.[59]

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to
the victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res
gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an
appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as
the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements
attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made
these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was
brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital
constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for
deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the
PEOPLE V. RAQUEL
G.R. No. 119005 | December 2, 1996
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Sabas Raquel, Valeriano Raquel & Amado Ponce (accused); Sabas
Raquel & Valeriano Raquel (accused-appellants)
Ponente: J. Regalado
Summary:
Sabas, Valeriano and Amado were convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide
before the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato. It was alleged that at midnight of July 4,
1986, after hearing a knock on the backdoor of their kitchen, Agapito opened it and
there emerged heavily armed men. They declared a hold-up and fired their guns at
him. His wife Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her
husband lifeless while a man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly.She shouted
for help and a certain George Jovillano reported the incident to the police. The police
then found Amado wounded and lying a few meters away from the house.
Thereafter, Sabas and Valeriano were arrested on different occasions. For the part
of the defense, they presented alibis. Valeriano testified that he was in Tunggol
Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay on the day the crime happened, while
his brother Sabas was then in Pagadian being a soldier assigned in the 2nd Infantry
Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. It should be noted
however that the 3rd accused, Amado, escaped from jail before he could give him
testimony and since then remained at large.
The SC acquitted Sabas & Valeriano of their conviction. It was held that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of the crime. The lone eyewitness, Juliet, was not able to identify the
assailants of her husband. Even the corroborating witness, George, in his testimony
made no mention of who shot Agapito. The identification of Sabas & Valeriano as
the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of Amado pointing to
them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. The extrajudicial statements of an accused
implicating a co-accused may NOT be utilized against the latter, unless these are
repeated in open court. The Res Inter Alios Rule ordains that the rights of a party
CANNOT be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is NOT admissible
against his co-accused. Moreover, the exceptions do not apply to the case at bar.
First, except for that extrajudicial statement of Amado, there exists no evidence
linking Sabas & Valeriano to the crime.Second, this extrajudicial statement was
made in violation of the constitutional rights of Amado. He was not informed of his
constitutional right while on the process of investigation, and he was not assisted by
counsel.
FACTS:
 In an information, Sabas Raquel (Sabas), Valeriano Raquel (Valeriano), and
Amado Ponce (Amado) were indicted for robbery with homicide before the RTC
of Kabacan, Cotabato.
 Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in
progress however, and before he could give his testimony, Amado escaped
from jail.
Prosecution’s Version:
 At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet
and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to
the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. To his surprise, heavily
armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at
him.
 Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband
lifeless while a man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly.
 She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water
pump while the 2 other men ran away.
 A certain George Jovillano (George) responded to Juliet’s plea for help. He
reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the
victim’s house. He was identified as Amado.
 Amado was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station.
Amado then revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato (P/Sgt. Pangato) that Sabas
and Valeriano were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in
their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since they fled
immediately after the shooting incident.
 Sabas and Valeriano were later on apprehended on different occasions.
Defense’s Alibi:
1. Valeriano
o He testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left
Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan,
Maguindanao.
o He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased
brother.
o Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on
July 3 and 4.
o On July 5, while he was still asleep, police authorities accompanied by his
father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan,
Cotabato
o He already heard the name of Amado Ponce to be an owner of a land in
Paatan.
o On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Agapito are
located in the same Barangay, and that he entertained no grudge against
Agapito.
2. Antonio Raquel (64 years old)
o He testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano
told him that he was going to Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to
harvest palay.
o His other son, Sabas, also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a
soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian.
o On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house, looking for his
2 sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to
Tunggol where they arrested Valeriano.
3. T/ Sgt. Natalio Zafra (of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga)
o He testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry
Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas was
under his division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986.
RTC: Rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubtof robbery with homicide.
o sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
o to pay the heirs of Agapito the P50,000 as indemnity for his death, and
P1,500 representing the value of the stolen revolver.
CA: Sabas & Valeriano appealed to the CA. In view of the penalty imposed, CA
properly forwarded the case to SC.

ISSUE:WON Sabas & Valeriano are guilty of the crime charged. – NO
RATIO:
 The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities
of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of Sabas & Valeriano in the
crime charged.
o The lone eyewitness (Juliet) was not able to identify the assailants of her
husband.
 In her testimony on direct examination in court she declared that she
did not know who the 3 persons were.1 She also said the same thing
on cross-examination.2
o Even the corroborating witness, George, in his testimony made no mention
of who shot Agapito.
 He declared this fact in his sworn statement he executed in Kabacan
Police Station.3
1“Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see any
when you pip (sic) at the window?
“A:Yes, sir.
“Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?
“
A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2) persons who
were running away, sir.
“Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two (2)
persons running away?
xxx
“Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?
“
A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police arrived.”
----------
2“Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?
“A:I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room.
“Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got
the gun of your husband because he was mask(ed), is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside?
FISCAL DIZON:Already answered.She was not able to identify, your Honor.
Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that
right?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and you
saw two (2) person(s) running, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?
A:I saw them running sir going around.
Q:These two (2) persons were running going around?
A:They were running towards the road.
ATTY. DIVINO:Going to the road.
Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road?
A: No, sir.
----------
3
Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from where you
were then drinking, what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any?
A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a maong jacket.
The other one wore a hat locally known as ‘kipis’ meaning a hat made of cloth with leaves
protruding above the forehead and seemed to be holding something which I failed to recognize.
The other one wore a shortpant with a somewhat white T-shirt with markings and there was a
 The identification of Sabas & Valeriano as the culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of Amado pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the
crime. And he escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been
at large since then.
o The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-
accused may NOT be utilized against the latter, unless these are
repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is
elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused, just like
what happened in the case at bar.
o A distinction should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions.
The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine
the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal.
 The Res Inter Alios Rule ordains that the rights of a party CANNOT be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
o An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is NOT
admissible against his co-accused.
o Reason: On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own
acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.
 This general rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, but those
exceptions do not apply to the present case.
o First, except for that extrajudicial statement of Amado, there exists no
evidence linking Sabas & Valerianoto the crime.
 The testimony of police Sgt. Pangato that Sabas was wounded and
went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante
Clemente, was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he
treated no person by the name of Danny Clemente.
o Second, this extrajudicial statement relied upon as prosecution evidence,
was made in violation of the constitutional rights of Amado. This was
unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Pangato who was
the chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police
station.4
white T-shirt covering his head and a part of his face as he was head-down during that time.
Q: Did you recognize any of these men?
A: No. Because they walked fast.”
----------
4“Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the
process of investigation?
“A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the information from him. . . . And after that I
checked the information that he gave.
“Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel?
“A:What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to investigate as to
against (sic) him, and you have to inform his constitutional right but if the purpose is to
interrogate him to acquire information which will lead to the identity of the other accused we do
not need to inform him.
“Q: Don’t you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit, the accused should be (re)presented by
counsel that is the ruling of the Supreme Court?
“A:I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.
“Q:But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right?
  Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel are inadmissible. While the right to counsel
may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of
counsel. These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and
foundation, were never observed.
 A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty
of guilt. Without the positive identification of Sabas & Valeriano, the evidence of
the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of
the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own
evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution’s
evidence is weak.
 It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in
criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant
case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor were the standards
therefor fulfilled.

Decision: WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED

and Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged.

“A:No sir.
Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.
A:No counsel, sir.