AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
ROXAS & CO., INC. vs. CA
G.R. No. 127876, DECEMBER 17, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and is the registered
owner of three haciendas: Hacienda Palico, Haienda Banilad,
and Hacienda Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of
Nasugbu, Batangas.
On July 27, 1987, President Aquino issued Proclamation NO.
131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and
EO 229, providing mechanisms necessary to initially
implement the program. Subsequently, the Congress of the
Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power
from the President. Congress passed RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Days before its effectivity, petitioner filed with the Department
of Agrarian Reform a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to provisions of EO 229; Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent
DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Hacienda Palico was assessed by the Municipal Agrarian
Officer, which subjected the same to acquisition and
distribution in accordance with the CARL. However, petitioner
applied with the DAR for conversion o the said hacienda into a
non-agricultural land, but such application was denied. The
same was appropriated in accordance with the provisions of
the CARL, and petitioner was compensated with appropriate
value through LBP Trust Accounts.
Hacienda Banilad was also appropriated in accordance with
the CARL; Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered to the
government by petitioner.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a case with the
DARAB, praying for the cancellation of the Certificate of Land
Ownership Awards issued by the DAR, alleging that the
Municipality of Nasugbu had been declared a tourist zone, and
thus the land was not suitable for agricultural production, and
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had already
reclassified the lands into non-agricultural.
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
The DARAB held that the case involved a prejudicial question
of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, thus
should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian
reform for determination.
The Municipal Agrarian officer denied the petition, which was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the three
haciendas were valid.
RULING:
No. For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two
notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner,
the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and
other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of
1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner
under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage
and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual
conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to
comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's
police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent
that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners,
there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived
of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
The Bill of Rights provides that "no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." The CARL
was not intended to take away property without due process
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of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires
that due process be observed in the taking of private property.
In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through
MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled
"Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner
corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of
Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the same day
it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received at
the bottom left corner of said invitation.
With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that
Jaime Pimentel, administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was
notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel
actually attended the conference on September 21, 1989 and
signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of Petitioner
Corporation. The Minutes was also signed by the
representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries.
59 No letter of invitation was sent or conference meeting held
with respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a
Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent DAR.
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various parties the Notice
of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A.O. No. 12,
Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month earlier.
The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. 12
does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be
sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the
LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties. The
procedure in the sending of these notices is important to
comply with the requisites of due process especially when the
owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a
domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality
separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and
employees.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required
to be sent to the landowner by "personal delivery or registered
mail." Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person
to whose address the Notice may be sent by personal delivery
or registered mail, the law does not distinguish. The DAR
Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the
proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between natural
and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is governed
by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure
Curiously, respondent DAR had information of the address of
petitioner's principal place of business. The Notices of
Acquisition over Haciendas Palico and Banilad were addressed
to petitioner at its offices in Manila and Makati. These Notices
were sent barely three to four months after Pimentel was
notified of the preliminary conference. Assuming further that
petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its
haciendas, the areas found actually subject to CARP were not
properly identified before they were taken over by respondent
DAR.
The failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of
due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this
Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the
farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit
the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular
course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct
its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In
Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer
beneficiaries in 1993. 92 Since then until the present, these
farmers have been cultivating their lands. 93 It goes against the
basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these
people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till.
Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for
the rightful owner of the land.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DUMLAO
G.R. No. 167809 November 27, 2008
FACTS:
Heirs of Dumlao were the co-owners of several parcels of
agricultural land. The properties were divided into 6 titles.
Pursuant to P.D. 27 and E.O. 288, 2 titles were already valuated
and payments were deposited to the name of landowners
while the other 4 titles remains pending with the DAR.
The heirs filed a Complaint before the RTC for determination
of just compensation for their properties. They claimed that
they were not paid their just compensation for the properties
despite issuance of certificates of land transfer to farmer-
beneficiaries by the DAR.
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The DAR posited that the complaint lacked a cause of action
and that the RTC did not have jurisdiction. Under Section 50 of
RA No. 6657, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) which is vested with primary and
original jurisdiction over land valuation, while the RTC as
a Special Agrarian Court may review the DARABs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the government’s acquisition of the land was
completed.
HELD:
NO. Agrarian reform is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation. The recognized rule in expropriation is that title
to the expropriated property shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Thus, payment of just compensation to the landowner is
indispensable.
In the case under review, the agrarian reform process was not
completed. The just compensation to be paid respondents was
not settled prior to the enactment of RA No. 6657, the law
subsequent to PD No. 27 and EO No. 228. In fact, the non-
payment of just compensation is precisely the reason why
respondents filed a petition for the determination of just
compensation before the RTC on July 13, 1995.
The records do not show when respondents or their father,
Florentino Dumlao, was formally notified of the
expropriation. The records, however, bear out that the bank
sent Florentino Dumlao a letter stating that it had approved
the land transfer claim involving that property covered
by TCT No. T-1180 on November 5, 1990. Moreover, the
various Land Valuation Summary and Farmers Undertakings
showing the valuation of the land transferred to the farmers-
beneficiaries were approved on May 17, 1989 and July 21,
1989. It is thus crystal clear that even after the passage of RA
No. 6657 in 1988, neither petitioner nor the DAR had settled
the matter of just compensation with respondents as
landowners.
In the case at bar, emancipation patents, and eventually,
transfer certificates of title, were issued to the farmer-
beneficiaries at least twenty-eight (28) years ago.
Needless to say, respondents have already been deprived of
the use and dominion over their landholdings for a substantial
period of time. In the interim, petitioner bank has abjectly
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
failed to pay, much less to determine, the just compensation
due to respondents. The law clearly recognizes that the exact
value of lands taken under PD No. 27, or the just compensation
to be given to the landowner must be determined with
certainty before the land titles are transferred. Petitioners
gross failure to compensate respondents for loss of their land,
while transferring the same to the farmer-beneficiaries, make
it unjust to determine just compensation based on the
guidelines provided by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228.
Accordingly, just compensation should be computed in
accordance with RA No. 6657 in order to give full effect to the
principle that the recompense due to the landowner should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain
but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full, and ample.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF FLORENCIO
ADOLFO AND HEIRS OF ELIAS POLICARPIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191615, August 02, 2017
FACTS:
Victoria Cabral claims that she is the registered owner of
several parcels of land situated, at Barangay Purok
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which was originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title. In 1972, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
subjected the said land under the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Thereafter in July 1973,
petitioner sought to convert her landholdings, which include
not only the subject property but also her lands in Marilao and
Meycauayan, to non-agricultural purposes.
DAR District Officer Fernando Ortega, acting upon the reports
of the Agrarian Reform Team stating that, the subject property
was not included in the OLT program under P.D. No. 27, nor
has any portion thereof been transferred to a tenant. He
recommended the conversion of the same into residential,
commercial, industrial, or other purposes.
In 1988, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to Gregoria
Adolfo et. al. Corresponding Transfer Certificates of Titles
(TCTs) were then issued to herein respondents. Cabral filed a
petition before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC)
for the cancellation of the EPs issued in favor of Florencio
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Adolfo et. al. The said petition was, however, forwarded to the
DAR Regional Director, who dismissed the case. Cabral
appealed but the same was denied by DAR Regional Director,
finding that despite the reclassification of the subject parcels
of land, the same will not be a bar in placing the said lands
under the OLT program, considering that petitioner's
landholdings exceeded 24 hectares.
On appeal, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, , affirmed
the DAR Regional Director's Order, declaring that the subject
landholdings are covered by the OLT program under P.D. No.
27 as it was only after the landholdings were placed under the
OLT program on October 21, 1972 when it was classified as
within the residential zone.
Victoria Cabral filed a Petition for Cancellation of Emancipation
Patents and Torrens Title20 before the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Malolos City, Bulacan
against the said respondents and the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), Region III. Cabral contended that the issuance
of the said EPs and TCTs were violative of applicable agrarian
laws considering that the subject property was already
classified as residential, hence, not covered by P.D. No. 27.
Petitioner invoked a Certification dated February 24, 1983
issued by the Zoning Administrator of the Office of the HSRC
Deputized Zoning Administration of Meycauayan, Bulacan, and
Certification dated August 28, 1989 issued by the Zoning
Administrator of Meycauayan, Bulacan, both attesting to the
classification of the subject property as within the residential
zone. Petitioner also averred that the said EPs were issued
without due process and without payment of just
compensation
ISSUE:
Whether the subject lands are covered by the OLT program
under P.D. No. 27.
HELD:
No. Under P.D. No. 27, which implemented the OLT program,
covers only tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for
coverage under the OLT program are the following:
(1) the land must be devoted to rice or com crops; and
(2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy
obtaining therein.
Neither of these requisites is present in this case.
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
Land acquisition by virtue of P.D. No. 27 and Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657 partakes of the nature of expropriation. In fact,
jurisprudence states that it is an extraordinary method of
expropriating private property. As such, the law on the matter
must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal
provisions, especially those which relate to procedure for
acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be
observed. In expropriation proceedings, as in judicial
proceedings, notice is part of the constitutional right to due
process of law. It informs the landowner of the State's
intention to acquire private land upon payment of just
compensation and gives him the opportunity to present
evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise
excused from the agrarian law.
In this case, the respondents and the DAR failed to adduce
evidence to prove actual notice to the petitioner and payment
of just compensation for the taking of the latter's property.
In G.R. No. 198160, there is nothing on record that will show
that the landholding was brought under the OLT program, CLTs
were issued prior to the issuance of the subject EPs,
respondents are full-fledged members of a duly recognized
farmer's cooperative, they finished payment of amortizations,
and that petitioner, as the landowner, was notified and paid
just compensation for the taking of her lands before the
issuance of the subject EPs.
In this issue of compliance with the procedure, it must be
remembered that the burden of proof lies with the party who
asserts a right and the quantum of evidence required by law in
civil cases is preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or
"greater weight of credible evidence".
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HEIRS of ANTONIO
MARCOS, SR.
G.R. No. 175726 March 22, 2017
FACTS:
Ramiro Marcos, authorized representative of the heirs of
Antonio, offered to sell the 14.9274 and 9.4653 hectares
agricultural lands of the deceased Antonio Marcos to the
Republic of the Philippines.
4

Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), then, valued the lands
covered by at ₱195,603.70 and ₱79,096.26, which valuation
were accepted by Ramiro and the heirs of Antonio.
While the payment is pending, DAR brought the matter of
valuation to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, to
determine the just compensation for the lands.
After proper proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered
a new valuation of the lands at ₱446,786.03 for the 14.9274
hectares and ₱283,302.10 for the 9.4653 hectares.
LBP, then, filed a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation for the lands with the RTC sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC).
RTC-SAC adopted the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
LBP appealed to the CA. CA denied.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed by the LBP
averring that hat the subject property was acquired by the
government pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, thus, in determining
the just compensation, Section 17 of the said law is applicable;
and that the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
cannot abrogate, vary or alter a consummated contract
between the government and the respondents in regard to
subject properties.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC-SAC was correct in determining the just
compensation of the subject properties based on the
decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
2. W/N the PARAD could alter a consummated contract.
HELD:
1. NO. The RTC-SAC was incorrect in determining the just
compensation of the subject properties based on the
decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
The factors under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 were already
translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its
rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. The
said factors and the DAR formula provide the uniform
framework or structure by which just compensation for
property subject to agrarian reform should be determined.
Hence, aside from considering the factors provided by law,
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
the courts should apply the formula outlined in DAR AO No.
5, series of 1998, in the computation of just compensation.
A reading of the decisions of the PARAD would reveal that
he did not apply or consider the formula in DAR AO No. 5,
series of 1998. He based his decision with the rule on
admissibility of evidence of bona fide sales transaction of
nearby places in determining the market value of like
properties and applied the valuation of LBP with the
property of Norma Marcos Clemente and Hacienda de Ares
after .ruling that the properties of respondents are
comparable with the said properties. His decisions did not
mention the consideration of the formula laid down by the
DAR in the valuation of the properties of respondents.
Likewise, the RTC-SAC did not conduct an independent
assessment and computation using the considerations
required by the law and the rules and merely relied upon
the Provincial Adjudicator's decision. Although it took into
consideration and mentioned some of the factors, it did not
point to any particular consideration that impelled it to set
the just compensation at ₱283,302.10 and ₱446,786.03.
To reiterate, the RTC-SACs are not strictly bound to apply
the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when
faced with situations that do not warrant the formula's
strict application; they may, in the exercise of their
discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the factual
situations before them. They must, however, clearly
explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and
formula that the law and the rules have provided.
2. YES, PARAD could alter a consummated contract since
there was no consummated contract on the first place.
The implementation of R.A. No. 6657 is an exercise of the
State's police power and power of eminent domain. It was
also settled that the taking of private property by the
Government in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. Thus,
acquisition of lands under the CARP is not governed by
ordinary rules on obligations and contracts but by R.A. No.
6657 and its implementing rules.
Unlike in the ordinary sale of real property where the buyer
and the seller are free to determine, by offer and
acceptance, the consideration for the subject matter of the
transaction, acquisition of lands under the CARP is
governed by administrative rules intended to ensure that
the rights of the landowners to just compensation are
respected.
5

The LBP's valuation of lands covered by the CARP Law is
considered only as an initial determination, which is not
conclusive, as it is the RTC-SAC that could make the final
determination of just compensation, taking into
consideration the factors provided in R.A. No. 6657 and the
applicable DAR regulations. The LBP's valuation has to be
substantiated during an appropriate hearing before it could
be considered sufficient in accordance with Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR regulations.
Since it is the RTC-SAC that could make the final
determination of just compensation, the supposed
acceptance of the LBP's valuation cannot be considered as
consummated contract.
HACIENDA LUISITA VS PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL
G. R. No. 171101 April 24, 2012
FACTS:
This is a Motion to Clarify and Reconsider the Resolution dated
Nov 22, 2012 which the court approves the revocation of the
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) Stock Distribution Plan (SLP) and
placing Hacienda Luisita under the compulsory land
distribution scheme.
HLI contends that since the SDP is a modality which the
agrarian reform law gives the landowner as alternative to
compulsory coverage, then the FWBs cannot be considered as
owners and possessors of the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita at the time the SDP was approved by PARC. It further
claims that the approval of the SDP is not akin to a Notice of
Coverage in compulsory coverage situations because stock
distribution option and compulsory acquisition are two (2)
different modalities with independent and separate rules and
mechanisms. Concomitantly, HLI maintains that the Notice of
Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very least, be
considered as the date of taking as this was the only time that
the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed under
compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain
obligations under the SDP.
Mallari, et al. are of a similar view. They contend that Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco), having as it were majority
control over HLI, was never deprived of the use and benefit of
the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita. Upon this premise,
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
Mallari, et al. claim the date of taking could not be at the time
of the approval of the SDP.
ISSUE:
WON the time of taking should be on January 2, 2006 for the
basis of just compensation
RULING:
No, the issue on the just compensation was already been
raised under their first motion for reconsideration and fully
passed upon by the court in its November 22, 2011 resolution
which provides that the just compensation be reckoned from
November 21, 1989 when PARC approve HLI’s SDP per PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2.
Considering that the issue on just compensation has already
been passed upon and denied by the Court in its November 22,
2011 Resolution, a subsequent motion touching on the same
issue undeniably partakes of a second motion for
reconsideration, hence, a prohibited pleading, and as such, the
motion or plea must be denied. Sec. 3 of Rule 15 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court is clear:
SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not
entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any
exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest
of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-
thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration in the
higher interest of justice when the assailed decision is not only
legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable
injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law
or by the Court’s declaration.
Nonetheless, even if the court will entertain said motion and
examine the arguments raised by HLI and Mallari, et al. one
last time, the result will be the same.
Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides
that the taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program
of the government is conditioned on the payment of just
compensation. As stated:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to
6

receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations,
and subject to the payment of just compensation.
Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss. In determining just compensation, the price or
value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner
and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the
government takes possession of the land before the institution
of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of
the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the
complaint.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that
the time of taking is the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when
title is transferred to the Republic. It should be noted,
however, that taking does not only take place upon the
issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the
beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are
voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for
CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in
the instant case. Thus, HLI.s submitting its SDP for approval is
an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the
PARC approval which should be considered as the effective
date of taking as it was only during this time that the
government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these
lands.
Indeed, stock distribution option and compulsory land
acquisition are two (2) different modalities under the agrarian
reform program. Nonetheless, both share the same end goal,
that is, to have a more equitable distribution and ownership of
land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just
compensation.
The fact that Sec. 31 of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) gives
corporate landowners the option to give qualified beneficiaries
the right to avail of a stock distribution or, in the phraseology
of the law, the right to purchase such proportion of the capital
stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually
devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the
company’s total assets, does not detract from the avowed
policy of the agrarian reform law of equitably distributing
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
ownership of land. The difference lies in the fact that instead
of actually distributing the agricultural lands to the farmer-
beneficiaries, these lands are held by the corporation as part
of the capital contribution of the farmer-beneficiaries, not of
the landowners, under the stock distribution scheme. The end
goal of equitably distributing ownership of land is, therefore,
undeniable. And since it is only upon the approval of the SDP
that the agricultural lands actually came under CARP coverage,
such approval operates and takes the place of a notice of
coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
Moreover, precisely because due regard is given to the rights
of landowners to just compensation, the law on stock
distribution option acknowledges that landowners can require
payment for the shares of stock corresponding to the value of
the agricultural lands in relation to the outstanding capital
stock of the corporation.
Although Tadeco did not require compensation for the shares
of stock corresponding to the value of the agricultural lands in
relation to the outstanding capital stock of HLI, its inability to
receive compensation cannot be attributed to the
government. The second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657
explicitly states that [u]pon certification by DAR, corporations
owning agricultural lands may give their qualified
beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the
capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land,
actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to
the company’s total assets, under such terms and conditions
as may be agreed upon by them. On the basis of this statutory
provision, Tadeco could have exacted payment for such shares
of stock corresponding to the value of the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita in relation to the outstanding capital stock of
HLI, but it did not do so.
What is notable, however, is that the divestment by Tadeco of
the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita and the giving of the
shares of stock for free is nothing but an enticement or
incentive for the FWBs to agree with the stock distribution
option scheme and not further push for land distribution. And
the stubborn fact is that the man days scheme of HLI impelled
the FWBs to work in the hacienda in exchange for such shares
of stock.
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, the suggestion
that there is taking only when the landowner is deprived of the
use and benefit of his property is not incompatible with Our
conclusion that taking took place on November 21, 1989. As
mentioned in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, even from the start,
the stock distribution scheme appeared to be Tadeco’s
preferred option in complying with the CARP when it organized
7

HLI as its spin-off corporation in order to facilitate stock
acquisition by the FWBs. For this purpose, Tadeco assigned and
conveyed to HLI the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita, set
at 4,915.75 hectares, among others. These agricultural lands
constituted as the capital contribution of the FWBs in HLI. In
effect, Tadeco deprived itself of the ownership over these
lands when it transferred the same to HLI.
While it is true that Tadeco has majority control over HLI, the
Court cannot subscribe to the view Mallari, et al. espouse that,
on the basis of such majority stockholding, Tadeco was never
deprived of the use and benefit of the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita it divested itself in favor of HLI.
It bears stressing that [o]wnership is defined as a relation in
law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by
law or the concurrence with the rights of another. The
attributes of ownership are: jus utendi or the right to possess
and enjoy, jus fruendi or the right to the fruits, jus abutendi or
the right to abuse or consume, jus disponendi or the right to
dispose or alienate, and jus vindicandi or the right to recover
or vindicate.
When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were
transferred by Tadeco to HLI in order to comply with CARP
through the stock distribution option scheme, sealed with the
imprimatur of PARC under PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated
November 21, 1989, Tadeco was consequently dispossessed of
the afore-mentioned attributes of ownership. Notably, Tadeco
and HLI are two different entities with separate and distinct
legal personalities. Ownership by one cannot be considered
as ownership by the other.
Corollarily, it is the official act by the government,
that is, the PARC’s approval of the SDP, which should be
considered as the reckoning point for the taking of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita. Although the transfer of
ownership over the agricultural lands was made prior to the
SDP’s approval, it is this Courts consistent view that these lands
officially became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval
of the SDP. And as We have mentioned in Our November 22,
2011 Resolution, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
Further, if We adhere to HLI’s view that the Notice of Coverage
issued on January 2, 2006 should, at the very least, be
considered as the date of taking as this was the only time that
the agricultural portion of the hacienda was placed under
compulsory acquisition in view of HLI’s failure to perform
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
certain obligations under the SDP, this Court would, in effect,
be penalizing the qualified FWBs twice for acceding to the
adoption of the stock distribution scheme: first, by depriving
the qualified FWBs of the agricultural lands that they should
have gotten early on were it not for the adoption of the stock
distribution scheme of which they only became minority
stockholders; and second, by making them pay higher
amortizations for the agricultural lands that should have
been given to them decades ago at a much lower cost were it
not for the landowner’s initiative of adopting the stock
distribution scheme for free.
Reiterating what We already mentioned in Our November 22,
2011 Resolution, [e]ven if it is the government which will pay
the just compensation to HLI, this will also affect the FWBs as
they will be paying higher amortizations to the government if
the taking will be considered to have taken place only on
January 2, 2006. As aptly observed by Justice Leonardo-De
Castro in her Concurring Opinion, this will put the land beyond
the capacity of the [FWBs] to pay, which this Court should not
countenance.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES AVANCEÑA
GR No. 190520, May 30, 2016
FACTS:
Respondents-Spouses Antonio and Carmen Avanceña were
the registered owners of a parcel of agricultural land. In 1988,
respondents spouses voluntarily offered to sell their land to
the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). In 1991, petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines initially valued the subject lot at Pl,877,516.09
based on the guidelines prescribed in DAR Administrative
Order No. 17, Series of 1989. Upon recomputation in 1994 and
based on DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, by DAR
AO No. 11, Series of 1994, the land was revalued at
P3,337,672.78 but respondents rejected the valuation.
Petitioner deposited the difference in the cash portion
between the revalued amount and the initial valuation of P
1,877,516.09 in trust for the respondents on July 24, 1996.
Respondents-spouses filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for determination of just compensation. They
prayed for a valuation of no less than P200,000.00 per hectare
for the subject lot or in the alternative, to appoint
Commissioners to determine the just compensation; and that
8

they be allowed to withdraw the valuation amount that
petitioner had deposited for them including the earned
interest, pending the court's final valuation. When the matter
was elevated to the CA, it awarded interest at the rate of 12%
p.a. reckoned from the time title to property was transferred
in the name of the government to the time petitioner
deposited the valuation in July 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether an interest rate of 12% per annum should be should
be imposed from the time the title of the property was
transferred in the name of the government up to the time LBP
allegedly deposited the valuation
RULING:
Yes.
The title to respondents spouses' land was canceled and a new
title was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
in December 1991, but there was no showing that petitioner
had made payments prior to the taking of the land.
Thus, there was delay in the payment of just compensation
which entitles the respondents spouses to the payment of
interest from the time the property was transferred in the
name of the government in December 1991 up to the time
petitioner deposited the valuation in the account of the
respondents-spouses in July 1996. Such payment of interest
should be computed up to the full payment of just
compensation.
Petitioner argues that it had made a deposit i.e., prior to the
cancellation of the title of the respondents-spouses, and
submitted a Certification issued by the petitioner's Bonds
Servicing Department stating that it had earmarked the sum of
Pl,877,516.09 in cash and in LBP bonds as compensation for
the parcel of lands pursuant to RA 6657 through voluntary
offer. However, the court rejected the practice of earmarking
funds and opening trust accounts for purposes of effecting
payment, hence, the law requires payment of just
compesation in cash or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
bonds, not by trust account.
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
Moreover, the court have allowed the grant of interest in
expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment of just
compensation. It recognizes that the owner's loss is not only
his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus,
when property is taken, full compensation of its value must
immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the
property and the potential income lost. The rationale for
imposing the interest is to compensate the landowners for the
income they would have made had they been properly
compensated for their properties at the time of the taking.
ROBERTO PADUA VS. CA
G.R. No. 153456, March 2, 2007
FACTS:
Private respondents Pepito Dela Cruz, et al. were tenants of Lot
Nos. 68 and 90 of one Dolores Ongsiako Estate. Upon the
request of Mayor Cruz, they agreed to donate said properties
to the municipality on the condition that these be used as
school sites. However, the project did not materialize, thus,
they asked that the lots be returned. They also found out that
Mayor Cruz had distributed Lot No. 68 to Flor Labagnoy and
Lot No. 90 to Edwin Cruz (who were each issued a Certificate
of Land Transfer (CLT). Dela Cruz et al. filed a Petition for
Cancellation of CLT with DAR and were granted.
Labagnoy and Cruz filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment for
lack of due process. They then appealed to the Office of the
President (OP) which dismissed the same. During the pendency
of the appeal, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Waiver over his
interest in Lot No. 90 declaring it open for disposition. DAR
Secretary Santiago issued an Order awarding the same to
herein petitioner Roberto Padua who had been occupying said
property and paying the amortization thereon to LBP.
Aggrieved, Dela Cruz, et al., filed with the DAR Secretary a
Letter-Petition for Cancellation of such order. DAR Secretary
Garilao granted the Letter.
Padua filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of a Final and
Executory Order. Padua claims that the DAR under Sec. 50 of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) cannot take
cognizance of the petition for cancellation because the matter
involved is a civil law issue relating to the validity of a contract
of sale executed by LBP and petitioner, not an agrarian reform
matter; that cancellation can only be ordered by a court of
justice, not by an administrative agency exercising only quasi-
judicial powers. This was however denied by the CA. Hence,
this petitions.
9

ISSUE
W/N the Court of Appeals committed a grave and reversible
error when it held that Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
may not be availed of for assailing an Order of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
RULING
The Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for
Annulment and affirmed the Garilao Order. A petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
may be availed of against final judgments and orders rendered
by either RTCs in civil actions or Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs).
Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals such as the
National Labor Relations Commission, the Ombudsman, the
Civil Service Commission, and the OP are beyond the reach of
a petition for annulment under Rule 47. An order of the DAR
Secretary issued in the exercise of his quasi-judicial powers is
also outside its scope.
The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of law. There must then be a law expressly
granting such right. This legal axiom is also applicable and even
more true in actions for annulment of judgments which is an
exception to the rule on finality of judgments. In the present
case, neither Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 nor R.A. No. 7902
allows a petition for annulment of a final DAR decision or
order.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS ROMEO C.
CARRIEDO
(G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016)
FACTS:
On May 23 1972, Pablo Mendoza (Mendoza) became the
tenant of a 73 hectare land owned by Roman de Jesus(Roman)
by virtue of a Contra to King Pamauisan executed between him
and Roman. The Contract stipulates that Mendoza has been
payinh 25 piculs of sugar crop year as lease rental to Roman
and was later changed to P2000 per crop year.
On November 7, 1979 Roman died leaving the entire 73
hectares to his surviving wife Alberta and their two sons Mario
and Antonio. Antonio then executed a deed of Extrajudicial
succession with waiver of rights which made Alberta and Mario
co-owners in equal proportion.
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
Mario sold approximately 70 hectares to respondent Romeo
Carriedo. The area sold to Carriedo includes the land tenanted
by Mendoza. Mendoza alleged that the sale took place without
his knowledge and consent.
Carriedo then sold the Land to the People’s livelihood
foundation. All lands, except one covered by TCT 17690 were
subject to Voluntary Land Transfer and were awarded to
agrarian reform beneficiaries in 1997.
The Parties were involved in three cases concerning the land:
EJECTMENT CASE
Carriedo filed a complaint for ejectment and collection of
unpaid rentals against Mendoza. The Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board(PARAD) ruled that Mendoza had
knowledge of the sale and hence he could not deny the feet
nor assail the validity of the conveyance. The PARAD declared
the leasehold contract terminated. Hence, Mendoza was
ordered to vacate the premises.
The Department of Agrarian Reform adjudication
board(DARAB) and the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the
PARAD.
REDEMPTION CASE
Mendoza filed a petition for Redemption with the PARAD. The
PARAD dismissed the petition on the grounds of lis pendentia
and lack of required certification of forum-Shopping.
The DARAB reversed the PARAD order. DARAB granted
Mendoza redemption rights over the land. Reasoning that at
thte time Carriedo filed his complaint for ejectment on
October 1990 he was no longer the owner of the land.
The CA reversed the decision of the DARAB and ruled that
Carriedo’s ownership over the land has been conclusively
established
COVERAGE CASE
On February 26, 2002 Mendoza filed a petition for coverage of
the land under RA no 6657. They claimed that they have been
in physical and material possession of the lant as tenants since
1956. The petition was granted by the Regional Director.
Carriedo filed a protest. The DAR-CO denied his petition.
Stating that he no longer allowed to retain the Land due to his
violation of RA 6657.
10

The CA reversed the DAR-CO a d declared the land as
Carriedo’s retained area. Stating that the right of retention is a
constitutionally-granted right, subject to certain qualifications
specified by the legislature.
Lastly, the Mendozas argued that Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) already generated in favor of his
co-petitioners Corazon Mendoza and Rolando Gomez cannot
be set aside. CLOAs under RA No. 6657 are enrolled in the
Torrens system of registration which makes them indefeasible
as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
ISSUE:
W/N a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) already
granted in favor of the Mendozas are indefeasible.
RULING:
NO. CLOAs are not equivalent to a Torrens certificate of title,
and thus are not indefeasible.
CLOAs and EPs are similar in nature to a Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) in ordinary land registration proceedings. CLTs,
and in turn the CLOAs and EPs, are issued merely as
preparatory steps for the eventual issuance of a certificate of
title. They do not possess the indefeasibility of certificates of
title.
Under PD No. 27, beneficiaries arc issued certificates of land
transfers (ClTs) to entitle them to possess lands. Thereafter,
they are issued emancipation patents (EPs) after compliance
with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon their
presentation to the Register of Deeds, shall be the basis for the
issuance of the corresponding transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) in favor of the corresponding beneficiaries.
Under RA No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified. Only
certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu
of EPs, after compliance with all prerequisites. Upon
presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are
issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer
issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not
absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered
thereby. Under AO No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be
cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area.
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
ESTATE OF THE LATE ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLIO vs.
GONZALO DIZON
G.R. No. 148777, OCTPBER 18, 2007
FACTS:
Encarnacion Vda. De Panlilio is the owner of the disputed
landholdings over a vast tract of land, with an aggregate area
of 115.41 hectares called Hacienda Masamat located in
Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga covered by 16 Transfer
Certificates of Title.
On April 19, 1961, Panlilio entered into a contract of lease over
the said landholdings with Paulina Mercado, wife of Panlilio’s
nephew. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed on
October 13, 1964 and September 18, 1974, covering
agricultural years from 1961 to 1979.
Sometime in 1973, pursuant to the OLT under PD 27, the DAR
issued 38 Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to Panlilio’s
tenants. The tenant-awardees were made defendants in the
instant consolidated complaints filed by petitioner Lizares.
On November 26, 1973, lessee Paulina Mercado filed a letter-
complaint with the DAR questioning the issuance of CLTs to
Panlilio’s tenants, alleging, among others, that the DAR should
not have issued the CLTs since the land involved was principally
being planted with sugar and was outside the coverage of PD
27. She claimed that respondents surreptitiously planted palay
instead of sugar in order to bring the land within the purview
of the law. After proper investigation, the DAR concluded that
the CLTs were "properly and regularly issued."
On December 4, 1976, the tenants of the portion of the land
planted with sugar cane petitioned the DAR to cause the
reversion of their sugarland to riceland so that it may be
covered by the Agrarian Reform Law.
Panlilio executed an affidavit wherein she alleged that:
1. She is the owner of the entire land in question;
2. That 50.22 hectares thereof is dedicated to palay crop and
has been placed under the provisions and coverage of PD 27;
3. That she did not object to the placing of the land under the
coverage of PD 27;
11

4. That all tenants of the said property have filed a petition
with the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to place the portion of
the land within the coverage of PD 27;
5. That the petition by the tenants carries with it her written
conformity; and
6. That she desires for her entire property be declared under
the coverage of PD 27, without exception, and that thereafter
the same be sold to tenant-petitioners.
The DAR secretary ordered to distribute all land transfer
certificates in view of Encarnacion’s desire to place the
property under the Land Transfer Program of the government.
On December 29, 1986, Panlilio died. George Lizares was
appointed as the executor of the estate of Panlilio. He later
filed a complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator for annulment of coverage of landholdings under
PD 27 and ejectment cases against the tenants, alleging among
others that there was no valid waiver under PD 27.
The PARAD dismissed Lizares’ complaint on the ground that
the subject landholdings have been placed under the coverage
of PD 27. Further, it applied the equitable remedy of laches
wherein Panlilio failed to bring to the attention of the DAR and
CAR to her second affidavit revoking the previous one. The
DARAB affirmed the decision.
Initially, the CA reversed the ruling of the DARAB. However,
private respondent Reynalod Villanueav interposed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the said decision. The CA ameneded its
earlier decision, concluding that the second affidavit was not
executed by Panlilio, ratiocinating that if she indeed made the
second affidavit which purportedly repudiated her earlier
January 12, 1977 Affidavit, the natural course of action to take
was for her to submit the second affidavit to the DAR to
exclude the majority of her landholdings planted with sugar
cane from the coverage of the OLT under PD 27. Her failure to
effectuate the removal of her land from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage for nine (9) years
until her death on December 29, 1986 led the court a quo to
believe that the second affidavit was not genuine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid waiver under PD 27.
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
RULING:
Yes. Considering the non-revocation of the January 12, 1977
Panlilio Affidavit,, the CA considered the land of Panlilio
planted with sugar cane as falling under the coverage of PD 27,
thus:
[W]hile the proceedings in the CAR tend to establish the land
as principally sugarland, hence outside the coverage of P.D. 27,
still, Panlilio’s consent to have the entire land covered by the
said law as alleged in her first affidavit, cannot be construed as
a violation of its provisions. In fact, in executing the said
affidavit, she did not defeat, nor contravene the express intent
of the law to emancipate her tenants from the bondage of the
soil. In doing so, she even supported its implementation.
In Our challenged Decision We found that the subject land was
principally planted [with] sugar and therefore outside the pale
of P.D. 27. But We overlooked the fact that Panlilio in her first
affidavit, which was not validly revoked, expressed her desire
to have her entire landholdings placed within the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. To be sure, the fact that Panlilio’s
land is sugarland has become inconsequential in the light of
her first affidavit.61
We agree with the CA.
While PD 27 clearly applies to private agricultural lands
primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop
or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not, it
does not preclude nor prohibit the disposition of landholdings
planted with other crops to the tenants by express will of the
landowner under PD 27.
In the instant case, a large portion of Hacienda Masamat with
an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares was planted with sugar
cane. It is undisputed, as was duly shown in the January 12,
1977 Panlilio Affidavit, that only 50.22 hectares were planted
with palay. Thus, approximately 65.19 hectares of the subject
landholdings were planted with sugar cane aside from the
portions used for the residences of the tenants and planted
with crops for their daily sustenance. Needless to say, with the
January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, she expressed her intent to
include the 65.19 hectares to be placed under the OLT
12

pursuant to PD 27 in favor of her tenants which otherwise
would have been exempt. Indeed, waiver or an intentional and
voluntary surrender of a right can give rise to a valid title or
ownership of a property in favor of another under Article 6 of
the Civil Code. Thus, such disposition through the OLT pursuant
to PD 27 is indeed legal and proper and no irregularity can be
attributed to the DAR which merely relied on the January 12,
1977 Panlilio Affidavit.
CABRAL v. HEIRS OF ADOLFO
G.R. No. 191615 August 2, 2017
FACTS:
Victoria Cabral filed a petition before the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Council (BARC) for the cancellation of the
Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles issued in favor of
private respondents. The patents and titles covered portions
of the property owned and registered in the name of
petitioner.
Cabral alleged that she was the registered owner of several
parcels of land that as early as July 1973, petitioner applied
with the DAR for the reclassification or conversion of the land
for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. The
application for conversion, however, was not acted
upon. Instead, on April 25, 1988, Emancipation Patents, and,
thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title, were issued in favor
of private respondents.
Cabral sought the cancellation of the TCTs on several grounds.
The Regional Director dismissed her petition and her motion
for reconsideration. Now, she’s claiming that the DARAB and
not the Regional Director of DAR has jurisdiction over her case.
ISSUE:
Whether the Regional Director of DAR had jurisdiction over
this case.
HELD:
NO. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may have had
over the cancellation of emancipation patents, it lost with the
passage of subsequent laws. Executive Order No. 129-A
subsequently provided for the creation of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board, granting it the powers and functions with
respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases:
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. “The Board
shall assume the powers and functions with respect to the
adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order
No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers and functions
may be delegated to the regional office of the Department in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Board.”
It is amply clear the function of the Regional Office concerns
the implementation of agrarian reform laws while that of the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases. The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the
enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
Thus, the Regional Director is primarily tasked with
implementing laws, policies, rules and regulations within the
responsibility of the agency, as well as the agency program in
the region.
The second is judicial in nature, involving as it does the
determination of rights and obligations of the parties. To aid
the DARAB in the exercise of this function, the Rules grant the
Board and Adjudicators the powers to issue subpoenas and
injunctions, to cite and punish for contempt, and to order the
execution of its orders and decision, among other powers. The
Rules also contain very specific provisions to ensure the
orderly procedure before the DARAB, RARADs and
PARADs. These provisions govern the commencement of
actions, venue and cause of action, the service of pleadings,
the presentation of evidence, motions, appeals and judicial
review.
No such powers were granted or provisions adopted when the
purported delegation was made to the Regional Director or
since. The DARAB Rules grant broader powers to the Board and
the Adjudicators and contain more detailed rules on procedure
than those provided by the orders, circulars, memoranda and
opinions cited by the Court of Appeals delegating jurisdiction
to the Regional Director.
In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to
allow a duplication of functions between agencies. Duplication
results in confusion between the various agencies upon whom
these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies
are supposed to serve. It divides the agencies resources and
prevents them from devoting their energy to similarly
important tasks. The intention to avoid this very situation is
evident in the various laws distinct delineation of the functions
of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional
Office. Accordingly, the Court must reject the theory of
concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We
13

hold that the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the
subject case.
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City,
and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL,
UDK No. 9864 : December 3, 1990
FACTS:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte "an agrarian
case for damages by reason of unlawful dispossession . . .was
tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo
and Eugenia Martil. Several persons were also impleaded as
defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being
alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a
mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure
thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the bank
as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by
the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other
persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the
National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed that mortgage
and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be
annulled and voided.
Respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint.
He opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 and
Executive No. 129-A, approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the
Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian
cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian
Reform
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, finding that the
jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the Trial
Court. The Court of Appeals, adverted to a case earlier decided
by it, Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in
which it was "emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer
fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather
under the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board."
The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once
again before the Supreme Court, contending that the Trial
Court's "order of dismissal, and the decision of the Honorable
Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal and
unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access
to courts and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas
Bilang 129."
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in dismissing the case
filed by the petitioners Tangub?
HELD:
NO. The RTC of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing
Agrarian Case. It being a case concerning the rights of the
plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the
"special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special
Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more
particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the
Department.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). It states that
the program — shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural
land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987,
including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture.
Section 17 thereof.
1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-
judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters," and
2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as "powers to punish
for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum
and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases,
disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every
case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of
the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of
14

procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer
oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel
the production of books and documents and answers to
interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly
deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish
direct and indirect contempts in the same manner and subject
to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been
completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform
matters.
Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special
jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional
Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one
(1) branch within each province — to act as such. These
Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have,
according to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.
In these cases, the Rules of Court shall apply, unless modified
by the Act
It is relevant to mention in this connection that:
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts may
be taken by filing a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the
decision, and
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the
DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the
application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation
of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be
brought to the Court of Appeals by Certiorari except as
otherwise provided . . . within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final
and conclusive if based on substantial evidence."
ALANGILAN REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 180471 March 26, 2010
FACTS:
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
Alangilan Realty is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare
land in Barangays Alangilan and Patay in Batangas City
(Alangilan landholding).
On August 7, 1996, Alangilan Realty filed an Application and/or
Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Coverage of the Alangilan
landholding with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO). It averred that the subject landholding is classified as
reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance and that, on
May 17, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City
approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive
Zoning and Land Use Ordinance (1994 Ordinance),
reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. Thus, it is
exempted from the coverage of CARP.
However, then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an Order
denying Alangilan Realty’s application for exemption and
noted that the Alangilan landholding remained agricultural,
reserved for residential. It was classified as residential-1 only
on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution No. 709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject
landholding was still agricultural at the time of the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL), on June 15, 1988. The qualifying phrase
reserved for residential means that the property is still
classified as agricultural, and is covered by the CARP.
Alangilan Realty then assailed the authority of the DAR
Secretary to determine the classification of lands and asserted
that the power to classify lands is essentially a legislative
function that exclusively lies with the legislative authorities,
and thus, when the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City
declared the Alangilan landholding as residential in its 1994
Ordinance, its determination was conclusive and cannot be
overruled by the DAR Secretary.
ISSUE:
W/N the jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for
coverage under the CARP lies with the legislative authorities.
HELD:
NO, the exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify
landholdings for coverage under the CARP is reposed in the
DAR Secretary.
The matter of CARP coverage, like the instant case for
application for exemption, is strictly part of the administrative
implementation of the CARP, a matter well within the
15

competence of the DAR Secretary. As we explained
in Leonardo Tarona, et al. v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division),
et al.:
The power to determine whether a property is subject
to CARP coverage lies with the DAR Secretary pursuant
to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Verily, it is explicitly
provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Revised
Rules that matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws
and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of
and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
CONCHIA VS RUBIO
G.R. No. 162446 March 29, 2010
FACTS:
The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory
Acquisition Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government. The controversy involves
the determination of who between petitioners are qualified to
become beneficiaries over a portion of land , registered in the
name of Lilia E. Gala, Luisita E. Gala and Teresita E. Gala,
respectively, with an aggregate area of 33.5006 hectares, more
or less.
On March 24, 1995, respondents filed a complaint for
declaration of their tenancy and their identification as
beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners to
become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. They
alleged that they are the tenants thereof and have not
relinquished their rights over the same, as they returned the
monetary awards given by the landowners
Meanwhile, the registered owners of the subject land entered
into a joint project with 1st A.M. Realty Development
Corporation, represented by Atty. Alejandro Macasaet for its
development.
On April 26, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
approved the landowners application for conversion, subject
to the following conditions:
1. The farmer-beneficiary, if any, shall be paid
disturbance compensation pursuant to R.A. 3844 as amended
by R.A. 6389;
2. The remaining 18.5006 hectares shall be covered by
CARP under compulsory acquisition and the same be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
In relation to paragraph 2 thereof, the MARO pursued the
coverage of the remaining 18.5006 has. The petitioners herein
were identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries where three
(3) Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) were issued
in their favor.
Respondents, on the other hand, were paid of their
disturbance compensation. They now, however, question the
validity and legality of the institution of the petitioners as
beneficiaries over the subject landholding.
Sometime on January 1996, respondents together with the
landowners filed another case for annulment of CLOAs and
prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order as
DARAB case.
On August 9, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator
(PARAD) rendered a Decision[4] dismissing the case
The PARAD ruled that respondents had waived their rights as
tenants and as farmer-beneficiaries of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) program, as evidenced by
their Salaysay (for respondent Paulino Rubio) and
their Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay (for the rest of the
respondents).[6] In addition, the PARAD ruled that it had no
authority to rule on the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, as
the same was a purely administrative matter under the
jurisdiction of the DAR.Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal of
the PARAD Decision.
On November 17, 2000, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) rendered a Decision setting aside
the PARAD Decision.
The DARAB ruled that in order for a voluntary surrender by an
agricultural tenant of his landholding to be valid, the same
must be done due to circumstances more advantageous to him
and his family − a consideration, which, the DARAB found, was
bereft of any evidence as shown by the records of the case.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the DARAB Decision. On September 6, 2002, the DARAB issued
a Resolution denying their motion.
Petitioners then appealed to the CA.
On September 9, 2003, the CA issued a Decision ruling in favor
of petitioners however reverse its decision upon the Motion
for reconsideration filed by the respondents, it ruled in favor
of the respondents.
Petitioners argue that the DARAB is not clothed with the
power or authority to resolve the issue involving the
identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries
16

since the same is an Agrarian Law Implementation case, thus,
an administrative function falling within the jurisdiction of
the DAR Secretary.
ISSUE:
WON DARAB has the jurisdiction to choose CARP beneficiaries.
RULING:
No, In Lercana v. Jalandoni, this Court was categorical in ruling
that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Suffice it to say that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the
identification of beneficiaries is a matter involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter which
is exclusively vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
through its authorized offices. Section 15 reads:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in
coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural
lessees, tenants and farm workers who are qualified to be
beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with
the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the
following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm
household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work
on and the length of tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) (e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental
paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries
in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or
other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open
to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.
Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 10 (Rules and
Procedures Governing the Registration of Beneficiaries),
Series of 1989, provides:
SUBJECT: I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as
organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all
agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers
who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This
Administrative Order provides the
Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said
registration.
B. Specific
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-
beneficiaries of the CARP.
Even a perusal of the DARAB Revised Rules shows that matters
strictly involving the administrative implementation of the
CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, are the
exclusive prerogative of, and cognizable by, the Secretary of
the DAR. Rule II of the said Rules read:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act
No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic
Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be
limited to the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons
engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
other agrarian laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination
and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of
lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization
payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the
Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or
decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease
contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments under the
administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;
17

d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or
representation in compact farms, farmers cooperatives and
other registered farmers associations or organizations, related
to land covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure,
pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the
coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and
Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction
thereof;
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or
concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian
laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
The administrative function of the DAR is manifest in
Administrative Order No. 06-00, which provides for the Rules
of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. Under
said Rules of Procedure, the DAR Secretary has exclusive
jurisdiction over identification, qualification or disqualification
of potential farmer-beneficiaries.
Section 2 of the said Rules specifically provides, inter alia, that:
SECTION 2. Cases Covered. - These Rules shall govern cases
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary
which shall include the following:
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential
farmer-beneficiaries
Thus, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers (MARO) decision
not to include respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be
accorded respect in the absence of abuse of discretion. It bears
stressing that it is the MARO or the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) who, together with the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee, screens and selects the possible agrarian
beneficiaries. If there are farmers who claim they have priority
over those who have been identified by the MARO as
beneficiaries of the land, said farmers can file a protest with
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
the MARO or the PARO who is currently processing the Land
Distribution Folder. Afterwards, the proper recourse of any
individual who seeks to contest the selection of beneficiaries is
to avail himself of the administrative remedies under the DAR
and not under the DARAB, which is bereft of jurisdiction over
this matter.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC. V. CA
G. R. No. 103953, March 25, 1999
FACTS:
Macario Aro was the former owner of two (2) parcels of
agricultural land. The members of petitioner Samahang
Magbubukid Ng Kapdula, Inc. were the tenants on the two (2)
parcels of land. Mr. Aro sold the said parcels of land to Arrow
Head Golf Club, Inc., for the establishment of a car assembly
plant within the area which was never materialized. The
parcels of land in question were later leased and were then
developed into a sugarcane plantation, with the herein private
respondents as the regular farmworkers.
The members of petitioner sought the assistance of DAR for
their reinstatement as farmworkers thereon, but nothing
came out of such efforts. The ownership of subject parcels of
land was later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust
("APT") which conveyed the same to the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the DAR. In furtherance of its
objective of instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR
issued Certificate of Land Ownership ("CLOA") Nos. 1116 5 and
11176 for the said parcels of the land in favor of the petitioner.
The private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA assailing the issuance of said CLOAs to the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a need for the private respondents to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing their petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
No.
18

The determination by secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform as the rightful beneficiaries has the effect of a final
ruling or award by the DAR itself and therefore, resort to
DARAB to question the ruling of the Secretary would be
improper. There is thus no need to exhaust administrative
remedies, under the premises.
From the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, it can be gleaned
that decisions of the DAR Secretary cannot be questioned
before DARAB. Pertinent rules, provide:
Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.
The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have
primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended
by Republic Act. No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but
not be limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Cases involving the annulment or
cancellation of orders or decisions or DAR officials other
than the secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or
their amendments under the administration and
disposition of the DAR and LBP," (Rule II DARAB Revised
Rules of Procedure)
From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that DARAB may only
entertain appeals from decisions or orders of DAR officials
other than the Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance
of subject CLOAs constituted a decision of the Secretary, who
issued and signed the same.
Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private
respondents to the respondent court on petition for certiorari,
to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is
beyond cavil. Under Section 54 of RA 6657, decisions and
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
awards of the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari.
LANDBANK VS. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. 180384
FACTS:
Land Bank (LBP) filed cases for determination of just
compensation against Corazon Villegas, and heirs of Catalino
Noel and Procula Sy before the RTC of Dumaguete City Br.32,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) for the province of
Negros Oriental. Villegas’ property was in Guihulngan City,
while the heirs’ land was in Bayawan City, both in Negros
Oriental, but which were outside the regular territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Br. 32 of Dumaguete City.
RTC Br. 32 dismissed both cases for lack of jurisdiction, ruling
that, although it was designated as the Special Agrarian Court
(SAC) for Negros Oriental, such designation did not expand its
territorial jurisdiction to hear agrarian cases, which are within
the territorial jurisdiction of Guihulngan City and Bayawan
City.
LBP moved for reconsideration of the 2 cases but Br. 32
dismissed the motions. LBP directly filed petitions for certiorari
before the SC, raising purely a question of law.
ISSUE
W/N an RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court, has jurisdiction
over just compensation cases involving agricultural lands
located outside its regular jurisdiction but within the province
where it is designated as an agrarian court under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998
RULING
Jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear and determine a
case. Such jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of
an action is conferred by law.
In the case at bar, Secs. 56 and 57 of the CARL of 1998 provide
that a branch of an RTC designated as SAC for a province has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation and prosecution of all
criminal offenses under CARL in that province (Republic v. CA)
19

By “special” jurisdiction, SACs exercise power in addition to or
over and above the ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC, such as
taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands located
outside their regular territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are
within the province where they sit as SACs.
CARL requires the designation of the SC before an RTC branch
can function as a SAC. Br. 64 of Guihulngan City and Br. 63 of
Bayawan City have not been designated as SAC by the SC.
Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation just
because the lands subject of such cases happen to be within
their territorial jurisdiction. Since RTC Br. 32 of Dumaguete City
is the designated SAC for Negros Oriental, it has jurisdiction
over all cases of determination of just compensation involving
agricultural lands within that province, regardless of WoN
those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.
SC GRANTS the petitions and SETS ASIDE the orders of RTC Br.
32 of Dumaguete City. The Court DIRECTS said RTC to
immediately hear and decide the 2 cases unless a compromise
agreement has been approved.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ARLENE DE LEON
(G.R. No. 143275, September 10 2002)
FACTS:
Spouses Arlene and Bernardo De Leon filed a petition to fix the
just compensation of a parcel of land before the RTC, acting as
a Special Agrarian Court. The agrarian court rendered
summary judgment fixing the compensation of the subject
property as P 1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of rice land and
P 2,957,250 for the 30.1460 hectares of sugar land.
The DAR and LBP both filed separate appeals using different
modes. The DAR filed a petition for review while the LBP
interposed an ordinary appeal filing a notice of appeal. DAR’s
petition was assigned to the Special Third Division of the CA
while LBP’s ordinary appeal was assigned to the fourth division
of the same court.
The CA’s special Third Division rendered a decision in the
petition for review filed by the DAR, giving it due course. The
trial court is ordered to recomputed the compensation based
on the selling price of palay at 213 per cavan.
The CA’s fourth division dismissed LBP’s ordinary appeal
primarily holding that LBP availed of the wrong mode of
appeal. lBP filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that
Section 61 of RA 6657 should be followed, not Section 60. The
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
reference by Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an
ordinary appeal requiring a notice of appeal is the proper
manner of appealing decisions of Special Agrarian Courts on
just compensation because Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.
The CA denied such motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of the appeal is correct.
RULING:
YES. The SC held that the CA’s decision to dismiss LBP’s
ordinary appeal is tenable.
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper
procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases
involving the determination of just compensation to the
landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and
categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be
adopted. There is no room for a contrary
interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is
no room for construction, but only application.
There is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657
inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all prescribe the
procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal
for decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact
makes no more than a general reference to the Rules of Court
and does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals
in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to the Court
of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in eminent
domain cases.
Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section
60. The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific
rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other
relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of
Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts. Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not
provide the details on how the petition for review shall be
conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61
uses the word review to designate the mode by which the
appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61
to the Rules of Court only means that the procedure under
20

Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in
agrarian cases.
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review
when appealing cases decided by the Special Agrarian Courts
in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in
the determination of just compensation. Just compensation
means not only paying the correct amount but also paying for
the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for
the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. Such objective is more in
keeping with the nature of a petition for review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with
the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of records as
requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for
review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived
landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not
foreseeable in an ordinary appeal.
CHARLES BUMAGAT vs. REGALADO ARRIBAY
G.R. No. 194818, JUNE 9, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners are the registered owners of the lots in question
located in Bubog, Sto. Tomas, Isabela Province.
On July 19, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint for forcible
entry against respondent, alleging that on May 9, 2005,
respondent – with the aid of armed goons, and through the
use of intimidation and threats of physical harm – entered the
above-described parcels of land and ousted them from their
lawful possession; that respondent then took over the physical
possession and cultivation of these parcels of land; and that
petitioners incurred losses and injuries by way of lost harvests
and other damages. Petitioners thus prayed for injunctive
relief, actual damages in the amount of not less than
₱40,000.00 for each cropping season lost,
₱30,000.00attorney’s fees, and costs.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the subject
properties are agricultural lands – which thus renders the
DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)
dispute an agrarian matter and subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB.
However, in a January 30, 2006 Order, the MCTC denied the
motion, finding that the pleadings failed to show the existence
of a tenancy or agrarian relationship between the parties that
would bring their dispute within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was similarly
rebuffed.
The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioners, holding that petitioners
were in actual possession of the subject parcels of land, since
respondent himself admitted that he brought an action against
petitioners before the MARO to collect rentals which have
remained unpaid since 1995 – thus implying that petitioners,
and not respondent, were in actual possession of the land, and
belying respondent’s claim that he took possession of the
property in 1993 when petitioners supposedly abandoned the
same. This was affirmed by the RTC.
The CA reversed the lower court’s ruling and agreed that since
petitioners acquired title by virtue of PD 27, this should by
itself qualify the controversy as an agrarian dispute covered by
the DARAB; that there is no need to allege in the pleadings that
he and the heirs of Romulo Sr. acquired title to the property,
in order for the dispute to qualify as an agrarian dispute; and
that respondent has been in possession of the property since
2003.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.
RULING:
Yes. In declaring that the parties’ dispute fell under the
jurisdiction of the DARAB, the CA held that respondents’ titles
were obtained pursuant to PD 27, and pursuant to the 1994
DARAB rules of procedure then applicable, cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which
are registered with the Land Registration Authority fall under
DARAB jurisdiction. It added that since the Complaint prayed
for the annulment of the coverage of the disputed property
under the land reform law, which thus relates to terms and
21
 AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS (2ND BATCH)

conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian

reform beneficiaries, the DARAB exercises jurisdiction.

What the appellate court failed to realize, however, is the fact

that as between petitioners and the respondent, there is no
tenurial arrangement, not even an implied one. As correctly
argued by petitioners, a case involving agricultural land does
not immediately qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The mere fact
that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the
possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. There are conditions
or requisites before he can qualify as an agricultural lessee or
tenant, and the subject being agricultural land constitutes just
one condition. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the
case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties.
"[I]n order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a
dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable
elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee." In the
present case, it is quite evident that not all of these conditions
are present. For one, there is no tenant, as both parties claim
ownership over the property.

Besides, when petitioners obtained their emancipation

patents and subsequently their certificates of title, they
acquired vested rights of absolute ownership over their
respective landholdings. "It presupposes that the grantee or
beneficiary has, following the issuance of a certificate of land
transfer, already complied with all the preconditions required
under P.D. No. 27, and that the landowner has been fully
compensated for his property. And upon the issuance of title,
the grantee becomes the owner of the landholding and he
thereby ceases to be a mere tenant or lessee. His right of
ownership, once vested, becomes fixed and established and is
no longer open to doubt or controversy." Petitioners "became
the owner[s] of the subject property upon the issuance of the
emancipation patents and, as such, enjoy the right to possess
the same—a right that is an attribute of absolute ownership

DIGESTED BY ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, PARAO, RIVERA, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN 22