G.R. No.
184681 February 25, 2013 On the same day, November 16, 2007, Ikram executed the first of his several affidavits
GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM AKBAR,
and NOR-RHAMA J. INDANAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The instant petitiOn assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated August 6, 2008 and October
16, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, which
affirmed the inclusion of petitioner Gerry A. Salapuddin (Salapuddin) in the amended
information for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder filed in Criminal Case No. Q-
07-149982 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), -Branch 83 in Quezon City.
The present controversy started on November 13, 2007 when, shortly after the adjournment
of the day's session in Congress, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing
lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex, Quezon City. The
blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar (Congressman Akbar), 3 Marcial
Taldo,4 Jul-Asiri Hayudini5 Maan Gale Bustaliño6 and Dennis Manila,7 and the inflicting of
serious injuries on Representatives Henry Teves8 and Luzviminda Ilagan,9 Ismael Lim,
Vercita Garcia,10 Kumhar Indanan,11 Larry Noda12 and Paula Dunga.
The post-blast investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by an improvised bomb
planted on a motorcycle that was parked near the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby.13
Acting on a confidential information that the person who parked the motorcycle near the
South Wing lobby of the HOR was staying with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and learning that one ASG member, Abu Jandal alias "Bong," has standing warrants of arrest
for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, 14 police officers raided an alleged ASG
safehouse located at Blk. 4, Lot 23, Anahaw St., Parkwood Hills, Payatas, Quezon City
(Parkwood) on November 15, 2007. During the course of the operation, a firefight ensued
killing three persons: Bong, Redwan Indama (Redwan) and Saing Indama.15 Meanwhile,
Caidar Aunal (Aunal), Ikram Indama (Ikram) and Adham Kusain (Kusain) 16 were arrested
and then brought to Camp Crame in Quezon City. Several items were likewise seized from
the premises, including two (2) Cal. 45 pistols, one motor vehicle plate number "8," an I.D.
of HOR issued to Ikram, and a black wallet with a GSIS ID card issued to Aunal with calling
cards of Salapuddin.17 One of the Cal. 45 pistols found was traced back to Julham S. Kunam,
Political Affairs Assistant of Salapuddin.18
On November 16, 2007, a day after the raid, Kusain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay. In it,
he stated that he is from Tipo-Tipo, Basilan and came to Manila in March 2005, staying when
he first arrived in Manila in the house of Salapuddin, his father’s friend. Salapuddin paid for
one year of his college education and helped him be employed as a building attendant at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. He explained that he was in the house at Parkwood Hills
because Redwan asked him to get the payment for his black XRM Honda motorcycle that
Redwan took from his house on November 2, 2007. He claimed that Redwan did not disclose
the purpose for which the motorcycle will be used and it was only after the raid that he learned
that his motorcycle was the very same motorcycle used during the bombing at
the Batasan Complex.19
(Ikram’s first affidavit). He stated that he is a driver working for Salapuddin since July 2002
and was staying in a house at 48-A Greenbucks, Filinvest St., Batasan Hills, Quezon City
(Greenbucks), owned by Salapuddin, from June 2004 until he went home to Isabela City,
Basilan in June 2007.20 He maintained that he returned to Manila on October 16, 2007. He
stressed that before returning to Manila, or on October 9, 2007, his cousin Redwan talked to
him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar of Basilan by means of a bomb to be planted
on a motorcycle. He was not, however, informed of the reason for the mission or the
identity of the person who gave the order. He stated that upon arrival in Manila, he stayed
at Greenbucks where the bombing was planned. He stated that those who took part in the
planning of the bombing included: Redwan and his wife Saing; Jang, who was a cousin and
member of the staff of Congressman Mujiv Hataman; Bong, who made the bomb; Aunal; and
Kusain. On October 20, 2007, he and Aunal went home to Basilan and returned to Manila
only on November 5, 2007. He also admitted bringing the motorcycle with the bomb to the
HOR.21 He narrated that at 3:30 p.m. of November 13, 2007, he went to
the Batasan premises on board a black Honda XRM with the bomb and parked it near the
entrance of the South Wing lobby, at a spot reserved by Jang.22 Later that day, he heard the
bomb explode and received a text message from Jang confirming that it was the bomb he
brought that exploded. He explained that it was Jang who set off the bomb by calling the
cellphone attached to the bomb inside the motorcycle.23
Jilbert C. Ortega, Chief of the Complaint and Investigation Unit of the HOR, likewise executed
an affidavit on the same day, November 16, 2007, stating that in the morning of November
13, 2007, he noticed two men near the South Wing lobby of the HOR roaming around and
seemingly surveying the premises. He identified Ikram as one of the two. 24
On the basis of the sworn statements, a request for the conduct of inquest proceedings
relative to the participation or involvement of Aunal, Ikram, Kusain, and Jang was made. 25
On November 17, 2007, Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily gave a sworn
statement denying any knowledge of the Batasan bombing, asserting that his name was
being used by the media only because of his relationship with the persons arrested in
connection with the incident: Ikram was his former driver;26 Aunal, his former brother-in-law,
being a brother of his ex-wife whom he divorced under Muslim laws; and Kusain who once
sought his assistance for employment. He clarified that he knew Redwan and Saing Indama
only because they were members of the Moro National Liberation Front but denied knowing
Bong. He stated that the individuals thus mentioned rarely visited him, and before the
incident, he spoke only to Ikram, who was then working in his water refilling station in Basilan,
when the latter asked permission to leave for Manila to look for better employment. 27 He
explained that his house at Greenbucks is usually used by his constituents, including Kusain
and Ikram, as a temporary residence or shelter whenever they are in Manila.28
As the police investigation prospered, Ikram executed several supplemental affidavits
augmenting the statement he previously gave to the authorities. At 8:00 in the morning of
November 18, 2007, Ikram narrated in his first supplemental affidavit 29 (Ikram’s second
affidavit) that he, together with Aunal, Redwan, and Bong, planned the Batasan bombing on
the night of October 17, 2007 at Greenbucks. On October 19, 2008, they all proceeded to
Raon, Quiapo to shop for materials to make the bomb.30 He added that on October 25, 2007,
he and Aunal went home to Basilan and returned to Greenbucks in Manila only on November
5, 2007. Bong made the bomb and placed it inside the toolbox of a Honda motorcycle in
Greenbucks.31 The following day, they all transferred to Parkwood bringing the motorcycle
with them.32 It was in Parkwood where they completed the plan to kill Congressman Akbar. 33
At 6:00 in the evening of the same day, November 18, 2007, Ikram executed another
supplemental affidavit (Ikram’s third affidavit).34 There he stated that on October 13, 2007,
when they were about to leave for Manila, he, Bong, Redwan and Aunal passed by Gersal
Hardware owned by Salapuddin in Zamboanga City35 upon the prodding of one Bayan
Judda, who handed them a bag. Redwan later informed him that the bag contained
ingredients for explosives. They brought the bag with them to Greenbucks in Manila. 36 On
October 17, 2007, he, along with Bong, Redwan and Aunal, went to Quiapo to buy the wires
needed to make a bomb.37 Thereafter, Bong made two bombs to be used in killing
Congressman Akbar: one intended for the HOR premises and another for either his Valle
Verde house or his condo unit in Ortigas. On October 22, 2007, Hajarun Jamiri (Jamiri), the
ex-mayor of Tuburan, Basilan arrived at Greenbucks on board a black Suzuki motorcycle
where the bomb intended for the Valle Verde house or the Ortigas condo will be placed. After
Bong placed the bomb in his motorcycle, Jamiri left on board the same motorcycle. 38 On
November 10, 2007, Ikram went to Jamiri’s apartment in Malate, Manila to get money. During
the said occasion, he saw the Suzuki motorcycle with the bomb parked inside Jamiri’s
apartment.39
Notably, Ikram, in his first three affidavits, never mentioned Salapuddin’s involvement,
let alone implicate him, in the plan to kill Congressman Akbar. Ikram’s narration of
events altogether changed in his third supplemental affidavit dated November 20,
2007 (Ikram’s fourth affidavit).40 There, Ikram alleged that, after receiving his last salary from
the HOR, he worked for Salapuddin’s water refilling station in Isabela City as a delivery boy.
In September 2007, before the Ramadan, Salapuddin asked him to fetch Redwan. 41 Ikram
complied and brought Redwan to Salapuddin’s house on the same day. 42 He claimed that
he was beside Redwan when Salapuddin ordered: "Pateyun si Cong. Wahab Akbar."43 Ikram
saw Redwan again on October 9, 2007 when the latter told him about the mission in Manila
to kill Congressman Akbar.44 Ikram further narrated in his fourth affidavit that on October 13,
2007, he, Bong, Redwan and Aunal left Isabela City for Manila. In Manila, they stayed at
Greenbucks owned by Salapuddin. Ikram also alleged in his affidavit that in the third week
of October 2007, he and Redwan met with Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman (Jim Hataman) in a
Figaro Coffee House in Ever Gotesco, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City (Figaro Café).
During the said occasion, Ikram heard Jim Hataman tell Redwan of the plan to kill
Congressman Akbar using a bomb. A week later, Redwan brought Ikram to the house of
Congressman Mujiv Hataman (Congressman Hataman) in Filinvest II, Batasan Hills where
Ikram heard Congressman Hataman order Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar. Ikram
explained that Redwan was a cousin of the Hatamans.45
Ikram would later amend the dates mentioned in his earlier affidavits by executing an affidavit
dated January 10, 200846 (Ikram’s fifth affidavit), where he made it appear that after bringing
Redwan to Salapuddin’s house in Basilan, he and Redwan again saw each other on the night
of September 5, 2007, not October 9, 2007.47 He declared, however, that Redwan talked to
him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar only on September 8, 2007, 48 which was
also the date that they started for Manila49 and dropped by Salapuddin’s Gersal Hardware,
not October 13, 2007.50 He added that they returned to Manila on September 11, 2007, not
on October 16, 2007.51 He declared that Bong made the bomb at Greenbucks on
September 13, 2007, not October 18, 2007.52Inconsistently, however, he stated in the
same affidavit that he, together with Aunal, Redwan and Bong, planned the Batasan
bombing only on the night of September 17, 2007 at Greenbucks, 53 then shopped in
Raon for materials to make the bomb only on September 19, 2007.54 On September 17,
2007, not October 22, 2007, Jamiri supposedly went to Greenbucks to have his motorcycle
fitted with a bomb.55 Ikram also stated that he last saw Congressman Hataman in September
2007, not October 2007.56 He further declared that he and Aunal returned to Basilan on
October 14, 2007, not October 20, 2007.57
Incongruously, however, Joel Maturan, the mayor of Ungkaya Pukan, Basilan, stated in his
affidavit that he saw Ikram driving Salapuddin’s minitruck in Lamitan, Basilan on September
20, 2007 and delivering water from Salapuddin’s water refilling station. 58
On November 19, 2007, Jamiri was apprehended for illegal possession of firearm. The
following day, or on November 20, 2007, he executed an affidavit where he narrated that
during Ramadan, in the month of October,59he brought a Suzuki motorcycle to Greenbucks
on the instruction of Redwan. The latter requested Jamiri to leave the motorcycle behind so
that he could place a bomb inside it. Jamiri returned the following day and was given
instructions on how to remove the bomb from the motorcycle.60 In exchange for keeping the
bomb, Redwan gave Jamiri PhP 50,000 with the promise of an additional PhP 500,000
should the bomb be actually used to kill Congressman Akbar when he dines at Sulo Hotel. 61
However, the bomb was never used as Jamiri failed to bring the motorcycle to the hotel on
October 23, 2007.62 He admitted hiding the bomb in a house located at Leveriza Street,
Pasay City and expressed his willingness to surrender it to the police. 63 Pursuant to the
undertaking he made in his affidavit, Jamiri accompanied and guided police authorities in
retrieving an improvised explosive device at an apartelle located in Leveriza St., Malate,
Manila on the same day he executed his affidavit. 64
In a supplemental affidavit,65 Jamiri added that during the last week of October 2007,
Redwan called him from Figaro Café, in Ever Gotesco, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon
City and asked him to go to the same place. When he arrived at the café, Jamiri saw Redwan
with Congressman Hataman and his brother Jim Hataman. Congressman Hataman then
asked Jamiri to help Redwan in his "project" to kill Congressman Akbar.66 Jim Hataman
thereafter interposed that the death of Congressman Akbar will bring peace to Basilan. 67
On November 22, 2007, Aunal executed his own affidavit 68 where he stated that he left
Isabela City, Basilan for Manila on October 13, 2007 with Ikram, Redwan and Bong. 69 They
arrived in Manila on October 16, 2007 and proceeded to stay at Greenbucks.70 He recalled
watching Bong assemble the two improvised bombs. He stated that when he asked about
who their target was, Bong answered that it was Congressman Akbar. He explained that it
had something to do with the politics in Basilan. Aunal likewise declared that Bong told him
that the order to kill Congressman Akbar was made by Jim Hataman who vied for the
congressional seat won by Congressman Akbar.71Aunal himself heard Jim Hataman order
Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar one evening in October 2007 when they were in Figaro
Café.72 He and Ikram then went back to Basilan during the last week of October and came
back to Manila in the first week of November.73 On November 13, 2007, Ikram brought one
of the improvised bombs, hidden inside a motorcycle, to the Batasan premises where Jang
detonated it, killing Congressman Akbar.74
Based on the affidavits of Jamiri, Ikram, and Aunal, Police Superintendent Asher Dolina
indorsed a letter dated November 29, 2007 to then Chief State Prosecutor Zuño requesting
the inclusion of Salapuddin, Congressman Hataman, Jim Hataman and Police Officer 1
(PO1) Bayan Judda in the complaints for murder and multiple frustrated murder. 75 After
conducting preliminary investigation, the Chief State Prosecutor approved a Resolution
dated December 6, 2007 where he: (1) found probable cause to indict Aunal, Ikram, and
Kusain for multiple murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829; (2) recommended
the conduct of further investigation for their indictment for multiple frustrated murder; and (3)
recommended the conduct of preliminary investigation as to the other respondents who were
not under detention.76
In the meantime, upon the request of the relatives and counsel of the accused, Dr. Benito
Molino (Dr. Molino)77conducted in the presence of investigators from the Commission on
Human Rights a medical examination of the detained on December 1, 4, and 7, 2007. The
results: Kusain, Aunal and Jamiri were subjected to physical and mental torture. 78 In
particular, Dr. Molino found that "the injuries found on the skin and private parts of Mr. Jamiri
two weeks after his claimed ordeal that he received countless blows all over his body in spite
of being sick with diabetes, hit by a blunt object on his head and his shins and that electric
current was applied to his private parts while being interrogated as to his knowledge and
participation in the Batasan bombing x x x are consistent. In his case, the three elements of
torture are present."79 Similarly, he found that both Aunal and Kusain "underwent severe
physical injuries and subjected to deep emotional stress x x x intentionally inflicted by men
believed to be officers of the CIDG [Criminal Investigation and Detection Group] x x x to get
information from them."80
On December 10, 2007, Jamiri executed an affidavit withdrawing and disavowing the
statements he made in his previous affidavits.81 He alleged that he was not carrying any
weapon, much less an explosive, when arrested. He was merely walking when six men
suddenly arrested him, forced him to a van, and blindfolded him. 82 He was thereafter tortured
and forced to sign an affidavit on November 20, 2007, not knowing its contents. 83 On the
same day, he was forcibly brought to an apartment in Leveriza Street, Manila where the
police found a bomb. He was thereafter forced to admit that it was he who placed the bomb
in the apartment.84 He was again prevailed upon by Mayor Tahira Ismael of Sumisip, Basilan
to sign another affidavit when the latter told him that the Hatamans and Salapuddin were out
to kill his wife and children.85 He claimed that the contents of the affidavits he was forced to
sign were all fabricated by the police.86
On December 12, 2007, Kusain and Aunal executed their respective affidavits of
recantation.87 Both stated that they were coerced to sign their confessions after they were
subjected to physical and psychological torture. They were also assisted by counsels not of
their choice but endorsed by the Philippine National Police-CIDG.88
On January 3, 2008, Salapuddin submitted his counter-affidavit where he reiterated the
statements he made in his November 17, 2007 affidavit and assailed Ikram’s attempt to
implicate him as Ikram’s desperate act of selfredemption after owning up to the crime.89
Nevertheless, on February 22, 2008, Prosecutor Zuño approved the Department of Justice
(DOJ) Investigating Panel’s Supplemental Resolution. The Resolution recommended the
amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, pending before Quezon
City RTC, Branch 83, to include respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan
Judda, Jang Hataman and Salapuddin.90 Referring to Salapuddin in particular, the DOJ
Investigating Panel stated the observation that: "Salapuddin’s participation in the [crime]
cannot be downplayed just because he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather,
despite this, it has his hands written all over it. The circumstances, the people and place
used are all, [in] one way or another, associated with him. It cannot be mere
coincidence."91 On the other hand, the resolution dismissed the charge as against Julham
Kunam, Congressman Hataman, and Jim Hataman. So the DOJ Investigating Panel found,
"their participation as conspirators in the grand scheme is unstable x x x apart from the
statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman, no
other evidence was presented to sufficiently establish their involvement in the crime." 92
On March 7, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review of the Supplemental Resolution
with the Office of the Secretary of Justice.93 The Investigating Panel, Salapuddin rued,
refused to give probative weight to the incriminating statements of Ikram with respect to the
Hataman brothers, but relied on the very same statements in finding probable cause to indict
him. Moreover, he maintained that there is no evidence independent of Ikram’s statements
that will support the finding of probable cause to indict him for murder and multiple frustrated
murder.
On April 23, 2008, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from
the Information for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder, thus modifying the
Supplemental Resolution of the Investigating Panel.94 The Secretary of Justice predicated
his modificatory action on the interplay of the following premises: the only material evidence
against Salapuddin is the statements of Ikram.95 However, Ikram’s statements are laden with
irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions that they cannot be considered worthy of
belief.96 What is more, the Secretary added, "there is nothing on record that will indicate that
x x x Salapuddin performed the overt acts of the offense charged." 97 The Secretary of Justice
observed that the statements of the other accused cannot be given weight as they were
obtained through force and intimidation contrary to the Constitution and were in fact later
recanted.
In a Petition for Certiorari dated May 13, 2008, herein respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-
Rhama Indanan questioned the Secretary of Justice’s Resolution98 before the CA, the
recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103461. They argued in the main that matters relating
to the admissibility of evidence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the courts
during trial, and not at the stage of determining probable cause. There is, so respondents
claimed, overwhelming evidence to link Salapuddin in the conspiracy to kill Congressman
Akbar.
The appellate court, by its Decision dated August 6, 2008, set aside the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. As held, the totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability
that Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime,"99 the CA adding in this regard that "the absence (or presence) of
any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature after a full-blown trial on the
merits."100And to the CA, the recantation made by Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain and their claim
of torture were of little probative value inasmuch as these were "unsupported by competent
proof."101
Salapuddin moved for, but was denied, reconsideration per the CA’s Resolution dated
October 16, 2008.102
In the meantime, Ikram filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbabawi, Pagwalang Bisa ng
Naunang Mga Salaysay at Pagpapatotoo dated October 6, 2008103 with the Quezon City
RTC-Branch 83 claiming that he was forced to sign the affidavits he previously executed and
was merely forced to implicate Salapuddin and the Hataman brothers in the alleged
conspiracy by respondent Gov. Jum Akbar and several mayors from Basilan because of their
political rivalry in the province.104 On November 11, 2008, Ikram submitted another affidavit
of recantation supplying details of his ordeal while under custodial investigation and alleging
that he was physically and mentally tortured so that he was forced to write and sign
statements regarding the Batasan bombing that were in fact supplied by the police officers
themselves.105
On November 24, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review before this Court, ascribing
on the appellate court the commission of grave error in admitting the extrajudicial admissions
of Jamiri, Kusain, and Aunal obtained as they were through torture and physical abuse,
without the effective assistance of a competent independent counsel of their choice, and
were in fact recanted. The appellate court also grievously erred, so Salapuddin argued, in
according full probative value to Ikram’s extrajudicial confession implicating Salapuddin even
if it was riddled with serious contradictions and inconsistencies.
The Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition on September 29, 2010. Hence, on
December 1, 2010, Salapuddin filed a Motion for Reconsideration 106 specifically inviting
attention to the prosecution’s admission no less that there is no other direct evidence linking
him to the crime charged except Ikram’s testimony. 107 Since, as urged, Ikram has recanted
his testimony on account of the violations of his constitutionally protected rights, there is no
longer any reason or probable cause to maintain the criminal case filed against Salapuddin.
To the motion, respondents interposed an Opposition dated December 17, 2010 108 stating
that Salapuddin has not provided this Court any new and substantial matter that would show
the serious error attributed to the CA; that the allegations of torture and recantation have
already been denied by the investigating prosecutors and should not sway this Court to
reverse the Decision of the appellate court; 109 and that Salapuddin’s evasion from arrest is
evidence of his guilt.110
In a Resolution dated November 21, 2012, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner and reinstated the petition.
Upon a second hard look and thorough reexamination of the records, the Court finds merit
in the instant petition.
The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive
function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion.111 Otherwise, a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers will ensue.
The Executive Branch, through its prosecutors, is, thus, given ample latitude to determine
the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a person. In the landmark Crespo v.
Mogul,112 We ruled, thus:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution
of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may
not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution
under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecutions by private persons x x x. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in
them by the law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who,
according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the duty not to
prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. (Emphasis supplied.)
This broad authority of prosecutors, however, is circumscribed by the requirement of a
conscientious conduct of a preliminary investigation for offenses where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day.113This rule is intended to guarantee
the right of every person to be free from "the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress
of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of
his or her guilt has been passed upon"114 and to guard the State against the "burden of
unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising
from false, frivolous or groundless charges." 115
Hence, even at this stage, the investigating prosecutors are duty-bound to sift through all the
documents, objects, and testimonies to determine what may serve as a relevant and
competent evidentiary foundation of a possible case against the accused persons. They
cannot defer and entirely leave this verification of all the various matters to the courts.
Otherwise, the conduct of a preliminary investigation would be rendered worthless; the State
would still be forced to prosecute frivolous suits and innocent men would still be
unnecessarily dragged to defend themselves in courts against groundless charges. Indeed,
while prosecutors are not required to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, a
preliminary investigation still constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
case116 so that the investigating prosecutor is not excused from the duty to weigh the
evidence submitted and ensure that what will be filed in court is only such criminal charge
that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant. 117
The prosecutor’s call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the
review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over
prosecutors.118 This much is clear in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:119
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who,
under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision
over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the
Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of
supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the
Code:
‘(1) Supervision and Control.—Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x’
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act
4007, which read:
‘Section 3. x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State
Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may be
assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.’
xxx xxx xxx
‘Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a
specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office,
division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper
Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review,
modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.’
‘Supervision’ and ‘control’ of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in
administrative law as follows:
‘In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.’
Thus, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the investigating prosecutor(s), he
or she can direct the prosecutor(s) concerned "to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties."120 This action is not subject to the review
of courts unless there is a showing that the Secretary of Justice has committed a grave abuse
of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged
resolution.121
Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is grave
abuse of discretion.122The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" connotes "a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law." 123
In CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, the appellate court, in reversing the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, has evidently neglected this elementary principle. In fact, the CA has assumed,
but has not sufficiently explained, how the Secretary of Justice’s decision finding the absence
of probable cause to indict Salapuddin amounts to a grave abuse of discretion. Instead, the
CA glossed over the testimonies presented by the parties and adopted the reversed
conclusion of the Investigating Prosecutors that the totality of the evidence presented points
to the probability that Salapuddin has participated in a conspiracy that culminated in
the Batasan bombing.
Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it
demands more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence. 124 A
review of the records, however, show that the only direct material evidence against
Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made
by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not the evidence competent to
establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of the crime. On the
contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against
Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet125 expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. 126
It cannot be
admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against
them.127 Tamargo v. Awingan128 elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz:
On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing
the admission of a conspirator129 requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by
evidence other than the confession.130In this case, there is a dearth of proof
demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in
the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other persons
arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved in
the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating prosecutors did
no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s association with these persons to conclude that he was
a participant in the conspiracy, ruling thus:
Respondent Gerry Salapuddin’s participation in the forgoing, cannot be downplayed just
because he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has hands written
all over it. The circumstances, the people and place used are all, one way or another,
associated with him. It cannot be mere coincidence.131 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court, however, has previously stressed that mere association with the principals by
direct participation, without more, does not suffice. 132 Relationship, association and
companionship do not prove conspiracy.133 Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be
the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his
ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.134 In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove
conspiracy.135 There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the
existence of conspiracy,136 and not simple inferences, conjectures and
speculations137 speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence." 138
The investigating prosecutors themselves were aware of the need for other clear and positive
evidence of conspiracy besides the confession made by a supposed co-conspirator in
charging a person with a crime committed in conspiracy. In discharging the Hataman
brothers, the investigating prosecutors ratiocinated:
Apart from the statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman Hataman-
Salliman, no other evidence was presented to sufficiently establish their involvement in the
crime. Certainly, this is not sufficient basis for finding probable cause to indict them for a non-
bailable crime. To do so would open the floodgates to numerous possible indictments on the
basis alone of name by mere mention of anyone. To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual
cooperation, rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required x x x. 139
Notably, the Hataman brothers were named not just by Ikram 140 but also by Jamiri141 and
Aunal142 as the persons who ordered the murder of Congressman Akbar. It is with more
reason, therefore, that the foregoing rationale applies squarely to Salapuddin who was
mentioned only by Ikram, and not by the other persons arrested.
Indeed, the Secretary of Justice has decided in accordance with the dictates of our
jurisprudence in overturning the investigating prosecutors and ordering Salapuddin’s
exclusion from the Information. The Secretary cannot plausibly be found culpable of grave
abuse of his discretion. The appellate court has committed a reversible error in holding
otherwise. As a matter of fact, the CA has failed to capture the import of Our ruling in People
v. Listerio143 in supporting its general declaration that "the totality of evidence"144 indicates
Salapuddin’s participation in the conspiracy. The appellate court held:
The totality of evidence sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and
material support or assistance to the perpetrators or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime.
Jurisprudence teaches that ‘it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be
committed.’ However, this overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In holding thus, the CA failed to correctly appreciate that even in Listerio, the "assistance,"
which was considered by this Court as an "overt act" of conspiracy, was extended while "by
being present at the commission of the crime."145 There We stressed:
x x x The rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence,
as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of direct proof thereof, as in
the present case, it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a
direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be
committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present
at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose x x x. In this
case, the presence of accused-appellant, all of them armed with deadly weapons at
the locus criminis, indubitably shows their criminal design to kill the
victims.146 (Emphasis supplied.)
The confession of Ikram relied on by investigating prosecutors and the appellate court does
not provide the threshold consistent picture that would justify Salapuddin’s complicity in the
conspiracy that led to the Batasan bombing. Consider: Ikram made the allegation regarding
Salapuddin’s participation in the conspiracy in his fourth affidavit, after he categorically
denied knowing who the mastermind was. In his affidavit dated November 16, 2007, Ikram
gave the following answers to the questions thus indicated:
T: Bakit nyo daw papatayin si Wahab Akbar?
S: Hindi po sa amin pinaalam.
xxxx
T: Alam mo ba kung sino ang nagutos sa inyo para patayin si
Wahab Akbar?
S: Hindi po.149 (Emphasis supplied.)
He did not correct this statement in the two affidavits he executed on November 18, 2007.
When shown his affidavit of November 16, 2007, Ikram did not refute his categorical
statement denying any knowledge of the person who gave the command to kill Congressman
Akbar. Instead, in the morning of November 18, 2007, he simply admitted that the November
16, 2007 affidavit was his own sworn statement:
T: Mayron akong ipapakitang sinumpaang salaysay ni IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA na may
petsa ika-16 ng Nobyembre 2007. Maaari bang suriin mo at sabihin mo kung ito ang sinasabi
mong salaysay mo? (For purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the
Sinumapaang Salaysay of IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA dated April 16, 2007.
S: Opo sa akin pong sinumpaang salaysay na ito.150
He repeated this acknowledgment in the evening of November 18, 2007:
T: Mayron akong ipapakitang sinumpaang salaysay ni IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA na may
petsa ika-16 ng Nobyembre 2007. Maari bang suriin mo at sabihin mo kung ito ang sinasabi
mong salaysay mo? (For purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA dated April 16, 2007)

In this case, on the other hand, no evidence or testimony, not even Ikram’s, suggests the S: Opo sa akin pong sinumpaang salaysay na ito.151
presence of Salapuddin during the blast that killed Congressman Akbar and injured several
others. He cannot, therefore, be properly accused of exerting an "overt act" by extending
Again, Ikram made the same acknowledgment on November 20, 2007 when he did not say
"assistance" to whoever was responsible for the commission of the felony.
that he lied when he answered "Hindi po" to the question "Alam mo ba kung sino ang nagutos
sa inyo para patayin si Wahab Akbar?" In his November 20, 2007 affidavit, Ikram stated:
Furthermore, the very cases the appellate court cited provide that while conspiracy can be
proven by circumstantial evidence, the series of evidence presented to establish an
T: Ikaw rin ba si Ikram Indama y Lawama na nagbigay ng Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2
accused’s participation in the conspiracy must be consistent and should lead to no other
Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-16 ng Nobyemb[re] 2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang
conclusion but his participation in the crime as a conspirator. 147 After all, the conspiracy itself
Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan F Jornadal noong ika – 18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang
must be proved as positively as the commission of the felony itself, for it is a "facile device
Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007?
by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold."148
S: Opo.
T: Mayroon akong ipapakita sayong Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr
noong ika-16 ng Nobyembre 2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan
F Jornadal noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay
PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007 na iyong ibinigay. Maari mo
bang suriin kung ito ang sinasabing salaysay mo? (For purposes of identification, affiant was
allowed to examine the Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-
16 ng Nobyembre 2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan F Jornadal
noong ika – 18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo
Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007).
S: Opo, ako po ang nagbigay ng mga salaysay na yan.152
of innocence, and all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary
investigation. It is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the
commission of a felony, only those matters which are constitutionally acceptable, competent,
consistent and material are considered. No such evidence was presented to sufficiently
establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused
of. It, thus, behooves this Court to relieve petitioner from the unnecessary rigors, anxiety,
and expenses of trial, and to prevent the needless waste of the courts' time and the
government's resources.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated August 6, 2008 and
Resolution dated October 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated April
23, 2008 in I.S. No. 2007-992 is REINSTATED.

Ikram’s acknowledged denial of the person behind the plan to kill Congressman Akbar is to Accordingly, let the name of Gerry A. Salapuddin be stricken off and excluded from the
be sure inconsistent with the claim he made in the very same affidavit dated November 20, Information for the complex crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder filed in Criminal
2007 that he heard Salapuddin order Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar. 153 Reference to Case No. Q-07-149982, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 in Quezon City.
Salapuddin as the mastermind behind the grand plan to kill Congressman Akbar also varies
with Ikram’s claim that the Hataman brothers made the order on two separate SO ORDERED.
occasions,154which allegation was, as previously stated, corroborated by Jamiri 155 and
Aunal156 in their own affidavits.1âwphi1

Furthermore, if We consider Ikram’s last affidavit where he moved back by at least a month
the chronology of the alleged events that led to the Batasan bombing, the coherence of the
arrested persons’ narration crumbles. For instance, where Aunal stated that he, Redwan,
and Ikram left Basilan for Manila on October 13, 2007,157 Ikram maintained that they started
for Manila way back on September 8, 2007. 158 And while Ikram claims that he witnessed
Bong assemble the bomb on September 13, 2007, he himself maintains that the plan to kill
Congressman Akbar by means of a bomb was hatched only four days after, or on September
17, 2007, and they shopped for the materials on September 19, 2007 or six days after the
bombs were actually assembled.159 Further, to reinforce Ikram’s association with
Salapuddin, a witness for the prosecution, Joel Maturan, was presented to make it appear
that Ikram was driving Salapuddin’s mini-truck on September 20, 2007 in Basilan.160 Ikram
himself, however, claims that he went home to Basilan only on October 14, 2007. It is not
necessary to state the impossibility of Ikram being in two places at the same time. Ikram also
alleged that Jamiri went to Greenbucks on September 17, 2007,161 but Jamiri claims that he
went to Greenbucks during Ramadan in the month of October. 162 Inconsistently, Ikram
further claims that he saw the Hatamans at Figaro Café during the last week of September
2007, but Jamiri and Aunal both stated in their respective affidavits that the meeting with the
Hatamans took place in the latter part of October 2007.163

The discrepancies in Ikrams’ affidavits and the variations in the statements of the other
accused do not persuade this Court to find probable cause that Salapuddin, who was indicted
primarily because of Ikram’s confession, was part of the conspiracy that led to
the Batasan bombing. Instead, while We are not pre-empting the findings of the trial court
with regard to Ikram, Aunal, Jamiri and Kusain, the variations and the inconsistencies
contained in their affidavits lend credence to their allegations of torture and coercion,
especially as these allegations are supported by medical reports prepared by an independent
medical practitioner who was assisted by the personnel of the Human Rights Commission.

It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and full respect of the rights
of the accused are essential in the pursuit of justice even in criminal cases. The presumption
G.R. No. 187899 October 23, 2013
ROBERT DA JOSE and FRANCISCO OCAMPO y ANGELES, Petitioners, vs. CELERINA
R. ANGELES, EDWARD ANGELO R. ANGELES and CELINE ANGELI R.
ANGELES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated August 29, 2008
of the Court of Appeals CA) In CA- G.R. CV No. 83309, which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated April 12 2004 of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 9, of Malolos,
Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 46-M-2002.
The facts are uncontroverted.
On December 1, 2001, at about 9:00 p.m., a vehicular collision took place along the stretch
of the Dofia Remedios Trinidad Highway in Brgy. Taal, Pulilan, Bulacan involving a Mitsubishi
Lancer model 1997 with Plate No. ULA-679 registered under the name of, and at that time
driven by the late Eduardo Tuazon Angeles 4 Eduardo), husband of respondent Celerina
Rivera-Angeles5 (Celerina) and father of respondents Edward Angelo R. Angeles6 (Edward)
and Celine Angeli R. Angeles7 (Celine), and a Nissan Patrol Turbo Inter cooler model 2001
with Plate No. RDJ-444 registered under the name of petitioner Robert Da Jose 8 (Robert)
and at that time driven by petitioner Francisco Ocampo y Angeles9 (Francisco).Eduardowas
rushed by unidentified persons to the F.M. Cruz Orthopedic and General Hospital in Pulilan,
Bulacan. Despite treatment at said hospital, Eduardo died on the same day due to
Hemorrhagic Shock as a result of Blunt Traumatic Injury.10
A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property was filed on December 3, 2001 against Francisco before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 01-8154.11 In a Decision12 dated December
22, 2008, the MTC declared Francisco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
During the pendency of the criminal case, respondents’ counsel sent petitioners via
registered mail a demand-letter13 dated December 15, 2001 for the payment (within 5 days
from receipt of the letter) of the amount of₱5,000,000 representing damages and attorney’s
fees. Failing to reach any settlement, respondents subsequently filed a Complaint 14 for
Damages based on tort against Robert and Francisco before the RTC on January 16, 2002.A
pre-trial conference was held on May 6, 2002.15 Trial on the merits ensued.
Police Officer 3 Jaime R. Alfonso (PO3 Alfonso), an investigator of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Pulilan Station, Bulacan, testified that after receiving a telephone call on
December 1, 2001 regarding a vehicular accident, he immediately went to the place of the
incident. Upon reaching the area at 9:30 p.m., PO3 Alfonso took photographs 16 of the two
vehicles which were both heavily damaged. He also prepared a rough sketch 17 of the scene
of the accident which showed that the Mitsubishi Lancer was at the time travelling towards
the south, while the Nissan Patrol was bound for Isabela in the opposite direction; and that
the debris denoting the point of impact lay on the proper lane of the Mitsubishi Lancer.PO3
Alfonso also submitted a Police Report18 dated December 10, 2001 which indicated that the
Nissan Patrol encroached on the proper lane of the Mitsubishi Lancer which caused the
collision and ultimately the death of Eduardo.19 PO3 Alfonso opined that the Nissan Patrol
was travelling too fast which explains why it had to traverse 100 meters from the point of
impact to where it finally stopped.20
Celerina testified on the various damages and attorney’s fees prayed for in their complaint.
She and Eduardo begot two children: Edward who was born on August 20, 1985 and Celine
who was born on June 22, 1987.Celerina testified that she loved Eduardo so much that when
he died, it was as if she also died. She also testified that their two children, who were very
close to their father, were shocked by the tragedy that befell him. Celerina claimed, among
others, that prior to his death, Eduardo at age 51, was physically fit and even played golf 2
to 3times a week. A businessman during his lifetime, Celerina attested that Eduardo was
earning a yearly gross income of over ₱1,000,000.She also testified that at the time of his
death, Eduardo was the President of Jhamec Construction Corp., a family enterprise, from
which he derived an annual salary of more or less ₱300,000; Vice-President of Classic
Personnel, Inc. from which he received a regular annual allowance of₱250,000 to ₱300,000;
and part owner of Glennis Laundry Haus per Joint Affidavit 21 dated December 28, 1999
executed by Eduardo and his partner, one Glennis S. Gonzales. Celerina also claimed that
the expenses for the medical attendance extended to Eduardo by the F.M. Cruz Orthopedic
and General Hospital amounted to ₱4,830 per the corresponding Statement of
Account.22She pegged the expenses incurred during the 4-day wake and subsequent burial
of Eduardo at ₱150,000. In her assessment, Eduardo’s unrealized income due to his
untimely demise is about₱98,000 a month and that the extensively damaged Mitsubishi
Lancer was valued at more or less ₱700,000.Lastly, Celerina averred that for the services of
counsel, she paid ₱100,000 as acceptance fee and ₱3,000 per court hearing. 23
Celine, then15 years old, testified on the affection she and her late father had for each other
and the grief she suffered due to the latter’s untimely demise. Eduardo was a doting father
and a good provider.24 To prove that Eduardo was gainfully employed at the time, Celine
identified cash vouchers which indicated that Eduardo received representation and
transportation allowances in the amount of ₱20,000 per month from Glennis Laundry
Haus,25Classic Personnel, Inc.26 and Jhamec Construction Corp.27 Cash vouchers were also
presented showing that Eduardo received, among others, a fixed monthly salary in the
amount of ₱20,000 from Glennis Laundry Haus for the period of January to November of
2001.28
On the other hand, Francisco testified that he was employed as a driver by Robert. He
narrated that on the night of December 1, 2001, he was driving Robert’s Nissan Patrol on
their way home to Santiago City, Isabela after his companions purchased certain
merchandise at Divisoria, Manila. Francisco was with Robert’s wife who happens to be his
cousin, the latter’s daughter, the sibling of Robert’s wife, and one helper. He claimed that
while they were travelling along the Doña Remedios Trinidad Highway, he tried to overtake
a truck. However, he failed to see the Mitsubishi Lancer coming from the opposite direction
as its headlights were not on. After the collision, the airbags of the Nissan Patrol deployed.
Confronted with the Police Report, Francisco said that the same is correct except for the
statement therein that the Nissan Patrol encroached on the lane of the Mitsubishi Lancer and
the lacking information about the Mitsubishi Lancer’s headlights being off at the time of the
incident. He also insisted that the Nissan Patrol was already in its proper lane when the
collision occurred.29
For his part, Robert admitted that he is the registered owner of the Nissan Patrol which was
being driven by Francis coat the time of the collision. He testified that he engaged the
services of Francisco as family driver not only because the latter is his wife’s cousin but also
because Francisco was a very careful driver. In open court, Robert intimated his desire to
have the matter settled and manifested his intention to pay the respondents because he felt
that indeed they are entitled to a compensation as a result of the incident.30
By stipulation of the parties’ respective counsels, the corroborative testimonies of Robert’s
wife and the helper who were also aboard the Nissan Patrol at the time of the accident were
dispensed with.31
On April 12, 2004, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision holding that "it was recklessness
or lack of due care on the part of defendant Ocampo while operating the Nissan Patrol [that]
was the proximate cause of the vehicular collision which directly resulted in the death of
Eduardo T. Angeles very soon thereafter."32 Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence on record and the laws/jurisprudence applicable
thereto, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Robert Da Jose and Francisco
Ocampo y Angeles to solidarily pay plaintiffs Celerina Rivera-Angeles, Edward Angelo R.
Angeles and Celine Angeli R. Angeles the following amounts:
1) ₱50,000.00 for the fact of death of the late Eduardo T. Angeles;
2) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages;
3) ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) ₱4,830.00 for the hospitalization and ₱50,000.00 for the burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; and
5) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.33
Dissatisfied, both parties sought recourse from the CA.34On August 29, 2008, the CA in its
assailed Decision affirmed with modification the RTC’s findings and ruling. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of both parties are PARTLY
GRANTED.1avvphi1 The April 12, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of
Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 46-M-2002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to
the following amounts of damages, to wit:
1. The ₱500,000.00 award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000.00;
2. The award of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages is further reduced to
₱25,000.00; and
3. ₱2,316,000.00 is awarded for lost earnings of the deceased Eduardo T. Angeles.
SO ORDERED.35
The CA agreed with the RTC’s findings that Francisco was clearly negligent in driving the
Nissan Patrol and that such negligence caused the vehicular collision which resulted in the
death of Eduardo. Like the RTC, the CA also dismissed Francisco’s claim that the Mitsubishi
Lancer’s headlights were not on at the time of the incident and found that petitioners failed
to adduce any evidence to the contrary that Eduardo was of good health and of sound mind
at the time. The CA thus ruled that no contributory negligence could be imputed against
Eduardo.
While sustaining the RTC’s award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000; actual
damages in the amount of ₱4,830 as hospitalization expenses and ₱50,000 as burial
expenses; and attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in the amount of ₱50,000, the CA reduced
the awards for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of ₱50,000 and ₱25,000
respectively, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Moreover, the CA awarded respondents
indemnity for Eduardo’s loss of earning capacity based on the documentary and testimonial
evidence they presented. Excluding the other cash vouchers, the CA took into consideration
the ₱20,000 monthly salary Eduardo received from Glennis Laundry Haus in the computation
thereof, finding that the said cash vouchers were typewritten and duly signed by employees
who prepared, checked and approved them and that said business venture was validated by
the aforementioned Joint Affidavit.1âwphi1 Thus, the CA awarded the amount of ₱2,316,000
for loss of earning capacity in favor of respondents.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration 36 but the CA denied it under
Resolution37 dated April 23, 2009. Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I.
Whether or not the award of ₱2,316,000.00 for lost earnings is supported by competent
evidence; and
II.
Whether or not the Joint Affidavit dated December 28, 1999 (Exh. U), and purported Cash
Vouchers of Glennis Laundry Haus (Exhibits W, W-1 to W-31) are hearsay evidence and as
such, they are inadmissible and have no probative value to establish the lost earnings of the
deceased.38
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in admitting the Glennis Laundry Haus cash vouchers as
evidence to prove loss of earnings as the said vouchers are purely hearsay evidence, hence,
inadmissible and of no probative value. Petitioners argue that contrary to the findings of the
CA that Celerina identified said vouchers, records show that it was Celine who actually
identified them and that the latter acknowledged her non- participation in the preparation of
the same. Absent Celine’s personal knowledge as to the due execution, preparation and
authenticity of the Glennis Laundry Haus cash vouchers and consistent with the CA’s ruling
in disregarding the cash vouchers of Classic Personnel, Inc. and the Jhamec Construction
Corp. as evidence, the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus are considered hearsay
evidence. Petitioners point out that respondents did not present any employee who had
knowledge of the preparation and due execution of said vouchers. Neither did they present
Glennis S. Gonzales who executed the Joint Affidavit together with Eduardo. 39
Petitioners rely on the ruling of the RTC which refused to render any award based on
unrealized earnings because the alleged authors of said cash vouchers were not presented
as witnesses in this case. They stress that whether objected to or not, the cash vouchers are
hearsay evidence which possess no probative value. Since the Glennis Laundry Haus cash
vouchers and the Joint Affidavit are inadmissible in evidence and without probative value,
petitioners assert that there exists no competent evidence to support the award of lost
earnings in the amount of ₱2,316,000, and consequently such award by the CA should be
set aside.40
Respondents counter that the questions raised by petitioners, specifically, the adequacy of
the amount of damages awarded and the admissibility of evidence presented, are not
questions of law, hence, not proper under a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
They argue that a court’s appreciation of evidence is an exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, the abuse of which is correctible by a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65.
Respondents claim that petitioners changed the theory of their case before this Court,
i.e.,from that of Eduardo being the negligent party and not Francisco to the propriety of the
award of unrealized income, which is proscribed. They maintain that the CA’s award for lost
earnings in the amount of ₱2,316,000 is supported by competent evidence on record and is
a finding entitled to great respect. The evidence adduced at the trial and reviewed on appeal
by the CA passed the test of preponderance of evidence and the rules on admissibility of
evidence. Respondents further argue that personal knowledge of a document does not
require direct participation for it is enough that the witness can convince the court of her
awareness of the document’s genuineness, due execution and authenticity. Thus, if not
admitted or admissible as documentary proof, the document can be admissible as object
evidence. Respondents submit that the convergence of testimonial and documentary
evidence in this case established a preponderance of evidence in favor of respondents. 41
At the outset it must be stressed that absent any issue raised by petitioners as regards the
negligence of Francisco and the corresponding liabilities of Francisco and Robert arising
therefrom, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb much less deviate from the uniform
findings of the RTC and the CA that Francisco was negligent in driving the Nissan Patrol,
and that such negligence caused the vehicular collision which resulted in the death of
Eduardo.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in awarding the sum of ₱2,316,000
for loss of earning capacity.
The petition is meritorious.
On the propriety of the matters raised by petitioners in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, our ruling in Asian Terminals,
Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.42 is instructive, to wit:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of
law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of
the situation.
The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained
by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and
admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which
the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the
findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both parties. (Emphasis supplied)
While indeed the petition raises a factual issue on the probative value of the cash vouchers
submitted in support of the claim for lost earnings, the present case falls under two of the
above mentioned exceptions because the findings of the CA conflict with the findings of the
RTC and that the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts. Since
petitioners raised these circumstances, it is but proper for this Court to resolve this case. 43
Under Article 220644 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss
of earning capacity. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for
loss of capacity to earn money.45 The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes
of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven46by competent proof and the
best obtainable evidence thereof.47Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.48
Based on the foregoing and in line with respondents’ claim that Eduardo during his lifetime
earned more or less an annual income of ₱1,000,000, the case falls under the purview of the
general rule rather than the exceptions.
Now, while it is true that respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove Eduardo’s income,
it is lamentable as duly observed by the RTC that the officers and/or employees who
prepared, checked or approved the same were not presented on the witness stand. The CA
itself in its assailed Decision disregarded the cash vouchers from Classic Personnel, Inc. and
the Jhamec Construction Corp. due to lack of proper identification and authentication. We
find that the same infirmity besets the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus upon which
the award for loss of earning capacity was based.
It bears stressing that the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus were not identified by
Celerina contrary to the findings of the CA but by Celine in her testimony before the RTC on
November 13, 200249 and Celine, under cross-examination, admitted by way of stipulation
that she had no participation in the preparation thereof.50
We thus agree with the RTC’s ruling that said cash vouchers though admitted in evidence,
whether objected to or not, have no probative value for being hearsay. 51
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of
hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2)
absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath.52 Basic under the rules of evidence
is that a witness can only testify on facts within his or her personal knowledge. This personal
knowledge is a substantive prerequisite in accepting testimonial evidence establishing the
truth of a disputed fact. Corollarily, a document offered as proof of its contents has to be
authenticated in the manner provided in the rules, that is, by the person with personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the document.53

Except for the award for the loss of earning capacity, the Court concurs with the findings of
the CA and sustains the other awards made in so far as they are in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, pursuant to this Court's ruling in Del Carmen Jr. v.
Bacoy54 citing Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. Court of Appeals55 an interest of 6% per annum
on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision
until full payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The award for the loss of earning capacity
in the amount of ₱2,316,000 granted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August
29, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83309 in favor of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE. All the
other monetary awards are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at the
rate of 6 per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time of
finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45 November 20, 2013
PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Petitioner, vs.
MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I.
MENDOZA,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the decision2 dated November 22
2005 and the resolution3dated April 21 2006 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
83149 83150 and 83576.
The CA decision reversed and set aside the joint decision 4
dated January 9 2004 of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas (Deputy Ombudsman), Primo C. Miro in OMB-V-A-02-
0414-H finding respondents Marilyn Mendoza Vda. de Erederos Catalina Alingasa and
Porferio I Mendoza guilty of the administrative charge of Grave Misconduct. The Deputy
Ombudsman also found Oscar Peque guilty of Simple Misconduct.
The Factual Antecedents
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present case are as follows:
Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land Transportation Office, Cebu City
(LTO Cebu), Erederos, Mendoza's niece and secretary, Alingasa, LTO clerk, and Peque,
Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division of LTO Cebu, were administratively charged with
Grave Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman by private complainants, namely: Maricar
G Huete (Liaison Officer of GCY Parts), Ernesto R Cantillas (Liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu,
Inc.), Leonardo Villaraso (General Manager of TBS Trading), and Romeo C. Climaco
(Corporate Secretary of Penta Star).5 They were likewise charged with criminal complaints
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act."
The administrative and criminal charges arose from the alleged anomalies in the distribution
at the LTO Cebu of confirmation certificates, an indispensable requirement in the processing
of documents for the registration of motor vehicle with the LTO.
Specifically, the private complainants accused Alingasa of selling the confirmation
certificates, supposed to be issued by the LTO free of charge. This scheme allegedly existed
upon Mendoza's assumption in office as Regional Director of LTO Cebu. They observed that:
(1) Confirmation certificates were sold for the amount of ₱2,500.00 per pad without
official receipt;
(2) Alingasa would usually remit the collections to Erederos who would, in turn,
remit all the collections to Mendoza;6
(3) The official receipt for the processing of the confirmation certificates issued to
the private complainants acknowledged only the amount of ₱40.00 which they paid
for each engine, chassis or new vehicle, as MR. (Miscellaneous Receipt-LTO Form
67);
(4) Said amount was separate and distinct from the ₱2,500.00 required to be paid
for each pad;
(5) The official receipt also served as the basis for the individual stock/sales reports
evaluation of Erederos;7and
(6) The confirmation certificates processed during the previous administration were
no longer honored; thus, the private complainants were constrained to reprocess
the same by purchasing new ones.
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also revealed that the confirmation
certificates were given to the representatives of car dealers, who were authorized to supply
the needed data therein. In the Requisition and Issue Voucher, it was Roque who received
the forms. On August 19, 2002, Cantillas executed an Affidavit of Desi stance on the ground
that he was no longer interested in prosecuting the case.
On September 25, 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman ordered the respondents to file their
respective counter-affidavits. The respondents complied with the order and made the
required submission.
On December 12, 2002, the case was called for preliminary conference. At the conference,
the respondents, thru their counsels, manifested their intention to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the evidence on record after the submission of their
memoranda/position papers.
In the interim, additional administrative and criminal complaints for the same charges were
filed by Rova Carmelotes (Liaison Officer of ZC Trading Center), Mildred Regidor (Liaison
Officer of Grand Ace Commercial), Estrella dela Cerna (Liaison Officer of JRK Automotive
Supply), and Vevencia Pedroza (Liaison Officer of Winstar Motor Sales) against the
respondents. These new complaints were consolidated with the complaints already then
pending.
In their complaints, the new complainants commonly alleged that they had to pay ₱2,500.00
per pad to Alingasa before they could be issued confirmation certificates by the LTO Cebu.
Alingasa would give her collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. When they protested,
Erederos and Alingasa pointed to Mendoza as the source of the instructions. They were also
told that the confirmation certificates processed during the previous administration would no
longer be honored under Mendoza s administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of
confirmation certificates to process the registration of their motor vehicles with the LTO.
In his counter-affidavit, Mendoza vehemently denied the accusations. He alleged that the
confirmation certificates actual distribution and processing were assigned to Alingasa; the
processing entails the payment of ₱40.00 per confirmation certificate, as administrative fee;
payment is only made when the confirmation certificates are filled up and submitted for
processing with the LTO, not upon issuance; and he did not give any instructions to impose
additional fees for their distribution.
He also alleged that the case against him was instigated by Assistant Secretary Roberto T.
Lastimosa of the LTO Head Office so that a certain Atty. Manuel I way could replace him as
Regional Director of the L TO Cebu.8
Mendoza additionally submitted the affidavits of desistance of Carmelotes and Dela Cerna.
Carmelotes testified that she has no evidence to support her allegations against Mendoza.
Dela Cerna, on the other hand, stated that she was merely told to sign a document which
turned out to be an affidavit-complaint against the respondents. Subsequently, however,
Dela Cerna executed a second affidavit, retracting her previous statements and narrating
how she was threatened by Peque to sign an affidavit of desistance (1st affidavit).
Erederos and Alingasa commonly contended that they did not collect, demand and receive
any money from the complainants as payment for the confirmation certificates.
Erederos stated that the case against her was initiated by Huete because she found several
discrepancies in the documents she had processed. According to her, the present case was
Huete s ploy to avoid any liability.
For their part, Alingasa stressed that her act of maintaining a control book for the releases
of the confirmation certificate pads negates her liability, while Peque denied any participation
in the distribution and sale of the confirmation certificates.
On January 9, 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman rendered a joint decision on the administrative
aspect of the cases filed against the respondents, and a joint resolution on the criminal
aspect of the cases.
The Deputy Ombudsman s Ruling
In its joint decision, the Deputy Ombudsman found Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa guilty
of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. Peque, on the
other hand, was only found guilty of simple misconduct and was meted the penalty of
reprimand.
The Deputy Ombudsman believed the complainants allegations that Alingasa collected
₱2,500.00 for the issuance of confirmation certificates and, thereafter, remitted the
collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. He relied largely on the affidavits supporting the
respondents guilt. He found the affidavits and the NBI/Progress report strong enough to
establish the respondents guilt. The Deputy Ombudsman also explained that while the
distribution of confirmation certificates to authorized car dealers is not prohibited, the demand
and the collection of payment during their distribution are anomalous.
The respondents separately moved for reconsideration, but the Deputy Ombudsman denied
their motions on March 5, 2004.9
The respondents separately appealed to the CA to challenge the rulings against them.
The CA’s Ruling
On November 22, 2005, the CA granted the respondents petition and reversed the Deputy
Ombudsman s joint decision in the administrative aspect. The CA ruled that the Deputy
Ombudsman s finding of grave misconduct was not supported by substantial evidence
because the affidavits, on which the decision was mainly anchored, were not corroborated
by any other documentary evidence. Additionally, the affiants did not appear during the
scheduled hearings. The CA also found that the affiants failed to categorically specify that
the respondents personally demanded from them the payment of ₱2,500.00 -an allegation
that the appellate court deemed material in establishing their personal knowledge. Without
this allegation of personal knowledge, the CA held that the statements in the affidavits were
hearsay and, thus, should not be given any evidentiary weight. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED
and accordingly the assailed Joint Decision dated January 9, 2004 (administrative aspect of
the cases filed by the private respondents) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the administrative charges against petitioners are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
With respect to the assailed Joint Resolution also dated January 9, 2004 (criminal aspect)
issued by the public respondent, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the same. 10
The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied
the motion in its resolution of April 21, 2006. The denial led to the filing of the present petition.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
The Deputy Ombudsman posits that the evidence adduced by the complainants satisfied the
requisite quantum of proof. He argues that the complainants personal knowledge can be
gleaned from the preface of their narration; hence, their affidavits could not have been
hearsay. Their affidavits read:
3. That in doing my job, I have noticed and witnessed the following anomalies concerning
the processing of vehicle registration, x x x, as follows:
a. That in order to secure the forms of Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy
the same at the present price of ₱2,500.00 per pad from Catalina Alingasa, an L
TO personnel, who will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza Vda. de
Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director, Porferio Mendoza;
b. That Confirmation Certificates processed during previous administration would
not be honored and under such situations, they would require that the same be
reprocessed which means that we have to buy and use the new forms supplied by
the present administration.11
The Deputy Ombudsman also argues that his joint decision was not solely based on the
complainants affidavits since he also took into account the NBI/Progress report, which
uncovered the alleged anomalies. He posits that these pieces of evidence, taken together,
more than satisfy the required quantum of proof to hold the respondents administratively
liable for grave misconduct.
The Case for the Respondents
In their respective comments, the respondents separately argue that the complainants
statements in their affidavits lack material details and particulars, particularly on the time, the
date, and the specific transactions.
They commonly alleged that the affidavits, which contained general averments, and the
NBI/Progress report that was based on the same affidavits, failed to meet the quantum of
proof required to hold them administratively liable.
For his part, Mendoza argues that since the affidavits failed to categorically state that the
complainants personally witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and
eventually to him, his participation in the anomalous scheme has not been sufficiently shown;
hence, he should not have been found liable.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in
dismissing the administrative charge against the respondents.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the findings and
conclusions of the Deputy Ombudsman on the ground that they were not supported by
substantial evidence.
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute
It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence.12 Their factual findings are generally accorded with great
weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
This rule was reiterated in Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,13 where we held that:
When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it should
be considered as conclusive. This Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the
Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA.
This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite the
respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review
and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agency s findings if
not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by the administrative
or quasi-judicial agencies (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. 14
In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the
respondents are guilty of the administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.15 Since the Deputy Ombudsman’s
findings were found wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall not bind this
Court.
Parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition
a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary to emphasize that
a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are
not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not
our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. As held in Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac,16 a re-examination of factual findings
is outside the province of a petition for review on certiorari to wit:
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court
is not a trier of facts. xxx The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again
the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province of
the instant Petition for Certiorari.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. 17 Unless the case falls under any of
the recognized exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal questions. 18
b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court
Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are those
of the CA, and not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or
officer which rendered the decision in the first instance. 19 It is imperative that we refrain from
conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert this
Court into a trier of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria
Altamirano etc. et al.20 our review is limited only to the errors of law committed by the
appellate court, to wit:
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of errors of
law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to review all over
again the evidence which the parties adduced in the court a quo. Of course, the general rule
admits of exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the CA and the trial court are
conflicting or contradictory.
In Montemayor v. Bundalian,21 this Court laid down the guidelines for the judicial review of
decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers,
as follows:
First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in
reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings
of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set
aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate
the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an
administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive
additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.
[emphases ours]
The present petition directly raises, as issue, the propriety of the CA s reversal of the Deputy
Ombudsman s decision that found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct. While this
issue may be one of law, its resolution also requires us to resolve the underlying issue of
whether or not substantial evidence exists to hold the respondents liable for the charge of
grave misconduct. The latter question is one of fact, but a review is warranted considering
the conflicting findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman and of the CA. Accordingly, we now
focus on and assess the findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman and of the CA for their
merits.
The Deputy Ombudsman’s appreciation of evidence
The Deputy Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct based on the
affidavits submitted by the complainants and the NBI/Progress report. In giving credence to
the affidavits, the Deputy Ombudsman ruled that the complainants have amply established
their accusations by substantial evidence.
The CA’s appreciation of evidence
The CA, on the other hand, reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s findings and ruled that no
substantial evidence exists to support the latter’s decision as the affidavits upon which said
decision was based are hearsay evidence. It found that the affidavits lack the important
element of personal knowledge and were not supported by corroborating evidence.
We agree with the CA. The findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman are not supported by
substantial evidence on record.
Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative cases
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence.22 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for
the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required
in an ordinary civil case,23 or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal
cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act of 198924 provides that:
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and
unappealable. [emphasis ours]
The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants to establish the respondents'
guilt of the act charged are: (1) their complaint-affidavits and the (2) NBl/Progress report. As
correctly found by the CA, these pieces of evidence do not meet the quantum of proof
required in administrative cases.
The Evidence Against Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa
i. Private complainants affidavits
The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal knowledge of the participation of
Mendoza and Erederos in the allegedly anomalous act. These affidavits indicate that the
complainants have commonly noticed and witnessed the anomalous sale transaction
concerning the confirmation certificates. Without going into details, they uniformly allege that
to secure the confirmation certificates, an amount of ₱2,500.00 would be paid to Alingasa,
an L TO personnel, "who will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza vda.
Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director, Porferio Mendoza."25 While
the payment to Alingasa might be considered based on personal knowledge, the alleged
remittance to Erederos and Mendoza -on its face - is hearsay.
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of he witness
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his
own Rersonal knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from his own perception. 26 A witness
may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned,
read or heard.27 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but,
of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but
likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits.28
The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money
from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically
allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific
allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the
complainants alleged in the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the
anomalous act complained of does not take their statements out of the coverage of the
hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the witness knows
himself but of what he has heard from others."29 Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence.30
The affidavits also show that the complainants did not allege any specific act of the
respondents. All that the affidavits allege is a description of the allegedly anomalous scheme
and the arrangement whereby payments were to be made to Alingasa. There is no averment
relating to any "personal demand" for the amount of ₱2,500.00.
Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the complainants have personal
knowledge of Erederos' and Mendoza's participation in the anomalous act. At most, their
personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who is the recipient of all payments
for the processing of confirmation certificates. This situation, however, is affected by the
complainants' failure to specify Alingasa's act of personally demanding ₱2,500.00 -a crucial
element in determining her guilt or innocence of the grave misconduct charged.
With respect to Pedroza's allegation in her affidavit 31 that Alingasa and Erederos
categorically told them that it was Mendoza who instructed them to collect the ₱2,500.00 for
the confirmation certificates, we once again draw a distinction between utterances or
testimonies that are merely hearsay in character or "non-hearsay," and those that are
considered as legal hearsay.
Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements were made; this class of
extrajudicial utterances or statements is offered not s an assertion to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, but only as to the fact of the utterance made. The latter class, on the other
hand, consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the statement; this kind pertains to
extrajudicial utterances and statements that are offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted.
The difference between these two classes of utterances lies in the applicability of the rule on
exclusion of hearsay evidence. The first class, i.e. the fact that the statement was made, is
not covered by the hearsay rule, while the second class, i.e. the truth of the facts asserted in
the statement, is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's allegation belongs to the first class;
hence, it is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement. The
following discussion, made m Patula v. People of the Philippines 32 is particularly instructive:
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received s evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance
is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth
of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a
prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief,
this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely
to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character
but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement
was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted
in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. [citations omitted]
Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule
We additionally note that the affidavits were never identified by the complainants. All the
allegations contained therein were likewise uncorroborated by evidence, other than the
NBI/Progress report.
In Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,33 we had the occasion to rule on the implications
of the affiants' failure to appear during the preliminary investigation and to identify their
respective sworn statements, to wit:
Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the Ombudsman merely on
the basis of the evidence extant in the record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The preliminary
conference required under Republic Act No. 6770 was dispensed with after the nominal
complainant, then BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma, manifested on July 29,
1996 that he was submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the documents on record
while the petitioner agreed to simply file his memorandum. Consequently, the only basis for
the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from the government
service was the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged
witness, Purisima Terencio.
A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and
Terencio were not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding
investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither
did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn
statements despite prior notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed
the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner "was not
supported by any evidence." Hence, Beck's affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
On this basis alone, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
should have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first
instance. (emphasis supplied)
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements, and considering the seriousness of
the charges filed, their affidavits must not be accepted at face value and should be treated
as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.
ii. NBI/Progress report
With regard to the NBI/Progress report submitted by the complainants as corroborating
evidence, the same should not be given any weight. Contrary to the Ombudsman's
assertions, the report cannot help its case under the circumstances of this case as it is
insufficient to serve as substantial basis. The pertinent portion of this report reads:
04. P/Sinsp. JESUS KABIGTING and Senior TRO ALFONSO ALIANZA visited JAGNA
District Office at Jagna, Bohol wherein they were able to conduct interview with MR.
RODOLFO SANTOS, Officer-In-Charge who has assumed his new post only in February
2002. During the conduct of the interview, Mr. SANTOS revealed that the anomalous Dos-
por-Dos transactions have been prevented and eliminated when the previous District
Manager in the person of Mr. LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR, who was transferred to Tagbilaran
District Office allegedly on a floating status and under the direct control and supervision of
its District Manager, Mr. GA VINO PADEN, Mr. SANTOS allegations of the existence of "Dos-
por-Dos" transactions were supported by the records/documents gathered of which the
signatures of Mr. OLAIVAR affixed thereof. Copies are hereto attached marked as Annexes
D-D-6.
xxxx
06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms. MARICAR G. HUETE, a resident of Lahug, Cebu City and
liaison Officer of GCY Parts, Kabancalan Mandaue City and Mr. ERNESTO R. CARTILLAS
a resident of Basak, Mandaue City and liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc. in Jagobiao,
Mandaue City stated among others and both attested that: Annexes "E-E-1."
In order to secure the forms of Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy the same at the
present cost of ₱2,500.00 per pad from CATALINA ALINGASA, an LTO Personnel, who will
remit her collections to a certain MARILYN MENDOZA V da De EREDEROS, a niece and
secretary of the Regional Director, PORFERIO MENDOZA.34
This quoted portion shows that it was based on complainant Huete's and Cantillas' affidavits.
It constitutes double hearsay because the material facts recited were not within the personal
knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. As held in Africa, et al. v. Caltex
Phil.) Inc., et al.,35 reports of investigations made by law enforcement officers or other public
officials are hearsay unless they fall within the scope of Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the
fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. xxx.
xxxx
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry
was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b)
that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the
material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not
within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? xxx.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated
therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having
been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. [emphases ours]
The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in the performance of their
duties not on the basis of their own personal observation of the facts reported but merely on
the basis of the complainants affidavits, is hearsay. Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman cannot
rely on it.
Conclusion
With a portion of the complainants affidavits and the NBI/Progress report being hearsay
evidence, the only question that remains is whether the respondents conduct, based on the
evidence on record, amounted to grave misconduct, warranting their dismissal in office.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.37 The misconduct is
considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.38
Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to establish the elements of grave
misconduct.1âwphi1 To reiterate, no substantial evidence exists to show that Erederos and
Mendoza received collected payments from Alingasa Their involvement or complicity in the
allegedly anomalous scheme cannot be justified under the affidavits of the complainants and
the NBI/Progress report, which are both hearsay.
With respect to Alingasa, in view of the lack of substantial evidence showing that she
personally demanded the payment of ₱2,500.00 – a crucial factor in the wrongdoing alleged
– we find that the elements of misconduct, simple or grave, to be wanting and unproven.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the assailed decision dated
November 22, 2005 and the resolution dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 83149, 83150 and 83576.
SO ORDERED.

Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in administrative or quasi-judicial

bodies is not a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules

While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard
fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the administrative agencies and the evidence
it relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial. that:

In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis,36 we ruled that:

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by
the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not
be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence
presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not
only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing business under
the name and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law.
Questions of fact are the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting
facts the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or
evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented
evidence, then the court can only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of
evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela Llana’s(petitioner) petition for review
on certorari1challenging the February 11, 2008 Decision2 and the March 31, 2008
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla
car along North Avenue, Quezon City.4
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim
was at the backseat.5
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned
red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly
rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s
rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing
Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have
suffered from any other visible physical injuries.6
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel
Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. 7
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under
the name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business. 8
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left
side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury
became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move
her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation
medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a
whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and
hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela
Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.9
She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric
Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo
a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr.
Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. 10
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from
the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery. 11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her
injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.12
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of
the vehicular accident and claimed ₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of
the complaint) and an average monthly income of ₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further
prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. 13
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as
no reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury.
She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one week
from the date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.14
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness 15 and Joel as a hostile
witness.16
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular
accident. To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated
November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana
suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical
examinations.17
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck. 18
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they
met several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed
out that she required Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as
barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she
only hired Primero after he successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto
Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic.19
Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of
March 30, 2000. He affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular
accident. He opined that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor.
According to him, the absence of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.20
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.21
It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the
neck area. It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck
was over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because
road visibility diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his
brake was stuck and could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It
also concluded that Joel was probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been
driving for fifteen hours on that fateful day. The RTC further declared that Joel’s negligence
gave rise to the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in Joel's selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because
she was the employer and she personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the
collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muñoz Market, Quezon City. The
Court concluded that the three elements necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability were
present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the employer, personally or through another;
(2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer had
the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion
or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the
amounts of ₱570,000.00 as actual damages, ₱250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost
of the suit.22
CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela
Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her
whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of
Appeals,23 it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is
no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue.
It noted that the interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana
began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised
doubts on whether Joel’s reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela
Llana’s injury. It also declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents
cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital
to check if she sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present
expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical certificate. The
medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.24
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the
present case. She stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566
of the Civil Code, provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely
no evidence in Nutrimix that showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the
respondents in that case. As opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts
that she has established by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s egligent act was the
proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that the
collision was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that
the massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in
the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her
testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she was a
surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several
cases, she posits that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.25
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of
common knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the
causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of
the fact that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
The Respondent’s Position
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is
beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
She maintains that the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses
that Dra. dela Llana’s arguments are not substantial to merit this Court’s consideration.
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joel’s reckless driving is the
proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when
the findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a
general rule, the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review
them on appeal. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review
the presented evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC
and the CA.27
We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence
presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-
delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose
acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the
damages.28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or
omission of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise
from non-contractual relations of certain members of society to others.29
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence
the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash
injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can
then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code.31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an
action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer
who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee." 32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual
obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or
greater weight of credible evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s
negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish
by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and
without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.36
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the
causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other
words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by
which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed
below.37
A. The pictures of the damaged
car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact
of the collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her
insistence that these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These
pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched
assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
B.The medical certificate cannot be
considered because it was
not admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be
considered in resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the
RTC in an order dated September 23, 2004.38
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the
case. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly
considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the
medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness
stand.39
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence 40 except in very
unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.41
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:
"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that
pain in your left arm?
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was
due to a compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty.
Yusingco: You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate.
What relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that
certificate, you said was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result
of that feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm?
Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my
condition after three months indicated that I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.
Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation?
Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not
resolve by the extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than three
months."42(emphasis ours)
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical
certificate.1âwphi1 However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able
to identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her
findings. We also point out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not
explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the
vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her
medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical
certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash
injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical
examinations.
B. Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that
Joel’s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in
this quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely
testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in
her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that
Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we
cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury
without violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial
difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary
witness may be received in evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions
of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. 43
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess. 44
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony,
much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is
that the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the
expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford
the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons
on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for
the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she
was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a
medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her
testimony.
The Supreme Court cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court
shows that Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence
that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela
Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash injury was not
established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in
this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash
injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.46 We have
no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and
interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal
arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of
evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially
assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim,
unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to
stand on.
WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192893 June 5, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY
and PRAXEDES MARTONITO, represented by POLICARPIO DELOY,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the November 9, 2009 Decision' and the July 5, 2010 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 96998. The challenged decision set aside the
May 4, 2006 Resolution3 and the September 27, 2006 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court,
Trece Martires City, Branch 23 (RTC), which affirmed the dismissal of an unlawful detainer
case by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Trece Martires City (MTCC).
The Facts
On July 8, 2003, Domingo Deloy, Maria Deloy-Masicap, Zosimo Deloy, Mario Deloy, Silveria
Deloy-Mabiling, Norma Deloy, Milagros Panganiban, Lino Deloy, Cornelio Deloy, Maricel
Deloy, Adelina Banta, Rogelio Deloy, Evelyn Deloy, Edgardo Deloy, Cynthia Deloy,
Donnabel Deloy, Glenda Deloy, Arnel Deloy, Ronnio Deloy, Isagani L. Reyes, and Policarpio
Deloy (respondents), all heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloy (Dionisio) and Praxedes Martonito-
Deloy, represented by Policarpio Deloy, instituted the Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer5 against Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) before the MTCC.
Respondents are the owners, by way of succession, of a parcel of land consisting of 8,550
square meters located in Trece Martires City (Trece Martires property). On November 12,
1965, Dionisio, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, donated a 680-square meter portion
(subject land) of the 8,550 square meter property to the Communications and Electricity
Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and affordable electric supply
to the province of Cavite. A deed of donation6 was executed to reflect and formalize the
transfer.
Sometime in 1985, CEDA offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric distribution system,
consisting of transformers and accessories, poles and hardware, wires, service drops, and
customer meters and all rights and privileges necessary for providing electrical service in
Cavite. This was embodied in a memorandum of agreement (MOA), 7dated June 28, 1985,
signed by the parties.
On the same date, June 28, 1985, after the approval of the MOA, CEDA and MERALCO
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, MERALCO occupied the subject land.
On October 11, 1985, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and Head of the Legal
Department, Atty. L.D. Torres (Atty. Torres), wrote a letter8 to Dionisio requesting the latter’s
permission for the continued use of the subject land as a substation site.
The parties were not able to reach any agreement. In an internal memorandum,9 dated
December 16, 1985, from L.G. De La Paz of the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO to
Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty. Torres of the Realty Division of MERALCO, it was stated that
the death of Dionisio, the lack of agreement yet among the heirs, and a request that a
member of the Deloy family be employed by MERALCO were some of the reasons.
Meanwhile, respondents claimed that they had no immediate use for the subject land and
that they were preoccupied with the judicial proceedings to rectify errors involving the
reconstituted title of the Trece Martires property, which included the subject land. On
November 22, 2001, the proceedings were terminated and the decision became final. 10 Not
long after,respondents offered to sell the subject land to MERALCO, but their offer was
rejected.
For said reason, in their letter,11 dated May 19, 2013, respondents demanded that
MERALCO vacate the subject land on or before June 15, 2003. Despite the written demand,
MERALCO did not move out of the subject land. Thus, on July 8, 2003, respondents were
constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Traversing respondents’ complaint, MERALCO countered that CEDA, as the owner of the
subject land by virtue of the deed of donation executed by Dionisio, lawfully sold to it all rights
necessary for the operation of the electric service in Cavite by way of a deed of sale on June
28, 1985.
MERALCO stressed that the condition of providing affordable electricity to the people of
Cavite,12 imposed in the deed of donation between Dionisio and CEDA, was still being
observed and complied with. Thus, MERALCO claimed that, being CEDA’s successor-in-
interest, it had legal justification to occupy the subject land.
On September 15, 2005, the MTCC rendered the decision 13 dismissing respondents’
complaint for unlawful detainer against MERALCO.
The MTCC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case because it would require an
interpretation of the deed of donation making it one not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Nevertheless, it opined that MERALCO was entitled to the possession of the subject land. It
was of the view that it would only be when the deed of donation would be revoked or the
deed of sale nullified that MERALCO’s possession of the subject land would become
unlawful.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the MTCC ruling to the RTC. In its May 4, 2006 Resolution,
the RTC sustained the MTCC decision.
The RTC pointed out that the only issue in an unlawful detainer case was possession. It
affirmed the MTCC ruling that the latter had no jurisdiction to interpret contracts involving the
sale of the subject land to MERALCO, after the latter raised the issue of ownership of the
subject land. According to the RTC, the interpretation of the deed of sale and the deed of
donation was the main, not merely incidental, issue.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the RTC in its
September 27, 2006 Order.
Not satisfied with the adverse ruling, respondents elevated the case before the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
In its November 9, 2001 Decision, the CA set aside the RTC ruling.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution, dated May 4,
2006, and Order, dated September 27, 2006, both of the Regional Trial Court of Trece
Martires City, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. TMCV-0055005, are hereby SET ASIDE and a
new one rendered partially granting Petitioners’ Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
Respondent. Accordingly, Respondent is ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay
Petitioners the amount of ₱50,0000.00 monthly rental counting from June 16, 2003, up to
the time Respondent shall have fully vacated the subject property, and ₱25,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Costs against Respondent.
SO ORDERED.14
In partially granting the appeal, the CA explained that an ejectment case, based on the
allegation of possession by tolerance, would fall under the category of unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involved the person’s withholding from another of the possession of real
property to which the latter was entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s
right to hold possession under a contract, either express or implied. Where the plaintiff
allowed the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any contract, the
defendant was necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she would vacate on
demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer would lie.
As to the issue of possession, the CA stated that by seeking Dionisio’s permission to
continuously occupy the subject land, MERALCO expressly acknowledged his paramount
right of possession. MERALCO, thru its representative, Atty. Torres, would not have asked
permission from Dionisio if it had an unconditional or superior right to possess the subject
land. The CA considered the fact that this recognition of Dionisio’s right over the subject land
was amplified by another letter, dated December 16, 1985,15 by one L.G. De la Paz to Atty.
Torres, expressly declaring Dionisio as the owner of the subject land. MERALCO never
disputed the declarations contained in these letters. Neither did it claim that the same was
made through palpable mistake. Indeed, Meralco even marked these letters as documentary
exhibits. Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or
declarations may be admitted against Meralco.
MERALCO moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the CA in its July 5, 2010
Resolution.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER.
II. WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE ALIUNDE, SUCH AS THE LETTERS DATED 11
OCTOBER 1985 OF PETITIONER’S ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT AND HEAD OF
LEGAL DEPARTMENT, L.D. TORRES AND INTERNAL MEMORANDUM DATED 6
DECEMBER 1985 OF PETITIONER’S L.G. DELA PAZ WHICH PURPORTEDLY
RECOGNIZED RESPONDENTS’ OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY CAN PREVAIL OVER
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
III. WHETHER OR NOT TITLE TO THE PROPERTY DONATED TO CEDA WAS VALIDLY
TRANSFERRED TO THE PETITIONER.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO THE PETITIONER VIOLATED
OR REVOKED THE DONATION TO CEDA.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT WAS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.16
Simply put, the vital issues for the Court’s consideration are: (1) whether an action for
unlawful detainer is the proper remedy in this case; and (2) if it is, who has a better right of
physical possession of the disputed property.
In presenting its case before the Court, MERALCO argues that respondents’ complaint
before the MTCC failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, but for one incapable
of pecuniary estimation, because the issue of physical possession is inextricably linked with
the proper interpretation of the deed of donation executed between Dionisio and CEDA.
Thus, the MTCC was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Further, MERALCO
avers that it validly acquired title to the subject land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by
CEDA in its favor on June 28, 1985. As a consequence, MERALCO contends that extrinsic
or extraneous evidence, such as the letters, dated October 11, 1985 and December 6, 1985,
cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to
Section 9, Rule 13017 of the Rules of Court.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.18 The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties involved.19
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the
category of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property
by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.20
Jurisdiction of the MTCC
MERALCO contends that respondents’ complaint failed to make out a case for unlawful
detainer but, rather, one incapable of pecuniary estimation, properly cognizable by the RTC
and not the MTCC. It stresses the allegations in the complaint involve a prior determination
on the issue of ownership before the issue of possession can be validly resolved.
This contention fails to persuade.
When the issue of ownership is raised in an ejectment case, the first level courts are not ipso
facto divested of its jurisdiction. Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,21provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
[Underscoring supplied.]
It is undisputed that on October 11, 1985 or four (4) months after the approval of the MOA
and the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice
President and Head of the Legal Department, Atty. Torres , sent a letter to Dionisio seeking
his permission for the continued use of the subject land. The letter reads:
Mr. Dionisio Deloy
Trece Martires City 2724
Province of Cavite
Dear Mr. Deloy:
This has reference to the Deed of Donation (Inter-vivos) executed on November 12, 1965
between Communications and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) and Dionisio
D(e)loy for a 680-square meter of land used as a substation site adjacent to A.B. Memorial
Hospital x x x.

xxxx
In this regard, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows the first level courts, in
ejectment cases, to provisionally determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
resolving the issue of physical possession.
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.–When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.
In compliance with the franchise Nationalization program of the National Government, we
wish to inform you that Meralco had taken over the electric operations in the province of
Cavite being served by CEDA.
In view of this recent development, may we respectfully request you to please allow Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) to continue the use of the above-mentioned portion of land as a
substation site, subject to the terms and conditions which we may mutually agree upon.
In the interest of public service, we shall highly appreciate your kind cooperation on this
matter and awaiting your reply.

Accordingly, it is unquestionably clear that the first level courts are clothed with the power to Very truly yours,
preliminarily resolve questions on the ownership of real property, if necessary, to arrive at
the proper and complete determination of the question on physical possession or possession
de facto. Thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, the MTCC should have taken cognizance of the [Signed]
complaint as it was well within its jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, considering that B.P. Blg. L. D. TORRES
129, as amended, has distinctly defined and granted the MTCC with jurisdiction, it is the trial Assistant Vice-President
court’s duty and obligation to exercise the same when properly invoked. & Head, Legal Department23
[Underscoring supplied]
Right of Possession
Relative thereto, L.G. De La Paz of the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO sent the
December 16, 1985 Internal Memorandum, addressed to Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty.
As earlier stated, on the issue of possession, the CA opined that by seeking Dionisio’s Torres, informing them of some obstacles in reaching a lease agreement with the Deloys.
permission to occupy the subject land, MERALCO expressly acknowledged his paramount The Internal Memorandum reads:
right of possession.
ATTY. G.R. GONZALES
MERALCO posits that extrinsic evidence, such as the letter request, dated October 11, 1985,
and the Internal Memorandum, dated December 6, 1985, cannot contradict the terms of the
deed of sale between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 13022 of the Rules ATTY. L.D. TORRES TRECE MARTIRES SUBTATION
of Court.
REALTY SERVICES
The Court has combed the records and is not convinced.
DECEMBER 16, 1985
This refers to the proposed contract of lease with Mr. Dionisio Deloy, co-owner of the lot
wherein the Trece Martires Substation is located.
Mr. Deloy had donated the use of 680-sq. m. portion of his co-owned land for CEDA’s
substation in Trece Martires in 1966. Copy of the Donation is enclosed. On October 11, 1985,
the company informed him through its letter of its intention of continuing with the use of the
property as a result of its acquisition of CEDA’s franchise. He agreed to the request and
proposed rental would be free provided one of his sons/grandsons would be employed by
Meralco. Governor Remulla had favorably recommended Lino Deloy, one of his grandsons,
for a position in the company. A son, Mr. Policarpio Deloy, former CEDA employee, had
passed Meralco’s entrance examination. According to PAD, his application papers were
being processed by the Branch Services Department.
It was unfortunate that when we went to see him on December 6, 1985, to finalize the
Contract of Lease, the man was already dead. His body laid at state in his residence. He
died on December 5, 1985. As it was not proper to discuss things with the family, we asked
the wife when the family would be available. She suggested that we should come back on
December 21, 1985. On that day, all the members of the family would be free to confer with
us.
There are some problems that may come up with the death of Mr. Deloy. These are:
1. the settlement of his estate among his heirs
2. the desire to have more members of the family to be employed in Meralco
3. the rent free use of the substation may not push through
4. the proper signatories in the contract of lease to be drawn
We do hope whatever the problem may be, we will be able to work it out.
For your information.
[Signed]
L.G. DE LA PAZ
x x x x.
Evidently, by these two documents, MERALCO acknowledged that the owners of the subject
land were the Deloys. It is clear as daylight. The first letter was written barely four (4) months
after the deed of sale was accomplished. As observed by the CA, MERALCO never disputed
the declarations contained in these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits.
Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or
declarations are admissible against MERALCO.
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party – The act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
In Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat,24 it was written, thus:
x x x Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration
was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is
his fault if it does not.
Guided by the foregoing rules and jurisprudence, the Court holds that the letter and the
internal memorandum presented, offered and properly admitted as part of the evidence on
record by MERALCO itself, constitute an admission against its own interest. Hence,
MERALCO should appropriately be bound by the contents of the documents.1âwphi1
Nevertheless, in this petition, MERALCO insists that extrinsic evidence, such as the two
documents, even if these were their own, cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale
between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 13025 of the Rules of Court.
The Court has read the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale but found nothing that clearly
stated that the subject land was included therein. What were sold, transferred and conveyed
were "its electric distribution facilities, service drops, and customers' electric meters except
those owned by the VENDOR'S customers, x x x, and all the rights and privileges necessary
for the operation of the electric service x x x." 26 No mention was made of any land. Rights
and privileges could only refer to franchises, permits and authorizations necessary for the
operation of the electric service. The land on which the substation was erected was not
included, otherwise, it would have been so stated in the two documents. Otherwise, also,
MERALCO would not have written Dionisio to ask permission for the continued use of the
subject land.
At any rate, it is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
It bears to emphasize that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the
property, including possession.1âwphi1 Thus, the Court must uphold the age-old rule that
the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to its possession. 27 In Pascual v.
Coronel,28 the Court reiterated the rule that a certificate of title has a superior probative value
as against that of an unregistered deed of sale in ejectment cases.
On a final note, the Court must stress that the ruling in this case is limited only to the
determination as to who between the parties has a better right to possession. This
adjudication is not a final determination on the issue of ownership and, thus, will not bar any
party from filing an action raising the matter of ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199938 January 28, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CAMALOUING SAMANODING, LARA y
BRION, Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the April 7, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 02479 which affirmed in toto the August 29, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 231, convicting appellant Camaloding Laba y
Samanoding (appellant) for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No.
91653 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.
The Facts
On July 18, 2005, at around 10:45 in the morning, appellant arrived at the Manila Domestic
Airport in Pasay City to take his flight bound for Davao City. When he approached the initial
check-in area, Mark Anthony Villocillo (Villocillo), a non-uniformed personnel (NUP)4 frisker
assigned thereat,5 physically searched the person of appellant and suspected that the latter’s
oversized white rubber shoes, with the identifying mark "Spicer," 6 seemed to contain what
felt like rice.7 Upon inspection of the rubber shoes, which Villocillo asked appellant to
remove,8 the former discovered three (3) plastic sachets containing shabu– two plastic
sachets were inside the left shoe while one was inside the right shoe.9
When Villocillo extracted the plastic sachets from appellant’s shoes, the latter told Villocillo,
"Baka pwedeng pag-usapan ito" while simultaneously handing him a rolled wad of paper
bills.10 Eventually, Villocillo called the attention of his supervisor, SPO2 Nolasco
Peji11 (SPO2 Peji), who apprehended appellant and apprised him of his
rights.12Subsequently, appellant was brought to their office and investigated by PO2 Edwin
Caimoso,13 who thereafter indorsed appellant, together with the confiscated plastic sachets,
to Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) agents who had eventually arrived at the
scene.14
On the same day, the PDEA, through Police Inspector Peter P. Alvarez, requested15 that a
laboratory examination on the three (3) plastic sachets be conducted, which were
accordingly marked as follows:
(a) EXH-A MTV ECC NSP 18/06/05 and signatures – 98.81 grams
(b) EXH-B MTV ECC NSP 18/06/05 and signatures – 96.65 grams
(c) EXH-C MTV ECC NSP 18/06/05 and signatures – 1.17 grams16
The following day, or on June 19, 2005, upon qualitative examination by forensic chemist
Police Senior Inspector Stella Garciano Ebuen (Police Senior Inspector Ebuen) on the
confiscated sachets, which contained a total of 196.63 grams of white crystalline substance,
the same tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 17
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 in an
Information18 which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of June 2005, in Pasay City, Metro-Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a departing
passenger via Cebu Pacific Airlines flight no. 5J-965 239 bound for Davao, without authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport 196.63 grams of
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride (SHABU), a dangerous drugs, by concealing it inside his
worn colored white rubber shoes with marking "SPICER."
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on June 27, 2005 with the assistance of counsel, appellant entered a plea
of not guilty to the offense charged.19
In defense, appellant claimed that on the date and time in question, he was at the Manila
Domestic Airport20 for his flight to Davao City. After passing through the metal detector and
while walking towards the ticketing counter to check-in, a police officer, whom he later
identified as SPO2 Peji,21 called his attention and asked him to stay for a while 22 because
something was allegedly recovered from him. At the same time, appellant noticed that
someone had been arrested, and he heard SPO2 Peji tell that person to settle the case so
that they could just "pass" the "thing" to appellant, which turned out to be shabu.23
Thereafter, SPO2 Peji and Villocillo brought appellant to an office24 where SPO2 Peji forced
him toadmit ownership of the shabu.25 When appellant refused, SPO2 Peji suggested the
settlement of the case for ₱100,000.00, an amount which appellant could not afford. 26 Later,
he was brought to a PDEA office where PDEA agents took his statement and once again
asked him to admit ownership of the confiscated shabu. 27 Appellant averred that SPO2 Peji
confiscated his wallet which contained ₱1,600.00 in cash, as well as ₱2,000.00 found in the
pocket of his pants.28 Finally, appellant denied wearing the white rubber shoes with the label
"Spicer" at the time he was arrested.29
Ruling of the RTC
On August 29, 2006, after trial on the merits, the RTC convicted30 appellant as charged upon
a finding that all the elements for transportation of drugs, i.e., actual physical possession and
control of the prohibited drugs, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in
court,31 have been established by the prosecution. It found the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Villocillo and SPO2 Peji to be candid, forthright and reliable. Moreover, as law
enforcers, they were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties.
On the other hand, the RTC refused to give credence to appellant’s bare and unsubstantiated
denials, as well as his claim that he was merely framed-up, and his insistence that the police
officers were extorting money from him. The fallo of the judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, on the evidence adduced and the facts and conclusions drawn therefrom,
the accused CAMALODING LABA y SAMANODING is hereby found Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the Information and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and PAY A FINE OF FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (Php500,000.00) WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF
INSOLVENCY, AND COSTS.
SO ORDERED.32
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed33the RTC Decision in toto, holding that the identity of the seized
substance had been adequately proved and that the chain of custody was properly
established, from the time that it was recovered from the person of the appellant, tested at
the laboratory for a qualitative examination, and its actual presentation in court. While the
CA conceded that the arresting officers were unable to strictly comply with the requirements
set forth under Sec. 21,Par. (1) of RA 9165 by failing to photograph the seized items, it
nonetheless found that the evidentiary value of the confiscated substance had been
preserved. It also did not find the non-presentation of the forensic chemist as fatal to the
cause of the prosecution.
Issue Before The Court
The core issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA and the RTC committed any
reversible error in convicting appellant as charged.
The Court’s Ruling
Appellant was convicted of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, which reads:
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. ―The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker
in any such transactions. (Emphasis supplied)
In adjudging appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the said offense, the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, considered the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession
of an extremely large amount of prohibited drugs inside the airport, before boarding his flight
bound for Davao City. The RTC explained34 that Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 penalizes the act
of transporting shabu, under which provision appellant must clearly be convicted.
The Court sustains appellant’s conviction.
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or convey
from one place to another."35 The essential element of the charge is the movement of the
dangerous drug from one place to another.36
In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his
flight bound for Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his
oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it may be argued that appellant was yet to board the
aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied
that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting
or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another.
Moreover, it may be reasonably inferred from the deliberations of the Congress that if a
person is found to have more than five (5) grams of shabu in his possession, then his purpose
in carrying them is to dispose, traffic, or sell it, as follows:
REPRESENTATIVE AQUINO (B.). We agree with the premises, Mr. Speaker.1âwphi1 But
just for the sake of our education, in terms of volume, somebody informed this
Representation that one gram of shabu would probably be the same size as a single kernel
of corn. Would that be correct?
REPRESENTATIVE CUENCO. The technical committee that has been assisting us in
carpentering this bill tells us that a habitual user of, let’s say, shabu, one of the dangerous
substances provided for here, a habitual user of shabu, even if we say daily taker of shabu
consumes only 1/5 of a gram, .02 grams a day. So that means, if he has with him one gram
of shabu, that is good for five days; if he has five grams, that is good for 25 days. Now if he
is a user, he won’t need more than five grams to carry with him or her. So the presumption
of the law is that, if he carries with him or her more than five grams, that is not for his personal
consumption. He is out to traffic the rest of it.37(Underscoring supplied)
With respect to the chain of custody of the confiscated drugs, the Court likewise finds no
reason to disturb the findings of the CA that the same had been faithfully observed by the
arresting officers: from the time that the illegal substance was seized from appellant and
properly marked by the arresting officers, to its laboratory examination until its presentation
in open court for identification purposes.38 Considering that the integrity of the seized
substance has been duly preserved, failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21, Par. (a) 39 of RA
9165 requiring the apprehending officers to physically inventory and photograph the
confiscated items shall not render the evidence inadmissible.10
Neither will the non-presentation in court of Police Senior Inspector Ebuen, the forensic
chemist who conducted the laboratory examination on the confiscated substance, operate
to acquit appellant. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the
court to decide. It has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to
choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses. 41 Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do
with the testimony of the chemical analyst, and the report of an official forensic chemist
regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
preparation.42 Corollarily, under Sec. 4443 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in
official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts
they state. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the April 7, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 02479.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES
NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN,
SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA
NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III, MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO,
TERESA NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-REJUSO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Luisa Navarro Marcos appeals the Decision1 dated February 28, 2011 and
Resolution2 dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460.
The antecedent facts follow:
Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993,
respectively. They left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot
(subject lot) located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.3
The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of
Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.4
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership
of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property
dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. 5
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos,
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary
Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard
signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person.6
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No.
5215.7
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued
that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that
presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since
no notice was given to them before the examination was conducted. 8 Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s
report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant. 9
In its Order10 dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified
PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be
hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also,
there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert
witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion in an
Order11 dated October 11, 2005.
Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however, dismissed
their petition in the assailed Decision dated February 28, 2011 on the ground that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as
a witness.
Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 29,
2011. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division which
reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of
decisions or matters pending before another Division of the appellate court where he or she
is not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it
that Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed decision in light of
the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 5215. Petitioner adds that the CA erred in not ruling that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a
witness.12 They stress that PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an
opinion on whether the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or whether it
is a forgery.13
In their comment,14 respondents counter that the CA properly disqualified PO2 Alvarez. They
also agreed with the CA that her disqualification was mooted by the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 5215.
We find in favor of petitioner.
The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2
Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the CA
ruling. While we agree with the CA in considering the RTC’s Orders 15 which dismissed Civil
Case No. 5215, we are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the
Decision16 of another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent
proceedings were even held in the reinstated Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders 17 issued by
the RTC which were already submitted to the CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated
is a fact that cannot be ignored.
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but
it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.18Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal violates the Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.19
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic
of the Philippines,20 we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies
a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a
witness by reason of privileged communication.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo,21 we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the
Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
We said:
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the
outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious
belief are not grounds for disqualification.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies
those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders
them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts
of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses
but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the
witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of
disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and
merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause
excludes other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these
comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be
implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied
therein. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her
perception to others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot
be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified
under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC
for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused
the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador,22 we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s signature
was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case
involved simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said
that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements
of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and
false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an
unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert
opinion, as the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled
at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is offered
and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued
a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies
that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the courts.23 Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with
the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. 24 However, we have also recognized
that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical
nature of the procedure in examining forged documents. 25 More important, analysis of the
questioned signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in
crucial to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The
Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used
the opinion of an expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she
conducted.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1) Decision dated February 28,
2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460,
and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez
as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181444 July 17, 2013
BOBBY "ABEL" AVELINO y BULAWAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal are the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02297
which affirmed petitioner's conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 01-189130,2 and the
CA’s Resolution3 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bobby "Abel" Avelino y Bulawan, together with Ricardo Tolentino, Alias Sonny
Muslim, Farouk Musa a.k.a. Boy Muslim, Alias Bubut Tuwad, Alias Angkol, Alias Mon,
Renato Meneses a.k.a. Nato, Benjamin Elbona a.k.a. Toto Mata, and Dominic Apan a.k.a.
Domeng Bakukang, was charged with murder4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused Renato Meneses, Benjamin Elbona, and
Farouk Musa entered a plea of not guilty. The other accused remain at-large.
At the trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of the victim;
Diana Espinosa; Alfredo Manalangsang (Manalangsang); Mary Ann Cañada (Cañada);
Renato Sosas; Dr. Romeo T. Salen; P/Insp. Mario Prado; and National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) agent Rizaldi Jaymalin.5
The facts, as culled from the CA Decision which cited the brief of the Office of the Solicitor
General, are as follows:
Around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of September 2000, Renato Sosas y Verzosa, an
employee of appellant Bobby Avelino y Bulawan in his wood business, was directed by
appellant to summon Toto Mata, Nato, Domeng Bakukang, Bobot Tuwad, Boy Muslim,
Angkol, Charlie, Sonny Muslim and Mon (TSN, January 29, 2002, pp. 5-6). An hour later, the
group called by Renato Sosas met at appellant’s warehouse in Tagaytay, Baseco
Compound, Tondo, Manila. Renato Sosas, who was just a step away from the group, was
astounded when he heard appellant utter "Papatayin si Chairman." Bobot Tuwad reacted by
asking appellant "Sino pong chairman?", to which appellant Avelino replied "Sino pa, Ninong
Chairman Gener." Terrified, Sosas kept mum about what he discovered (TSN, January 29,
2002, pp.10-12).
On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding
on a tricycle going to Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last
passenger to board the tricycle, he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point
between Muelle Del Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang
was riding on passed at the left lane instead of the right lane of the road to give way to the
owner-type (sic) jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its Chairman, Generoso Hispano,
herein victim (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 11-17, Exhs. "R-1" and "4").
While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man
suddenly emerged and blocked Chairman Hispano’s vehicle. Instantaneously,
Manalangsang heard bursts of gunshot which prompted him to jump from the tricycle.
Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the center island of the road (TSN, September 26,
2001, pp. 17-21).
At this juncture, Manalangsang peeped at the direction of Chairman Hispano’s jeep and saw
three (3) men wearing bonnets, two of whom were strategically blocking the jeep of Chairman
Hispano. The third man, who was wearing a green jacket and positioned himself near the
gutter, fired successive shots at Chairman Hispano and thereafter approached the jeep of
Chairman Hispano. He pulled down from the jeep the almost lifeless body of Chairman
Hispano. Since Manalangsang was situated near the third assailant, he failed to identify the
other two assailants. However, Manalangsang positively identified the third assailant as
appellant Bobby "Abel" Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the Chairman’s body and
pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive.
Sensing that it was safe for him to leave the scene, Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again
and went home (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 22-26).
Thereafter, appellant and the other assailants drove away using the owner-type jeep of
Chairman Hispano. However, on their way towards Divisoria, the jeep was incidentally
blocked by a tricycle and a white car which prompted the companion of appellant to shout
"tabi-tabi." At that moment, Mary Ann Ca[ñ]ada saw appellant, who was wearing a green
jacket and a bonnet rolled up to his forehead, driving the owner-type (sic) jeep of Chairman
Hispano. Ca[ñ]ada readily recognized appellant as she was familiar with the face of appellant
having seen him driving the jeep of the Chairman on several occasions before (TSN,
November 19, 2001, pp. 17-28).
When the police arrived at the crime scene, Chairman Hispano was already dead. The
owner-type (sic) jeep of Chairman Hispano was recovered in front of house No. 440,
Orbiztondo Street, Binondo, Manila, with several pieces of empty shells of 9 mm caliber gun
scattered on its floor (TSN, May 7, 2003, pp. 6-7) (Rollo, pages 120-123).6
Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner,
PO2 Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI
Lito D. Cabamongan (Cabamongan).7
Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he
and his wife went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as
they planned to go to Baguio that day. But as he was issued a temporary license late in the
afternoon, instead of going home, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh Hotel in Sta.
Cruz, Manila to spend the night. He parked his car along Dasmariñas Bridge and slept. Later,
he woke up to transfer his car but his car was gone. Thus, he and his wife went to the police
station in Sta. Cruz, Manila then to the AntiCarnapping Unit along U.N. Avenue to report the
incident. At the latter location, they learned from a certain Tata Randy, an acquaintance and
former police officer, that the victim had been gunned down. Around 1:00 a.m., he and his
wife returned to the hotel. On October 23, 2000, he was arrested by agents of the NBI.8
After trial, the RTC, on April 28, 2006, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder qualified by treachery, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The RTC likewise ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Generoso
Hispano (Hispano) the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay them an additional sum of ₱50,000 as
moral damages, the sum of ₱158,471.75 as actual damages, and costs.9
For failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused Farouk
Musa, Benjamin Elbona, and Renato Meneses were acquitted of the crime charged.10
As aforesaid, the CA, in its assailed decision, denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the RTC
decision with modification by increasing the award of actual damages to
₱171,128.75.11 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate
court on January 25, 2008.12
Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA erred in relying
on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and
disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and the findings
of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman. He also
reiterated his defense of denial and alibi.
We have carefully studied the records of this case and find no cogent reason to overturn the
ruling of the CA which is in accord with law and jurisprudence.
As for the defense of the petitioner which is grounded, firstly, upon denial and alibi, basic is
the rule that the defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witness’ positive
identification of the accused-appellants.13 Moreover, as oft-repeated in jurisprudence
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the
crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any
weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving
negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.14
In this case, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the petitioner
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Pharaoh Hotel, where
petitioner claims to have stayed with his wife at the time of the commission of the crime, is
in Sta. Cruz, Manila.15 The said hotel is not so far from the scene of the crime, which is in
Baseco Compound in Tondo, Manila, so as not to afford the petitioner an opportunity to easily
go to the place of the shooting at the time Hispano was killed. Indeed, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. These, the defense failed to do.
The defense of the petitioner is based, secondly, on his allegations that prosecution
witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada failed to positively identify him as the gunman who
mortally wounded Hispano, and that Manalangsang’s testimony as to the locations and
number of gunshot wounds, as well as the position of the gunman, is inconsistent with the
physical evidence as provided by the medico-legal officer and the testimony of SOCO PSI
Cabamongan.
These allegations cannot exculpate the petitioner from criminal liability.
Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. Manalangsang was
able to identify the petitioner because the latter revealed his face when he pulled down the
bonnet he was wearing, thereby exposing his eyes, nose, mouth, and chin. 16 Moreover, the
certainty of Manalangsang in identifying the petitioner as the one who shot Hispano is
bolstered by the fact that he and petitioner were neighbors for five years in Baseco. 17 The
RTC cites the following statement by Manalangsang as an added indication of his certainty
– "Si Avelino, kahit ubod ng layo, kahit naglalakad lang, kilala ko na. Dahil unang-una,
matagal ko na siyang kilala, dahil ako hindi niya ako gaanong kilala, pero sila kilala ko, kahit
nakatagilid, kilala ko siya."18 It cannot be denied that once a person gains familiarity of
another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. 19
Even the theory of the defense that identification of the petitioner by Manalangsang and
Cañada is unlikely due allegedly to the lack of sufficient illumination at the scene of the crime,
has been overcome by the fact that there are lampposts and signboards in the subject area
which can provide illumination despite the black of night. Indeed, even assuming arguendo
that the lampposts were not functioning at the time, the headlights of passing vehicles
provided sufficient illumination at the crime scene. 20 "The Court has previously held that the
light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give ample
illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize another." 21Similarly, the headlights of
vehicles are sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify individuals at a distance of four to
ten meters,22 and it should be noted that the distance between Manalangsang and the jeep
where Hispano was felled was only 31 feet23 or a little over nine meters.24
The identification made by Manalangsang was likewise sufficiently corroborated by the
testimony of Cañada, that she saw the petitioner, with whom she was familiar, drive away in
Hispano’s owner-type jeep, wearing a green jacket and black bonnet rolled up to his
forehead.25
Further, as can be gleaned from the excerpt below, the petitioner’s defense that
Manalangsang’s testimony contradicts with the medical findings, and should then be
disregarded, must fail. Petitioner claims that Manalangsang’s statements that Hispano was
shot in a downward direction conflict with the findings of the medico-legal that the trajectory
of the bullets is in an upward direction. The testimony of Dr. Salen is pertinent and
enlightening:
Q: The trajectory of the bullet is upward?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So the gunman must be at a lower level from the decease[d]?
A: We can not [sic] say that, sir.
Q: But the trajectory of the bullet is upward?
A: It depends on the matter of the position of the head when the head was hit. It could be
when the trajectory is upward it [sic] could be lying down with his back and the gunman and
the barrel of the gun is here and if we will put the normal position of the body it is still upward
but the normal position is like that so…
COURT: Make of record that the witness is demonstrating a slightly incline position of the
head and the body.
WITNESS:
A: So we can not [sic] determine the position of the gunman when it was related [sic] the
gunshot wound of the entry and the victim it will depend on the position of the gunman but
likewise the position of the victim during the infliction [sic] of the gun.
ATTY. VARGAS:
Q: Mr. Witness, if the gunman is standing on an elevated floor of about three feet do you
think that the trajectory of a bullet is upward?
A: It is possible also.26
Clearly, the fact that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction does not negate
the veracity of Manalangsang’s statement that Hispano was shot by the gunman from an
elevated plane.
The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan
as regards the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted
that the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is
opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan
was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the
gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were found is immaterial.
Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires
expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. 27 In this case, counsel for the
petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during
trial.
Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy
the probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. The
case of Madali v. People28 elucidates thus:
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material
details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a
witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant
details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the
very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one
another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as
corroborated by Cañada, must stand. Indeed, it has been consistently held by this Court that
in criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect
because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and
ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Absent any showing that the lower courts
overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result
of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the
credibility of witnesses, especially since Manalangsang and Cañada’s testimony meets the
test of credibility.29 The Court also notes that other than his claim of denial, petitioner failed
to show how the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery or alevosia was additionally properly appreciated
in this case.
The two elements that must be proven to establish treachery are: (a) the employment of
means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and
retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
offender.30 The two elements are present in this case.
These elements are established by the testimony of Manalangsang showing the unexpected
attack by the petitioner on the unsuspecting Hispano whose vehicle was suddenly blocked
by three men, at least one of whom was armed with a firearm.31 The victim was then unarmed
and had no opportunity to defend himself.
Thus, considering all the above-mentioned facts, we uphold the conviction of the petitioner
for the crime of murder.
Regarding the award of damages, we affirm the trial court and CA in ordering the petitioner
to pay the heirs of Generoso Hispano the amount of ₱50,000 as moral damages. In cases
of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.32 Similarly, the CA correctly awarded
his heirs the amount of ₱171,128.75 as actual damages, as said amount which was spent
for funeral and burial expenses was duly supported by receipts. However, as regards the
award of civil indemnity, the same should be increased to ₱75,000 to conform with recent
jurisprudence.33 Also, the heirs of the victim are entitled to exemplary damages which recent
jurisprudence pegs at ₱30,00034 considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of treachery. Lastly, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid, consistent with
current policy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02297 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner BOBBY "ABEL" AVELINO
y BULAWAN is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Generoso
Hispano the amounts of ₱171,128.75 as actual damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary
awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192050 January 9, 2013
NELSON VALLENO y LUCITO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this petition for review is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03433, dated 29 October 2009, affirming the Judgement 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2004-0308. The trial court found petitioner Nelson
Valleno y Lucito3 guilty of violation of Section 11 of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00)
The Information charged petitioner of illegal possession of shabu. It reads:
That on or about the 12th day of March, 2004, in Barangay San Antonio, Milaor, Camarines
Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without any
authority of law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possess, control and
have in custody nine (9) transparent plastic sachets, containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, locally known as "SHABU", a prohibited drug, weighing no less than 34.7011
grams, with an estimated cost or market value of P69,402.20, to the great damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.4
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Five police officers, two barangay officials and one forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution.
P/Insp. Perfecto De Lima (P/Insp. De Lima) was the group director of the 504th Provincial
Mobile Group located at Camarines Sur Police Provincial Office in Naga City. He ordered
PO3 Jaime Villano (PO3 Villano) to conduct a surveillance in connection with the illegal drug
trade of petitioner. PO3 Villano was tasked to conduct a test-buy operation. The specimen
he obtained from petitioner was submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, which, in turn, was tested positive for the presence of shabu. Subsequently,
P/Insp. De Lima ordered SPO4 Romulo Fabiano (SPO4 Fabiano) to apply for a search
warrant. Branch 24 of the RTC of Naga City issued Search Warrant No. 2004-006.5
In the early morning of 12 March 2004, P/Insp. De Lima organized two (2) teams to enforce
the search warrant. SPO4 Feliciano was in charge of the security team, which was tasked to
secure the area to be searched, while the search team composed of PO3 Villano, PO3 Emilio
Edrano (PO3 Edrano) and PO2 Sergio Valenzuela (PO2 Valenzuela), were designated to
search the target house in LRV Village, Barangay San Antonio, Milaor, Camarines Sur. 6
At around 4:30 a.m., the group left the police station and proceeded to petitioner’s house.
They arrived at 5:00 a.m. P/Insp. De Lima instructed PO3 Villano to coordinate with the
barangay officials.7 At 6:00 a.m. and upon arrival of the two (2) barangay officials, SPO4
Fabiano knocked on the door of petitioner’s house. Petitioner opened the door located at the
back of the house. PO3 Villano, who was armed with the search warrant, informed petitioner
that his group would conduct a search inside the house. 8
Before entering petitioner’s house, P/Insp. De Lima instructed the search team to raise their
hands and shirts to show that they have nothing in their possession. P/Insp. De Lima
explained that his purpose was to prevent any speculation that they intend to plant evidence.9
The search team, together with the barangay officials, went inside the house, while P/Insp.
De Lima, petitioner and his wife were waiting just outside the house. PO3 Edrano and PO2
Valenzuela started searching a cabinet located in the kitchen. PO3 Edrano stood up on a
chair to look at the top portion of the cabinet while PO2 Valenzuela was searching the bottom
part. PO3 Edrano saw a black Natel bag with a red stripe on it on top of the cabinet. He
passed it to PO2 Valenzuela, who handed the bag over to PO3 Villano. PO3 Villano unzipped
the bag and uncovered 3 different sizes of white plastic bags containing white granules. The
bag also contained a weighing scale and a bamboo stick. Thereafter, he closed the bag and
brought it outside to P/Insp. De Lima.10
PO3 Villano put his markings "JV" on the plastic sachets, the weighing scale and bamboo
stick in the presence of the barangay officials. He likewise prepared the Inventory Receipt,
which was signed by the barangay officials. Petitioner, however, refused to sign the Inventory
Receipt.11
After the search, petitioner was handcuffed and brought to the police station. PO3 Villano
turned over the seized items to a certain PO3 Molina. 12 While in the police station, PO3
Villano prepared the return of the search warrant. He then brought the Return of the Search
Warrant, accompanied by the seized items, to the RTC of Naga City. The court ordered him
to bring them to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.13
Reynaldo Brito, a barangay tanod, testified that the police officers found one plastic sachet
containing shabu underneath the bed of petitioner. 14 Wilfredo Brito, another barangay tanod,
corroborated the statements of the police officers that a black bag was taken from the top of
the cabinet and that the black bag contained the seized items. 15
Josephine Macura Clemen (Clemen), a forensic chemist, was presented as an expert
witness. She related that after taking a representative sample from the nine (9) plastic
sachets seized from petitioner, they were tested positive for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.16 Her findings were reflected in Chemistry
Report No. D-052-04.17
Petitioner interposed denial. He countered that around 6:00 a.m. of 12 March 2004, he heard
a knock at the bedroom door.18 He opened the door and the policemen introduced
themselves, showed him the search warrant and asked him to come out of the house while
they searched it. After a while, the police officers emerged from the house and told him that
they have found a tawas-like substance.19 He refused to sign the inventory receipt because
he did not understand the contents of the document. He was then brought to the police
station.20
On 13 June 2008, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for illegal possession of shabu. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for illegal possession of methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug,
defined and penalized under Sec. 11(1)(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Four Hundred Thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby CANCELLED. 21
In convicting petitioner, the trial court lent credence to the straightforward testimonies of the
police officers over the mere denial of the accused. The trial court ruled that the chain of
custody over the illegal drugs seized was properly established.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction on 29 October 2009 and
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on 13 April 2010. Petitioner now seeks relief
before this Court via a petition for review. On 11 August 2010, this Court treated the petition
as a notice of appeal and required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if
they so desire, within thirty days from notice.22 The Office of the Solicitor General manifested
that it would no longer file a supplemental brief.23
Petitioner filed his supplemental brief and harped on the inconsistencies of the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses.
In his petition for review, petitioner ascribes upon the Court of Appeals the following errors:
(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS NOT ABLE TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN OF PROVING
BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER HAS
COMMITTED THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
(B) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING THAT THE
REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165 ARE NOT MANDATORY AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF IS
NOT FATAL TO THE CAUSE OF THE PROSECUTION.
(C) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED PROHIBITED DRUGS SUBJECT OF THE CASE WERE A
PRODUCT OF AN IRREGULAR SEARCH AND SEIZURE.24
The primordial issue here, as in any criminal case, is whether the guilt of the accused has
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
It is hornbook doctrine that the factual findings of the appellate court affirming those of the
trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.25 After an exhaustive review of
the records of this case, we see no sufficient reason for resort to the exception to the rule.
In order for prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be
proof that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. 26
All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. During the search, PO3 Edrano
found a bag on top of a cabinet inside the house of petitioner. He handed the same to PO3
Villano, who in turn opened it, and found nine (9) plastic sachets of shabu, thus:
Q Where did you start searching the house?
A We started at the cabinet.
Q Where is that cabinet located?
A Inside his house in front of the dining table.
Q While you were starting to search the cabinet, do you know where your companions were
at that time?
A Yes sir.
Q Where were they?
A The house of the accused was just a small house, so we were just back to back with each
other.
Q While you were searching the cabinet, at what particular part of the cabinet did you start?
A I started at the lower portion of the cabinet.
Q What did you find at the lower portion of the cabinet?
ATTY. GENERAL:
Leading, it is presumed that something was found.
COURT:
Reform.
PROS. ABONAL:
Q What happened when you started to look at the lower portion of the cabinet?
A I saw different kitchen utensils.
Q After searching the lower portion of the cabinet, what happened next?
A I took a chair which I could use in order to see the top portion of the cabinet.
Q What happened after you took a chair?
A I stood at the chair and I saw a natel bag colored black with red stripe on it.
Q After finding that black bag, what happened next?
A I gave the bag to PO3 Villano.
Q When you handed over the bag to Villano, where were you at that time?
A I was still standing by the chair and looking for other things.
Q After giving the bag to Villano, what happened?
A I went down from the chair and told our team leader to check the bag.
Q Did your team leader accede to your request?
A Yes sir.
Q What happened after checking the bag?
A In front of the 2 barangay officials, our team leader opened the bag and we saw different
sizes of plastic bag containing white granules. Our team leader told us that those things are
what we are looking for, then he closed the bag.27
PO3 Villano confirmed receiving the bag and finding white plastic sachets inside:
PROS. TADEO:
Q Why, according to you, you proceeded to search the premises of the accused. Now, what
happened to your search?
A We were able to recover inside his house the nine (9) pieces transparent plastic sachets
containing shabu and several pieces of "PP Bags: which we believed they used in repacking
of the shabu, and a weighing scale. And others I cannot recall, sir.
Q Now, we will go to the specifics. You said that there was actually nine (9) pieces sachets
of shabu recovered from the place, who actually recovered these items?
A PO2 (sic) Edrano and PO1 Valenzuela, sir.
PROS. TADEO:
Q How about you?
A I was only informed that they recovered shabu inside the black bag, sir.
Q When you were informed that these items, these shabu were recovered by Edrano and
Valenzuela?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your distance from them?
A More or less one (1) arm length, sir.
Q By the way, tell us, how were you able to, because according to you, you heard, in what
manner this information reached you during the conduct of the search?
A I heard from them that they saw plastic sachets containing shabu, sir.
Q Meaning to say, they uttered words?
A Yes, sir. They uttered words.
Q When you heard them uttered that words, what exactly the words?
A In Bicol dialect they said: "Yaon digdi an shabu sa bag." (The shabu is in the bag.)
Q Upon hearing this matter, what was your reaction?
A I was surprised, sir. But I already expected that we will be able to recover shabu because
that is the subject of our search warrant, sir.
PROS. TADEO:
Q According to you, you heard somebody uttered the words, "here is the shabu inside the
bag?"
A Yes, sir.
Q When for the first time did you see the bag?
A It was placed on top of the cabinet and it was placed on the table, sir.
Q Who was responsible for the placing of this item from the cabinet down to the table?
A PO2 (sic) Edrano and PO1 Valenzuela, including the two (2) barangay officials, sir.
Q So, if that bag will be shown to you, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Did you see any bag that was recovered?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And were you able to find out what were the contents of that bag?
A Yes, your honor, when it was scrutinized in my presence, I saw the other plastic sachets
containing the shabu itself.
xxxx
PROS. TADEO:
Q When the contents were put out from this bag, were you present?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what were those contents?
A The nine (9) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing shabu.28
Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on petitioner’s person, it was found
inside a bag which was hidden on top of a cabinet in the house of petitioner. Thus, petitioner
is deemed in possession thereof. Petitioner was not lawfully authorized to possess the same.
It can also be inferred that petitioner was privy to the existence of the shabu. Mere
possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such
possession – the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi. With the burden of evidence shifted to the petitioner, it was
his duty to explain his innocence about the regulated drug seized from his
possession.29 This, petitioner failed to do.
The petitioner’s proposition that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is anchored on his claim that the prosecution failed to prove and establish the chain of
custody of the subject prohibited drugs allegedly seized from his house.
The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining
a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. In other words, the evidence must definitely
show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from
the accused.30
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure
and custody of prohibited drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxxx
The provisions of Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of Republic Act No. 9165 provide:
xxxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Petitioner highlights the following acts of non-compliance with the aforementioned rule: 1)
there was failure to present the alleged photographs of the seized substance in court; 2)
there were no representatives from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) during
the conduct of the inventory of the seized items; 3) there was a major contradiction from
among prosecution witnesses on who actually brought the seized items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory; and 4) the manner of conducting the physical inventory of the alleged drugs
taken from petitioner’s house appeared to be irregular as the seized items were allowed to
be handled by persons not authorized to do so.
The Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165 offer some flexibility when a proviso added
that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items."31
In People v. Concepcion,32 this Court ruled that the failure to submit in evidence the required
physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as well as the absence of a
member of media or the DOJ, pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is
not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.33
In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not broken. The
prosecution established that PO3 Edrano recovered the white plastic sachets, later on
confirmed positive for traces of shabu. PO3 Edrano handed them over to PO3 Villano, who
made markings on the seized items and prepared an inventory of the same while inside
petitioner’s house. It was also shown that PO3 Villano brought the seized illegal drugs to the
police station where he himself prepared the inventory. While he presented the same to a
certain PO3 Molina, it was still PO3 Villano and SPO4 Fabiano who first brought the seized
illegal drugs to the court, who in turn ordered him to bring it to the PNP Crime Laboratory. In
the letter request addressed to the forensic chemist, it was PO3 Villano who signed as the
requesting party. Clearly therefore, the recovery and handling of the seized illegal drugs were
more than satisfactorily established in this case.
This Court notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, particularly
that of barangay tanod Reynaldo Brito and PO3 Molina, relating to the place where one of
the plastic sachets was found and to the person who brought the illegal drugs to the crime
laboratory, respectively. We however brush aside these inconsistencies as inconsequential.
Indeed, one can hardly expect their testimonies to be in perfect agreement. As held in the
past, it is perhaps too much to hope that different eyewitnesses shall give, at all times,
testimonies that are in all fours with the realities on the ground. Minor discrepancies in their
testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the essential integrity of the
evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of witnesses. For a
successful appeal, the inconsistencies brought up should pertain to that crucial moment
when the accused was caught selling shabu, not to peripheral matters. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning
the principal occurrence.34
The inconsistent testimony of Reynaldo Brito deserves little weight in light of the consonant
testimonies of all the police officers who testified in court. It is well-settled that the testimonies
of the police officers in dangerous drugs cases carry with it the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions. Absent any clear showing that the arresting officers had
ill-motive to falsely testify against the petitioner, their testimonies must be respected and the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties must be upheld. Petitioner himself
testified that he never had any personal encounter with the police prior to his arrest, thus
negating any ill-motive on the part of the police officers.35
Finally, there was nothing irregular in the conduct of search of petitioner’s house. There were
variations in the witnesses’ testimonies as to whether petitioner was inside the house during
the search. One witness testified that petitioner was coming in and out of the house during
the search while the other witnesses claimed that petitioner was waiting just outside the
house. Assuming that petitioner was indeed outside the house, it does not taint the regularity
of the search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court allows the absence of the lawful
occupant provided that two witnesses are present.
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. —
No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner.1âwphi1 As
elucidated by the appellate court:
As correctly found by the trial court, accused-appellant and his wife were not prevented from
entering their house to observe the search conducted therein. This is bolstered by the
testimonies of police officers. Thus, PO3 Villano testified on cross-examination that the wife
of the accused was inside, watching x x x. Likewise, P/C Insp. Perfecto de Lima, Jr. Testified
that the accused-appellant and his wife went in and out of their house while the team was
conducting a search inside said house: that Valleno and his wife stood outside and
sometimes, came in while the search was being conducted; and that before the search the
Valleno spouses were requested not to go inside the house but during the search they kept
going in and out of said house. In addition, the search was conducted in the presence of two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, in the persons of Brgy.
Kgd. Reynaldo Brito and Chief Tanod Wilfredo Brito. Resultantly, the seized items cannot,
therefore, be considered as "fruits of the poisonous tree."36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed 29 October 2009 Decision and the 13
April 2010 Resolution of the Court or Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 03433 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194253 February 27, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintifT-Appellee, vs. MAGSALIN DIWA Y drugs;
GUTIERREZ, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal via a Notice of Appeal of the Court or Appeals Decision1 in CA-G.R.
CR.-II. C. No. 03219 affirming the Dccision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120,
Caloocan City, which, in turn, convicted accused-appellant Magsalin Diwa (Diwa) of violation
of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dongerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Diwa was charged in two separate Informations for illegal sale and illegal possession
of marijuana, a dangerous drug:
CRIM CASE NO. 68962
Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165
That on or about the 20th day of August 2003, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON
GALVEZ, who posed as buyer ONE (1) folded newspaper print containing 72.90 grams of
dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops for one (1) pc. one hundred peso bill with serial
number #FJI62290 knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.3
CRIM CASE NO. 68963
Violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165
That on or about the 20th day of August 2003, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) yellow plastic bag with one (1) folded newspaper print containing 288.49
grams of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops, knowing [the same] to be a dangerous drug
of the provisions of the above-cited law.4
During arraignment, Diwa pleaded not guilty to both charges.
At the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense admitted the identity of the accused (Diwa) and
the jurisdiction of the RTC, and stipulated on the testimony of prosecution witness, P/Insp.
Jesse Dela Rosa, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District-Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Office, Caloocan City Police Station, to wit:
(1) That the witness was the one who conducted qualitative examination on the
specimens submitted which gave positive results for the presence of dangerous
(2) That he reduced his findings in writing which is Physical Science Report No. D-
1097-03; and
(3) That under his present oath, the witness confirms that the signature above the
name P/Insp. Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa is his signature.5
The foregoing charges were preceded by facts contrarily presented by the parties.
The prosecution’s version, initially testified to by P03 Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez) and
corroborated by SPO1 Fernando Moran (SPO1 Moran), follows:
On 20 August 2003, an informant came to the Caloocan City Police Station and reported the
rampant selling of prohibited drugs by a certain Magsalin Diwa along North Diversion Road,
Service Road, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Upon receiving the information, P/Insp. Cesar
Gonzalez Cruz (P/Insp. Cruz) forthwith formed a group to conduct surveillance on the
pinpointed area and to arrest possible violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The police operatives were composed of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio, SPO1 Wilson Gamit, PO3
Manuel de Guzman, PO1 Rolly Montefrio, SPO1 Moran and PO3 Galvez. The team assigned
PO3 Galvez as the poseur-buyer and agreed on a pre-arranged signal of identifying
accused, i.e., the informant throws his cigarette in front of Diwa. Thereafter, P/Insp. Cruz
handed over to PO3 Galvez a One Hundred Peso-bill dusted with ultra-violet powder, which
PO3 Galvez then marked with his initials "RG."
On the same date, at 8:30 in the evening, the police operatives proceeded to North Diversion
Road, Service Road, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The team of police operatives
positioned themselves, with PO3 Galvez at a distance of about five (5) meters from the
informant and the other policemen at ten (10) meters away from where PO3 Galvez was
situated. Prompted by the informant’s execution of the pre-arranged signal, PO3 Galvez
approached Diwa and asked him, "Pre, may chongke (street name for Marijuana) ka pa ba?"
to which Diwa replied "Meron, magkano ba ang kukunin mo?" PO3 Galvez answered back
"Piso lang," which, in street lingo, meant One Hundred Pesos (₱100.00) worth of marijuana.
PO3 Galvez paid Diwa with the One Hundred Peso-bill dusted with ultra-violet powder. Diwa
held the marked money in his right hand, reached for a yellow "SM Supermarket" plastic bag
beside him, and got a portion of a bunch of marijuana wrapped in a newspaper, which portion
he gave to PO3 Galvez. At once, as soon as the buy-bust deal was consummated, PO3
Galvez scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal for the other policemen to approach
them, and instantaneously grabbed Diwa’s hands. Seeing PO3 Galvez’s signal, the waiting
police operatives rushed towards him. PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a policeman to
Diwa, recovered the buy-bust money and marked the marijuana he bought from the latter,
"MDG," Diwa’s initials. SPO1 Moran then confiscated the yellow "SM Supermarket" plastic
bag which contained more marijuana. After informing Diwa of his constitutional rights, the
team brought Diwa to the police station for investigation.
The items confiscated from Diwa were sent to the Crime Laboratory Office of Caloocan City
for examination. P/Insp. Jesse Dela Rosa conducted a laboratory test on the specimen
submitted by the police operatives, and subsequently issued Physical Sciences Report No.
D-1097-03 containing the following entries:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A. One (1) yellow plastic bag with markings SM Supermarket containing the following;
A-1 = One (1) folded newspaper print with markings ‘MDG-1 08-20-03 BUY BUST’
containing 72.90 grams of dried suspected Marijuana fruiting tops.
A-2 = One (1) folded newspaper print with markings ‘MDG-2 08-20-03’ containing
288.49 grams of dried suspected Marijuana fruiting tops.
xxx xxx xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of a dangerous drug. x x x
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen A-1 and A-2 gave
POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a dangerous drug. x x x
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A-1 and A-2 contain Marijuana, a dangerous drug. x x x6
PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), the investigator-in-case, was likewise presented by
the prosecution, but his testimony was eventually dispensed with because the prosecution
and defense entered into another stipulation, that PO2 Hipolito prepared the Referral Slip,
Request for Laboratory Examination and the Pinagsamang Salaysay.
Accused-appellant Diwa proffered an entirely different story. He claimed that on the
inauspicious date of 20 August 2003, he was in front of his house, fetching water, when
SPO1 Moran, whom Diwa did not know at the time, approached him and inquired about a
certain Brenda. Not knowing who Brenda is, and having told SPO1 Moran so, Diwa was
surprised to be whisked away by SPO1 Moran. SPO1 Moran first took Diwa to Balintawak,
EDSA, where they transferred to another vehicle; thereafter, Diwa was brought to the
Caloocan City police station.
At the precinct, Diwa was detained for two (2) days, and in the interim was supposedly
brought to the hospital for medical examination. Further, the policemen allegedly demanded
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) from Diwa in exchange for his release. When
Diwa told the police that he had no money, Diwa was detained for another day, and the next
day was brought to the prosecutor’s office for inquest. He was then returned to the Caloocan
City Jail.
On the whole, Diwa denied all the allegations against him; he denied ownership of
the marijuana, claiming that he only saw these when he was brought before the prosecutor’s
office. Diwa only admitted to the money, Forty Pesos (₱40.00) that was taken from him,
which was purportedly used for his fare in going to the hospital for check-up. He claimed to
have never met PO3 Galvez, and his supposed arrest by the latter during a buy-bust
operation never happened.
However, on cross-examination, Diwa admitted that PO3 Galvez was present during his
arrest. On re-direct examination, Diwa failed to clarify his inconsistent statements. Lastly,
Diwa claimed that he was brought to a dark room in the Drug Enforcement Unit where his
hands were held, rubbed and examined.
On 11 February 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Diwa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds the accused Magsalin Diwa GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes
upon him the following:
(a) In Crim. Case No. C-68962, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and
(b) In Crim. Case No. C-68963, the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱300,00.00).
The drugs subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with law.7
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant and the penalty
imposed on him by the RTC.
Gaining no reprieve before the lower courts, Diwa comes to us assigning the following errors:
I. THE [LOWER COURTS] GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE SELF-SERVING TESTIMONIES OF POLICE OFFICERS
RAMON GALVEZ AND FERNANDO MORAN.
II. THE [LOWER COURTS] GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.8
Accused-appellant hinges his appeal on PO3 Galvez’s and SPO1 Moran’s failure to follow
the procedure for the custody and disposition of the marijuana, outlined in Section 219 of
Republic Act No. 9165, after these were seized and confiscated. Diwa points out that, on
cross-examination, PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran did not know what was done to the seized
and confiscated marijuana fruiting tops. Thus, the prosecution failed to establish that the
seized items were marijuana, in short, dangerous drugs. Corollary thereto, Diwa theorizes
that it was possible that, not having had the money to pay the police for his release, the
actual items seized from Diwa were replaced with the marijuana dried fruiting tops to justify
his arrest.
As the lower courts were, we are not convinced. We find no cause to disturb their factual A: Because we agreed in the briefing regarding the pre-arranged signal and that is the
findings that a buy-bust transaction took place between PO3 Galvez and Diwa, resulting in informant will (sic) throw cigarette in front of the person of Magsalin Diwa.
the latter’s lawful arrest for illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana. xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, what happened when you were following the informant?
On more than one occasion, we have ruled that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly A: After seeing the throwing of cigarette by the informant, I immediately approached the
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great weight. 10 This is because the trial suspect.
judge has the distinct advantage of closely observing the demeanor of the witnesses, as well Q: To whom was that cigarette thrown by the informant?
as the manner in which they testify, and is in a better position to determine whether or not A: In front of Magsalin Diwa.
they are telling the truth.11 On that score alone, Diwa’s appeal ought to have been dismissed Q: Aside from you and the informant, were there other persons around?
outright. A: None Ma’am.
xxxx
Q: And how far were you when the informant threw cigarette in front of the suspect?
As found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements A: Five (5) Meters.
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to Q: Upon seeing that situation, throwing of cigarette in front of the suspect, what did you do?
another and (2) knew that what was sold and delivered was a prohibited drug; 12 and illegal A: I approached him.
possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of the object identified as Q: "Siya" you are referring to the suspect?
a prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the A: I am referring to Magsalin Diwa.
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 13 Q: What about the informant?
A: He went already, Ma[’a]m.
For the reversal of his conviction, Diwa of course relies on the presumption of innocence in Q: What did you do when you approach (sic) the suspect?
his favor, and on the corresponding argument that the details of the purported transaction A: I told him, "PRE, MAY CHONGKE KA PA BA?"
between him and PO3 Galvez were not clearly and adequately shown. In this regard, we Q: What do you mean by "Chongke?"
study the testimony of PO3 Galvez: A: The street name of Marijuana.
A: He replied, "Meron, magkano ba ang kukunin mo."
FISCAL GRAVINO: Q: What is the response?
Do you recall where were you on August 20, 2003? A: I replied, "Piso lang," worth ₱100.00 pesos.
A: I was in the office. Q: What did he do after you told him that you are going to buy Chongke for ₱100.00?
Q: And do you remember if you had an operation on that date? A: He took the ₱100.00 peso [bill] from me. He held the money with his right hand.
A: Yes, Ma[’a]m. Q: And what else happened?
Q: Can you recall what is (sic) that operation all about? A: He got a plastic bag colored yellow "SM Supermarket."
A: We conducted buy bust operation[.] xxxx
Q: Who ordered you to conduct buy bust operation? Q: What did he do with the yellow plastic bag?
A: Our Chief. A: The yellow plastic bag contained Marijuana and took Marijuana wrapped in a newspaper
Q: What is the name? and gave it to me.
A: Police Insp. Cesar Gonzales Cruz. xxxx
Q: And how did Police Insp. Cesar Cruz got (sic) information which prompted him to order Q: So there were other parts of Marijuana left in that plastic bag, is that what you mean?
you tour (sic) team to conduct buy bust operation? A: Yes, Ma’am.
A: There was an informant who came to our office, giving information about rampant selling xxxx
of Marijuana. Q: And so after the small portion of Marijuana was already handed to you by the suspect
Q: And were you informed about the place where the rampant selling of Marijuana took what did you do?
place? A: When I got the Marijuana from the suspect I scratched my head as pre-arranged signal
A: Yes, Ma’am. that I already bought Marijuana from him.14
Q: Where?
A: Along Express Way, Service Road, Caloocan City. Manifest from the foregoing is that the buy-bust transaction between the police operatives
Q: And you said that your team was ordered by your Chief to conduct buy bust operation. and Diwa was unequivocally established by the prosecution, and it was so found by both
Who was the subject? lower courts. After being identified by the informant, Diwa was approached by PO3 Galvez
A: Magsalin Diwa. for the purchase of marijuana. Diwa, after ascertaining the quantity to be purchased and
xxxx accepting the marked money from PO3 Galvez, handed him a portion of marijuana from the
Q: When you arrived and parked your vehicle near the target area, what else happened? bunch wrapped in newspaper, contained in the yellow "SM Supermarket" plastic bag. The
A: We went ahead to the target area. contents thereof were sent to the Physical Sciences Division, and after examination,
Q: You said "we" to whom are you referring to? confirmed to be marijuana, a dangerous drug.
A: Me and the informant.
Q: Why do (sic) you went (sic) ahead?
In contrast to the presentation of the prosecution, Diwa’s roughly drawn scene is that of a
frame up, and that he was eventually charged with illegal sale and illegal possession
of marijuana because he could not produce the money to obtain his release. For good
measure, Diwa argues that the police operatives did not perform their duties regularly.
The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, and the corresponding
testimony of the arresting officers on the buy-bust transaction, can only be overcome through
clear and convincing evidence showing either of two things: (1) that they were not properly
performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive. 15 In the face of
the straightforward and direct testimony of the police officers, and absent any improper
motive on their part to frame up Diwa, stacked against the bare and thin self-serving
testimony of Diwa, we find no reason to overturn the lower courts’ findings.
Diwa makes much of the fact that the police operatives did not follow to the letter the text of
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, in that they were unaware whether or not an inventory
was made of the seized items, or photos taken thereof. Regrettably for Diwa, and as found
by both lower courts, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs (corpus delicti) was duly
accounted for and remained unbroken as demonstrated by the marking placed by PO3
Galvez on the substance, from the time it was seized from Diwa until the police turned it over
to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis.
In this regard, we quote with favor the appellate court’s disquisition:
There can be no doubt that the marijuana bought and seized from [Diwa] was the same one
examined in the crime laboratory and later, presented in court. This Court, thus, finds the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the drugs coming from [Diwa] to have not been
compromised. Having found the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to be
properly preserved, then there is no violation of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. As held
by the Supreme Court, non-compliance by the apprehending policemen with Section 21 is
not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team [citation omitted]. As provided in Section 21 (a) of the pertinent Implementing
Rules of Republic Act No. 9165:
"…Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.."
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. [Diwa], in the instant case,
has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered, altered or meddled with to
overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and a
presumption that public officer properly discharge their duties. Having failed to discharge this
burden, his conviction must be sustained [citation omitted]. 16
Turning now to the imposable penalty on accused-appellant, we sustain the penalty imposed
by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No.
9165 provide for the penalty for the illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively, of
dangerous drugs:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. -
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as
a broker in any of such transactions.
xxxx
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:
xxxx
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:
xxxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(₱400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as but not
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA. LSD, GHB. and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements or less than three hundred (300) grams
of marijuana.
For the illegal sale of marijuana, violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the lower
courts correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00). The penalty of death was deleted given the advent of
Republic Act No. 934617 which prohibits the imposition of the Death Penalty.1âwphi1
For the illegal possession of marijuana in the amount of 288.49 grams, violation of Section
11 of Republic Act No. 9165, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,18 the lower
courts correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen ( 14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-II. C. No. 03219 and the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. C -68962 and C-68963
arc AFFIRJVIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181598 March 6, 2013
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V,
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
of the Decision1 dated January 23, 2007, as well as the Resolution 2 dated January 7, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86062, entitled "ARNEL A. BERNARDO, Attorney
V, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V MARCELO, FACT-
FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB)- Office of the Ombudsman, and HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue," which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated July 6, 2004 issued by
petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (the Ombudsman) in OMB-C-A-03-0531-K (LSC),
entitled "Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), Represented by Atty. Ma. Elena A.
Roxas v. Arne! A. Bernardo, Attorney V, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)."
These are the facts of this case, as summed by the Court of Appeals:
Respondent Arne! A. Bernardo was hired by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on
September 3, 1979 and therein rendered continuous and uninterrupted service until his
promotion to his present position as Attorney V with Salary Grade of 25 and assigned as
Technical Assistant at the Office of the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue – Criminal
Prosecution Group. Primarily, the respondent derived his income from his employment with
the BIR.
On various dates in 1979 up to 2001 respondent acquired various properties and had
business interests in BP Realty Corporation which was registered in 1988, and in Rina’s
Boutique and Gift Shop-Gel’s Gift Center where his wife is the owner/proprietress. He and
his family also made several foreign travels during the period 1995 to 2002. However,
petitioner’s SALN for the years 1993 up to 2001 did not disclose any business interest and/or
financial connection, but showed a steady increase of his net worth.
Based on the foregoing, respondent was administratively and civilly charged with acquiring
unexplained wealth by the FFIB (hereafter, the "OMBUDSMAN"). Accordingly, on November
12, 2003 the OMBUDSMAN filed the appropriate administrative action against the
respondent for Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act
No. 1379. This case was docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0531-K (LSC) entitled "Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), Represented by Atty. Ma. Elena A. Roxas versus Arnel A.
Bernardo, Attorney V, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)".
In its Complaint, the OMBUDSMAN alleged that the respondent is an incorporator and
director of BP Realty Corporation as shown by its Articles of Incorporation dated October 15,
1998 and that his wife, Ma. Lourdes I. Bernardo is the owner/proprietress of Rina’s Boutiques
and Gift Shop-Gel’s Gift Center as may be shown by Business Permits for CY 1999-2003.
On various dates in 1979 up to 2001 the respondent purchased parcels of residential and
agricultural land, the purchase prices and costs of which were manifestly out of proportion or
not commensurate to his and his wife’s lawful incomes, allowances, savings or declared
assets. He and his family also made several foreign travels during the period 1995 to 2002.
The respondent’s cash on hand and net worth also consistently increased. However,
respondent’s SALN for the years 1993 up to 2001 did not disclose any business interest
and/or financial connection.
The evidence for the Ombudsman consists of the CERTIFICATION (dated July 7, 2003) of
the annual salary compensation and allowances received by the respondent from 1998 to
2002; Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of BP Realty Corporation which shows that the
respondent is one of the incorporators of the said corporation; Business Permits of Rina’s
Boutiques and Gift Shop; Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information dated June 24, 2003
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which shows that BP Realty
Corporation is registered with the (SEC) on November 4, 1988 and is on active status and
that said corporation failed to file the General Information Sheet for 1990-2003 as well as its
Financial Statement from 1989 to 2002; SALNs for the years 1993 to 2001; Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 166204, 244954, 191636, CLOA-T-9835, CLOA-T-9834, T-
118783; Declaration of Real Property No. D-105-03089, D-105-05849; Deed of Absolute
Sale dated October 23, 1997 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-57064 (T-113488)
of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan; Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 27, 1985 over a parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 151157 of the Registry of Deeds Manila; Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 10, 1999 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 190651 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila; Certification dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Bureau of Immigration which
shows the travel records from January 1995 to May 31, 2003 of the respondent, his wife,
Ma. Lourdes I. Bernardo, and his children Lorina I. Bernardo and Adrian
I. Bernardo, Angeline I. Bernado, and Aldrin I. Bernardo; and Certification dated June 3, 2003
which shows the travel records of the respondent’s wife, Ma. Lourdes I. Bernardo from
January 1995 to May 31, 2003.
The Ombudsman thus sought that the respondent be adjudged guilty of acquiring
unexplained wealth and be dismissed from the service, as well as the forfeiture of his
properties.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated January 30, 2004 the respondent (respondent below) averred
that: he is engaged in various legitimate businesses; he had divested his interest and/or
shares from BP Realty Corporation as may be shown by a Deed of Assignment dated
November 28, 1988, and that its certificate of registration had been revoked as may be
shown by the Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on September 29, 2003 for being inactive pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 902-A; he religiously paid corresponding internal revenue taxes from income of
the business disclosed in his SALN, as may be shown by his Income Tax Returns covering
the period 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001; on his earnings derived not purely from
compensation income, but also from legitimate business as well as business interest or
financial connection to Rina’s Boutique and Gift Shop/Gel’s Gift Center managed by his wife
as shown by business permits for Rina’s Boutique and Gift Shop, he stated that he disclosed
in his SALNs filed during the period 1993 to 2001 under "B. Personal and Other Properties"
the following: "Merchandise Inventory", "Building Improvement", "Store Equipment" and
"Depreciation" accounts; on the respondent’s non-declaration of an agricultural land
purchased in Bulacan in 1995, the respondent points out that the agricultural land declared
in his SALNs for 1995 to 2001 appeared to refer to only one (1) parcel although in truth and
in fact, the acquisition covered two (2) parcels of land awarded to him under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government, covered by TCT No. CLOA-
T9834 (consisting of 8,969 sq.m.) and TCT No. 9835 (consisting of 20,004 sq.m.) both
registered on November 27, 1995 with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The reason for this
is because he honestly believed that it was sufficient to declare the two (2) lots as one, with
the total cost indicated in his SALN, since the two parcels were acquired at the same time in
1995; respondent had availed of Tax Amnesty under the following laws: Executive Order No.
41 dated August 22, 1986 (for the years 1981 to 1985), PD No. 213 dated June 16, 1973 (for
the years 1969 to 1972), PD No. 631 dated January 6, 1975, and PD No. 1840 dated
December 31, 1980.4 (Citations omitted.)
From its appreciation of the aforementioned evidence, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision
dated April 21, 2004 which expressed its conclusion that respondent had acquired
unexplained wealth during his tenure as a government employee. The dispositive portion of
said ruling is reproduced here:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED:
1. Respondent ARNEL A. BERNARDO is hereby found GUILTY of Dishonesty, in
accordance with the provision of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to
Republic Act No. 1379, for which the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE,
with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service, is hereby
recommended pursuant to Sections 53 and 58, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
2. That the Honorable Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be
furnished a copy of the Resolution, for the implementation of this administrative
penalty in accordance with law, with the request to inform this Office of the action
taken hereon.
3. Finally, it is respectfully recommended that copies of the case records be referred
to the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, this Office for the preparation and filing
of the appropriate complaint pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379. 5
In explanation of its guilty verdict, the Ombudsman essentially opined that the value of
respondent’s acquired properties, the costs of his and his family’s foreign trips abroad, and
the increasing net worth indicated in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALNs) for the years 1993 to 2001 were manifestly disproportionate to his salary and
allowances. The Ombudsman also decreed that there was no proof of respondent’s claim of
other lawful income nor was there any evidence that the purported donation he received in
the amount of ₱8,000,000.00 was lawful. Thus, the Ombudsman concluded that
respondent’s properties were illegally acquired based on a finding that the evidence
presented by the latter allegedly failed to rebut the presumption provided for by law.
Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered the assailed
January 23, 2007 Decision, overturning the Ombudsman’s finding of administrative guilt on
the part of respondent. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ Decision states:
WHEREFORE, reversible error having been committed by the Ombudsman, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED and its Decision dated April 21, 2004 as well as the Order dated
July 22, 2004 are both REVERSED and SET ASIDE.6
The Ombudsman moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the assailed January 7, 2008 Resolution.
Thus, the Ombudsman filed the present petition with the following issues submitted for
consideration:
I. CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
FINDING OF GUILT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT WAS SUPPORTED
BY MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT HE HAS COMMITTED DISHONESTY
AND SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE: (A) FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE HIS
BUSINESS INTERESTS, (B) FOR HAVING ACCUMULATED
PROPERTIES WORTH MORE THAN HIS LAWFUL MEANS TO
ACQUIRE, (C) FOR HIS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE SUCH PROPERTIES
IN HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH
(SALN), AND (D) FOR FAILING TO DISCLOSE IN HIS SALNs HIS AND
HIS SPOUSE’S FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS.
II. AS CONSISTENTLY HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT, THE FINDINGS
OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN DESERVE GREAT WEIGHT,
AND MUST BE ACCORDED FULL RESPECT AND CREDIT.7
The Ombudsman argues that there are factual and legal bases to uphold its findings,
particularly as to the administrative liability for Dishonesty of respondent. It further asserts
that the findings of fact of an administrative agency akin to itself must be respected, as long
as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or preponderant.
The petition is without merit.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise
stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as
it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the
complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.8
As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts.9 When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the findings set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by evidence on record.10
The issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for the
charge of Dishonesty is one of fact, which is not generally subject to review by this Court.
Nonetheless, a review of the facts of the instant case is warranted considering that the
findings of fact of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals were not in harmony with each
other.
The Ombudsman applied against the respondent the prima facie presumption laid down in
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379, which states that:
Section 2. Filing of petition. – Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during
his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Nevertheless, the presumption in the aforementioned provision is merely prima facie or
disputable. As held in one case, "a disputable presumption has been defined as a species
of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold
the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence." 11
Unsurprisingly, Section 5 of the same statute requires any court, before which the petition
for forfeiture is filed, to set public hearings during which the public officer or employee may
be given ample opportunity to explain to the satisfaction of the court how he had acquired
the property in question, to wit:
Section 5. Hearing. The court shall set a date for a hearing, which may be open to the public,
and during which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the
satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.
Respondent appears to have been given sufficient opportunity by the Ombudsman to rebut
the prima facie presumption applied against him which is that his properties were illegally
acquired, however, as the instant case illustrated, the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals
came to differing conclusions with regard to respondent’s evidence.
A careful perusal of the records of this case has convinced this Court that although
respondent had acquired properties, cash on hand and in bank, and had gone on foreign
travels with his family, the aggregate cost of which appear to be not in proportion to the
combined salaries of the respondent and of his wife, it had been sufficiently shown that such
assets and expenses were financed through respondent’s, and his wife’s, other lawful
business income and assets, and for which they have paid the corresponding taxes thereon.
Anent the Ombudsman’s charge that respondent’s 1985 purchase of real property could not
be supported by his salaries for the period 1980 to 1985, the Court of Appeals noted in
respondent’s favor his availment of tax amnesty for the taxable years 1981 to 1985 under
Executive Order No. 41 dated August 22, 1986. To our mind, this circumstance sufficiently
showed that respondent had income other than his salaries for the relevant period prior to
his purchase of the aforementioned property. Indeed, it is significant to point out that only
respondent’s SALNs for the periods 1993 to 2001 were presented in evidence by the
Ombudsman. Interestingly, Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol, who was among the
signatories to the Ombudsman’s Decision dismissing respondent from the service, wrote and
appended a comment to the said Decision recommending, among others, that the FFIB
"secure additional Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Networth starting from the first day
of government service to establish the true opening net worth of the respondent." 12 To be
sure, this is a tacit admission that the evidence on record failed to present an accurate picture
of all the lawful sources of income of respondent prior to his 1993 SALN.
As for the other charges of unexplained acquisitions/expenses made by the Ombudsman
against respondent, we quote with approval the detailed discussion made by the Court of
Appeals, speaking through then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes
(who is now a member of this Court), in the assailed January 23, 2007 Decision:
For the year 1989, We find that the respondent had satisfactorily explained how he was able
to acquire a residential land in Quezon City covered by Tax Declaration Nos. D-105-02089
and D-105-05849 for ₱235,420.00 despite the fact that his declared income for the year 1989
only amounts to ₱43,140.00. As pointed out by the respondent, the lot covered by Tax
Declaration No. D-105-03089, and the property improvement thereon covered by Tax
Declaration No. D-105-05849, was awarded to the respondent by the GSIS for ₱235,420.00
pursuant to a housing program for BIR employees, subject to a monthly salary deduction of
₱2,001.00 since June 1990. This was also secured by the respondent’s GSIS Insurance
Policy and a Real Estate Mortgage on the same property as shown by loan documents.
Anent the Ombudsman’s claim that the respondent had failed to justify the increase in his
"cash on hand and in bank", and to substantiate his claim that the reason for the increase
thereon was due to a cash donation of ₱8,000,000.00 made in favor of the respondent in the
year 2001. The Ombudsman points out that the respondent’s SALN for the year 2000
showed a total networth of ₱12,734,083.60 while his "cash on hand and in bank" is
₱3,921,061.80. Then for the year 2001, the respondent’s SALN showed a total networth of
₱21,085,296.95 while his "cash on hand and in bank" is ₱10,431,897.45. We are convinced
that the respondent had substantiated his claim that the reason for the increase in his "cash
on hand and in bank" was due to a cash donation of ₱8,000,000.00 made in his favor in the
year 2001. The respondent had voluntarily made such disclosure in his SALN as required by
the law. The Deed of Donation October 8, 2001 is, indeed, a credible proof that such donation
was lawful, there being no showing of its illegality. As correctly noted by the respondent,
there was no legal requirement to attach the Deed of Donation or to disclose the identity of
the donor, nor to append to the SALN evidence of payment of the imposable tax due as Sec
99 (b) of RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997, imposes the tax liability arising from
the gratuitous act upon the donor, not upon the donee.
For the year 1999, the Ombudsman noted that the respondent acquired a residential land in
Manila for ₱1,000,000.00, and this is covered by TCT No. 244854 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Manila, despite the fact that his "cash on hand and in bank" had decreased in the
amount of ₱565,823.10, such amount together with his income for the year 1999 in the sum
of only ₱230,628.00 are not sufficient to justify the purchase of the residential land. Even
with the reported net income from Rina’s Boutique and Gift Shop/Gel’s Gift Center for 1999
amounting to only ₱63,857.65, the purchase still could not be justified. For his part, the
respondent insists that this property was acquired by him and his wife from the latter’s
parents. According to the respondent, his SALN for 1999 shows that his "cash on hand and
in bank" was ₱3,653,079.85, which is adequate to justify this purchase. To support his
contention, the respondent submitted documentary evidence consisting of the following:
a. Annual Income Tax Return for 1999
b. Financial Documents:
b.1 Audited Report
b.2 Balance Sheet
b.3 Income Statement
 b.4 Rental Income Statements
b.5 Employer’s Certificate of Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld
b.6 Monthly Agents Commission/ Withholding Tax Report
b.7 Certificate of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source issued by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
b.8 Official Receipt issued by the Trader’s Royal Bank as proof of payment
of income Tax Liability in the amount of ₱159,974.65
We are convinced that the respondent had justified his purchase of the residential land in
1999 for ₱1,000,000.00. In his SALN for 1999, the respondent had declared a networth of
₱12,447,700.75 and cash on hand and in bank in the amount of ₱3,653,079.85. His
aggregate tax payment of ₱159,974.65 would indeed negate the Ombudsman’s claim that
his additional income derived from his wife’s business amounted to only ₱63,857.65, and
this is bolstered by the fact that in the respondent’s annual income tax return for 1999 he
reported a taxable business income of ₱425,904.50 while his wife reported a taxable
business income of ₱63,857.65. We also note that the respondent had also derived income
from lottery business as may be shown by Annexes "5-I" to "5-R" of his Counter-Affidavit.
Although such exhibits are in the name of his (respondent) brother Alberto A. Bernardo, the
latter had already assigned to him the operation of two (2) lotto outlets/terminals located in
Sta. Mesa, Manila and in Quezon City on June 9, 1998 as shown by the Deed of Assignment.
These exhibits also negate the Ombudsman’s claim that "(A)s regards the respondent’s
claim of other income (rental, lottery, other income) no proof of the same was presented."
For the year 1990, the Ombudsman alleged that the respondent acquired a residential land
in Manila for ₱230,000.00, covered by TCT No. 244854 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila, despite the fact that his declared income for the year 1990 only amounts to
₱57,432.00. In defense, the respondent said that this acquisition was truthfully disclosed in
his SALN, and that he had the capacity to make this purchase as he was engaged in lawful
business, deriving lawful income. The Ombudsman in its Decision stated that in 1995, the
respondent acquired a residential land located in Quezon City for ₱4,150,000.00 and an
agricultural land in Bulacan worth ₱500,000.00. The respondent indicated in his SALN for
the year 1995 as one of his liabilities, "notes payable" in the amount of ₱4,000,000.00 which
the Ombudsman presumed to have been used by the respondent in buying the said
properties. The Ombudsman noted, however, that the respondent’s loan payable had
decreased by ₱2,000,000.00 in 1996, but his "cash on hand and in bank" had increased from
₱3,861,077.05 to ₱4,701,709.95. The Ombudsman emphasizes that while the respondent
had paid out cash in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00, his cash on hand and in bank did not
decrease, but even increased by ₱1,600,072.90 which means that he had earned a total
amount of ₱3,600,072.90 for the year 1996 alone. respondent’s building improvements
likewise increased from ₱143,420.00 to ₱902,860.00. However, his annual income for 1996
amounted only to ₱177,428.00. The respondent however draws attention to his SALN for the
year 1995 which shows that he was financially capable of purchasing property valued at
₱4,150,000.00 as he had a cash disposable balance of ₱12,323,731.75 and net worth of
₱6,471,782.95. The Ombudsman also makes much of the fact of the respondent’s and his
family’s trips abroad in the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, pointing out that the respondent’s
lawful income for the years 1995 (₱157,000.00), 1996 (₱177,408.00), and 1997
(₱224,988.00) cannot support such travels. But this is denied by the respondent, saying that
his Cash on Hand and In Bank (Cash Flow Analysis) for the years 1995 to 2001, his Income
Tax Returns for the years 1995-1996-1997, and his networth including disposable income
was more than sufficient to justify his property acquisitions and foreign travels for the covered
period.
In an attempt to present a clear outline of his financial capacity, the respondent presented a
comparative Cash Flow Analysis which he had embodied in his counter-affidavit. The
evidence for herein respondent as attached to his Counter-Affidavit consists of the Deed of
Assignment dated November 28, 1988 to show that the respondent had absolutely
transferred and conveyed his rights and interests over BP Realty Corporation to Noble
Bambina B. Perez; Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information dated June 24, 2003 issued by
the SEC which shows that BP Realty Corporation’s Certificate of Registration was revoked
on September 29, 2003; a copy of the Sales Invoice of Rina’s Boutique and Gift Shop-Gel’s
Gift Center; Annual Income Tax Return of the respondent for the years 1998 to 2001 with
Reports of Independent Certified Public Accountants To Accompany Philippine Income Tax
Return; Amended SALN for the year 1995; and Revenue Special Order dated May 5, 2003.
His income tax returns clearly show that he had been paying taxes not only for compensation
income, but for business incomes, as well. In fact, a big chunk thereof was derived from
rental incomes of the respondent.
Notably, the Ombudsman appeared to have heavily relied solely on the respondent SALNs
for the years 1993 to 2001. We do not understand why no evidence was presented to show
the respondent beginning net worth from the first day of his employment with the government
as declared in the SALN’s filed by him. His beginning net worth must be considered for
purposes of determining whether his disposable income was more than sufficient to justify
his property acquisitions and foreign travels for the covered period, and whether he
possesses the financial capability to acquire or purchase properties as reported in his
SALNs. Such net worth of the respondent as declared in the statement filed by him from the
first day of his employment with the government shall be considered as his true new worth
as of such date, for purposes of determining his capacity for future property acquisitions
during his tenure as a public officer. Any unexplained increase in his net worth thereafter
may then fall within the ambit of the presumption provided by Republic Act No.
1379.13 (Citations omitted.)
As regards to the Ombudsman’s contention that respondent should be administratively held
liable for Dishonesty for also failing to truthfully declare in his SALNs the business interests
and financial connections that are attributable to himself, his spouse, and unmarried children
below 18 years of age living in his household, we hold that, absent a clear showing of intent
to conceal such relevant information in his SALN, administrative liability cannot attach.
An examination of his SALNs during the period 1993 to 2001 would reveal that, although
respondent indicated the words "Not Applicable" to the SALN question "Do you have any
business interest and other financial connections including those of your spouse and
unmarried children below 18 years living in your household?," he likewise declared under
the enumeration entitled "B. Personal and Other Properties" personal properties consisting
of "Merchandise Inventory," "Building Improvement," "Store Equipment," and "Depreciation"
which clearly indicate his engagement in lawful businesses since the said items have nothing
to do with compensation income.
Furthermore, respondent clearly indicated on the face of his 1999 and 2000 SALNs that his
spouse is a "businesswoman" which manifested his intent to divulge and not to conceal the
business interests of his wife. In fact, this Court had previously ruled in another case that the
indication of the wife as a "businesswoman" leads to the inference that said person has
business interests:
Neither can petitioner’s failure to answer the question, "Do you have any business interest
and other financial connections including those of your spouse and unmarried children living
in your house hold?" be tantamount to gross misconduct or dishonesty. On the front page of Prescinding from our analysis of the facts and circumstances attending this case, we are
petitioner’s 2002 SALN, it is already clearly stated that his wife is a businesswoman, and it inclined to impose the same penalty on herein respondent.
can be logically deduced that she had business interests. Such a statement of his wife’s
occupation would be inconsistent with the intention to conceal his and his wife’s business WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
interests. That petitioner and/or his wife had business interests is thus readily apparent on Decision dated January 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
the face of the SALN; it is just that the missing particulars may be subject of an inquiry or MODIFICATION that respondent Arnel A. Bernardo is found GUILTY of simple negligence
investigation.14 (Emphasis supplied.) in accomplishing his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), and as a
penalty therefor, it is ORDERED that he be SUSPENDED from office for a period of six (6)
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencia,15 we elaborated on the nature and effects of an months without pay.
administrative charge of Dishonesty as follows:
SO ORDERED.
Dishonesty is incurred when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any
material fact, practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure
his examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; the
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon
one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public
officer or employee. Like the offense of Unexplained Wealth, Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service treats Dishonesty as a grave
offense, the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. (Citations
omitted.)

On the other hand, we had, on occasion, defined Negligence as the omission of the diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence
when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. 16

Given the fact that respondent was able to successfully overcome the onus of demonstrating
that he does not possess any unexplained wealth and that the omissions in his SALNs did
not betray any sense of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part considering
that his SALNs actually disclose the extent of his and his wife’s assets and business
interests, we are inclined to adjudge that respondent is merely culpable of Simple Negligence
instead of the more serious charge of Dishonesty.

This Court had previously passed upon a similar infraction committed by another public
official in Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG)17 and ruled that suspension without pay, not removal from office, is the
appropriate penalty therefor:

It also rules that while petitioner may be guilty of negligence in accomplishing his SALN, he
did not commit gross misconduct or dishonesty, for there is no substantial evidence of his
intent to deceive the authorities and conceal his other sources of income or any of the real
properties in his and his wife’s names. Hence, the imposition of the penalty of removal or
dismissal from public service and all other accessory penalties on petitioner is indeed too
harsh. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to pay attention to the details and proper form of his
SALN, resulting in the imprecision of the property descriptions and inaccuracy of certain
information, for which suspension from office for a period of six months, without pay, would
have been appropriate penalty. (Citation omitted.)
G.R. No. 173166 March 13, 2013
PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO and RUPERTO ESTANISLAO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
NORMA GUDITO and DAMIANO GUDITO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated October 25, 2005, and Resolution2 dated June 16,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 46323.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondents are the owners of a residential lot being leased by petitioners on a month-to-
month basis. Petitioners had been renting and occupying the subject lot since 1934 and were
the ones who built the house on the subject lot in accordance with their lease agreement
with one Gaspar Vasquez. When Gaspar Vasquez died, the portion of the lot on which
petitioners’ house was erected was inherited by his son Victorino Vasquez, married to Ester
Vasquez (Vasquez couple).
In the 1980’s, the Vasquez couple wanted the Estanislao family and the other tenants to
vacate the said property, but the tenants refused because of laws allegedly prohibiting their
ejectment therefrom. Resultantly, the Vasquez couple refused to accept their rental
payments. Thus, petitioner Purificacion Estanislao, with due notice to Ester Vasquez,
deposited the amount of her monthly rentals at Allied Banking Corporation under a savings
account in the name of Ester Vasquez as lessor.
In the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Vasquez couple in favor of
respondent Norma Vasquez Gudito. Hence, in October 1994, respondents notified
petitioners to remove their house and vacate the premises within three months or up to
January 31, 1995, because of their urgent need of the residential lot. In a letter dated March
5, 1995, respondents reiterated the demand and gave petitioners another three months or
up to June 30, 1995, within which to remove their house, vacate the subject lot and pay the
rental arrearages. However, petitioners failed to comply.
Accordingly, on November 10, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer/Ejectment against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
On March 6, 1996, the MeTC of Manila rendered a Decision 3 in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants ordering:
(1) The defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately
vacate the subject premises known as 2351 Pasig Line, Sta. Ana, Manila, and
surrender its peaceful possession to the plaintiffs;
(2) The defendants to pay reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of
the subject premises in the amount of ₱500.00 a month beginning October 1985
and every month thereafter until they shall have finally and actually vacated the
subject premises;
(3) To pay the plaintiffs the sum of ₱5,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees;
(4) To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Thereafter, petitioners elevated the case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
On November 28, 1997, the RTC of Manila rendered a Decision5 reversing the MeTC’s
decision. The fallo states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 6, 1996 rendered by the
court a quo is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
(1) The instant complaint filed by the Guditos is hereby DISMISSED;
(2) The "Guditos" are hereby enjoined to respect the lease agreement as well as
the possession of the "Estanislaos" over the leased premises. Should the "Guditos"
decide to sell or otherwise dispose of the same property to third parties, the
"Estanislaos" are given the right of first refusal pursuant to PDs 1517 and 2018 or;
should the "Guditos" need the same property for residential purposes, they can
avail of the remaining 205.50 square meters of the same lot wherein they can build
their house.
(3) The present monthly rental is hereby fixed at ₱500 per month;
(4) Attorney’s fees at ₱20,000 plus the cost of suit; and
(5) Other claims and counter-claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents interposed an appeal before the CA.
In a Decision7 dated October 25, 2005, the CA annulled and set aside the RTC’s decision
and reinstated the MeTC’s decision. It held as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Civil Case
No. 96-77804 dated November 28, 1998 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the Decision of Branch 11 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 149805-CV dated March 6, 1996 is hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION
that the respondents are ordered to pay reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the subject premises in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos a month beginning
November 1995, and every month thereafter until they have finally vacated the subject
premises.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
1. Whether or not the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals violates Presidential
Decree No. 2016, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1517, expressly prohibiting
the eviction of legitimate tenants from land proclaimed as Areas for Priority
Development or as Urban Land Reform Zones.
2. Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 877, relied upon by the Court of Appeals
in its decision, can prevail over P.D. 2016, in relation to P.D. No. 1517, a special
law and a later enactment, considering that P.D. No. 2016 expressly repeals,
amends or modifies accordingly any law inconsistent with it.
3. Whether or not a legitimate tenant covered by P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016 can be
evicted if the owner of the leased land does not intend to sell his property as
affirmatively held by the Court of Appeals.
4. Whether or not respondents as lessors can adequately use the leased lot for the
alleged personal need without ejecting petitioners who occupy only a very small
portion thereof.
5. Whether or not the donation of the leased lot to respondents can defeat
petitioners’ protected right under P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016.9
The pertinent issue in this case is who has the better right of possession over the subject
property.
Petitioners strongly argue that respondents cannot evict them from the subject property
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, as the subject property
is allegedly within one of the 245 Proclaimed Area for Priority Development and/or Urban
Land Reform No. 1967, as amended by Presidential Proclamation No. 2284. Petitioners
further contend that they were not aware that the subject property had been acquired by
respondents via a Deed of Donation executed by the Vasquez couple. Thus, they assail that
said donation was merely simulated in order to deprive them of their right of first refusal to
buy the subject property.
Conversely, respondents maintain P.D. 1517 cannot be appropriately applied to the present
case, since the same applies only to a case where the owners intend to sell the property to
a third party. They argue that in the instant case they are seeking the eviction of petitioners
solely on the ground that they need the property for residential purposes. Lastly, they assert
that they have sufficiently established a better right of possession over the disputed property
than the petitioners.
We deny the petition.
To begin with, the only question that the courts must resolve in an unlawful detainer or
ejectment suit is − who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession
of the property in dispute.10
In the case under review, respondents have overwhelmingly established their right of
possession by virtue of the Deed of Donation made in their favor. Moreover, they have
complied with the provisions of the law in order for them to legally eject the petitioners.
Section 5 (c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 states:
Sec. 5. Grounds for judicial ejectment. – Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:
xxxx
(c) Legitimate need of owner/ lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the use
of any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or immediate
member not being the owner of any other available residential unit within the same city or
municipality: Provided, however, that the lease for a definite period has expired: Provided,
further, that the lessor has given the lessee formal notice within three (3) months in advance
of the lessor’s intention to repossess the property: Provided, finally, that the owner/ lessor is
prohibited from leasing the residential unit or allowing its use by a third party for at least one
year.
Here, it is undisputed that respondents do not own any other lot or real property except the
herein subject lot. They have urgent need of the same to build their own house to be used
as their residence. Also, petitioners had already been asked to leave the premises as early
as 1982, but sternly refused, hence, its former owners refused to accept their rental
payments. When the same property was donated to respondents, petitioners were allowed
to continue occupying the subject lot since respondents did not as yet have the money to
build a house of their own.1avvphi1 But now that respondents have sufficient money to build
their own house, petitioners still rebuff respondents’ demand to vacate the premises and to
remove or demolish their house. Clearly, since respondents have complied with the
requirements of the law, their right to possess the subject property for their own use as family
residence cannot be denied.
It is also worthy to note that petitioners have failed to prove that the transfer of the subject
property was merely a ploy designed to defeat and circumvent their right of first refusal under
the law. As emphasized by the CA, the Deed of Donation executed in favor of respondents
was signed by the parties and their witnesses, and was even notarized by a notary public.
Veritably, it is a settled rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized document has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect
to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.11
Having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public, the said Deed is vested
with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear
and convincing evidence.12 Thus, the donation made by the Vasquez couple is a valid
exercise of their right as owners of the subject property and respondents are legally entitled
to the said property as donees.
By the same token, this Court is not persuaded with petitioners’ insistence that they cannot
be evicted in view of Section 6 of P.D. 1517, which states –
SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. – Within the Urban Zones
legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their
homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract,
continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed
the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable
prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and
Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, petitioners cannot use P.D. 1517 as a shield to deny
respondents of their inherent right to possess the subject property. The CA correctly opined
that "under P.D. 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, the lessee is given the right of first refusal
over the land they have leased and occupied for more than ten yean and on which they
constructed their houses. But the right of first refusal applies only to a case where the owner
of the property intends to sell it to a third party. If the owner of the leased premises do not
intend to sell the property in question but seeks to eject the tenant on the ground that the
former needs the premises for residential purposes, the tenant cannot invoke the land reform
law."13

Clearly, the circumstances required for the application of P.D. 1517 are lacking in this case,
since respondents had no intention of selling the subject property to third parties, but seek
the eviction of petitioners on the valid ground that they need the property for residential
purposes.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 25, 2005, and Resolution
dated June 16, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46323 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194382 June 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GLORIA CALUMBRES
AUDITOR, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the 25 August 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00242-MIN entitled People of the Philippines v. Gloria Calumbres y Auditor, affirming
the 16 May 2005 Judgment in Criminal Case No. 2004-293 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City. The RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 5, Article IT of Republic Act No. 9165, in an Information which alleged –
That on April 6, 2004 at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon at Sto. Niño, Barangay 31,
Cagayan de Oro City. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court the
above-named accused without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully.
unlawfully and criminally sell, trade, dispense, deliver, distribute, and give away to another
(1) heat-scaled transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
locally known as shabu weighing 0.09 gram accused knowing the same to be a dangerous
drug, in consideration of the amount of One Hundred Pesos (Php 100.00) in different
denominations one of which is a Twenty Peso bill with serial Number EZ203528.1
As summarized in the appealed Court of Appeals decision, the facts are as follows:
On 6 April 2004, at around 5:30 p.m., SPO1 Reynaldo Dela Victoria (SPO1 Dela Victoria),
the prosecution’s lone witness, was in his office at the Special Operation Unit of the City Drug
Enforcement Unit at the Cogon Public Market in Cagayan de Oro City when an informant
reported to him that someone was selling shabu at Sto. Niño, Brgy. 31.
SPO1 Dela Victoria then hired a faux-buyer, giving the latter five twenty-peso bills marked
money, and, riding a trisikad, the duo proceeded to the area that the informant described.
SPO1 Dela Victoria claimed to have positioned himself at a strategic place where he could
see the transaction. He saw his poseur-buyer handing something to Gloria Calumbres
(Calumbres) after receiving something from the latter; the poseur-buyer’s pre-arranged
signal followed, prompting him to immediately approach Calumbres. He ordered her not to
move, "police mi, ayaw lihok," shocking the accused into disbelief. He took the money from
Calumbres and retrieved the suspected shabu from the faux-buyer who was standing two
meters away.
SPO1 Dela Victoria brought Calumbres to his office at the Cogon Market for booking. He
claimed he recorded the incident in the police blotter, prepared a request for laboratory
analysis of the confiscated item and allegedly took a photograph, which, according to his
testimony, was not developed, however, due to budget constraints. 1
A laboratory report on the confiscated item showed the white substance to be shabu.
Calumbres maintained her innocence and presented this defense:
Calumbres was at the ACCP Used Clothing Enterprise (ukay-ukay) when she snatched a
wallet of a man, a customer of the store. She was caught, however, when the man’s wife
y saw what she did. She was brought to the police station at Precinct 2 in the Cogon Market
where Police Inspector Celso Montel interrogated her.
Minutes later, SPO1 Dela Victoria arrived. He investigated her and told her he was the one
in charge in the security of the area where she snatched the wallet. He promised her release
if she would give him three cell-phone units. At that time, however, she had none. She just
arrived from Iligan City and the man from whom she snatched the wallet was supposedly her
first victim.
Calumbres’ defense was corroborated by Relian Abarrientos (Abarrientos), a store employee
who witnessed the whole incident. Abarrientos testified that in April 2004, a woman tried to
snatch a wallet from a man inside the store. The man’s wife caught her and the snatcher was
detained at the Cogon Police Station. Abarrientos claimed that this was the only incident that
happened in the store.
The RTC convicted Calumbres as charged and sentenced her to lifeimprisonment, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, this Court hereby finds the accused
Gloria Calumbres y Auditor GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information and sentences the accused GLORIA CALUMBRES y AUDITOR to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php 500,000.00).2
Finding no reversible error in the RTC ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision; hence, this appeal on the following grounds: first, the prosecution failed to prove
the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; second, the police failed to follow the chain of
custody rule as required under Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9167.
RULING OF THE COURT
We resolve to ACQUIT Calumbres on the following grounds:
While it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the
witness and the testimony is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon
appeal, such rule does not apply when the trial court overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied facts of weight or substance that would point to a different conclusion. In the
instant case, these circumstances are present, that, when properly appreciated, would
warrant the acquittal of the accused.
First, that Calumbres was arrested and brought to Precinct 2 at the Cogon Police Station,
after she was caught snatching a man’s wallet, was duly recorded in its police blotter.3 The
police blotter shows that she was arrested due to pickpocketing, a fact which was also
corroborated by the testimony in open court of the store-employee who witnessed the whole
incident.
The circumstance of Calumbres’ arrest and the charge as reflected in the police blotter at
Precinct 2 which was for pickpocketing, when compared to the succeeding charge for the
sale of illegal drugs which was blottered at the Special Operation Unit of the City Drug
Enforcement Unit casts serious doubt as to her culpability to the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
The same crimes were committed and blottered on the same day, separated only by hours.
There was no record that while in custody in the police station that she was released. Rather,
the succeeding records reveal that she was already being charged for illegal sale of shabu,
this time at the Special Operation Unit of the City Drug Enforcement Unit, which happens to
be also located in Cogon Market.
Second, SPO1 Dela Victoria’s credibility must be thoroughly looked into, being the lone
arresting officer who allegedly took custody of the confiscated shabu and the five twenty-
peso bills supposedly used by his poseur-buyer to buy the shabu from Calumbres. It did not
escape us that while there were five 20-peso bills used, only one of them was presented in
court. SPO1 Dela Victoria also claimed to have taken a photograph of the confiscated items
but he failed to present it in court on the lame excuse that there was no money to have the
picture developed; and, alone, he inventoried these items without the participation of the
accused and in the absence of the authorities, in blatant disregard of Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
The details of SPO1 Dela Victoria’s testimony reveal lapses too, which, if connected, cast
reasonable doubt on the guilt of Calumbres. His informant never identified Calumbres as the
drug pusher; what his informant told him was that drug sale was ongoing at Sto. Nino, Brgy.
31, prompting him to hire a faux-buyer.4 At that time, the information was still unverified and
the seller of shabu unidentified. Without the informant’s details of who the pusher was, it was
incomprehensible how a poseur-buyer, randomly and instantly hired, would have been able
to identify Calumbres as the pusher.
Third, a reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the conviction was arrived at
upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of SPO1 Dela Victoria’s
official duty.
It is noteworthy however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.5 Nothing less than evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can erase the
postulate of innocence. And this burden is met not by placing in distrust the innocence of the
accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability. 6
The solo performance by SPO1 Dela Victoria of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of
the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object
itself, in serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to
who possessed what from the time of the alleged apprehension until the trial of the case. We
are left in doubt whether or not the sachet of shabu allegedly seized from Calumbres was
the very same object offered in court as the corpus delicti, or if a sachet of anything was in
fact seized from Calumbres.
As we held in Zafra v. People:
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty. The dangerous
drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is
vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized
possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding
of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 7
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied).
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied).
SPO1 Dela Victoria’s claim that the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same one
confiscated from Calumbres, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the presumption of
regularity of one’s performance of duty. SPO1 Dela Victoria blatantly broke all the rules
established by law to safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. To allow this to happen is to
abandon everything that has been said about the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of
custody of the corpus delicti.1âwphi1
We reiterate that this Court will never waver in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in
the handling of the seized drugs should be observed. In People v. Salonga, 8 we acquitted
the accused for the failure of the police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items.
We also reversed a conviction in People v. Gutierrez,9 for the failure of the buy-bust team to
inventory and photograph the seized items without justifiable grounds. People v.
Cantalejo10 also resulted in an acquittal because no inventory or photograph was ever made
by the police.
We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Capuno, 11 People v.
Lorena,12 and People v. Martinez,13 all in obedience to the basic and elementary precept that
the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. At the base, of course,
is the constitutional presumption of innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 25 August 2010 in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 00242-MIN. Gloria Calumbres
y Auditor is hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she is
confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution
for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the
Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report to this Court the action taken within
five ( 5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194846 June 19, 2013
*HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO, ANTONIO D. ROSAROSO, MANUEL D. ROSAROSO,
ALGERICA D. ROSAROSO, and CLEOFE R. LABINDAO, Petitioners, vs. LUCILA
LABORTE SORIA, SPOUSES HAM SOLUTAN and **LAILA SOLUTAN, and MERIDIAN
REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
December 4, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA G.R. CV No. 00351, which
reversed and set aside the July 30, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, 7th
Judicial Region, Cebu City (RTC), in Civil Case No. CEB-16957, an action for declaration of
nullity of documents.
The Facts
Spouses Luis Rosaroso (Luis) and Honorata Duazo (Honorata) acquired several real
properties in Daan Bantayan, Cebu City, including the subject properties. The couple had
nine (9) children namely: Hospicio, Arturo, Florita, Lucila, Eduardo, Manuel, Cleofe, Antonio,
and Angelica. On April 25, 1952, Honorata died. Later on, Luis married Lourdes Pastor
Rosaroso (Lourdes).
On January 16, 1995, a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages was
filed by Luis, as one of the plaintiffs, against his daughter, Lucila R. Soria (Lucila); Lucila’s
daughter, Laila S. Solutan (Laila); and Meridian Realty Corporation (Meridian). Due to Luis’
untimely death, however, an amended complaint was filed on January 6, 1996, with the
spouse of Laila, Ham Solutan (Ham); and Luis’ second wife, Lourdes, included as
defendants.3
In the Amended Complaint, it was alleged by petitioners Hospicio D. Rosaroso, Antonio D.
Rosaroso (Antonio), Angelica D. Rosaroso (Angelica), and Cleofe R. Labindao (petitioners)
that on November 4, 1991, Luis, with the full knowledge and consent of his second wife,
Lourdes, executed the Deed of Absolute Sale 4 (First Sale) covering the properties with
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 31852 (Lot No. 8); TCT. No. 11155 (Lot 19); TCT No.
10885 (Lot No. 22); TCT No. 10886 (Lot No. 23); and Lot Nos. 5665 and 7967, all located at
Daanbantayan, Cebu, in their favor.5
They also alleged that, despite the fact that the said properties had already been sold to
them, respondent Laila, in conspiracy with her mother, Lucila, obtained the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA),6 dated April 3, 1993, from Luis (First SPA); that Luis was then sick, infirm,
blind, and of unsound mind; that Lucila and Laila accomplished this by affixing Luis’ thumb
mark on the SPA which purportedly authorized Laila to sell and convey, among others, Lot
Nos. 8, 22 and 23, which had already been sold to them; and that on the strength of another
SPA7 by Luis, dated July 21, 1993 (Second SPA), respondents Laila and Ham mortgaged
Lot No. 19 to Vital Lending Investors, Inc. for and in consideration of the amount of
₱150,000.00 with the concurrence of Lourdes.8
Petitioners further averred that a second sale took place on August 23, 1994, when the
respondents made Luis sign the Deed of Absolute Sale 9 conveying to Meridian three (3)
parcels of residential land for ₱960,500.00 (Second Sale); that Meridian was in bad faith
when it did not make any inquiry as to who were the occupants and owners of said lots; and
that if Meridian had only investigated, it would have been informed as to the true status of
the subject properties and would have desisted in pursuing their acquisition.
Petitioners, thus, prayed that they be awarded moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, actual damages, and litigation expenses and that the two SPAs and the deed
of sale in favor of Meridian be declared null and void ab initio. 10
On their part, respondents Lucila and Laila contested the First Sale in favor of petitioners.
They submitted that even assuming that it was valid, petitioners were estopped from
questioning the Second Sale in favor of Meridian because they failed not only in effecting the
necessary transfer of the title, but also in annotating their interests on the titles of the
questioned properties. With respect to the assailed SPAs and the deed of absolute sale
executed by Luis, they claimed that the documents were valid because he was conscious
and of sound mind and body when he executed them. In fact, it was Luis together with his
wife who received the check payment issued by Meridian where a big part of it was used to
foot his hospital and medical expenses.11
Respondent Meridian, in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that Luis was
fully aware of the conveyances he made. In fact, Sophia Sanchez (Sanchez), Vice-President
of the corporation, personally witnessed Luis affix his thumb mark on the deed of sale in its
favor. As to petitioners’ contention that Meridian acted in bad faith when it did not endeavor
to make some inquiries as to the status of the properties in question, it countered that before
purchasing the properties, it checked the titles of the said lots with the Register of Deeds of
Cebu and discovered therein that the First Sale purportedly executed in favor of the plaintiffs
was not registered with the said Register of Deeds. Finally, it argued that the suit against it
was filed in bad faith.12
On her part, Lourdes posited that her signature as well as that of Luis appearing on the deed
of sale in favor of petitioners, was obtained through fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained
that they signed the prepared deed out of pity because petitioners told them that it was
necessary for a loan application. In fact, there was no consideration involved in the First
Sale. With respect to the Second Sale, she never encouraged the same and neither did she
participate in it. It was purely her husband’s own volition that the Second Sale materialized.
She, however, affirmed that she received Meridian’s payment on behalf of her husband who
was then bedridden.13
RTC Ruling
After the case was submitted for decision, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that
when Luis executed the second deed of sale in favor of Meridian, he was no longer the owner
of Lot Nos. 19, 22 and 23 as he had already sold them to his children by his first marriage.
In fact, the subject properties had already been delivered to the vendees who had been living
there since birth and so had been in actual possession of the said properties. The trial court
stated that although the deed of sale was not registered, this fact was not prejudicial to their
interest. It was of the view that the actual registration of the deed of sale was not necessary
to render a contract valid and effective because where the vendor delivered the possession
of the parcel of land to the vendee and no superior rights of third persons had intervened,
the efficacy of said deed was not destroyed. In other words, Luis lost his right to dispose of
the said properties to Meridian from the time he executed the first deed of sale in favor of
petitioners. The same held true with his alleged sale of Lot 8 to Lucila Soria. 14 Specifically,
the dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds that a preponderance of evidence exists in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Judgment is hereby rendered:
a. Declaring that the Special Power of Attorney, Exhibit "K," for the plaintiffs and
Exhibit "3" for the defendants null and void including all transactions subsequent
thereto and all proceedings arising therefrom;
b. Declaring the Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "E" valid and binding;
c. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale of Three (3) Parcels of Residential Land
marked as Exhibit "F" null and void from the beginning;
d. Declaring the Deed of Sale, Exhibit "16" (Solutan) or Exhibit "FF," null and void
from the beginning;
e. Declaring the vendees named in the Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "E" to be
the lawful, exclusive and absolute owners and possessors of Lots Nos. 8, 19, 22,
and 23;
f. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally each plaintiff ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages; and
g. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses.
The crossclaim made by defendant Meridian Realty Corporation against defendants Soria
and Solutan is ordered dismissed for lack of sufficient evidentiary basis.
SO ORDERED."15
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ruled that the first deed
of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered
a consideration for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that
petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the sale was simulated to
make it appear that payment had been tendered when in fact no payment was made at all. 16
With respect to the validity of the Second Sale, the CA stated that it was valid because the
documents were notarized and, as such, they enjoyed the presumption of regularity.
Although petitioners alleged that Luis was manipulated into signing the SPAs, the CA opined
that evidence was wanting in this regard. Dr. Arlene Letigio Pesquira, the attending physician
of Luis, testified that while the latter was physically infirmed, he was of sound mind when he
executed the first SPA.17
With regard to petitioners’ assertion that the First SPA was revoked by Luis when he
executed the affidavit, dated November 24, 1994, the CA ruled that the Second Sale
remained valid. The Second Sale was transacted on August 23, 1994, before the First SPA
was revoked. In other words, when the Second Sale was consummated, the First SPA was
still valid and subsisting. Thus, "Meridian had all the reasons to rely on the said SPA during
the time of its validity until the time of its actual filing with the Register of Deeds considering
that constructive notice of the revocation of the SPA only came into effect upon the filing of
the Adverse Claim and the aforementioned Letters addressed to the Register of Deeds on
17 December 1994 and 25 November 1994, respectively, informing the Register of Deeds
of the revocation of the first SPA."18 Moreover, the CA observed that the affidavit revoking
the first SPA was also revoked by Luis on December 12, 1994. 19
Furthermore, although Luis revoked the First SPA, he did not revoke the Second SPA which
authorized respondent Laila to sell, convey and mortgage, among others, the property
covered by TCT T-11155 (Lot No. 19). The CA opined that had it been the intention of Luis
to discredit the
Second Sale, he should have revoked not only the First SPA but also the Second SPA. The
latter being valid, all transactions emanating from it, particularly the mortgage of Lot 19, its
subsequent redemption and its second sale, were valid.20 Thus, the CA disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 30 July 2004 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and in its stead a new decision is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the Special Power of Attorney, dated 21 July 1993, as valid;
2. DECLARING the Special Power of Attorney, dated 03 April 1993, as valid up to
the time of its revocation on 24 November 1994;
3. DECLARING the Deed of Absolute sale, dated 04 November 1991, as ineffective
and without any force and effect;
4. DECLARING the Deed of Absolute Sale of Three (3) Parcels of Residential Land,
dated 23 August 1994, valid and binding from the very beginning;
5. DECLARING the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 27 September 1994, also valid
and binding from the very beginning;
6. ORDERING the substituted plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally the defendant-
appellant Meridian Realty Corporation the sum of Php100,000.00 as moral
damages, Php100,000.00 as attorney’s fee and Php100,000.00 as litigation
expenses; and
7. ORDERING the substituted plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally the defendant-
appellants Leila Solutan et al., the sum of Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.21
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the CA Resolution, 22 dated
November 18, 2010. Consequently, they filed the present petition with the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (19TH DIVISION) GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED AS VOID THE FIRST SALE EXECUTED BY
THE LATE LUIS ROSAROSO IN FAVOR OF HIS CHILDREN OF HIS FIRST
MARRIAGE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
SUSTAINING AND AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
DECLARING THE MERIDIAN REALTY CORPORATION A BUYER IN BAD
FAITH, DESPITE THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS THAT THE DEED OF
SALE (First Sale), IS GENUINE AND HAD FULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE
LEGAL FORMALITIES.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THE SALE (DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1994), NULL AND VOID
FROM THE VERY BEGINNING SINCE LUIS ROSAROSO ON NOVEMBER
4, 1991 WAS NO LONGER THE OWNER OF LOTS 8, 19, 22 AND 23 AS HE
HAD EARLIER DISPOSED SAID LOTS IN FAVOR OF THE CHILDREN OF
HIS (LUIS ROSAROSO) FIRST MARRIAGE.23
Petitioners argue that the second deed of sale was null and void because Luis could not
have validly transferred the ownership of the subject properties to Meridian, he being no
longer the owner after selling them to his children. No less than Atty. William Boco, the lawyer
who notarized the first deed of sale, appeared and testified in court that the said deed was
the one he notarized and that Luis and his second wife, Lourdes, signed the same before
him. He also identified the signatures of the subscribing witnesses.24 Thus, they invoke the
finding of the RTC which wrote:
In the case of Heirs of Joaquin Teves, Ricardo Teves versus Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 109963, October 13, 1999, the Supreme Court held that a public document executed
[with] all the legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained
therein. In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that a grantor
executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere
preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence must (be) so clear, strong
and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the certificate. When
the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld x x x .
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. (Ramirez vs. Ner,
21 SCRA 207). As such it … must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who
impugns it shall not have presented strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided against by law (Robinson vs. Villafuerte,
18 Phil. 171, 189-190).25
Furthermore, petitioners aver that it was erroneous for the CA to say that the records of the
case were bereft of evidence that they paid the price of the lots sold to them. In fact, a perusal
of the records would reveal that during the cross-examination of Antonio Rosaroso, when
asked if there was a monetary consideration, he testified that they indeed paid their father
and their payment helped him sustain his daily needs.26
Petitioners also assert that Meridian was a buyer in bad faith because when its representative
visited the site, she did not make the necessary inquiries. The fact that there were already
houses on the said lots should have put Meridian on its guard and, for said reason, should
have made inquiries as to who owned those houses and what their rights were over the
same.27
Meridian’s assertion that the Second Sale was registered in the Register of Deeds was a
falsity. The subject titles, namely: TCT No. 11155 for Lot 19, TCT No. 10885 for Lot 22, and
TCT No. 10886 for Lot 23 were free from any annotation of the alleged sale. 28
After an assiduous assessment of the records, the Court finds for the petitioners.
The First Deed Of Sale Was Valid
The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties in favor
of petitioners, was never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently insist, though,
is that the said sale was simulated because the purported sale was made without a valid
consideration.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions:
(1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has
been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. 29 These
presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them.
They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created,
and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of
proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved
for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.30
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare
allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and
convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of
Court.31
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It
relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached
him and convinced him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan
application, but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties. 32 This
testimony, however, is self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence
required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was
sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.
Granting that there was no delivery of the consideration, the seller would have no right to sell
again what he no longer owned. His remedy would be to rescind the sale for failure on the
part of the buyer to perform his part of their obligation pursuant to Article 1191 of the New
Civil Code. In the case of Clara M. Balatbat v. Court Of Appeals and Spouses Jose Repuyan
and Aurora Repuyan,33 it was written:
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to
revest to the seller unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant
to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. Non-payment only creates a right to demand the
fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the contract. [Emphases supplied]
Meridian is Not a
Buyer in Good Faith
Respondents Meridian and Lucila argue that, granting that the First Sale was valid, the
properties belong to them as they acquired these in good faith and had them first recorded
in the Registry of Property, as they were unaware of the First Sale. 34
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The fact that Meridian had them first registered will not help its cause. In case of double sale,
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who
in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof; to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
Otherwise stated, ownership of an immovable property which is the subject of a double sale
shall be transferred: (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith. The requirement of the law then is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and
registration in good faith. Good faith must concur with the registration. If it would be shown
that a buyer was in bad faith, the alleged registration they have made amounted to no
registration at all.
The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater
significance in case of a double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold twice is an
immovable, the one who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made
in good faith, shall be deemed the owner. Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with
good faith— that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his
vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry
and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his
vendor.)35 [Emphases and underlining supplied]
When a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller, the buyer
must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without making such
inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or
deal with realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there
upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which an honest man of
ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in contemplation of
law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to
him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. 36 In the case of Spouses
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,37 it was written:
Verily, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. Thus, the general rule is that a
purchaser may be considered a purchaser in good faith when he has examined the latest
certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist important facts that would
create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present title and to
investigate those that preceded it. Thus, it has been said that a person who deliberately
ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is
not an innocent purchaser for value. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. As we have held:
The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would have
taken under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in the actual, visible and
public possession of another person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence
amounting to bad faith.
In this connection, it has been held that where, as in this case, the land sold is in the
possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the
certificate of title to make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Failure to
do so would make him a purchaser in bad faith. (Citations omitted).
One who purchases real property which is in the actual possession of another should, at
least make some inquiry concerning the right of those in possession. The actual possession
by other than the vendor should, at least put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarely, in
the absence of such inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such
possessors. (Emphases supplied)
Prescinding from the foregoing, the fact that private respondent RRC did not investigate the
Sarmiento spouses' claim over the subject land despite its knowledge that Pedro Ogsiner,
as their overseer, was in actual possession thereof means that it was not an innocent
purchaser for value upon said land. Article 524 of the Civil Code directs that possession may
be exercised in one's name or in that of another. In herein case, Pedro Ogsiner had informed
RRC that he was occupying the subject land on behalf of the Sarmiento spouses. Being a
corporation engaged in the business of buying and selling real estate, it was gross
negligence on its part to merely rely on Mr. Puzon's assurance that the occupants of the
property were mere squatters considering the invaluable information it acquired from Pedro
Ogsiner and considering further that it had the means and the opportunity to investigate for
itself the accuracy of such information. [Emphases supplied]
In another case, it was held that if a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has
acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration constitutes a registration in bad faith
and does not confer upon him any right. If the registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there
is no registration at all, and the buyer who has first taken possession of the property in good
faith shall be preferred.38
In the case at bench, the fact that the subject properties were already in the possession of
persons other than Luis was never disputed. Sanchez, representative and witness for
Meridian, even testified as follows:
x x x; that she together with the two agents, defendant Laila Solutan and Corazon Lua, the
president of Meridian Realty Corporation, went immediately to site of the lots; that the agents
brought with them the three titles of the lots and Laila Solutan brought with her a special
power of attorney executed by Luis B. Rosaroso in her favor but she went instead directly to
Luis Rosaroso to be sure; that the lots were pointed to them and she saw that there were
houses on it but she did not have any interest of the houses because her interest was on the
lots; that Luis Rosaroso said that the houses belonged to him; that he owns the property and
that he will sell the same because he is very sickly and he wanted to buy medicines; that she
requested someone to check the records of the lots in the Register of Deeds; that one of the
titles was mortgaged and she told them to redeem the mortgage because the corporation
will buy the property; that the registered owner of the lots was Luis Rosaroso; that in more
or less three months, the encumbrance was cancelled and she told the prospective sellers
to prepare the deed of sale; that there were no encumbrances or liens in the title; that when
the deed of absolute sale was prepared it was signed by the vendor Luis Rosaroso in their
house in Opra x x x.39 (Underscoring supplied)

From the above testimony, it is clear that Meridian, through its agent, knew that the subject
properties were in possession of persons other than the seller. Instead of investigating the
rights and interests of the persons occupying the said lots, however, it chose to just believe
that Luis still owned them. Simply, Meridian Realty failed to exercise the due diligence
required by law of purchasers in acquiring a piece of land in the possession of person or
persons other than the seller.

In this regard, great weight is accorded to the findings of fact of the RTC. Basic is the rule
that the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as to observe the
demeanor of witnesses who testify in the case.40

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 4, 2009 Decision and the
November 18, 201 0 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00351, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 30, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16957, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188395 November 20, 2013
HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON, namely: NICANORA G. BUCTON, ERLINDA
BUCTON-EBLAMO, AGNES BUCTON-LUGOD, WILMA BUCTON-YRAY and DON G.
BUCTON, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GONZALO and TRINIDAD GO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the 27 May 2009 Decision2 rendered by the Special Twenty-First (21st) Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00888-MIN. In its assailed decision, the appellate
court affirmed the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch
· 17, which upheld the title of the respondents Spouses Gonzalo and Trinidad Go (Spouses
Go) over the subject property.
The Facts
The suit concerns a parcel of land with an area of 6,407 square meters situated in Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City and presently registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-342104 by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City in the names of the Spouses Go.
The said property was originally registered in the name of Felix M. Bucton (Felix), married to
Nicanora Gabar (Nicanora) and covered by TCT No. T-9830.5
Sometime in March 1981, Felix received a phone call from Gonzalo Go (Gonzalo) informing
him that he has bought the subject property thru a certain Benjamin Belisario (Belisario) who
represented himself as the attorney-in-fact of Felix. Surprised to learn about the transaction,
Felix made an inquiry whereby he learned that the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the
subject property was lost while in the possession of his daughter, Agnes Bucton-Lugod
(Agnes). By an unfortunate turn of events, the said certificate of title fell into the hands of
Belisario, Josefa Pacardo (Pacardo) and Salome Cabili (Cabili), who allegedly conspired
with each other to unlawfully deprive Felix of his ownership of the above-mentioned property.
As shown in the annotation at the back of the title, the Spouses Bucton purportedly
authorized Belisario to sell the subject property to third persons, as evidenced by a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA)6 allegedly signed by the Spouses Bucton on 27 February 1981. On
the strength of the said SPA, Belisario, on 2 March 1981, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale7 in favor of the Spouses Go. Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro
City cancelled TCT No. T-9830 in the name of Felix and issued a new one under TCT No.
T-34210 in the names of the Spouses Go.
Meanwhile, Felix passed away leaving Nicanora, Erlinda Bucton-Eblamo, Agnes, Wilma
Bucton-Yray and Don Bucton (Heirs of Felix), as his intestate heirs.
Claiming that the signatures of the Spouses Bucton on the SPA were forged, the Heirs of
Felix, on 19 February 1996, filed against the Spouses Go a complaint for Annulment of the
SPA, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. T-34210, Recovery of Ownership and Possession,
Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 17.8 In their Complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-093, the Heirs of Felix mainly alleged that since the SPA was spurious, no valid title
was conveyed to the Spouses Go.9 Such being the case, the Heirs of Felix argued that the
cancellation of the certificate of title in the names of the Spouses Go and the reconveyance
of the ownership and possession of the disputed property, are warranted in the instant
case.10
In their Answer,11 the Spouses Go refuted the allegations in the complaint by asserting that
they are buyers in good faith and for value, and that they are in actual possession of the
property from the time it was purchased in 1981. In insisting that their title is valid and binding,
the Spouses Go argued that under the Torrens system, a person dealing with the registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title without the need of further
inquiry. For this reason, they posited that the Court cannot disregard the right of an innocent
third person who relies on the correctness of the certificate of title and they are entitled to the
protection of the law.
After the pre-trial conference was terminated without the parties having reached at an
amicable settlement, the RTC went on to receive testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced by the parties in support of their respective positions.
On 25 June 2005, the RTC issued a Judgment,12 finding that the complaint filed by the Heirs
of Felix is already barred by laches and prescription. The court a quo observed that from the
time the alleged fraudulent transaction was discovered in 1981 up to 1996 the complainants
failed to take any legal step to assail the title of the Spouses Go. The trial court thus disposed
in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds for the defendants. Accordingly, the
case is hereby dismissed as it is hereby dismissed on grounds that plaintiffs were barred by
laches and prescription. With costs against plaintiffs.13
Elevated by the Heirs of Felix on appeal before the Court of Appeals, under CA-G.R. CV No.
00888-MIN, the foregoing decision was affirmed by the appellate court in its 27 May 2009
Decision.14 In upholding the dismissal of the complaint, the Court of Appeals found that the
evidence adduced by the Heirs of Felix failed to preponderantly establish that the questioned
SPA was a forgery.15 The appellate court further declared that the Spouses Go were
innocent purchasers for value who acquired the property without any knowledge that the
right of Belisario as attorney-in-fact was merely simulated.16 It determined that the Spouses
Go can rely in good faith on the face of the certificate of title, and in the absence of any sign
that might arouse suspicion, the buyers are under no obligation to undertake further
investigation.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed June 25, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 17, 10th Judicial Region, Cagayan de Oro City, in Civil Case No. 96-093, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.18
The Heirs of Felix are now before this Court assailing the above-quoted Court of Appeals
Decision and raising the following issues:
The Issues
 I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SIGNATURES OF THE SPOUSES BUCTON IN
THE SPA WERE NOT FORGED;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SPOUSES GO ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS
FOR VALUE; AND
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT ACTION OF THE HEIRS OF FELIX ARE ALREADY
BARRED BY LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.19
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition impressed with merit.20
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a
forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized upon to have been forged.21
To prove forgery, the Heirs of Felix offered the testimony of an expert witness, Eliodoro
Constantino (Constantino) of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified that
significant differences existed between the signatures of Felix on the standard documents
from the one found in the SPA of Belisario. His testimony, however, was disregarded both
by the RTC and the Court of Appeals which upheld the validity of the SPA on the ground that
it enjoys the presumption of regularity of a public document.
While it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this
presumption, however, is not absolute.22 It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.23 The testimony of Constantino and Nicanora, had it been properly
appreciated, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to public
documents and to meet the stringent requirements to prove forgery.
Constantino pointed out in open court the manifest disparity between the strokes of the letters
of Felix’s purported signature on the assailed SPA and the latter’s genuine signature which
led him to conclude that the standard signature and the one appearing in the SPA were not
written by one and the same person.24 To further fortify their claim, Nicanora herself took the
witness stand and testified that she is familiar with her husband’s signature for they had been
married for more than 50 years. She denied having signed her name on the SPA and averred
that the signature appearing above the name of Felix was not that of her husband. 25
Evidently, the foregoing testimonial evidence adduced by the Heirs of Felix are proof
opposite to that which is required to show the genuineness of a handwriting as set forth by
the Rules of Court:
Rule 132. Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person
may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, or has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by
the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. 26
In upholding the validity of the SPA, the Court of Appeals brushed aside the foregoing
testimonial evidence of the expert witness and made an independent examination of the
questioned signatures, and based thereon, ruled that there is no forgery. The appellate court
attributed the variations to the passage of time and the person’s increase in age and
dismissed the findings of the expert witness because it failed to comply with the rules set
forth in jurisprudence that the standard should embrace the time of origin of the document,
so that one part comes from the time before the origin and one part from the time after the
origin.27 We are not unmindful of the principle that in order to bring about an accurate
comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as possible in point
of time to the suspected signature.28 However, when the dissimilarity between the genuine
and false specimens of writing is visible to the naked eye and would not ordinarily escape
notice or detection from an unpracticed observer, resort to technical rules is no longer
necessary and the instrument may be stricken off for being spurious. More so when, as in
this case, the forgery was testified to and thus established by evidence other than the writing
itself. When so established and is conspicuously evident from its appearance, the opinion of
handwriting experts on the forged document is no longer necessary.29
Far more important from the testimony of the witnesses is the fact that in 1984, Felix filed a
criminal case for falsification of public document against Belisario, Pacardo and Cabili
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4679 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. 30 The
case was, however, archived after the accused jumped bail and could not be arrested. 31
Indubitably, the foregoing testimonial and circumstantial evidence cast doubt on the integrity,
genuineness, and veracity on the questioned SPA and impels this Court to tilt the scale in
favor of the Heirs of Felix. Although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery,
preponderance of evidence indubitably favors the Heirs of Felix. Preponderance of evidence
is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence."32Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.33
We now proceed to determine whether the Spouses Go are innocent purchasers for
value.1âwphi1 It has been consistently held that a forged deed can become a source of a
valid title when the buyers are in good faith.34
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time
of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. 35 The burden of
proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that
status.36 This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the ordinary
presumption of good faith.37
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the law will no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. 38 However, this principle
admits exceptions:
x x x (a) person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor
or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title
of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither
be denominated as innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence
does not merit the protection of the law.39
Likewise worthy of credence is the claim of the Heirs of Felix that the instant case is not
barred by laches or prescription. As held in Titong v. Court of Appeals,42 ownership and real
rights over real property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten
years,43 provided that the occupant is in good faith and with just title, viz:
x x x [A] prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under
claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo
tilulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists
in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner
thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.44

While this Court protects the right of the innocent purchaser for value and does not require As pointed out earlier the Spouses Go miserably failed to meet the requirements of good
him to look beyond the certificate of title, this protection is not extended to a purchaser who faith and just title thus the ten-year prescriptive period is a defense unavailable to them. It
is not dealing with the registered owner of the land. In case the buyer does not deal with the must be stressed that possession by virtue of a spurious title cannot be considered
registered owner of the real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be constructive possession for the purpose of reckoning the ten-year prescriptive period. The
exercised by the purchaser. As succinctly pointed out in San Pedro v. Ong:40 conclusion of the appellate court that prescription has already set in is erroneously premised
on the absence of forgery and the consequent validity of the deed of sale. And extraordinary
The Court has stressed time and again that every person dealing with an agent is put upon acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon the Spouses
inquiry, and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent, and this is especially true Go since the law requires 30 years of uninterrupted adverse possession without need of title
where the act of the agent is of unusual nature. If a person makes no inquiry, he is chargeable or of good faith before real rights over immovable prescribes.45 The Spouses Go purportedly
with knowledge of the agent’s authority, and his ignorance of that authority will not be any took possession of the subject property since March 1981 but such possession was
excuse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). effectively interrupted with the filing of the instant case before the RTC on 19 February
1996.46 This period is 15 years short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article
1137.47
An assiduous examination of the records of this case pointed to the utter lack of good faith
of the Spouses Go. There is no question that the Spouses Go dealt not with the registered
owner of the property, but with a certain Belisario, who represented himself as an agent of WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Felix. An ordinary prudent man in this situation would have first inquired with the registered Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
owner if he is indeed selling his property and if he authorized the purported agent to negotiate
and to sell the said property on his behalf. It is inconceivable for the Spouses Go to have SO ORDERED.
been without any opportunity to contact Felix before the transaction, given that the Spouses
Go personally knew the Buctons’ for they are residents of the same locality and both Felix
and Gonzalo were members of the Knights of Columbus. Instead, the Spouses Go entered
into a sale contract with an agent according full faith and credence to the SPA he was
presented with thereby exposing the evident dearth of merit in their claim that they exercised
prudence in entering into the sale in question. It was only after the sale was consummated
that Gonzalo called Felix to inform him that he already bought the subject property from
Belisario who was surprised to learn about the transaction. In an effort to extricate
themselves from this quandary, the Spouses Go claimed that they authorized their lawyer to
inspect the title of the property including the property itself for any possible burdens. Such
assertion could have saved the day for the Spouses Go if they were dealing directly with the
registered owner and not with a mere agent. As buyers of the property dealing with an agent,
the Spouses Go are chargeable with knowledge of agent’s authority or the lack thereof, and
their failure to ascertain the genuineness and authenticity of the latter’s authority do not
entitle them to invoke the protection the law accords to purchasers in good faith and for value.
They cannot close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still
claim that he acted in good faith. Certainly, we cannot ascribe good faith to those who have
not shown any diligence in protecting their rights.41
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner, vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.
The Facts and the Case
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny
failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally
deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had
convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To
save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the
hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The
marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated
crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage
relationship could no longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that
Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit
of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined.
The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records
sought by subpoena duces tecum.2
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied
Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a
special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to
allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and
pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he
did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited
purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.
Question Presented
The central question presented in this case is:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
The Ruling of the Court
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records
of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in
support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted
her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He
cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who
gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This
rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history
of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct
diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could
be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him
and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. 4
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could
be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made
entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after
the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall
be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of
offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. Evidence that provides:

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces
tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those
records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to
their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party,
of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any
party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for
the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and
manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe
such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder
admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any
other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may
also be given in evidence.1âwphi1
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had
already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which
would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement.
Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any
request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her
request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
SO ORDERED.

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents
to be disclosed are "not privileged."

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged
since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent
of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at
the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the

patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC
that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the
G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Petitioner, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M.
CASTILLO, doing business under the trade name and style of PERMANENT LIGHT
MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES and GUIA S. CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition1 for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision 2 dated May
21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80572. The Court of Appeals had
affirmed with modification the Decision3dated July 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 168, in Civil Case No. 65224. The appellate court deleted the award to
petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) of the amount of P1, 138,898.86, representing
overpaid electric bills, and ordered petitioner to pay temperate damages to respondents in
the amount of P500,000.
The facts follow.
Respondents Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged in the business
of manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal
fabrications under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprises
(Permanent Light).
On March 2, 1994, the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) approved the award to Permanent Light of a contract for the supply and installation
of 1,200 units of lateral steel filing cabinets worth P7,636,800.4 Immediately, Permanent
Light began production of the steel cabinets so that it can obtain the award for the supply of
500 additional units.
In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi, Fully Phased
Inspectors of petitioner Meralco, sought permission to inspect Permanent Light’s electric
meter. Said inspection was carried out in the presence of Mike Malikay, an employee of
respondents.
The results of the inspection, which are contained in a Special Investigation Report, 5 show
that the terminal seal of Permanent Light’s meter was deformed, its meter seal was covered
with fake lead, and the 100th dial pointer was misaligned. On the basis of these findings,
Ignacio concluded that the meter was tampered with and electric supply to Permanent Light
was immediately disconnected. The questioned meter was then taken to Meralco’s
laboratory for verification.
By petitioner Meralco’s claim, it sustained losses in the amount of P126,319.92 over a 24-
month period,6 on account of Permanent Light’s tampered meter. The next day, in order to
secure the reconnection of electricity to Permanent Light, respondents paid P50,000 as down
payment on the differential bill to be rendered by Meralco. 7
Thereafter, Meralco performed a Polyphase Meter Test on the disputed meter and made the
following findings:
1. The ST-5 seal#A217447 padlock type was tampered by forcibly pulling out the sealing
hasp while the lead cover seals (ERB#1 (1989) and Meralco#21) were found fake.
2. The meshing adjustment between the 1st driven gear and the rotating disc was found
altered causing the said gear to [disengage] totally from the driving gear of the same disc.
Under this condition, the meter failed to register, hence, had not been registering the energy
(KWhrs) and kw demand used by the customer.
3. The 100th dial pointer of the register was found out of alignment which indicates that the
meter had been opened to manipulate said dial pointer and set manually to the desired
reading.8
Petitioner Meralco billed Permanent Light the amount of P61,709.11, representing the latter’s
unregistered electric consumption for the period of September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994.
Meralco, however, credited the initial payment of P50,000 made by respondents. It assessed
respondents a balance of P11,709.11, but later reduced said amount to P5,538.20 after
petitioner allowed respondents a 10% discount on their total bill. Then, petitioner received
the amount of P5,538.20 as full settlement of the remaining balance.
Subsequently, respondents received an electric bill in the amount of P38,693.53 for the
period of March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. This was followed by another bill for P192,009.64
covering the period from November 19, 1993 to April 21, 1994. Respondents contested both
assessments in a Letter dated October 12, 1994.9 They likewise complained of a significant
increase in their electric bills since petitioner installed the replacement meter on April 20,
1994.
In a Letter dated December 7, 1994,10 petitioner Meralco explained that the bill for
P38,693.53 was already a "corrected bill." According to petitioner, the bill for P192,009.64
was adjusted on August 25, 1994 to reflect respondents’ payment of P61,709.11 as
settlement of Permanent Light’s electric bills from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. It
assured respondents that Permanent Light’s meter has been tested on November 29, 1994
and was found to be in order. In the same letter, petitioner informed respondents that said
meter was replaced anew on December 1, 1994 after it sustained a crack during testing.
While respondents continued to pay, allegedly under protest, the succeeding bills of
Permanent Light, they refused to pay the bill for P38,693.53.
On August 2, 1995, respondents filed against Meralco a Petition 11 for Injunction, Recovery
of a Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The case was raffled to Branch 162 of the
Pasig RTC, which was presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina, and docketed as Civil
Case No. 65224.
Mainly, respondents prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner
from cutting power supply to Permanent Light, refrain from charging them unrecorded electric
consumption and demanding payment of P38,693.53, representing their bill for March 22,
1994 to April 21, 1994. Corollary to this, respondents sought reimbursement of the
P55,538.20 that they had paid as the estimated electric bill of Permanent Light from
September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. They likewise prayed for the reinstatement of their
old meter, which respondents believe accurately records Permanent Light’s electric
consumption.
In an Order12 dated August 29, 1995, the RTC directed the issuance of a TRO to restrain
petitioner Meralco from disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light. Later, in an
Order13 dated September 8, 1995, the RTC directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P95,000.
While trial was pending, respondents reiterated their request for a replacement meter.
According to them, the meters installed by Meralco ran faster than the one it confiscated
following the disconnection on April 19, 1994.
In 1997, Judge Manuel S. Padolina retired. Thus, the case was heard by Pairing Judge
Aurelio C. Trampe until the parties had presented all their witnesses. On October 30, 1998,
respondents rested their case and submitted a Written Offer of Exhibits. 14 Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a Formal Offer of Evidence15 on September 22, 1999. By then, a regular
presiding judge had been appointed to Branch 162 in the person of Hon. Erlinda Piñera Uy.
However, on November 8, 1999, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad
Cautelam.16 Judge Uy voluntarily recused herself from hearing the case by Order 17 dated
November 10, 1999. Eventually, the case was raffled to Branch 168 of the Pasig RTC
presided by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri.
On November 28, 2001, Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of Permanent
Light. Following this, on January 29, 2002, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Proffer and
Mark the Latest Meralco Bill of P9,318.65 which was Reflected in the 3rd Meralco Electric
Meter
Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco.18 Despite petitioner’s opposition, the RTC admitted
said bill into evidence.
On July 9, 2003, the Pasig RTC, Branch 168, rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners
and against the respondent ordering the latter to pay the former the following:
1. P1,138,898.86 representing overpayments made by the petitioners from May 1994 to
November 2001;
2. P200,000.00 as and for moral damages;
3. P100,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
4. P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
5. the costs of this suit.
On the other hand, petitioners are hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the amount of
P38,693.53 representing the billing differential.
The Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.19
The trial court ruled that petitioner failed to observe due process when it disconnected
electricity to Permanent Light. It explained that under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
783220 (RA 7832), in order that a tampered meter may constitute prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity by the person benefited thereby, the discovery thereof must have
been witnessed by an officer of the law or an authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB). In this case, however, the RTC noted that no officer of the law or
authorized ERB representative was present when the tampered meter was discovered.
Moreover, the trial court found no direct evidence to prove that respondents were responsible
for tampering with said meter.
On the basis of the proffered bill dated December 29, 2001, 21 the RTC concluded that the
replacement meter installed by Meralco did not accurately register Permanent Light’s electric
consumption. Consequently, it ordered petitioner to reimburse respondents in the amount of
P1,138,898.86, representing the supposed overpayment from April 1994 to November 2001.
For failure to observe due process in disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light, the trial
court likewise imposed upon petitioner Meralco moral and exemplary damages in the amount
of P200,000 and P100,000, respectively.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the Decision of the RTC. It deleted the award of P1,138,898.86 in favor of respondents and
instead ordered petitioner to pay temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner abused its right when it disconnected the electricity
of Permanent Light. The appellate court upheld the validity of the provision in petitioner’s
service contract which allows the utility company to disconnect service upon a customer’s
failure to pay the differential billing. It however stressed that under Section 97 22 of Revised
Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the right of a public utility to discontinue its
service to a customer is subject to the requirement of a 48-hour written notice of
disconnection. Petitioner’s failure in this regard, according to the appellate court, justifies the
award of moral and exemplary damages to respondents.
The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to reimburse respondents for overpayment on their
electric bills. It sustained the finding of the trial court that the electric meter installed by
petitioner in Permanent Light’s premises on April 20, 1994 was registering a higher reading
than usual. The appellate court based its conclusion on the marked difference between
Permanent Light’s net billing from 1985 to 2001 compared to its consumption after the new
meter was installed, and the consequent decrease after said meter was replaced on
November 28, 2001. However, instead of actual damages, the Court of Appeals awarded
respondents temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS;23
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARDING P500,000.00 FOR AND AS
TEMPERATE DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS.24
Amplified, the issues for our resolution are two-fold: (1) Are respondents entitled to claim
damages for petitioner’s act of disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light on April 19,
1994? and (2) Are respondents entitled to actual damages for the supposed overbilling by
petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from April 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001?
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for affirming the award of moral and exemplary
damages to respondents. It argues that respondents failed to establish how the
disconnection of electricity to Permanent Light for one day compromised its production.
Petitioner cites respondents’ admission that soon after the power went out, they used
generators to keep the operations of Permanent Light on track.
Petitioner further negates bad faith in discontinuing service to Permanent Light without notice
to respondents. It contends that the 48-hour notice requirement in Section 97 of Revised
General Order No. 1 applies only to a customer who fails to pay the regular bill. Petitioner
insists that the discovery by its Fully Phased Inspectors of Permanent Light’s tampered meter
justified disconnection of electricity to the latter.
Also, petitioner challenges the award of temperate damages to respondents for the alleged
overbilling. It objects to the admission into evidence of Permanent Light’s December 29,
2001 electric bill, which respondents proffered two years after the case was submitted for
decision by the court a quo. Petitioner disputes the finding of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that respondents overpaid on Permanent Light’s electric bill. It reasons that the
volume of business of any establishment varies from season to season such that it cannot
be expected to constantly register the same electric consumption. Lastly, petitioner protests
the award of P500,000 in temperate damages as excessive and unconscionable.
In a Memorandum dated May 27, 2009, respondents denied any involvement in the
tampering of Permanent Light’s electric meter. Respondents reiterate that petitioner violated
their right to due process when it disconnected electricity to Permanent Light without
apprising them of their violation and affording them an opportunity to pay the differential bill
within the 10-day grace period provided by law. Respondents claim that such disconnection
imperiled the prompt completion of Permanent Light’s contract with GSIS, thereby causing
them anxiety. They believe that the "embarrassment, humiliation and pain" brought about by
such disconnection justify the award of moral damages in their favor. Respondents invoke
Article 2425 of the Civil Code on parens patriae against the alleged abuse by petitioner
Meralco of its monopoly as an electric service provider.
Respondents also rely on the testimony of Enrique Katipunan, Meralco Billing Expert, to
prove that the sudden increase in Permanent Light’s electric consumption was caused by
the "high-speed" replacement meter installed by petitioner. They reiterate their claim for
actual damages, arguing that absolute certainty as to its amount need not be shown since
the loss has been established.
Upon a careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Court resolves to deny
the petition.
The pertinent law relative to the immediate disconnection of electricity is Section 4, RA 7832,
which reads:
SEC. 4. Prima Facie Evidence.–(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the
person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the
electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
(iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated, altered, or
tampered meter recording chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph, or log;
xxxx
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in
order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Thus, in order for the discovery of a tampered, broken or fake seal on the meter to constitute
prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from such illegal
use, the discovery thereof must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer
of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB.
Citing Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company,26 we reiterated the significance of this
requirement in Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. Chua,27 thus:
The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into
the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as
prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly
that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect
would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
On cross-examination, Meralco’s Fully Phased Inspector, Joselito M. Ignacio, recounted who
were present during the inspection:
Q. Mr. Ignacio, let us reconstruct the evidence on April 19, 1994. Before you came across
the Meralco meter of the plaintiffs, where did you come from?
A. We were inspecting other meters within that vicinity.
Q. So you mean to tell us that you were cruising in the vicinity of Cubao, Quezon City on
April 19?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And were you alone?
A. No, sir, we were two.
Q. Who was with you?
A. Mr. Peter Legaspi, sir.28
On further cross-examination by Atty. Pablito M. Castillo, Ignacio confirmed that only he and
another Fully Phased Inspector were present when they discovered Permanent Light’s
tampered meter:
Q. Who was with you when you entered the compound of the plaintiffs?
ATTY. BONA: Already answered, Mr. Legaspi.
ATTY. CASTILLO: No. They were both on board but the question now is more particular.
ATTY. BONA: At what particular time?
WITNESS:
A. Mr. Legaspi.
COURT: Only?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.29
Absent any showing that an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB
personally witnessed and attested to the discovery of Permanent Light’s tampered electric
meter, such discovery did not constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity that
justifies immediate disconnection of electric service.
Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 4, RA 7832
requires due notice to the person benefited before disconnection of electricity can be
effected. Specifically, Section 6 of RA 7832 calls for prior written notice or warning, thus:
SEC. 6. Disconnection of Electric Service. - The private electric utility or rural electric
cooperative concerned shall have the right and authority to disconnect immediately the
electric service after serving a written notice or warning to that effect, without the need of a
court or administrative order, and deny restoration of the same, when the owner of the house
or establishment concerned or someone acting in his behalf shall have been caught in
flagrante delicto doing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4(a) hereof, or when any of the
circumstances so enumerated shall have been discovered for the second time: Provided,
That in the second case, a written notice or warning shall have been issued upon the first
discovery: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even when the consumer, or someone acting in his behalf, is caught in flagrante delicto
or in the act of doing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832, petitioner may not
immediately disconnect electricity without serving a written notice or warning to the owner of
the house or establishment concerned.
Petitioner Meralco submitted a memorandum with Control No. 6033-9430 dated April 19,
1994 to prove that respondents were duly notified of the disconnection. Notwithstanding,
petitioner maintains that the 48-hour notice of disconnection does not apply in this case since
Section 97 of Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission pertains to nonpayment
of bills while the cause for discontinuing service to Permanent Light was the discovery of the
tampered meter.
We do not agree.
On February 9, 1987, the Bureau of Energy approved 31 the Revised Terms and Conditions
of Service and Revised Standard Rules and Regulations of Meralco’s Electric Service
Contract. Pertinent to this case, the provision on Discontinuance of Service under the
Revised Terms and Conditions of Service states:
DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE:
The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears in
the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter
stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to comply
with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company.
Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill
of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may disconnect
the same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former
Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such
suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and the
Customer.32 (Emphasis supplied)
On August 3, 1995, the ERB passed Resolution No. 95-21 or the Standard Rules and
Regulations Governing the Operation of Electrical Power Services which superseded and
revoked Revised Order No. 1, which the Public Service Commission adopted on November
27, 1941. The relevant provision on disconnection of service is found in Section 48 of ERB
Resolution No. 95-21, which reads:
SEC. 48. Refusal or Discontinuance of Service. – An electric utility shall not refuse or
discontinue service to an applicant, or customer, who is not in arrears to the electric utility,
even though there are unpaid charges due from the premises occupied by the applicant, or
customer, on account of unpaid bill of a prior tenant, unless there is evidence of conspiracy
between them to defraud the electric utility.
Service may be discontinued for the nonpayment of bills as provided for in Section 43 hereof,
provided that a forty eight (48)-hour written notice of such disconnection has been given the
customer; Provided, however, that disconnections of service shall not be made on Fridays,
Saturdays, Sundays and official holidays; Provided, further, that if at the moment of the
disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of the unpaid bill to the agent or
employee of the electric utility who is to effect the disconnection, the said agent, or employee
shall be obliged to accept tendered payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount
and shall desist from disconnecting the service.
The electric utility may discontinue service in case the customer is in arrear(s) in the payment
of bill(s). Any such suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the electric
utility and the customer.
In the case of arrear(s) in the payment of bill(s), the electric utility may discontinue the service
notwithstanding the existence of the customer’s deposit with the electric utility which will
serve as guarantee for the payment of future bill(s) after service is reconnected. (Emphasis
supplied)
True, Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21 expressly provides for the application of the
48-hour notice rule to Section 43 on Payment of Bills. However, petitioner Meralco, through
its Revised Terms and Conditions of Service, adopted said notice requirement where
disconnection of service is warranted because (1) the consumer failed to pay the adjusted
bill after the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, (2)
or for failure to comply with any of the terms and conditions, (3) or in case of or to prevent
fraud upon the Company.
Considering the discovery of the tampered meter by its Fully Phased Inspectors, petitioner
Meralco could have disconnected electricity to Permanent Light for no other reason but to
prevent fraud upon the Company. Therefore, under the Revised Terms and Conditions of
Service vis-a-vis Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21, petitioner is obliged to furnish
respondents with a 48-hour notice of disconnection. Having failed in this regard, we find basis
for the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of respondents for the
unceremonious disconnection of electricity to Permanent Light.
Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury.33Jurisprudence has established the following requisites
for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury whether physical, mental or
psychological, which was clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 34
Pertinent to the case at hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for the award of moral
damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law, are violated. 35In Quisumbing v. Manila Electric
Company, this Court treated the immediate disconnection of electricity without notice as a
form of deprivation of property without due process of law, which entitles the subscriber
aggrieved to moral damages. We stressed:
More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service
constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a
clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any
act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered
an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar. 36
Here, petitioner failed to establish factual basis for the immediate disconnection of electricity
to Permanent Light and to comply with the notice requirement provided by law. As the court
a quo correctly observed, there is no direct evidence that points to respondents as the ones
who tampered with Permanent Light’s electric meter. Notably, the latter’s meter is located
outside its premises where it is readily accessible to anyone.
In addition to moral damages, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. In this case, to serve as an example - that before disconnection
of electric supply can be effected by a public utility, the requisites of law must be complied
with - we sustain the award of exemplary damages to respondents.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the award of
moral damages and exemplary damages to respondents in the amount of P200,000 and
P100,000, respectively. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, however, this Court deems the
award of moral damages in the amount of P100,00037 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,00038 appropriate in cases where Meralco has wrongfully disconnected
electric service to its customer.
Nonetheless, the Court finds no reason to order the reimbursement to respondents of the
P55,538.20, which petitioner received as full settlement of Permanent Light’s "differential
billing" for its unregistered consumption from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. At this
point, it is well to clarify that RA 7832 assigns a specific meaning to "differential billing" and
utilizes various methodologies as basis for determining the same. More particularly, Section
639 of RA 7832 defines "differential billing" as the amount to be charged to the person
concerned for the unbilled electricity illegally consumed by him. However, since RA 7832
was approved only on December 8, 1994 and introduced such concept only on said date, it
would be improper to treat the term "differential billing" as used by Meralco in this case in
such context. Rather, we shall treat the same as a generic term to refer to the unbilled
electricity use of Permanent Light from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994.
The Computation Worksheet40 of said "differential billing" shows that the amount of
P61,709.11 was derived based on Permanent Light’s average KWhour consumption for the
six months immediately preceding September 20, 1993. We find such method of computation
in accord with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy on February 9, 1987,
thus:
PAYMENTS:
Bills will be rendered by the Company to the Customer monthly in accordance with the
applicable rate schedule. Said bills are payable to collectors or at the main or branch offices
of the Company or at its authorized banks within ten (10) days after the regular reading date
of the electric meters. The word "month" as used herein and in the rate schedule is hereby
defined to be the elapsed time between two succeeding meter readings approximately thirty
(30) days apart. In the event of the stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full
amount of energy consumed, the Customer shall be billed for such period on an estimated
consumption based upon his use of energy in a similar period of like use or the registration
of a check meter.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Spreading the P61,709.11 over the 6-month period covered by the "differential billing" will
yield a monthly rate of P10,284.85 - well within Permanent Light’s average net bill for the
previous months. It is undisputed by respondents that from September 20, 1993 to March
22, 1994, Permanent Light continued to enjoy petitioner’s services even as its electric meter
stopped functioning and no monthly electric bills were issued to it. We cannot therefore allow
respondents to enrich themselves unjustly at the expense of petitioner public utility.
However, we are at a loss as to how petitioner Meralco arrived at the second "differential
billing" for P38,693.53, which represents Permanent Light’s unregistered consumption from
March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. It bears mentioning that it was not until April 19, 1994 that
petitioner’s Fully Phased Inspectors replaced Permanent Light’s electric meter. In months
prior to that, Permanent Light’s electric meter had been stationary; hence, the first differential
bill for its consumption from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. The first differential bill
was computed in accordance with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy.
It is only proper that the same standard be used in estimating Permanent Light’s consumption
for the period of March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994.
Considering, however, that Permanent Light’s electric meter had stopped registering its
consumption for months prior to April 20, 1994, we shall base our estimate on Permanent
Light’s use of energy in a similar period. Permanent Light’s Bill History42 shows that from
March 19, 1992 to April 20, 1992, it consumed 3,648 KWhours of electricity. It last posted
the same level of consumption for the period of July 20, 1993 to August 19, 1993, for which
it was billed P10,834.58. We deem this amount a reasonable approximation of the net bill
that respondents should pay for Permanent Light’s use of electricity from March 22, 1994 to
April 21, 1994.
We now turn to the question of whether respondents are entitled to actual damages for the
supposed overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from April 20, 1994
to November 28, 2001.
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position
where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a
party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven.
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable
of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.43
Respondents anchor their claim for actual damages on the alleged overbilling by petitioner
Meralco of Permanent Light’s electricity use from April 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001. In
support, respondents presented in evidence the Comparative Monthly Meralco Bills of
Permanent Light Mfg. Enterprises from 1985-2001.44 Said document lists the amounts which
respondents supposedly paid based on Permanent Light’s electric bills from the year 1985
to 2001 for a total of P2,466,941.22. In particular, respondents submitted "representative
Meralco bills" of Permanent Light for the years 1985 to 1987, 1993 to 1997 and 2001 to 2002.
On January 29, 2002, respondents filed with the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Proffer and
Mark the Latest Meralco Bill of P9,318.65 which was Reflected in the 3rd Meralco Electric
Meter Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco. Attached to said pleading is a copy of
Permanent Light’s electric bill for the period of November 29, 2001 to December 29, 2001
for P9,318.65. Apparently, Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of
Permanent Light on November 28, 2001.
Respondents claim that the bill for P9,318.65 more accurately reflects Permanent Light’s
normal consumption, consistent with the latter’s electric bills before its meter was first
replaced on April 20, 1994. Respondents argue that, at most, their net bill should be at par
with those of Permanent Light’s neighboring establishments, Eureka Steel and Asiatic Steel
Manufacturing Co., (Asiatic Steel) which are purportedly engaged in the same business. For
the court’s reference, respondents submitted "representative Meralco bills" of Eureka Steel
for 1996 to 1997 and Asiatic Steel for the years 1994 to 1998. Using the figures in the latter
bills vis-a-vis Permanent Light’s "comparative bills" from 1986 to 2001, respondents seek the
refund of P1,138,898.86, representing their alleged overpayment to Meralco.
However, Section 34,45 Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, dictates
that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. In this case,
respondents rely heavily on the bill for P9,318.65 covering the period of November 29, 2001
to December 29, 2001 to demonstrate a defect in the replacement meter installed at
Permanent Light on April 20, 1994. However, said bill was not included in the Written Offer
of Exhibits which respondents filed much earlier, on October 30, 1998. To be sure, it could
not have been made part thereof.
Yet, even if we disregard the bill for P9,318.65, we cannot ignore the sudden and
unexplainable increase in Permanent Light’s electric consumption following the replacement
of its broken meter. Normally, when a tampered electric meter is replaced, assuming the
same amount of monthly rate of usage, the new electric meter will register the increased use
of electricity that had previously been concealed by the tampered meter. 46 While Permanent
Light’s electric meter, indeed, registered a sharp increase in its electricity use after being
replaced on April 20, 1994, there is no direct evidence to suggest that respondents tampered
with said meter. Truth be told, respondents repeatedly sought technical assistance from
Meralco after Permanent Light’s electric meter stopped working on December 7,
1993,47 albeit, without success. This fact remains undisputed by petitioner.
Based on Permanent Light’s Meralco bills of record, its electricity use has increased by
approximately 96.3% from an average of 1,672 KWhours per month in 1985 to 3,282
KWhours per month in 1993. On the other hand, the last recorded electric consumption of
Permanent Light before its meter broke, that is, from August 19, 1993 to September 20,
1993, was 3,432 KWhours while it registered a reading of 11,904 KWhours from June 20,
1994 to July 20, 1994 – a 246.85% increase in consumption over a period of nine (9) months.
This inordinate surge in electric reading is inconsistent with the pattern of steady but gradual
rise in Permanent Light’s consumption over the years. To our mind, the fact that Permanent
Light registered a significant increase in its electric use after the replacement meter was
installed is no reason to automatically conclude that its meter had been running tampered
long before the same stopped working. From 1985 to 1993, petitioner Meralco has observed
nothing irregular with Permanent Light’s recorded electric use such as a drastic and
unexplainable drop in its consumption to arouse suspicion that its meter has been tampered.
As the appellate court correctly observed, petitioner did not even present an iota of proof to
refute the claim that the replacement meter was running at an unusually high speed. 48 It must
be underscored that petitioner has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper
inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the
due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. 49
Notably, respondents complained of a sudden spike in Permanent Light’s net bill in their
Letter50 to Meralco dated December 7, 1993 - two days before Permanent Light’s meter
stopped working. Thus, if it is true that there was evidence of tampering found on April 19,
1994 yet Permanent Light continued to register an increased consumption even after its
meter was replaced, the better view would be that the defective meter was not actually
corrected after the first inspection.
Be that as it may, we cannot award actual damages to respondents.
We reiterate that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. The award is dependent upon competent proof
of the damage suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the
evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy,
remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof.51
In this case, respondents presented a summary of Permanent Light’s electric bills from the
years 1986 to 2001. Said list contains the amounts which respondents allegedly paid on
Permanent Light’s from 1986 to 2001. Curiously, respondents submitted mere
"representative samples" of
Permanent Light’s electric bills for the years 1985 to 1987 and from 1993 to 1997. It appears,
however, that respondents conveniently selected the bills which cover the period from
December to mid-March - months in which demand for electricity is normally less. To our
mind, respondents did this for no other reason than to magnify the disparity between
Permanent Light’s net bill before and after its meter was replaced on April 20, 1994 so that
it can demand greater in damages.
Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered,
a party is entitled to temperate damages.52 Temperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty.53 The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of
the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages
should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.

In this case, we are convinced that respondents sustained damages from the abnormal
increase in Permanent Light’s electric bills after petitioner replaced the latter’s meter on April
19, 1994. However, respondents failed to establish the exact amount thereof by competent
evidence. Considering the attendant circumstances, an award of temperate damages in the
amount of P300,000 is just and reasonable.

Finally, we delete the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.

An award of attorney’s fees has always been the exception rather than the
rule.1âwphi1 Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit. The policy
of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.54 The trial court must
make express findings of fact and law that bring the suit within the exception. What this
demands is that factual, legal or equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not
only in the fallo but also in the text of the decision, or else, the award should be thrown out
for being speculative and conjectural.55

Here, the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondents appeared only in the fallo of the
trial court’s Decision dated July 9, 2003. Neither did the appellate court proffer any
justification for sustaining said award.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80572 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:

(a) Petitioner is ordered to pay respondents ;P300,000 as temperate damages, ;PI

00,000 as moral damages and ;P50,000 as exemplary damages;

(b) Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner ; PI 0,834.58, representing the

estimate of its unregistered consumption for the period from March 22, 1994 to April
21, 1994; and

(c) The award of attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of basis.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199219 April 3, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GERRY OCTAVIO Y FLORENDO
and REYNALDO CARIÑO Y MARTIR, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review of this Court is the appeal filed by Gerry Octavio (Octavio) and Reynaldo Cariño
(Cariño) assailing the 29 March 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 03900. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65,
Makati City finding both accused guilty of violating Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No.· 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
On 21 August 2007, three (3) separate Informations were filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Makati City for violations of R.A No. 9165. The first information charges Gerry
Octavio y Florendo with violation of Section 5 thereof in the following manner:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-1580
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2007, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
necessary license or prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away Php200.00 worth of
[Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, a
dangerous drug.2
The second information charges the same accused with violation of Section 11 of the same
law allegedly committed as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-1581
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2007, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess and/or use dangerous drugs and without any license or proper
prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
each weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram or a total of zero point zero four (0.04) gram,
which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the aforesaid law. 3
The third information charges Reynaldo Cariño y Martir (Cariño) of violating Section 11 of
R.A. No. 9165, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-1582
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2007, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess and/or use dangerous drugs and without any license or proper
prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (Shabu)
each weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram or a total of zero point zero four (0.04) gram,
which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the aforesaid law. 4
Version of the Prosecution:
At around 7:00 o’clock in evening of 16 August 2007, an informant went to the Office of the
Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) to report the alleged rampant illegal drug
trafficking activities of Gerry Octavio alias "Buboy" at Pateros Street, Barangay Olympia,
Makati City.5
On the basis of this report, an anti-narcotics team was formed to conduct a buy-bust
operation with MADAC operatives Danilo Baysa (Baysa) and Danilo Sumudlayon
(Sumudlayon) as the designated poseur-buyer and immediate back-up, respectively. Two
(2) pieces of One Hundred Peso bills were pre-marked to be utilized as buy-bust money.
Proper coordination was made with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) before
the team, together with the asset, proceeded to the target area.6
Upon arrival at the designated area, the team spotted Octavio conversing with another male
person along an alley. MADAC operative Baysa and the asset approached the duo while the
rest of the team strategically positioned themselves. The asset, who was familiar with the
subject, introduced MADAC operative Baysa as a "scorer" or user of shabu. The other male
person, however, tried to convince MADAC operative Baysa to buy shabu from him instead,
at the same time showing two (2) pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu. The subject then introduced his companion to MADAC
operative Baysa as alias "Nano" before asking him how much he wanted to purchase.
MADAC operative Baysa intimated that he needed ₱200.00 worth of shabu, while
simultaneously handing over the marked money to the subject who, in turn, gave him one
(1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing suspected shabu.
The transaction having been consummated, MADAC operative Baysa executed the pre-
arranged signal to the rest of the team for assistance. Taking their cue, [PO1 Michelle V.
Gimena] (PO1 Gimena) and MADAC operative Sumudlayon rushed to the scene.
Meanwhile, MADAC operative Baysa introduced himself before effecting the arrest of the
subject, who was later identified as the herein accused Gerry Octavio y Florendo. A routine
body search upon his person yielded the marked money, two (2) pieces of small plastic
sachets containing suspected shabu and another two (2) ₱100 bills. MADAC operative
Sumudlayon, on the other hand, was able to arrest alias "Nano," who was later identified as
the herein accused Reynaldo Cariño y Martir. Two (2) pieces of heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing the same illegal substance were recovered from his possession.
Thereafter, both of the accused, as well as the confiscated items were brought to the SAID-
SOTF office for further investigation and later to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug test and
examination, respectively.7
Version of the Defense
Both accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Accused Cariño maintained that
at around 6:00 c’clock in the evening of 17August 2007, he was resting inside his house
when four (4) men suddenly entered. They asked him if he was Cesar Martir, referring to his
cousin who resided next door. When he did not respond, they handcuffed and boarded him
inside their vehicle. One of those on board was MADAC operative Ed Monteza who
previously invited him to the barangay hall in connection with an investigation regarding
persons suspected to be drug peddlers within the neighborhood. Upon seeing him, MADAC
Ed Monteza allegedly told his companions that they arrested the wrong person ("Hindi iyan
ang target natin.") Thus, the men returned to the house of Cesar Martir but the latter was
already nowhere in sight. They later proceeded to the SAID-SOTF and MADAC office,
passing through Pateros Street, Brgy. Olympia, Makati City, where his co-accused Gerry
Octavio was also arrested.
For his part, accused Octavio narrated that at around 6:30 o’clock in the evening of 16 August
2007, he was walking along Pateros Street on his way to the house of Sylvia Lopez. Since
he worked as a car painter, he was supposed to estimate the cost of materials needed to
repaint her vehicle. Along the way, he caught sight of an incoming Mitsubishi L-300 van.
When it stopped in front of him, two (2) armed men alighted therefrom and wanted to know
where he was going. They likewise accused him of using illegal drugs ("Siguro i-iscore ka,
ano?"). Although he denied the accusation, they handcuffed and boarded him just the same
inside their vehicle. Once inside, he saw MADAC operative Eduardo Monteza who arrested
him sometime in 2003. He likewise saw his co-accused Reynaldo Cariño already on board
the van. Upon arrival at the SAID-SOTF office, the men asked if they knew the whereabouts
of Cesar Martir. They allegedly threatened to file charges against the accused if they refused
to provide any information about him. Since the accused were unable to give any information,
an investigator accordingly produced plastic sachets of shabu which were allegedly
recovered from them.8
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. After pre-trial,
trial on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
On 23 March 2009, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. In Criminal Case No. 07-1580, accused Octavio
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
In Criminal
Case No. 07-1581, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen years (14) and eight (8) months as maximum
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Cariño, for his part, was sentenced in Criminal Case No.
07-1582 to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum, to fourteen years (14) and eight (8) months as maximum and to pay a fine of
₱300,000.00.9
The RTC found that the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the two accused for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. It ruled that
the evidence presented during the trial adequately established that a valid buy-bust operation
was conducted by the operatives of the MADAC, as well as the SAID-SOTF, Makati City on
16 August 2007 upon proper coordination with the PDEA.10 On the other hand, accused
Octavio and Cariño failed to present substantial evidence to establish their defense of frame-
up. The RTC ruled that frame-up, as advanced by the herein accused, is generally looked
upon with caution by the court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Like
alibi, frame-up as a defense had invariably been viewed with disfavor as it is common and
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.11
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution. It found credible the statements of prosecution witnesses Baysa, Sumudlayon
and Barangay Captain Victor Del Prado (Barangay Captain Del Prado) about what transpired
during and after the buy-bust operation. Further, it ruled that the prosecution has proven as
unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA likewise upheld the findings of the trial
court that the buy-bust operation conducted enjoyed the presumption of regularity, absent
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the police operatives who conducted the same.
The CA found accused-appellants’ defenses of denial and frame-up unconvincing and lacked
strong corroboration.12
ISSUE: Accused-appellants raised in their brief a lone error on the part of the appellate court,
to wit:
The court-a-quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.13
Our Ruling: The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellants submit that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws
committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. 14Accused-appellants allege that no
photograph was taken of the items seized from them. Further, Barangay Captain Del Prado,
an elected public official, was not present during the alleged buy-bust operation. He was only
asked to sign the inventory of the seized items shortly after his arrival at the scene of the
buy-bust operation. Thus, he has no personal knowledge as to whether the drugs allegedly
seized from the accused-appellants were indeed recovered from them. Accused-appellants
maintain that such failure created a cloud of doubt as to whether the alleged shabu seized
from them were the same ones forwarded by the apprehending officers to the investigating
officer, to the crime laboratory for examination and later presented in court.15
Relevant to accused-appellants’ case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II,
R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Clearly, there is nothing in the aforesaid law or its implementing rules which require the
presence of the elected public official during the buy-bust operation. It is enough that he is
present during the physical inventory immediately conducted after the seizure and
confiscation of the drugs and he signs the copies of the inventory and is given a copy thereof.
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Barangay Captain Del Prado testified
as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned it was evening time when Eduardo Monteza called you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the date again?
A: August 16 think.
Q: Am I correct to say that Eduardo Monteza called you up regarding the arrest of the suspect
in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you proceeded to the place, it was designated by Ed Monteza, the place you would
be?
A: They told me the site of apprehension because I know the place of operation, sir.
THE COURT:
Q: Where was the area of operation?
A: Pateros Street Barangay Olympia near Osmeña Street.
Q: You said that some items were shown to you, will you please enlighten us what are these
items?
A: I remember four (4) items in the inventory receipt that I signed, the first item consists of
five (5) transparent plastic sachets containing suspected shabu, one with marking ‘BUBOY’,
the subject which was bought from Buboy, then 2 plastic sachets with marking ‘BUBOY’ 1
and 2, those recovered from the possession of the said @Buboy, then 2 items with marking
‘NANO-1’ and ‘NANO-2’ recovered from accused Reynaldo.
Q: When you proceeded to the place, did you happen to see the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were they wearing at that time, if you can still remember?
A: I remember that Gerry was wearing sando and short.
Q: What’s the color of the sando?
A: I remember it’s white, sir.
Q: The short, what’s the color?
A: It’s maong shorts, sir.
Q: What about the other accused?
A: I remember he’s wearing white t-shirt, sir.
Q: And his lower garment?
A: I did not notice, sir, because they were then sitting. 16
xxxx
In the aforesaid testimony, Barangay Captain Del Prado, not only positively identified both
accused but also identified the items contained in the inventory receipt. Such testimony
clearly established compliance with the requirement of Section 21with regard to the presence
and participation of the elected public official.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to take
a photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence.17 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.18 In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution
must be able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous
drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-
over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their
composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of
custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements
provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused
will not be affected.19
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing
of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Appellants bear the
burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome
the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption
that public officers properly discharged their duties20 Appellants in this case failed to present
any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the
testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit21 In fact, accused-
appellants did not even questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They
anchored their appeal solely on the alleged broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.
Finally, we note and agree with the observation of the CA that the issue regarding the break
in the chain of custody of evidence was raised belatedly and only for the first time on
appeal.22 In People v. Mateo,23 this Court brushed aside the accused's belated contention
that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person was inadmissible because the arresting
officers failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Whatever justifiable grounds may
excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown,
because accused did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without
such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
On the basis of the aforesaid disquisition, we find no reason to modify or set aside the
decision of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the 29 March 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03900 in is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185518 April 17, 2013
SPOUSES FELIX CHINGKOE AND ROSITA CHINGKOE, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
FAUSTINO CHINGKOE AND GLORIA CHINGKOE, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the 3 July
2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) annulling the 30 March 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.1 The RTC affirmed2 the Metropolitan Trial Court's
(MTC) dismissal3 of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by herein respondents.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondents are the registered owners of a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 82834 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. They claim that sometime in 1990,
out of tolerance and permission, they allowed respondent Faustino’s brother, Felix, and his
wife, Rosita, to inhabit the subject property situated at No. 58 Lopez Jaena Street, Ayala
Heights, Quezon City. Due to the intercession of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino agreed
to sell the property to Felix on condition that the title shall be delivered only after Felix and
Rosita’s payment of the full purchase price, and after respondents’ settlement of their
mortgage obligations with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). After further
prodding from their mother, however, and at Felix’s request, Faustino agreed to deliver in
advance an incomplete draft of a Deed of Absolute Sale, which had not yet been notarized.
While respondents themselves drafted the deed, the parties again agreed that the document
would only be completed after full payment.5
On 24 July 2001, respondents sent a demand letter6 to petitioners asking them to vacate the
premises. To this date, petitioners have refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a
complaint7 for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Quezon City. In their Answer, petitioners
presented a copy of a completed Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 October 1994, claiming
that respondents had sold the property for ₱3,130,000, which petitioners had paid in full and
in cash on the same day. Due to respondents’ adamant refusal to surrender the title to them
as buyers, petitioners were allegedly constrained to file an action for specific performance
with Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC on 31 January 1995.8
The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by petitioners and dismissed the
Complaint, as follows:
The defendants herein assert that "since October 1994, when they bought their property in
CASH, their stay thereat is by virtue of their absolute ownership thereof as provided for in
the Absolute Deed of Sale," x x x. The foregoing would right away tell us that this Court is
barred from ordering the ejectment of the defendants from the premises in question so much
so that what is at stake only in cases of this nature as above stated is as regards possession
only.
With the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale whereby the Vendors never reserved their
rights and interests over the property after the sale, and the transfer appears to be absolute,
beside the fact that the property is now under the control and custody of the defendants, we
could conclude that instant case unlawful detainer (sic) is destined to fail, 9
x x x.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC in toto, reasoning thus:
x x x (T)here exists a Deed presented in evidence on the sale of the subject property entered
into by the herein parties. The Deed of Sale renders weak the claim of tolerance or
permission.
Although the plaintiffs-appellants questioned the validity and authenticity of the Deed of Sale,
this will not change the nature of the action as an unlawful detainer, in the light of our premise
of the principal issue in unlawful detainer – possession de facto.10
The CA reversed the findings of the lower courts and ruled that a mere plea of title over
disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as sound basis for dismissing an action for
recovery of possession. Citing Refugia v. Court of Appeals, the appellate court found that
petitioners’ stay on the property was merely a tolerated possession, which they were no
longer entitled to continue. The deed they presented was not one of sale, but a "document
preparatory to an actual sale, prepared by the petitioners upon the insistence and prodding
of their mother to soothe in temper respondent Felix Chingkoe." 11
Petitioners now come before this Court, raising the following arguments:
a. The CA committed reversible error when it admitted and gave weight to testimony
given in a different proceeding (action for specific performance) pending before the
Regional Trial Court in resolving the issue herein (unlawful detainer); and
b. The CA committed reversible error when it ruled on the validity of a notarized
Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment action.
We deny the petition.
Anent the first argument, petitioners fault the CA for citing and giving credence to the
testimony of Tan Po Chu, who was presented as a witness in another case, the action for
specific performance filed by petitioners. The CA stated:
In the case instituted by the respondents against herein petitioner for Specific Performance
entitled "Felix Chingkoe and Rosita Chingkoe v. Faustino Chingkoe and Gloria Chingkoe,"
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-22865 pending before Branch 96 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Tan Po Chu testified on 25 November 1999 to shed light on the matter
once and for all, to wit:
xxxx
Atty. Nicolas:
Q You mentioned that this is the second copy of the deed of absolute sale, you identified the
signature appearing here as the signature of Felix, how do you know that this is the signature
of Felix?
A Well, he is my son. I am familiar with his signature and besides that he signed it in my
presence.
Q And this is the very document and not as photocopy (sic) of the second document which
you brought to Felix?
Atty. Flores:
Again, Your Honor, very leading.
Court:
I will allow.
A I am not very sure now but I think this is the real one, I think this is the one because I saw
him signed (sic) this.
Atty. Nicolas:
May I request that this be marked as Exhibit "1" and the signature of Felix be signed as
Exhibit "1-A"?
Court:
Mark.
Atty. Flores:
Just a moment, no basis, Your Honor, please.
Atty. Nicolas:
Your Honor, the witness said that there was a deed of absolute sale,
I was asking if she knows how much Felix paid for the property when she delivered the
document.
Court:
She never testified that there was a sale, she only said that there was a deed of sale.
Atty. Nicolas:
I will reform, Your Honor.
Q When you delivered this document to Felix, what did he give you in return, if any?
A He did not give me anything, he had never paid me any single cent.
Q When you delivered the deed of sale?
A There was no payment whatsoever.
Q As far as you know, Ms. Witness, was the property paid for by Felix to Faustino?
A I swear to God, no payment, there was no payment at all, I swear.
xxxx
As clearly shown in the testimony given in open court which was above-quoted, petitioners
merely delivered to their mother a draft of the deed, which they signed to appease her and
respondent Felix Chingkoe.12 (Emphases supplied.)
The CA indeed quoted at length from the testimony of Tan Po Chu, and culled therefrom the
factual finding that the purported contract of sale had never been consummated between the
parties. The CA cited as basis her testimony from Civil Case No. Q-95-22865: that she
witnessed Felix signing the blank deed, and that upon its signing, there was no payment for
the property. This account directly contradicts petitioners’ claim that payment was made
simultaneously with the perfection of the contract.
Petitioners claim that the CA erroneously considered this testimony in Civil Case No. Q-95-
22865. They cite the general rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. As early as
United States v. Claveria, this Court has stated: "In the absence of objection and as a matter
of convenience, a court may properly treat all or part of the original record of a former case
filed in its archives, as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated."13
We reiterated this stance in Adiarte v. Domingo,14 in which the trial court decided the action
pending before it by taking judicial notice of the records of a prior case for a sum of money.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint, after it considered
evidence clearly showing that the subject matter thereof was the same as that in the prior
litigation. In a 1993 case, Occidental Land Transportation Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
the Court ruled:
The reasons advanced by the respondent court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No.
3156 are valid and not contrary to law. As a general rule, "courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge." The general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in
Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing U.S. v. Claveria, which We quote:
x x x (I)n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into
the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part
of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with
the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, ‘in the absence of objection,’
‘with the knowledge of the opposing party,’ or ‘at the request or with the consent of the parties’
the case is clearly referred to or ‘the original or part of the records of the case are actually
withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.’
xxxx
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed
part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties
and in the absence of their objection. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted).15
This doctrine was restated in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, viz: "As a matter of convenience
to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case
filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending." 16(Underscoring
supplied)
In the case at bar, as the CA rightly points out in its Resolution dated 28 November
2008,17 petitioners never objected to the introduction of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
containing the testimony of Tan Po Chu, which were records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865.
As shown by the records and as petitioners admitted in their Reply, the testimony was
already introduced on appeal before the RTC. In fact, it was petitioners themselves who
specifically cited Civil Case No. Q-95-22865, referring to it both by name and number,
purportedly to bolster the claim that they were constrained to sue, in order to compel delivery
of the title.18
Given these facts, the CA committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of the records
of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. In any case, the said testimony was not the only basis for
reversing the RTC’s Decision. Independent of the testimony, the CA – through its perusal
and assessment of other pieces of evidence, specifically the Deed of Absolute Sale –
concluded that petitioners’ stay on the premises had become unlawful.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100008 (dated 3 July 2008) is
AFFIRMED.
We make no pronouncement as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

Concerning the second issue, petitioners object to the assessment of the Deed of Sale by SO ORDERED.
the CA, claiming such a determination is improper in summary proceedings. It should be
noted that it was petitioners who introduced the Deed of Sale in evidence before the MTC
and the RTC, as evidence of their claimed right to possession over the
property.1âwphi1 They attached the deed to their Answer as Annex "1." 19 The CA
discovered that they falsified their copy of the document denominated as Deed of Absolute
Sale in this wise:

Said draft of the deed was undated and bears the signature of one witness, as can be clearly
noticed upon its very careful perusal. Notably, respondents made it appear in the draft of the
Deed of Absolute Sale that there indeed was a valid and consummated sale when in truth
and in fact, there was none. The document accomplished by the respondents (herein
petitioners) gave them some semblance, albeit highly questionable, of ownership over the
property by affixing their signatures, affixing the signature of one Cora Hizon as witness and
superimposing the signature of Jane Chan with that of one Noralyn Collado. 20

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership
in unlawful detainer cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.21 This Court has repeatedly ruled that although the issue in unlawful
detainer cases is physical possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve
the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. 22 "These
actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in
their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue
is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of
ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality." 23

Trial courts must necessarily delve into and weigh the evidence of the parties in order to rule
on the right of possession, as we have discussed in Sps. Esmaquel and Sordevilla v.
Coprada:

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his
possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract
between them. However, defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of
the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession
of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where
the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in
order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however,
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer
case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more
weight.24 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
G.R. No. 191391 June 19, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BENEDICT HOMAKY
LUCIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Benedict Homaky Lucio (Lucio) from the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of conviction rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 of Baguio City for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.2
Factual Antecedents
The prosecution presented a buy-bust case.
On 31 March 2004, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, a male informant went to the office
of Philippine Drug Enforcement AgencyCordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR) in
Baguio City to give information regarding an illegal sale or distribution of dangerous drugs,
particularly dried marijuana being done in Barangay Lucnab, Baguio City by a couple
identified as Wilma and Ben. Upon receiving this information, PO1 Cesario Castro (PO1
Castro), then on-duty as a member of PDEACAR, immediately referred the informant to his
senior officers, Police Senior Inspectors Edgar S. Apalla (PSI Apalla) and Paul John Mencio
(PSI Mencio).3 PSI Apalla and PSI Mencio interviewed the informant regarding the alleged
illegal activities of the couple. Giving merit to the statement of the informant, PSI Apalla and
PSI Mencio decided to conduct a buy-bust operation.4 Thereafter, a buy-bust team was
formed composed of PO1Castro, as the poseur-buyer, SPO4 Arthur Lucas (SPO4 Lucas) as
the arresting officer, Officer Lito Labbutan (Officer Labbutan) as the seizing officer and PO1
Harold Estacio (PO1 Estacio) as the back-up officer.
Correlative to his duty as poseur-buyer, PO1 Castro was given two (2) pieces of five hundred
peso (₱500.00) bill marked money by PSI Apalla to be used in buying marijuana from the
couple.5 POI Castro then placed his initials in the marked money and gave it to PO3
Dorotheo T. Supa (PO3 Supa) for the purpose of writing the details of the money in the blotter
of Police Precint 3, Pacdal, Baguio City and coordinating the PDEA’s buy-bust operation with
the police.6
At around 8:15 in the evening, the members of the buy-bust team, together with the informant
proceeded to the area of operation in Barangay Lucnab, Baguio City on board the PDEA’s
service vehicle.7 Upon arrival, the informant led PO1 Castro to the shanty of the couple, while
the back-up police officers followed from behind. 8 The informant then called for the name
Ben several times.9 A male individual came out from the shanty and asked what their
business was.10 Both standing in front of the door, the informant introduced PO1 Castro to
Ben (identified as the accused Benedict Homaky Lucio during trial) as a taxi driver from
Manila interested in buying marijuana to be transported back to Manila. 11 Afterwards, PO1
Castro and Lucio transacted which led to the latter’s offer that he was selling the marijuana
brick for ₱1000.00 each. Lucio further offered that he would sell the brick for ₱800.00 each
if PO1 Castro would buy at least five (5) bricks. PO1 Castro then asked for a sample to
determine the quality of the marijuana which prompted Lucio to ask his female companion
Wilma Padillo Tomas (Wilma) to get one inside. Upon examination of the brick handed by
Wilma, PO1 Castro requested Lucio and Wilma if he could see other samples.12Lucio heeded
to his request and allowed him to go inside and look for something of bigger size. Inside the
shanty, PO1 Castro noticed a white nylon sack just behind the door with marijuana bricks
inside. Lucio pointed at the nylon sack and asked if he can choose the brick he wanted. PO1
Castro examined one from the sack but opted to choose the one given by Wilma. During this
time, the informant only entered half of his body to observe the transaction while Wilma stood
in the middle of the half-opened door.13 Afterwards, Lucio and PO1 Castro went out in order
to examine the brick because the shanty was only lighted by a candle. PO1 Castro decided
to buy one (1) brick of marijuana from the accused and handed the two (2) five hundred bills
to Lucio as payment.14
After handling the money, he then switched off his flashlight several times as his pre-
arranged signal that transaction has been consummated. Immediately thereafter, the
arresting and back-up officers hiding from behind approached them and arrested Lucio and
Wilma. The officers then informed the couple that they were being arrested for selling
marijuana and informed them of their constitutional rights in Tagalog and Ilocano. 15 Lucio
immediately denied ownership of the marijuana bricks. 16 A body search was conducted
against Lucio and the marked money, still being held by him, was recovered. 17 Thereafter
the officers confiscated the sack containing the marijuana bricks and made an inventory of
the bricks inside the shanty in the presence of the couple18 which yielded thirty six (36)
marijuana bricks on initial count, thirty (35) bricks inside the sack and one (1) brick sold to
PO1 Castro.
Lucio and Wilma, together with the confiscated marijuana bricks, were brought by the
arresting officers to the PDEA Office for proper documentation and identification. 19 Inside the
office, PO1 Castro then put his initial "GCPC," signature "GCP Castro" and the date on the
marijuana brick sold to him as well as on the confiscated 35 marijuana bricks.20 Other
members of the buy-bust team also affixed their initials on the bricks for proper identification
as evidenced by the markings "LPL" as the initial of Officer Labbutan as the seizing officer,
"HPE" as the initial of PO1 Estacio as the back-up element and "AAL" as the initial of SPO4
Lucas as the arresting officer.21 Inside the office, a recounting of the confiscated bricks was
done in the presence of the Prosecutor E. Sagsago, the buy-bust team, the Barangay
Officials and media personalities who thereafter affixed their signatures on the Inventory of
the Seized Item22 prepared in relation to the operation.23 Thereafter, the seized marijuana
bricks were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service-CAR for laboratory examination. The
laboratory examination conducted by Forensic Officer Emilia Gracio Montes yielded positive
results for marijuana, a dangerous drug on all the thirty-five bricks tested.24
The other prosecution witnesses SPO4 Lucas and Officer Labbutan corroborated the
statements of PO1 Castro on materials points.25
The defense interposed frame-up.
On his part, accused Lucio denied both illegal sale and possession of marijuana bricks that
occurred on 31 March 2004 at Lucnab, Baguio City. He testified that on 28 March 2004, he
met his uncle Alex Accatan (Alex), a cousin of his father, at the trading post at Km. 5, La
Trinidad, Benguet. He was there with his live-in partner Wilma to bring vegetables; while Alex
was there to get some vegetables for his pigs. During the course of their conversation, Alex
told him and Wilma that he has a house located at Lucnab, Baguio City and invited them to
come on 31 March 2004 as his son will be graduating from elementary education. 26 For them
to know how they can reach the house on the 31st, Alex asked them go with him on that day
to his residence. At around 3:00 in the afternoon, they all went to Alex’s house as planned
where the couple met for the first time Alex’s wife. After a brief talk, Lucio and Wilma went
back to their residence at Bugias, Ifugao.27
On 31 March 2004, Lucio and Wilma went to the house of Alex as requested and arrived
there at around 4:30 in the afternoon. Upon arrival, Lucio was told by his uncle’s minor child
that Alex went to Teacher’s Camp. As it was already getting late, Lucio called his uncle
through his cellular phone and was told by the latter that they can spend the night at the
house of his neighbor identified as Kollit. This Kollit, as told by his uncle, permitted them to
use the house.28 He was then instructed to get the key from his uncle’s daughter Arlene
Accatan (Arlene). Lucio and Wilma proceeded to the house of Kollit to rest but left their small
bag inside the house of Alex.29
While resting inside, somebody knocked at the door and shouted the name, "Kollit, Kollit."
Lucio answered that Kollit was not there but the persons outside responded by kicking the
door open and entered the house. These persons inquiring about Kollit introduced
themselves as policemen and asked about marijuana. When the accused denied any
knowledge, these policemen, whom he noticed as armed, searched the room and recovered
a sack under the bed.30 Afterwards, Lucio was handcuffed to the left hand of PO1 Estacio
and was brought to another house located below the place of Kolit.31 The policemen inquired
again about Kollit and destroyed the door of the second house adjacent to the first house
where Lucio and Wilma were resting.32 Thereafter, the couple were brought to the PDEA
Office where they were told that marijuana was recovered from them. They denied ownership
of the marijuana found inside the sack and reiterated their plea that they were only allowed
to sleep inside the house of Kollit.33
Lucio and Wilma were brought to the Baguio General Hospital for physical examination.
Upon their return to the PDEA Office, the PDEA Officers then called a media representative,
a member of the Department of Justice and a barangay official for inventory witnessing.
Afterwards, pictures of the sack allegedly recovered from them together with the two pieces
of five hundred peso (₱500.00) bill were taken.34
Alex corroborated the testimony of Lucio that he invited him and his companion Wilma into
his house on 31 March 2004 when they met at the trading post on 28 March 2004. 35 He
narrated that when Lucio called him, he was doubtful if the latter was already at his residence
or just on his way. Alex told Lucio that if he would still be going, there might be several visitors
in his home at that time. He added that he can get the key of his neighbor’s house from his
daughter Arlene. He identified the name of his neighbor Kullit36 as Arthur Basilan.37
Upon returning home, he was surprised to know that Lucio was arrested by policemen and
was being investigated for a sack of marijuana allegedly taken from him. 38
Another witness for the defense is Martisio Paguli, the Barangay Chairman of Lucnab,
Baguio City. He testified that at around 9:00 in the morning of 1 April 2004, he received a
message that somebody was arrested in his purok. He then proceeded to the PDEA Office
and was asked by PSI Mencio to identify Lucio and Wilma. He replied that he did not know
them and that was the first time he saw the two accused.39 He was able to talk to Lucio who
informed him of his name and that the purpose of his visit to Lucnab was to attend the
graduation of Alex’s son.40 He also identified that a certain Arthur Basilan owned the house
where Lucio and Wilma were arrested.41
Wilma and Arlene, daughter of Alex, were also presented to corroborate the testimony of
Lucio regarding the real circumstances of what transpired on 31 March 2004. 42
Lucio and Wilma were eventually charged with Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous
Drugs punishable under Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Two sets of
information were eventually filed by the Office of the Prosecutor of Baguio City. The
accusatory portion of the Information in violation of Section 5 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
reads:
Criminal Case No. 22910-R
That on or about the 31st day of March, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [referring to Lucio and
Wilma] conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another and without the authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and/or deliver
one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves, weighing 741.7 grams for One Thousand Pesos
(₱1,000.00), Philippine Currency, to PO1 Gil Cesario P. Castro, a member of the PNP who
acted as poseur buyer, knowing fully well that said dried marijuana leaves, is a dangerous
drug, in violation of the aforementioned provision of law. 43
On the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information in violation of Section 11 of
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reads:
Criminal Case No. 22911-R
That on or about the 31st day of March, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused [referring to Lucio and
Wilma] conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another and without the authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and
control thirty five (35) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with approximate total weight of twenty
four (24) kilos, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription, in
violation of the aforecited provision of law.44
When arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 12 December 2006 rendered a decision, 45 the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Benedict Homaky Lucio GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in both cases and he is sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment in
each case and likewise to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 in each case and the costs.
The accused Wilma Padillo Tomas is ACQUITTED in both cases on grounds of reasonable
doubt and she is hereby ORDERED RELEASED from the custody unless being held for
some other offense requiring her continued detention.46
The trial court justified the guilty verdict against Lucio as it was convinced that the elements
of both illegal sale and possession of dangerous drug were sufficiently established by the
prosecution.47 It also recognized the credibility of the testimonies of the police officers
pertaining to the buy-bust operation48 and the positive identification of the accused as the
seller of the bricks of marijuana.49
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, the dispositive portion 50 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Baguio City, in Criminal Case Nos. 22910-R & 22911-R finding appellant Benedict Homaky
Lucio guilty of Violation of R.A. 9165 is AFFIRMED in toto.
It ruled that all the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drug were
proven by the prosecution. It also upheld the credibility of the witnesses and placed highest
respect on the findings of facts of the trial court. It likewise disregarded the absence of
surveillance or test buy prior to the buy-bust operation as well as the strict compliance of the
requirements to establish chain of custody under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the ruling of conviction of both the trial court
and CA.
In People v. Llanita51 citing People v. Unisa,52 the Court ruled that in order to successfully
prosecute an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements
must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In illegal sale, what the prosecution needs to present is proof that a transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti.
The commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as the police
officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by appellant,
followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already
consummated. In this case, the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drugs
sale with moral certainty.53
Upon examination of the testimonies of PO1 Castro on both his direct and cross
examinations, we are convinced of Lucio’s guilt on both charges.
The following narrates the course of buying and selling to constitute illegal sale:
Q: While you were transacting with the other accused Benedict Homaky Lucio where were
you again situated?
A: Just infront of their shanty, Sir.
Q: Who was beside you?
A: The male Informant, Sir.
xxxx
Q: What was the gist of your conversation then with Benedict Lucio?
A: We were transacting with the marijuana he was selling it for ₱1,000.00 per brick so during
our conversation I made some bargain, Sir.54
xxxx
His cross-examination supplants further details:
Q: And so after huddling (sic) you decided to buy just one (1) brick?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you said that you delivered the buy-bust money to one of the accused?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How did you deliver it?
A: I handed to him the two (2) 500.00 peso bills, Sir.
Q: Where did he place it?
A: He was holding it, Sir.55
In this case, the police officers positively identified Lucio as the one who transacted and sold
marijuana bricks to PO1 Castro in exchange of the marked money consisting of two (2) five
hundred peso (₱500.00) bills. As per Chemistry Report of Police Inspector Emilia Gracio
Montese, the submitted items consisting of thirty five suspected marijuana bricks to the
Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination yielded positive results for
presence of dangerous drugs.56 The marijuana brick marked as Exhibit A was likewise
presented in court with the proper identification by PO1 Castro.
Lucio’s conviction on illegal possession is likewise affirmed. To prosecute Lucio of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, there must be a showing that (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug.57
It must be noted that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict him, unless there is a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence is, thus, shifted to Lucio
to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. 58 In this case, the illegal
possession came about when Lucio allowed PO1Castro to look for other bricks inside the
sack. The following narration shows willful possession of illegal drugs:
Q: What did you actually tell him?
A: I told him it cost a lot, Sir.
Q: And so what did he say?
A: He said that if I will take at least five (5) bricks of marijuana he will give it for ₱800.00 per
brick, Sir.
Q: So for five (5) bricks that would be about…
A: ₱4,000.00, Sir.
Q: What did you say to that?
A: I asked him to look for the sample of the marijuana in order to determine if it is with good
quality, Sir.
Q: What did he do to comply with your request?
A: He asked Wilma Padillo to get sample inside their shanty, Sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: Wilma Padillo reached for the half opened door just behind the door of their shanty that
sample, Sir.59
xxxx
Q: From the time that it was given to you by the accused Wilma Padillo, who had custody of
it if you know?
A: I took hold of this as my sample but at the same time requested the couple to see if there
are some other things because it appears to be like it doesn’t look like one (1) kilo.
Q: What did the two (2) say to that request of yours?
A: I requested if Benedict would allow me to go inside their shanty and to look for something
that has a bigger size, Sir.
Q: What happened next after that?
A: He acceded, he allowed me to enter inside their shanty, Sir. 60
xxxx
Q: What happened next?
A: When I entered their shanty, I noticed a white nylon sack just behind the door with some
marijuana bricks inside, Sir.
Q: Is that the same door where Benedict and Wilma were standing?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And that is the same door you were facing while you were talking with Benedict and
Wilma?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How were you able to see this white nylon sack?
A: Benedict pointed it, Sir.
Q: When he pointed it did you see anything?
A: He said that I can choose what brick I wanted, Sir.
Q: How did he say it?
A: In Ilocano, Sir.
Q: Tell us how he told it in Ilocano?
A: "Agpili ka latta ditan", Sir.
COURT: Which means "just choose from the sack."
Q: After he said that what happened next?
A: I carefully choose one but I opted to get hold of the previous one that was given to me
and told "daytoy laengan", Sir.61
To recapitulate the elements, Lucio was in possession of marijuana bricks identified to be
prohibited drugs, such possession was not authorized by law and he freely and consciously
possessed the said drugs.
In his appellant’s brief, Lucio questions the full credence given by the lower courts to the
version of the prosecution despite their irregularities and inconsistencies. Among the lapses
asserted was the lack of previous surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation. No test buy
was conducted to confirm the truthfulness of the statements given by the informant which
prompted the operation.62
It must be stressed that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment operation. This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again, has long
been settled by this Court. We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is
not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied
to the target area by their informant.63
In People v. Eugenio,64 the Court held that there is no requirement that prior surveillance
should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken especially when the
policemen are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant. Prior surveillance is not
a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed
or textbook method for conducting one. When time is of essence, the police may dispense
with the need for prior surveillance. The buy-bust operation conducted by PO1 Castro and
the rest of them, together with their civilian informant is justified by the urgency of the
situation.
Another point argued is the inconsistency of the recollection of events by PO1 Castro, PO1
Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas with regard to the recovery of the marked money from the
accused. PO1 Castro recalled that it was recovered from the hand of Lucio while PO1
Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas testified that the same was recovered from the pocket of the
accused after a body search.65
We cannot sustain his argument. In order for a discrepancy or inconsistency between the
testimonies of witnesses to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to significant facts vital
to the guilt or innocence of the accused x x x. An inconsistency which has nothing to do with
the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the accused." 66
As stated in People v. Albarido:67
It is elementary in the rule of evidence that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of
their declaration nor the veracity or weight of their testimony. In fact, these minor
inconsistencies enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that
their testimonies were contrived or rehearsed. Further, in People vs. Maglente, this Court
ruled that inconsistencies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not
grounds for acquittal. x x x.68
In this case, the question as to what part of the body of the accused did the police officers
recover the money does not dissolve the elements of illegal sale and possession as minor
inconsistencies do not negate or dissolve the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.69 Minor inconsistencies in the narration of PO1
Castro, PO1 Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas do not detract from their essential credibility as long
as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable.70
The accused also put into issue the capacity of the back-up officers to witness the alleged
transaction as the place was very dark and without electricity. He argues that the only source
of light was a candle inside the shanty.71
We disagree. The fact that the area and shanty were poorly lighted did not prevent the
members of the buy-bust team to witness the transaction. During his cross examination,
prosecution witness SPO4 Lucas was able to describe the surrounding environment at the
time of the transaction.
Q: Are there lights along the way going to the shanty of the accused?
A: From the road to the houses there are lights but there is no light near the shanty, sir.
Q: What do you mean sa taas?
A: Because the shanty house is located below, sir.
Q: What then illuminates the shanty, are there lights near the house of the accused?
A: There is because there is a street light, sir.
Q: So a light coming from a post illuminates the vicinity of the shanty?
A: Yes even the neighbors illuminates the shanty dahil ang lapit lang ng bahay dito yung
kapitbahay mo dito lang sa baba yung shanty house, sir.
Q: Now you said that when the back up team followed secretly the C.I. and thee poseur
buyer.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So that they were ahead with you?
A: Not too far, sir.
Q: And according to you the rest of the team [hide] behind big trees and tall grasses?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That is why the accused were not able to notice your presence?
A: No, because we were almost seven meters from the shanty house, sir.
Q: And you were able to see the transaction between the accused?
A: Yes, because there is light at the shanty house and the transaction is being conducted
outside the shanty, sir.
Q: Now you said that after the transaction between the poseur buyer and the accused
Homacky, you immediately rush to the place and arrested the accused, correct?
A: When the poseur buyer signal that’s the time when we the back up team rush to the scene
and effect the arrest of the suspect, sir.72 (Emphasis supplied)
The accused also put in issue the withdrawal of the chemistry reports on the urine tests
conducted on the accused. The accused noted as an intriguing circumstance why it was
withdrawn as part of the prosecution’s exhibit.73
In the presentation of evidence, the prosecution or the defense has the discretion on what to
present as evidence or choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses in order to establish
its cause of action. For example, the prosecution’s failure to present the chief investigator in
court is not fatal to its cause.74
Castro as well the thirty five bricks confiscated, all resulted positive of presence of dangerous
drug.82
There was a question regarding the physical condition of the marijuana bricks when they
were allegedly bought and confiscated compared to when they were presented in court. It
was argued that the bricks were wrapped in newspapers when bought, but when presented
in court, they were already found with packing tape and contained in a plastic bag.83
This observation cannot be taken against the prosecution.1âwphi1 It is only natural that the
bricks were no longer be wrapped in newspapers as they were opened by the forensic
chemist for testing purposes. It was explained by the prosecution that when the bricks were
brought back to the prosecutor’s office, a portion of the bricks was cut in order to take
representative samples.
It has been ruled time and again that failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1 ), Article II
of R.A. No. 916584 does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized
or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.85

In his final effort to evade conviction, the accused challenged the establishment of chain of
custody of illegal drugs.
In People v. Kamad,75 the following elements are necessary in order to establish the chain
of custody in a buy-bust operation:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by
records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it
came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. 86
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 14 December 2009 in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 02676 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
cost.
SO ORDERED.

Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist
to the court.76

Upon review, we are convinced that the prosecution had sufficiently proved all the elements
to establish chain of custody of illegal drugs.1âwphi1 In his direct examination, PO1 Castro
positively identified the marijuana brick sold to him through the markings "GCPC GCP
Castro" and date "3/31/04" placed on the brick also identified as Exhibit A. 77 The rest of the
marijuana bricks subject of illegal possession case were likewise marked with AAL, LPL
GCPC and HPE and dated as "3/31/04" numbered from B-1 to B-35.78 Upon taking custody
of the marijuana bricks, the marijuana bricks were brought to the PDEA Office for proper
investigation and documentation.79 The same were properly inventoried and recounted in the
presence of the fiscal and the arresting team.80 Thereafter, a request for examination of the
marijuana bricks was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory to determine presence of illegal
drug.81As per Chemistry Report identified as Exhibit "G" made by Forensic Chemist Officer
Emilia Gracio Montes, Exhibits "A" and "B," consisting of the marijuana brick sold to PO1
G.R. No. 180418 August 28, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, vs. LUZ REYES-BAKUNAWA,
MANUEL BAKUNAWA, JR., MANUEL BAKUNAWA III, FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND
IMELDA R. MARCOS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown to have originated
from the Government itself, and should have been taken by former President Marcos, the
members of his immediate family, relatives, close subordinates and close associates by
illegal means. That one served as a government official or employee during the Marcos
administration did not immediately make her a close subordinate or close associate of former
President Marcos.1
The Case
The Republic appeals the adverse decision rendered on April 10, 2002,2 and the resolution
issued on November 8, 2007,3 whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively dismissed the
complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages filed against
respondents in Civil Case No. 0023, and denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel
Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for
having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other
property "in unlawful concert with one another" and "in flagrant breach of trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their
unjust enrichment." 4
The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had served
as Imelda Marcos’ Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was during that
period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel
Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly
disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income; 5 and that Luz Bakunawa, "by
herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter
Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure
and recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and
stratagems,"6 particularly:
1) acted as dummies, nominees, and/or agents of the Marcos spouses and, with
the active collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of the other defendants,
established several corporations engaged in a wide range of economic activities,
such as construction and cattle ranching;
2) secured favorable contracts with the Department of Public Works and
Communications for the construction of government projects through grossly
undercapitalized corporations and without complying with such usual requirements
as public bidding, notice and publication of contractors;
3) unlawfully acquired heads of cattle from the government dispersal program and
raised them on ranch lands encroaching on forest zones;
4) unlawfully encroached upon a mangrove-forested section in Masbate, Masbate
and converted it into a fishpond;
5) unlawfully amassed funds by obtaining huge credit lines from government
financial institutions, and incorporating into their contracts a cost-escalation
adjustment provision to justify collection of grossly arbitrary and unconscionable
amounts unsupported by evidence of increase in prices;
6) unlawfully imported hundreds of brand-new units of heavy equipment without
paying customs duties and other allied taxes amounting to millions of pesos, by
falsely representing said heavy equipment to be for official government use and
selling them at very low prices to avoid paying the required taxes. 7
The Republic prayed for: (a) the reconveyance to itself of all funds and other property
impressed with constructive trust, as well as funds and other property acquired by
respondents’ abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment, plus interests; (b)
accounting of all beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets in excess of their
unlawful earnings; and (c) payment of actual damages to be proved during the trial, moral
damages of ₱50,000,000,000.00, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and treble judicial costs.8
In their amended answer, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa was never the Social
Secretary of Imelda Marcos, but only an employee in the office of the Social Secretary; that
the properties acquired while Luz Bakunawa was employed in the Government were
purchased with honestly earned money and their acquisition was well within their legitimate
income; that their family owned and controlled five closed family corporations, namely: (1)
Hi-Tri Development Corporation; (2) 7-R Development Corporation; (3) 7-R Heavy
Equipment, Inc.; (4) 7-R Sales Company, Inc.; and (5) 7-R Ranch, Inc.; that their public works
contracts were awarded to them in accordance with law; that their acquisition of the heads
of cattle were legal;9 and that they did not commit any breach of trust while in public office,
and did not possess illegally acquired funds that rendered them liable under constructive
trust in favor of the Republic.10
During the pre-trial on August 26, 1999, the Bakunawas admitted that: (a) the properties
enumerated in Annex A of the complaint11 belonged to or were connected to them, except
three corporations, namely:7-R International Trading, 7-R Enterprise, Inc., and 7-R Group of
Companies; and (b) two parcels of land that belonged to one of their children.12
Also during the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the following statement of the issues, to wit:
[t]he fundamental issue in this case is whether or not defendant Luz Bakunawa, considering
her position in Malacañang during the incumbency of President Ferdinand E. Marcos from
1970 up to 1986, occupied a confidential position in Malacañang, and was able to obtain
contracts, run businesses and acquire real properties as enumerated in the Complaint, using
her office and the influence of either or both of the [s]pouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos.
The parties agreed that it is the use of the influence of the Spouses Marcos that constitutes
the essence of the case, and not the failure to report the Statement of Assets and Liabilities
or any other impropriety in the acquisition of the properties herein, this case having been
filed under the authority given to the Presidential Commission on Good Government under
Executive Orders No. 1,2, 14 and 14-a.13
After the Republic rested its case, respondents filed their motion to dismiss, 14 insisting that
the Republic "has failed to establish even prima facie, its case and/or charges against
them."15
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On April 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in favor of respondents, to wit:16
xxxx
As the evidence stands, neither the presence of the link with the Marcoses, nor the
irrefutability of the evidence against the Bakunawas for their misuse of that connection exists
to justify the instant action by the PCGG.
In view of all the above, this Court is constrained to grant the Motion to Dismiss, as it hereby
dismisses, the Complaint of the plaintiff for its failure to prove the essential allegations
thereof.
The writs of sequestration issued and in force against the properties of the Bakunawas as
enumerated in Annex A of the Complaint (page 24 and p. 34, Vol. I, Record) are lifted, set
aside and declared of no further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
The Sandiganbayan justified its decision in the following manner:
xxxx
Many of the plaintiff’s allegations in its specific averments (Article V) in the complaint are
alluded to in the evidence in a general fashion: engaging in cattle ranching and construction
[para. 12 (a)], entering into public works contracts [para.12 (b)], acquisition of mangrove
areas [para. 12 (c)]. Nothing exists in the record, however, with respect to undercapitalization
of the corporation, non-compliance with bidding requirements, encroachment of ranches into
forest zones, huge credit lines, unjustified claims of cost escalation adjustment, and
importation of heavy equipment.
Properties have been shown in the name of the spouses Bakunawa or either of them;
testimonies have been rendered about eviction, official documents presented with respect to
public works contracts, and finally, a Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1985.
Indeed, to hear some of the witnesses, acts of oppression appear to have been committed
if not by the wife then by the husband Manuel Bakunawa. There is no indication however,
that the acts of oppression involved the improper use of influence on the part of the defendant
Luz Bakunawa by reason of her having been employed in the office of the Social Secretary
of Imelda Marcos when the latter was the First Lady.
xxxx
An examination of the testimonial evidence for the Plaintiff, as summarized in the first part of
this decision, shows its concentration in the alleged dispossession of some landowners of
their occupied land in the province of Masbate by the defendants Bakunawa and the
allegedly (sic) inaction by the Bureau of Forestry and the police agencies thereon. Thus, the
almost uniform allegation of witnesses is that they were dispossessed of pasture lands which
they believed they were entitled to possess. There were documents presented to prove that,
indeed, the witnesses had claims to these pieces of property or had occupied them and had
introduced improvements thereon.
The tenor of the testimony of the said witnesses is that while there was no force directly
applied in the dispossession of their properties, their lands, however, were fenced in, and
occupied by, other people, allegedly the Bakunawas and secured by armed and uniformed
men.
There is likewise the contention of the plaintiff’s witnesses that they did not know who these
men were, although it has been said that one or two of the men who helped in fencing off
these properties were employees of the Bakunawas.
What is clear is that with the evidence thus far, the Bakunawas, or more specifically, Manuel
Bakunawa, ignored the Bureau of Forestry summons, and caused the unceremonious
exclusion of people who had apparently occupied rather large tracts of land under permits
for the Bureau or those with pending applications.
There also seems to be evidence that defendant Luz Bakunawa did quite a bit of work in her
capacity as a member of the staff of the Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos. While the
influence of Luz Bakunawa may be assumed or conjectured, there has been no evidence
which would categorically show that the position of defendant Luz Bakunawa in Malacañang
"in concert with the spouses Marcos" or either of them was the explanation for the absence
of the law enforcement officers or the inaction of the administrative officers of the
government.
xxxx
The influence may be assumed and in common parlance, it might be reasonably made. But
to conclude that there was abuse of office by Luz Bakunawa or her utilization of the influence
of her office or of the spouses Marcos cannot be assumed or stated in any certainty.
And since, as aforesaid, the action herein is confiscatory in character, assumptions will not
do to obtain judgment against the defendants Bakunawa. 17
The Sandiganbayan ruled that in civil suits initiated by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the recovery of illegally acquired property pursuant to Republic Act
No. 1379,18 the Republic must show not only that defendant was a subordinate of the Marcos
spouses or of either of them, but also that the relationship was similar to that of an immediate
member of the Marcos family or a dummy of the Marcoses. 19 It concluded that no proof
established the link between the alleged acts of the Bakunawas and those of the Marcoses,
or even the proximity of Luz Bakunawa as a Marcos relative or Marcos dummy.
The Republic sought the reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the Sandiganbayan
erred in holding that it did not show the Bakunawas’ link with the Marcoses, and in ruling that
it did not prove that the Bakunawas had abused their connections or close association with
the Marcoses.20
On November 8, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s motion for
reconsideration,21 reiterating its ruling that the Republic did not discharge its burden of
proving the close links between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses, and of proving how the
Bakunawas had abused said links, assuming that the links existed.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The Republic ascribes the following errors, to wit:
I. THE QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO PROVE PETITIONER’S
CASE AGAINST THE BAKUNAWAS IS MERE PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE LINK BETWEEN AND/OR AMONG THE BAKUNAWAS AND THE
MARCOSES WAS SATISFACTORILY ESTABLISHED BY PETITIONER.
III. PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE BAKUNAWAS
AMASSED ASSETS, FUNDS AND PROPERTIES GROSSLY AND
MANIFESTLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THEIR SALARIES AND
OTHER LAWFUL INCOME BECAUSE OF THEIR POSITION IN THE
GOVERNMENT AND/OR CLOSE ASSOCIATION AND CONNECTION
WITH THE MARCOSES TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER AND
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE.22
In their comment,23 respondents mainly submit that the Republic failed to present a
justiciable issue to warrant the reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s decision; and that the April
10, 2002 decision already become final and could no longer be reviewed and modified
because of the belated filing of the petition for review.
On her part, First Lady Marcos opted not to file her comment.24
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
1. Appeal of the Republic was timely
The Bakunawas contend that the April 10, 2002 decision already became final because of
the Republic’s failure to file the petition for review on time.
We cannot sustain the contention.
The Republic had until November 24, 2007 within which to file the petition for review. It filed
a motion seeking an extension of 30 days of its period to file, or until December 24, 2007.
Although it did not file the petition within the requested extension period, the Court directed
it on June 30, 2008 to file the petition for review within 15 days from notice. Considering that
it received the resolution of June 30, 2008 on August 11, 2008, 25 its filing of the petition for
review on August 26, 2008 was timely.
2. Preponderance of evidence is required in actions brought to recover ill-gotten wealth
In its decision of April 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan stated as follows:
Considering the confiscatory character of proceedings described in E.O. No. 14 in actions
for recovery of alleged unlawfully acquired property such as the instant case, evidence must
be substantial, if not beyond reasonable doubt, akin to the actions for forfeiture under
Republic Act. No. 1379; this, notwithstanding the statements in Sec. 3 of the Executive Order
which states the adequacy of mere preponderance of evidence. 26
The Republic argues that the Sandiganbayan thereby erred in seemingly requiring a degree
of proof greater than that required by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 14-A.27 This was also its
submission in the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the decision of April 10, 2002.
In denying the Republic’s motion for reconsideration through the November 8, 2007
resolution, the Sandiganbayan agreed with the Republic’s submission to the effect that
preponderance of evidence was all that was required for this case. However, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that even on that basis the Republic still did not satisfy its
quantum of proof because the facts it established were not sufficient to prove its case against
respondents.28
We uphold the Sandiganbayan.
We first clarify that the Republic correctly submits that only a preponderance of evidence
was needed to prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth. That is
quite clear from Section 1 of E.O. No. 14-A, which provides:
Section 1. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379
or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their
immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies,
agents and nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance of evidence refers to the
comparative weight of the evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been
defined as "the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater
weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 29
Here, the Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they specifically demurred to the
evidence adduced against them. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties
in an action to the effect that the evidence that his adversary produced, whether true or not,
is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or to sustain the issue. The demurring party
thereby challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a judgment. The court,
in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is required merely to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or claim, or to support a verdict
of guilt or liability.30
Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and to dismiss
the case against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is nothing in
the evidence that tilts the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of
proof has failed to establish its case, and the parties are no better off than before they
proceeded upon their litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the parties as they
are.31
Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant,
there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiff’s side if its evidence alone is
insufficient to establish its cause of action.32Similarly, when only one side is able to present
its evidence, and the other side demurs to the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can
result only if the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this
purpose, the sheer volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales in
its favor. Quality, not quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence.
3. The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten nature of the
Bakunawas’ wealth
The decisive query is whether the Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had
acquired ill-gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawa’s employment during the Marcos
administration.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), decided on April 12, 2011, 33 the Court settled
not only the meaning of ill-gotten wealth but also who were the persons liable to illegally
acquire or amass such wealth, viz:
xxxx
II
The Concept and Genesis of Ill-Gotten Wealth in the Philippine Setting
A brief review of the Philippine law and jurisprudence pertinent to ill-gotten wealth should
furnish an illuminating backdrop for further discussion.
In the immediate aftermath of the peaceful 1986 EDSA Revolution, the administration of
President Corazon C. Aquino saw to it, among others, that rules defining the authority of the
government and its instrumentalities were promptly put in place. It is significant to point out,
however, that the administration likewise defined the limitations of the authority.
The first official issuance of President Aquino, which was made on February 28, 1986, or just
two days after the EDSA Revolution, was Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, which created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Ostensibly, E.O. No. 1 was the first
issuance in light of the EDSA Revolution having come about mainly to address the pillage of
the nation’s wealth by President Marcos, his family, and cronies.
E.O. No. 1 contained only two WHEREAS Clauses, to wit:
WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
abroad;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth;
Paragraph (4) of E.O. No. 234 further required that the wealth, to be ill-gotten, must be
"acquired by them through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of
funds belonging to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage
of their official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense and to the grave damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines."
Although E.O. No. 1 and the other issuances dealing with ill-gotten wealth (i.e., E.O. No. 2,
E.O. No. 14, and E.O. No. 14-A) only identified the subject matter of ill-gotten wealth and the
persons who could amass ill-gotten wealth and did not include an explicit definition of ill-
gotten wealth, we can still discern the meaning and concept of ill-gotten wealth from the
WHEREAS Clauses themselves of E.O. No. 1, in that ill-gotten wealth consisted of the "vast
resources of the government" amassed by "former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad." It is clear, therefore,
that ill-gotten wealth would not include all the properties of President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates but only the part that originated from the "vast
resources of the government."
In time and unavoidably, the Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning and concept of ill-
gotten wealth. In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, or BASECO, for the sake of brevity, the Court held that:
x x x until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the
property was in truth "ill-gotten," i.e., acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal
use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage
of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust
enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State. And this,
too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other jurisdictions.
The BASECO definition of ill-gotten wealth was reiterated in Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Lucio C. Tan, where the Court said:
On this point, we find it relevant to define "ill-gotten wealth." In Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Co., Inc., this Court described "ill-gotten wealth" as follows:
"Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the
conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the
ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State. And this, too, is the sense
in which the term is commonly understood in other jurisdiction."
Concerning respondents’ shares of stock here, there is no evidence presented by petitioner
that they belong to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions. Nor is there evidence that
respondents, taking undue advantage of their connections or relationship with former
President Marcos or his family, relatives and close associates, were able to acquire those
shares of stock.
Incidentally, in its 1998 ruling in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
the Court rendered an identical definition of ill-gotten wealth, viz:
x x x. We may also add that ‘ill-gotten wealth’, by its very nature, assumes a public character.
Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, ‘ill-gotten wealth’ refers to assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or
illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their
public office; or their use of powers, influence or relationships, "resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from
the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As
such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts.
Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
that it may be used for national economic recovery.
All these judicial pronouncements demand two concurring elements to be present before
assets or properties were considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have
"originated from the government itself," and (b) they must have been taken by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means.
But settling the sources and the kinds of assets and property covered by E.O. No. 1 and
related issuances did not complete the definition of ill-gotten wealth. The further requirement
was that the assets and property should have been amassed by former President Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad. In this regard,
identifying former President Marcos, his immediate family, and relatives was not difficult, but
identifying other persons who might be the close associates of former President Marcos
presented an inherent difficulty, because it was not fair and just to include within the term
close associates everyone who had had any association with President Marcos, his
immediate family, and relatives.
Again, through several rulings, the Court became the arbiter to determine who were the close
associates within the coverage of E.O. No. 1.
In Republic v. Migriño, the Court held that respondents Migriño, et al. were not necessarily
among the persons covered by the term close subordinate or close associate of former
President Marcos by reason alone of their having served as government officials or
employees during the Marcos administration, viz:
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association
or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the
respondent’s case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter. x x x
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court declared that the petitioner was not a close
associate as the term was used in E.O. No. 1 just because he had served as the President
and General Manager of the GSIS during the Marcos administration.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Q.
Ramas’ having been a Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the Marcos
administration "d[id] not automatically make him a subordinate of former President Ferdinand
Marcos as this term is used in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that
he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos."
It is well to point out, consequently, that the distinction laid down by E.O. No. 1 and its related
issuances, and expounded by relevant judicial pronouncements unavoidably required
competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings to determine:
(a) whether the assets or properties involved had come from the vast resources of
government, and (b) whether the individuals owning or holding such assets or properties
were close associates of President Marcos. The requirement of competent evidentiary
substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings was imposed because the factual
premises for the reconveyance of the assets or properties in favor of the government due to
their being ill-gotten wealth could not be simply assumed. Indeed, in BASECO, the Court
made this clear enough by emphatically observing:
6. Government’s Right and Duty to Recover All Ill-gotten Wealth
There can be no debate about the validity and eminent propriety of the Government’s plan
"to recover all ill-gotten wealth."
Neither can there be any debate about the proposition that assuming the above described
factual premises of the Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3 to be true, to be
demonstrable by competent evidence, the recovery from Marcos, his family and his minions
of the assets and properties involved, is not only a right but a duty on the part of Government.
But however plain and valid that right and duty may be, still a balance must be sought with
the equally compelling necessity that a proper respect be accorded and adequate protection
assured, the fundamental rights of private property and free enterprise which are deemed
pillars of a free society such as ours, and to which all members of that society may without
exception lay claim.
x x x Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary
components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of
happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of
enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. x x x Evincing much concern
for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognizes the preferred position
which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspect of
social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution
realizes the indispensable role which property, owned in reasonable quantities and used
legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a
solid social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of
every progressive and happy country.
a. Need of Evidentiary Substantiation in Proper Suit
Consequently, the factual premises of the Executive Orders cannot simply be assumed.
They will have to be duly established by adequate proof in each case, in a proper judicial
proceeding, so that the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth may be validly and properly adjudged
and consummated; although there are some who maintain that the fact — that an immense
fortune, and "vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
abroad," and they have resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise
and hide their illicit acquisitions — is within the realm of judicial notice, being of so extensive
notoriety as to dispense with proof thereof. Be this as it may, the requirement of evidentiary
substantiation has been expressly acknowledged, and the procedure to be followed explicitly
laid down, in Executive Order No. 14.
Accordingly, the Republic should furnish to the Sandiganbayan in proper judicial proceedings
the competent evidence proving who were the close associates of President Marcos who
had amassed assets and properties that would be rightly considered as ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
As can be gleaned from the foregoing pronouncement, evidentiary substantiation of the
allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that
purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily
make the holder a close associate within the context of E.O. No.1. According to Republic v.
Migriño,35 the term subordinate as used in E.O. No. 136 and E.O. No. 237 referred to a person
who enjoyed a close association with President Marcos and/or his wife similar to that of an
immediate family member, relative, and close associate, or to that of a close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee. Indeed, a prima facie showing must be
made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or
relation with President Marcos and/or his wife. 38 It would not suffice, then, that one served
during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or employee.
The Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary or the
Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos; and mentions several other circumstances
that indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses, such as her assumption of office in
the early part of the Marcos administration,39 the accommodations extended to her during
her various travels,40 the fact that her close relationship with the Marcoses was of common
knowledge among the Masbateños,41 and the negotiated contracts the Bakunawas entered
into during the Marcos administration.42
However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos’ Social Secretary but
a mere member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the assets of the Bakunawas
were honestly earned and acquired well within the legitimate income of their businesses.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able
to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacañang Palace during
the Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship with the
Marcoses, or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the assets
subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate
or subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.
The determination by the Sandiganbayan of the equiponderance or insufficiency of evidence
involved its appreciation of the evidence. We cannot undo such determination unless the
Republic makes a strong demonstration to us that the determination was whimsical or
capricious.43 Alas, the Republic did not make such demonstration. Its evidence could not
sustain the belief that the Bakunawas had used their influence, or the Marcoses’ influence in
acquiring their properties. Nor did it prove that the ties or relationship between the
Bakunawas and the Marcoses had been "similar to that of an immediate member of the
family or a dummy."
On another important aspect, the evidence of the Republic was likewise
wanting.1âwphi1 The Sandiganbayan enumerated in its decision five activities in which the
Bakunawas had acquired their ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) land-grabbing and cattle-
ranching; (b) engaging in government construction projects; (c) operating fishponds; (d)
obtaining credit lines from government financial institutions; and (e) importing heavy
equipment.44 However, the decision dwelt only on land-grabbing and the construction
projects for the reason that the Republic attempted to substantiate only those two activities.
The Court is thus limited to the review of the findings on the two activities.
Anent land-grabbing, the records show that although the Bakunawas had ignored the
summons from the Bureau of Forestry, and that the several persons occupying large tracts
of land under permits from the Bureau of Forestry or under still-pending applications had
been dispossessed thereof, the dispossessed persons whom the Republic presented as
witnesses could not tell in court that the Bakunawas had employed the people who had
fenced or occupied the lands in question. Such witnesses admitted that they did not put up
much resistance against their forcible dispossession because of their belief that the
Bakunawas had been very influential and had enjoyed very close ties with the Marcoses.
However, they did not show that they had at the time any direct contact or communication
with the Bakunawas, which could only mean that they only surmised and suspected the
participation of the Bakunawas in their dispossession. As such, the Republic’s evidence in
that regard could not be sufficient, for surmises and suspicions could not support any
conclusion either that the Bakunawas had taken advantage of their close ties with the
Marcoses in order to dispossess the affected witnesses, or that Luz Bakunawa had abused
her influence arising from her close association with the Marcoses.
The Republic presented documents tending to prove that the dispossessed witnesses had
retained claims to the affected properties,45 and that the Bakunawas themselves had been
issued pasture leases over the same areas.46Given that both the dispossessed witnesses
and the Bakunawas held legal rights of possession respecting the same areas independently
of each other, the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that "the plaintiff’s evidence is not
conclusive proof of the ill-gotten character of the lands in the possession of the defendants
Bakunawas."47 This is really a good reason for the Sandiganbayan to hold that the Republic
had not preponderantly shown that the acts of dispossession and oppression had involved
the improper use of her influence by Luz Bakunawa on account of her close association with
the Marcoses.48
Concerning the negotiated construction contracts, the Republic posits that the contracts had
been entered into when Luz Bakunawa was a member of the Presidential Staff during the
Marcos administration, laying heavy emphasis on the notations and handwritten instructions
by President Marcos found on the written communications from Manuel Bakunawa to then
DPWH Secretary Baltazar Aquino.
Yet, the Republic offered the negotiated contracts solely to prove that the Bakunawas had
been incorporators or owners, or had held key positions in the corporations that entered into
the contracts.49 The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, therefore, that the contracts could be
considered and appreciated only for those stated purposes, not for the purpose of proving
the irregularity of the contracts, opining as follows:
x x x. The documents appear to be public documents and are, therefore, considered prima
facie evidence of the fact of their issuance and that they were signed by the persons whose
signatures appear therein. It is, indeed, apparent on the face of the documents that
government projects were awarded to the defendants Bakunawas through negotiated
contracts, and that at least one was approved by then President Marcos himself. Outside of
these, however, there can be no other facts that can be inferred from the aforesaid
documents.50
The Court upholds the Sandiganbayan. It was basic enough that the Sandiganbayan could
not consider any evidence that was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only
for the purposes it was specifically offered. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly states:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be
overemphasized. This need is designed to meet the demand for due process by apprising
the adverse party as well as the trial court on what evidence the court would soon be called
upon to decide the litigation. The offer and purpose will also put the trial court in the position
to determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or denying admission to the
evidence being offered. According to Union Bank of the Philippines v. Tiu:51
x x x a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts
and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. It
has several functions: (1) to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence; (2) to allow opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility; and (3) to facilitate review by the appellate court,
which will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. x
x x.
Expounding on the office of the offer and statement of the purposes, the Court has cogently
said in Candido v. Court of Appeals:52
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to
object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is
necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only - and
strictly - upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any
document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw
unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine
the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing
documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in
the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at
the hearing of the case.
At any rate, the Court must point out that negotiated contracts are not per se illegal. A
negotiated contract is one that is awarded on the basis of a direct agreement between the
Government and the contractor, without going through the normal procurement process, like
obtaining the prior approval from another authority, or a competitive bidding process. It is
generally resorted to for convenience, or "when time is of the essence, or where there is a
lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater
economy and efficiency would be achieved." 53 The Court has upheld the validity of a
negotiated contract made pursuant to law, like a negotiated contract entered into by a City
Mayor pursuant to the then existing Local Government Code,54 or a negotiated contract that
eventually redounded to the benefit of the general public, even if there was no specific
covering appropriation pursuant to COA rules,55 or a negotiated contract that was made due
to an emergency in the health sector,56 or a negotiated contract for long overdue repair and
renovation needed to provide better health services. 57
Absent evidence proving that the negotiated construction contracts had been irregularly
entered into by the Bakunawas, or that the public had been thereby prejudiced, it is pointless
for the Court to declare their invalidity. On the contrary, the Sandiganbayan correctly
observed that the presumption of the validity of the contracts prevailed. 58
It is true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued. But the pursuit
should not be mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that there
be sufficient competent evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or
persons charged with the illegal acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or
subordinate of the Marcoses who took advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich
themselves. In that effort, the Republic carries the heavy burden of proof, and must discharge
such burden fully; otherwise, the effort would fail and fall.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for its lack of merit; and AFFIRM
the decision rendered on April 10, 2002, without pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs. GILBERT REYES
WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is
required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof
is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the
offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of
the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11,
2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit:
knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands,
and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter,
did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08,
1997 in the amount of ₱200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation,
but which check when presented for encashment with the bank, was dishonored for the
reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite of notice and several demands made
upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed
and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during which the Defense
admitted that the check alleged in the information had been dishonored due to insufficient
funds.3 On its part, the Prosecution made no admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness.
Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the
telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order
by postdated check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint them
and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and money in
the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on
April 30, 1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No.
0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later
deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that
he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not
pay him.6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because
they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to
Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving
the rice.7
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No.
0011003 in the amount of ₱200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13,
1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligaray’s affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by
Cañada. After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its case. 8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003
to Cañada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation
or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a
portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through,
he did not anymore fund the check.9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997
apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing
Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is self-explanatory.
It is worthy also to discuss with you the environmental facts of the case for your
consideration, to wit:
It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth ₱200,000.00 and I promised to settle
the same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On this point, let me inform you that I sold my
real property to a buyer in Manila, and promised to pay the consideration on the same date
as I promised with your client. Unfortunately, said buyer likewise failed to make good with
such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise resultant thereof. (sic)
Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15, 1997, but still
to no avail attributable to the same reason as aforementioned. (sic)
To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject property as
collateral. This other means is resorted to for the purpose of settling the herein obligation.
And as to its status, said funds will be rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or
before August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial
obligation.
xxxx
Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray,
and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had
begged him to assume the responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that
Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to
accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada’s
application for overseas employment.12 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC
admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence.13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged and he is hereby sentenced as follows:
To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum,
to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum;
To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of ₱200,000.00;
To pay said complainant the sum of ₱30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as
payment for an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to
deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been informed that the check
had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated
check and upon Wagas’ assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing that the Prosecution did
not establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the
check to the latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and
that Ligaray’s testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it
was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the
reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of
Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he was then out of the country, and (b)
Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining
that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered,
and that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision. 16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail
pending appeal. The RTC granted the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at
₱40,000.00.18 Wagas then posted bail for his provisional liberty pending appeal.19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant of Wagas’
application for bail. On November 17, 2003, the Court required the RTC Judge to explain
why Wagas was out on bail.20 On January 15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court
a so-called manifestation and compliance which the Court referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation. 21 On July 5, 2005, the
Court, upon the OCA’s recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative complaint for
simple ignorance of the law against the RTC Judge. 22 On September 12, 2006, the Court
directed the OCA to comply with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause the filing of the
administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to explain
why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously granted. 23 Finally, in its
memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA manifested to the Court that it had
meanwhile filed the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge.24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known
to one other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered
into a transaction with him involving a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that
on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the person with whom Ligaray had
transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by Cañada,
indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA," that the goods had
been received by Cañada in good order and condition, and that there was no showing that
Cañada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Cañada upon
a different transaction; that Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the
element of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with certainty
that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt
the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of
the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary
to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee
or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means
that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason
of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution
must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his
money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency
of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or
deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt.27 Prima
facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit
the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the
postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when
presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must
be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing
the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he
was transacting over the telephone, thus:
Q: On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
Q: How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
A: He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase two hundred
bags of rice and he will just issue a check.29
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he
had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked
with him only over the telephone, to wit:
Q: After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
A: I made a demand on them.
Q: How did you make a demand?
A: I called him over the phone.
Q: Who is that "him" that you are referring to?
A: Gilbert Wagas.30
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by
mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. 31 This rendered it highly probable that
Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-
in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray.1âwphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did
not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly
stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the
check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not
the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply
because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly
show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the
check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who
delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that
Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to
conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal
bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the
telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person
with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met
or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness
that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to
be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with
whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice
recognition or any other means.32 Without the authentication, incriminating another person
just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect,
an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly
recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. 33 The identity of the caller could
also be established by the caller’s self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like
the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged,
internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts
known peculiarly to the caller.34
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication
is accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence. According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact
or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning
face-to-face conversations except the party against whom the conversations are sought to
be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time
of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had, provided
subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the
development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself
sufficient proof of such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to
render the conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or following the
conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the
identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court to determine within its sound
discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely
establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The
Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that
his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him was whether he had
known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:
Q: Do you know the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is present inside the courtroom […]
A: No, sir. He is not around.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of Compostela.36
During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had
determined that his caller was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to
wit:
Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice
selling, particularly with these 200 sacks of rice subject of this case, through telephone
conversation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?
A: I know it was him because I know him.
Q: Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the accused
through telephone conversation, and as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the
accused through telephone he issued a check in your favor?
A: No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
Q: But still through the telephone?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 200
bags rice transaction?
A: No. It was through telephone only.
Q: In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused
himself?
A: Yes. It was through Robert.
Q: So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody
other than the accused?
A: Yes, sir.37
Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because
he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the
identification, and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the
caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not even an
acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray
had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was
speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed
with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively
as the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into
any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only
for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the
purpose for which it is offered,38 not for any other purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party
demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that
he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do
so could not be taken for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the
tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove,40 and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence
in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden
of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of
the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be
proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without
solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be
weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his
identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution
to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. 41 Indeed, the
accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For
this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity
of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without
competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no
conviction.42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of
mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the
circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did
not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the
accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where
the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. 46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of
the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due
course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11,
2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas
of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto
Ligaray the amount of ₱200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this decision. No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No.176897 December 11, 2013
ADVANCE PAPER CORPORATION and GEORGE HAW, in his capacity as President of
Advance Paper Corporation, Petitioners, vs. ARMA TRADERS CORPORATION,
MANUEL TING, CHENG GUI and BENJAMIN NG, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review1 seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71499 dated March 31, 2006 and the Resolution dated
March 7, 2007.2 The Decision reversed and set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 94-72526 which ordered Arma Traders
Corporation (Arma Traders) to pay Advance Paper Corporation (Advance Paper) the sum of
₱15,321,798.25 with interest, and ₱1,500,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus the cost of the
suit.3
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Advance Paper is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of producing,
printing, manufacturing, distributing and selling of various paper products. 4 Petitioner George
Haw (Haw) is the President while his wife, Connie Haw, is the General Manager. 5
Respondent Arma Traders is also a domestic corporation engaged in the wholesale and
distribution of school and office supplies, and novelty products. 6 Respondent Antonio Tan
(Tan) was formerly the President while respondent Uy Seng Kee Willy (Uy) is the Treasurer
of Arma Traders.7 They represented Arma Traders when dealing with its supplier, Advance
Paper, for about 14 years.8
On the other hand, respondents Manuel Ting, Cheng Gui and Benjamin Ng worked for Arma
Traders as Vice-President, General Manager and Corporate Secretary, respectively. 9
On various dates from September to December 1994, Arma Traders purchased on credit
notebooks and other paper products amounting to ₱7,533,001.49 from Advance Paper. 10
Upon the representation of Tan and Uy, Arma Traders also obtained three loans from
Advance Paper in November 1994 in the amounts of ₱3,380,171.82, ₱1,000,000.00, and
₱3,408,623.94 or a total of ₱7,788,796.76. 11 Arma Traders needed the loan to settle its
obligations to other suppliers because its own collectibles did not arrive on time. 12 Because
of its good business relations with Arma Traders, Advance Paper extended the loans.13
As payment for the purchases on credit and the loan transactions, Arma Traders issued 82
postdated checks14payable to cash or to Advance Paper. Tan and Uy were Arma Traders’
authorized bank signatories who signed and issued these checks which had the aggregate
amount of ₱15,130,636.87.15
Advance Paper presented the checks to the drawee bank but these were dishonored either
for "insufficiency of funds" or "account closed." Despite repeated demands, however, Arma
Traders failed to settle its account with Advance Paper.16
On December 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a complaint17 for collection of sum of money with
application for preliminary attachment against Arma Traders, Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui, and Ng.
Claims of the petitioners
The petitioners claimed that the respondents fraudulently issued the postdated checks as
payment for the purchases and loan transactions knowing that they did not have sufficient
funds with the drawee banks.18
To prove the purchases on credit, the petitioners presented the summary of the
transactions and their corresponding sales invoices as their documentary evidence.19
During the trial, Haw also testified that within one or two weeks upon delivery of the paper
products, Arma Traders paid the purchases in the form of postdated checks. Thus, he
personally collected these checks on Saturdays and upon receiving the checks, he
surrendered to Arma Traders the original of the sales invoices while he retained the duplicate
of the invoices.20
To prove the loan transactions, the petitioners presented the copies of the checks 21 which
Advance Paper issued in favor of Arma Traders. The petitioners also filed a
manifestation22 dated June 14, 1995, submitting a bank statement from Metrobank EDSA
Kalookan Branch. This was to show that Advance Paper’s credit line with Metrobank has
been transferred to the account of Arma Traders as payee from October 1994 to December
1994.
Moreover, Haw testified to prove the loan transactions. When asked why he considered
extending the loans without any collateral and loan agreement or promissory note, and only
on the basis of the issuance of the postdated checks, he answered that it was because he
trusted Arma Traders since it had been their customer for a long time and that none of the
previous checks ever bounced.23
Claims of the respondents
The respondents argued that the purchases on credit were spurious, simulated and
fraudulent since there was no delivery of the ₱7,000,000.00 worth of notebooks and other
paper products.24
During the trial, Ng testified that Arma Traders did not purchase notebooks and other paper
products from September to December 1994. He claimed that during this period, Arma
Traders concentrated on Christmas items, not school and office supplies. He also narrated
that upon learning about the complaint filed by the petitioners, he immediately looked for
Arma Traders’ records and found no receipts involving the purchases of notebooks and other
paper products from Advance Paper.25
As to the loan transactions, the respondents countered that these were the personal
obligations of Tan and Uy to Advance Paper. These loans were never intended to benefit the
respondents.
The respondents also claimed that the loan transactions were ultra vires because the board
of directors of Arma Traders did not issue a board resolution authorizing Tan and Uy to obtain
the loans from Advance Paper. They claimed that the borrowing of money must be done only
with the prior approval of the board of directors because without the approval, the corporate
officers are acting in excess of their authority or ultra vires. When the acts of the corporate
officers are ultra vires, the corporation is not liable for whatever acts that these officers
committed in excess of their authority. Further, the respondents claimed that Advance Paper
failed to verify Tan and Uy’s authority to transact business with them. Hence, Advance Paper
should suffer the consequences.26
The respondents accused Tan and Uy for conspiring with the petitioners to defraud Arma
Traders through a series of transactions known as rediscounting of postdated checks. In
rediscounting, the respondents explained that Tan and Uy would issue Arma Traders’
postdated checks to the petitioners in exchange for cash, discounted by as much as 7% to
10% depending on how long were the terms of repayment. The rediscounted percentage
represented the interest or profit earned by the petitioners in these transactions. 27
Tan did not file his Answer and was eventually declared in default.
On the other hand, Uy filed his Answer28 dated January 20, 1995 but was subsequently
declared in default upon his failure to appear during the pre-trial. In his Answer, he admitted
that Arma Traders together with its corporate officers have been transacting business with
Advance Paper.29 He claimed that he and Tan have been authorized by the board of
directors for the past 13 years to issue checks in behalf of Arma Traders to pay its obligations
with Advance Paper.30 Furthermore, he admitted that Arma Traders’ checks were
issued to pay its contractual obligations with Advance Paper. 31 However, according to
him, Advance Paper was informed beforehand that Arma Traders’ checks were funded out
of the ₱20,000,000.00 worth of collectibles coming from the provinces. Unfortunately, the
expected collectibles did not materialize for unknown reasons. 32
Ng filed his Answer33 and claimed that the management of Arma Traders was left entirely to
Tan and Uy. Thus, he never participated in the company’s daily transactions. 34
Atty. Ernest S. Ang, Jr. (Atty. Ang), Arma Traders’ Vice-President for Legal Affairs and Credit
and Collection, testified that he investigated the transactions involving Tan and Uy and
discovered that they were financing their own business using Arma Traders’ resources. He
also accused Haw for conniving with Tan and Uy in fraudulently making Arma Traders liable
for their personal debts. He based this conclusion from the following: First, basic human
experience and common sense tell us that a lender will not agree to extend additional loan
to another person who already owes a substantial sum from the lender – in this case,
petitioner Advance Paper. Second, there was no other document proving the existence of
the loan other than the postdated checks. Third, the total of the purchase and loan
transactions vis-à-vis the total amount of the postdated checks did not tally. Fourth, he found
out that the certified true copy of Advance Paper’s report with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC report) did not reflect the ₱15,000,000.00 collectibles it had with Arma
Traders.35
Atty. Ang also testified that he already filed several cases of estafa and qualified
theft36 against Tan and Uy and that several warrants of arrest had been issued against them.
In their pre-trial brief,37 the respondents named Sharow Ong, the secretary of Tan and Uy,
to testify on how Tan and Uy conspired with the petitioners to defraud Arma Traders.
However, the respondents did not present her on the witness stand.
The RTC Ruling
On June 18, 2001, the RTC ruled that the purchases on credit and loans were sufficiently
proven by the petitioners. Hence, the RTC ordered Arma Traders to pay Advance Paper the
sum of ₱15,321,798.25 with interest, and ₱1,500,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus the cost of
the suit.
The RTC held that the respondents failed to present hard, admissible and credible evidence
to prove that the sale invoices were forged or fictitious, and that the loan transactions were
personal obligations of Tan and Uy. Nonetheless, the RTC dismissed the complaint against
Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui and Ng due to the lack of evidence showing that they bound themselves,
either jointly or solidarily, with Arma Traders for the payment of its account. 38
Arma Traders appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA held that the petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence
of the purchases on credit and loans based on the following grounds:
First, Arma Traders was not liable for the loan in the absence of a board resolution
authorizing Tan and Uy to obtain the loan from Advance Paper.39 The CA acknowledged that
Tan and Uy were Arma Traders’ authorized bank signatories. However, the CA explained
that this is not sufficient because the authority to sign the checks is different from the required
authority to contract a loan.40
Second, the CA also held that the petitioners presented incompetent and inadmissible
evidence to prove the purchases on credit since the sales invoices were hearsay. 41 The CA
pointed out that Haw’s testimony as to the identification of the sales invoices was not an
exception to the hearsay rule because there was no showing that the secretaries who
prepared the sales invoices are already dead or unable to testify as required by the Rules of
Court.42 Further, the CA noted that the secretaries were not identified or presented in court.43
Third, the CA ruling heavily relied on Ng’s Appellant’s Brief 44 which made the detailed
description of the "badges of fraud." The CA averred that the petitioners failed to satisfactorily
rebut the badges of fraud45 which include the inconsistencies in:
(1) "Exhibit E-26," a postdated check, which was allegedly issued in favor of
Advance Paper but turned out to be a check payable to Top Line, Advance Paper’s
sister company;46
(2) "Sale Invoice No. 8946," an evidence to prove the existence of the purchases
on credit, whose photocopy failed to reflect the amount stated in the duplicate
copy,47 and;
(3) The SEC report of Advance Paper for the year ended 1994 reflected its account
receivables amounting to ₱219,705.19 only – an amount far from the claimed
₱15,321,798.25 receivables from Arma Traders.48
Hence, the CA set aside the RTC’s order for Arma Traders to pay Advance Paper the sum
of ₱15,321,798.25, ₱1,500,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus cost of suit.49 It affirmed the RTC
decision dismissing the complaint against respondents Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui and Ng. 50 The CA
also directed the petitioners to solidarily pay each of the respondents their counterclaims of
₱250,000.00 as moral damages, ₱250,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱250,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.51
The Petition
The petitioners raise the following arguments.
First, Arma Traders led the petitioners to believe that Tan and Uy had the authority to obtain
loans since the respondents left the active and sole management of the company to Tan and
Uy since 1984. In fact, Ng testified that Arma Traders’ stockholders and board of directors
never conducted a meeting from 1984 to 1995. Therefore, if the respondents’ position will be
sustained, they will have the absurd power to question all the business transactions of Arma
Traders.52 Citing Lipat v. Pacific Banking Corporation,53 the petitioners said that if a
corporation knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of
an apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as possessing the power to do those
acts; thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through
such agent, be estopped from denying the agent’s authority.
Second, the petitioners argue that Haw’s testimony is not hearsay. They emphasize that Haw
has personal knowledge of the assailed purchases and loan transactions because he dealt
with the customers, and supervised and directed the preparation of the sales invoices and
the deliveries of the goods.54 Moreover, the petitioners stress that the respondents never
objected to the admissibility of the sales invoices on the ground that they were hearsay.55
Third, the petitioners dispute the CA’s findings on the existence of the badges of fraud. The
petitioners countered:
(1) The discrepancies between the figures in the 15 out of the 96 photocopies and
duplicate originals of the sales invoices amounting to ₱4,624.80 – an insignificant
amount compared to the total purchases of ₱7,533,001.49 – may have been
caused by the failure to put the carbon paper. 56 Besides, the remaining 81 sales
invoices are uncontroverted. The petitioners also raise the point that this
discrepancy is a nonissue because the duplicate originals were surrendered in
the RTC.57
(2) The respondents misled Haw during the cross-examination and took his answer
out of context.58 The petitioners argue that this maneuver is insufficient to discredit
Haw’s entire testimony.59
(3) Arma Traders should be faulted for indicating Top Line as the payee in Exhibit
E-26 or PBC check no. 091014. Moreover, Exhibit E-26 does not refer to PBC check
no. 091014 but to PBC check no. 091032 payable to the order of cash. 60
(4) The discrepancy in the total amount of the checks which is ₱15,130,363.87 as
against the total obligation of ₱15,321,798.25 does not necessarily prove that the
transactions are spurious.61
(5) The difference in Advance Paper’s accounts receivables in the SEC report and
in Arma Traders’ obligation with Advance Paper was based on non-existent
evidence because Exhibit 294-NG does not pertain to any balance
sheet.62 Moreover, the term "accounts receivable" is not synonymous with "cause
of action." The respondents cannot escape their liability by simply pointing the SEC
report because the petitioners have established their cause of action – that the
purchases on credit and loan transactions took place, the respondents issued the
dishonored checks to cover their debts, and they refused to settle their obligation
with Advance Paper.63
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents argue that the Petition for Review should be dismissed summarily because
of the following procedural grounds: first, for failure to comply with A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC;64 and second, the CA decision is already final and executory since the petitioners filed
their Motion for Reconsideration out of time. They explain that under the rules of the CA, if
the last day for filing of any pleading falls on a Saturday not a holiday, the same must be filed
on said Saturday, as the Docket and Receiving Section of the CA is open on a Saturday. 65
The respondents argue that while as a general rule, a corporation is estopped from denying
the authority of its agents which it allowed to deal with the general public; this is only true if
the person dealing with the agent dealt in good faith.66 In the present case, the respondents
claim that the petitioners are in bad faith because the petitioners connived with Tan and Uy
to make Arma Traders liable for the non-existent deliveries of notebooks and other paper
products.67 They also insist that the sales invoices are manufactured evidence. 68
As to the loans, the respondents aver that these were Tan and Uy’s personal obligations with
Advance Paper.69Moreover, while the three cashier’s checks were deposited in the account
of Arma Traders, it is likewise true that Tan and Uy issued Arma Traders’ checks in favor of
Advance Paper. All these checks are evidence of Tan, Uy and Haw’s systematic conspiracy
to siphon Arma Traders corporate funds.70
The respondents also seek to discredit Haw’s testimony on the basis of the
following. First, his testimony as regards the sales invoices is hearsay because he did not
personally prepare these documentary evidence.71 Second, Haw suspiciously never had any
written authority from his own Board of Directors to lend money. Third, the respondents also
questioned why Advance Paper granted the ₱7,000,000.00 loan without requiring Arma
Traders to present any collateral or guarantees.72
The Issues
The main procedural and substantive issues are:
I. Whether the petition for review should be dismissed for failure to comply with A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC.
II. Whether the petition for review should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
file the motion for reconsideration with the CA on time.
III. Whether Arma Traders is liable to pay the loans applying the doctrine of apparent
authority.
 IV. Whether the petitioners proved Arma Traders’ liability on the purchases on credit
by preponderance of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition.
The procedural issues.
First, the respondents correctly cited A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008 which
refer to the amendment of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. It deleted the Community
Tax Certificate among the accepted proof of identity of the affiant because of its inherent
unreliability. The petitioners violated this when they used Community Tax Certificate No.
05730869 in their Petition for Review.73 Nevertheless, the defective jurat in the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect because it is only a
formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive. 74 Furthermore, we cannot
simply ignore the millions of pesos at stake in this case. To do so might cause grave injustice
to a party, a situation that this Court intends to avoid.
Second, no less than the CA itself waived the rules on the period to file the motion for
reconsideration. A review of the CA Resolution 75 dated March 7, 2007, reveals that the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied because the allegations were a mere
rehash of what the petitioners earlier argued – not because the motion for reconsideration
was filed out of time.
The substantive issues.
Arma Traders is liable to pay the
loans on the basis of the doctrine of
apparent authority.
The doctrine of apparent authority provides that a corporation will be estopped from denying
the agent’s authority if it knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within
the scope of an apparent authority, and it holds him out to the public as possessing the power
to do those acts.76 The doctrine of apparent authority does not apply if the principal did not
commit any acts or conduct which a third party knew and relied upon in good faith as a result
of the exercise of reasonable prudence. Moreover, the agent’s acts or conduct must have
produced a change of position to the third party’s detriment. 77
In Inter-Asia Investment Industries v. Court of Appeals,78 we explained:
Under this provision [referring to Sec. 23 of the Corporation Code], the power and
responsibility to decide whether the corporation should enter into a contract that will bind the
corporation is lodged in the board, subject to the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or relevant
provisions of law. However, just as a natural person who may authorize another to do
certain acts for and on his behalf, the board of directors may validly delegate some of
its functions and powers to officers, committees or agents. The authority of such
individuals to bind the corporation is generally derived from law, corporate bylaws or
authorization from the board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom or
acquiescence in the general course of business, viz.:
A corporate officer or agent may represent and bind the corporation in transactions with third
persons to the extent that [the] authority to do so has been conferred upon him, and this
includes powers as, in the usual course of the particular business, are incidental to, or may
be implied from, the powers intentionally conferred, powers added by custom and usage, as
usually pertaining to the particular officer or agent, and such apparent powers as the
corporation has caused person dealing with the officer or agent to believe that it has
conferred.
[A]pparent authority is derived not merely from practice. Its existence may be
ascertained through (1) the general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or
agent as having the power to act or, in other words the apparent authority to act in general,
with which it clothes him; or (2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with
actual or constructive knowledge thereof, within or beyond the scope of his ordinary
powers. It requires presentation of evidence of similar act(s) executed either in its
favor or in favor of other parties. It is not the quantity of similar acts which establishes
apparent authority, but the vesting of a corporate officer with the power to bind the
corporation. [emphases and underscores ours]
In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 79 we ruled that the
doctrine of apparent authority is applied when the petitioner, through its president Antonio
Punsalan Jr., entered into the First Contract without first securing board approval. Despite
such lack of board approval, petitioner did not object to or repudiate said contract, thus
"clothing" its president with the power to bind the corporation.
"Inasmuch as a corporate president is often given general supervision and control over
corporate operations, the strict rule that said officer has no inherent power to act for the
corporation is slowly giving way to the realization that such officer has certain limited powers
in the transaction of the usual and ordinary business of the corporation." 80 "In the absence
of a charter or bylaw provision to the contrary, the president is presumed to have the
authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within
the scope of his or her usual duties."81
In the present petition, we do not agree with the CA’s findings that Arma Traders is not liable
to pay the loans due to the lack of board resolution authorizing Tan and Uy to obtain the
loans. To begin with, Arma Traders’ Articles of Incorporation 82 provides that the
corporation may borrow or raise money to meet the financial requirements of its
business by the issuance of bonds, promissory notes and other evidence of
indebtedness. Likewise, it states that Tan and Uy are not just ordinary corporate officers
and authorized bank signatories because they are also Arma Traders’ incorporators along
with respondents Ng and Ting, and Pedro Chao. Furthermore, the respondents, through Ng
who is Arma Traders’ corporate secretary, incorporator, stockholder and director, testified
that the sole management of Arma Traders was left to Tan and Uy and that he and the
other officers never dealt with the business and management of Arma Traders for 14
years. He also confirmed that since 1984 up to the filing of the complaint against Arma
Traders, its stockholders and board of directors never had its meeting. 83
Thus, Arma Traders bestowed upon Tan and Uy broad powers by allowing them to transact
with third persons without the necessary written authority from its non-performing board of
directors. Arma Traders failed to take precautions to prevent its own corporate officers from
abusing their powers. Because of its own laxity in its business dealings, Arma Traders is now
estopped from denying Tan and Uy’s authority to obtain loan from Advance Paper.
We also reject the respondents’ claim that Advance Paper, through Haw, connived with Tan
and Uy. The records do not contain any evidence to prove that the loan transactions were
personal to Tan and Uy. A different conclusion might have been inferred had the cashier’s
checks been issued in favor of Tan and Uy, and had the postdated checks in favor of
Advance Paper been either Tan and/or Uy’s, or had the respondents presented convincing
evidence to show how Tan and Uy conspired with the petitioners to defraud Arma
Traders.84 We note that the respondents initially intended to present Sharow Ong, the
secretary of Tan and Uy, to testify on how Advance Paper connived with Tan and Uy. As
mentioned, the respondents failed to present her on the witness stand.
The respondents failed to object to
the admissibility of the sales invoices
on the ground that they are hearsay
The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court
cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence.85 When a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the
objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. Because of a party’s failure to timely
object, the evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are
considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of evidence properly presented.86
In Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, 87 however, we held:
[H]earsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no
probative value.1âwphi1 This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in
addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other
pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support
the fact in issue. (emphasis and underscore ours; citation omitted)
We agree with the respondents that with respect to the identification of the sales invoices,
Haw’s testimony was hearsay because he was not present during its preparation 88 and the
secretaries who prepared them were not presented to identify them in court. Further, these
sales invoices do not fall within the exceptions to the hearsay rule even under the "entries in
the course of business" because the petitioners failed to show that the entrant was deceased
or was unable to testify.89
But even though the sales invoices are hearsay, nonetheless, they form part of the records
of the case for the respondents’ failure to object as to the admissibility of the sales invoices
on the ground that they are hearsay.90Based on the records, the respondents through Ng
objected to the offer "for the purpose [to] which they are being offered" only – not on the
ground that they were hearsay.91
The petitioners have proven their
claims for the unpaid purchases on
credit by preponderance of evidence.
We are not convinced by the respondents’ argument that the purchases are spurious
because no less than Uy admitted that all the checks issued were in payments of the
contractual obligations of the Arma Traders with Advance Paper.92 Moreover, there are
other pieces of evidence to prove the existence of the purchases other than the sales
invoices themselves. For one, Arma Traders’ postdated checks evince the existence of the
purchases on credit. Moreover, Haw testified that within one or two weeks, Arma Traders
paid the purchases in the form of postdated checks. He personally collected these checks
on Saturdays and upon receiving the checks, he surrendered to Arma Traders the original
of the sales invoices while he retained the duplicate of the invoices. 93
The respondents attempted to impugn the credibility of Haw by pointing to the
inconsistencies they can find from the transcript of stenographic notes. However, we are not
persuaded that these inconsistencies are sufficiently pervasive to affect the totality of
evidence showing the general relationship between Advance Paper and Arma Traders.
Additionally, the issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by the trial court
because it is in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses as it heard the
testimonies and observed the deportment and manner of testifying of the witnesses.
Accordingly, its findings are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result
of the case.94
In the present case, the RTC judge took into consideration the substance and the manner
by which Haw answered each propounded questions to him in the witness stand. Hence, the
minor inconsistencies in Haw’s testimony notwithstanding, the RTC held that the
respondents claim that the purchase and loan transactions were spurious is "not worthy of
serious consideration." Besides, the respondents failed to convince us that the RTC judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which would have affected the result of the case.
On the other hand, we agree with the petitioners that the discrepancies in the photocopy of
the sales invoices and its duplicate copy have been sufficiently explained. Besides, this is
already a non-issue since the duplicate copies were surrendered in the RTC.95 Furthermore,
the fact that the value of Arma Traders' checks does not tally with the total amount of their
obligation with Advance Paper is not inconsistent with the existence of the purchases and
loan transactions.
As against the case and the evidence Advance Paper presented, the respondents relied on
the core theory of an alleged conspiracy between Tan, Uy and Haw to defraud Arma Traders.
However, the records are bereft of supporting evidence to prove the alleged conspiracy.
Instead, the respondents simply dwelled on the minor inconsistencies from the petitioners'
evidence that the respondents appear to have magnified. From these perspectives, the
preponderance of evidence thus lies heavily in the petitioners' favor as the RTC found. For
this reason, we find the petition meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition. The decision dated March 31,
2006 and the resolution dated March 7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71499 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court decision in Civil Case No.
94-72526 dated June 18, 2001 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.