Van Dorn vs Romillo (1985)

G.R. No. L-68470 | 1985-10-08

Subject:

Effect of foreign divorce on conjugal assets

Facts:

Alice Reyes, a Filipino citizen, and Richard Upton, an American citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the
marriage, they resided in the Philippines and begot two children.

Subsequently, the were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982. Alice re-married in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.

Richard Upton filed suit against Alice Van Dorn stating that her business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop) is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that he
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Alice van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein Upton had acknowledged that they had "no community
property" as of 1982. The lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located
in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
Certiorari proceeding.

Upton contends that Alice cannot rely on the divorce decree obtained in Nevada as the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

Held:

1. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard Upton from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

2. Pursuant to his national law, Richard Upton is no longer the husband of Alice van Dorn. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as Alice's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound
by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
1
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ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,

Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City, and RICHARD UPTON, respondents.

G.R. No. L-68470 | 1985-10-08

Recognition of Foreign Divorce decree by Philippine Courts

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence
in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time
to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved
is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of
this Certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. Certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However,
when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then
it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 We consider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds; and that respondent's claim is barred by
prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot,
2

especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
Page

jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving
his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt, Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of
the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

"You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

"1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

"2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

"3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx" 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.

A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of
a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage."
3
Page
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil
Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

4
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Republic vs Orbecido III (2005)

G.R. No. 154380 | 2005-10-05

Subject: Art 26 paragrah 2, Family Code; Recognition of Foreign Divorce by Philippine Courts

Facts:

In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City, Philippines. They had a son and a
daughter.In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.

In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife, who had been naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree in the USA and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and they now live in California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the Philippine trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Article 26 par. 2 of the
Family Code. The court granted the same.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contends that Article 26 par 2 does not apply to Cipriano
since it only applies to a valid mixed marriage (between a Filipino citizen and an alien). The proper remedy is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation

Held:

Art 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code

1. The second paragraph of Art 26, Family Code reads: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law”

2. On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry

3. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

4. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

5. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

(a) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

(b) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

6. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.

7. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

Statutory Construction (Ratio Legis est Anima)

8. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning
of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

Burden of Proof; Recognition of Foreign Divorce by Philippine Courts

5

9. Cipriano did not present any evidence concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of his (ex) wife. It is
Page

settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
10. For his plea to prosper, he must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove

(a) the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

(b) such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact,
such laws must be alleged and proved.

(c) that the divorce decree allows his former spouse to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.

6
Page
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

G.R. No. 154380 | 2005-10-05

Effect of Divorce Obtained Abroad by Foreign Spouse

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
7

proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the
Page

OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition
for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition-Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where
one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
8

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Page

Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
9

case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Page
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition
for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the
other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent's bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15,
2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
10
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IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City

Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

G.R. No. 80116 | 1989-06-30

Effect of Divorce Obtained Abroad by Foreign Spouse

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a
criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on
what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating
a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed
that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No.
83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable
law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.
6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case
No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge
Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
11
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On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua,
her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused
have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On
the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6,
1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending
before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same
order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she
submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The
petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner,
does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing
the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435.
Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review
and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the
parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens partriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include
the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law
to initiate the action therefor.
12

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
Page

such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion
to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes", or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of
the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be
absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time
he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before
or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely
the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only
by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that
the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of
the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the
rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that

" 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to
be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make
the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be
such when the prosecution is commenced."

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
13

complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
Page

spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging
that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that
the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

"There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union . . .

"It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law . . .

"Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets . . ." 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended
to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear
that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a
formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still
be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to
stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said
declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and
within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before
the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would
necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
14

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, herein before cited, 27 must suffer the same fate
of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably
Page

filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

15
Page
Pilapil vs ibay-Somera (1989)

G.R. No. 80116 | 1989-06-30

Subject:

Prosecution for adultery, Effect of divorce on status as offended spouse

Facts:

Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in
Germany. The couple lived for a while in Manila and had a daughter together

After about 3 and ½ years of marriage, the husband initiated divorce proceedings in Germany. The German court
granted a divorce decree.

Five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, the Geiling filed two complaints for adultery against Pilapil
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to him, Pilapil had an affair with 2 men (William Chia
and James Chua). Information was filed against Pilapil and the two men.

Pilapil moved unsuccessfully to have the criminal case dismissed. The present petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio, since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."

Held:

Prosecution for Adultery

1. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

2. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.

3. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, do not apply to adultery and concubinage. No provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of
adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
16

4. Criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines,
Page

the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes",
or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is
a matter exclusively within his power and option.

Status as offended spouse

5. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case

6. Such status or capacity (as an offended spouse) must exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to
the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

7. Hence, Geiling, being no longer the husband of Pilapil, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

8. The allegation that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. There would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs
into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.

17
Page
Quita vs Court of Appeals (1998)

G.R. No. 124862 | 1998-12-22

Subject: Hearing is necessary to determine who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo; Determination of
citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time of divorce was relevant to the controversy in light of the Van Dorn ruling;
Blandina Padlan is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from Arturo; No forum shopping exists

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines in 1941. They were not blessed with
children. Eventually, their relationship soured and Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated July 19, 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.

In July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in
the USA but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the USA., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.

In 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.

Blandina Padlan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon.

In 1973 the oppositors (spouse Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the July 19,
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between Fe D. Quita and Arturo.

Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs. Escaño which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction” disregarded the divorce between Fe D. Quit and Arturo.
Consequently, it held that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their
extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. On the other hand, it opined that there
was no showing that marriage existed between Blandina and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan
children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. Hence, only Fe D. Quita and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo and the equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two of them.

Upon presentation of proofs of the recognition of the children by the deceased, partial reconsideration was granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan, and Fe D. Quita to the other half.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed
by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the
Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

The CA found this ground sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, it declared null and void the decision of the trial
court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings

Hence, the present petition for certiorari. The issue is whether the case should be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. Petitioner insists that there is no need because the issue as to who between petitioner (Fe D.
Quita) and private respondent (Blandina Padlan and childeren) is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which
can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.

Held:

Hearing is necessary to determine who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo

1. Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are thelawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

2. We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
18

recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to
who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.
Page

3. Petitioner insisted that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time
of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Determination of citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time of divorce was relevant to the controversy in light of
the Van Dorn ruling

4. The citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, the the trial court, in finding that the divorce was invalid, simply relied on the fact that petitioner and Arturo
were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained
solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship
at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.

5. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the
decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a
reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case
returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

Blandina Padlan is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from Arturo

6. We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner Fe D. Quita's to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent Blandina Padlan's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. Blandina Padlan and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from
the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

No forum shopping exists

7. As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and
that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the
actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the
subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of
titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of
forum shopping.

19
Page
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

G.R. No. 154380 | 2005-10-05

Effect of Divorce Obtained Abroad by Foreign Spouse

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
20

only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the
Page

OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition
for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition-Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where
one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
21

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Page

Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
22

married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Page
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition
for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the
other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent's bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15,
2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
23
Page
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-

SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

G.R. No. 142820 | 2003-06-20

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by public
respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained
abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order[1] dated September 30, 1999 of public
respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,[2] Branch 149, in Civil
Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order[3] dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion
for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court's order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389,
for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their
children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.[4] Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on
November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition[5] for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,[6] but it was denied by the
trial court in its order[7] dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order[8] dated August 13,
1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27,
1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese,
promulgated on December 16, 1997. The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court of
First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby
dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.[9]

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner's motion to dismiss. Private
respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private
respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground
that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and
respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court
of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had
already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of
Article 26 of the Family Code,[10] endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July 14,
1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their
children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:
24

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel
Page

which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was
included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married
to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a
divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of the termination of
the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the
property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is
partially set aside with respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge in an
order dated March 31, 2000.[12]

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge.
He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.[13]

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the
Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.[14]

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for
Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.[15]

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999,
which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over
the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her
previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order
the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court's action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion, or
ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because it
had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent's motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.-The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order
and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend
such judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.-If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the
issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it,
the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the
judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained
finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial
court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held that the
court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory[17] and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.[18] In our view, there are even more
compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she
partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree
25

from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.

Page

In Garcia v. Recio,[19] Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,[20] and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[21] we consistently held that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[22] where this Court
specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by
either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be
valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly
relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but
the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.[23]
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner
by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to
do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[24]

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of
the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of
petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to
what was the extent of private respondent's participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings[25] nor has she given
her opinion to the Social Services Office.[26] Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private
respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.[27] More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued
to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three
years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending
spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful
of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that
the child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. [28]

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction
when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent.
Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August
26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any
conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage."[29] Herein petitioner did not
contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.[30]
Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent
judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children
born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming
cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and
March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the
issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children,
namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court
for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
26
Page
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, versus DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,

Respondents

G.R. No. 186571 | 2010-08-11

Recognition of Foreign Divorce decree by Philippine Courts

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition and, in fact,
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family
Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
27

capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Page
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision
was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."[11]

THE PETITION

From the RTC's ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido;
he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the
provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse - an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him,
would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerbert's position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT'S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages - void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time
of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after
the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No.
(EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
28

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
Page

capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse's assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree between the alien
and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between
the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse]
and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as
a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion - i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of aliens - with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section
states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.-The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
29

foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
Page
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."[28] This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above,
will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.
30

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

Page
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We
consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had
been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity and status that
must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. - A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. - The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
31

decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
Page

the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] - both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce
any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries
in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38]
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;[39]
and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry - one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108
of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
32
Page
Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas (2010)

G.R. No. 186571 | 2010-08-11

Subject:

Recognition of Foreign Divorce; Recognition and Effect of Foreign Judgment; Recording and Cancellation of Entries
in the Civil Register

Facts:

Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization in 2000.

In January 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Canadian court granted the petition for divorce on December
8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has found another Filipina he wished to marry. Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. However,
Gerbert was informed that for the foreign divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Daislyn did not oppose.

The RTC denied Gerbert's petition on the ground that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy under Article 26 par 2 of the Family Code in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.

Held:

Divorce not Sanctioned under Philippine laws

1. The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages - void[ and voidable marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

Right under Art 26 par. 2 available only to Filipino citizens

33

2. Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon
Page

Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code.
3. Specifically, the second paragraph Article 26 of the Family Code reads: “Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

4. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

5. The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond.

6. Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.

7. An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law

Recognition and Effect of Foreign Judgment (Foreign Divorce Decree)

8. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our
rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

9. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

10. In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

11. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
34

certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. The Supreme Court
deemed it appropriate the remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Page

Canadian divorce law.

12. A remand will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome petitioner's
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Recording of Divorce Decree in the Civil Register

13. Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
personsshall be recorded in the civil register."

14. A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity and status
that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires
theregistration of divorce decrees in the civil registry.

15. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Cancellation of Entries in the Civil Registry

16. The recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

17. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
35
Page