Evidence; Deadline: Tuesday 11PM

Testimonial Evidence

1. Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System vs. Republic,
G.R. No. 188956. March 20, 2013

Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.

Nature of the case: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the orders of the RTC of Pasig City
(Br. 68) in a Land Registration case
 First order – reconsidered and recalled the Decision of the RTC, which granted the application for
land registration of petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS)
 Second order – denied the MR filed by the petitioner

FACTS:
 Petitioner AFP-RSBS was “created under PD No. 361, as amended
o And was designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines military retirement system as provided for in RA No.
340
 Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over three (3) parcels of land located in
West Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City
o The said application was later docketed as LRC Case No. N-11517 and raffled to Branch
68 of the court a quo.
 These three parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No.
1218, issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998

 The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr. Azcueta),

o The then Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner,
o And who was duly authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner, as
evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s Certificate dated August 18, 2003
 After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since no oppositor registered any
oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued an order
of general default against the whole world, and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence
ex-parte

 Petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and
Head of its Asset Enhancement Office
 She testified, inter alia, that:
o Among her main duties is to ensure that the properties and assets of petitioner, especially
real property, are legally titled and freed of liens and encumbrances;
o The subject properties were acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218;
o Prior to Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the Philippines was in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner to the exclusion of the world since time immemorial;
o Petitioner, after the Republic of the Philippines transferred ownership of the subject
properties to it, assumed open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession
and occupation, and exercised control over them in the concept of owner, and likewise
assumed the obligations of an owner;
o Petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on the subject properties; and
o The subject properties are not mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted.
 Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence
RTC Decision:
 Following the submission of formal offer of evidence, the court a quo GRANTED the application
in a Decision dated April 21, 2008
o It declares, confirms, and orders the registration of AFP-RSBS’ title thereto xxx
o Also furnished the OSG, LRA, LMB, and RD, Taguig City, Metro Manila

 In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed MR dated May 12, 2008

OSG’s Arguments:
 That the petitioner failed to prove that it has personality to own property in its name, and
 The petitioner failed to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for
and in its behalf.

 On June 2, 2008, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition

RTC Decision on MR:

 On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued the assailed Order granting the MR of the OSG
on the ground that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case

 MR of petitioner was denied.

 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s
application for land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case.

RULING:
 Yes. The court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s
application for land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case.
 The reason of the court a quo in dismissing petitioner’s application for land registration on the
ground of failure to prosecute was the lack of authority on the part of Ms. Aban to testify on
behalf of the petitioner.

 However, Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only
three instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute:
o Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.― If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails
to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or
any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

 Jurisprudence has elucidated on this matter in De Knecht v. CA:

o An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances:
(1) If the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or
(2) If he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or
(3) If he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court.
o Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on
the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
o In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without
prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with
prejudice [Emphasis supplied]

Application:
  Clearly, the court a quo’s basis for pronouncing that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case is
NOT among those grounds provided by the Rules.
o It had no reason to conclude that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case.

 FIRST, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time of the trial.
o In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated April 21, 2008 ordering the registration of petitioner’s
title to the subject lots shows that the petitioner appeared before the Court and was
represented by counsel.
o Records would also reveal that the petitioner was able to present its evidence, and as a
result, the RTC rendered judgment in its favor.
 SECOND, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject case considering that it appeared
during trial, presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the titling of the
subject lots, and the court a quo never held petitioner liable for any delay in prosecuting the subject
case.
 THIRD, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that the petitioner did not fail to comply with
the Rules or any order of the court a quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the latter to this effect.

 Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that the petitioner failed to prosecute the
subject case, because none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a case due to
failure to prosecute is present.

 That the RTC dismissed the application for land registration of the petitioner for failure to prosecute
after the petitioner presented all its evidence and after said court has rendered a decision in its
favor, is highly irregular.

(In relation to Topic)

As regards the alleged LACK OF AUTHORITY OF THE WITNESS, MS. ABAN to TESTIFY on behalf
of Petitioner:
 There is NO substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some
form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her
 No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a
failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness.
 All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided therein
 Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
o SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.― Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses.
xxxx
 Cavili v. Judge Florendo speaks of the disqualifications:
o Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
o Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender
age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses.
o Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship.
o Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on privileged communications.
o Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called
o xxx The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.
o It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an
express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. (In Re
Estate of Enriquez)
o As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations
on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. (Citation removed) The
 Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. (Emphasis
supplied)

Application:
 A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is qualified to testify
as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive
and being able to make her perceptions known to others
 Furthermore, she possesses none of the disqualifications described above.

 The RTC clearly erred in ordering the dismissal of the subject application for land
registration for failure to prosecute because petitioner’s witness did not possess an
authorization to testify on behalf of petitioner.
 The court a quo also erred when it concluded that the subject case was not prosecuted by
a duly authorized representative of the petitioner
 The OSG and the court a quo did not question the Verification/Certification of the application, and
neither did they question the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application on behalf of the
petitioner
 Case records would reveal that the application was signed and filed by Mr. Azcueta in his capacity
as the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as authorized by
petitioner’s Board of Trustees.
 The authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application was established by a Secretary’s
Certificate attached to the said application
 The asseveration that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly authorized representative of
the petitioner is thus unfounded

 Interestingly enough, the respondent itself agrees with the petitioner that the dismissal of the
subject application by the court a quo on the ground of failure to prosecute due to lack of authority
of the sole witness of the petitioner is unfounded and without legal basis.

Disposition: Petition granted. Reversed and set aside the assailed orders (dated February 17, 2009 and
July 9, 2009) of RTC. RTC Decision dated April 21, 2008 is reinstated and upheld.

2. People v. Aleman
Facts:
 Accused-appellant was charged with robbery with homicide
 The victim, Ramon Jaime Birosel, was a 55-year old real estate broker
 He was survived by his widow, Maria Filomena Birosel, with whom he had no child.
 The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness account of
Mark Almodovar:
o On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, [Mark] went out of his house
to play
o At about 9:00 o’clock, he stopped playing as he then felt like urinating.
o While urinating, he saw a fat man walking towards a car.
o He then noticed two men following the fat man, who entered a parked car.
o The two male persons who were then following the fat man then separated: one went to
the left side of the fat man’s car and stood by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle.
o While the other positioned himself by the door at the opposite side of the car.
o [Mark] made a diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on both sides, (Exhibit “L”)
depicting the car and the positions of the two men.
o The man who stood by the door at the driver’s side had a knife while his companion was
armed with a gun.
o He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing the fat man repeatedly on
different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once.
 o After taking the fat man’s personal belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular
phone, the two men left.
o He followed them to a place which he described as far and there, he saw them buried the
knife and covered it with soil.
o He made a drawing representing the place where he followed them (Exh. “M”).
o After burying the knife in the ground, the men left and he followed them again to a place
which he described as near.
o While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his face.
o He recognized him as the person who went to the left side of the car and stabbed the victim
who was later on identified as the accused Edwin Aleman.
o After which, the two men left.
o He decided not to follow them and went home instead.
o After waking up at 8:00 o’clock the following morning, he returned to the scene of the
incident.
o There were many people gathered in the area, including policemen.
o He saw a chubby girl and requested her to call the policemen.
o He rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby girl.
o They went to a house in a far place, but no one was there.
o He recognized and identified the face of the fat man depicted in the picture (Exhibit “N”)
shown to him.
o On cross-examination, he stated that he did not receive any death t[h]reat.
o He added that he is familiar with Sikatuna Bliss but he does not know what building in
Sikatuna Bliss was fronting the five cars that were parked near the basketball court.
o It was the first time that he saw the fat man and the two male persons who wore black
bonnets which covered their whole face.
o The fat man was already inside his car when he was repeatedly stabbed.
o The fat man was not using his cell phone when the one with the knife knocked twice on the
window of the car.
o The window of the car was half-opened when the fat man was immediately stabbed.
o The man with a gun was on the other side of the car when he fired his gun once.
o He did not notice any argument between the fat man and his attacker. He kept a distance
of about eight to ten meters between him and the two men as he followed them. There
were no persons around when the two men attacked the fat man. After witnessing the
stabbing, his initial reaction was to follow the culprits. He did not call his playmates because
they were still playing. In fleeing, the two male persons did not run. They just walked fast.
He had been [on] their trail for about nine minutes before they removed their bonnets. He
followed them for about thirty minutes.
o When he gave his statements to the police, he did not tell them that the knife was buried
under the ground. It was 9:56 o’clock when the men took off their bonnets. The man with
the knife removed the bloodstained white t-shirt that he was wearing and, along with his
bonnet, threw it away in a place he described as flowing or running water. At about 10:00
o’clock, the two men boarded a motorcycle and left. It was the man with the gun who drove
the motorcycle. He took the same route when he walked back home. It was about 10:00
o’clock when he passed by the car of the fat man again. There were no persons when he
went back to the basketball court. Thus, he just went home to sleep and the following
morning, he gave his statement to the police.
o On re-direct examination, he was asked and he made a drawing (Exhibit "O") showing the
basketball court (Exhibit "O-1"), the five parked cars near the place where he urinated
(Exhibit "O-2"), the exact spot where he urinated (Exhibit "O-3") and the car of the fat man
(Exhibit "O-4"). When asked how he was able to see the face of the accused, he answered
that "there was light in the area which he described as near the flowing water where the
accused removed his bonnet." He stated that the light near the flowing water came from a
light bulb and the distance from the witness stand up to second door outside the courtroom
represents how far he was from the man with the knife when the latter took off his bonnet.7
 Mark was 14 years old when he testified.
 He is a deaf-mute.
  He was assisted in his testimony by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the
Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for
the Deaf since 1990.
 Catinguil had also completed a five-year course at the Philippine Normal University with a degree
in teaching special education children
 Accused-appellant was 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay Botocan, Project 2,
Quezon City when he testified.
 He interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at the time the incident happened
on February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall which was a 15-minute walk from his residence.
A road separates the billiards hall from Sikatuna Bliss.
 Accused-appellant’s testimony that he was at the billiards hall on February 10, 2003 playing against
Ruben until around 10:00 in the evening was corroborated by Filomena Fungo, grandmother of
Ruben, who saw accused-appellant and Ruben playing when she went to the billiards hall twice
that night to fetch Ruben. Hilda, accused-appellant’s sister, also corroborated accused-appellant’s
testimony that she fetched him from the billiards hall at around 10:00 in the evening of February
10, 2003. She further stated that, upon getting home, she and accused-appellant ate dinner
together and, thereafter, watched some television shows until accused-appellant went to sleep
some 30 minutes later.
 Accused-appellant also attempted to show that the eyewitness, Mark, failed to identify him during
the police line-up. Defense witness SPO1 Leonardo Pasco stated that he was the one who
prepared the spot report although it was his superior who signed it. He further stated that Mark
failed to identify accused-appellant during the police line-up. Another defense witness, barangay
kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos, stated that he was with Mark on February 13, 2003 when Mark was
asked to identify the robber-killer of the victim from a line-up. According to Barrientos, a police
officer made a gesture to Mark by slashing his throat with the use of his hand and, after viewing
the persons in the line-up, Mark shook his head. The line-up was presented to Mark twice and he
shook his head in both instances.
 Accused’s arguments:
o First, accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness. Accused-
appellant argued that, being a deaf-mute who cannot make known his perception to others
as he has no formal education on sign language, Mark is unqualified to be a witness. In
fact, he was unable to give a responsive answer to some questions propounded to him
through the interpreter such as when he could not answer why he preferred to play in a
basketball far from his house than in a nearer one.
o Second, accused-appellant asserted that Mark’s testimony was not corroborated by his
alleged playmates or by the "chubby girl" he mentioned in his testimony. Such lack of
corroboration weakened Mark’s testimony.
o Third, accused-appellant contended that Mark admitted receiving money, new clothes and
shoes from the private complainant before he took the witness stand. This made his
testimony highly suspicious.
o Fourth, accused-appellant highlighted Mark’s failure to identify him as the perpetrator of
the crime in the two instances that he was presented to Mark in a line-up. This made Mark’s
alleged

Main Issue:
Can a deaf-mute be a competent witness?

Ruling:
 YES
 The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness.
 The rule is that "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses."
 A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of
sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and
experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally
 with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols
and, as in this case, sketches.
 Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those observations known to others.
 As this Court held in People v. Tuangco27:
o A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent
witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can
comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through
a qualified interpreter. Thus, in People vs. De Leon and People vs. Sasota, the accused
was convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. x x x.
 When a deaf-mute testifies in court, "the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute should
be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its discretion, and the
method adopted will not be reviewed by the appellate court in the absence of a showing that the
complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted."

Application:
 In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and appreciated the
sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on. This Court sees no reason
in ruling otherwise.
 Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from
the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School
for the Deaf since 1990 and possessed special education and training for interpreting sign
language. The trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for Mark.
No ground to disturb that finding exists.
 Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that fateful February 10, 2003
– the situation of the victim who had just boarded his car; the respective positions of accused-
appellant and his still unidentified cohort vis-à-vis the victim; accused-appellant’s knock on the
window of the victim’s car and the sudden series of stabs accused-appellant inflicted upon the
victim; the taking of the victim’s various personal properties; accused-appellant’s walk away from
the crime scene; and, the revelation of accused-appellant’s identity when he finally removed the
bonnet that covered his face, unaware that someone was secretly and silently watching.
 In this connection, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that "despite intense and grueling cross-
examinations, the eyewitness responded with consistency upon material details that could only
come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before his eyes."
 The imperfections or inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant were due to the fact that there is
some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is a deaf-mute.
 Besides they concerned material details which are neither material nor relevant to the case. As
such, those discrepancies do not detract from the credibility of Mark’s testimony, much less justify
the total rejection of the same.
 What is material is that he positively identified accused-appellant and personally saw what
accused-appellant did to the victim on the fateful night when the incident happened. The trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of Mark, which was affirmed by the appellate court, deserves the
highest respect of this Court.
 Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the
findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was
"hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax."
 The multiple mortal wounds inflicted on the victim constitute physical evidence which further
establish the truth of Mark’s testimony. Its evidentiary value far outweighs any corroborative
testimony which accused-appellant requires of the prosecution.
 Moreover, the settled rule is that the positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient
to secure the conviction of an accused.
 The RTC and the Court of Appeals saw no improper motive which would impel Mark to testify
falsely against accused-appellant. As the determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a
 question of fact, this Court respects the unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts on
the matter.
 Accused-appellant’s attempt to render doubtful Mark’s identification of him fails.
 Indeed, the law requires not simply an eyewitness account of the act of committing the crime but
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
 Here, Mark has positively pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
 The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Mark’s failure to identify accused-appellant in a police
line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment.
 There is no law stating that a police line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in
open court.
 Nevertheless, the records show that Mark identified accused-appellant as the robber-killer of the
victim in a police line-up on February 18, 200335 and, more importantly, in open court in the course
of Mark’s testimony.

3. Sanson vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
 On February 7, 1990, Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon
Fing Sy the deceased.
 Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to his
sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.
 Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later
filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00
and P150,000.00, respectively.
 Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled, appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving
spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate, following which she was issued letters
of administration.
 During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife
of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the
objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute which reads:
o SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.—Parties or
assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind. (Emphasis supplied)
 Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with
the deceased which is evidenced by six checks issued by him before his death;
o before the deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his
(the deceased’s) son Jerry who told her that his father would settle them once he got well
but he never did;
o after the death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment
but were dishonored due to the closure of his account.
 Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the
deceased issued five checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt;
o after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for payment
but were returned due to the closure of his account.
  Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles,
testified that:
o on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her
husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the
deceased,9 two to Angeles and the other to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.;
o before the deceased died or sometime in August 1989, they advised him that they would
be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he would pay them cash, but he
never did
o after the deceased died on January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were
dishonored as the account against which they were drawn was closed
 Hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter addressed to the deceased’s heirs Melicia,
James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks have remained unsettled.

 The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and
extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred by prescription.
o she objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in
evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon
are disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute.
o Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix
asserted that they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant
Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the
above-said rule on disqualification.
 At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the
deceased and that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank.
 After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations
informing the trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their
claims.
 Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of
the subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order of December 8, 1993, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
o WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to pay, in due
course of administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of
P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;18 Angeles A.
Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of
P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of the above-entitled intestate estate.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by
Decision of May 31, 1996, disposing as follows:
o WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is
entered dismissing the claims of: 1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00; 2.
Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00; 3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the
amount of P150,000.00; and 4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00
against the estate of the deceased JUAN BON FING SY.
 The claimants’ Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Court of Appeals decision was denied. Hence,
this petition.
POSITION OF PARTIES:
 With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix did not deny
the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and neither did she deny the
execution and genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased (as well as the check return
slips issued by the clearing bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the
Montinolas insufficient to prove their claims.
 The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state that she saw the filling up
and signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade
 had identical and unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a
circumvention of the Dead Man’s Statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not relationship to a party is an adverse factor in determining the credibility of
the witness?
RULING:
 The administratrix’s counter-argument does not lie.
 Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the
credibility of the witness or—subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here
present—the admissibility of the testimony.
 At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more
caution in the assessment of a witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which
should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of Jade against the deceased is covered by the Dead Man’s
Statute?
RULING:
 Yes, the testimony of Jade falls under the Dead Man’s Statute.
 As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie.
o The rule renders incompetent:
 1) parties to a case;
 2) their assignors; or
 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
 The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to
disqualify persons not mentioned therein.
 Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying
as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active
part therein.

APPLICATION:
 Jade is not a party to the case.
 Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted.
 She testified as a witness to the transaction.
 In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family
members or relatives of the parties.
 Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship
to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions.
 In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the
Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim
against the deceased are covered by the Dead Man’s Statute?
RULING:
 No, it is not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute because the administratix has already
waived the application of the law.
 As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia
as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s
Statute; besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-
examined them.
 The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on
review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
o The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from
testifying in each other’s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.
 o Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without
distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he
should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties.
o The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case."
o Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-parties
to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the
original and emphasis supplied)
 But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate
transactions.
o Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim.
o And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s claim.
 One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.
 In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence
upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased.
 The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.
 Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-
documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of the deceased appearing on the checks issued are
authentic?
RULING:
 Yes, the signature of the deceased are authentic.
 This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing
on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia.
 By Celedonia’s account, she "knows" the signature of the deceased.
Q: Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit "A" to "E", please go over these
checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And therefore, you know his signature?
A: Yes, sir.
 Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased:
Q: I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit "A" to "G-1" – Saquin,
please go over this if these are the checks that you said was issued by the late Juan Bon Fing Sy
in favor of your sister?
A: Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.
Q: Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?
A: Yes, sir.
 While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum
of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
o Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. x x x,
 not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison with the naked eye
of the deceased’s signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that
of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same
account, they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.
 In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims
against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix
who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims.
WITH REGARD TO MINTOLA’S CHECKS
 Jade’s testimony on the genuineness of the deceased’s signature on the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas is clear:
Q: Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust Company Check
No. 84262, in the amount of P100,000.00, is this the check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is this?
A: That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he signed this check.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that this is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262 dated July 6, 1989,
in the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo Montinola, are you referring to this check?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?
A: Mr. Sy’s signature.
Q: Why do you know that it is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
 The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown, he is prima
facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law which reads:
Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. – Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima
facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature
appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value. (Underscoring and italics in the
original; emphasis supplied),
 Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was not
rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was dispensing
with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy,
through Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay: 1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00; 2)
Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00; 3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and
4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00. representing unsettled checks issued by the
deceased. SO ORDERED.

4. Sunga-Chan v. Chua
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
Principle: The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or othermental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 denying the motion
for reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga
Facts:
 On June 22, 1992, Respondent Lamberto Chua filed against Petitioners Lilibeth Sunga Chan and
Cecilia Sunga, daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter
Jacinto), for “Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of
Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment” with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
 Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship.
 Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the
latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits
would be equally divided between them. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager,
assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. As
compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit
and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and other
remuneration from the business.
 Allegedly, sometime, on July 8, 1977, its business operation went quite and was profitable.
Respondent claimed that he could attest to success of their business because of the volume of
orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets
and net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent however suspected that the amount
indicated in these documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their
own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance
 HOWEVER, upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, and daughter
(herein PETITIONERS) took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and
management of Shellite without respondent's consent.
 Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal,
winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply.
Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and
advantage its properties.
 On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and reasons
to evade respondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of
P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed
respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latter's share in the
partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of
the properties of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed
to comply with their duty to account.
 On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del Norte
had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
 RTC finding the complaint sufficient in from and substance denied the motion to dismiss.
 On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims,
contending that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests,
damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation.
 On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that the
claim for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership affairs,
accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties should be dismissed and
prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
 RTC denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
 On Nov 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss.
  On Nov 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial Conference.
 On Dec 13, 1993, RTC granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.
 On Nov 15, 1994, CA denied the petition for lack of merit.
 On Jan 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, "as
petitioners failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court."
 On Feb 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was
remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.
 On Sept 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of the case
of January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were considered to have
waived their right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of
evidence despite notice.
 On Oct 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants
 Aggrieved, on Oct 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the
case to the Court of Appeals, however, CA dismissed. MR was also denied.
 Hence, this petition.
(Petitioner’s position)
 Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death.
 In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies
of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after
Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or
"Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
 "SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. - Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind."
 Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.

ISSUE:
1. Whether there exists a valid partnership between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late
Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latter'' invitation and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets
and business were taken over by petitioners

RULING:
 Yes, there was a valid partnership, the court was not persuaded by Petitioner’s allegation.
 A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real rights are
contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary. Hence, based on the
intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and
conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise. The essential profits that must be proven to
that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint
interest in the profits.
 In this case, in view of the absence of the written contract of partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove
said partnership.

MAIN ISSUE:
The crucial issue to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case
so as to render inadmissible respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
Ruling: No. Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
 As defined, the "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.
 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in
prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person
or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person
or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind."

 IN THIS CASE, the Two reasons to forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" are:
 First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the
trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this
case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the
plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.
 Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple
reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that
Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
"assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor
of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
 We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value
because she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his
favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that
if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude
from this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way
categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.
 Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of
her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.
 Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot prevail
over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was
established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but
the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the
evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an
informal one.
 Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of judicial
precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent
and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review.
  This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze,
assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in
according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. It must be also
pointed out that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent.
 Petitioners cannot now turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the
documentary evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the
evidence at the time that such evidence was offered.

ISSUE: Whether laches and/or prescription did not apply in the instant case.
Ruling: No.
 With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished
respondent's claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for
accounting filed by respondents three (3) years after Jacinto's death was well within the
prescribed period.
 The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years while
the right to demand an accounting for a partner's interest as against the person continuing the
business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary agreement.
 Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the partnership, in this case, it
was Jacinto's death that respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an account of his
interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto's death dissolved the
partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil Code expressly
provides that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until
the complete winding up of its business, culminating in its termination.

ISSUE: Whether the failure to register divest the partnership of its juridical personality
RULING: No.
 In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should
have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since registration is
mandated by the Civil Code, True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnerships
with a capital of P3,000.00 or more must register with the SEC, however, this registration
requirement is not mandatory.
 Article 1768 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that the partnership retains its juridical personality
even if it fails to register.
 The failure to register the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the
partners, so long as the contract has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of
registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves
knew of the contents of their contract.
 In the case at bar, non-compliance with this directory provision of the law will not invalidate the
partnership considering that the totality of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto indeed
forged the partnership in question.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

5. Zulueta v CA

G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

FACTS:

 Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.

 On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs.
 The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
 Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner.
 The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which, after trial, rendered judgment
for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the
Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf
to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
 The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence"
the documents and papers in question.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
 Hence this petition.
 There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge
and consent.
 For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using
them in evidence.
 In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision,
petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case)
were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did
not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers are inadmissible.

RULING: YES

 Petitioner's contention has no merit.

 The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
 Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged
that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross
misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court.
 In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of
Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2
 On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains
that:

....

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the
said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness
and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence
against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under
oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence
against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her
husband's admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.

 Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.
 It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by
this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

 Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
 The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4
 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." 5
 The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
 A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
 The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged.
  Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6
 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7
 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

6. Regala v Sandiganbayan, GR 105938, 20 September 1996

FACTS:
 PCGG filed a complaint against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and Petitioner Teodoro Regala and his
partners in the ACCRA Law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares
of stock in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033).
 On 20 August 1991, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” and “Third
Amended Complaint” which excluded Raul Roco from the complaint as party-defendant.
 PCGG based its exclusion on Roco’s undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s
for whom he acted as nominees/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
 Petitioners ACCRA lawyers filed their “COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION” dated 8 October 1991
with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them as accorded
to Roco.
 In its “Comment” PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
o The disclosure of the identity of its clients;
o Submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
o The submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners exdecuted in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
 On 18 March 1992, Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution denying the exclusion of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers for their refusal to comply with the conditions set by PCGG.
 Petitioners ACCRA lawyers filed a petition for certiorari, invoking that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion:
o In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as
nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.
o In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and MR. Roco as similarly situated and,
therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
o In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits
petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.
o In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on
reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: Can attorney-client privilege be invoked in the refusal to disclose names of their clients?

RULING: YES.
 The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke
the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
 Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions:
o 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
o 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For
instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,
 prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer’s claim to the effect that he could
not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
o 3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by
revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged.
 The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money
was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a
sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but one purpose— to ascertain which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature
of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due
than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for non-payment of taxes, though
whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the
feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed—to advise his clients
what, under the circumstances, should be done.
 In fine, the crux of petitioners’ objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter’s case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring
them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the
nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and
nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply dissociate one
from the other. In this sense, the name is as much “communication” as information revealed directly
about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged.
A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a
principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.

7. Sereno vs Committee on Tariff GR No. 175210 Feb 1, 2016

Facts:
 The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to any and all information,
but is rather confined to matters of public concern. It is subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. The State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving
public interest, and is tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

 May 23, 2005 - the CTRM, an office under NEDA, held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend
to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule
on petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates on products covered by E.O. No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting
July 2005.
 June 9, 2005 - Wilfredo A. Paras, Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of
the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector, wrote to the
CTRM Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza, to request a copy of the minutes of the
May 23, 2005 meeting
 Director Mendoza denied the request through her letter but only provided with the action taken of
the CTRM
 The CTRM sent a second letter as a response to the series of letter-requests from the APMP,
stating:
o The CTRM during its meeting on 14 July 2005 noted that Section 3, Rule IV of the IRR of
RA 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides that every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records
or documents to any requesting public (sic).
o However, the section also provides exceptions to the rules, such as if ‘…(c) such
information, record or document south (sic) falls within the concepts of established
privileged or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or
 jurisprudence…’ The acknowledged limitations to information access under Section 3 (c)
include diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions
of either House of Congress, as well as internal deliberations of the Supreme Court
(Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government)
o The CTRM is of the view that the limitation pertaining to closed-door cabinet meetings
under Section 3 (c) of the IRR applies to the minutes of the meeting requested by APMP.
In view thereof, the CTRM is constrained [not] to provide the said minutes to the APMP.

 The APMP sent another letter-request to the CTRM reminding about the legal implications of the
refusal to furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of the petitioner’s Constitutional right of
access to information on matters of public concern. However, the CTRM continued to refuse access
to the documents.
 this prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring the petition for mandamus in the RTC to compel
the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and to grant access to the minutes.

 The APMP sent letters to the Office of the President, stating the reasons why the recommendation
of the CTRM should be rejected, but the OP did not respond to the letters.

 Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction to which the respondent filed its Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, which RTC denied
the Urgent Motion

 Meanwhile, Pres. Arroyo signed EO No. 486 to lift the suspension of the tariff reduction on
petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the ASEAN Free Trade Area – Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme.

 RTC Decision: dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit. It relied on the relevant
portions of Section 3 of Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713, to
wit:
o Sec 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records and
documents to any requesting public except if: x x x x
 (c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of
established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or
settled policy or jurisprudence;
 (d) such information, record or document comprises drafts or decisions, orders,
rulings, policies, memoranda, etc.
o and relevant portions of Section 7 (c) of the same law, viz.:
o Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared unlawful: x x x x
 (c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information – Public officials and
employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public either:
xxxx
 (2) To the prejudice of public interest.
o RTC declared that the "CTRM is an advisory body composed of various department heads
or secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and inter-agency communications;"
and that the record of the communications of such body "falls under the category of
privileged information because of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect
public interest."

Issue: Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of
the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern and the State’s policy of full public disclosure?
Ruling: NO.

 The request for information was motivated by his desire to understand the basis for the CTRM’s
recommendation that allegedly caused tremendous losses to the petrochemical industry through
the issuance of E.O. No. 486.
 The petitioner invokes the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6713, thusly:
o Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
 Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
o Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
 Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
o Section 1 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
 Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
o Section 5 of R.A. No. 6713:
 Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. – In the performance of their
duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to: x x x x
 (e) Make documents accessible to the public. – All public documents must be
made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public within
reasonable working hours.

 The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed.

 The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in
Sec. 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public disclosure
in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Sec. 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
o These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the
operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the
freedom of expression. In a democratic society like ours, the free exchange of information
is necessary, and can be possible only if the people are provided the proper information
on matters that affect them. But the people’s right to information is not absolute.
 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, the constitutional guarantee to information "does not open
every door to any and all information." It is limited to matters of public concern and is subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State’s policy of full public disclosure is
restricted to transactions involving public interest and is further subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.

 Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus.
o Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public
interest.
o Secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

 First Requisite: there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern or public interest. Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may want
to be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the issues
"naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen." As such, whether or not the information sought
is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of the courts on a case to
case basis.
 Petitioner arguments: As a citizen and as the Executive Director of the APMP, the petitioner has
sought to obtain official information dealing with the policy recommendation of the CTRM with
respect to the reduction of tariffs on petrochemical resins and plastic products. He has asserted
that the recommendation, which would be effected through E.O. No. 486, not only brought
significant losses to the petrochemical industry that undermined the industry’s long-term viability
and survival, but also conflicted with official government pronouncements, policy directives, and
enactments designed to support and develop an integrated petrochemical industry. He has claimed
that the implementation of E.O. No. 486 effectively deprived the industry of tariff support and market
share, thereby jeopardizing large investments without due process of law.
o The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other
related materials, and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural and
industrial sectors of the country. Thus, the position of the petrochemical industry as an
essential contributor to the overall growth of our country’s economy easily makes the
information sought a matter of public concern or interest.

 Second Requisite: that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-
door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.

 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court has ruled that the right to information does not extend
to matters acknowledged as "privileged information under the separation of powers," which include
"Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings." Likewise exempted from the right to information are "information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused."

 Respondents argument: claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was
classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee’s composition and the nature
of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the
information withheld was within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM
meetings were directly related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the
Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3
(a) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.

 The authority of the CTRM as the advisory body of the President and the NEDA is set forth in E.O.
No. 230 (Reorganization Act of the National Economic and Development Authority), to wit:
o SECTION 6. National Economic and Development Authority Inter-agency Committees. –
To assist the NEDA Board in the performance of its functions, there are hereby created the
following committees xxx. The Chairman of these committees shall be designated by the
President. x x x x
 (e) Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (TRM) – The TRM to be composed
of the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority
Secretariat, the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries of Trade and Industry,
Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources and of Budget
and Management, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Chairman of the Tariff
Commission shall have the following functions:
 (i) Advise the President and the NEDA Board on tariff and related
matters, and on the effects on the country of various international
developments;
  (ii) Coordinate agency positions and recommend national positions for
international economic negotiations;
 (iii) Recommend to the President a continuous rationalization program for
the country’s tariff structure. (underlining supplied)

Court:
 The respondents are correct.
 It is always necessary, given the highly important and complex powers to fix tariff rates vested in
the President, that the recommendations submitted for the President’s consideration be well-
thought out and well-deliberated.
 The Court has expressly recognized in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority that "a frank exchange
of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested
parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power."
 Almonte v. Vasquez, the Court has stressed the need for confidentiality and privacy, stating thusly:
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately." Without doubt, therefore, ensuring and promoting the free exchange of ideas among the
members of the committee tasked to give tariff recommendations to the President were truly
imperative.

 Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the people, is
liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However,
the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be
clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption.
 In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency concerned that has the
burden of showing that the information sought to be obtained is not a matter of public concern, or
that the same is exempted from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee. We reiterate,
therefore, that the burden has been well discharged herein.

 Respondents argument: further assert that the information sought fell within the concept of
established privilege provided by jurisprudence under Section 3 (c) of Rule IV of the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 6713, the May 23, 2005 meeting being regarded as a closed-door Cabinet
meeting.

 Petitioner arguments: that R.A. No. 6713, by itself, neither provides exceptions to the constitutional
right to information nor specifies limitations on the State policy of full public disclosure;
o that the IRR went beyond the scope of R.A. No. 6713 in providing exceptions not covered
by the law;
o that the alleged closed-door Cabinet meeting exception, so as to fall within the ambit of
Section 3(c) of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713, was not established under settled
policy or jurisprudence;
o that the reliance on the rulings in Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez v. PEA-Amari that declared
the closed-door Cabinet meeting as an exception to the right to information was misplaced
considering that the exception was not squarely in issue in those cases;
o that the pronouncement could only be regarded as obiter dicta;
o that the closed-door Cabinet meeting exception, assuming though not admitting the same
to have been established by law or settled jurisprudence, could not be automatically
applied to all the CTRM meetings because the CTRM was different from the Cabinet
inasmuch as two of its members, namely, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
and the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, were not members of the President’s Cabinet;
and
o that the deliberations of the CTRM as a body merely akin to the Cabinet could not be given
the privilege and confidentiality not expressly provided for by law or jurisprudence, most
 especially considering that only by legislative enactment could the constitutional guarantee
to the right to information be restricted.

Court Ruling:
 We cannot side with the petitioner.
 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, we have said that executive privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information, not to categories of persons. As such, the fact that
some members of the committee were not part of the President’s Cabinet was of no moment. What
should determine whether or not information was within the ambit of the exception from the people’s
right to access to information was not the composition of the body, but the nature of the information
sought to be accessed. A different holding would only result to the unwanted situation wherein any
concerned citizen, like the petitioner, invoking the right to information on a matter of public concern
and the State's policy of full public disclosure, could demand information from any government
agency under all conditions whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or recommendation of the
latter.
 In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of the people and the
interest of the Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the protection of the privilege
of non-disclosure is necessary to allow the free exchange of ideas among Government officials as
well as to guarantee the well-considered recommendation free from interference of the inquisitive
public.
 WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision
of the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action No. 2903. SO ORDERED.

8. Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998

Ponente: Romero, J.

Nature of the case: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA – finding private
respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners’ extra-judicial partition
of the decedent’s estate.

FACTS:
 On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before
the then CFI of Manila
 In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed:
o That they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a
bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
 On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that:
o The real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as
belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner
being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa
 On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the
intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
 Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered
by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021
 By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the name of
Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof:
o TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad,
o TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and
o TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales
 The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs.
Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola
  On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian
Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special
Proceedings No. 86792.
 In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo Abad for twenty- seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and
 During this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian
Abad Empaynado
 Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered
by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho
 As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives,
private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three
children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad

 On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu
thereof, filed MR praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar
Tioseco.
o Trial court denied private respondents’ motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator,
but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of
Ricardo Abad

 Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother’s estate.
 Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens
titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages
constituted by the latter on said properties.
 After due trial

CFI Decision: (November 2, 1973)

 Declared Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad; 

 Declared said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and
Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as
such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria
Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that may have been acquired
thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife;
 Denied the petition of decedent’s collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco
and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluded them from participating in the
administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad; 

 Appointed Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of P30,000; and


 Ordered Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties, monies
and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as administrator, which
appointment is hereby revoked

 Trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter’s motion for
annulment of certain documents. (On its Judgment rendered November 19, 1974)
o Declared the 6 parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all
registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of
Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT
No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house
situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of
the late Ricardo Abad 

 o Declared the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de
Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to
be inexistent and void from the beginning; 

o Declared null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance
in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484; 

o Ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa
Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de
Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding
certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
o Declared inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages
executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, xxx (b)
petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, xxx and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, xxx, in
favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the
registration or annotation thereof from the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
o Ordered Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to
surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and
108484 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

 Petitioners’ MR was denied by the trial court.

 Notice of appeal was likewise denied – on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.
 Petitioners’ instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with CA

CA Decision:
 Granted petitioners’ petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latter’s appeal.

Trial Court
 The trial court, however, again dismissed petitioners’ appeal on the ground that their record on
appeal was filed out of time.
 Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974
ruling of the trial court, but was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed out of time
 Petitioners again instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the CA

CA Decision
 Affirmed the dismissal of the 2 appeals
 Hence, this appeal in the SC.

SC Order (July 9, 1985)

 Directed the trial court to give due course to petitioners’ appeal from the order of November 2, 1973
declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November
19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
 Accordingly, the two appeals were elevated by the trial court to the appellate court

CA Decision: [when the two appeals were elevated to the CA]

 Instant appeal is denied for lack of merit.

Petitioners’ Argument re: Filiation of the acknowledged natural children:

 In contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad’s filiation, submit the startling theory that the
husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were
born in 1948 and 1954, respectively

Petitioners’ Evidence
  They presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua Institute of Technology of
Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, as well as Cesar Libunao’s 1958 application for enrolment
at the Mapua Institute of Technology, indicating Jose Libunao as their father.
o They claimed that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said
applications were accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated
so
o These not being the case, they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in
1956 and 1958
 They presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos stating that to their
knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and that
the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park
 Lastly, they presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abad’s physician, declaring
that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and
that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the CA and trial court erred in holding that respondents Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad
and Rosemarie S. Abad are the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo De Mesa Abad.

RULING:
 No. The CA and trial court did not err in holding that the aforementioned respondents are the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo De Mesa Abad.

 With these pieces of evidence (enumerated above), petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad
are not the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses
Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
 However, it is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was
married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria
Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian
 But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the
latter died sometime in 1971
 The date of Jose Libunao’s death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he
was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are
not Ricardo Abad’s children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
 Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:
o Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

 At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court’s
finding of facts.
 It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.
o Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on
this Court when there appears in the record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.
o This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.

Application:
 FIRST, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say
the least, far from conclusive
 Re: the failure to indicate “deceased” in the enrolment form
o Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one’s parent is “deceased” is not necessarily
proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished
 Re: joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos
 o Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed
death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter’s death at
that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof
 Jose Libunao’s death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when
the latter died.
 Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there
is no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be
unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao’s death.
 More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose
Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be
different from Honoria Empaynado’s first husband, the latter’s name being Jose
Santos Libunao.
 Even the name of the wife is different.
 Jose Bautista Libunao’s wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose
Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.

 Re: Dr. Arenas’ affidavit (In relation to topic)

o The same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged communication
under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
o The rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that:
a) The action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used
is a civil case;
b) The relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the
privilege or his legal representative and the physician;
c) The advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the
physician while professionally attending the patient;
d) The information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and
e) The disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the
patient

 Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites.
 They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad’s “sterility” does not blacken the character
of the deceased.
 Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad’s “sterility” arose when the latter contracted
gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation
 In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant
embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the
reputation of any patient
 We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence.
 And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.

 In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that:
o “The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in
established precedents.
o It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy
intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy,
from the communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician.
o After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace
his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of
the statute.

 Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their
claim by the quantum of evidence required by law
  On the other hand, the EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS overwhelmingly
prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad, as follows: (quoted
with approval from trial court’s decision):
o In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970,
and in all his individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and
1970, he has declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his
legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad xxx
o In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years
old, and Marian, then (5) years old, on a twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums.
o In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund account of P100,000.00
with the People’s Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable
to either of them in the event of death
o On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same bank,
payable to his daughter Marian
o On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate
in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall
(sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account
No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad, where the income of the trust
fund intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly
o Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in
the name of his daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account
17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972

ISSUE 2: With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, are
petitioners precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother?

RULING 2:
 Yes. With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad,
petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother.
 The applicable provisions are:
o Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
o Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (Italics supplied)

 As to petitioners’ claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their
mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented
by private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad.
 As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be
disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case.
 In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to
the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa

 Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad
and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time.
o This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the
same was not filed out of time.
o Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may
not be reversed by a lower court.
Disposition: Instant petition is denied. The decision of the CA is affirmed with modification that the
affirmance of the Order denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being
filed out of time is Set Aside.

9. Lim vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
 Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
 On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage
o the ground for the annulment is that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental
illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the present.
 Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to
testify on his own behalf.
 On 11 January 1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his next
witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a
Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
 Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring
Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989.
o Petitioner’s counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be
elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
o Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January 1989.
 On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena
and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.
 Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent
motion.
o Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity,
Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a
physician-patient relationship.
o Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
 The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr.
Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an
expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise.
 She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the
results of her examination and the medicines she had prescribed.
o On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as
an expert in psychiatry;
o she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets
applied to;
o she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain
behaviours of a person;
o and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what
illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly
Lim, nor (sic) the medicines she prescribed.
 On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
 On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to
the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the
testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989."
 o The divergence in views is whether the information given by the physician in her
testimony in open court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged communication.
o We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication
because the information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her in
her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the information necessary to enable the
physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim.
o neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of
the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach.
o Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the
National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an
expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Dr. Acampado is covered by the privileged
communication?
RULING:
 No, Dr. Acampado testimony is not covered under the privileged communication.
 The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
 “SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.—The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
o x x x (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil
case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment
given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such
patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.”
 This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
with two (2) modifications, namely:
o (a) the inclusion of the phrase “advice or treatment given by him,” and
o (b) substitution of the word reputation for the word character.
 Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules
of Court with a modification consisting in the change of the phrase “which would tend to
blacken” in the latter to “would blacken.”
 Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the provision.
 Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the
character of the patient.
 In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative that the
information would blacken such character.
 With the advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once
more by the substitution of the word character with the word reputation.
 There is a distinction between these two concepts. “Character’ is what a man is, and
‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is.
o ‘Character’ depends on attributes possessed, and ‘reputation’ on attributes which others
believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted
to be reality at present.”
 In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must
concur: “
o 1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
o 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
o 3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
o 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
 o 5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient.”
 These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: “
o 1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
o 2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
o 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered.
o 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.”
 The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he
attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment.
 Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him
“safely and efficaciously to treat his patient” are covered by the privilege.
 It is to be emphasized that “it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
 The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number
of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated.”

APPLICATION:
 Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to
agree with the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden.
 In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness.
o As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient.
o There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded
to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained
from the petitioner.
o Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she
had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient
relationship existing between them.
o As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be
excluded.
o The rule on this point is summarized as follows: “The predominating view, with some
scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient privilege, though
duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion
testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where
his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and
disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such
patient.
o But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such
a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in
the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient
acquired through the physician and patient relationship.
o If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge
of the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion.”
 Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone.
 Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party.
  "Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?

A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I interviewed the
patient, Nelly.

Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office?

A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the month of
April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it
was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.

Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?

A Yes, I understand.

Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?

A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could not get
anything from Dr. Lim.

Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor who was also
present during that interview?

A No, sir, I don’t remember any."

o There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a
physician in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of
the privilege.
o "Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the
confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient and thus
destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify.
o Other courts have reached a contrary result."
 Thirdly, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the information
obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s "character" (or "reputation").
o Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the
latter’s ailment and the treatment recommended therefor.
 Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the
witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite
the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony
"once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule."
 The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the
petitioner’s Petition and Memorandum, and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at
all show that any objections were interposed.
 Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the
privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
 10. People v Invention

G.R. No. 131636 March 5, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us for automatic review1 is the Decision2 dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y
Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter
Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of
P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.

FACTS:

 Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in
separate complaints.
 The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
 At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
 The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie
Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal
witnesses were Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
 Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School testified
that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife.
o Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room
with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by
Cynthia’s loud cries.
o Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion.
o After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.3
 Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard.
o He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors.
o Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino
Navarro.4
 Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac,
Tarlac, testified while he was passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish,
he heard somebody crying.
o He then peeped through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of
Artemio’s house.
o He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a
pumping motion.
 Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she
and Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969.
o On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant.
o Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition.
o The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father.
o Gloria then went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and
reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia.8
 Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16
September 1996.
o She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed
hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 o’clock positions, which could have been caused by sexual
intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private part.9
 Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied
by her mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was
raped by her father Artemio.
o She then executed a written statement,10 which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Canlas.11
 The defense did not present Artemio as a witness.
o Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand and testified
for the defense.
o He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified before the court),
between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio in
Barangay Sapang Tagalog.
o The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its windows were shut.
o When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the
front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where
Artemio and his children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark
inside.12
o Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the
truth when he declared having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped
through a small opening in the sawali wall of the house in the early morning sometime on
the second week of March 1996.
 On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small hut with
some destroyed portions in its sawali walls.
o When she went there to visit her children sometime in December 1995, there was a hole
in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to fish in
a nearby brook.13
o When she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was informed
of Cynthia’s pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the hut’s sawali walls
were not yet repaired.14
 The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the
owner of the small house where Artemio and his children used to reside.
 At the time that Artemio and his children, including Cynthia, were living in that house, the hut’s old
sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat.
 After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthia’s complaint before the NBI, Celestino made
some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes
at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin occupied the
house.15
 In its Decision, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It, however,
acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.
 In his Appellant’s Brief, Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness.
o He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him
under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.16
o Besides, Elven’s testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to
say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions.
o Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
 In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Artemio points to
the following inconsistencies in their testimonies:
o (1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen Artemio on
top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having seen them in
the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996;
o (2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the former was living with
her in Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared
that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and
o (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant,
but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.
  In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of
Artemio’s conviction and sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000 be awarded in addition to the awards of moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Elvin is disqualified to be a witness against his father under Sec25 Rule 130.

RULING: NO

 As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is NOT affected by Section 25, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court,19 otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege."
 This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or
disqualified to testify against an ascendant.20
 The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
 As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his
father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio.
 Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only
"to tell the truth."21
 Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions on Elven.
Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court22 expressly allows leading questions when the
witness is a child of tender years like Elven.
 The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant
consideration.
 Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy.
 As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to the
ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the
despoiler of his sister’s virtue.
 There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor
is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to
testify against his father.
 The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is
entitled to full credence.23

OTHERS:

 The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the
credibility of these witnesses.
o We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the
credibility of the witnesses.
o We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
that refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility. 25
o On the contrary, they may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of
truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the
testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and
coherent whole.26
 Artemio’s allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed
the crime because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal
witnesses Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
 Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without electricity, Elven could not
have been mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the latter for a long
time.
o Moreover, Elven was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio.
o Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthia’s
loud cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his father.27
  The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently proved.
o Nothing in the records suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify falsely
against Artemio, who is the father of her other children.
o Moreover, we have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to the
humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not
motivated solely by the desire to have the person responsible for her child’s defilement
incarcerated.28
o As for Celestino, he testified that the lot where the hut stands is owned by his daughter
Erlinda, and not by Artemio’s mother.29 At any rate, even without Celestino’s testimony,
Artemio’s conviction would stand.

 As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000
and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape,33 should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall not be less than P50,000.

NOTES:

 It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
o This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through
the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.17
o This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or circumstance of
weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the court, or where the
trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.18We do not find any of these
exceptions in the case at bar.

 We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was
committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the
testimony of Eddie.
o The exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime.
o What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has
been sufficiently proved.
o Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the
crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.24
o In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by
Elven and Eddie.
o
 To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the
minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are special qualifying
circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint or information and proved by the prosecution
during the trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction.
 Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly
established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not
clearly proved.
 In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,31 we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as
an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.
 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

 In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and
offered in evidence to prove Cynthia’s age. The statement in the medical certificate showing
Cynthia’s age is not proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not authenticate the date of
birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to Pruna, Gloria’s testimony regarding Cynthia’s age was
insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what
is sought to be proved is that she was then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even
make a categorical finding on Cynthia’s minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthia’s age could not be taken against him.
 It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature
once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most
exacting rules of procedure and evidence.32 Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of
Cynthia’s minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the
death penalty. He should only be convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.