FACTS

Petitioner seeks (1) to enjoin respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation from
misrepresenting to the public, as well as to private and government offices/agencies, that they are
the owners of the disputed lots and Concorde Condominium Building, and from pushing for the
demolition of the building which they do not even own; (2) to prevent respondent Asian Security
and Investigation Agency from deploying its security guards within the perimeter of the said
building; and (3) to restrain respondents Engr. Morales, Supt. Perdigon and F/C Supt. Laguna
from responding to and acting upon the letters being sent by Baculio, who is a mere impostor and
has no legal personality with regard to matters concerning the revocation of building and
occupancy permits, and the fire safety issues of the same building. It also prays to hold
respondents solidarily liable for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. No. 12-309 and raffled to the Makati RTC, Branch
149, which was designated as a Special Commercial Court. Meanwhile, respondents Baculio and
New PPI Corporation filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated April 25, 2012, claiming that it
is a regular court, not a Special Commercial Court, which has jurisdiction over the case.

In their Motion to Vacate Order and Motion to Dismiss dated May 8, 2012, respondents Baculio
and New PP1 Corporation assailed the RTC Order dated April 24, 2012, stating that the case is
beyond its jurisdiction as a Special Commercial Court. Respondents claimed that the petition
seeks to restrain or compel certain individuals and government officials to stop doing or
performing particular acts, and that there is no showing that the case involves a matter embraced
in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, which enumerates the cases over which the
SEC (now the RTC acting as Special Commercial Court pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8799) exercises exclusive jurisdiction. They added that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, which is a condition precedent before filing the said petition.

In an Order dated June 28, 2012, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It noted that
by petitioner's own allegations and admissions, respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation
are not owners of the two subject lots and the building. Due to the absence of intra-corporate
relations between the parties, it ruled that the case does not involve an intra-corporate
controversy cognizable by it sitting as a Special Commercial Court. It also held that there is no
more necessity to discuss the other issues raised in the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion
to vacate order, for lack of jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner contends that its petition for injunction with damages is an ordinary civil case correctly
filed with the RTC which has jurisdiction over actions where the subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. However, petitioner claims that through no fault on its part, the petition
was raffled to Branch 149 of the Makati RTC, a designated Special Commercial Court tasked to
hear intra-corporate disputes.

Petitioner notes that R.A. 8799 merely transferred the Securities and Exchange Commission's
jurisdiction over cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to the courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court, and that there is nothing in R.A. 8799 or in
A.M. No. 00-11 -03-SC which would limit or diminish the jurisdiction of those RTCs designated
as Special Commercial Courts. Petitioner stresses that such courts shall continue to participate in
the raffle of other cases, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 82-2003 on Consolidation of Intellectual
Property Courts with Commercial Court. It insists that for purposes of determining the
jurisdiction of the RTC, the different branches thereof (in case of a multiple sala court) should
not be taken as a separate or compartmentalized unit. It, thus, concludes that the designation by
the Supreme Court of Branch 149 as a Special Commercial Court did not divest it of its power as
a court of general jurisdiction.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 28, 2012, which the RTC
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (Makati RTC), a designated Special Commercial
Court, erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction

RULING

Yes, according to The Supreme Court, Makati RTC erred in dismissing the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

In resolving the issue of whether Branch 149 of the Makati RTC, a designated Special
Commercial Court, erred in dismissing the petition for injunction with damages for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Court is guided by the rule "that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint
which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein."

Accordingly, the RTC exercising jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute can be likened to an
RTC exercising its probate jurisdiction or sitting as a special agrarian court. The designation of
the SCCs as such has not in any way limited their jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all
nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.

Furthermore, as enunciated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. CA:

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All
cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the
jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.

Therefore, one must be disabused of the notion that the transfer of jurisdiction was made only in
favor of particular RTC branches, and not the RTCs in general.

Having clearly settled that as courts of general jurisdiction, the designated Special Commercial
Courts and the regular RTCs are both conferred by law the power to hear and decide civil cases
in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as an action for
injunction. In view of the above discussion, the Court finds no necessity to delve into the other
contentions raised by the parties, as they should be properly addressed by the Makati RTC
branch 149.
FACTS

On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales
(petitioners) filed a Complaint for "Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order,
Three (3) and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Damages" against respondents GJH Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land,
Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang, Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II
(respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s
shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially,
petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in full in
the books of S.J. Land, Inc., but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the
corporation's stockholders, hence, their plea for injunction.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a
Special Commercial Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining order,
and later, in an Order dated August 24, 2011, granted the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

After filing their respective answers to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an
intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court
of Muntinlupa City.

In an Order dated April 17, 2012, Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents.
It found that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out that the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the
Special Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot
lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Accordingly, it dismissed the case.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that they filed the case with
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to
Branch 276 by raffle.

They further maintained that the RTC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under
Republic Act No. (RA) 8799, but since the Court selected specific branches to hear and decide
such suits, the case must, at most, be transferred or raffled off to the proper branch.

In an Order dated July 9, 2012, Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that it
has no authority or power to order the transfer of the case to the proper Special Commercial
Court, hence, the present petition.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter

RULING

The court ruled in affirmative.

At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as
a commercial case, more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute, considering that it relates to
petitioners' averred rights over the shares of stock offered for sale to other stockholders, having
paid the same in full. Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the
suit between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and
pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code
and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation, hence, intra-corporate,
which should be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC.

The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be followed when a commercial case -
such as the instant intra-corporate dispute -has been properly filed in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court but is, however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a
regular branch of that station.

As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular
case's subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of
jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders
issued from time to time by the Court. Citing the case of Lozada v. Bracewell, which was
recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has
nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.

In the case of corporate disputes, only those that are now submitted for final determination of the
SEC will remain with the SEC. So, all those cases, both memos of the plaintiff and the
defendant, which have been submitted for resolution, will continue. At the same time, cases
involving rehabilitation, bankruptcy, suspension of payments and receiverships that were filed
before June 30, 2000 will continue with the SEC. in other words, we are avoiding the possibility,
upon approval of this bill, of people filing cases with the SEC, in manner of speaking, to select
their court.

It is important to mention that the Court's designation of Special Commercial Courts was made
in line with its constitutional authority to supervise the administration of all courts as provided
under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states that, “the Supreme Court
shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

According to the Supreme Court, here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-
corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is
the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court. Unfortunately, the commercial
case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, Branch 276, instead of being assigned to the sole
Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256.

The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the
exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of
Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for
the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to
the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge
should then assign said case to the only designated Special Commercial Court in the station,
which was Branch 256.

Furthermore, the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural
tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of
jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule
under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of procedure and its constitutional
mandate to supervise the administration of all courts and the personnel thereof. Certainly, an
internal rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the commanding statute. But as a more
fundamental reason, the designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an
incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is distinct from
the concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary
civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure.

In fine, Branch 276's dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077 is set aside and the transfer of said case
to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City,
is hereby ordered.