CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y.

2019-2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DR. VICENTE ORESTES ROMUALDEZ EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION
COLLEGE OF LAW I. PRELIMINARY TITLE (Article 1-36, NCC)

A. Effect and Application of Laws

Tañada vs. Tuvera ……………………………………………………………………..3
Tañada vs. Tuvera ……………………………………………………………………..4

1. E.O. No. 200

Kasilag vs. Rodriguez …………………………………………………………………5
PNB vs. Office of the Philippines ………………………………………………….5
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC and Lee ……………………………………………………6

B. Conflict of Laws Provisions (Articles 15-17 NCC)

1. Nationality Theory

CASES ON
2. Domiciliary Theory
3. Generality
4. Territoriality

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 5. Lex Situs

6. Lex Loci Celebrationis
Raytheon Int’l v. Stockton W. Rouze, Jr. ……………………………………..7
Miciano vs. Brimo ……………………………………………………………………..8
Aznar v. Garcia …………………………………………………………………………9

C. Human Relations (Articles 19-36 NCC)

Prepared by: Clarissa Mata vs. Elexander M. Agravante ……………………………………10
LAW 4-A Nikko Hotel Manila Garden & Ruby Lim v. Roberto Reyes
A.K.A Amay Bisaya ……………………………………………………………………10

Separate Civil Action (Articles 30-35 NCC)

First Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
Sapiera v. Court of Appeals ……………………………………………………….11

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Prejudicial Question (Article 36)
Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani Bobis ……………………………………..11

D. Persons (Article 40-47 NCC)

1. Juridical Capacity
2. Capacity to Act
3. Natural Persons
4. Juridical Persons
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Citibank,
N.A. And Bank Of America, S.T. & N.A. ……………………………………….12

I. Presumption of Death (Article 390-392 NCC)

ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. Republic …………………………………………………13
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II. FAMILY RELATIONS (Executive Order No. 209)
A. Marriages
Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines ……………………………………………13
1. Requisites of Marriage
Abbas vs. Abbas ………………………………………………………………………….14
Beso vs. Daguman ……………………………………………………………………….15
Navarro vs. Domagtoy ………………………………………………………………….16
People vs. Santiago ……………………………………………………………………..17
2. Marriages Exempt from License
3. Marriages of Filipinos with Foreigners
Corpuz vs. StoTomas & Solicitor General ………………………………………. 17
Noveras v. Noveras……………………………………………………………………….18
Vda. De Catalan vs. Catalan-Lee ……………………………………………………19
Norman A. Del Socorro/ Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsen vs.
Ernst Johan Brinkham Van Wilsem ………………………………………………..20
Fujiki vs. Marinay ………………………………………………………………………..21
4. Void and Voidable Marriages
Article 34
Santiago v. People ……………………………………………………………………..22
OCA vs. Necessario …………………………………………………………………….23
Article 35
Capili v. People ………………………………………………………………………….23
Montanez v. Cipriano ………………………………………………………………….24
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen ……………………………………………………………..24
5. Article 36
Psychological Incapacity
Aurelio vs. Aurelio ……………………………………………………………………….25
Pimentel v. Pimentel …………………………………………………………………...25
Republic v. Encelan …………………………………………………………………….26
Valerio E. Kalaw v. Ma. Elena Fernandez ……………………………………….28
Dino v. Dino ……………………………………………………………………………….28
Marietta N. Barrido v Leonardo v. Nonato ……………………………………..29
Mendoza vs. Republic ………………………………………………………………….30
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals ……………………………………………………31
Art. 38
Vda. De Carungcong v. People …………………………………………………….32
Art. 39
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
Isidro Ablaza v. Republic ……………………………………………………………..33
Art. 40
Social Security Commission v. Azote ……………………………………………..33
Susan Nicdao Cariño vs. Susan Yee Cariño …………………………………….34
Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani Bobis ………………………………………..36
Art. 41
Republic v. Narceda …………………………………………………………………….36
Celerina J. Santos v. Ricardo Santos ……………………………………………..37
D. Property Relations of Spouses
3. Absolute Community Property System
a. What constitutes a community property (Article 92)
Munoz v. Ramirez ……………………………………………………………………….38
Charges upon and Obligations of ACP (Article 96)
Fuentes v. Roca ………………………………………………………………………….38
Ownership and Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition
Consolacion Villanueva vs. IAC …………………………………………………….39
4. Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG) (Article 116)
Beumer vs. Amores ……………………………………………………………………40
Exclusive Property of Each Spouse
Conjugal Partnership Property
Charges Upon and Obligations of CPG (Article 121-122)
Aguete vs. PNB …………………………………………………………………………..41
Pana vs. Heirs of Juanito ……………………………………………………………..41
Administration of CPG (Article 124)
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Flores v. Lindo ……………………………………………………………………………42
Dissolution of CPG
Liquidation of CPG Assets and Liabilities (Article 129-130)
Cornelia Matabuena vs. Petronila Cervantes ……………………………………43
Quiao vs. Quiao …………………………………………………………………………..43
Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. v. Servacio and Go …………………………………..44
7. Property Regime of Unions without Marriage (Article 147-148)
Virginia Ocampo v. Deogracio Ocampo ………………………………………….46
Ventura v. Spouses Paulino ………………………………………………………….46
Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna ………………………………46
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III. FAMILY
A. Family and Family Home (Article 152-162)
Fortaleza vs. Lapitan ………………………………………………………………..48
De Mesa v. Acero …………………………………………………………………….49
Eulogio v. Bell ………………………………………………………………………….50
B. Paternity and Filiation (Articles 163-182)
1. Legitimate Children
2. Proof of Filiation
3. Illegitimate Children
4. Legitimated Children
Perla v Baring ………………………………………………………………………….51
Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat …………………………………………. 52
Virginia Ocampo v. Deogracio Ocampo ………………………………………53
Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas ……………………………………………….54
Grande v. Antonio ……………………………………………………………………55
V. SUPPORT (Articles 194-208 NCC)
Lim Lua vs. Lua ……………………………………………………………………….56
Calderon v. Roxas, Jose Antonio & CA ……………………………………….58
VI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Uy. vs. Spouses Lacsamana ……………………………………………………..59
Go Bangayan vs. Bangayan ……………………………………………………..60
Becket vs. Sarmiento ………………………………………………………………61
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE
A. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA (G.R. No. L-63915 April 24,
1985)
FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a
right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the
alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding,
they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
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ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have legal standing in the present case. – YES (involves
public right)
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is a requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
RULING: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect.
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Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude [prevent] the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA (G.R. No. L-63915, December
29, 1986)
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be
made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the
time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information
on matter of public concern.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision.
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on
the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and
so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence
in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication."
The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because
of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can
think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding
that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary
Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by,
say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions
for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
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assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by
the Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"),
the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
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E.O. 200
MARCIAL KASILAG vs. RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO
MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO (G.R. No. 46623, December 7, 1939)
FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of
improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the
indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio
was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years., and in such case, mortgage
would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a
deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax
on the land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence,
they entered a verbal agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession
of the land on the condition that they would not collect the interest of the loan, would
attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, &
would introduce improvement thereof.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the
mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of
antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the
land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith
because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by
which it is invalidated
RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can
neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116.
This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon
ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith,
but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is
not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage
of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not
violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession
thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith.
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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (G.R. No.
104528, January 18, 1996)
FACTS: Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from
Marikina Village, Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed
over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the
petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents
duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on
the lots in question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on
the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of
the lots.
Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later
consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA)
ruled that PNB - without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. -
may collect from private respondents only the "remaining amortizations, in
accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into
with" Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over
again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer.
ISSUES:
1. Whether PD 957 can have retroactive application in this case.
2. Whether Petitioner bank’s defense of being not privy to the contract will prosper.
RULING: 1. Yes. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the
law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As
between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the
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developers deal with, it is obvious that the law - as an instrument of social justice -
must favors the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast
resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is
presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained
(whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status,
condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could
not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On
the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the
attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It
was precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted,
its very essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over helpless
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citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed "unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers."
Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly
prospective application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years through
blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their own.
Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute
strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole.
As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find
the following statements of Justice Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the
case at bench:
Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution
may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law.
If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the
contract.
Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a
reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a
matter, affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held,
suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the
legislature as a postulate of the legal order.
2. No. As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the
provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a "total stranger to the land
purchase agreement," cannot be made to take the developer's place.
We disagree, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank
to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private
respondents.
Sec. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the
owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority, Such
approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the
mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or
subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure
such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage
shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before
the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for
the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the
corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit
being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot
or unit promptly after full payment thereof.(emphasis supplied)
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Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly
grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit
directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to
reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the
particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without prejudice
to petitioner Bank's seeking relief against the subdivision developer.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE
(G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996)
FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee
questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential
Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based
on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had
proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect
Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.
RULING: Yes, his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative
nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the
filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine
Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are:
(1) filing the application;
(2) action by the committee; and
(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.
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It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath
taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not
have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as
follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his
lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of
Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
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The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship
as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor.
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine,
that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to
this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or
when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure
errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts
of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce
their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to
comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing,
and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that
curative statutes are "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of
enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative
statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble,
it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the
intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof." It is obvious to the Court that the statute was
meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise
covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech,
liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other
guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give
retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has
been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the
evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends
to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied
although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some
vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty." This is all the more true of P.D.
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725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of
repatriation granted therein.
B. CONFLICT OF LAWS PROVISIONS
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR. (G.R.
No. 162894, February 26, 2008)
FACTS: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized &
existing under the laws of Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract. BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the
sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Rouzie secured a service contract w/
the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.
Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International
(Rust) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of
employment contract. The Labor Arbiter ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s
money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie filed an action for damages before the
RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against Raytheon International. He
reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project w/c he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred
that BMSI, RUST and Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company.
Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of failure
to state a cause of action & forum non conveniens & prayed for damages by way
of compulsory counterclaim. The RTC denied Raytheon’s motion. The CA affirmed.
Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI
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included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign
elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved are American
corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements
of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction.
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2. Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens.
RULING:
1. Yes. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case
is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules
of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is
an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by
the Constitution and the law & by the material allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or
reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages arising from an
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
Rouzi upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person
of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine
courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the
civil action.
Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation
will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop,
that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
2. No. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient”
or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum
non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts
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are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the
case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even
if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the
case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred
by the Constitution and the law and by the material allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein. Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action
and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator vs.
ANDRE BRIMO (G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927)
FACTS: Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines
stated in the will thathis property should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law, and not that of his nation.
The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of
partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.
The appellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition
on the fact that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be
in accordance with the laws of his nationality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine
Laws.
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RULING: No. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void
as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things,
provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order
of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
8

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein
appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in
will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part
of the second clause of the will,
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not
in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and
void, being contrary to law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of
the deceased vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA (G.R. No. L-16749, January 31,
1963)
FACTS: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California
where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of
nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until
the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the
Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his.
Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law
should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that
Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in
view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the
other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16
(2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts
must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are
no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property
possessed by him in absolute dominion.
ISSUE: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.
RULING: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.
1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California,
and
2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that
“if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated,
it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the
domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the
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lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law
provides.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-
of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum.
This is renvoi in the narrower sense.
9

C. HUMAN RELATIONS
CLARISSA U. MATA v. ALEXANDER M. AGRAVANTE, et. al. (G.R. No. 147597,
August 6, 2008)
FACTS: Respondents Eddie E. Santillan et al. were former security guards of the
Bessang Pass Security Agency, owned by herein petitioner Clarissa Mata. The
respondents filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in Cebu City for non-payment of salaries/wages and other benefits. Subsequently,
they filed an affidavit-complaint with the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Cramp
Crame, requesting an investigation of the Bessang Pass Security Agency and
cancellation of its license to operate as security agency for violation of labor laws.
Copies of this affidavit-complaint were likewise sent to the following offices: (1) Office
of the President, (2) Office of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, (3) Office
of the PNP Director General, (4) PNP Chief Superintendent, (5) Office of the DILG
Secretary, (6) Ombudsman and (7) Office of the Vice-President. Petitioner instituted
an action for damages against the respondents averring that respondents filed
unfounded, baseless complaints before the NLRC for alleged violation of the labor
laws and with the PNP for cancellation of its license to operate. She further alleged
that by furnishing the government offices copies of these complaints, especially the
Department of Public Works and Highways which was its biggest client, the agency's
reputation was besmirched, resulting in the loss of contracts/projects and income.
Petitioner then declared that respondents' deliberate and concerted campaign of hate
and vilification against the Bessang Pass Security Agency violated the provisions of
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and found
preponderant evidence enough to justify petitioner's cause of action. It gave
credence to the petitioner's contentions that the respondents had no other motive in
sending the letter to the seven (7) government offices except to unduly prejudice her
good name and reputation. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's
decision. It dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled for damages in violation of Article 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code
RULING: It has been held that Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts
and social grievances. The object of this article is to set certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of
one's duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis is any act evincing bad faith
or intent to injure. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the following
elements: (1) an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order or public policy; and (3) is done with intent to injure. The common
element under Articles 19 and 21 is that the act complained of must be intentional
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and attended with malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked. The question of whether or not this principle has been violated, resulting
in damages under Articles 20 and 21or other applicable provision of law, depends
on the circumstances of each case. The circumstances do not warrant an award of
damages. We agree with the appellate court that in the action of the respondents,
there was no malicious intent to injure petitioner's good name and reputation. The
respondents merely wanted to call the attention of responsible government
agencies in order to secure appropriate action upon an erring private security
agency and obtain redress for their grievances. In applying the basic postulate that
in the absence of proof that there was malice or bad faith on the part of the
respondents, no damages can be awarded.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES
a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA” (G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005)
FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of
Hotel Nikko, respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in
celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager. During the party and when
respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the
Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and
embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself
a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out
of her party.
Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not
under the ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act
politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party
intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by
the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to
leave the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter
screamed and made a big scene.
Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she
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invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel
Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant
petition for review.
ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the
celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be
solidarily liable with her.
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RULING: No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part
of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be
humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance
of one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
Art. 21 of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Article 2165 refers to acts
contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven
by animosity against him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave
was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been
in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to
be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct. Considering
the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to
be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held
liable as its liability springs from that of its employees.
Separate Civil Action
SAPIERA vs CA (G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999)
FACTS: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased
from Monnico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with
checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by
the petitioner.
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When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the
drawer’s account was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De
Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the
checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but
consequently she was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo
did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed
to private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent the remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already
collected by the latter as civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether Sapiera is still liable to pay civil indemnity after being acquitted of
the criminal charges
RULING: Yes. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused
for damages only when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil
in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the
criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her
civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a
declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did
not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable
where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be
adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the
complainant.
Prejudicial Question
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Bobis vs. Bobis (GR 138509, July 31, 2000)
FACTS: October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one
Maria Dulce. Without said marriage having been annulled, Isagani contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia. An information for bigamy was filed against Isagani
based on Imelda's complaint. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground
that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Isagani then filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil
case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.
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ISSUE: Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?
RULING: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of
the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential
elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.
Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. He
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question.
Respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first
on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration
of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
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contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
D. PERSONS
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CITIBANK, N.A.
and BANK OF AMERICA, S.T. & N.A., (G.R. No. 170290, April 11, 2012)
FACTS: Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) and Bank of America, S.T. & N.A. (BA) are duly
organized corporations and existing under the laws of the United States of
America and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, with offices
in Makati City. Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) conducted an examination of the books of account of Citibank
and BA in 1977and 1979 respectively. It discovered that Citibank in the course of
its banking business, received from its head office and other foreign branches a
total of P11,923,163,908.00 in dollars from September 30, 1974 to June 30, 1977
covered by Certificates of Dollar Time Deposit that were interest-bearing with
corresponding maturity dates. And BA a total of P629, 311,869.10 in dollars,
covered by Certificates of Dollar Time Deposit that were interest-bearing with
corresponding maturity dates and lodged in their books under the account Due to
Head Office/Branches. For failure to report the said amounts as deposit liabilities
that were subject to assessment for insurance, PDIC sought the remittance of
deficiency premium assessments for dollar deposits.
Citibank and BA each filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court
of First Instance stating that the money placements they received from their head
office and other foreign branches were not deposits and did not give rise to
insurable deposit liabilities under Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 3591 (the PDIC
Charter) and, as a consequence, the deficiency assessments made by PDIC were
improper and erroneous. RTC ruled in favor of Citibank and BA which reasoned
that there was no depositor-depository relationship between the respondents and
their head office or other branches. Also, the placements were deposits made
outside the Philippines which are excluded under Section 3.05(b) of the PDIC Rules
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and Regulations and Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter likewise excludes from the
definition of the term deposit any obligation of a bank payable at the office of the
bank located outside the Philippines.
PDIC argues that the head offices of Citibank and BA and their individual
foreign branches are separate and independent entities hence not exempt in
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3591.
PDIC appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the dollar deposits are money placements, thus, they are not
subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 6426 otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines.
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2. Whether or not the Philippine branch of a foreign corporation has a separate legal
personality from its foreign head office for the purpose of PDIC.
RULING: The court ruled that the funds in question are not deposits within the
definition of the PDIC Charter and are, thus, excluded from assessment. Pursuant to
Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter, the term deposit means unpaid balance of money or
its equivalent received by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it has
given or is obliged to give credit to a commercial, checking, savings, time or thrift
account or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, and trust funds held by
such bank whether retained or deposited in any department of said bank or deposit
in another bank, together with such other obligations of a bank as the Board of
Directors shall find and shall prescribe by regulations to be deposit liabilities of the
Bank; Provided, that any obligation of a bank which is payable at the office of the
bank located outside of the Philippines shall not be a deposit for any of the purposes
of this Act or included as part of the total deposits or of the insured deposits. As
explained by the respondents, the transfer of funds, which resulted from the inter-
branch transactions, took place in the books of account of the respective branches in
their head office located in the United States. Hence, because it is payable outside of
the Philippines, it is not considered a deposit.
The Court in resolving the controversy in the relationship of the Philippine
branches of Citibank and BA to their respective head offices and their other foreign
branches examined the manner by which a foreign corporation can establish its
presence in the Philippines. It may choose to incorporate its own subsidiary as a
domestic corporation, in which case such subsidiary would have its own separate and
independent legal personality to conduct business in the country. In the alternative, it
may create a branch in the Philippines, which would not be a legally independent
unit, and simply obtain a license to do business in the Philippines. It is apparent that
the respondent banks did not incorporate as a separate domestic corporation to
represent its business interests in the Philippines. Thus, being one and the same
entity, the funds placed by the respondents in their respective branches in
the Philippines should not be treated as deposits made by third parties subject to
deposit insurance under the PDIC Charter.
I. PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
Valdez v. Republic (G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009)
FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a
baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and
did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita
and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home.
3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he
showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It
was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing
that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s
application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with
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Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
RULING: Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration
of presumptive death of Sofio.
Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.
Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established
by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death
is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s
marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry,
and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
II. FAMILY RELATIONS
A. MARRIAGES
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ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 174689,
October 22, 2007)
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as a male, underwent
sex reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the
Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate issued by one Dr. Marcelino Reysio
Cruz. He then lived his life as a woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex before the RTC of Manila. The
court having underwent the jurisdictional requirements, and there having no
opposition, the court proceeded with the hearing where Rommel presented his
American Fiance as witness. RTC gave due course to his petition, ruling based on
equity, that “petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
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doing and should not be taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or prejudice
will be caused to anybody” if the petition were to be granted. His name was thus
changed to Mely, and sex “female.” Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
RULING: Petitioner’s contention is not meritorious. The Supreme Court ruled that, a
ale person who had a surgical reassignment where she become biologically a woman
cannot use that ground as reason to change his name as person’s sex is immutable
from birth.
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essence that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors, which can be changed by concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general. The jurisdiction therefore is primarily lodged with these
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108(Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial. Hence, the venue to which petitioner filed is
improper.
RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The new first name or
nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or 3) The
change will avoid confusion. From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications. Before a person can legally change his given name,
he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying.
No law allows the change of entry in the Birth Certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment. By virtue RA 9048, Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in the entries in the civil register, excluding the
clerical or typographical error. Section 2 of RA 9048 provides expressly that no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of petitioner.
Requisites of Marriage
Abbas vs. Abbas (689 SCRA 646)
FACTS: The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
(Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria). Syed
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alleged the absence of a marriage license as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria. In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that
Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the
resolution of this case.
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located
at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document.
He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria
told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply
for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
In July of 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan.
Furthermore, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him
in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license
on advice of his counsel.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented
the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. She and her mother
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to
be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will
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get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez
who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and
Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June
15, 1993.
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous
marriage. Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9,
1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated
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under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese.
RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had
been issued for Gloria and Syed. It also took into account the fact that neither party
was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued. As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It
held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state
that a “diligent search” for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA
ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites
laid down by law.
CA denied Syed’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was valid
RULING: No. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was
issued, Syed turned to the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which
had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested Certification that no
such license was issued. It is worth noting that in a particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on
the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the
alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a “diligent search”, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary.
It is worth telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a
copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured
in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no
pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity
and existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been
secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably
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failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.
This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions. Thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, a formal requisite, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
Beso vs. Daguman (323 SCRA 566)
FACTS: An administrative complaint against respondent Judge stands charged
with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated
December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a
copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local
Registrar.
Respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman
had to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside
his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the
following circumstances:
a. first, because complainants said she must leave that same
day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as
scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another
town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail
serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer; third, if
they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant
would be out of the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse and necessitate another
publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their
plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it
would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all
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other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were
considered impracticable by the parties.
b. The contracting parties were ready with the desired
documents for a valid marriage, which respondent found all
in order.
c. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker,
who, respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary
official attention under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he
believed in good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of
liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
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3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration
of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which
failure was also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the
control of respondent.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11,
1998 found that respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that
the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his
jurisdiction
RULING: Yes. The Judge solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction.
There are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code,
wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a
place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case. In this case,
there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made
by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized
outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on
record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the
marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who,
respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present
Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage
in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side
of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for
citizens to get married." Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed
with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when
failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. It is clearly evident
from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed non-feasance
in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic
social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted
more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive
position, he is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His
imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by
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Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve
consideration for being devoid of proof.
NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY (259 SCRA 129, July 19, 1996)
FACTS: Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this
case to the Supreme Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC
of Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage
of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan has a
subsisting marriage with Isa Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was
told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and not
been heard for almost seven years. Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on
the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Basey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan
and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. However, the
certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed
that his civil status was “separated”.
Second, he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo
and Gemma del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction in October 1994.
Respondent Judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao Del Norte but he solemnized said wedding at
his residence in the municipality of Dapa, located 40 to 50km away.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
(2) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was
merely separated from his wife for almost seven years.
(3) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence.
RULING: (1) The marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous,
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there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and his wife, notwithstanding,
the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was dead. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the said
marriage was solidified and valid. Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was not authorized to
solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario as against Article 3 (1) of the
Family Code with regard to irregularity of formal requisites of marriage, Article 4
(3) states that formal requisites shall not affect the vaidity of marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly and administratively
liable.
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(2) No, since there was no institution of summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage
contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains to be
married to Peñaranda. Wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part
of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by Tagadan. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void
marriage.
(3) No. Article 7 provides that “A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction xxx.” Article 8, however, states
that marriages shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or
vice consul, as the case maybe, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
the Family Code; or the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by both parties as stipulated in a sworn statement to that effect. There is no pretense
that either Sumaylo or Del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge is
the “authority of the solemnizing officer”.
Under Article 8, which is only a discretionary provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may
officiate in marriages only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, it may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Judge
Domagtoy was suspended for six months for demonstrating gross ignorance of the
law.
PEOPLE VS SANTIAGO (G.R. No. L-27972, October 31, 1927)
FACTS: The deceased wife of Appellant Santiago was the aunt of Felicita Masilang,
aged 18, who was the injured girl in this case. Masilang is therefore appellant's niece
by marriage, and she calls him uncle. Both are residents of the municipality of Gapan,
in the Province of Nueva Ecija.
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On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita, who was then about
18 years of age, to accompany him across the river on some errand, to which the
latter agreed. After crossing the river, the appellant conducted the girl to a place
about twenty paces from the highway where tall grass and other growth hid them
public view. In this spot the appellant manifested a desire to have sexual
intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, and he finally
notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purpose by force and against her
will.
After the deed had been done, the appellant conducted the girl to the
house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who then brought in a protestant minister
who went through the ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over, the
appellant gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be
away that night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had
happened, and this prosecution for rape was started.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was valid.
RULING: No, the marriage was not valid. The trial court found that the offense of
rape had been committed, and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which
the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act. The
manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well as
before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of making Masilang his wife or
living maritally with her, and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her
because her consent to the performance of the marriage was vitiated by duress
and the ceremony had been performed as a mere device of the accused to escape
punishment. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it
supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.
Marriages of Filipinos with Foreigners
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL (G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
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FACTS: Petitioner Corpuz is a former Filipino Citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He married the Filipina respondent on January
18, 2005 in Pasig City. Soon after the wedding, petitioner left for Canada due to
work and other professional commitments. Corpuz returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise respondent, only to discover her having an
affair with another man.
Corpuz returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was
granted on December 8, 2005 effective January 8, 2006. Two years after,
petitioner moved on and found a new Filipina and with the desire to marry his new
fiancée, petitioner went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office (CRO) and registered
the divorce decree granted by the Canadian Court.
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The divorce decree has been registered but petitioner was informed by an
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO), now the Philippine Statistics Authority,
that the marriage between him and the Filipina respondent still subsists under
Philippine laws, and the divorce decree, to be enforceable, must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Respondent was summoned and
thru a notarized letter/manifestation offered no opposition to the petition, and that
she could have filed a same case but was prevented by financial/personal constraints
and requested that she be considered a party-in-interest with the same prayer as the
petitioner.
The petition was denied by the RTC on the ground that petitioner is not the
proper party to institute the case, as only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy
under Par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code.
The RTC stated that the decision is consistent with the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the disputed provision, determined by the Court in Republic
vs. Orbecido III, such that it is “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse”.
ISSUE: Whether Par. 2, Art. 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a
Philippine Court for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING: The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 was enacted, amending Article 26
of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than
that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
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Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our
rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect
of foreign judgments.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
DAVID A. NOVERAS vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS (G.R. No. 188289, August 20,
2014)
FACTS: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who acquired properties in the
USA and in the Philippines during their marriage. They have 2 children. According
to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with
his mistress. Further, she claimed that they executed a joint affidavit where he
renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in
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the Philippines.
After learning of David’s extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for
divorce before the Superior Court of California. Divorce was granted and judgment
was duly entered on June 29, 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.
Leticia then filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property
before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit
and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same. David demanded
that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated since a divorce decree was already entered.
The RTC regarded that since the parties are US citizens,their marriage is
hereby declared DISSOLVED pursuant to the divorce decree. Thus, the trial court
considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute
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community of property instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal
property. Their property was classified as absolute community because they did not
execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant
to Article 75 of the Family Code.
Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual
presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial
notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law.
The court adjudicated the Philippine properties to Davidsubject to the payment of the
children’s legitimes.
On appeal, the CA modified the decision and directed the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses and both should pay their children the
amount of P520,000.00.
In the present petition, David insists that CA should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him and allowing
Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment
considering that she was already granted all US properties by the California court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved pursuant to
the divorce decree issued by the Superior Court of California.
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper in accordance
with the Family Code.
RULING: 1. No. The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which
severed the bond of marriage between the parties. Foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself. A copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven
as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication
or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence.
The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California
law on divorce were not presented. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual
presumption, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly
to liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Any of the following shall be
considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that both parties had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, it
is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia
heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who
represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the
hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE (G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012)
FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen, allegedly obtained a
divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted
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a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the
RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed
a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent
on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not
considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further
alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas
Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite
having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
19

However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized
under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
The RTC took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed by
Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action
to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of
bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to
its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between
petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando.
The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition.
The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the
marriage with Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD: It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce
to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the
estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC
in Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that,
because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with
Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the
divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
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material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. It is well-
settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the
validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the
proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact
of divorce.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM (GR
No. 193707, 2014-12-10)
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage in Holland on September
25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition was 16
years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son
was only 18 months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home to the
Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and
his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay
Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including
their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive
the letter.
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Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation
of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold
Departure Order against respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.
Without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection
order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.
20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine la
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
RULING: We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with
petitioner's contentions.
We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code
on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle
applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed
by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their
child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
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pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court held that a divorce
obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons,
the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he
is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
Emphasis is placed on petitioner's allegation that under the second page of the
aforesaid covenant, respondent's obligation to... support his child is specifically
stated, which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national
law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children
or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American
Realty Corporation, to wit:
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
MINORU FUJIKI, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
(G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January
2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
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In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on
15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court
in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
21

based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in
the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest
in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it.
3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is
an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,
which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
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In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent
to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii
expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines;
and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by
default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Void and Voidable Marriages
Article 34
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 200233,
July 15, 2015)
FACTS: The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to
Estela Galang, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old
widow then, married Santos. Four months after the solemnization of their
marriage, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for
bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the
criminal suit.
Petitioner asserted that she could not be included as an accused in the
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crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but
in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela
Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner on
which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only or after she
had already married Santos.
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos
during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Petitioner moved for
22

reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the CA gave more weight to the
prosecution witnesses' narration.
ISSUE: Is the second marriage of Santiago valid, for there to be a conviction for
bigamy?
HELD: YES. It is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained
in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under
Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of
a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before
the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at
least five years before they married each other.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. Petitioner now seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they
had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making
claims in no less than her marriage contract.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner married Santos
while knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. It will be the height of absurdity for
this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State." It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the
conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE ANATALIO S.
NECESSARIO (A.M. NO. MTJ-07-1691, APRIL 2, 2013)
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) formed a judicial audit team that
investigated on irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several MTCs and
RTCs in Cebu. The OCA recommended the dismissal of the said judges and court
employees generally for gross neglect of duty due to the following circumstances:
Solemnized marriages with questionable documents even where one of the
contracting parties (foreigner) submitted an affidavit instead of a certificate of
legal capacity from his embassy; and under Art. 34 (one of the contracting
parties was a minor during cohabitation); failed to make sure that
solemnization fee has been paid; solemnized marriage with expired marriage
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license; and provided couples who are to be married under Art. 34 with the
required affidavit of cohabitation even if one or both of them were minors
during cohabitation.
ISSUE: Whether the marriages solemnized by these judges are void for lack of the
essential/formal requisites
HELD: The affidavits of cohabitation should be issued and accepted pro forma
particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year
cohabitation should be on of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have
been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the
time of the marriage. The actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue
regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow
the proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In
Aranes vs Occiano, a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and
subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of
validity to the marriage.
Article 35
CAPILI v. PEOPLE (G.R. 183805 JULY 3, 2013)
FACTS: In Sept. 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But just three months
later in December 1999, he married another woman named Shirly Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla
Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason
of the subsisting marriage between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a
motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the second marriage
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was already declared void ab initio that marriage never took place and that
therefore, there is no bigamy to speak of.
The prosecutor filed a motion stating, among others, that the issue raised
in the civil case (declaration of nullity) are not similar or intimately related to the
issue in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the
trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even
if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
23

HELD: Yes, the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of the petitioner’s marriage to
(private complainant) had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and second marriage were subsisting before the marriage
was annulled.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Montanez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012)
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983,
during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano.
In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of
her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as
defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said
decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter
from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for
Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was
already declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of
prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her
petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that
both wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a
subsequent marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003
justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
RULING: No. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the
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case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of
nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen (G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)
FACTS: Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria
Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas
City.
In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry,
Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to
the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by
Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real
properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In
order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
ISSUE: Did the Court err in declaring the marriage of Amelia to Eliseo void?
RULING: No. The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito
was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative
value of the entries therein.
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In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia,
may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The
said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said
marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
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Art. 36
Psychological Incapacity
AURELIO V. AURELIO (G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011)
FACTS: Danilo A. Aurelio and Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on 23 March
1988. They were gifted with two sons: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
Four years after their marriage, the wife with the RTC of Quezon file a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In the petition it was alleged that both
the petitioner and respondent were suffering from psychological incapacity in the
performance of the essential marital obligations. The wife stated that this state was
present even before and during the time of the marriage ceremony. Putting forward
Article 36 of the Family Code, she prays that their marriage be declared null and void.
On the side of the husband, psychological incapacity manifested by lack of
financial support from him as well as his lack of drive for his wife. He also was
consistently jealous and distrust his wife. His moods were very hostile and he
constantly refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. Moreover, on the side
of the wife, her moods changed quickly – from feeling very high in spirits to instantly
switching to despair all depending on her day-to-day experiences. She was
emotionally immature that she gets really upset if she cannot get what she wants.
With all these said, their marriage broke down and they both were incapacitated to
accept and fulfill the essential obligations of a marital life.
However, on 8 November 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
said petition of the wife. He argues that the petition did not state a cause of action
and that it did not meet the standards set by the Court for the implementation of
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC denied the petition and the CA affirmed it.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the allegations in the wife’s petition are sufficient to declare their
marriage null and void based on psychological incapacity?
HELD: Yes. The petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage observed the
requirements in Republic v. CA or better known as the Molina Doctrine. The root
cause of psychological incapacity, juridical antecedence and incurability were all
alleged in the petition.
The petition included the family backgrounds of both spouses and was seen
as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. An expert also affirmed the same
as the root causes. Moreover, the illnesses of both spouses were also of such grave
nature to the point that there was a disability for them to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder
with Narcissistic Features, while the petitioner suffered from Passive Aggressive
Personality Disorder. These disorders are alleged to be grave and incurable. And
lastly, the failure to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 68 of
the Family Code that states “the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
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observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support,”
were all alleged in the petition. Hence, their marriage must be declared null and
void.
The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition
of cases involving psychological incapacity:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a. medically or clinically identified
b. alleged in the complaint
c. sufficiently proven by experts
d. clearly explained in the decision
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife,
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
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therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition.
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL (G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010)
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial
question in a criminal case for parricide.
FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial
and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
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Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case
would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City. The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting
the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
HELD: No. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was
filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or
his spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
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committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be
held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
that “the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in
Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for
bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court
ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In
fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESAR ENCELAN (G.R. No. 170022,
January 9, 2013)
FACTS: Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To
support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia,
Cesar learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez (Alvin).
Subsequently, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived
with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed
with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to
provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her
illicit affair with Alvin.
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita
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void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The petitioner, through the OSG,
appealed to the CA. The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation
report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness
nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and
abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds
for legal separation. The OSG then filed a petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground
for declaration of nullity of marriage. In interpreting this provision, the Court have
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repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity

or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not
merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas
alleged psychological incapacity.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling,
even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations.

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Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015)
FACTS: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez
(Malyn) met in 1973, maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong
and subsequently had four children. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son,
Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano who gave birth to a son.
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with
Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more
children.
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their
children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in
Valle Verde with only a house helper and a driver.
The house helper would just call Malyn to take care of the children
whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement,
the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one
year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and
resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to
Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends
because of alleged weekend plans with their father.
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with
the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He
further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity
and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a
Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns
psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding
Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent
nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).
The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.
The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported by the
facts on record.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity.
RULING: The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family
Code which provides:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged
acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect
of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in
the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding
that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would
show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for
its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
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ALAIN M. DIÑO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, (GR No. 178044, 2011-01-19)
Facts: Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were
childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they
decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not
faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
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A clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply
ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was
able to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even
without Dr. Tayag's psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts
which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that
respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her... under
Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned
petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
dissolution of the absolute community of property
Issue: whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Ruling: We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before
the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies
only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code
does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
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liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition
may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x."
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO VS. LEONARDO V. NONATO (G.R. No. 176492,
October 20, 2014)
FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and
petitioner Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in
Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to
maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition,
but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for
partition before theMTCC of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property
had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She
likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Bacolod MTCC ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and
Marietta Nonato adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. RTC Reversed the
ruling of the MTCC, to equitably partition the house and lot. CA affirmed the RTC
Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it
clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying
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on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of
its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
ISSUE: Whether the MTCC had jurisdiction to try the present case.
RULING: Yes. Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the
recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
29

xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an
amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00
for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant
case.
The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared
void for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of
the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void
marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that
for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry
each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these
elements are present. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision
pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to
marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido.
They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage
was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
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Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said
party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has
no salary or income or work or industry.
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject
property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over
the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of
the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary
public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be
private and cannot be converted into a public document, making it inadmissible in
evidence unless properly authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its
due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to
her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the
rules on co-ownership.
MENDOZA V. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 157854, November, 12 2012)
PRINCIPLE: The office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is required to actively
participate in all stages of the proceedings and to require the OSG to appear as
counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e, defender of the
marital band) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of,
declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby
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ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced.
Even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination is to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to support a finding of psychological incapacity. What is essential is the
“presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition.”
FACTS: Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea.
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Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while Arabelle was eight months
pregnant. They lived together but depended on their parents for financial support.
Arabelle had different jobs to support the needs of the family.
When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in 1994, he spent
his first salary celebrating with his friends. September of the same year, Arabelle
found out of Dominic’s illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee. Communication
between them became rare and they started sleeping in separate rooms.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a car as a birthday present only to
find out that he did not pay for it, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law for the
payment of the car. Dominic eventually got fired from his job because of he ran away
with P164,000 belonging to his employer. He was charged with estafa. Petitioner also
found out that he swindled many of his clients some of them threatening her and
their family.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because
petitioner asked him for “time and space to think things over.” A month later, she
refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. She
and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from
him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC found that all the
characteristics of psychological incapacity which are gravity, antecedence and
incurability, were attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that
Dominic’s personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the
time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code; that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court,
and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels
over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. CA reversed
the decision of RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity of Dominic was established, and
thus their marriage is null and void.
RULING: No. The appeal has no merit. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-
feelings that the petitioner harbored against Dominic furnished the basis to doubt the
findings of the expert witness; that such findings were one-sided and that he did not
participate in the proceedings. The findings and conclusions on his psychological
profile were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions of him by the
petitioner and her witnesses. The court finds the totality of evidence adduced by the
petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit. Accordingly,
the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was characterized by
gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. His alleged immaturity,
deceitfulness and lack of remorse did not necessarily constitute psychological
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incapacity. The court denies the petition for certiorari and affirms that decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself
subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert. He also did not
participate in the proceedings. And that the findings and conclusions on his
psychological profile by her expert were solely based the testimonies of the
petitioner.
Luisita Estrella Hernandez v. Court of Appeals & Mario C. Hernandez (320
SCRA 76)
FACTS: They were married in January 1, 1981, and had three children. On July 10,
1992, petitioner filed a petition for annulment due to psychological incapacity
because private respondent:
 Failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household.
 Engaged in drinking sprees with friends.
 Cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child.
 Having affairs with different women.
 Infected with STD that was transmitted to petitioner.
 Beats her
 Irresponsible
 Immature
 Unprepared for the duties of a married life.
 Abadoned his family and left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992
Private respondent was 5 years younger than petitioner. Petitioner was the teacher
of private respondent in college. From 1983-1986, he could not find a stable job.
On 1986 to 1991, he was able to secure a job upon the recommendation
of a family friend but he availed himself to early retirement that was offered to him
by the company.
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On April 10, 1993, the RTC denied the petition for nullity because the
reasons cited by the petitioner are grounds for Legal Separation and not in
accordance of Art. 36 of the FC which is psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision of the
RTC citing the ruling in Santos v. CA that the grounds for declaration of nullity
must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. More so, chronic
infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds for
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annuled on the ground of private respondent’s psychological incapacity.
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RULING: The decisions of RTC and CA were affirmed by the SC.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity and
not physical incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism merely
renders the marriage contract VOIDABLE under Art. 55 of the FC, these are mere
grounds for LEGAL SEPARATION.
Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married,
private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived
him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
Lack of drive to work, philandering, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not themselves constitute grounds for finding that
the private respondent is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the FC.
Art. 38
Vda. De Carungcong vs. People (GR. 181409, Feb. 11, 2010)
FACTS: Pursuant to Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, “No criminal, but only
civil liability shall result from the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by the spouses, ascendants and descendants or
relatives by affinity in the same line.” This is the law that Akihiro, a Japanese
National, tried to invoke in his case.
Akihiro was married to Teresa, a Filipina and one of the daughters of a
widow, Juanita who owned substantial properties particularly four valuable pieces of
land in Tagaytay City. Akihiro and Teresa begot six children, the older ones being
Hazel and Tricia. Unfortunately, after several years of marriage Teresa died in Japan.
Subsequently, Akihiro and his children returned to the Philippines to stay
with Juanita. While staying with Juanita, Akihiro presented a document to her (who
was then already blind) and induced her to sign and thumb-mark the same. He made
Juanita believe that said document was in connection with her taxes when it was in
fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Hazel to sell
and dispose the Tagaytay properties. Relying on these fraudulent representations,
Juanita signed and thumb-marked the SPA.
On the basis of said SPA, Akihiro found buyers for property and made Hazel
sign three Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of two Filipino-Chinese women-buyers for
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a total consideration of P22,034,000. But he neither delivered the proceeds to
Juanita nor accounted for the same until the latter died.
Upon her death, one of her surviving daughters, Helen, was appointed
administratrix of her estate. Helen learned from her niece Hazel about the fraud
committed by Akihiro and thus demanded an accounting and delivery of the
proceeds of sale. But Akihiro refused and failed and continued to refuse and fail to
do so. So as Administratrix of the estate of her late mother Juanita, Helen filed a
complaint affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law Akihiro.
Thus after preliminary investigation which reached the Department of
Justice, the City Prosecutor filed an Information estafa against Akihiro. But the
latter moved to quash the Information, claiming that under Article 332 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code his relationship to the person defrauded, the deceased Juanita
who was his mother-in-law, exempts him from criminal liability.
The Prosecution opposed this motion contending that the death of Teresa,
the wife of Akihiro severed the relationship between him and his mother-in-law
Juanita. But the RTC still granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case against Akihiro declaring that the death of his wife Teresa does not
erase the fact that he is still the son-in-law of Teresa’s mother Juanita. So,
according to the RTC, he cannot be held criminally liable pursuant to Article 332 of
the RPC. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) .
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and CA were correct.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the relationship by affinity endures even
after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of
one of the parties to the marriage. So even with the death of Teresa, Akihiro,
remains the son-in-law of Juanita. Thus for purposes of Article 332 (1), the
relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created
the affinity.
But said article only applies to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned therein is
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complexed with another crime such as estafa through falsification.
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Akihiro is
being charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. Akihiro resorted to falsification of public
documents particularly the SPA and the Deeds of Sale, as necessary means to
commit the estafa. Article 332 only covers the violation of the juridical right to
property committed by the offender against certain family members which is a
private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The exemption from
criminal liability does not apply when the violation of the right to property is
achieved through falsification of public documents that involves paramount public
interest. So Akihiro should really be tried and held criminally liable for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents
32

Art. 39
Ablaza vs. Republic (628 SCRA 27, August 11, 2010)
FACTS: The marriage between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato was
celebrated on December 26, 1949 but the marriage license was issued only on
January 9, 1950. After the death of Cresenciano, Isidro Ablaza, Cresenciano’s brother,
filed a Petition to Declare Cresenciano’s marriage to Leonila void on the ground of
absence of marriage license. Isidro did not, however, implead, Leonila Honato Ablaza.
He also failed to implead Leila Ablaza, an alleged child of Cresenciano with Leonila.
ISSUES:
1. Is the rule that only the Husband or the Wife can file a Petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage applicable in this case?
2. Who has the personality to file such petition for marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the old and new Civil Code?
3. Is Isidro Ablaza a proper party to file the petition to declare the marriage of his
brother void on the ground of absence of a marriage license?
RULING:
1. No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code,
which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective
in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the
parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application in
this case. [Ablaza vs. Republic, 628 SCRA 27, August 11, 2010]
2. The absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as
giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of
a marriage. The plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit
for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
proper interest can file the action. [Ablaza vs. Republic, 628 SCRA 27, August 11,
2010]
3. It depends.
If Leila is indeed a child of the deceased Cresenciano, then Isidro, being a
collateral relative of the deceased, is excluded by Cresenciano’s child in intestate
succession, whether said child is legitimate or illegitimate. If such is the case, then
Isidro is not a legal heir of the deceased and he does not have any material interest
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
in the estate of the deceased. He has no personality, therefore, to file the present
petition.
If Leila is not a child of the deceased Cresenciano, then the deceased died
without any descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children. In their absence, a
brother of the deceased becomes the latter’s legal heir together with the
decendent’s surviving spouse. In such a situation, Isidro acquires the right to file
the present petition.
Art. 40
Social Security Commission vs. Edna A. Azote (G.R. No. 209741, April 15,
2015)
FACTS: On 1992, Edna and Edgardo (SSS member) were married and produced 6
children. On 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their 3
older children as designated beneficiaries. On 2001, Edgardo submitted another
Form E-4 to the SSS designating his 3 younger children as additional beneficiaries.
On 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim
for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of the deceased-member. It appeared,
however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form
E-4 on 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote as his
spouse; and Elmer Azote as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied.
Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits of Edgardo,
and insisted that she was the legitimate wife of the latter. SSC dismissed Edna’s
petition for lack of merit, stating that although Edgardo filed the Form E-4
designating Edna and their 6 children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the
designation of Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary, and Rosemarie was still
presumed to be his legal wife. Moreover, the NSO records revealed that the
marriage of Edgardo to one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on 1982.
Consequently, SSC opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there
was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved. The SSC
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stated that there must be a judicial determination of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party could enter into a second marriage.
On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the resolution and the order of the
SSC. It held that the SSC could not make a determination of the validity or
invalidity of the marriage of Edna to Edgardo considering that no contest came
from either Rosemarie or her child.
ISSUE: Whether Edna, as the wife of the second marriage and designated
beneficiary, is entitled to the SS benefits.
RULING: No. Although an SSS member is free to designate a beneficiary, the
designation must always conform to the statute. To blindly rely on the form
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submitted by the deceased-member would subject the entire social security system to
the whims and caprices of its members and would render the SS Law inutile.
The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was R.A. 8282, the
amendatory law of R.A. 1161 or the “Social Security Law” Section 8 (e) and (k) of the
said law expressly provides who would be entitled to receive benefits from its
deceased-member:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall,
unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and has not reached
twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of
age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally;
and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided,
That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent
(50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children:
Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate,
legitimated children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children
shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their
absence, the dependent parents shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the
member. In the absence of all the foregoing, any other person designated
by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
It is clear that only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that
Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their
marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he filled out
the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of
marriages, it is required by R.A. No. 8282 to examine available statistical and
economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries pursuant
to Section 15 of the SS Law:
Sec. 15. Non-transferability of Benefits. – The SSS shall pay the benefits
provided for in this Act to such [x x x] persons as may be entitled thereto
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Settled is the rule that “whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law
should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.” As can be gleaned
from the certification issued by the NSO, there is no doubt that Edgardo married
Rosemarie in 1982. Edna cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Edgardo as
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
their marriage took place (in 1992) during the existence of a previously contracted
marriage.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly states:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Edna, without doubt,
failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was
already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. She did
not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo.
Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse
of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary
of the death benefits of Edgardo.
Susan Nicdao Cariño vs. Susan Yee Cariño (G.R. No. 132529, February 02,
2001)
FACTS: The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose "death
benefits" is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married.
The late Santiago contracted 2 marriages: 1. On 1969 with petitioner
Susan Nicdao, with whom he had 2 offsprings; and 2. On 1992 with respondent
Susan Yee, with whom he had no children.
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Santiago passed away on 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig, while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS and SSS. Susan
Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao
praying that the latter be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the
P146,000.00.
Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of,
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she
had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only
34

at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as
the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license, and
presented evidence to prove such fact.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent Susan Yee, which ruling was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the invalidity of the first marriage entitles the respondent (wife of
the second marriage) to the “death benefits”
RULING: No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
The marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
The presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that
their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license, which
petitioner failed to do.
However, it does not follow that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death benefits" under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
Under the law, one of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage
is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code on "Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage."
Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man:
"... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ..."
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in
the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI, NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-
ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim
the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" of the deceased shall
pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is
not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
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marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
35

children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong
to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by
either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and
will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and
the other did not contribute thereto.
Thus, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of
bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in
good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to
the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass, by intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
Bobis vs. Bobis (GR 138509, July 31, 2000)
FACTS: October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one
Maria Dulce. Without said marriage having been annulled, Isagani contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia. An information for bigamy was filed against Isagani
based on Imelda's complaint. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity
of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge
granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.
ISSUE: Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?
RULING: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of
the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential
elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not
for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of
the marriage.
Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage.
He was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question.
Respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that
an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming
that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into
a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity
of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would
render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A
party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
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Art. 41
Republic vs. Narceda (GR 182760, April 10, 2013)
FACTS: Robert and Marina Narceda contracted marriage on July 22, 1987. Marina
went to Singapore in 1994 and never returned. Robert tried to look for her but he
could not find her. Several years later, Robert was informed by a town mate in La
Union who came home from Singapore that his wife was already living with a
Singaporean husband.
In view of his wife’s absence and his desire to remarry, Robert filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for a declaration of presumptive death
and/or absence of Marina.
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The court then granted the petition in 2005. Petitioner appealed and claimed
that the respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with diligence
required by law and enough to give rise to a well-founded belief that his wife was
dead. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
judgment of the RTC in the summary proceeding is immediately final and executory.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition.
RULING: No. By express provision of the law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. It follows that no
appeal can be approved from trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
However, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in
the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTC’s and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
Art. 42
CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS (GR 187061, Oct 8, 2014)
FACTS: On 2007, the RTC declared petitioner Celerina presumptively dead after her
husband, respondent Ricardo had filed a petition for declaration of absence or
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. Ricardo remarried on
2008.hanrobleslaw
In his petition, Ricardo alleged that: a year after they had gotten married on
1980 they moved to Tarlac City where they were engaged in the buy and sell
business; their business did not prosper and because of Celerina's insistence, he
allowed her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong; she left Tarlac and was
never heard from again; he exerted efforts to locate Celerina; that it was almost 12
years from the date of his RTC petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had
passed away.
On the other hand, Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's
petition only sometime in 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.
On November 2008, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment before
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina claimed
that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic
helper abroad. it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was
aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left
the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. She was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead
November 2008, CA dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. The proper remedy was to file a
sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance
with Article 42 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of reappearance of a presumptively dead
spouse in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code is the proper remedy for a
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of
the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the
spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded
belief of the spouse's death. it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of
reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. It would also not be a
sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment
declaring her presumptive death. She insisted that an action for annulment of
judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the RTC’s judgment, order,
or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.
The Family Code provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:
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Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the
remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
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Yet, the filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of
the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when
he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Also, a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded
belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as
validly terminated.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage
but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, it is not the mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance but an
action for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy.
D. PROPERTY RELATIONS OF SPOUSES
Absolute Community Property System
What constitutes a community property (Article 92)
MUNOZ, JR. v. ERLINA RAMIREZ (GR 156125, August 25, 2010)
FACTS: Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to
the GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k). Thereafter, they used the money loaned to
construct a residential house on said lot.
It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter
used to pay the debt to GSIS. The balance of the loan (400k) will be delivered by
MUNOS upon surrender of the title over the property and an affidavit of waiver of
rights (over the property) to be executed by the husband. While the spouses were
able to turn over the title, no affidavit was signed by the husband. Consequently,
MUNOZ refused to give the 400k balance of the loan and since the spouses could no
longer return the 200k (which was already paid to GSIS), MUNOZ kept the title over
the property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own name.
The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the
property in favor of MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that the property was the wife’s exclusive
paraphernal property (since she inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is
valid even without the husband’s consent.
The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife, it became conjugal property when it was used as a
collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is
void.
ISSUE: Is the property paraphernal or conjugal?
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RULING: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule, all property acquired during the
marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In this case,
clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has sufficiently
rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential lot
is the wife’s exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC).
It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on
Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were married during the effectivity of the CC
and thus its provisions should govern their property relations. With the enactment
of the FC however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of gains
superseded those of the CC. Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and
not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which supersedes Article 158 of the
CC), when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the value are
more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement;
otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement.
In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k).
Thus, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is
considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the property
remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she contracted
with MUNOZ; the written consent of the husband was not necessary.
Charges upon and Obligations of ACP (Article 96)
Fuentes vs. Roca (G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010)
FACTS: Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to
her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later
in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes
(the Fuentes spouses). They met in the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom
they asked to prepare the documents of sale and signed an agreement to sell that
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Atty. Plagata prepared. It expressly stated that the sale was to take effect in six
months. Within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and
occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca
(Rosario), to the sale.
Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses
were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional pay besides the
downpayment, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the
house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the
Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and
payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then
worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to
see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.
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After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately
constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his
wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-
conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s
wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent
had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon
reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata
who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He
admitted, however,that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months
later. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was
personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive
period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband
Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?
2. Whether the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed?
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
action to annul that sale?
RULING:
1. No. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the
document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact
that she gave her consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render
the other issues merely academic. The SC agreed with the CA that the signature was
forged.
While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together
with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of
Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on
the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still
void without an authentic consent.
2. No. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case
is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in
1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11,
1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of
conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made
Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him
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from selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he
sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173
gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten
years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after
dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I
of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the
Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal
partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not
provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other
spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be
void.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or
inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule
applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the
case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. But,
although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it
aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This
action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold
without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not
erode the right to bring such an action.
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3. No. The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.As stated above,
that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they
passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs. Therefore, the heirs may
bring action to annul the sale.
Ownership and Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition
Consolacion Villanueva vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, Jesus
Bernas And Remedios Q. Bernas (G.R. No. 74577, December 4, 1990)
FACTS: Modesto and Frederico Aranas inherited Lot 13 from their parents,
Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa. Said lot was divided into a northern and
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southern portion (Lot 13-C) and was distributed between Frederico and Modesto,
respectively. Modesto had two illegitimate children names Dorothea Aranas Ado and
Teodoro C. Aranas. These two loaned from Jeusu Bernas an amount of P18,000.00
secured by Lot 13-C. A Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage was executed
between the siblings and Bernas wherein they described themselves as absolute co-
owners of Lot 13. Raymundo Aranas and Consolacion Villanueva signed the document
as witnesses.
About a month later, Villanueva and Aranas filed a complaint against Bernas
alleging that they be declared co-owners of the land based on the will of Victoria
Comorro bequeathing to Villanueva and Aranas all of Comorro’s “interests, rights and
properties, real and personal, x x as her net share from the conjugal partnership
property with her husband, Modesto Aranas x x.” Modesto Aranas’ will, on the other
hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro all his interests in his conjugal
partnership with Victoria “as well as his own capital property brought by him to his
marriage with his said wife.”
ISSUES: Whether Consolacion Villanueva has any right over Lot 13-C and the
improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria Camorro’s last will and
testament.
RULING: No. Lot 13-C was not part of the conjugal partnership property of Comorro
and Aranas. It was the latter’s exclusive, private property, which he had inherited
from his parents and registered solely in his name. It is inconsequential whether he
acquired the property subsequent to his marriage to Comorroo for Article 148 of the
Civil Code decrees that to be considered “the exclusive property of the spouse” is
inter alia, “that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own,” or “that which
each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title. Such is the case in Modesto’s
acquisition of Lot 13-C. Furthermore, the fact that Comorro died 2 years ahead of
Aranas clearly signifies that she never inherited anything from her husband.
To claim for the improvements thereon, proof is needful of the time of the
making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used
therefor in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. No such proof was presented by
Villanueva.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG) (Article 116)
WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES (G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012)
FACTS: Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29,
1980. Their marriage was declared null by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason
of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were acquired during
their marriage.
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BY PURCHASE:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, including a residential house constructed thereon
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, including a residential house
constructed thereon
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre
BY INHERITANCE:
a. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre(the area that appertains to
the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
b. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre(the area that appertains to
the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
The respondent averred that she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal
properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal
money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots
2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the
money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12 since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register
of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the
money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12 since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register
of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid.
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ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD: The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the
Philippines. However, there are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or
structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are
considered co-owned by the parties.
While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that
respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that
his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. The Court cannot,
even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase.
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A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests
no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Charges Upon and Obligations of CPG (Article 121-122)
AGUETE V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011)
PRINCIPLE: Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for annulment against
PNB before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00 from PNB
and as security, a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-9646
was executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the
lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the
mortgage constituted on the land which is part of
their conjugal property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the
proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to
the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their marriage
and within ten years from the transaction mentioned, may ask the court for
an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by PNB, Court of Appeals reversed this
ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded without adequate proof.
It also found that the loan was used in the expansion of the family business. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: How is the benefit to the family proven so as to render the loan contracted
by the husband binding upon the conjugal property?
RULING: If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract
falls within the term “x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
family is apparent at the signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Court denies the petition.
Annulment of the contract will only be granted upon a finding that the wife
did not give her consent to the transaction. Even as Aguete disavows the documents
supposedly acknowledged before the notary public, the document carries the
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evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due exececution. It has in
its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence
so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of
the certificate.
Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete’s signatures
were really forged.
In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business,
but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Debts contracted by the husband
for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed, such
may still be charged against the conjugal property of the spouses.
Pana vs. Heirs of Juanito (G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012)
FACTS: Petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and others were accused of
murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and
was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered
the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on
execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
Melecia.
ISSUE: Whether the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be
levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the
murder case.
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RULING: Article 22 provides, the payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to be
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Neither shall the fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be
enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the
murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in article 121 of the Family CCode have been
covered.
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admits of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42 acted
Administration of CPG (Article 124)
with grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents’ motion to dismiss. The
Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPS. ENRICO L. LINDO (G.R. No. 183984 APRIL
Procedure, a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
13, 2011)
action. But the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
FACTS: On October 31, 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores on
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing
December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of
the complaint for collection for sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna
RULING: The petition has merit.
issued three checks as partial payments for the loans. All checks were dishonored for
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a
insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of
mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.
Mortgage with Damages against respondents.
The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for
On September 30, 2003 the RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
collection of sum of money or instituting a real to foreclose on the mortgage
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC found that the Deed was executed by
security.
Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico noted that the Deed was executed
An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would
on 31 October 1995 while the SPA executed by Enrico was only dated 4 November
be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to
1995.
another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence
The RTC further that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from
of the parties. The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by
Edna as he could file a personal action against her.
itself.
However, the RTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the personal action
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate
which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the defendant resides.
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however it was denied for a lack of
foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be authorized plural redress for a single
merit.
breach of contract at so much costs to the court and with so much vexation and
On September 8, 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
oppressiveness to the debtor.
Damages. Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into
Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated that it only amounted to
consideration.
P340, 000. Also, respondents alleged that Enrico was not a party to the loan because
As the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the
it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature.
RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executor without
Hence, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that
improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping. On March 7, 2005, respondents
petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a
also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of
separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled
action.

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jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the
On July 22, 2005, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that res
loan.
judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action and were
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil
not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
Code which provides that, every person who through an act of performance by
February 8, 2006, however, such motion was denied and the RTC ruled that
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated its decision did not mean that petitioner could
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
no longer recover the loan petitioner extended to Edna.
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a
prevent one form enriching him at the expense of another without just cause or
Writ of Preliminary Injuction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of
consideration.
Appeals.
The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted
On May 30, 2008 the Court of Appeals set aside the July 22, 2005 and
obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without
February 8, 2006 Orders of the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that while the
just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first
general rule is that a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the rule
42

when she raised it as defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed
an action for declaratory relief before the
RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33
for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have
done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any
personal action that petitioner might have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust
enrichment being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on
multiplicity of suits.
Liquidation of CPG Assets and Liabilities (Article 129-130)
CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES (GR No. L-28771, 1971-03-
31)
PRINCIPLE: A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if
made between the spouses during the marriage.
When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant
on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet
married. At that time they were not spouses. They... became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been
executed
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the... same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship
FACTS: The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased
Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The
lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to
the donor, sustained the latter's stand. Hence... this appeal. The question, as noted,
is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it.
A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista,[2] by the then
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of
the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is
that a donation between common-law spouses falls... within the prohibition and is
"null and void as contrary to public policy."[3] Such a view merits fully the acceptance
of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
ISSUE: Whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage
applies to a common-law relationship.
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RULING: The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to
the disputed property.
Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and
the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, the other half.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing
the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void,
with the rights of plain-tiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in
question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate
disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
QUIAO V. QUIAO (G.R. No 176556, July 04, 2012)
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation
thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all
remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the
offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the
RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder
of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of
the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of
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the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article
129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution
of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in
the conjugal partnership– NO.
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3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the
same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.
RULING:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current
family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All
property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same
if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.
First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the
conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision
for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7)
of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to
due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the
wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property
each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage
(except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass
of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation ½
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share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the
children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife
place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and
her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger
of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that
the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.
The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court
found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2)
of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community
regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the
guilty party’s favor.
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROL vs. ESTER L.
SERVACIO and RITO B. GO (G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011)
FACTS: Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140
square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Twenty-three years
later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver whereby he
affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he,
who had purchased the two parcels of land.
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of
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Protacio, Sr. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by
Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square
meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00. The petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand.
After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and
Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the
annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable
law; and that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made
without prior liquidation.
Servacio and Rito both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the
sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally
44

allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any
rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was
within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio,
Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three
vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the
participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of
the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the
property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was
grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.
The RTC’s denial of their motion for reconsideration prompted the petitioners
to appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
ISSUE: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable.
RULING: The appeal lacks merit. Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article
105 of the Family Code
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 of Title IV
of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the
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dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void.
There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was
properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to
Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article
493 of the Civil Code.
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s
share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific
portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal
or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by
Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners
was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s
share. This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force
of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando
res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or
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for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person
who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] Thus,
it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale
merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-
heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.
45

Property Regime of Unions without Marriage (Arts. 147-148)
VIRGINIA OCAMPO v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO (G.R. No. 198908, August 03,
2015)
FACTS: Petitioner Virginia filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage
with Deogracio before RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court rendered a Decision4 declaring the marriage between Virginia
and Deogracio as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. The status of
their children, however, shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby awarded
to the petitioner. The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment
annulling the marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of
partition of their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be
held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a
project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties
adduced evidence in support of their respective stand.
The trial court rendered the assailed Order 6 stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court and Deogracio filed a
Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of Appeal and for immediate execution
pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-10 on February 13 and 20, 2004
respectively. But the same was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
RULING: The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage but without the benefit of
marriage or whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 states
that their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on CO-OWNERSHIP.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of Article 147, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the
property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses." Since as a rule,
even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s] care of the
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household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled
to a share in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or properties
acquired by the marriage.
Petitioner's claim that the seed money was provided by her mother and
had it not been for that the properties could not have been acquired. The Court is
not prone to believe because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but
petitioner's self-serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as
an irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as family man were made but the
testimonies adduced failed to fully convince the Court that respondent should be
punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his
indiscretion.
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR. v. SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE
ABUDA (G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013)
FACTS: In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto
Sr. who was married to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of
herein petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if
she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also
married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the death of his previous
wife. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila,
while the remaining portion was purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf
(Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had small business
establishments located in Delpan St., Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban was
diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline.
Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999.
When Leonora, petitioner’s mother, discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they
filed a petition for annulment of the sale, claiming that petitioner is entitled to a
right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on the
other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her
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heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and
respondents.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties
were not conjugal properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision,
applying Article 148 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the
subject properties.
RULING: No. In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to
marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the
subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the
parties.
46

It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. This
is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered
common property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and
Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the
parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property
shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after
the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of
legal age, married to Socorro Torres."
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The
phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does
not show that Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record also shows
that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to
Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the
marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not
vest title.
As correctly pointed out by the CA. settled is the rule that in civil cases, the
burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. Here it is Appellant who is duty
bound to prove that Socorro contributed funds for the acquisition of the properties
which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do. Hence, Socorro cannot be considered a
co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA (G.R. No. 171914, July
23, 2014)
FACTS: ATTY. LUNA, initially married in a civil ceremony on September 10, 1947
herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), with whom they
begot seven children, one of which is Gregorio Luna, one of the respondents herein.
ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into
a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
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SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately
and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with EUGENIA from the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic and on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another
marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
During their cohabitation, some properties were acquired by ATTY LUNA
under his name and which became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD
against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on
September 10, 1999: 1) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit at the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project; 2) the
law books, office furniture and equipment found therein.
Said properties were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage which led to petitioner’s filing of the complaint.
The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during
the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their
joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the
said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage.
2. Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the
petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
RULING: 1. No. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time
of his death.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time
of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality
rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
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legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although
living abroad
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10,
1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between
Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the
spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the
first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule,
47

however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his
death on July 12, 1997. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. No. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties
acquired during their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void
for being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being
void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of
proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and
competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not
discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being
evidence, did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired
the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be
justly concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal
partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of
the pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law books
pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
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III. FAMILY
A. FAMILY AND FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA v. SPOUSES
RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN (GR 178288, 15 August 2012)
FACTS: Sps. Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from Sps. Rolando and
Amparo Lapitan in the amount of P1.2M subject to 34% interest per annum. As
security, Sps. Fortaleza executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their
residential house & lot in Barrio Anos, Los Baños, Laguna. When Sps. Fortaleza
failed to pay their indebtedness including interests and penalties, the creditors
Lapitan applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City.
At the auction sale, the creditor’s son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona
emerged as the highest bidders at the amount ofP2.5M. They were then issued a
Certificate of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and
annotated at the back of the TCT. The one-year redemption period expired without
the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Spouses Raul and Rona Lapitan
executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and caused the cancellation of
the TCT held by Sps. Fortaleza and the registration of the subject property in their
names under a new TCT. Despite the foregoing, Sps. Fortaleza refused the Sps.
Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the property.
Sps. Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession with RTC, Br35 of Calamba City, alleging thatas new registered owners
of the subject property, they were entitled to its possession. Sps. Fortaleza
questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They
argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal
amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest.
RTC: Ordered issuance of a writ of possession ministerial duty of the court
since the redemption period had expired & a new title had already been issued in
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the name of Sps. Lapitan.
Sps. Fortaleza’s MR: Subject property is their family home and is exempt
from foreclosure sale. MR denied. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed RTC
Ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the subject property is a family home exempt from forced sale.
RULING: No. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment. However, Article 155(3) ofthe Family Code explicitly allows the forced
sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or
after such constitution.”
In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily
executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
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subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of
record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale,
spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption
from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.
As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals: While it is true that the family
home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party
from later claiming the exemption.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not
mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to
redeem the property.
The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to
redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse from
the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all
intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their
right of redemption. Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in
favor of the original owner of the property, we cannot apply the privilege of liberality
to accommodate the Sps. Fortaleza due to their negligence or omission to exercise
the right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA vs. SPOUSES
CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO
L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS (G.R. No. 185064, January 16,
2012)
PRINCIPLES/RULES on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption
from execution:
1. Family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
2. Family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution
from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
3. Family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are
considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it
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must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the
property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must
be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS: Araceli De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa purchased a parcel of land in
Meycauayan Bulacan and constructed a house thereon. They occupied said
property after their marriage sometime January 1987.
A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from
Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land
and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan.
When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because
the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However,
Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22
in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to
pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy the
said property.
The house and lot was sold in a public auction and Acero was the
highest bidder. Consequently, a new title was issued to Acero after the issuance of
a final certificate of sale.
Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for
several years. An ejectment case was filed against Oliva who then contended that
the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s
complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject
property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the
property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject
property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment
was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff,
the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy
of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero.
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Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property is a family home, which is
exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been
validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed
the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to
execution in this case.
RULING: Yes, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In
general, the family home is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming
this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
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For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made
as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must
be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code
or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially
or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to
be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus
exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January
1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however,
that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The
petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a
family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have
been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it
was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the
exemption of the property from execution.
ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO vs. PATERNO C. BELL,
SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-BELL, PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE
FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PATERNO FERDINAND BELL III, AND PATERNO
BENERAÑO BELL IV (G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160,
petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual
value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property
introduced by the persons constituting... the family home, its owners or any of its
beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.
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FACTS: Respondents the Bell siblings are the unmarried children of respondent
Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Sps. Bell). In 1995, the Bell
siblings lodged a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the (RTC) of
Batangas City for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios).
The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses
Bell over their residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title
obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed. The RTC granted respondents'
prayers and ordered the Register of Deeds of Batangas City to cancel TCT in the
name of defendants the Eulogios and to reconstitute TCT as "family home" of
the plaintiffs the Bell siblings and Sps. Bell. However RTC declared Spouses Bell
liable to petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12% interest per annum. On 9
June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents'
property covered by the newly reconstituted TCT was levied on execution. Upon
motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of
the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family home. RTC
issued on 25 November 2004 an Order directing the issuance of a writ of
execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition
with an urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA
docketed as87531. CA eventually enjoined the execution. On 09 February 2009,
the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article
160 of the Family Code.
RULING: No. Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as
expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of
the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead - the
dwelling place. A... houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy,
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industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity,
not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under
which it has been gathered and sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by
creditors except in special cases.
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be
exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is
limited to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the
statute; the exemption cannot exceed the... statutory limit.
Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned
in Article 153, to wit:
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
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(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of
the building.
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article
155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article
157, he may apply to the court... which rendered the judgment for an order directing
the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of
the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value... exceeds the maximum
allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or
owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure
shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall
be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article
157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any,
shall be delivered to the... judgment debtor.
Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time
of its constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas,
and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may
hereafter be fixed by... law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the
value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of
evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered
cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for
chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas.
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced
sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas,
unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those
amounts do not match the present value... of the peso because of currency
fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most
favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits
can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155...
and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the
persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the
actual value of the property at... the time of its constitution has been determined to
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fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not
result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.
Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a... forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155
and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article
160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its
actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the
property introduced by the persons constituting... the family home, its owners or
any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum
allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much
less proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale,
but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null,
and that the actual transaction was an... equitable mortgage. Evidently, when
petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated
therein was not the actual value of the property in dispute.
The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution of the
property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court had already determined with
finality that the property was a family home, and... there was no proof that its
value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by
respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property. There is grave
abuse of discretion when one acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner... in the exercise of one's judgment, as in this case in which the assailed
order is bereft of any factual or legal justification.
B. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
ANTONIO PERLA v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA (G.R. No.
172471, Nov. 12, 2012)
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FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio)
were allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol
became pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured her that he would support her.
However, Antonio started to evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the
RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that
Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys
Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as
parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information
in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support
Randy, which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?
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HELD: No. Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged
illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his
filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for support
may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives
of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate
filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy
have no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had
not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the
veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT (G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015)
FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses)
died, intestate and without debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of land
(herein subject properties).
Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat, alleging that
petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he
(petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected
that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed
affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds
of Bacolod and Bago, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of
second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,which respondent opposed;
and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two
missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for
mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the
owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the
Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a
natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon
the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate
as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her
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for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of
counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following documents,
among others:
1. His school records , wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s
parent;
2. His Individual Income Tax Return , which indicated that Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar is his mother;
3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 ), a public
instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his
employment , which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that
petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment, indicating that
petitioner is his son;
5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan, where it is declared that
the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary addressed to a BMMC supervisor introducing
petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to the effect that the
record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were "all destroyed by
nature," hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could
be issued as requested (Exhibit "Q").
RTC ruled that there was no solid evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein
is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was
a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological
relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC’s Resolution, the
CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in]
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not taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit "G" (SSS E-1 acknowledged and
notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the
petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article
172 of the [Family] Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the
petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
RULING: Yes. This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held
that –The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
52

laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code , the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth
since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of
Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other
documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") – to
prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first
paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
no further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the
Court has further held that:
..the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement
of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:
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1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child
shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3 – (1) In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."
As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his
legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to
impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code, the Court has held before that -Article 26331 refers to an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a
man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not
a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the
Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then
left with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate, since
succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line.
Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the
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petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.
VIRGINIA OCAMPO vs. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO (G.R. No. 198908 August 3,
2015)
FACTS: On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the
marriage between Virginia and Deogracio Ocampo as null and void from the
beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code (on the ground of psychological
incapacity).
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project
of partition of their inventoried properties. Having failed to agree on a project of
partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued and the trial court rendered
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the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to each
one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
RULING: No. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage but without the
benefit of marriage or whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147
states that their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on CO-OWNERSHIP.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of Article 147, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the
property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses." Since as a rule,
even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s] care of the
household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to a
share in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or properties acquired
by the marriage.
Petitioner's claim that the seed money was provided by her mother and had
it not been for that the properties could not have been acquired. The Court is not
prone to believe because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but
petitioner's self-serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an
irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as family man were made but the
testimonies adduced failed to fully convince the Court that respondent should be
punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his
indiscretion.
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS (G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011)
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college
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diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with
a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment
manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons
should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and
Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case
for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case
and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects
for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima
facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the
grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering
that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse
failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had
been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has
failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a
DNA testing order
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RULING: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-
vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been
filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is
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herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that
are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that
the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological
sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a
DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not
mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there
must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
“good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must
be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order
for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
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the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO (G.R. No. 206248, February 18,
2014)
FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children.
This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar
to cause the entry of the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned
minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the
correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental
authority over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over
the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her
motion was denied by the trial court.
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Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error
on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of
the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the
surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of
live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver
the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grande’s
consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of
the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors,
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taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause,
compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial
motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it
decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was
denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
RULING: The petition is partially granted. Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally
phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname
of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or
change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public
document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a
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judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children's surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use
the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free
from any interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors
to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in
the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
V. SUPPORT
LIM-LUA vs. LUA (G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013)
FACTS: On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. In her prayer
for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount of ₱500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings
from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
RTC stated that support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said
support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also
granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support
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considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their
children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance
and well-being in accordance with the family’s social and financial standing.
Further, respondent found the amount to be unconscionable and beyond the
intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. But
such motion for reconsideration was denied.
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA nullified the RTC’s ruling and
reduced the amount to P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by
both parties. The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s
compliance with the CA’s decision indicated that he deducted from the total
amount in arrears the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two
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cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to the petitioner
and his children.
CA ruled in favor of the husband stating that the expenses already incurred
by him be considered as advances which may be properly deducted from the support
in arrears. Thus, ordered the deduction of the amount of Ph₱2,482,348.16 plus
946,465.64, or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of
Danilo to his wife and their two children. The appellate court said that the trial court
should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees,
travel expenses, and the credit card purchases, which certainly inured to the benefit
not only of the two children, but their mother as well. It held that respondent’s act of
deferring the monthly support was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and
justifiable reasons. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be
deducted from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children.
RULING: The Supreme Court partly granted the petition. Petitioner argues that it
was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the
two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are
not indispensable to the sustenance of the family. Respondent, on the other hand,
contends that disallowing the deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus
making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the children
resided in one residence, the groceries purchased using respondent’s credit card were
not consumed by the children alone but shared with their mother. As to the cars
which respondent bought, these, too, are to be considered advances for support, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being
children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, they had never in their
entire life commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat at "carinderias".
Hence, the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to the children’s day-to-day
living, the value of which were properly deducted from the arrearages in support
pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage
and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court,
motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment. Because of its provisional
nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the
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kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the
application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. In this case, the amount of
monthly support pendente lite was determined after due hearing and submission of
documentary evidence by the parties. It is clear that the monthly support pendente
lite of ₱115,000.00 was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children, e.g., food, clothing, etc. Since the amount of support was not appealed
by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness.
The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in
arrears.
The following are US rulings used by the SC: In Bradford v.
Futrell, appellant complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should
have been allowed full credit for all money and items given by him to the children
themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The CA of Maryland ruled
that to determine the amount of arrears due, appellant was not entitled to credit
for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit an
automobile or television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in
the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid
directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of finding of consent by the mother, courts refuse to allow
a husband to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support payments
when the mode of payment is fixed by the court. Thus he will not be credited for
payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and
made payments direct to the children of his own accord. The payments to the
children do not appear to have been made as payments upon alimony, but were
rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. The
general rule is that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the
mother money for the support of their children and the unpaid and accrued
installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot claim credit on account of
payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However, special considerations
of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his
indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her.
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Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred
by respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite.
The monthly support pendente lite granted was intended primarily for food and
household expenses. Hence, the deduction of the value of the cars plus their
maintenance cost, and purchases through credit card of items other than groceries
and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to
the judgment awarding support pendente lite. The deductions should be limited to
those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts.
The amounts already extended to the 2 children, being a commendable
act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial
resources at his disposal. Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent
may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner
and her children: (1) Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua - 42,450.71; (2) Dental
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Expenses of Daniel Ryan - 11,500.00; (3) Credit card purchases of Angelli -
365,282.20; and Groceries and Dry Goods - 228,869.38, or a total of Php 648,102.29.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate
income on her own because she presently maintains a boutique and at the same time
engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two children have
finished their education and are now employed in the family business earning their
own salaries. Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support
should be submitted to the trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity of
marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be
reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support. Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a
needy party is entitled to support; his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver.
It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED.
CALDERON vs. ROXAS and CA (G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013)
FACTS: Petitioner Calderon and private respondent Roxas were married on
December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s
application for support pendente lite. Private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce
Support citing that the P42,292.50 monthly support as fixed by the court was even
higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor. The trial court
issued an Order dated March 7, 2005 granting the motion to reduce support and
denying petitioner’s motion for spousal support, increase of the children’s monthly
support pendente lite and support-in-arrears. Petitioner’s motion for partial
reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005. On May 16,
2005, the trial court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage null and void,
awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner, ordering respondent to
provide support to the children, and dissolving the community property or conjugal
partnership property of the parties.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the Orders dated March 7, 2005 and
May 4, 2005. Petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the Decision dated May
16, 2005 which had become final as no appeal had been brought by the parties,
rather her appeal is "from the Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the
rendition of the decision in the main case", as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying
her motion for partial reconsideration. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground
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that granting the appeal would disturb the Decision of May 16, 2005 which had
long become final and executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to
avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders on the matter
of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
RULING: The Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final
orders. A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Conversely, an
order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task
of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities
as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done
by the Court, is "interlocutory". Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is
appealable; an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only
as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
rendered in the case.
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and
support in arrears were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They
did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the
merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other
incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory
aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to
reduce support which was granted, and to her own motion to increase support,
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which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears which
have remained unpaid were in the nature of final orders assailable by ordinary
appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 61 of
the Rules of Court can apply only prospectively. Thus, from the moment the
accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which the
amounts were made payable by private respondent have ceased to be provisional
and have become final.
We disagree. An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters
and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. In
contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action
or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same
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action. Clearly, whether an order is final or interlocutory is not dependent on
compliance or non-compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests.
It is important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed
orders.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente
lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order. Provisional remedies
are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be
resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein
pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the
case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of
during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere
incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The subject orders
on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Private respondent’s obligation to give monthly support may be enforced by
the court itself, as what transpired when the court cited the private respondent in
contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the
order granting support pendente lite. A few years later, private respondent filed a
motion to reduce support while petitioner filed a motion to increase the same, and in
addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact underscores the
provisional character of the order granting support pendente lite. Petitioner’s theory
that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred
by private respondent is therefore untenable.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal from
interlocutory orders is not allowed. The remedy against an interlocutory order not
subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that
the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the interlocutory
orders, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA. WHEREFORE, the
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
VI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Uy vs. Spouses Lacsamana (G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015)
DOCTRINE: Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent
any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
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Properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is
proof to the contrary.
FACTS: Uy filed with RTC Batangas a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents with Damages against Petra Rosca and Sps. Lacsamana. Uy alleged
that he was the lawful husband of Rosca, living together as husband and wife from
1944 until 1973 (29 years) when they separated because of Uy’s alleged affair.
They had 8 children.
Subject of this case is a piece of residential land Rosca bought from Sps.
Manuel. This property, together with the house Rosca built, was then subsequently
sold to Sps. Lacsamana. Uy alleged that the property which is part of the sale of
Rosca to Sps. Lacsamana was void for failure to obtain his marital consent, the
property being conjugal in nature.
Uy then filed a complaint, praying that the Deed of Sale (executed by
Rosca in favor of Sps. Lacsamana) be declared null and void with respect to his
rights, interest, and ownership. Rosca’s defense was the purchase of land was
from her paraphernal funds and that she was never married to Uy.
Upon Uy’s death, his 2 daughters substituted him. Upon Sps. Lacsamana’s
sale of the property to Buena, both Rosca and Sps. Lacsamana were substituted by
Buena.
RTC decided that there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca. The
Deed of Sale by Rosca in favor of Sps. Lacsamana was valid. CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling. It further denied Uy’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy’s
consent, in favor of Sps. Lacsamana, is valid
RULING: Yes. The Deed of Sale was valid.
Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by
Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a
presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
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marriage."Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and
overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda
v. Trias, we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of
the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the
solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. Documentary evidence may also be shown.
Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he
could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the
municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the
RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually
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married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and
Rosca were not legally married to each other.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and
wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married
to her because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this
Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent
any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus
probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of
plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became
necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were
legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca,
their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which
applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-
owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and
appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-
owned but is paraphernal.
Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan (G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013)
FACTS: Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage. Benjamin alleged that he
married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely,
Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan
(Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by
Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America.
In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s
father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father,
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and
Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired real properties.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for
bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court
on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of
the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of
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the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial
court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition,
Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial court ruled that the
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage
with Azucena. Furthermore, the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of
a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court
did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because
they were not parties to the case.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim
the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with
Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. The
trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that
Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal of Sally. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. Sally moved
for the reconsideration of the CA’s decision but was later on denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was void for
not having a marriage license
2. Whether or not Article 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property
relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by petitioner
RULING:
1. Yes. The marriage between Sally and Benjamin was null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
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expect those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be
void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Sally and
Benjamin was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between them was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules or void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.” Thus, the CA did not err in sustaining the trial
court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.
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2. Yes. The property relations of Benjamin and Sally are governed by Article
148.
Article 148 of the Family Code states that:
In case of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules of forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the RTC and CA correctly excluded the 37
properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his
children as advance in inheritance.
As regards the seven remaining properties, the decision of the CA is more in accord
with evidence on record. The words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses,
there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
3. No. There was no bigamy committed.
It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there
being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on
the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of
license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.
In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed and purported a marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2019-2020
GEOFFREY BECKETT vs. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013)
FACTS: Geoffrey Beckett (Australian) was previously married to Eltesa Densing
Beckett (Filipina). Out of the marriage was born their son, Geoffrey, Jr.
They eventually separated and sued each other. Eltesa filed a case for
violation of the VAWC Act and a suit for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. While Geoffrey commenced criminal charges against Eltesa for adultery.
Both cases ended in the sala of respondent Judge Sarmiento.
A judgment was rendered based on a compromised agreement. Eltesa
and Geoffrey agreed to cause the dismissal of all pending civil and criminal cases
against each other and categorically agreed that Geoffrey shall have full and
permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject to the
visitorial rights of Eltesa.
Beckett left for Australia but in the years to come they would come and
see Eltesa in Cebu every Christmas. Eventually, Beckett obtained a divorce from
Eltesa in Australia.
In the 2010 visit, Beckett consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with
Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011.
January 9 came and went but Geoffrey, Jr. remained with Eltesa prompting
Beckett to file a petition against Eltesa for violation of VAWC.
Geoffrey also later applied for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
During conference on the application for habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then 9
years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying,
not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a total
stranger.
Despite this Judge Sarmiento issued the March 1, 2011 Order which
ordered (1) Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey; and (2) Geoffrey to bring the
child in the pre-trial conference. But for some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr.
to Beckett did not materialize.
On March 15, 2011, Geoffrey alleged that while waiting for the pre-trial
conference to start, he saw one Helen Sy, purportedly a close friend of Eltesa,
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enter Judge Sarmiento’s chambers. Then, during the conference itself, Eltesa
moved for the reconsideration of the court’s March 1, 2011 Order, praying that it
be set aside insofar as it directed her to return the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to
George.
Judge Sarmiento, in open court, issued another order giving Eltesa
provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. and directing the DSWD to conduct a social
case study on the child. (March 15, 2011 Order)
Weeks later, Geoffrey moved for MR of the March 15, 2011 Order which
granted provisional custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on
compromise agreement. He also alleged that Judge Sarmiento conversed with
Eltesa in Cebuano, a dialect which neither the former nor his counsel understood,
and which they (respondent and Eltesa) persisted on using despite requests that
they communicate in English or Filipino.
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His MR was left unheeded and several hearings on the case were postponed
because of the belated submission by the DSWD of the case study report requested
by respondent Judge.
Thus, the instant complaint, alleging that Judge Sarmiento is liable for (1)
gross ignorance of the law for granting Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey Jr.;
and (2) partiality by committing acts of serious misconduct and irregularities in the
performance of official duties.
OCA found the complaint meritorious insofar as the charges for gross
ignorance of the law is concerned given that respondent Judge issued his March 15,
2011 Order granting provisional custody in favor of Eltesa despite the existence of
the judicial compromise. OCA recommended he be given stern warning.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
granting custody of the child to Eltesa despite the existence of the judicial
compromise.

RULING: No. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-
settled rule is that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already 7
years of age, the child’s choice as to which parents he prefers shall be respected,
unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Further, in all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
A custody agreement can never be regarded as a “permanent and
unbending”, such that agreement would no longer be to the child’s best interest.
Thus, Judge Sarmiento is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law in granting
the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa.

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