1. RAUL SESBREÑO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

117438, 8 June 1995

Facts:
Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of Cebu for reinstatement and
back wages. They signed 2 documents whereby the employees agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as
attorney’s fees and 20% expenses to be taken from their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor the employees and fixed Atty. Sesbreno’s attorney’s fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave,
gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies paid to the
employees. The court later on modified the attorney’s fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the CA, which
decided that the attorney’s fees should be reduced to 20% of the back salaries awarded to the employees.
Atty. Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the ground that attorney’s fees amounting to 50% of all monies awarded
to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with prevailing case law and the
contract of professional services between the parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded
to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by the client

Held:
Yes! The CA has the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees. A lawyer may charge and receive
as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial control. In the case at bar, the parties entered into a contingent
fee contract, wherein Atty. Sesbreno will get 50% from the employees money claims if they will win the case.
However, the court finds the 50% fee as unconscionable. Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable
whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to
amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. Contingent fee contracts are under the supervision and close
scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The court held that a fee of
20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement.

2. Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

Facts:
Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty. Gonzales agreed to pay all
expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in litigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados is valid

Held:
No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados. However,
the agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses
of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be
subject to reimbursement. The agreement between Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not provide for
reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney
agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are
against public policy. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer
and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

3. GAMILLA v MARINO, AM No. 4763, March 20, 2003

Facts:
Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST Faculty Union. There’s a long history of collective
bargaining agreement between UST and UST Faculty Union. During the series of agreements between UST
and the UST Faculty Union, Atty. Marino was removed from his position but continued to serve as a lawyer
for the UST Faculty Union. In the end, the UST Faculty won and was awarded 42 million pesos for back
wages, salaries, additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of the UST Faculty Union
questioning the lack of transparency in the disbursement of the monetary benefits (42M) for the faculty
members, and prays for the expulsion of Atty. Marino for failure to account for the balance of 42M ceded to
them by UST and the attorney’s fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from the benefits allotted to
faculty members.
Issue:
Whether or not the 4.2M attorney’s fees is proportionate to the legal services rendered by Atty. Marino

Held:
No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear
differentiation between his legal services and his tasks union president comprising in all probity the same
duties for which he has collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there was
lack of notice and transparency in Atty. Marino’s dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty Union when
he obtained 4.2M as attorney’s fees. A simple accounting of the money that he and others concerned
received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have enlightened the
faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondent’s part and guided them to look
for alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to
punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the
public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our
goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent,
a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action. Hence, Atty. Mariño is admonished to
refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests,
and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially
observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client.

4. Pineda vs De Jesus, GR No. 155224, August 23, 2006

Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora proposed a
settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of properties which was accepted by Vinson.
Settlement was approved by the trial court and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they still billed petitioner
additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid
P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a total of P2M.

Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?

Held:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of the main action. RTC has
jurisdiction.
The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the properties awarded
to Vinson. What respondents were demanding was additional payment for service rendered in the same
case.
The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by quantum meruit.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients
concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort
to it.
In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by respondents. It was an act
of unconscionable greed!

5. Roxas vs De Zuzuarregui – GR No 152072, January 31, 2006

Facts:
The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to
represent them in the case. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement, wherein it was contained that the
attorneys would endeavor to secure just compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a
price of 11pesos or more per square meter, and that any lower amount shall not entitle them to any atty’s
fees. They also stipulated that in the event they get it for 11pesos per square meter, their contingent fee shall
be 30% of the just compensation. They also stipulated that their lawyer’s fees shall be in proportion to the
cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation.
[…]
A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA. The Compromise
Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would
be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC,
approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis
amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turned over to the
Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation,
although this amount is bigger) in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis
was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was
P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds
paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal
action.

Issue:
The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in holding that the letter-agreement
re: contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand as the law between the parties

Held:
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to
the other, to give something or to render some service. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The
Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the
Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters
which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was forced
into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents were admitted by
the Zuzuarreguis themselves.
In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same
becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception – that the stipulations
therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their
professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They
are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances
of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to
reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. It
becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character
of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent
(44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an
amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown
hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably,
unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced.
In the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the
P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided
between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must
be pro rata. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for
they would still be earning or actually earned attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no direct
showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not
per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable, which
we have already done.

6. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan vs CA, GR No. 169298, July 9, 2008

Facts:
Ingcos hired the petitioner law firm to enforce delivery of a land title. Complaint was filed by the law firm
in behalf of the Ingcos before the HLURB against Villa Crista alleging that the Ingcos had paid P5.1M for a
lot but Villa Crista failed to deliver the title thereto. The Ingcos and Villa Crista entered into a compromise
whereby the latter was bound to refund P4.8M provided that in case of breach of such obligation, an additional
P200k would be paid by way of liquidated damages.
Villa Crista failed to pay. Writ of execution issued. Sheriff levied and auctioned 10 lots belonging to Villa
Crista. The Ingcos bought 3 lots, the payment of which includes P5.1M contract price for the initial lot they
primarily bought, P1.35M attorney’s fees and other expenses. The Ingcos then terminated the services of the
law firm.
The law firm filed with the HLURB to recover 25% of the excess of the existing prevailing selling price or
the fair market value of the 3 lots. It also filed for damages in the RTC.
The law firm argued that the spouses still owed P4.5M; that in their contract the law firm was entitled to
25% of the excess of the total bid price.
HLURB arbiter ruled for the law firm. HLURHB Board reversed. The Office of the President reversed,
affirming the HLURB arbiter’s decision. CA reversed the OP.

Held:
SC ruled that the lawyers are not entitled to additional fees. The spouses acquired the 3 lots as the
highest bidder at the auction sale. It can be said that the lots had been acquired not through the recovery
efforts of the law firm.
Moreover, during the negotiations with Villa Crista, it was Renato Ingco who was actually negotiating,
not the lawyers.
When the auction sale was made, the attorney-client relationship no longer existed, hence the lawyers
are not entitled to the additional fees.

7. Regala vs Sandiganbayan, GR No 105938, September 20, 1996

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the
Presidential Commission on Good Gov’t (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corps.
in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S.
Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA)
Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these
services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings.
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative
to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA
Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco
from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant, Roco having promised he’ll reveal the identity
of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case # 33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed, conspired &
confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate
framework & structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more
than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means &
machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their participation in the
acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering
 Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying
the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG exclude them as
parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the same
conditions precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didn’t refute petitioners' contention that he
did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to
reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ the conditions
required by PCGG. It held, “ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts
until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the
client.”
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he filed a separate petition for
certiorari, assailing SB’s resolution on essentially same grounds averred by petitioners, namely:
SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application of the law of agency.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus,
deserving equal treatment
SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested
by the PCGG.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of partydefendants be based on
reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to constitutional rts of petitioners
PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of
the client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.

RULING (pulled out only the pertinent sections ): WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS
PETITIONERS FROM REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR CLIENT(S) & THE OTHER INFORMATION
REQUESTED BY THE PCGG

YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance
could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person
who requested him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-
lessee
An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and
confidence reposed on him by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an
officer of the Court & exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his
client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe
life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and
public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice.
Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court, Rule 130:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which
has been acquired in such capacity.
 Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.”) Canon 15, CPE also demands a lawyer's
fidelity to client.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists
between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. Thus, the Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.
The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity
of his client.
Reasons advanced for the general rule:
 Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood.
 Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.
 Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationship
 Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary.

Exceptions to the gen. rule: Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

8. Pfleider vs Palanca – AC No. 927, September 28, 1970

Facts:
Palanca was the legal counsel of Pfleider. Pfleider leased an agricultural land to Palanca known as
Hacienda Asia. Pfleider filed a civil suit against Palanca for rescission of the lease contract for defaulting in
rental payments. He also filed this administrative complaint of gross misconduct against Palanca. Pfleider
alleged that in a criminal case for estafa filed against him in which Palanca was his counsel, the latter sought
to negotiate the dismissal of the complaint. Pfleider alleged that Palanca informed him through letters that he
had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the complaint and that he had deposited P5k with the court.

Issue:
W/N Palanca was guilty of gross misconduct?
W/N the filing of the civil suit for the rescission of the lease contract terminated the attorney-client
relationship?

Held:
Palanca was not guilty of gross misconduct. The letters relied upon by Pfleider did not show that Palanca
stated that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Pfleider.
The civil suit for rescission terminated the attorney-client relationship. While the object of the suit was
the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became incompatible with the mutual confidence
and trust essential to every attorney-client relationship.

9. Mercado vs Vitriolo – AC No. 5108, May 26, 2005

Facts:
Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for annulment of marriage filed by the latter’s husband.
Vitriolo filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents against Mercado alleging that the latter
made false entries in the certificates of live birth of her children which were presented in the annulment case.
Mercado filed this complaint alleging that due to the criminal case filed against her by Vitriolo, information
relating to her civil case for annulment was divulged. Hence, Vitriolo breached the privilege and confidence
reposed within a lawyer-client relationship. Mercado prayed the Vitriolo be disbarred.

Issue:
W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a
criminal case against his former client?

Held:
 SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the communication privilege
between an attorney and his client.
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
The client made the communication in confidence.
The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on record fails to substantiate Mercado’s
allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged communication. all her claims were couched in general
terms and lacked specificity.

10. Genato vs Silapan – AC No 4078, July 14, 2003

Facts:
Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genato’s building. Atty. Silapan handled some of Genato’s
cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a car. Atty. Silapan bought the car,
and issued a postdated check to Genato. The check was dishonored.
Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he alleged that Genato was in
the business of “buying an selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals” and
that he was also involved in bribery cases.
Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship.

Issue:
Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?

Held:
No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him,
especially with privileged communication – the protection is only limited to communications which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those
made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense.
However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan’s rights as they were not
pertinent to the case. It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were not the subject matter
of litigation at hand. His professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said case.
A lawyer must conduct himself with integrity.
He is therefore suspended for 6 months.

11. Hadjula vs Madianda – AC No. 6711, July 3, 2007

Facts:
Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed confidential
information during that period. However, after the confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty.
Madianda referred her to another lawyer.
Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to
hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for
falsification of public documents and immorality – using the disclosures as basis for the charges.

Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?

Held:
Reprimanded.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept the information secret
and confidential, under the attorney-client privilege rule.
However, the seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that
she was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a
negative sentiment, she was violating the rule of confidentiality.
 12. Rebecca Palm vs Atty. Felipe Iledan Jr., AC No. 8242, October 2, 2009

Facts:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a case of
disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’
meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the
corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client
privilege of confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad who
was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.

Issue:
Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?

Held:
No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have been given
to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of
new by-laws may be effected by “the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners
of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock
corporation.”It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. Further,
whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-
laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of
incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments
must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be
filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure
made by respondent during the stockholders’ meeting could not be considered a violation of his client’s
secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by
Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its
former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any
confidential information acquired while he was still Comtech’s retained counsel. Further, respondent made
the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty
to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.
The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters
that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated

13. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club vs CA – GR No. L-11724, November 23, 1959

Facts:
Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During the pendency of the case, Wack-wack wanted
to change their counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz to the Law Office of Juan Chudian.
During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their original counsels showed up, so Arcangel was
allowed to present his evidence without Wack-wack. The court awarded judgment to Arcangel. The law firm
of Chuidian then filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding. This petition
was denied by the lower court. Wack-wack assails the denial of the petition.
It has to be taken note of that the court did not know of the change of counsel because Chudian only
entered his appearance after the judgment was rendered against Wack-wack.

Issue: Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to set aside the judgment?

Held:
Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz must have known that, its impending relief
as counself for the defendant notwithstanding, it is still under obligation to protect the client’s interest until its
final release from the professional relationship with such client. The court could recognize no other
representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is
effected.
 Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach regarding the
presentation of the client’s case in court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in court cannot be made
to depend on them.

14. Venterez vs Cosme – AC No. 7421, October 10, 2007

Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court rule against Venterez
and friends. They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so.
Because of this, Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the MR.
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that he was withdrawing the
case from him because he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme
explained that he even turned over the records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to be counsel any
longer.

Issue: Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case?

Held:
Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attornery who undertakes an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its termination – that is, until the case becomes final and executory. Any dereliction of
duty affects the client.
The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosme’s defense that he had already withdrawn from the case. A
lawyer may retire at any time with the written consent of his client fileed in court and with a copy thereof
served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application
with the court. The application must be based on a good case.
What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22.
There was no proper revocation in this case. He is suspended for 3 months.

15. Santero vs Vance – GR No. L-61700, September 14, 1987

Facts:
Santeco got Atty. Avance to handle a case for her in a civil suit. She paid her P12,000 as acceptance
money. Losing in the first instance, Atty. Avance made representations that she was going to file a petition
for certiorari with the CA.
She didn’t.
She also didn’t appear during scheduled hearings, causing the case to get dismissed for failure to
prosecute.

Issue: Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her duties?

Held:
Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, she abruptly stopped appearing
as complainant’s counsel even as proceedings were still pending – with neither a withdrawal nor an
explanation for doing so. This violated Canon 22.
Suspended for 5 years.

16. Francisco vs Portugal – AC No. 6155, March 14, 2006

Facts:
Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After judgment was rendered
convicting appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion and Petition for review of the judgment of
conviction. But after the filing, Atty disappeared and was nowhere to be found.
Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being filed out of time and for failure
to pay the docket fees. The decision became final and warrants of arrest were issued.
Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel. He wrote a letter to one of the complainants
giving them instructinos to sign and file with the Court the Notice to Withdraw. But the complainant didn’t file
it with the court because they were aware that it would be difficult to find another counsel.

Issue: Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?

Held: Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself if he truly wanted to
withdraw. At the very least, he should have informed the court. For failure to do so, Atty was negligent. Atty
was also negligent in filing the petition out of time. eventually he would have known that the petition was
denied but still he failed to informe the convicts and return their calls.
One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written
consent or from a good cause.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the
client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in
which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

17. Metrobank vs CA – GR No. 86100-03, January 23, 1990

Facts:
Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of
sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to enter his charging lien equal to 25% of the market
value of the litigated properties as atty fees. The court granted and the atty’s lien was annotated on the
TCTs. The cases were later dismissed with prejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs therein. Thus the Bank
now had the TCT’s in its name and the atty’s lien was carried over.
Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC granted the motion and fixed the
fees at 936K. CA affirmed.

Issue:
Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for enforcement of the lien?

Held:
Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper proceedings. A charging lien,
to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney
in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in
the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which
the fee is to be paid.
Here, there was no money judgment. Thus there is no charging lien. And court has no authority to fix a
charging lien.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main
action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim.

18. Gatchalian Promotions vs Atty. Primo Naldoza – A.C. No. 4017 September 29, 1999

Facts:
Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty asked from complainants
$2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket fees and that the court could take cognizance of
the case. Later, complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the SC consisted only of
nominal fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented complainant a fake xerox copy of
an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.
A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for $2.5K.

Issue: Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed because of his acquittal?

Held:
Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldn’t be dismissed. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof is clearly preponderant evidence.
A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability
in the administrative case and vice versa. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different
from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and
vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis
 Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he
also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official
receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of
the bar.

19. Santos vs Llamas – AC No. 4749, January 20, 2000

Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself
a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos.
and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted
member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-
A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Issues:
W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES
W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES

Held:
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior
citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income
does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and
the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of
one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.

20. Barrientos vs Daarol – AC No. 1512, January 29, 1993

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.
 Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty. Daarol went to her
house because he was a friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She knew Daarol to be a single
and as a General Manager of ZANECO (electic cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos’ house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the
Mason’s convention so the latter said he should ask for the permission of her parents. They consented and
so she served as an usherette, Daarol picking her up and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioner’s house and invited her for a joy ride, with the permission of
her mother (who was Daarol’s former classmate). They went to the beach and Daarol proposed his love for
Barrientos and told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within 6 months from her acceptance.
After a few days of courting, she accepted the offer of love. Visitations continued and they agreed to get
married in Dec 1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when they left, he took her for a joy ride to an airport
in Sicayab where there were no houses around. There, he pressured her into having sexual intercourse
reiterating that he loved her, and that he would marry her and that December was very near anyway they
would marry soon. She gave in after much hesitation because she loved him. She cried after the deed.
This event happened frequently thereafter during August to October 1973, where she consented
because she loved him. Eventually, she became pregnant and informed Daarol. He however suggested that
she have the baby aborted. She refused. He told her that she didn’t have to worry because they were getting
married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and her mother and told them that he could not
marry her because he was already married. He reassured them though that he has been separated from his
wife for 16 years and that he would work for the annulment of his marriage and subsequently marry her. So
Barrientos waited and delivered the baby but eventually wasn’t able to contact Daarol anymore (he went
MIA).

ISSUE: W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.

HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became
pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been
estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work
for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never
bothered to annul said marriage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible
complainant. He is perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being
married." Worse, he even suggested abortion.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter
into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant. As records indicate,
however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his
self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has
amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order.

21. Berbano vs Barcelona – AC No. 6084, September 3, 2003

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross
Misconduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.
Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was being
claimed by FIlinvest Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed a certain Mr. Daen as
attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane was arrested in Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed the assistance
of a law for his release. Someone recommended Atty. Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty. Barcelona
went to see Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for his release. Atty. Barcelona
told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so that he could secure Daen’s
release the following day. Berbano didn’t have enough money and time to immediately come up with such
big amount but they were able to come up with P15,700. She handed Atty. Barcelona the money. He said
that he would go to the SC to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, and that they should just meet
tomorrow.
 The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check worth P24,000. The day after,
they gave another P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and daughter). There were other payments
of money, the total amounting to P64,000. After much time wasted, and promises reiterated of the release of
Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasn’t seen again and he didn’t return their calls. Daen was still in jail.
Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioner on Bar Discipline found Barcelona guilty of
malpractice and serious breach of CPR. He recommended disbarment and return of the P64,000. IBP Board
of Governots adopted such findings but recommended only suspension.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as
to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers
of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have
proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise
its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition
of the administrative penalty.
Complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the Commission
attesting to the truth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit. The act of respondent in not filing his answer
and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt
for legal proceedings.
Respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of the detained person in the total
amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee through his alleged connection with a Justice
of the Supreme Court. He deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent has demonstrated
a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek,
and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections. In this case, respondent
misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with
a Supreme Court Justice. In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt. He is
disbarred.

22. Tabas vs Mangibin – A.C. No. 5602, February 3, 2004

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty. Mangibin for allegedly having committed
forgery.
Tabas claims that in March 2001, a certain Galvan mortgaged to her a piece of real property to secure
a P48,000 loan. The deed of the REM was registered and annotated. On October 2001 however, a certain
Castillejos, falsely representing herself as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibin and asked him to prepare
a discharge of the said mortgage and then notarize it afterwards.
Atty. Mangibin prepared the said discharge but he didn’t ask Castillejos for any other document other
that a Community Tax Certificate. He later on notarized the said deed. Subsequently, the mortgagor Galvan
was able to mortgage the same property again with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When Tabas learned of the
cancellation, she promptly informed Atty. Mangibin that her signature in the deed was forged. However, he
did not help her.
Atty. Mangibin admits of the discharge deed but denies liability for the falsification under a claim of
good faith. He says he did not know of Castillejos’ fraudulent intent and so, he cannot be faulted. He claims
it is beyond the realm of his futy to investigate the identity of persons appearing before him. And that as a
matter of routine, he only requires the CTCs of persons appearing before him.
IBP recommended to give respondent merely a warning, to be more careful in the preparation of legal
documents so that such situations may me avoided in the future. Bar Confidant however recommended
suspension. He was found guilty of gross negligence.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the Notarial Law and should be suspended from the practice
of law.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes, suspended for 2 years.
 A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public
and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be
undermined. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the
very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
matters stated in the document. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's
free act and deed.
The circumstances in this case indubitably show that respondent did not take even ordinary precautions
required in the premises. Respondent’s conduct showed serious lack of due care in the performance of his
duties as a notary public. Because of his carelessness, respondent failed to notice the glaring difference in
the signature of mortgagee in the deed of real estate mortgage from her purported signature in the questioned
discharge of real estate mortgage. Hence, he breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires lawyers to promote respect for the law and legal processes as well as to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land.

23. Manalang vs Angeles – AC No. 1558, March 10, 2003

FACTS:
Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and separation pay
filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the National Labor Relations.
Respondent was their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of P6,500. After the
decision became final, a writ of execution issued. However, without authority from his clients, respondent
compromised the award and was able to collect P5,500 only.
Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the amount
collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles refused and offered
to give them only the sum of P2,650.
Respondent counsel stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but they insisted that he
"deduct from this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representing the amount discounted by the counsel
of the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and other administrative expenses."
Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition meant that he "would not be compensated for
prosecuting and handling, the case.”

ISSUE: Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law
because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds.

HELD
Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not meant solely to
rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed of that good moral character,
which is a condition precedent to the privilege of practicing law and continuing in the practice thereof.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise effected by
counsel without the consent of the workers concerned . A client has every right to expect from his counsel
that nothing will be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied. By compromising the
judgment without the consent of his clients, respondent not only went against the stream of judicial dicta, he
also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as want of zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. In
the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to respondent's receipt of and failure to deliver
upon demand, the amount of P4,550 intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03, Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, his excuse in his answer, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's fees and other
administrative expenses before delivering the money due his clients, is unsatisfactory. Respondent clearly
failed to comply with the Rules of Court in the enforcement of an attorney's liens. The records of this case
are barren of any statement of respondent's claims for lien or payment of his alleged disbursements. Nor did
respondent present any showing that he caused written notices of his lien on the money judgment to be
served upon his clients and to the losing party
 His act of holding on to his clients' money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of
integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something which was not his, and to which he had no right. He
appears oblivious of the admonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.
This is the first case on record against him, a fact which could be taken into account by way of mitigation.
Considering further the amount involved, the penalty of six (6) months suspension appears to us in order.

24. Briones vs Jimenez – AC No. 6691, April 27, 2007

FACTS:
The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is Atty. Jimenez. Complainant
Briones is the Special Administrator of the Henson Estate, while respondent Jimenez is the counsel for Heirs
of Henson.
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order (2002). The RTC Order
directed complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares.
Complainant Briones did not reply to the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file a criminal complaint
in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code
of Professional responsibility by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against complainant to obtain an
improper advantage:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case of proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since no evidence of malice or bad
faith] for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Fair play demands that respondent
should have filed the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered
to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal.
However, the same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of his duties towards his client must be
within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit lawyers to resort to
unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the
purposes of the state – the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are, first and
foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice.

25. Pena vs Aparicio – AC No. 7298, June 25, 2007

FACTS
Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case before the NLRC
against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given separation pay. Peña
rejected the claim. Thereafter, Peña sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio replied with a
letter reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also contained threats against the company stating that if
the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple charges such as, criminal charges for tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the company’s business license.
Peña filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn
filed counterclaims for the defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the complaint because Peña
had allegedly failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum shopping. The IBP transmitted
the records of the case to the SC.
Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for damages against Peña in the amount
of P400M for filing false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent suit against him. Peña likewise filed this Petition
for Review alleging that he submitted his position paper and that the dismissal denied him of due process.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?

HELD
Yup!
First of all, the SC found that Peña actually submitted his position paper. In addition, disbarment
proceedings are sui generis, hence, the requirement of a certification of forum shopping is not to be strictly
complied with in such a case. At any rate, Peña actually submitted a certification against forum shopping
after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing the supposed defect in the original complaint.
Now to the merits…
Canon 19, “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” this shows that a
lawyer’s duty to his client is subordinate to his duty in the administration of justice.
Rule 19.01, “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under such Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to
file baseless criminal cases against the adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyer’s client. This is exactly what Atty. Aparicio did in this case.
Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail – extortion of money
by threats of accusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would not only entail
disbarment but also possible criminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actually admitted and even found
it his obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed against Peña. He also stated that the writing of
demand letters is standard practice.
SC ruled that Atty. Aparicio’s assertions are misleading because the fact of the matter is, he used such
threats to gain leverage against Peña and force the latter to accede to his client’s claims. The letter even
implied a promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if the claim is met.
While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the profession of law, such letters must
not contain threats such as those found in this case.
Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the
letter out of his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a
stern warning.