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Cases for Jan. 18, 2019 RULING: Yes.

Clearly, the primary functions of the Office


of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to
the primary functions of the Department of Justice.
1. Funa vs. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013 Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices
are such as to render it improper, from considerations of
FACTS: Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, public policy, for one person to retain both, an
2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed incompatibility between the offices exists, further
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the
resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his
to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for
on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as being in violation of the express provisions of the
the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that Constitution.
on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a
taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced 2. Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018
this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s (MR)
concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to
be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 FACTS:
Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, This En Banc Resolution treats two of respondent Maria
President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Lourdes P. A. Sereno's motions. One of them is her Ad
Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration of the Supreme
assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his Court decision dated May 11, 2018, which granted the
duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different Republic’s (filed by the OSG) Petition for Quo Warranto.
version of the antecedents. He represents that on Respondent was found DISQUALIFIED from and was
January 12, 2010, he was then the Government thereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor Accordingly, respondent was OUSTED and EXCLUDED
General Devanadera who had been appointed as the therefrom.
Secretary of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President
Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of ISSUES:
Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile 1. Can an impeachable official like CJ Sereno be
tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress removed via quo warranto?
representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2. Will the one-year prescriptive period to file quo
2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as warranto proceedings warrant the dismissal of this case?
the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending
the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to RULING:
perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General. 1. YES. Quo warranto is not a figment of
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the imagination or invention of this Court. It is a mandate
parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the boldly enshrined in the Constitution where the judiciary
two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, is conferred original jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the other branches of the government. Quo warranto, not
constitutional question that petitioner raises herein. impeachment, is the constitutional remedy prescribed to
adjudicate and resolve questions relating to
ISSUE: Does incompatibility exist between the office of qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to public office.
the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor Those who chose to ignore this fact are Constitutionally
General? blind. US Supreme Court Justice Scalia once said: "If it is
in the Constitution, it is there. If it is not in the
Constitution, it is not there." There is nothing in Our foundations of a State stand, especially so when the
Constitution that says that impeachable officers are government cannot be faulted for such lapse.
immuned, exempted, or excluded from quo warranto
proceedings when the very issue to be determined
therein is the status of an officer as such. No amount of On another point, the one-year prescriptive period was
public indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution. necessary for the government to be immediately
informed if any person claims title to an office so that the
2. NO. The Court finds no reason to reverse its government may not be faced with the predicament of
ruling that an action for quo warranto is imprescriptible having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually
if brought by the State at its own instance, as in the holding it albeit illegally, and another to the person not
instant case. rendering service although entitled to do so. It would
thus be absurd to require the filing of a petition for quo
The long line of cases decided by this Court since the warranto within the one-year period for such purpose
1900's, which specifically explained the spirit behind the when it is the State itself which files the same not for the
rule providing a prescriptive period for the filing of an purpose of determining who among two private
action for quo warranto, reveals that such limitation can individuals are entitled to the office. Stated in a
be applied only against private individuals claiming different manner, the purpose of the instant petition is
rights to a public office, not against the State. not to inform the government that it is facing a
predicament of having to pay two salaries; rather, the
Indeed, there is no proprietary right over a public office. government, having learned of the predicament that it
Hence, a claimed right over a public office may be might be paying an unqualified person, is acting upon it
waived. In fact, even Constitutionally-protected rights head-on.
may be waived. Thus, We have consistently held that the
inaction of a person claiming right over a public office to Most importantly, urgency to resolve the controversy on
assert the same within the prescriptive period provided the title to a public office to prevent a hiatus or
by the rules, may be considered a waiver of such right. disruption in the delivery of public service is the ultimate
This is where the difference between a quo warranto consideration in prescribing a limitation on when an
filed by a private individual as opposed to one filed by action for quo warranto may be instituted. However, it is
the State through the Solicitor General lies. There is no this very same concern that precludes the application of
claim of right over a public office where it is the State the prescriptive period when it is the State which
itself, through the Solicitor General, which files a petition questions the eligibility of the person holding a public
for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the person office and not merely the personal interest of a private
holding the public office. As We have emphasized in the individual claiming title thereto. Again, as We have
assailed Decision, unlike Constitutionally-protected stated in the assailed Decision, when the government is
rights, Constitutionally-required qualifications for a the real party in interest and asserts its rights, there can
public office can never be waived either deliberately or be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation,
by mere passage of time. While a private individual may, otherwise, it would be injurious to public interest if this
in proper instances, be deemed to have waived his or her Court will not act upon the case presented before it by
right over title to public office and/or to have acquiesced the Republic and merely allow the uncertainty and
or consented to the loss of such right, no organized controversy surrounding the Chief Justice position to
society would allow, much more a prudent court would continue.
consider, the State to have waived by mere lapse of
time, its right to uphold and ensure compliance with the Worthy to mention is the fact that this is not the first
requirements for such office, fixed by no less than the time that this Court precluded the application of the
Constitution, the fundamental law upon which the prescriptive period in filing a petition for quo warranto.
When the Court in several cases exercised liberality in
the application of the statute of limitations in favor of Revised Penal Code. From both law and
private individuals so as not to defeat their personal jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective
interests on a public position, is it not but proper, just, office is unequivocally considered as a political
reasonable, and more in accord with the spirit of the right. Hence, the pardon granted to former
rule for this Court to decide against the application of President Estrada admits no other interpretation
the prescriptive period considering the public interest other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the
involved? Certainly, it is every citizen's interest to have pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil
qualified individuals to hold public office, especially and political rights – including the right to seek
that of the highest position in the Judiciary. elective office.

3. Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. 206666, Jan. 21, 2015 4. Cerilles vs. CSC, G.R. No. 180845, Nov. 22, 2017
FACTS: FACTS: On November 7, 2000, Republic Act
The Sandiganbayan convicted former President No. 8973 entitled "An Act creating the
Estrada, a former President of the Republic of Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the
the Philippines, for the crime of plunder. Province of Zamboanga del Sur and for other
However, former President Arroyo extended purposes" was passed. As a consequence
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former thereof, the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
President Estrada. of the province of Zamboanga del Sur
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada (province, for brevity) was reduced by thirty-
filed a Certificate of Candidacy for local elective six percent (36%). Subsequently on August 21,
post of Mayor of the City of Manila. Risos-Vidal 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
then filed a Petition for Disqualification against Zamboanga del Sur passed Resolution No. 2Kl-27
former President Estrada before the COMELEC. approving the new staffing pattern of the
Risos- Vidal anchored her petition on the theory provincial government consisting only of 727
that Former President Estrada is Disqualified to positions and Resolution No. 2Kl-038 which
Run for Public Office because of his Conviction authorized petitioner to undertake the
for Plunder, sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty reorganization of the provincial government and
of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute to implement the new staffing pattern.
Disqualification. The COMELEC opined that the
petition will not belabor the controversy. Hence, Pursuant to said authority, petitioner appointed
on April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s employees to the new positions in the provincial
jurisdiction by filing the present petition. government. The private respondents were
among those who were occupying permanent
ISSUE: Did the pardon extended to Estrada positions in the old plantilla and have
restore his right civil and political rights and to allegedly been in the service for a long time
seek public elective office? but were not given placement preference and
were instead terminated without valid cause
RULING: and against their will.
YES, former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil ISSUE: Was the reorganization of the Province
and political rights, which naturally includes the of Zamboanga del Sur tainted with bad faith?
right to seek public elective office, the focal point
of this controversy. The wording of the pardon RULING:YES. First, the sheer number of
extended to former President Estrada is appointments found to be violative of RA
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is 6656 is astounding. As initially observed by
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the the CSCRO, no less than ninety-six (96) of the
appointments made by Gov. Cerilles violated the Facts: These are consolidated petitions for
rule on preference and non-hiring of new review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
employees embodied in Sections 4 and 5 of the Procedure.
said law. While the relative scale of invalidated On September 27, 2005, petitioner Cueva, then
appointments does not conclusively rule out PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative
good faith, there is, at the very least, a strong case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross
indication that the reorganization was dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of
motivated not solely by the interest of economy official documents, conduct prejudicial to the
and efficiency, but as a systematic means to best interest of the service, being notoriously
circumvent the security of tenure of the undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of
ninety-six (96) employees affected. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva charged
Guevarra with falsification of a public document,
Second, Respondents were replaced by either specifically the Application for Bond of
new employees or those holding lower Accountable Officials and Employees of the
positions in the old staffing pattern - Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter
circumstances that may be properly denied the existence of his pending criminal and
appreciated as evidence of bad faith pursuant administrative cases. As the head of the school,
to Section 2 and Section 4 of RA 6656. Guevarra was required to be bonded in order to
Significantly, Gov. Cerilles plainly admitted be able to engage in financial transactions on
that new employees were indeed hired after behalf of PUP. In his Application for Bond of
the reorganization. Accountable Officials and Employees of the
Republic of the Philippines (General Form No.
Moreover, the Court notes that the positions 58-A), he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
of Respondents were not even abolished. 11. Do you have any criminal or administrative
However, instead of giving life to the clear records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature
mandate of RA 6656 on preference, Gov. thereof NO.5.
Cerilles terminated Respondents from the This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that
service and forthwith appointed other time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had
employees in their stead. Neither did Gov. 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of
Cerilles, at the very least, demote them to R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. Cezar,
lesser positions if indeed there was a knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra
reduction in the number of positions had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan,
corresponding to Respondents' previous endorsed and recommended the approval of the
positions. This is clear indication of bad faith, application.
as the Court similarly found in Dytiapco v. Civil The respondents explained that they believed
Service Commission. "criminal or administrative records" to mean
final conviction in a criminal or administrative
case. Thus, because their cases had not yet been
decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted
that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in
General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good
CASES FOR JAN 21 faith. Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued
Resolution No. 0605211 formally charging
1. CSC vs. Guevarra, G.R. No 176162, etc., Oct. 9, Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with
2012 Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service after a prima facie finding that they had
committed acts punishable under the Civil statutory construction which requires that when
Service Law and Rules. espondents filed their the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court,
Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case praying that however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is
the case be suspended immediately and that the not in keeping with the intention of the statute
CSC declare a complete absence of a prima facie and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-
case against them. the CSC denied the motion established rule that laws should be given a
for reconsideration filed by the respondents for reasonable interpretation so as not to defeat the
being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a very purpose for which they were passed. As
motion to dismiss, which was a prohibited such, "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if
pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. A
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean
Commission. It also denied Cuevas motion to that only private citizens can file a complaint
include additional charges against the directly with the CSC. For administrative cases
respondents. The CSC, however, placed instituted by government employees against
Guevarra under preventive suspension for their fellow public servants, the CSC would only
ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary have appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a
because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was plain reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202
in a position to unduly influence possible would effectively divest CSC of its original
witnesses against him. Aggrieved, Guevarra and jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by law.
Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would
prohibition before the CA essentially questioning be tantamount to disenfranchising government
the jurisdiction of the CSC over the employees by removing from them an
administrative complaint filed against them by alternative course of action against erring public
Cueva. he CA noted that the CSC erred in officials.
recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of
reasoning out that the latter should have the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition
exhausted all administrative remedies by first of jurisdiction over an administrative case by the
bringing his grievances to the attention of the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear
PUP Board of Regents. Hence, these petitions. and decide administrative disciplinary cases
brought directly before it or it may deputize any
Issue: Can CSC only take cognizance of a case department or agency to conduct an
filed directly before it if the complaint was made investigation.
by a private citizen?
2. Catipon vs. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22,
Ruling: No. 2015
The understanding by the CA of Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. Facts: Macario Catipon Jr. though lacking 1.5
292 which states that "a complaint may be filed units in Military Science, was allowed to join the
directly with the Commission by a private citizen graduation ceremonies for B.S. Criminology
against a government official or employee" is students of the Baguio Colleges Foundation, with
that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case a restriction that he must cure the deficiency
filed directly before it if the complaint was made before he can be considered a graduate. He
by a private citizen. The Court is not unaware of joined the Social Security System in 1985. In
the use of the words "private citizen" in the September, 1993, he took the Civil Service
subject provision and the plain meaning rule of Professional Examination on the belief that the
Civil Service Commission still allowed CSPE Commission, after his motion for
applicants to substitute length of service reconsideration was denied by the CSC-CAR
government service for any academic deficiency Regional Director. To forestall his impending
they may have, unaware that the CSC had issued suspension, Macario filed a Petition for Review
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular to assail the CSC-CAR Regional Director’s ruling,
No. 42, Series of 1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, which the Court of Appeals denied.
Series of 1992 which discontinued the policy. He
took the CSPE tests, obtained a rating of 80.52% Issue: What is conduct prejudicial to public
and was later promoted to Senior Analyst and office?
OIC Branch Head of the SSS. He completed his
1.5 units deficiency in Military Science in 1995. Ruling: Under our civil service laws, there is no
concrete description of what specific acts
Thereafter, Jerome Japson filed a letter- constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
complaint with the CSC-CAR Regional Director, interest of the service, but the following acts or
alleging that Macario made deliberate false omissions have been treated as such:
entries in his CSPE application, by stating therein misappropriation of public funds; abandonment
that he graduated in 1993, when he actually of office; failure to report back to work without
graduated only in 1995 after removing his prior notice; failure to safe keep public records
deficiency in Military Science. Thus, Macario was and property; making false entries in public
not qualified to take the CSPE examination, was documents; falsification of court orders; a
charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official judge’s act of brandishing a gun, and threatening
documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct the complainants during a traffic altercation; a
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by court interpreter’s participation in the execution
the CSC-CAR after preliminary investigation. of a document conveying complainant’s
property which resulted in a quarrel in the
The CSC-CAR Regional Director, noting that all latter’s family; selling fake Unified Vehicular
the entries in the application form submitted by Volume Program exemption cards to his
Macario for the CSPE exam were typewritten, officemates during office hours; a CA employee’s
except for the entries on “Year Graduated”, forging of receipts to avoid her private
“School Where Graduated”, and “Degree contractual obligations; a Government Service
Finished” ruled that Macario consciously drafted Insurance System (GSIS) employee’s act of
the application form and meticulously prepared repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused
it before submitting to the CSC. But the pre- network problems within his office and allowed
drafted application form showed Macario’s him to gain access to the entire GSIS network,
confusion as to how the entries should be filled thus putting the system in a vulnerable state of
up; in sum, the CSC-CAR Regional Director noted, security; a public prosecutor’s act of signing a
Macario had tried to show the real state of his motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him,
educational attainment, mitigating his liability, but by a judge; and a teacher’s act of directly
and did not show a blatant disregard of an selling a book to her students in violation of the
established rule or a clear intent to violate the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers.
law. Thus, the Regional Director exonerated him
on all charges except as to the charge for In petitioner’s case, his act of making false
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the entries in his CSPE application undoubtedly
Service, where he was found guilty and penalized constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best
with suspension of six months and one to one interest of the service; the absence of a willful or
year. Macario appealed to the Civil Service deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest
entries in his application is immaterial, for Acting Election Officer to serve the Municipality
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, in order not to
the service "may or may not be characterized by jeopardize the voters’ registration process at
corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or said Municipality.
to disregard established rules." Meanwhile, Dir. Ibanez also issued a
Memorandum dated October 7, 20038 for the
3. CSC vs. Plopinio, G.R. No.197571, April 3, 2017 COMELEC en bane, withdrawing his earlier
recommendation to drop respondent from the
Facts: Respondent Crisostomo M. Plopinio rolls of employees.
served as a COMELEC Election Officer III of
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, prior to his separation Because of the foregoing superseding events, it
from the service. A certain Alberto G. Adan appears that [respondent] was reporting, as he
(Adan) filed a letter-complaint against did report to office on certain days per his daily
respondent alleging that because of time records submitted to the OPES. One key
respondent’s frequent absences, respondent issue however is that many DTR entries were
failed to act on Adan’s petition for being questioned by [respondent’s] supervisor
disqualification of a barangay candidate named for being invalid or unauthorized considering his
Jessie V. Sanchez. reported absences.
Acting Director IV Adolfo A. Ibafiez (Dir. Ibanez),
Personnel Department, COMELEC, conducted an Consequently, because of the inability to fully
investigation into Adan’s lettercomplaint against establish a successive thirty-day absence
respondent and submitted a Memorandum without approved leave (AWOL) on the part of
dated August 20, 2003 to Commissioner [respondent], the undersigned withdraws his
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. (Com. Tuason), former recommendation to drop from the rolls.
COMELEC, who, in turn, forwarded the same to
the COMELEC en banc for appropriate action. Through his Memorandum dated October 16,
2003 for the COMELEC en banc, respondent
In its Resolution No. 03-0278 dated September sought reconsideration of COMELEC Resolution
11, 2003, the COMELEC en bane adopted in toto No. 03-0278, as well as Com. Tuason’s
Atty. Ibañez’s findings and recommendation to Memorandum dated October 7, 2003.
drop respondent from the rolls of Comelec Respondent lamented that the COMELEC en
employees effective January 1, 2003 and the bane was misled by Dir. Ibañez’s initial
salaries paid to him until June 30, 2003 be recommendation to drop him from the rolls of
charged against his leave credits. However, the employees, which lacked factual and legal bases;
same shall be without prejudice to the filing of and that he was not afforded due process as he
formal charge for violating reasonable office was never confronted with any formal charge
rules and regulations in view of his deliberate regarding his alleged absenteeism prior to
failure to submit his daily time records for the COMELEC Resolution No. 03- 0278.
months of January to April 2002 and from
January until present of the current year. Issue #1: May a public officer or employee who
is AWOL be separated from service or dropped
Com. Tuason then issued a Memorandum7 from the rolls of employees without prior
dated October 7, 2003, directing respondent to notice?
immediately cease and desist from performing
his official duties, based, among other grounds, Ruling: Yes. There is no question that a public
on his unauthorized absences; and appointing an officer or employee who is AWOL may be
separated from service or dropped from the rolls prior notice. He/She shall, however, be informed
of employees without prior notice. of his/her separation not later than five (5) days
from its effectivity which shall be sent to the
Rule VI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Rules on address on his/her 201 files or to his/her last
Leave in the Civil Service provides: known address;
Sec. 63. Effect of absences without approved
leave. – An official or employee who is If the number of unauthorized absences incurred
continuously absent without approved leave for is less than thirty (30) working days, a written
at least thirty (30) working days shall be Return- to-Work order shall be served on the
considered on absence without official leave official or employee at his/her last known
(AWOL) and shall be separated from the service address on record. Failure on his/her part to
or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. report to work within the period stated in the
However, when it is clear under the obtaining order shall be a valid ground to drop him/her
circumstances that the official or employee from the rolls;
concerned, has established a scheme to
circumvent the rule by incurring substantial If it is clear under the obtaining circumstances
absences though less than thirty working (30) that the official or employee concerned, has
days 3x in a semester, such that a pattern is established a scheme to circumvent the rule by
already apparent, dropping from the rolls incurring substantial absences though less than
without notice may likewise be justified. thirty (30) working days, three (3) times in a
semester, such that a pattern is already
If the number of unauthorized absences incurred apparent, dropping from the rolls without notice
is less than thirty (30) working days, a written may likewise be justified.
Return-to-Work Order shall be served to him at Section 96. Dropping from the Rolls; Non-
his last known address on records. Failure on his Disciplinary in Nature. – This mode of separation
part to report for work within the period stated from the service for unauthorized absences or
in the Order shall be a valid ground to drop him unsatisfactory or poor performance or physical
from the rolls. or mental incapacity is non-disciplinary in nature
and shall not result in the forfeiture of any
Rule 19, Sections 93 and 96 of the Revised Rules benefit on the part of the official or employee or
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service in disqualification from reemployment in the
(RRACCS) similarly state: government.

Rule 19 DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS Based on current rules, a public officer or
Sec. 93. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping employee may be dropped from the rolls for
from the Rolls. – Officers and employees who are AWOL without prior notice, under any of the
either habitually absent or have unsatisfactory following circumstances:
or poor performance or have shown to be (1) the public officer or employee was
physically and mentally unfit to perform their continuously absent without approved leave for
duties may be dropped from the rolls subject to at least 30 working days; or
the following procedures: (2) the public officer or employee had
Absence Without Approved Leave established a scheme to circumvent the rule by
An officer or employee who is continuously incurring substantial absences, though less than
absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least 30 working days, three times in a semester, such
thirty (30) working days shall be separated from that a pattern was readily apparent.
the service or dropped from the rolls without
Dropping from the rolls is not disciplinary in Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
nature. It shall not result in the forfeiture of any Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
benefit of the public official or employee arising out of her failure to disclose the true and
concerned nor in said public official or detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and
employee’s disqualification from reemployment net worth, business interests, and financial
in the government. Thus, the concerned public connections, and those of her spouse in her
official or employee need not be notified or be Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
heard. (SALNs).
For her part, petitioner insisted that she
Issue # 2: Was there legal basis to drop the acquired her properties through lawful means,
respondent from the rolls on account of being and maintained that she was not totally
AWOL? dependent on her salary to finance the said
acquisitions.
Ruling: No. There being no factual basis that The Ombudsman’s Ruling - In a Joint Decision,
respondent had been AWOL, he could not simply the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of
be dropped from the rolls. Any other allegation Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of
of wrongdoing on respondent’s part, i.e., Section 8(A) of RA 6713, and imposed the
falsification of entries in the DTRs or frequent penalty of Dismissal, and its accessory penalties,
absenteeism, does not warrant dropping from without prejudice to criminal prosecution. It
the rolls, but require the institution of any observed that petitioner committed perjury
appropriate charge and/or administrative under Article 183 of the RPC when she failed to
proceedings against respondent before any declare in her SALNs for 1997 to 2003 the Galant
disciplinary action can be taken against him. The sedan, and her business interest in KEI in her
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not commit any 1997 SALN, which is sufficient basis to hold her
reversible error in ordering respondent’s liable for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
reinstatement and payment of his back salaries. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied in a Joint
4. Daplas vs. Dept. of Finance, G.R. No. 221153, Order, prompting her to elevate her case before
April 17, 2017 the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA’s Ruling - In a Decision, the CA dismissed
FACTS: the petition, holding that the Ombudsman’s
Petitioner joined the government ruling was sufficiently supported by substantial
service as a casual clerk for the Municipal evidence. It found that petitioner’s failure to
Treasurer of Kawit, Cavite sometime in 1968, and declare all her assets and business interests
had held various posts until she was appointed constituted Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
as the Pasay City Treasurer on May 19, 1989. At a violation of Section 8(A) of RA 6713.
the time material to the complaints, petitioner Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for
was concurrently holding the position of Officer- reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
in-Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Resolution; hence, the instant petition.
Local Government Finance (BLGF) in Cebu City.
Two (2) separate complaints were filed against ISSUE: For failure to declare some properties in
petitioner by the Department of Finance- her SALNs for the years 1997 to 2003 is
Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) petitioner liable for Dishonesty, Grave
and the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Misconduct, etc., warranting dismissal from
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman; service?
respondents) for averred violations, constituting
RULING: No. SALNs, by itself, does not amount to Grave
Records reveal that the element of intent to Misconduct, in the absence of showing that such
commit a wrong required under both the omission had, in some way, hindered the
administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave rendition of sound public service for there is no
Misconduct are lacking to warrant petitioner’s direct relation or connection between the two.
dismissal from service. Without any of these Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold
elements, the transgression of an established petitioner liable for the charges of Dishonesty
rule is properly characterized as simple and Grave Miscounduct.
misconduct only.
Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in 5. Gonzales vs. Office of the President, G.R. No.
doubt the integrity of the public officer or 196231, Sept. 4, 2012
employee, and would normally amount to PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, FACTS: These two petitions have been because they raise
that mere non-declaration of the required data a common thread of issues relating to the President's
in the SALN does not automatically amount to exercise of the power to remove from office herein
such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious petitioners who claim the protective cloak of
intent to conceal the truth or to make false independence of the constitutionally-created office to
statements. Here, the Court finds that there is no which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman. The
substantial evidence of intent to commit a cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily
wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of
the other properties in petitioner’s and her Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the
husband’s names. Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the
Petitioner’s failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of
her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient the Ombudsman.
badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, (The facts of the two petitions/cases are too long. Wala
or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to na lang nkogiapil.)
make false statements. Consequently, absent
any intent to commit a wrong, and having ISSUE: Being an appointing authority and under the
accounted for the source of the “undisclosed Doctrine of Implication, can the President remove the
wealth”, as in this case, petitioner cannot be Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor?
adjudged guilty of the charge of Dishonesty; but
at the most, of mere negligence for having failed RULING: YES. The Power of the President to remove a
to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately. Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied
In the same vein, petitioner’s failure to declare from his power to appoint. In giving the President the
the Galant sedan in her SALNs from 1997 to 2003 power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
stemmed from the fact that the same was Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms
registered in her husband’s name, and an authority that is already implied from the President's
purportedly purchased out of his personal constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
money. While such bare allegation is not enough in the Office of the Ombudsman. Granting the President
to overthrow the presumption that the car was the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
conjugal, neither is there sufficient showing that diminish the independence of the Office of the
petitioner was motivated by bad faith in not Ombudsman. The independence which the Office of the
disclosing the same. Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
Likewise, the charge of Grave Misconduct political considerations in pursuing its constitutional
against petitioner must fail. Verily, the omission mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
to include the subject properties in petitioner’s
Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, continuation of the proceedings against her... after
essentially, political independence. upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline 6770.
administratively is extensive and covers all government In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the motion for reconsideration through the Office of the
exception only of those officials removable by Solicitor General (OSG).
impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive.
For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the ISSUE: Being an appointing authority and under the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government Doctrine of Implication, can the President remove the
officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor?
President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious RULING: In the voting held, by a vote of 8-7,the Court
construction of these two apparently conflicting resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision
provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No.
conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman 196231). The court declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to
jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of
Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to
Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
to provide for an external authority, through the person insofar as Special Prosecutor is concerned. The Court did
of the President, that would exercise the power of not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and
and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter
the constitutional and plenary authority of the enjoys under the Constitution.
Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN:
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary
powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
non-feasance of all public officials, including Members of
the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their
Gonzales vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, tenure. The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office
Jan. 28, 2014 (MR) of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but is
similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly
FACTS: In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled Commissions since all these offices fill the political
that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The its existence and proper functioning. Section 8(2) of RA
Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President
Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence
Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus
imposed on him the penalty of dismissal. Sulit, who had unconstitutional we rule that subjecting the Deputy
not then been dismissed and who simply sought to Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President,
restrain the disciplinary proceedings against her, solely whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary
disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. FACTS: The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s
The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally- Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be
not only with the independence that the Constitution issued by any court to delay an investigation being
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless
inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation
and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department. The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of
Even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
expressly made part of the composition of the Office of extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any
the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage
component of that Office militates against a differential of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be
treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes
hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true,
not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser ISSUE: Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of
officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?
Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE
reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par with until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an procedure through an administrative circular duly
extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must issued; The second paragraph is declared
also enjoy the same grant of independence under the UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
Constitution.
However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to The Court rules that when Congress passed the first
maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or
the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
Constitution. provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy
that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
6. Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial
Nov. 10, 2015 power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription,
as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part
of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a 7. Ombudsman vs. Valencerina, G.R. No. 178343,
violation of the separation of powers principle. July 14, 2014

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of FACTS: Ecobel Land, Inc. through its Chairman, Josephine
Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in Boright, applied for a medium term loan financial facility
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only with the GSIS to finance the construction of its
undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it condominium project. However, the loan application
also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its was denied. Intent on pursuing the project, Ecobel,
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be applied for a surety bond with the GSIS to guarantee the
mooted by supervening events if no provisional repayment of the principal loan obligation to be
injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the procured with the Philippine Veterans Bank. The
same. respondent Alex M. Valencerina, then Vice President for
Marketing and Support Services of the GSIS General
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits Insurance Group, submitted Ecobel’s Guarantee
the remedy against “decision or findings” of the Payment Bond application for evaluation and
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the endorsement of the GSIS Investment Committee. In the
fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to said Memorandum, Valencerina made it appear that
effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate Ecobel’s application was fully secured by reinsurance and
jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is real estate collaterals.
therefore concluded that the former provision is also Ecobel’s application was “APPROVED” in
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the principle subject to analysis/evaluation of the project
Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply and the offered collaterals. Later, however, GSIS
since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in President and General Manager Federico Pascual issued
part materia in that they “cover the same specific or a memorandum suspending the processing and issuance
particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial of guaranty payment bonds. Accordingly, Valencerina
review over issuances of the Ombudsman. prepared a cancellation notice to Ecobel, but was told
that the subject bond could no longer be cancelled
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA because it was already a “done deal.” Notwithstanding
6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA’s the issuance of the subject bond Ecobel paid its yearly
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. premium, and thereon submitted the certificates of title
139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings for the collaterals required therefor which was
relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has eventually found to be spurious. Despite the bond
developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this cancellation notices, Ecobel was still able to secure a
issue ex mero motu (on its own motion): US$10,000,000.00 loan from BSIL using the subject bond.
The GSIS, thereafter, conducted an investigation
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and on the circumstances surrounding the processing and
orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected issuance of the subject bond and forwarded its report to
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of
appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised the Ombudsman, which then conducted its own fact-
at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex finding investigation. The OMB Preliminary Investigation
mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-B found
any point in the case where that fact is developed. The Valencerina, among others, guilty of gross neglect of
court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own duty, and inefficiency and incompetence in the
jurisdiction in any proceeding. performance of official duties, and ordered his dismissal
from service with the accessory penalties provided for
under Sections 57 and 58 of the Uniform Rules on him with the penalty of dismissal from the
Administrative Cases. service with all its accessory penalties.
In a Memorandum, the GSIS informed Aggrieved, Escandor went to the CA via a Petition
Valencerina that he is deemed dismissed from the for Certiorari (with application for Temporary
service. Aggrieved, Valencerina filed an Urgent Motion Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction)
for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
with the CA, which, finding the necessity to preserve the set aside, reverse and declare null and void the
status quo between the parties, granted the same. OMB Order directing the immediate
Consequently, the corresponding writ of preliminary implementation and execution of the OMB
injunction was issued and the GSIS directed Valencerina Visayas Decision, dismissing him from the
to return to work. At odds with the return directive, the service. In support of his petition, Escandor
OMB filed a motion for reconsideration which was claimed that he timely moved for
denied. The CA pointed out that “under Rule 43 of the reconsideration of the said Decision; thus, it
Rules of Court, an appeal shall not stay the judgment to would be premature for the OMB and the NEDA
be reviewed unless the CA shall direct otherwise” and to dismiss him from the service.
that it has resolved to stay the assailed judgment and
orders during the pendency of the case. Unperturbed, ISSUE: Whether or not the OMB's Decision and
the OMB filed the instant petition for certiorari. Order of Dismissal against Escandor can be
immediately implemented despite the pendency
Issue: As between Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rule of his MR and/or Appeal?
of Procedure and Sec. 12, Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, which shall prevail?

RULING: Yes. It has long been settled in a


Ruling: It is a fundamental legal principle that when two number of cases, to wit: Office of the
rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially Ombudsman v. Samaniego, Villaseñor, et al. v.
designed for the said case must prevail over the other. Ombudsman, et al., and The Office of the
Evidently, the aforesaid Section 7, Rule III is a special rule Ombudsman v. Valencerina,14 stating that the
applicable to administrative complaints cognizable by OMB’s decision, even if the penalty imposed is
the OMB, while Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules applies dismissal from the service, is immediately
to appeals from quasi-judicial bodies in general, executory despite the pendency of a motion for
including the OMB. Thus, as between the two rules, reconsideration or an appeal and cannot be
Section 7, Rule III should prevail over the application of stayed by mere filing of them.
Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules in appeals from a Section 7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure,
decision of the OMB in an administrative case. as amended by AO No. 17 dated September 15,
2003, explicitly provides: An appeal shall not
8. Cobarde-Gamallo vs. Escandor, GR. No. 184464, stop the decision from being executory. In case
June 21, 2017 the penalty is suspension or removal and the
FACTS: respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
These two cases arose from an administrative considered as having been under preventive
complaint for Violation of RA No. 7877 (Anti- suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) filed by other emoluments that he did not receive by
Cobarde-Gamallo against Escandor. There being reason of the suspension or removal. A decision
substantial evidence, the OMB-Visayas adjudged of the Office of the Ombudsman in
Escandor guilty of grave misconduct and meted
administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for review before the Office of the
Ombudsman does not operate to stay the
immediate implementation of the foregoing
Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.

Take note: The unappealable decisions are final


and executory, to wit: (1) respondent is absolved
of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not
more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent
to one month’s salary. The appealable decisions,
on the other hand, are those falling outside the
aforesaid enumeration, and may be appealed to
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
within 15 days from receipt of the written notice
of the decision or order denying the motion for
reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in
providing that an appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory, and that such
shall be executed as a matter of course.

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