Sane automatism requires total destruction of voluntary
AG's ref #2 (1992) control
The grounds for self defence need to be honestly believed, Beckford v R (1988) but not reasonably believed Prosecution may raise insanity in response to a plea of automatism; any mental disorder manifesting in violence is Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland (1963) `insanity', not automatism Jury should be given an opportunity to consider whether defendant's refusal to answer questions has reasonable Condron v UK (2001) grounds s.16 deception requires that dishonesty coincides with the intention to deprive; the dishonesty must be cause of the Davies v Flackett (1972) deprivation DPP v Lynch (1975) Duress may be a defence to accomplice to murder Voluntary intoxication not a defence to crime requiring no DPP v Majewski (1977) specific intent A mistaken, genuine belief in consent excuses, even if not DPP v Morgan (1975) based on any reasonable grounds Edwards v Ddin (1976) Making off without payment is not theft Elliot v C (1983) Caldwell test for recklessness is entirely objective For an indecent assault, the action need not be hostile or Faulkner v Talbot (1981) agressive Hyam v DPP (1974) `Intention' found in foresight of probable harm Low self control not a characteristc of the ordinary person in Luc Theit Than v R (1996) provocation (but see R v Smith(2000)) Murray v UK (1996) Right to silence not an absolute right under Art. 6 Insanity is a `defect of reason arising out of a disease of the mind' such that the accused did not know the `nature and M'Naghten's case (1843) quality' of the act, or did not know that it was wrong For gross negligence manslaughter, it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant's acts were bad enough to be R v Adomako (1995) criminal `Rough horseplay' is defence to charge of assault, even if R v Aitken (1992) very dangerous Conviction for conspiracy possible even if the conspired R v Anderson (1986) outcome is not desired, or even possible Constructive manslaughter requires a demonstrable unlawful R v Arobieke (1988) act R v Becerra and Cooper (1975) Withdrawal from joint enterprise requires timely notice
Provocation should not take into account physical
R v Bedder (1954) pecularities of the defendant (but see R v Camplin (1978)) Unwillingness to fight is not essential for defence of self R v Bird (1985) defence, but should be taken into account by jury R v Blaue (1975) Defendant takes his victim as he finds him Whether consent negates assault depends on the harm R v Boyea (1992) (objectively) likely to be caused R v Brown (1993) Consent no defence to sadomasochistic injuries For diminished responsibility, `abnormality of mind' winder R v Byrne (1960) than M'Naghten insanity Provocation can take into account age and gender as R v Camplin (1978) characteristics of the `reasonable man' Heroin is a `noxious thing'; injection of heroin can give rise to R v Cato (1975) constructive manslaughter, even with consent R v Chan-Fook (1994) Psychiatric illness can amount to bodily harm Constructive manslaughter requires mens rea as to the R v Church (1965) dangerous act
R v Clarence (1889) Mistake as to circumstances of act do not vitiate consent
For a trespassory entry, some part of the defendant's body R v Collins (1972) must enter the building R v Burstow and Ireland (1997) Psychiatric illness can amount to bodily harm `Recklessness' is assessed objectively in criminal damage R v Caldwell (1982) (now overruled by R v G)
Negligent medical treatment does not break the chain of
R v Cheshire (1991) causation; defendant's acts must a significant contribution. `menaces' in blackmail must be sufficient to sway a person of reasonable firmness, even if the victim himself was not R v Clear (1967) swayed Assault is indecent if defendant believes it indecent, or it is R v Court (1989) obviously indecent R v Cunninghman (1957) `Recklessness' is a state of mind of the defendant Self-neglect does not break chain of causation; suicide does, R v Dear (1996) but not if caused by the defendant Obtaining by deception: deception must operate on the mind R v Doukas (1977) of the victim R v Dudley and Stevens (1884) Necessity no defence to murder Self defence no defence when defendant not attacked, but R v Duffy (1965) prevention of crime might be It is an offence to aid and abet an attempt, but not to attempt R v Dunnington (1983) to aid and abet R v Eason (1971) Attempted theft not made out if indictment too narrow R v Fagan (1969) Actus reus may extend beyond original act Self-induced intoxication does not justify mistake as to R v Fotheringham (1988) consent in rape `menaces' in blackmail must be sufficient to sway a person of reasonable firmness, or a particular timid victim if the R v Garwood (1987) defendant new of his timidity For attempt, evidence must be adduced to show that R v Geddes (1996) defendant had started to implement the offence Caldwell test for recklessness affirmed (now overruled by R R v Gemmell (2003) v G) `Dishonesty' is based on the defendant's understanding of R v Ghosh (1982) the standards of ordinary people `Administration' of a `noxious thing' does not require physical R v Gillard (1988) contact R v Gomez (1993) `Appropriation' can occur even if the victim consents Duress requires a `sober person of reasonable firmness' to R v Graham (1981) fear death or serious injury For an attempt, the defendant must have `embarked on the R v Gullefer (1986) crime' Whether force was used `at the time of the theft' is a R v Hale (1978) question for the jury Using a false coin in a machine is not a deception, but it is a R v Hands (1887) larceny Stress and anxiety are not `external factors' that can give R v Hennessey (1989) rise to a defence of automatism R v Hinks (2000) Absolute title in civil law does not defeat `appropriation' The standard for duress as a defence does not depend on R v Horne (1994) the characteristics of the defendant
R v Howe (1977) Duress is not a defence to murder or accomplice to murder
Ommission my be culpable where the defendant has R v Instan (1893) assumed a duty of care Entry to premises is `as a trespasser' if it is for the purposes R v Jones and Smith (1976) of theft Negligent medical treatment might break the chain of R v Jordan (1956) causation if it exceptionally bad `Intention' is evidenced by, but not determined by, foresight R v Hancock and Shankland (1986) of harm Obtaining work by deception is an offence if the deception is R v King (1986) the operative case
R v Kingston (1994) Involuntary intoxication not a defence if intent still present
Constructive manslaughter requires an unlawful act; the R v Lamb (1967) mens rea for the unlawful act must be present Presenting a credit card without authority to use misrepresents that defendant is authorised; unauthorised R v Lambie (1967) credit cards are the same as unauthorised cheques R v Lawrence (1972) `Appropriation' can occur even if victim consents Whether a substance is `noxious' is a question of fact and R v Marcus (1981) degree Duress of circumstances may apply when the threat is not R v Martin (1989) against the defendant Woollin direction for intention does not compel jury to accept that foresight of virtually certain harm is determinative, it only R v Matthews (2003) entitles the jury to do so Ommission to act may be culpable if duty to act results from R v Miller (1982) defendant's own actions `Intention' found in foresight that harm is a `natural R v Moloney (1985) consequence' `Maliciously' in assault offences means only `intentionly or R v Mowatt (1967) recklessly' Appropriation in theft does not require assumption of all the R v Morris (1983) rights of an owner, only some R v Neddrick (1986) `Intention' is as defined in Hancock and Shankland `Consent' is different to `acquiescence', but ordinarily this is R v Olugboja (1981) not important to the jury For self defence, the defendant must (subjectively) believe R v Owino (1995) the force was (objectively) reasonable R v Pittwood (1902) Liability for ommission may arise out of contractual obligation Obtaining a cheque by deception is not `obtaining propery by deception' because the thing-in-action represented by the R v Preddy (1996) cheque always belongs to the payee Caldwell test for recklessness is entirely objective, but a reasonable person may overlook an obvious risk by being R v Reid (1992) distracted For purposes of consent, mistake as to qualifications not R v Richardson (Diane) (1998) mistake as to identity Voluntary intoxication no defence to assault, but may be R v Richardson (Nigel) (1998) defence where there is a drunken belief in consent Causation in assault found if events were reasonably R v Roberts (1971) forseeable Obtaining by deception: if the person deceived knows of the R v Rozeik (1995) fraud, then obtaining is not by deception A mistaken, genuine belief in consent excuses, even if not R v Satnam v Kewal (1983) based on any reasonable grounds R v Savage and Parmenter (1991) s.47 OAPA requires mens rea of assault Duress no defence if defendant puts himself into a criminal R v Shepherd (1987) conspiracy where threats are likely No defence to a charge of attempt that the substantive R v Shivpuri (1986) offence is actually impossible to commit Whether consent negates assault depends on the harm R v Slingsby (1992) (anticipated) likely to be caused Jury should consider all aspects of the defendant when assessing whether his response to provocation was R v Smith (2000) reasonable `Dangerous damage' under s.1(2) CDA requires intention or recklessness towards danger caused by the damage, not by R v Steer (1987) the way it is caused Ommission my be culpable where the defendant has R v Stone and Dobinson (1976) assumed a duty of care Victims' mistake as to circumstances of act may vitiate R v Tabassum (1889) consent Jury should consider all aspects of the defendant when assessing whether his response to provocation was R v Weller (2003) reasonable, including irrational jealousy There is a defence of duress of circumstances, if D is placed R v Willer (1986) in immediate danger Action in prevention of crime justified on the basis of R v Williams (Gladstone) (1983) defendent's honestly held belief Consent a defence to s.20 offence if it is classed as R v Wilson (1996) `adornment' R v Woolin (1998) `Intention' found in forsight that harm is virtually certain