MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, the RTC Branch 80 rendered judgment in a civil case in favor of Pililla and
against Phil. Petroleum Corp. (PPC), ordering PPC to pay the following:

P 5.3 million in taxes due from PPC under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of Pililla from
1979 – 1983,

P 3.3 million in storage permit fees under Section 10, Paragraph Z(13)(b-1-c) of the same municipal tax
ordinance from 1975 – 1986,

Mayor’s permit fee due from the same tax ordinance amounting to P 12,120.00,

Sanitary inspection fee amounting to P 1,010.00, and

Costs of suit.

On June 3, 1991, the SC affirmed the judgment of the RTC, with some modification regarding
business taxes accruing prior to 1976 to not be paid by PPC. The judgment became final and executory
on July 13, 1991, with the records remanded to the RTC for execution.

On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of the judgment of the SC, Atty. Felix
Mendiola filed a motion on behalf of Pililla with the RTC Branch 78 of Morong, Rizal for the examination
of PPC’s gross sales for the years 1976 – 1978 and 1984 – 1991 for the purpose of computing taxes on
businesses as imposes under the Local Tax Code. Meanwhile, on October 21, 1991, PPC filed a
manifestation that it had already paid the sum of P11.45 million to Pililla’s mayor in full satisfaction of
the judgment of the SC. As evidence, it presented release and quitclaim documents signed by the mayor.
Accordingly, the RTC denied Atty. Mendiola’s motion.

Atty. Mendiola filed an Motion for reconsideration to the RTC, stating that total liability of PPC
actually amounted to P24.2 million, while the amount paid to the Municipality was less than half of that,
and that the mayor could not waive the balance which represents taxes due under the judgment of the
muncipality. It must be noted that the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens over the
judgment of the municipality for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which,
when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million. The RTC Branch 78, however, denied the
MR.

Atty. Mendiola then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, which was remanded to the CA for
disposition. The PPC afterwards filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola’s authority to represent the
Municipality. The CA subsequently dismissed the petition of Atty. Mendiola for having been filed by a
private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar
petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. A
subsequent MR was similarly denied.

ISSUE: whether or not Atty. Mendiola may represent the Municipality of Pililla.

HELD: NO.

The CA is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of
and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private
attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where the SC ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a
province or municipality in lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the RAC, complemented by Section 3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Law)
provides that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a
private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it. For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was
disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on 
 record.

As applied to the case at hand, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal
was disqualified to act as counsel for Pililla on appeal, therefore the appearance of Atty. Mendiola was
without authority of law.

The SC did not sustain Atty. Mendiola’s argument that the exception is broad enough to include
situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case. A fiscal's refusal to represent the
municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. A fiscal cannot
refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the
Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined
to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the RAC.

Atty. Mendiola’s argument that PPC cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority
to represent the municipality was also held as untenable. The legality of his representation can be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings, as provided in the aforementioned jurisprudence.

It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola was even raised by the
municipality itself. Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty.
Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when
Pililla, through the mayor and without Atty. Mendiola’s participation, entered into a compromise
agreement with herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and
thereafter filed personally with the court two pleadings 
 constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment"
and a "Release and Quitclaim".
 A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have
impliedly dismissed his lawyer. Counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the
municipality since the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. Under Section 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings,
and there is nothing 
 to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own
litigation.

____________________________________________________________________________________

ANTONIO C. RAMOS, ROSALINDA M. PEREZ, NORMA C. CASTILLO and BALIUAG MARKET VENDORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 19, and MUNICIPALITY OF BALIUAG,
Respondents.

FACTS: petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag Market
Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a quo for the Declaration of Nullity of
Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial
arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan.

On April 27, 1980, during the hearing on the petitioners' motion for the issuance of preliminary
injunction, the Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed the
petition. Whereupon, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo on May 9, 1990.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D.
Regalado, filed an Answer in (sic) behalf of respondent municipality.

At the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 1990, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared,
manifesting that he was counsel for respondent municipality. On the same date, and on June 15, 1990,
respectively, Atty. Romanillos filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an Amended
Answer with motion to dismiss.

On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel
of Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the
Reply to- petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It was also Atty.
Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of evidence on July 17, 1990 for respondent
municipality.

During the hearing on August 10, 1990, petitioners questioned the personality of Atty.
Romanillos to appear as counsel of the respondent municipality, which opposition was reiterated on
August 15, 1990, and was put in writing in petitioners' motion of August 20, 1990 to disqualify Atty.
Romanillos from appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the
proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.

Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion dated August 22, 1990
stating, among others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality
and that Atty. Regalado, as his collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is adopting the
entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.

On September 19, 1990 respondent Judge issued the Order now being assailed which, as
already stated, denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent
municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on
the other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's motion 'to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the
formal offer of evidence'. In support of his foregoing action, respondent Judge reasoned:

'Petitioners' motion for the disqualification of Atty. Romanillos as respondent municipality's

counsel is deemed moot and academic in view of his withdrawal as counsel of said municipality
pursuant to a joint motion dated August 22, 1990, although he shall remain as counsel on record of
private respondent Kristi Corporation. Atty. Oliviano Regalado under the same joint motion moved for
the adoption of the entire proceedings conducted by collaborating counsel, Atty. Romanillos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Romanillos may represent the Local Government.

HELD: NO

In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals,this Court, through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who may legally
represent a municipality in a suit for or against it, thus:

The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.,and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where we
ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

'Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The
provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any
court, except in cases whereof (sic) original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where
the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial
government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of
the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy
Law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in
their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.

For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle
the municipality's case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to
show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal,
hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law."

The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a province and
corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney. ir

The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial
attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional
instances may a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. These exceptions
are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, to wit:c

"Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the
municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or
city within the province.

EDGARDO MANCENIDO FOR HIMSELF AND OTHER TEACHERS OF CAMARINES NORTE HIGH SCHOOL,
Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD, PROVINCIAL SCHOOL BOARD,
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, PROVINCIAL TREASURER AND PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, ALL OF THE PROVINCE
OF CAMARINES NORTE, Respondents.

FACTS:

FACTS: Petitioners, who are public school teachers, filed a case against the provincial officials to compel
them to pay their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition for review on certiorari, they argue
that the CA erred in recognizing the authority of the council of the provincial officials to file a notice of
appeal. Respondent in this case employed a private council Atty. Jose Lapak. Petitioners contend that
Atty. Jose Lapak could not represent the respondents Provincial Treasurer and Provincial School Board,
because both are instrumentalities of the National Government and may be represented only by the
Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title 3, Book 4 of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Only the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte may represent the Provincial Governor
and the Provincial Board in accordance with Section 481 [1], par. B of the Local Government Code of
1991. Petitioners cite Province of Cebu v. IAC, 147 SCRA 447 (1987), where we held that

"The municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it (De Guia v. The Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169; Municipality
of Bocaue, Et. Al. v. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173; Enriquez, Sr., v. Honorable Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932) as when
he represents the province against a municipality.

"The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be represented in its court cases by a
government lawyer, like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal, intended that the local
government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer.

The lawmaker also assumed that the interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a
government lawyer handles its litigations."

ISSUE: Whether or not the council of petitioners in this case may represent the latter.

HELD: YES

Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the

Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the
appointment of a legal officer, whose function is.

"(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local
government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or
proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or
to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the
adverse party;"

The Court has previously ruled on the representation of a local government unit by a private attorney. In
Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, 93 Phil, 173 (1953), and succeeding cases, we held that only when
the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire the services of a
special attorney. We reiterated this in De Guia v. Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169 (1972). 6 In Enriquez, Sr.
v. Gimenez, 107 Phil 932 (1960), we enumerated the instances when the provincial public prosecutor is
disqualified from representing a particular municipality, i.e., when the jurisdiction of a case involving the
municipality lies with the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when in a case involving the
municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or
otherwise.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

But do these rulings equally apply to local government officials? In Alinsug v. RTC, Br. 58, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 559 (1993), we laid down the rule that, in resolving whether a local
government official may secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official
capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In Albuera v. Torres, 102
Phil. 211 (1957), we approved the representation by private counsel of a provincial governor sued in his
official capacity, where the complaint contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages,
which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. In Province of
Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, we declared that where rigid adherence to the law on
representation would deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of private
counsel would be proper.

The present case had its origins in Civil Case No. 5864 filed before the RTC of Camarines Norte, Branch
38, for mandamus and damages. Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court granted mandamus,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals since the trial court did not award damages. In view of
the damages sought which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents could not be
deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. No error may thus be attributed to
the appellate court when it recognized the right of respondents to be represented by private counsel.

DIVISION

[ GR No. 191691, Jan 16, 2013 ]

ROMEO A. GONTANG v. ENGR. CECILIA ALAYAN

FACTS:Respondent Engr. Cecilia Alayan (respondent) was appointed in 2000 as Municipal Government
Department Head (Municipal Assessor) on temporary status. In May 2001, she applied for change of
status from temporary to permanent, which the Civil Service Commission-Camarines Sur Field Office
(CSC-CSFO) denied for lack of relevant experience. On appeal, the CSC-Regional Office in its August 13,
2001 Order approved her application effective May 22, 2001. Thus, she reported for work and sought
recognition of her appointment and the grant of the emoluments of the position from petitioner, then
incumbent Mayor Romeo A. Gontang (petitioner). Her requests having been denied, she filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on February 5, 2002 a petition for mandamus, docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019, against petitioner, in his official capacity as Municipal Mayor of
Gainza, Camarines Sur. However, the RTC dismissed the petition for having been prematurely filed as
the Order of the CSC-Regional Office had not attained finality due to the pendency of the appeal before
the CSC. Respondent appealed to the CA which, in its June 20, 2003 decision, ruled in her favor holding
that the pendency of an appeal is not a justification to prevent her from assuming office. Said decision
attained finality on August 10, 2007 with the denial of petitioner's petition before the Supreme Court.
However, prior to the CA decision, the CSC set aside the August 13, 2001 Order of the CSC-Regional
Office on May 8, 2003 upon a finding that there was no permanent appointment as the concurrence of
the local Sanggunian was not obtained. Respondent's appeal of the CSC decision was denied by the CA
and such denial became final on October 6, 2006.On March 17, 2008, respondent moved for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution by the RTC in Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019 for the alleged
unsatisfied judgment award in the amount of P837,022.50 representing her unpaid salaries and
allowances from May 8, 2003 to October 6, 2006 during the pendency of her appeal of the CSC
Resolutions.[9] Petitioner opposed the motion claiming full satisfaction of the judgment after having
already paid respondent the net sum of P391,040.60[10] covering all benefits for the period from the
date the CSC-CSFO approved her request for change of status on August 13, 2001 to May 7, 2003, the
day before the CSC denied her application for permanent appointment. RTC ordered the issuance of an
alias writ of execution in the order dated October 22, 2008.[11] It also subsequently denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.[12]

Dissatisfied, petitioner,through Attorneys Joselito I. Fandiño (Atty. Fandiño)and Voltaire V. Saulon (Atty.
Saulon), the counsels he had retained since the initial stage of the litigation, filed a petition
for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the two (2) Orders of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition
on the ground of lack of legal authority on the part of Atty. Saulon, a private attorney, to represent the
Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the
assailed March 22, 2010 Resolution.

ISSUE: whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized
representation of petitioner by private lawyers.

HELD: YES

The present case stemmed from Special Civil Action for mandamus and damages. The damages sought
therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence, petitioner cannot be deemed to have been
improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal liability on the part of
local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel, explaining:

It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that
capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then
been underwritten by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On
the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of
assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge of
governmental functions, 'municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and
when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the
requirements thereof.

In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In one case, We held
that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a
party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And
in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may
engage the services of private counsel when "the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for
moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private
capacity.[16] (Citations omitted)

Consequently Attys. Fandiño and Saulon had the authority to represent petitioner at the initial stages of
the litigation and this authority continued even up to his appeal[17] and the filing of the petition
for certiorari with the CA respecting the execution of the RTC judgment.[18] It was therefore an error
for the CA to have dismissed the said petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized
representation.