*Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008.

(Apportionment of legislative districts)

Facts:
-Congress enacted RA 9054, the Section 19, Article VI of which delegated to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays.
-Pursuant to such delegation, the ARMM Regional Assembly enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
-(complicated facts but not important to the topic)
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Congress validly delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives;
(2) Whether or not RA 9054 is constitutional;
(3) Whether or not MMA Act 201 is void.
Ruling:
(1) No. The power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or
more, requires also the power to create a legislative district.
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5
(4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts
out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that
Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative
bodies enact.
(2) RA 9054 is unconstitutional. (See above ruling.)
(3) MMA Act 201 is void. (See above ruling.)

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

Facts:
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of
the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.
Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29.
This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint
Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective
sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and
the equal protection clause
Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause
Ratio:
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has a locallygenerated average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
 (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants,
as certified by the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by

metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed
to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under
the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written
in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection clause.
G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina
vs Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita

Facts:
April 3, 2002, the Office of the President advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Surigao del
Norte to deficient population in the propsed Province of Dinagat Islands.
Consequently, Prov. Gov't. of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census with the
assitanc eof the NSo District Census Coordinator to determine the population of Dinagat. The
census yield 371,576 inhabitants. NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census.
Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of Dinagat was
82M . The land area is 802.12 sqkm.
Later, Congress passed the bill for the creation of the Province of Dinagat which was
approved by then President GMA. Then a plebiscite was ratified and approved by the majority.
Consequently, new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their
appointment by PGMA, another set were then elected in the election later.
Petitioners aver that they are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del
Norte, they are Vice-gov and members of the provincial board. They allege that the creation of
the Dinagat Islands as a new province is an illegal act of Congress and unjustly deprives the
people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of its territory, IRA and rich resources from the area.
They also claim that the creation is not valid because it failed to comply with the
population and land area requirement.
Ruling:
Petition is granted. SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if
it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
 Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by
a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
The requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in
absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed
province composed of one or more islands from the land-area requirement cannot be considered
an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an
extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is null and
void.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an
approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12
sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x
x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square
kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of
not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of
Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May
1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of
population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result
was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.34 Moreover,
respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the
original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province.

Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of
gerrymandering on the ground that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a
population of 118,534 inhabitants, from the new province for complete political dominance by
Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. This is unsubstantiated.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists
of one island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate
territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor
Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman.
*Miranda v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999.
(Plebiscite; Conversion: From independent component city to component city)
-On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law.
-On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
-On February 14, 1998, R.A. No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among
others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city.
-Petitioners filed a petition challenging the validity of R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that
it has no provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in
a proper plebiscite.
-Contention of respondents: R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an
independent component city into a component city. It did not involve any “creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units,” and hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8528 is valid despite its lack of provision regarding the
conduct of plebiscite to ratify the reclassification of Santiago City.
Ruling:
No. It is unconstitutional.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or
its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly
affected.”
This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
“Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political
units directly affected.”
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local
government units belongs to Congress. This power is part of the larger power to enact
laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. The exercise of the power must be in
accord with the mandate of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an
independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the
people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on
whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said
constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a
common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of
the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people “in
the political units directly affected.” It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this
constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of
the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed
the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were
created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and
not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local
government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to
any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the
boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their
sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of thepeople as
opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more
autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from
an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be
characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a
political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the
Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have
to be shared with the province. x x x x
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people
thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this
plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago
City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is
more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their
right.
Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite — (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of
boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called
for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or
ordinance
prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. x x x x”
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so
long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly
affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.
Samson vs Aguirre G.R. No. 133076 September 22, 1999

FACTS

Moises S. Samson is incumbent councilor of 1st district of QC

He challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8535 , creating the City of Novaliches out of 15
barangays of Quezon City.

Samson argues that RA 8535 failed to conform to the LGC because: o from the minutes of the
public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government, certifications as to
income, population, and land area were NOT presented to Congress during the deliberations

o The law contained no specification as to seat of government

o no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon
City, would not be adversely affected was submitted

o Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of concerned barangays
calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches

ISSUE W/N RA 8535 is constitutional? YES.

RATIO

Requirement as to certification on compliance with the income, population and land area is met
The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of Representatives.
Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee
on Local Government. The presumption of regularity stands. Moreover, during the public
hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government, resource persons from NSO,
Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), Land Management Bureau, DBM, and officials
of Quezon City were present. The representative from the BLGF estimated the combined average
annual income of the 13 barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26
(>than the 20M minimum requirement). The representative from the NSO estimated the
population in the barangays that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around
347,310 (> than the 150,000 required). There is no need to consider the land area. Under the
LGC, other than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number of
inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is
sufficient. The court also took judicial notice that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.

The official statements of the representatives could serve the same purpose contemplated by law
requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of
either the Senate or the House of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification
submitted to either chamber. Moreover, Samson failed to show that, aside from the oral
declarations during the public hearings, the representatives present did not also submit written
certifications. Samson did not

present a copy of the petition to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as
required by law.

Samson failed to present any concrete evidence on the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by
the creation of the City of Novaliches QC Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present during the
deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local Government, and made no mention of anything
concerning such adverse effects. As chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be
the first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. The
fact that he did not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings is indicative of the non-
existence of such negative issues. Also, in the plebiscite as contemplated on R.A. 8535, all
persons concerned will have the opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote The
omission of R.A. No. 8535 to provide for a seat of government is not fatal to its validity. Under
Section 12 of the LGC, which applies by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535, the City of
Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its creation. While Section 12 speaks of
the site of government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of government, “from
where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered.”

Failure to furnish copy to the QC Council will not render invalid R.A. No. 8535 The evident
purpose of this requirement is to inform the City Council of the move to create another city and
to enable it to formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City
Council members are obviously aware of the petition since matter has been widely publicized in
the mass media. The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in not result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions
the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country.
Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner
ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA – G.R. NO. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of
Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in
the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action
of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue:

Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act
No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?

Held:

Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate
in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives
the House bill.
Mariano v. Comelec, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995.
(Apportionment of legislative districts)
Facts:
-R.A. No. 7854 converted Makati into a highly-urbanized city and created an
additional legislative district. From having been comprised of just one legislative
district, Makati now has two.
-Argument of petitioners: The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7854 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. R.A. No. 7854 is constitutional.
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
Cawaling vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite
conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806,
an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon
In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite
in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed
the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from
the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
plebiscite.

Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional
,contending, in essence, that:

1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which
requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and
the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-
one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be
created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two
municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon

(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution

(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The
phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not
a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province city,
municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of
an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division
shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not
competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the
exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political
departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.”

3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of
the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation
of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation.

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory
is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful
scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other
words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We
hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
*Aquino III v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010.

(Apportionment of legislative districts)

Facts:

-R.A. 9716 created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines

Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

As a result of such reconfiguration, the first district ended up with a population of

only 176,383.

-Argument of the petitioners: R.A. 9716 must be declared unconstitutional because

Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum

population for the creation of a new legislative district, to wit: “x x x Each legislative

district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.

Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall

have at least one representative.”

-Argument of the respondents: The 250,000 minimum population is only a

requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a CITY, but not in a PROVINCE.

Since R.A. 9716 only created an additional legislative district within the province of

Camarines Sur, it should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not R.A. 9716 is constitutional.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. R.A. 9716 is constitutional.

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For

while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned

about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in

order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city

with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or

each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum

population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Plainly read, Section

5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be

entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. x x x x

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population

requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while

Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum

population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to

increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional

district.

Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the

composition of the additional district

*Tan v. Comelec, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986.

(Plebiscite; Creation of Province)

-Congress enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, “An Act Creating a New Province in the

Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.”

-Contained therein is a provision regarding conduct of plebiscite involving the

inhabitants of Negros del Norte only, to the exclusion of the voters from the rest of

the province of Negros Occidental.

-Petitioners—who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various

cities and municipalities therein—went to the Comelec via prohibition, seeking to stop

the conduct of the said plebiscite.

Contentions of respondents: (1) The remaining cities and municipalities of the Province

of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte,

do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term “unit or units affected,” as

referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution; (2) The petition should be

dismissed because the motive and wisdom of B.P. Blg. 885 is a political question that

cannot be challenged by petitioners.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the term “unit or units affected” includes the voters of the mother

province (Negros Occidental) and not only the voters of the newly created province of

Negros del Norte, for purposes of the plebiscite.

(2) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed because the wisdom of B.P. Blg.

885 cannot be challenged by petitioners.

Ruling:

Yes.

Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

“SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished,
or its

boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government

code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units

affected.”

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative

that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the

unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is

substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the

boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be

substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there

can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple

logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first

would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would

be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in

the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed

province of Negros del Norte.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said

constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two

component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion

of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of

the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to

be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The

alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our

Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be

observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a

supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local

government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the

Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no

different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.

(2) No.

We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be

dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged

by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and

motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a

proper subject of judicial inquiry.