PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PANIS G.R. No.
L-58674-77 | 1986-07-11
CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P. D. 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
"(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting,
transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement."
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-
charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate
a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and
promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in
violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense
because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four
informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered
any employment for a fee."
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial
court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on
certiorari.
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under
Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable.
However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without
proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the
definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all
the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement
of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of
an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.
The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and
are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of
an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or
more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does
not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor
to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is
that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is
dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise
of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment
and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will
constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration
of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example,
regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property
entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put them
to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be
given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in
recruitment and placement. (Klepp v. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision
for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available
if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The
trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued
without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own
counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent
results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the
instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts
usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers
seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed
funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception
at the hands of their own countrymen.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and
the four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DARVIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125044 | 1998-07-13
ROMERO, J:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR.
No. 15624 dated January 31, 1996, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, convicting accused-appellant, Imelda Darvin for
simple illegal recruitment under Article 38 and Article 39, in relation to Article 13 (b) and
(c), of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following information:
"That on or about the 13th day of April 1992, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, through fraudulent representation to one Macaria Toledo to the effect that she
has the authority to recruit workers and employees for abroad and can facilitate the
necessary papers in connection thereof, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, hire, recruit and promise a job abroad to one Macaria Toledo, without first
securing the necessary license and permit from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration to do so, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the aforesaid Macaria
Toledo.
Contrary to law." 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of private respondent, Macaria
Toledo, shows that sometime in March, 1992, she met accused-appellant Darvin in the
latter's residence at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite, through the introduction of their common
friends, Florencio Jake Rivera and Leonila Rivera. In said meeting, accused-appellant
allegedly convinced Toledo that by giving her P150,000.00, the latter can immediately
leave for the United States without any appearance before the U.S. embassy. 3 Thus, on
April 13, 1992, Toledo gave Darvin the amount of P150,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt
stating that the 'amount of P150,000.00 was for U.S. Visa and Air fare.' 4 After receiving
the money, Darvin assured Toledo that she can leave within one week. However, when
after a week, there was no word from Darvin, Toledo went to her residence to inquire
about any development, but could not find Darvin. Thereafter, on May 7, 1992, Toledo
filed a complaint with the Bacoor Police Station against Imelda Darvin. Upon further
investigation, a certification was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) stating that Imelda Darvin is neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment. 5 Accused-appellant was then charged for
estafa and illegal recruitment by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, testified that she used to be connected with Dale
Travel Agency and that in 1992, or thereabouts, she was assisting individuals in securing
passports, visa, and airline tickets. She came to know Toledo through Florencio Jake
Rivera, Jr. and Leonila Rivera, alleging that Toledo sought her help to secure a passport,
US visa and airline tickets to the States. She claims that she did not promise any
employment in the U.S. to Toledo. She, however, admits receiving the amount of
P150,000.00. from the latter on April 13, 1992 but contends that it was used for necessary
expenses of an intended trip to the United States of Toledo and her friend, Florencio
Rivera 6 as follows: P45,000.00 for plane fare for one person; P1,500.00 for passport,
documentation and other incidental expenses for each person; P20,000.00 for visa
application cost for each person; and P17,000.00 for services. 7 After receiving the
money, she allegedly told Toledo that the papers will be released within 45 days. She
likewise testified that she was able to secure Toledo's passport on April 20, 1992 and
even set up a date for an interview with the US embassy. Accused alleged that she was
not engaged in illegal recruitment but merely acted as a travel agent in assisting
individuals to secure passports and visa.
In its judgment rendered on June 17, 1993, the Bacoor, Cavite RTC found accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of simple illegal recruitment but acquitted her of the crime of
estafa. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Imelda Darvin is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment for having committed
the prohibited practice as defined by paragraph (b) of Article 34 and punished by
paragraph (c) of Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 2018.
Accused Imelda Darvin is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of Four (4) years, as
minimum, to Eight (8) years, as maximum; and to pay the fine of P25,000.00.
Regarding her civil liability, she is hereby ordered to reimburse the private complainant
the sum of P150,000.00 and attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
She is hereby acquitted of the crime of Estafa.
SO ORDERED." 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this
petition.
Before this Court, accused-appellant assails the decision of the trial and appellate courts
in convicting her of the crime of simple illegal recruitment. She contends that based on
the evidence presented by the prosecution, her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
We find the appeal impressed with merit.
Article 13 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the definition of recruitment and
placement as:
". . .; b) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
On the other hand, Article 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and
Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
xxx xxx xxx
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements
need to be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken
recruitment activities; and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do
so. 9
In this case, private respondent, Macaria Toledo alleged that she was offered a job in the
United States as nursing aide 10 by accused-appellant. In her direct examination, she
testified as follows:
"Atty Alejandro:
Q. How did you come to know the accused?
Witness
I was introduced by my two friends. One of whom is my best friend. That according to
them, this accused has connections and authorizations, that she can make people leave
for abroad, sir.
Court

What connections?
Witness
That she has connections with the Embassy and with people whom she can approach
regarding work abroad, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you came to meet for the first time in Imus, Cavite, what transpired in that
meeting of yours?
A. When I came to her house, the accused convinced me that by means of P150,000.00,
I will be able to leave immediately without any appearance to any embassy, non-
appearance, Sir.
Q. When you mentioned non-appearance, as told to you by the accused, precisely, what
do you mean by that?
A. I was told by the accused that non-appearance, means without working personally for
my papers and through her efforts considering that she is capacitated as according to her
I will be able to leave the country, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Alejandro
What transpired after the accused told you all these things that you will be able to secure
all the documents without appearing to anybody or to any embassy and that you will be
able to work abroad?
Witness
She told me to get ready with my P150,000.00, that is if I want to leave immediately, Sir.
Atty. Alejandro
When you mentioned kaagad, how many days or week?
Witness
She said that if I will able to part with my P150,000.00. I will be able to leave in just one
week time, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx" 11
The prosecution, as evidence, presented the certification issued by the POEA that
accused-appellant Imelda Darvin is not licensed to recruit workers abroad.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant does not have a license or authority to engage in
recruitment activities. The pivotal issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the
accused-appellant indeed engaged in recruitment activities, as defined under the Labor
Code. Applying the rule laid down in the case of People v. Goce, 12 to prove that accused-
appellant was engaged in recruitment activities as to commit the crime of illegal
recruitment, it must be shown that the accused appellant gave private respondent the
distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the private respondent abroad
for work such that the latter was convinced to part with her money in order to be so
employed.
In this case, we find no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job
to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was
capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however,
is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.00. The claim of the
accused that the P150,000.00 was for payment of private respondent's air fare and US
visa and other expenses cannot be ignored because the receipt for the P150,000.00,
which was presented by both parties during the trial of the case, stated that it was "for Air
Fare and Visa to USA." 13 Had the amount been for something else in addition to air fare
and visa expenses, such as work placement abroad, the receipt should have so stated.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual,
without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of
private respondent, there is nothing to show that accused-appellant engaged in
recruitment activities. We also note that the prosecution did not present the testimonies
of witnesses who could have corroborated the charge of illegal recruitment, such as
Florencio Rivera, and Leonila Rivera, when it had the opportunity to do so. As it stands,
the claim of private respondent that accused-appellant promised her employment abroad
is uncorroborated. All these, taken collectively, cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused.
This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of private respondent that she was
offered by accused-appellant employment abroad, nor on mere presumptions and
conjectures, to convict the latter. No sufficient evidence was shown to sustain the
conviction, as the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish that accused-
appellant indeed engaged in recruitment activities, thus committing the crime of illegal
recruitment.
In criminal cases, the burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
the essential elements of the offense with which the accused is charged; and if the proof
fails to establish any of the essential elements necessary to constitute a crime, the
defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. 14
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion
that accused-appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is
insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When the People's evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused's authorship of the crime
of which he stands accused, then it is the Court's duty, and the accused's right, to proclaim
his innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. 15
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 15624 dated January 31, 1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Imelda Darvin is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, let the accused be immediately released from her place of confinement
unless there is reason to detain her further for any other legal or valid cause. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAPIS
G.R. Nos. 145734-35 | 2002-10-15
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Illegal recruiters prey on our gullible and impoverished people by inveigling them with false
or fraudulent promises of attractive employment in foreign shores. Such vultures deserve
the full sanction of the law.
The Case
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo appeal the March 6, 2000 Joint Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 138), finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court rules -
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112[,] accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are
pronounced guilty of violating Section 6, of Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and they are both sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment. Pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 7, Republic Act No. 8042,
considering that both accused are non-licensers or non-holders of authority, they are both
sentenced to pay fines of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) each. Both accused are
ordered to indemnify both complainants jointly and severally of the amount of
P118,000.00, the net amount after deducting the recovery of P40,000.00. They are
likewise ordered to pay both complainants jointly and severally the amounts of P24,000.00
as reimbursement for traveling expenses; P4,000.00 as rental for boarding house, and
P100,000.00 as unrealized income;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113[,] accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are
guilty of violating Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and they are both
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
No civil liability need be imposed considering that in Criminal Case No. 99-1112 the same
was already provided.
Let the case as against Jane Am-amlao and Aida de Leon be sent to the archives to be
revived upon arrest, surrender or acquisition of jurisdiction over their person.
SO ORDERED. [2]
Two separate Informations,[3] both dated April 20, 1999, charged appellants with
syndicated illegal recruitment under Republic Act (RA) 8042[4] and estafa under
paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.[5]
In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, they were charged as follows:
"That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit the herein complainants, MELCHOR F. DEGSI and PERPETUA L. DEGSI for
employment as an office worker and as a cook or mechanic in Japan, for and in
consideration thereof, they were required to pay the amount of P158,600.00 as alleged
placement and processing fees, which the complainants delivered and paid the amount
of P158,600.00 Philippine Currency, without the accused having deployed the
complainants despite the lapse of several months, to their damage and prejudice." [6]
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, the Information reads:
"That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit and promise employment to spouses MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI in Japan
for a total consideration of one hundred fifty eight thousand and six hundred pesos
(P158,600.00) as placement and processing fees, knowing that they have no capacity
whatsoever and with no intention to fulfill their promise, but merely as a pretext, scheme
or excuse to get or exact money from said complainant as they in fact collected and
received the amount of P158,600.00 from said MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI to
their damage, loss and prejudice for the aforesaid amount." [7]
With the assistance of their counsel de oficio,[8] appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charges during their arraignment on July 27, 1999.[9]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) relates how appellants, despite their lack of
authority or license, represented themselves as persons who had the capacity to send the
victims abroad for employment. We quote its version of the facts as follows:
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Melchor Degsi and Perpetua Degsi
('Complainants' for brevity) and Priscilla Marreo (or Priscilla Marelo).
The prosecution and appellants stipulated that appellants are not licensed or authorized
to recruit workers for employment abroad, in lieu of the testimony of Senior Labor
Researcher Johnson Bolivar of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
Complainants are husband and wife, residents of Baguio City. They made a living earning
an average of P20,000.00 a month by selling fish and vegetables in a rented stall in said
City, at least until March 24, 1998 when they closed shop for reasons of attending to the
demands of the promised jobs for them in Japan. Both categorically identified Jane Am-
amlao (or Jean Am-amlaw), their co-vendor in Baguio City Market, as the person who
approached them and assured them that she knew a legal recruiter, an ex-POEA
employee, who had the capacity to send them both abroad. Jane Am-amlaw (or 'Am-
amlaw' for brevity) recruited complainants and personally accompanied them on March
24, 1998 to meet the person she earlier referred to, or Aida de Leon (or Alma de Leon),
in the latter's apartment at No. 7280 J. Victor St., Pio del Pilar, Makati.
Complainants likewise categorically identified Aida de Leon ('de leon' for brevity) as the
person who arranged a meeting in her apartment on March 24, 1998 between
complainants and appellant Angel Mateo ('Mateo' for brevity) whom de Leon introduced
as their contact person for Japan-bound workers. In said meeting, Mateo represented
himself as having the capacity to send people abroad and showed complainants various
documents to convince them of his legitimate recruitment operations. Convinced that
Mateo had indeed the capacity to facilitate their employment as an office worker and as a
cook or mechanic in Japan, complainants, on that same day, handed Mateo P15,000.00
which Mateo required them to pay for their processing fees. This was to be the first of a
series of sums of money to be extracted from complainants.
Complainants were able to positively identify Mateo in court as the contact person of de
Leon and who collected from them, from March 24, 1998 to June 23, 1998, sums of money
for the alleged necessary expenses relative to the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan
in the total amount of P158,600.00. Complainants likewise categorically identified Mateo
as the same person whose authorization was needed for the recovery of P40,000.00 of
the P45,000.00 they gave Mateo who in turn deposited it to Sampaguita Travel Agency
under his own name.
Complainants likewise positively identified appellant Vicenta 'Vicky' Lapis ('Lapis' for
brevity) in Court as the person introduced to them by Mateo as his wife on April 29, 1998
at Max's Restaurant in Makati when Lapis required complainants to pay P49,240.00 for
their plane tickets and travel taxes. Lapis is, in fact, only the live-in partner of Mateo. Lapis
told complainants that she was helping to speed up the process[ing] of their papers
relative to the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan. Complainants met again Lapis, who
was with Mateo on May 2, 1998 at the Makati Restaurant, annex of Max's Restaurant,
when Lapis assured them that Mateo could really send them abroad and even wrote in a
piece of paper appellants' address at Phase I, Lot 14, Blk 13 Mary Cris Subd., Imus,
Cavite. On May 17, 1998, complainants once more met Lapis who was with Mateo, de
Leon and de Leon's husband in Baguio City at the house of Priscilla Marreo's daughter.
Both appellants updated complainant as to the status of their paper and reiterated their
promise that complainants would soon be leaving for Japan, then collected from
complainants unreceipted amount of P20,000.00. Complainants met again with Lapis,
who was again with Mateo, on May 19, 1998 at the Sampaguita Travel Agency. Mateo
extracted P45,000.00 from complainants and deposited it under his name. On that
occasion, Perpetua wanted to ask from the Sampaguita Travel Agency's employees
where to pay the P45,000.00 but failed to do so because Lapis took her attention away
from asking while Mateo asked Melchor to hand over to him said sum.
Priscilla Marreo ('Priscilla' for brevity) is the sister of Melchor who loaned complainants
part of the P158,000.00 which appellants extracted from complainant[s]. Thus, she made
herself present in most of the meetings between complainants and appellants together
with the two other accused where she witnessed the assurances and promises made by
appellants relative to complainants' immediate departure for Japan and their
corresponding demands of sums of money. The testimony of Priscilla underscored the
testimony of complainants showing that Am-amlaw, de Leon, Lapis and Mateo indeed
corroborated and confederated in the commission of illegal recruitment.
The prosecution presented documentary evidence, such as varied unofficial receipts all
bearing the signature of Mateo; 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' of Perpetua L. Degsi executed on
July 21, 1998; Affidavit executed by complainants on July 21, 1998; Requirement for
Guarantee Letter of Visa bearing the names of both private complainants; Request for
Certification of POEA-CIDG, Team to Mr. Hermogenes Mateo, Director II, Licensing
Branch of POEA as represented by Johnson Bolivar, Senior Labor Researcher of POEA,
and the various documents that complainants alleged to have been shown to them by
Mateo to prove the legality of his recruitment operations. [10] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
For their part, appellants deny that they were engaged in recruitment activities, and that
they promised foreign employment to the victims. Below is the version of the facts
presented by the defense:
VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS testified that she is the live-in partner of her co-accused Mateo.
They have been living together for almost three (3) years. According to her, she first met
both complainants at Max's Restaurant in Makati when they talked to accused Mateo. She
was there only to accompany her live-in partner. The subject of the conversation between
the complainants and accused Mateo was a contract in Baguio City. She did not see
complainant deliver money to accused Mateo while they were in that meeting. She also
has no knowledge about the transaction between complainant and accused Mateo. She
admitted that she went to Baguio City together with accused Mateo to talk to the City
Mayor. She likewise admitted that the handwriting appearing in Exhibit 'F' is hers but the
reason why she gave it was only to comply to the request of the complainant Perpetua
Degsi regarding a matter to be followed up at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The result of her follow-up rendered was that complainant Perpetua Degsi has a pending
case of estafa.
"ANGEL MATEO averred that he is engaged in the importation of heavy equipment and
containers but he has never been engaged in recruitment. To prove that he was really
engaged in the delivery of heavy equipment, he presented a document of Import Service
signed by a certain Alexander Arcilla addressed to Honorable Timoteo Encar Jr., City
Mayor, Cavite City dated March 14, 1997 and were marked as Exhibit '1' and '1-a'. He
also presented another document of Import Services issued by the Department of Trade
and Industry addressed to Honorable Mayor Maliksi as Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite;
a photocopy of a Bill of Lading from Trade Bulk cargoes by Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.;
and Invoice of used vehicles, airconditioners and washing machines and the packing list
which were all marked as Exhibits 3 to 5. Sometime in March 24, 1998, he met the
complainants at Pio del Pilar, in Makati City at the apartment of accused Aida de Leon.
He went there to follow-up their transaction about heavy equipment with Mayor Binay
because, it was accused de Leon who entered the transaction with Mayor Binay. While
he was there, the complainants were introduced to him by accused de Leon. He admitted
meeting the complainants on April 29, 1998 at Max's Restaurant but the reason was for
him to meet Mrs. Marero in person and also because complainant Perpetua Degsi has a
pending case for large scale estafa and she needed a clearance. He denied having signed
Exhibit 'B'. He further claimed that the topic of their meeting was to supply heavy
equipment in Baguio City. He denied having asked for P50,000.00 on May 6, 1999. He
likewise denied signing the receipt showing the total amount of P158,600.00." [11]
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court held that the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established the
criminal liability of appellants for the crimes charged. It ruled in this manner:
Evidence for the prosecution clearly established that both complainants were enticed by
accused Mateo and were led to believe that the latter has the capacity to send them for
employment to Japan. Complainant Melchor Degsi and his wife Perpetua Degsi both
testified to this fact. Acting on their belief that indeed accused Mateo can deploy them to
Japan, amounts were disbursed by both complainants to accused Mateo to cover the
processing and placement fees. x x x The Court finds the evidence presented by the
prosecution sufficient to establish that accused Mateo violated Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8042 when he demanded amounts for placement and processing fees but he failed
to deploy both complainants. The Court has a similar conclusion insofar as the accusation
for estafa is concerned as the evidence shows accused Mateo knew beforehand that he
has no capacity to deploy both complainants abroad and that the enticement to work
abroad was merely a scheme or plan to exact money from both complainants. Deception
was proven.
Insofar as the accused Lapis is concerned it is to be noted that the theory of the
prosecution is that she acted in conspiracy with her co-accused Mateo who is her live-in
partner. Evidence for the prosecution shows that at least on three (3) occasions accused
Lapis was present when accused Mateo asked and received money from complainants in
connection with their intended employment in Japan. x x x The Court conclude[d] that
accused Lapis has knowledge of the intention of her co-accused Mateo in asking for
money from both complainants. There was active participation on her part in the
recruitment of both complainants and in deceiving them about the capacity to secure
employment. The Court believes that conspiracy was established beyond reasonable
doubt. Her defense of ignorance of the transaction cannot be considered given the
positive evidence presented by the prosecution which should prevail over her plain denial.
[12]
Hence, this appeal.[13]
The Issues
In their Brief, appellants interpose the following assignment of errors:
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violations of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers' and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995) committed by a syndicate and Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant Vicenta Medina Lapis guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.
III
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
IV
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. [14]
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Appellants aver that the finding of syndicated illegal recruitment by the lower court was
erroneous; its conclusion that the offense was committed by three (3) or more persons
had no factual or legal basis. Allegedly, without sufficient evidence, the trial court
wrongfully presumed that all of them had acted in conspiracy. According to them, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had conspired and
confederated in illegally recruiting complainants. Appellants conclude that, if at all, they
could only be held liable for illegal recruitment in its simple form. We disagree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders have
no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within
the meaning of recruitment and placement[15] defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code.[16]
Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers[;] and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes.[17]
We believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense
sufficiently. The case records reveal that appellants did in fact engage in recruitment and
placement activities by promising complainants employment in Japan. Undisputed is the
fact that the former did not have any valid authority or license to engage in recruitment
and placement activities. Moreover, the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly show that, in consideration of their promise of foreign
employment, they indeed received various amounts of money from complainants totalling
P158,600.
Where appellants made misrepresentations concerning their purported power and
authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected from
complainants various amounts in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly
committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.[18] In fact, this Court held that illegal
recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons who
have the ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the
impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to
induce the latter to tender payment of fees.[19]
It is also important to determine whether illegal recruitment committed by appellants can
be qualified as a syndicated illegal recruitment or an offense involving economic sabotage.
Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage when it is committed by a syndicate or carried out by a group of three
or more persons conspiring and confederating with one another.
In several cases, illegal recruitment has been deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with each other
in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under
Article 38(b) of the Labor Code.[20]
In this case, it cannot be denied that all four (4) accused -- Jane Am-amlaw, Aida de Leon,
Angel Mateo and Vicenta Medina Lapis - participated in a network of deception. Verily,
the active involvement of each in the various phases of the recruitment scam formed part
of a series of machinations. Their scheme was to lure complainants to Manila and to divest
them of their hard-earned money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The
prosecution evidence shows that complainants were convinced by Jane Am-amlaw to go
to Manila to meet someone who could find employment for them abroad. Upon reaching
the city, they were introduced to Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo; Mateo claimed to have
the contacts, the resources and the capacity to employ them overseas. After that initial
meeting, complainants made several payments to him, supposedly for the processing
requirements of their deployment to Japan. Later on, they met Vicenta Medina Lapis who
volunteered her assistance in the processing of their employment papers and assured
them that Mateo could easily send them abroad. Complainant Perpetua Degsi testified on
the devious trail of transactions with all of the accused as follows:
Q How did you come to know the accused in this case?
A They were introduced to me by one Aida de Leon and Jane Am-Amlao.
Q Who is this Jane Am-Amlao you are referring to?
A She is our co-member in Baguio.
Q What is she in relation to your recruitment by Angel Mateo and Vicenta Lapis?
A She was the first one who mentioned to us that she knows somebody who has the
capacity to send us abroad.
Q When was this?
A March, 1998.
Q When Jane Am-Amlao told you that she knows somebody who has the capacity to send
you abroad what happened next?
A On March 24, 1998 Jane accompanied us here in Manila.
Q Where in Manila particularly?
A At No. 72 J. Victor Street, Pio del Pilar, Makati in the apartment of Aida de Leon.
Q So what happened at the apartment of Aida de Leon?
A Jane told us that Aida de Leon was an ex-employee of POEA and she was able to send
many workers abroad.
Q Were you able to meet Aida de Leon?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q What happened when you met her?
A Aida called us by phone and according to her she has the contact person who can
explain [to] us the details on how to be able to work abroad.
Q After Aida called you up on the phone what happened next?
A We waited because according to her, that person is coming over to the house.
Q A[fter] waiting what happened after that?
A ANGEL MATEO arrived and he was introduced to me as the contact person and we
could ask him how we could work abroad.
Q Who is this siya, you are referring to?
A ANGEL MATEO.
Q Who introduced you to ANGEL MATEO?
A AIDA DE LEON.
Q After introducing you to ANGEL MATEO what happened?
A ANGEL MATEO showed us some documents AND HE WAS ABLE TO convince us that
he has the capacity to send us abroad.
Q What documents were shown to you?
A Incorporation documents of two companies one, Philippine company and one is Japan
company and some other documents they made in order to send workers abroad.
Q After convincing you that he can send you abroad what happened after that?
A He asked for a processing fee and I asked him how much.
Q What did he tell you?
A He told me that he does not know because AIDA DE LEON will be the one to give us
the price.
Q After that what happened?
A I asked AIDA how much and she answered, twenty thousand pesos.
Q After telling you that the amount is P20,000.00 what happened next?
A We went to the bank to withdraw P20,000.00 but we were only able to withdraw
P15,000.00 and then we handed the P15,000.00 to ANGEL MATEO, in front of Jane Am-
Amlaw.
Q After receiving said amount from you by ANGEL MATEO what happened next?
A We parted ways.
Q Was there anything else that happened after that?
A Before we parted ways, [he] asked from us other documents like ID, birth certificate,
marriage contract in order for him to begin processing our papers.
Q After that what happened next?
A On March 31, we went back to [him] and we gave [him] the other documents needed
and we also gave [him] the balance for the processing fee.
Q Who is this niya or he you are referring to?
A Angel Mateo.
Q Where did you meet?
A [He] called me and we met in the apartment of AIDA.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in the apartment of AIDA DE LEON?
A Yes.
Q What happened there?
A We gave [him] the documents and we started processing the documents
Q What are those documents that you gave to ANGEL MATEO?
A Birth certificate authenticated, marriage contract and passport IDs and then we went to
Pasay City to start the processing of the passport.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO asked for the balance of P5,000.00, were you able to
pay the said amount to ANGEL MATEO?
A Yes, ma'am.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After receiving said amount of P5,000.00 what happened?
A After that meeting at Pasay City we parted ways but [he] did not issue us any receipt so
on April 15, [he] again called us up and told me that he needs NBI clearance so we
processed our NBI clearance.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO called you, where were you at that time?
A Baguio City.
Q Were you able to come here in Manila?
A Yes ma'am, we met in Quiapo.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in QUIAPO?
A [He] did not arrive in Quiapo.
Q So what did you do?
A We proceeded [to] the NBI and we called up AIDA and asked her why ANGEL MATEO
did not arrive and whom did AIDA talk to.
Q What was the reply of AIDA DE LEON?
A She told me that whatever ANGEL MATEO would tell us, that's what we should follow.
Q After that what happened?
A The processing of our NBI clearance did not finish so on April 15 ANGEL MATEO asked
for P2,000.00 in order to help us process the NBI.
Q After calling you on April 15, what happened next?
A On April 29, 1998 me, my sister, Melchor, and Melchor's sister together with ANGEL
MATEO met at Max's Restaurant in Makati.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO?
A Yes ma'am, they arrived together with somebody whom [she] introduced to us as [his]
wife.
Q Who is this wife you are referring to?
A She is Vicky Lapis, and later on we found out that she is Vicenta Medina Lapis.

Q What was this meeting all about?
A We were updated on what was happening on our papers and then ANGEL MATEO
AND VICENTA LAPIS asked for a plane ticket.
Q What was the update for the processing of your papers?
xxxxxxxxx
A Vicenta Lapis told us that she is just helping to speed up the processing of papers so
that we could be sent abroad immediately and she even showed us some documents and
I even told her that I could help them in typing those documents. [21]
The foregoing testimony very clearly demonstrates that the individual actuations of all four
(4) accused were directed at a singular criminal purpose -- to delude complainants into
believing that they would be employed abroad. The nature and the extent of the former's
interactions among themselves as well as with the latter clearly show unity of action
towards a common undertaking. Certainly, complainants would not have gone to Manila
to meet Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo without the prodding of Am-amlaw. They would
not have made various payments for their travel and employment papers without the
fraudulent representations of Mateo De Leon. Moreover, they would not have complied
with further instructions and demands of Mateo without the repeated assurances made
by Lapis.
Even assuming that the individual acts of the accused were not necessarily indispensable
to the commission of the offense, conspiracy would have still been present. Their actions,
when viewed in relation to one another, showed a unity of purpose towards a common
criminal enterprise and a concurrence in their resolve to commit it.
In People v. Gamboa,[22] the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of conspiracy in
the context of illegal recruitment as follows:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of
the malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime
clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in execution. Direct proof of
previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the
accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. As such, all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the
crime of illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. [23]
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the
conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.[24]
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by
the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed.[25]
The OSG avers, as an incident to this issue, and in line with People v. Yabut,[26] that
complainants are entitled to recover interest on the amount of P118,000, which the trial
court awarded from the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid. We agree with
the OSG's observation and hereby grant the legal interest on the amount prayed for.
In a number of cases,[27] this Court has affirmed the trial court's finding that victims of
illegal recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the amount to be recovered as
indemnity, from the time of the filing of the information until fully paid.
Second Issue:
Appellants' Liability for Estafa
Appellants argue that in a prosecution for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting of fraudulent
representations or false statements of the accused, be made prior to or simultaneous with
the delivery of the thing; and that such misrepresentations or false statements induce the
complainants to part with the object of the crime. The former allege that the prosecution
failed to point out with certainty whether their misrepresentations or false statements were
made prior to or at least simultaneous with the latter's delivery of the money.
Under the cited provision of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business; by imaginary
transactions or similar forms of deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with the fraud.[28]
Moreover, these false pretenses should have been the very reason that motivated
complainants to deliver property or pay money to the perpetrators of the fraud. While
appellants insist that these constitutive elements of the crime were not sufficiently shown
by the prosecution, the records of the case prove otherwise.
During almost all of their meetings, complainants paid various amounts of money to
appellants only after hearing the feigned assurances proffered by the latter regarding the
former's employment prospects in Japan. Even as early as their first meeting in the house
of Aida de Leon, the payment by complainants of the initial amount of P15,000 was
immediately preceded by an onslaught of promises. These enticing, albeit empty,
promises were made by Angel Mateo, who even showed them documents purportedly
evincing his connections with various foreign companies. Equally important, they relied
on such misrepresentations, which convinced them to pay the initial amount as
"processing fees." Complainant Melchor Degsi testified on the matter in this wise:
"Prosecutor Ong:
So when Angel Mateo arrived at the apartment of Aida de Leon, what did he do, if any?
Witness:
He introduced himself to us and told us that he can easily send us to Japan because he
knows many Japanese employers and he also showed us some documents, ma'am.
(Nagpakilala siya at ang sabi niya ay kayang-kaya niya kaming padalhin sa Japan dahil
marami siyang kilalang Japanese employer at may ipinakita siyang mga dokumento,
ma'am).
Q What are these documents, if you remember, that were shown to you?
A Papers of Japanese companies, Clean Supplies Co. Ltd., Arabian Boy Express
Corporation and that is the reason why we were convinced, ma'am.
Q So, after being convinced that Angel Mateo can send you abroad, what did you do after
that?
A Nakumbinsi nga po kami at pagkatapos noon ay nag-usap-usap silang tatlo nina Jean
Am-amlaw at humihingi na sila ng processing fee na P20,000, ma'am.
Q So what did you do when they were already asking for the amount of P20,000 from you
as processing fee?
A We told them that we do not have any money that time and we have to withdraw from
the bank and then we went to Pasay and we withdrew the amount of P15,000.00 so that
was the only amount we were able to give them that time, ma'am.
Q Who were with you when you withdrew the said amount from the bank in Pasay?
A Jean Am-amlaw and Angel Mateo, ma'am.
Q Who received the amount of P15,000?
A Angel Mateo in front of Jean Am-amlaw, ma'am."[29]
From the foregoing, it is evident that the false statements that convinced complainants of
the authenticity of the transaction were made prior to their payment of the various fees.
Indubitably, the requirement that the fraudulent statements should have been made prior
to or simultaneous with the actual payment was satisfied.
Verily, by their acts of falsely representing themselves as persons who had the power and
the capacity to recruit workers for abroad, appellants induced complainants to pay the
required fees.[30] There is estafa if, through insidious words and machinations, appellants
deluded complainants into believing that, for a fee, the latter would be provided overseas
jobs.[31]
Although we agree with the ruling of the RTC convicting appellants of estafa, we note that
it failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalty. Under Section
1 of that law, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty
properly imposed, considering the attending circumstances; while the minimum term shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code.[32] Hence,
pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court should have fixed the
minimum and the maximum penalties.[33]
The Revised Penal Code provides the penalties for estafa as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000.00 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be."
Considering that complainants were defrauded in excess of the P22,000 limit fixed by law,
the maximum penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its minimum period, or six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000
in excess of the P22,000 limit. The total amount defrauded from the complainants was
P158,600 -- or P136,600 in excess of P22,000, which translates to an additional prison
sentence of thirteen (13) years based on the aforementioned computation. Accordingly,
the maximum penalty to be imposed should be nineteen (19) years and one (1) day to
twenty-one (21) years, thus raising the penalty to reclusion temporal. However, the penal
provisions for the crime of estafa provide that the total penalty to be imposed should not
in any case exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113 for estafa, consonant with the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
appellants should thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of
prision mayor which is the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Indeed, the expression "the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense," used in Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, means the penalty next lower than that determined by the
court in the case before it as the maximum.[34]
Third Issue:
Liability as Co-conspirator
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court should not have convicted Vicenta Medina
Lapis because the prosecution evidence did not sufficiently prove her participation in the
conspiracy to defraud the victims. They maintain that she merely accompanied Angel
Mateo during his meetings with complainants and that she had no knowledge of the
intentions of her co-accused. They add that mere knowledge, acquiescence or agreement
to cooperate is not enough to constitute one as a co-conspirator.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, Lapis not only knew of the conspiracy, but
she also offered her assistance in the processing of the employment requirements of
complainants. Contrary to her claim that she was merely an unknowing spectator in the
underhanded transactions, she deliberately inveigled them into pursuing the promise of
foreign employment. The records clearly bely her claim of innocence and indicate that her
participation in the criminal scheme transcends mere knowledge or acquiescence.
Complainant Melchor Degsi describes one of the many instances of how deeply involved
Lapis was in the whole recruitment charade:
"Prosecutor Ong:
Mr. Witness, you testified a while ago that you were at Max Restaurant together with
Vicenta Lapis and Angel Mateo?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Q: Could you remember what Vicenta Medina [Lapis] said to you?
A: She promised that we will be sent to Japan sooner as OCW, ma'am.
Q: Could you recall how she said it?
A: She said 'Sigurado kay, makakapunta kayo ng Japan', ma'am.
Q: During that time that she was telling you 'sigurado kay makakapunta kayo ng Japan',
did she show you anything?
A: Tinanong namin ang address nila at kusang loob na ibinigay ni Vicenta Medina [Lapis]
sa amin ang address at direksyon para makapunta kami sa Imus, Cavite, ma'am.
Q: What was the reason why Vicenta Medina Lapis gave you the address?
A: Para sigurado raw kami na hindi sila illegal kaya ibinigay niya ang address nila, ma'am."
[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all regardless of the
degree of individual participation.[36] Moreover, the precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator becomes merely a secondary
consideration.[37] Notwithstanding nonparticipation in every detail of the execution of the
crime, the culpability of the accused still exists.[38]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, appellants are ordered to pay legal interest on the
amount of P118,000 from the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, appellants are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOGAN
G.R. Nos. 135030-33 | 2001-07-20
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Joint Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-66231 to Q-96-66234 convicting the appellant
of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.
The appellant, Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with three (3) counts of the crime
of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in three
(3) separate informations which, save for the names of the private complainants and
amounts involved,[2] are substantially worded, thus:
Criminal Case No. Q-96-66231:
That on or about and during the period comprised from January to August 1994 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Rodrigo Acorda y Javier in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestation and fraudulent representations which she made to said
Rodrigo Acorda y Javier to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ factory and construction worker for Japan and could facilitate the processing of
the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and
by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Rodrigo
Acorda y Javier and to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P65,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P65,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Rodrigo Acorda y Javier in the aforesaid amount of P65,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the other hand, the information charging the appellant Mercy Logan y Calderon with
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, under Article 38(b) in relation to Article 39(a)
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, reads:
That in or about and during the period comprised from the year 1993 to August 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, enlist, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons, to wit:
NAME AMOUNT
1. Rodrigo Acorda ------- P65,000.00
2. Orlando Velasco ------- P145,000.00
3. Florante Casia ---------- P100,000.00
Without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group as penalized under Art(s). 38
and 39, as amended by P.D. 2018, of the Labor Code (P.D. 442).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on October 1, 1996, the appellant, assisted by counsel of her
choice, entered separate pleas of 'Not guilty' to each of the Informations in the instant
criminal cases. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that private respondent Rodrigo
Acorda went to the office of the appellant, Mercy Logan, at 180-D Monterey Street, 15th
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City sometime in January 1994. Rodrigo was informed by the
appellant who purported to do business under the name and style Logan Promotion of
Arts and Talents,[3] that she could recruit or secure for him employment in Japan. After
having communicated his desire to apply for work in Japan, Rodrigo was required by the
appellant to pay a placement fee in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00). Rodrigo initially paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)[4] to the
appellant on January 31, 1994 and he was required to fill up an application form.[5]
While his travel documents were allegedly being processed, Rodrigo was asked by the
appellant to pay the additional amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) which
the former did on February 7, 1994.[6] On April 27, 1994, Rodrigo paid her the amount of
Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00)[7] this time allegedly for the processing of his
working visa.[8]
Rodrigo visited the appellant at her office on several occasions to inquire about his
employment application but he was told by the appellant to return each time inasmuch as
his travel documents were allegedly not yet processed. After losing his patience, Rodrigo
requested the appellant to return his money. The appellant then issued two (2) Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) checks, with Serial Nos. 276712 and 276713[9], in the total
amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) payable to Rodrigo Acorda. Rodrigo
attempted to deposit the two (2) BPI checks with the said drawee bank but he was
informed that the account of the appellant with the bank was already closed.[10] The
appellant failed to make good her subsequent promise to pay back the amount to him.
Rodrigo discovered later that the appellant was not duly licensed to recruit applicants for
overseas employment.[11]
Private complainant Florante Casia met the appellant at her office through a friend who
was also a job applicant. The appellant required him to pay her the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) in consideration of an alleged employment
as construction worker in Japan. After some haggling, they settled for the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) which Florante paid to the appellant in two (2)
installments.[12] Thereafter, the appellant required Florante to fill up an application form
and to submit his bio-data.[13]
After several futile visits to the office of the appellant, Florante likewise grew tired of her
assurances for an employment in Japan. He filed a complaint with the police in Camp
Crame, Quezon City when appellant failed to return his money despite her promises and
after having learned at the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) that the
appellant was not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas employment.[14]
Private complainant Orlando Velasco applied for work at the office of the appellant in
December 1993 after he was informed that the appellant could secure jobs and send job
applicants to Japan for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). He
paid, without asking for a receipt, Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to the appellant as
initial payment for the processing of his passport and other travel documents.[15] On
February 8, 1994 he and his mother paid the balance in the amount of One Hundred Forty
Five Thousand Pesos (P145,000.00)[16].
Like the other private complainants in the instant criminal cases, Orlando relied on
appellant's promises of employment in Japan. After failing to receive his working visa,
Orlando attempted to contact the appellant by telephone who, by then, had already
disappeared. He realized his misfortune after learning at the POEA that the appellant was
not a licensed job recruiter, thus prompting him to seek assistance from the police.[17]
Appellant Mercy Logan denied that she swindled the private complainants of their money
nor promised them any overseas employment. Appellant disclosed that she maintained a
dance studio at 180-D Monterey Street, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City that was
available only to females, and that a certain Gloria de Leon used to refer women to the
appellant who wished to practice dancing in her studio. Appellant claimed that the private
complainants merely vented their anger on her after Gloria de Leon whose services were
earlier engaged by them, absconded without fulfilling her undertaking to provide them
overseas employment for a fee.[18]
Although she admitted having signed the two (2) BPI checks for the amounts of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00), respectively,
payable to Rodrigo Acorda, the appellant denied having actually received the said
amounts inasmuch as, according to her, she merely accommodated Gloria de Leon who
promised her that she (de Leon) would redeem the said checks. Anent the amount of One
Hundred Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P145,000.00) paid by Orlando Velasco, she
declared that the same was also actually received by Gloria de Leon in her office.
Appellant denied having signed the receipts for the amounts of Seventy Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00), respectively,
evidencing payment by Florante Casia. However, on cross-examination, she admitted that
the same were prepared with her approval.[19]
Lastly, the appellant declared that she had delivered her sala set to Orlando Velasco who
agreed to withdraw his complaint against her in consideration thereof.[20]
After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision on February 10, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which, reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding MERCY LOGAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in all the four (4) cases at bench (3 for Estafa and 1 for
Large- scale Illegal Recruitment), and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
term of:
1. In Q-96-66231 (for Estafa involving P60,000.00), six (6) years of prision correccional
as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum;
2. In Q-96-66232 (for Estafa involving P100,000.00), six (6) years of prision correccional
as maximum (sic) to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum;
3. In Q-96-66233 (for Estafa involving P150,000.00), six (6) years of prision correccional
as minimum to nineteen (19) years of reclusion temporal as maximum;
4. In Q-96-66233 (sic) (for Large-scale Illegal Recruitment), life imprisonment and the
accused is also ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
On the civil aspect, the accused Mercy Logan is ordered to pay the private complainants
by way of restitution, the following sums:

1. To Rodrigo Acorda ' P60,000.00[21]
2. To Florante Casia ' P100,000.00
3. To Orlando Velasco ' P115,000.00
No moral damages is awarded. The complainants checked with POEA only after the
accused was not able to sent (sic) them to Japan.
This Court believes that legislation is needed so as not to make as estafa or illegal
recruitment complaints of persons who do not first verify with POEA whether an alleged
recruiter is duly licensed; or, at the very least, such prior verification should be made an
element of these penal laws.
These activities proliferate because people provide a market for them ignoring all
government efforts and expenses just to warn people not to deal with persons who are
not duly licensed by POEA; and then, when they do not land any job abroad, they go to
the government to help solve matters, in the process overloading the already overloaded
court system. Some kind of penalty or disincentive should be imposed on people who
ignore government's efforts to deter unauthorized recruitment for foreign placement from
proliferating. After all, POEA operations are now computerized and it is so easy for plain
citizens to reach it. Congress, the Court hazarding its humble opinion without meaning to
be presumptuous, can gradually build the confidence of its citizens towards government
by gently enacting statutes that would encourage citizens not to ignore our laws and
placing some negative results when citizens do not, or they fail to give government due
attention.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished POEA.
SO ORDERED.
In her appeal,[22] appellant Mercy Logan essentially claims that she did not represent
herself as a job recruiter to the private complainants. According to her, the private
complainants were the ones who went to her office in Cubao, Quezon City and pleaded
with her to help them find jobs abroad. While she admitted having received money from
the private complainants, the appellant turned the same over to Gloria de Leon who
actually recruited them for overseas employment; and that Gloria de Leon reneged on her
promise to the private complainants. Hence, they implicated her in these cases inasmuch
as their transactions with Gloria de Leon took place in her office.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale which is
punishable with life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, are as follows: 1) the
accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article
13(b)[23] or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; 2) the accused
has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers, whether locally or overseas; and 3) the accused commits the same against three
(3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[24]
It has been established that the three (3) private complainants met with the appellant on
separate occasions in her office at 180-D Monterey Street, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon
City to apply for overseas employment. On the said occasions, she promised them
employment either as construction workers or piggery helpers in Japan for a fee. Despite
subsequent payment of her required fees, she failed to secure for the three (3) private
complainants any overseas employment. Clearly, the appellant was engaged in large
scale recruitment and placement activities which were illegal for the reason that she had
no license nor authority from the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
The appellant cannot escape liability for her criminal acts by conveniently passing the
blame on a certain Gloria de Leon who has allegedly escaped to Taiwan after reneging
on her commitment to secure overseas employment for the private complainants. Like the
trial court, we entertain serious doubts on this version of the appellant which is self-serving
and lacks corroborative evidence to support it.
On the other hand, the testimonies of the private complainants that they transacted
directly with the appellant who promised them overseas jobs after receiving money from
them were found by the trial court to be honest and straightforward and thus worthy of full
faith and credence, as compared to the evasive and ambiguous answers of the appellant
to the questions propounded to her during the trial.[25] We accord great respect to the
said finding of the trial court considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.[26]
Besides, we find it hard to believe that the three (3) private complainants would be so
morally depraved as to maliciously impute grave charges against the appellant if she were
not the actual perpetrator thereof. The records of these cases do not show that they had
any ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant. They were not known to one another
and did not have any previous transaction with the appellant before they met her at her
office to apply for overseas employment. It is generally observed that it is against human
nature and common experience for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of
a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings.[27]
The signatures[28] of the appellant appearing on the written receipts presented by the
prosecution during the trial of the instant criminal cases acknowledging receipt of the
corresponding amounts stated thereon undeniably support the testimonies of the private
complainants that they transacted directly with the appellant. Significantly, the signature
of Gloria de Leon does not appear on any of those written receipts. The appellant even
issued two (2) BPI checks in the total amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00)
payable to Rodrigo Acorda. She also delivered to Orlando Velasco a sala set, as partial
re-payment in kind, which Orlando admitted had an equivalent value of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00). These acts of the appellant certainly militate against her claim that
she did not actually receive and benefit from the amounts that she collected from the said
private complainants.
The appellant cannot pretend having merely accommodated Gloria de Leon for the
amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) which is the total amount of her two
(2) BPI checks payable to Rodrigo Acorda inasmuch as her checking account in the BPI
has already been closed when private complainant Rodrigo Acorda attempted to encash
the checks in the said drawee bank. What appears clear then is that the appellant never
really intended to settle her account with the said private complainant. Her issuance of
the two (2) BPI checks was merely a ploy intended to dissuade the said private
complainant from filing a case against her.
Consequently, in the light of these established facts, the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of three (3) counts of estafa and one count of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code, the appellant should
suffer, in the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, the penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). In addition, she is liable to
indemnify the private complainants in the amounts which they respectively paid to her.
It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa
under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The reason for the
rule is that the crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent
of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se
where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In other words, a
person convicted under the Labor Code may also be convicted of offenses punishable by
other laws.[30]
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not
exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by
any of the following means:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means
of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of the above mode of committing estafa are: a) that there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; b) that such false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; c) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, i.e., he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and, d) that as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[31] The acts of the appellant of deliberately
misrepresenting herself to the private complainants as having the necessary authority or
license to recruit applicants for overseas employment so that she could as she did collect
money from them allegedly for processing fees and travel documents only to renege on
her promise to get them overseas employment and for failure to return the money she
collected from the private complainants, despite several demands, clearly amount to
estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code.
However, there is a need to modify the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court
on the appellant in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-66231 to Q-96-66233, for three (3) counts
of estafa, in accordance with our ruling in the case of People v. Gabres.[32] Our ruling in
said case is to the effect that in the determination of the indeterminate penalty for the
crime of estafa, the fact that the amount involved exceeds Twenty Two Thousand Pesos
(P22,000.00) should not be initially considered; instead the matter should be taken as
analogous to a modifying circumstance in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence. That interpretation of the law is in accord with the rule that penal
laws should be construed in favor of the accused.
In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-66231 to Q-96-66233, since the penalty prescribed by law
for the charge of estafa involving more than Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00),
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would
be prision correccional minimum to medium. In accordance with our ruling in People v.
Gabres, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence would be anywhere within six
(6) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional while
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence would be at least six (6) years and one
day of prision mayor plus an additional one year for each additional Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), but the total penalty shall not exceed twenty (20) years; and the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence shall be prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the
case may be.
Hence, in Criminal Case No. Q-96-66231, where the amount involved is Sixty Five
Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00), the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should be
reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional (which is the
maximum of the allowable minimum period of the indeterminate sentence) while the
maximum term is at least six (6) years and one day of prision mayor plus an additional
one year for each additional Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or a maximum term of
ten (10) years and one day of prision mayor.
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-66232, where the amount involved is One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should be reduced
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional while the maximum term
should be at least six (6) years and one day of prision mayor plus an additional one year
for each additional Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or a maximum term of fourteen
(14) years and one day of reclusion temporal.
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-66233, where the amount involved is One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should
be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional while the maximum
term should be at least six (6) years and one day of prision mayor plus an additional one
year for each additional Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or a maximum term of
eighteen (18) years and one day of reclusion temporal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Joint Decision of the Regional trial court of Quezon City,
Branch 103 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-66231 to Q-96-66234 is AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-96-66231 (for estafa involving Sixty Thousand Pesos
[P60,000.00]), the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-96-66232 (for estafa involving One Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P100,000.00]), the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
(3) In Criminal Case No. Q-96-66233 (for estafa involving One Hundred Forty-Five
Thousand Pesos [P145,000.00]), the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
(4) In Criminal Case No. Q-96-66234 (for large scale illegal recruitment), the accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay the private complainants in the
following amounts: (a) Rodrigo Acorda, Sixty-Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00); (b)
Florante Casia, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); and (c) Orlando Velasco,
One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P115,000.00).
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA
G.R. No. 128280 | 2001-04-04
PARDO, J.:
Accused Alicia Chua has appealed from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch V finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment and a fine of
P100,000.00, and eight (8) counts of estafa sentencing her to various penalties therefor.
On October 05, 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Leocadio H. Ramos, Jr. of Manila filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Manila an information[2] against accused Alicia A. Chua
reading as follows:
Crim. Case No. 93-127418:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between October 29, 1992 and January
19, 1993, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing
herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons, namely: DOMINGO F.
TERCENIO, MARTIN B. BERMEJO, EVANGELINE F. GAVINA, DANTE F. BALUIS,
EDUARD V. ESTILLER, EDGAR B. ABONAL, VIOLETA F. REGALADO, GLORIA J.
RICAFRENTE and LONITO F. BALUIS, without first having secured the required license
or authority from the Department of Labor.
"Contrary to law."[3]
On the same date, the same prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila nine
(9) other informations against the accused for estafa:
Crim. Case No. 93-127419:
"The undersigned accuses ALICIA A. CHUA of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That on or about October 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud DOMINGO F. TERCENIO
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which she made to said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO to the effect
that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount
to meet the requirements thereof and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO to give and deliver, as in fact he
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain as in fact she did obtain the amount of
P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO in the
aforesaid amount of P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
Crim. Case No. 93-127420:
"That on or about November 21, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARTIN B. BERMEJO in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/they/she made to said MARTIN B. BERMEJO to the
effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ MARTIN BERMEJO in
Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said MARTIN B. BERMEJO to give and deliver, as in fact he
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of
P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said MARTIN B. BERMEJO in the
aforesaid amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[5]
Crim. Case No. 93-127421:
"That on or about November 6, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EVANGELINE F. GAVINA
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/they/she made to said EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to
the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ EVANGELINE F.
GAVINA and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits induced
and succeeded in inducing said EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to give and deliver, as in fact
she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of
P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EVANGELINE F. GAVINA in the
aforesaid amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[6]
Crim. Case No. 93-127422:
"That on or about December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud DANTE F. BALUIS in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/they/she made to said DANTE F. BALUIS to the effect
that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ DANTE F. BALUIS in Taiwan
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount
to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said DANTE F. BALUIS to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P11,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P11,000.00 which
amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit to the
damage and prejudice of said DANTE G. BALUIS in the aforesaid amount of P11,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[7]
Crim. Case No. 93-127423:
"That on or about November 24, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDUARD V. ESTILLER in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said EDUARD V. ESTILLER to the
effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ EDUARD V. ESTILLER
in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said EDUARD V. ESTILLER to give and deliver, as in fact
he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength
of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount
of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EDUARD V. ESTILLER, in the
aforesaid amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[8]
Crim. Case No. 93-127424:
"That on or about December 11, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and therein wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGAR B. ABONAL in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said EDGAR B. ABONAL to the
effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ EDGAR B. ABONAL in
Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said EDGAR B. ABONAL to give and deliver, as in fact
he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.oo on the strength
of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount
of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EDGAR B. ABONAL in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[9]
Crim. Case No. 93-127425:
"That on or about, December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud VIOLETA F. REGALADO in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said VIOLETA F. REGALADO to the
effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ VIOLETA F. REGALADO
in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said VIOLETA F. REGALADO to give and deliver, as in fact
he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength
of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount
of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said VIOLETA F. REGALADO in the
aforesaid amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"Contrary to law."[10]
Crim. Case No. 93-127426:
"That on or about January 19, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to
the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ GLORIA J.
RICAFRENTE in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to give and
deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of
P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well
knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in
fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with
intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE in the aforesaid amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[11]
Crim. Case No. 93-127427:
"That on or about October 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud LONITO F. BALUIS in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said LONITO F. BALUIS to the effect
that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ LONITO F. BALUIS in Taiwan
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount
to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said LONITO F. BALUIS to give and deliver, as in fact he/she/they
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of
P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said LONITO F. BALUIS in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[12]
On November 8, 1993, the trial court arraigned the accused. She pleaded not guilty to
each case.[13] Trial ensued. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
The facts are as follows:
In September 1992, accused Chua received a facsimile message from Harmony
Electronics Company in Taiwan.[14] The message was written in Chinese characters
except for the names of To-ong Zenon Tumenlaco and Tercenio Domingo Fornaliza.
Harmony asked her to call up To-ong and Tercenio and tell them that they were needed
in Taiwan. Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told him the message.[15]
In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of accused Chua, and the latter
told them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of
P15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI clearances and medical
certificates.[16] On October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together with private complainant Lonito
Baluis, went back to the office of accused Chua and submitted the requirements. Tercenio
and Lonito Baluis paid P15,000.00 each for which they were issued a receipt bearing the
name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chua's signature.[17]
Accused Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to leave for
Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but they were not deployed. Tercenio became
apprehensive and told accused Chua that he would withdraw his application and ask for
refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua repeatedly promised that she would give back
the money to him, but she never did. After a few more months, Tercenio could not
anymore locate accused Chua.[18]
Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private complainants. After
requiring each complainant to pay a placement fee of P15,000.00 each, to secure NBI
clearances and to undergo medical examinations, she would go in hiding.
In time, complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
about accused Chua's activities. The POEA issued a certification that accused Chua was
not licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment.[19]
On October 3, 1995, the trial court promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion[20] of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Alicia A. Chua is hereby found:
"1) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large
scale in Criminal Case No. 93-127418 and is therefore sentenced to serve a penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00;
"2) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127419
and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of Prision Mayor minimum
as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus legal interest from
the filing of the case until fully paid;
"3) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127420
and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal
interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"4) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127421
and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal
interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"5) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127422
and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of Arresto
Mayor maximum, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision
correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P11,500.00
plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"6) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127423
and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum, as maximum and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal
interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"7) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127425
and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P14,500.00 plus legal
interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"8) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127426
and is therefore sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P14,500.00 plus legal
interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"9) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127427
and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as
maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus legal interest from the
filing of the case until fully paid.
"As earlier stated, Criminal Case No. 93-127424 is dismissed for failure of the prosecution
to adduce evidence.
"SO ORDERED.
"Manila, September 20, 1995.
"(Sgd.) ZEUS C. ABROGAR
"Judge."
Hence, this appeal.[21]
In her brief, accused-appellant anchors her defense on the approval of her application for
a license to recruit on April 13, 1993, which, according to her, rendered her a genuine
holder of authority. She also claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to
compulsory process.[22]
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that appellant was a non-licensee and
had no authority to recruit anyone for overseas employment, and that she failed to proffer
any compelling reason to justify her request for the production of POEA records.[23]
We find the appeal devoid of merit.
Appellant interposes the defense that the approval of her application for a service
contractor's authority on April 13, 1993 should be given a retroactive effect as to make all
her previous recruitment activities valid. However, this issue was not raised in the trial
court. She cannot now be allowed to raise it for the first time on appeal without offending
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[24]
The records show that the license was not issued due to her failure to comply with post-
licensing requirements.[25] It is the issuance of the license which makes the holder thereof
authorized to perform recruitment activities. The law specifically provides that "every
license shall be valid for at least two (2) years from the date of issuance unless sooner
cancelled or revoked by the Secretary.[26]
Appellant herself admitted that she had no authority to recruit private complainants, thus:
ATTY. MONTERO (to witness):
Q: Now what was the reply of Harmony Electronics Company when you questioned them
about the use of your company?
A: They wrote back to me and they told me that "never mind, we only need Cenon To-ong
and Domingo Tersenio." But I told them that I am not in the position to employ these
people because I am not a licensed agency for that matter and they said that "I would just
send you an authority and show this to the pertaining government agency who could at
least send these two people."
Q: So what did you do after that?
A: I told them to send me something if I can do the way out of it, I will ask anybody from
my colleagues to do the hiring of these people.
Q: Did you ask anybody from your colleagues to do the hiring of these two?
A: I did but Alcamojar was not also licensed.
Q: So what happened after that?
A: I told Cenon because Cenon is much better to understand that, he looked for one
company who could just or whom I can transfer the authority that the Harmony Electronics
would be sending me, so I will just transfer the authority to any agency who could send
them back to Taiwan.[27]
Appellant cannot now claim that she was a genuine holder of authority from the Secretary
of Labor and Employment to recruit factory workers for Harmony Electronics Company
based in Taiwan.
As to her claim of denial of the constitutional right to compulsory process, we find the
same to be without merit.
The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now
includes the right to secure the production of evidence in one's behalf.[28] By analogy,
U.S. vs. Ramirez[29] which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of
witnesses, may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a)
that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously
obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the
time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion for the production of
the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated February 3,
1994,[30] as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was
not issued a license until then.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision in toto, with costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERIS
G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447 | 2000-03-28
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1,
convicting accused-appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla of illegal recruitment in large-scale
and six counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision1 [Records, Criminal Case
91-94192-97, pp. 192-193.] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused, Leonida Meris y Padilla, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192 to 91-94197,
and of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 and, as a
consequence thereof, sentences her as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 91-94192, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) months (sic) of prision correccional as maximum;
2. In Criminal Case No. 91-94193, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
3. In Criminal Case No. 91-94194, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
4. In Criminal Case No. 91-94195, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
5. In Criminal Case No. 91-94196, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
6. In Criminal Case No. 91-94197, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
7. In Criminal Case No. 91-94198, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P100,000.00.
Further, the accused shall indemnify the private complainants, Napoleon Ramos, Cristina
Nava, Margarita Nadal, Purita Conseja and Leo delos Santos, the sum of P30,000.00
each and complainant Merlita Bombarda the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon
at the legal rate from the date of institution of these cases, i.e., April 29, 1991, until fully
paid.
Costs against the accused in all the above-captioned cases.
SO ORDERED.
The above conviction stemmed from seven informations. The information in Criminal Case
No. 91-94192 reads:
That on or about and during the period comprised between January 12, 1991 and
February 17, 1991, both dates inclusive, prior or subsequent thereto in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with three others whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud NAPOLEON RAMOS y
ESPEJO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which they made to said NAPOLEON E.
RAMOS to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him as
Factory Worker in Hongkong and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to give
and deliver, as in fact (he) gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P30,000.00
on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing
that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact did
obtain the amount of P30,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud
he (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to
their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said NAPOLEON E.
RAMOS, in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 [Id., at 2.]
The information in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195, 91-94196 and
91-94197 likewise charged accused-appellant with Estafa and contain substantially the
same allegations as the above-quoted information, except as to the name of the
complainants and the amounts involved.3 [The informations with complainants Cristina
Nava, Margarita Nadal, Purita Conceja and Leo de los Santos, respectively, involve the
amount of P30,000.00 each, and Merlita Bombarda involves the sum of P20,000.00.]
The seventh information in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 charged accused-appellant with
illegal recruitment in large-scale, to wit:
That on or about and during the period comprised between December 21, 1990 and
February 17, 1991, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with others still unknown and helping one another,
and representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee,
recruit and promise employment abroad to Leo D. delos Santos, Merlita L. Bombarda,
Margarita R. madae (sic), Purita A. Conceja, Cristina I. Nava and Napoleon E. Ramos,
without first securing the required license or authority from the Dept. of Labor.
Contrary to law.4 [Records, Criminal Case 91-94198-SCC, p. 1.]
Criminal Case No. 91-94198 was originally filed before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila where, upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.5
Records, Criminal Case 91-94192-97, p. 21.] The six other cases were filed before Branch
I of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where accused-appellant, likewise, entered a plea
of "not guilty" to all the indictments. The cases were eventually consolidated and tried
jointly before Branch I.6 [Records, Criminal Case 91-94198-SCC, p. 37.]
The evidence for the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court, is reproduced herein:
Napoleon Ramos, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192 and 91-94198, testified
that he was at the house of the accused on Estrada Street, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, in the
evening of January 9, 1991, between the hours of 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock. Also in the house
were Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda. The accused told the private complainants that she
knew someone in Manila who could help them secure employment in Hongkong; that if
they are interested she would take them to Manila on January 12, 1991, and that they
should be prepared to make an initial payment of P15,000.00 each, for their placement
fees.
On the early morning of January 12, 1991, Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda
together with the accused proceeded to Manila by bus. They went directly to a house on
Lardizabal Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where they were served breakfast. After a while, a
woman arrived and was introduced by the accused to the private complainants as Julie
Micua. The complainants were assured by Micua that she could get them overseas
employment and upon payment of their placement fees of P35,000.00 each, they would
leave for Hongkong within one month. Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda made a
downpayment of P5,000.00 each to the accused and her husband. The corresponding
receipts, however, which were prepared by the accused, were in the name of and signed
by Micua, Exhibits "E-1," "L," "H," "D," and "C."
On January 14, 1991, Ramos went back to the House in Sampaloc, Manila, and handed
to the accused the sum of P15,000.00. As in the first payment, the accused prepared a
receipt in the name of Micua, who signed the same, Exhibit "E." On January 17, 1991,
Ramos paid the accused an additional sum of P10,000.00 and the latter prepared a
receipt in the name of Micua, who signed it, Exhibit "E-2." After Ramos failed to leave for
Hongkong or secure overseas employment for more than two months since January 1991,
he became suspicious and later realized that he and the other complainants had been
hoodwinked.
On April 26, 1991, Ramos and the other five complainants went to Manila and lodged with
the Western Police District Command, Manila, criminal complaints for estafa and illegal
recruitment against the accused, which led to her immediate arrest, Exhibit "A" and "B."
On the other hand, Merlita Bombarda, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94196 and
91-94198, declared that in 1987, the accused offered to recruit her for overseas
employment in Japan, but she declined the offer, due to her singing engagement in
Dagupan. Later, she worked in Singapore. Upon her return to the Philippine in 1990, she
again met the accused in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The accused told Bombarda that she
knew of an agency that was recruiting people for overseas employment as factory workers
in Hongkong, in consideration of a placement fee of P45,000.00.
In the evening of January 9, 1991, she was at the accused's house where she met the
other complainants, Nadal, Ramos, Delos Santos and Conseja. The accused discussed
with them the requirements for their overseas employment such as documentation,
payment of placement fees and their trip to Manila.
On the early morning of January 12, 1991, the complainants and the accused left by bus
for Manila. They were taken by the accused to a house on Lardizabal Street, Sampaloc,
Manila. Bombarda was assured by Micua that she would be employed in Hongkong as a
factory worker with a monthly salary of H$4,000.00. She and the other complainants were
asked by Micua to sign blank contracts of employment. After signing the blank contracts,
complainants paid P5,000.00 each to the accused, who prepared the receipts that Micua
signed. The receipt issued to Bombarda was marked as Exhibit "D-2."
On January 17, she paid another P5,000.00 to the accused at the same house in
Sampaloc, Manila, Exhibit "D-1."
On February 17, she again paid P10,000.00 to the accused at the latter's house in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Exhibit "D," in the presence of Micua. She was told by the accused
that she (Bombarda) would leave for Hongkong within two months, but she waited in vain.
Neither was her money returned by the accused.
Leo delos Santos, complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 91-94197 and 91-94198, asserted
that he met the accused in Urdaneta, Pangasinan in October 1990. The accused
persuaded him to apply for overseas employment, by telling him that she knew a recruiter
who could deploy workers abroad. He was further advised by the accused to prepare
P15,000.00 as initial payment of his placement fee. On December 21, 1990, January 21
and February 17, 1991, De los Santos gave to the accused the respective sums of
P8,000.00, P10,000.00 and P12,000.00, Exhibits "F," "F-2," "F-3," and "F-4." The accused
assured De los Santos that he would leave for Hongkong and work thereat as a factory
worker within two months, but his projected trip never materialized. Neither was his money
returned.
When recalled to the witness stand by the prosecution as a witness for Margarita Nadal,
complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94194 and 91-94198, Napoleon Ramos declared
that Nadal was his neighbor in Urdaneta, Pangasinan; that on January 9, 1991, he was
with Nadal when she applied with the accused a the latter's house in Urdaneta,
Pampanga, for employment abroad; that he was present when Nadal handed to the
accused the sum of P5,000.00 in Sampaloc, Manila, and he saw the accused prepare a
receipt therefor that was signed by Micua, Exhibit "J;" that he was also present when
Nadal gave an additional sum of P10,000.00 to the accused at her residence on Estrada
Street, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, for which a receipt was issued by the accused, Exhibit "J-
3' that Nadal had gave (sic) to him other receipts of payments she had made to the
accused on January 21 and 22, 1991 in the respective sums of P5,000 and P10,000.00,
Exhibits "J-1" and "J-2," but he was not present when these two payments were made,
and that Nadal was unable to testify, because she is now abroad.
The prosecution next presented Cristina Nava, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
94193 and 91-94198, who testified that sometime in 1991, the accused went to her
(Nava's) house in San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan, and offered to recruit her for
overseas employment in Hongkong. Nava told the accused that she would consult her
husband about the matter. A few weeks later, the accused again visited Nava and she
(accused) succeeded in convincing the reluctant Nava to accept the offer. The accused
told Nava that her placement fee would be P40,000.00 of which P30,000.00 was to be
paid in advance and the balance of P10,000.00 would be deducted from her salary. On
different occasions, Nava delivered to the accused various amounts totalling P30,000.00
as placement fee, Exhibit "G," "G-1," and "G-2." The accused assured Nava that she
would leave for and work in Hongkong within two months, but the promised employment
turned out to be a dud. Despite repeated demands from Nava, the accused has failed and
refused to return the latter's money.
x x x.7 [Records, Criminal Case Nos. 91-94192-97, pp. 188-190.]
Testifying in her own defense, accused-appellant denied the charges of engaging in
recruitment activities and of receiving money from complainants. She described herself
as a public school teacher living in Pangasinan with her four children and unemployed
husband. Like the other complainants, she claimed she was a victim of Julie Micua. She
first met Micua on December 17, 1990, at the house of Lina Salcedo in Sampaloc, Manila.
Micua was introduced to her as a recruiter of overseas workers. Interested, she applied
for a job abroad. Micua informed her that she would be a factory worker and showed her
a contract. Accused-appellant was required to submit her medical certificate and passport
and to make an advance payment of P5,000.00 as part of the P40,000.00 placement.8
[TSN, September 11, 1992, pp. 2-10.]
When complainants learned that she had applied for overseas employment, they sought
her help in going to the agency where she applied. Hence, on January 12, 1991, accused-
appellant accompanied the complainants to see Julie Micua who assured them that they
would be leaving for Hongkong within two or three months. They were also informed that
their placement fee would be P45,000.00. On that day, accused-appellant and
complainants gave Julie Micua the amount of P5,000.00. On February 17, 1991, accused-
appellant gave Micua an additional P5,000.00. According to her, complainants were all
given corresponding receipts for their payments. The receipts were issued and signed by
Micua.
Accused-appellant got to know complainant Ramos when she was invited by his wife
Marita to a birthday party at the couple's residence. In that party, they talked about
applying for a job abroad and Marita convinced her husband to apply. It was Ramos who
introduced accused-appellant to complainant Nadal. Ramos convinced Nadal to apply for
overseas employment. On the other hand, accused-appellant's co-teacher, Isabel Valdez,
brought complainant Delos Santos to accused-appellant's classroom and sought her
assistance in applying for an overseas job through the agency she was using. With
respect to Merlita Bombarda, accused-appellant met her through her cousin Nadal who
also accompanied Merlita to accused-appellant's house to apply. Purita Conceja, who was
also introduced to accused-appellant, sought her help in applying for a job abroad through
the agency she was using. As regards complainant Cristina Nava, accused-appellant met
her through Cristina's husband who was a regular customer of her store. Accused-
appellant claims she never represented herself as having the capacity to deploy workers
abroad. She only told them that she could accompany them to the agency where she also
applied.
According to accused-appellant, two months after they were unable to leave for abroad,
she and the complainants had a meeting. They discussed how they could recover their
money. On April 26, 1991, upon Nadal's invitation, she voluntarily joined the complainants
in going to Manila. Their main purpose was to look for Julie Micua. In Manila, they went
to Blumentritt where they met Blas Santos, a police officer whom Ramos knew. Accused-
appellant saw Ramos collecting money from his companions. Afterwards, they proceeded
to the United Nations Police Headquarters. Santos endorsed them to investigator Val
Torres, who, in turn, typed the consolidated affidavits of complainants. The money
collected by Ramos was given to the investigator. The complaint filed by the complainants
included accused-appellant as one of the defendants.9 [TSN, December 2, 1992. p. 8.]
Lina Salcedo corroborated accused-appellant's testimony. Salcedo testified that she owns
the house on 1333 Lardizabal St., Sampaloc, Manila. Also living there was a house
boarder named Paz Alonzo who had a friend named Julie Micua. Sometime in December
1990, Micua visited Paz at Salcedo's boarding house when accused-appellant arrived. It
was on this occasion that Julie Micua and accused-appellant met for the first time and
they discussed how to get employment in HongKong. After Christmas, accused-appellant
returned to Salcedo's house with some companions. Salcedo saw the members of the
group giving money to Julie Micua for which the latter issued corresponding receipts. It
was Julia Micua who did all the explaining. Accused-appellant and her companions
returned to Salcedo's house on two other occasions. According to Salcedo, she was
present when all the transactions took place and she observed that Julie Micua never
gave money or any consideration to accused-appellant.10 [TSN, March 5, 1993. pp. 2-8.]
Lina Salcedo's testimony was corroborated on the witness stand by her sister Violy
Constantino.11 [TSN, June 9, 1993. pp. 2-4.]
On March 1, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch I, rendered the decision
now on appeal before this Court. In justifying accused-appellant's conviction, the trial court
gave full credence to the testimonies of the complainants as they were "clear and
straightforward" and "reflect spontaneity and are replete with details, which conform to
what appears from the other evidence on record." It found that the complainants
"positively identified the accused as the one who had persuaded them to apply for
overseas employment, accompanied them all the way from Pangasinan to Manila, [and]
personally received from them various sums as placement fees." Further, the trial court
found no improper motive on the part of the complainants, thus:
xxx it is hard to believe that the private complainants, who all reside in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, would undergo the expense, rigor and inconvenience of a public trial if their
motive is not to bring to justice the person/s who had defrauded them. xxx12 [Records,
SCA Gr. 117145-50, p. 191.]
Accordingly, the trial court held that all the elements of Article 315, Paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code were proven in the cases for estafa. In likwise finding accused-
appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, the trial court stated:
x x x this court is convinced beyond moral certainty that there was unity of action, purpose
and design between the accused and Julie Micua to recruit the private complainants for
overseas employment in Hongkong without first securing a license or an authority therefor
from the Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency. The accused took a direct and
active participation in the recruitment of the private complainants by referring and
persuading them to apply for deployment abroad, accompanying them all the way from
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, to Manila to refer them to Micua, who presented herself as a
recruiter of worker(s) for overseas employment, personally collecting and receiving from
them various amounts for their placement fees, and preparing the receipts therefor.13 [Id.,
at 56, Rollo, p. 34.]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE ON THE GROUND
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION ON ITS PART OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
RECRUITED THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FOR DEPLOYMENT AS LAND
WORKERS IN HONGKONG.
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIND (SIC) THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL
REQUISITES OF ESTAFA AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 315, REVISED PENAL CODE,
ARE CONCURRENTLY SATISFIED IN THIS CASE.
We find no valid grounds to reverse accused-appellant's conviction.
Accused-appellant's first assignment of error challenges the trial court's judgment on a
jurisdictional ground. She argues that her arrest without warrant was illegal and, therefore,
following the settled rule that the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of one who is illegally arrested, the case should have been dismissed.14 [Id., at 67-69.]
This contention is untenable.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary
appearance in court. The record amply demonstrates that accused-appellant voluntarily
appeared in court at her arraignments, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges
against her, and later actively participated in the trial. Hence, granting arguendo that
accused-appellant's arrest was defective, such is deemed cured upon her voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.15 [People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 (1994)] It
should be stressed that the question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground
are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an
otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings
void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point
to the culpability of the accused.16 [People v. Briones, 202 SCRA 708 (1991)]
The second and third assigned errors regarding accused-appellant's culpability for the
crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale are closely interrelated, hence, shall
be discussed jointly. These alleged errors boil down to the issue of credibility.
All the complainants are one in saying that accused-appellant made representations that
she knew someone who could help them secure employment in Hongkong. Relying on
these representations, they applied for placement for employment abroad and paid
various sums of money therefor. Unfortunately, accused-appellant failed to comply with
her promise of employment or restitute the amounts she received from them.
For her part, accused-appellant claims that she merely helped complainants find an
agency that could secure for them employment overseas. She acted as a "good
samaritan" by facilitating their quest for a better economic status. She denies receiving
the fees paid by complainants and asserts that it was Julie Micua who recruited
complainants and collected the placement fees for overseas employment. An examination
of the records, however, reveals that accused-appellant is as culpable as Julie Micua.
As to which of the contending claims should be believed is fundamentally an issue of
credibility. Well settled is the rule that the issue of credibility is the domain of the trial court
that had observed the deportment and manner of the witnesses as they testified. The
findings of facts of a trial court, arrived at only after a hearing and evaluation of what can
usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies of witnesses certainly deserve respect
by an appellate court.17 [People v. Jumao-as, 230 SCRA 70, 77 (1994)] We find no cogent
reason to depart from this time-honored doctrine.
Accused-appellant failed to show that complainants, who were mostly her townmates and
some even her relatives, were ill-motivated in filing the cases against her; hence, their
testimonies merit full faith and credit.
The Court finds unacceptable accused-appellant's claim that the complainants are
"barking at the wrong tree" and that they only turned their ire on her because the alleged
real culprit, Julie Micua, was nowhere to be found.18 [TSN, November 18, 1992, p. 5.]
Complainants would not run after her if she, too, were really a victim. The lame defense
consisting of accused-appellant's bare denial cannot overcome the prosecution's positive
evidence proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, compared to accused-
appellant's evidence, which is mainly one of denial, the prosecution presented evidence
showing her positive acts of complicity with Julie Micua in recruiting complainants. The
accordance of greater probative value to evidence that is positive in nature than that which
is negative in character is a time-honored principle. Hence, the negative assertions of
accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the complainants.19
[People vs. Padre-e, 319 Phil 545, 550 (1995)]
The prosecution undoubtedly proved that accused-appellant, without license or authority,
engaged in recruitment and placement activities. This was done in collaboration with Julie
Micua, when they promised complainants employment in Hongkong. Art. 13, par. (b) of
the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement."
In People v. Agustin,20 [317 Phil. 897 (1995)] therein appellant argued that she could not
be convicted of illegal recruitment because in introducing the complainants to the alleged
recruiters, she merely acted "out of the goodness of her heart."
In resolving said case, the Court ruled:
Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced
complainants to the Goce couple or her actions went beyond that. The testimonial
evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially
approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned
about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after
they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement
agency.
As such, the Court concluded that appellant was an employee of the Goce spouses, as
she was actually making referrals to the agency. She was, therefore, engaged in
recruitment activities.
The same factual circumstance obtains in this case. Although accused-appellant was not
an employee of the alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence show that she was
the one who approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment abroad. It
was through her that they met Julia Micua. This is clearly an act of referral. Worse,
accused-appellant declared that she was capable of placing them in jobs overseas.
Suffice it to say that complainants' recruitment would not have been consummated were
it not for the direct participation of accused-appellant in the recruitment process.
Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code provides that:
Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34
of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if perpetrated against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged
in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the
prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3)
committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group.21
[People vs. Ganaden, 299 SCRA 433, 438 (1998)]
All these three essential elements are present in the case at bar. As earlier discussed,
accused-appellant recruited the six complainants. Further, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration certified that neither accused-appellant nor Julie Micua is
licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.22 [Exhibit "C," Records, p. 162.]
Accused-appellant's contention that she was a mere applicant and eventually a victim like
complainants holds no water. Note should be made of the fact that throughout the trial of
the case, no mention was made that accused-appellant exerted any effort to seek a refund
for her money nor did she file a case against Julie Micua, her alleged victimizer. Her only
excuse was that at the time of the filing of the complaint in Manila, she was confused and
the investigating officer would not listen to her side of the controversy.
Moreover, accused-appellant and her husband's acts of receiving almost all the payments
of the complainants and issuing receipts signed by Julie Micua contradict her claim of
being a mere applicant. There were even times that accused-appellant herself signed the
receipts for the placement fees.23 [Exhibit "F," Records, p. 170.] Taken as a whole, the
evidence shows that accused-appellant conspired and actively participated in the deceitful
plan adopted by her co-accused Julie Micua, Rico Cordova and her own husband, Renato
Meris, to hire without license or authority, gullible and naá¯ve applicants for non-
existent overseas jobs.
Likewise, we find that accused-appellant committed the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. This is committed by any person who defrauds
another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damages.24 [People vs. Juego, 298 SCRA 27, 33 (1998)]
Complainants parted with their money upon accused-appellant's prodding and
enticement, and on the false belief that she had the capacity to deploy them abroad. In
the end, complainants were neither able to leave nor get their money back.
A close scrutiny of the appealed decision warrants correction of the penalty imposed in
each of the estafa cases.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which maybe imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, a the case may be;
In People v. Gabres,25 [267 SCRA 581, 595-596. (1997)] where the amounts swindled
ranged from P40,000 to P50,000, the Court said:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed" for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords
with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would be prision correccional
minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months while
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and one
(1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00 plus an additional one (1)
year for each additional P10,000.00.
Here, the amounts involved are P20,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 91-94196 and
P30,000.00 each in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192, 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195 and
91-94197. The amounts in excess of the P22,000.00 as provided for in the first paragraph
of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are less than P10,000.00, hence, do not warrant
the imposition of an additional one-year imprisonment. There being no proven modifying
circumstances, the correct penalty in each of the six (6) estafa cases should be the
indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 91-94198, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty
of life imprisonment and fine of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision in question is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification
that in each of the six (6) estafa cases, the indeterminate sentence that appellant Leonida
Meris y Padilla must serve is two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MILLARES vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 110524 | 2002-07-29
KAPUNAN, J.:
On March 14, 2000, the Court promulgated its decision in the above-entitled case, ruling
in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision, dated June 1, 1993, of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the private respondents to:
(1) Reinstate petitioners Millares and Lagda to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights, and to pay full backwages computed from the time of illegal dismissal to
the time of actual reinstatement;
(2) Alternatively, if reinstatement is not possible, pay petitioners Millares and Lagda
separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service; and,
(3) Jointly and severally pay petitioners One Hundred Percent (100%) of their total
credited contributions as provided under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan.
SO ORDERED.[1]
A motion for reconsideration was consequently filed[2] by the private respondents to which
petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.[3]
In a Minute Resolution dated June 28, 2000, the Court resolved to deny the motion for
reconsideration with finality.[4]
Subsequently, the Filipino Association for Mariners Employment, Inc. (FAME) filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit a Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention.
Private respondents, meanwhile, also filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for
Reconsideration of our decision.
In both motions, the private respondents and FAME respectively pray in the main that the
Court reconsider its ruling that "Filipino seafarers are considered regular employees within
the context of Article 280 of the Labor Code." They claim that the decision may establish
a precedent that will adversely affect the maritime industry.
The Court resolved to set the case for oral arguments to enable the parties to present
their sides.
To recall, the facts of the case are, as follows:
Petitioner Douglas Millares was employed by private respondent ESSO International
Shipping Company LTD. (Esso International, for brevity) through its local manning
agency, private respondent Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. (Trans-Global, for brevity)
on November 16, 1968 as a machinist. In 1975, he was promoted as Chief Engineer which
position he occupied until he opted to retire in 1989. He was then receiving a monthly
salary of US $1,939.00.
On June 13, 1989, petitioner Millares applied for a leave of absence for the period July 9
to August 7, 1989. In a letter dated June 14, 1989, Michael J. Estaniel, President of private
respondent Trans-Global, approved the request for leave of absence. On June 21, 1989,
petitioner Millares wrote G.S. Hanly, Operations Manager of Exxon International Co., (now
Esso International) through Michael J. Estaniel, informing him of his intention to avail of
the optional retirement plan under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP)
considering that he had already rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous
service. On July 13, 1989 respondent Esso International, through W.J. Vrints, Employee
Relations Manager, denied petitioner Millares' request for optional retirement on the
following grounds, to wit: (1) he was employed on a contractual basis; (2) his contract of
enlistment (COE) did not provide for retirement before the age of sixty (60) years; and (3)
he did not comply with the requirement for claiming benefits under the CEIP, i.e., to submit
a written advice to the company of his intention to terminate his employment within thirty
(30) days from his last disembarkation date.
On August 9, 1989, petitioner Millares requested for an extension of his leave of absence
from August 9 to 24, 1989. On August 19, 1989, Roy C. Palomar, Crewing Manager, Ship
Group A, Trans-global, wrote petitioner Millares advising him that respondent Esso
International "has corrected the deficiency in its manpower requirement specifically in the
Chief Engineer rank by promoting a First Assistant Engineer to this position as a result of
(his) previous leave of absence which expired last August 8, 1989. The adjustment in said
rank was required in order to meet manpower schedules as a result of (his) inability."
On September 26, 1989, respondent Esso International, through H. Regenboog,
Personnel Administrator, advised petitioner Millares that in view of his absence without
leave, which is equivalent to abandonment of his position, he had been dropped from the
roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989.

On the other hand, petitioner Lagda was employed by private respondent Esso
International as wiper/oiler in June 1969. He was promoted as Chief Engineer in 1980, a
position he continued to occupy until his last COE expired on April 10, 1989. He was then
receiving a monthly salary of US$1,939.00.
On May 16, 1989, petitioner Lagda applied for a leave of absence from June 19, 1989 up
to the whole month of August 1989. On June 14, 1989, respondent Trans-Global's
President, Michael J. Estaniel, approved petitioner Lagda's leave of absence from June
22, 1989 to July 20, 1989 and advised him to report for re-assignment on July 21, 1989.
On June 26, 1989, petitioner Lagda wrote a letter to G.S. Stanley, Operations Manager of
respondent Esso International, through respondent Trans-Global's President Michael J.
Estaniel, informing him of his intention to avail of the optional early retirement plan in view
of his twenty (20) years continuous service in the complaint.
On July 13, 1989, respondent Trans-global denied petitioner Lagda's request for
availment of the optional early retirement scheme on the same grounds upon which
petitioner Millares request was denied.
On August 3, 1989, he requested for an extension of his leave of absence up to August
26, 1989 and the same was approved. However, on September 27, 1989, respondent
Esso International, through H. Regenboog, Personnel Administrator, advised petitioner
Lagda that in view of his "unavailability for contractual sea service," he had been dropped
from the roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989.
On October 5, 1989, petitioners Millares and Lagda filed a complaint-affidavit, docketed
as POEA (M) 89-10-9671, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of employee benefits
against private respondents Esso International and Trans-Global, before the POEA.[5]
On July 17, 1991, the POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the POEA was affirmed on June 1, 1993 with the
following disquisition:
The first issue must be decided in the negative. Complainants-appellants, as seamen and
overseas contract workers are not covered by the term "regular employment" as defined
under Article 280 of the Labor Code. The POEA, which is tasked with protecting the rights
of the Filipino workers for overseas employment to fair and equitable recruitment and
employment practices and to ensure their welfare, prescribes a standard employment
contract for seamen on board ocean-going vessels for a fixed period but in no case to
exceed twelve (12) months (Part 1, Sec. C). This POEA policy appears to be in
consonance with the international maritime practice. Moreover, the Supreme Court in
Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, 181 SCRA 702, had held that a fixed term is essential and
natural appurtenance of overseas employment contracts to which the concept of regular
employment with all that it implies is not applicable, Article 280 of the Labor Code
notwithstanding. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb the POEA Administrator's finding
that complainants-appellants were hired on a contractual basis and for a definite period.
Their employment is thus governed by the contracts they sign each time they are re-hired
and is terminated at the expiration of the contract period.[6]
Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to this Court[7] and successfully obtained
the favorable action, which is now vehemently being assailed.
At the hearing on November 15, 2000, the Court defined the issues for resolution in this
case, namely:
I. ARE PETITIONERS REGULAR OR CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES WHOSE
EMPLOYMENTS ARE TERMINATED EVERYTIME THEIR CONTRACTS OF
EMPLOYMENT EXPIRE?
II. ASSUMING THAT PETITIONERS ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES, WERE THEY
DISMISSED WITHOUT JUST CAUSE SO AS TO BE ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT
AND BACKWAGES, INCLUDING PAYMENT OF 100% OF THEIR TOTAL CREDITED
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONSECUTIVE ENLISTMENT INCENTIVE PLAN (CEIP)?
III. DOES THE PROVISION OF THE POEA STANDARD CONTRACT FOR SEAFARERS
ON BOARD FOREIGN VESSELS (SEC. C., DURATION OF CONTRACT) PRECLUDE
THE ATTAINMENT BY SEAMEN OF THE STATUS OF REGULAR EMPLOYEES?
IV. DOES THE DECISION OF THE COURT IN G.R. NO. 110524 CONTRAVENE
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW, ALLEGEDLY PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND
UNDER SECTION 2, ARTICLE II OF THE CONSTITUTION?
V. DOES THE SAME DECISION OF THE COURT CONSTITUTE A DEPARTURE FROM
ITS RULING IN COYOCA VS. NLRC (G.R. NO. 113658, March 31, 1995)?[8]
In answer to the private respondents' Second Motion for Reconsideration and to FAME's
Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention, petitioners maintain that they are regular
employees as found by the Court in the March 14, 2000 Decision. Considering that
petitioners performed activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of private respondents, they should be considered as regular employees
pursuant to Article 280, Par. 1 of the Labor Code.[9] Other justifications for this ruling
include the fact that petitioners have rendered over twenty (20) years of service, as
admitted by the private respondents;[10] that they were recipients of Merit Pay which is
an express acknowledgment by the private respondents that petitioners are regular and
not just contractual employees;[11] that petitioners were registered under the Social
Security System (SSS).
The petitioners further state that the case of Coyoca v. NLRC[12] which the private
respondents invoke is not applicable to the case at bar as the factual milieu in that case
is not the same. Furthermore, private respondents' fear that our judicial pronouncement
will spell the death of the manning industry is far from real. Instead, with the valuable
contribution of the manning industry to our economy, these seafarers are supposed to be
considered as "Heroes of the Republic" whose rights must be protected.[13] Finally, the
first motion for reconsideration has already been denied with finality by this Court and it is
about time that the Court should write finis to this case.
The private respondents, on the other hand, contend that: (a) the ruling holding petitioners
as regular employees was not in accord with the decision in Coyoca v. NLRC, 243 SCRA
190; (b) Art. 280 is not applicable as what applies is the POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment; (c) seafarers are not regular employees based on
international maritime practice; (d) grave consequences would result on the future of
seafarers and manning agencies if the ruling is not reconsidered; (e) there was no
dismissal committed; (f) a dismissed seafarer is not entitled to back wages and
reinstatement, that being not allowed under the POEA rules and the Migrant Workers Act;
and, (g) petitioners are not entitled to claim the total amount credited to their account
under the CEIP.[14]
Meanwhile, Intervenor Filipino Association of Mariners Employment (FAME) avers that
our decision, if not reconsidered, will have negative consequences in the employment of
Filipino Seafarers overseas which, in turn, might lead to the demise of the manning
industry in the Philippines. As intervenor FAME puts it:
xxx
7.1 Foreign principals will start looking for alternative sources for seafarers to man their
ships. AS reported by the BIMCO/ISF study, "there is an expectancy that there will be an
increasing demand for (and supply of) Chinese seafarers, with some commentators
suggesting that this may be a long-term alternative to the Philippines." Moreover, "the
political changes within the former Eastern Bloc have made new sources of supply
available to the international market." Intervenor's recent survey among its members
shows that 50 Philippine manning companies had already lost some 6,300 slots to other
Asian, East Europe and Chinese competition for the last two years;
7.2 The Philippine stands to lose an annual foreign income estimated at U.S. DOLLARS
TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FORTY NINE
THOUSAND (US$ 274,549,000.00) from the manning industry and another US DOLLARS
FOUR BILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND
(US$ 4,650,760,000.00) from the land-based sector if seafarers and equally situated land-
based contract workers will be declared regular employees;
7.3 Some 195,917 (as of 1998) deployed overseas Filipino seafarers will be rendered
jobless should we lose the market;
7.4 Some 360 manning agencies (as of 30 June 2000) whose principals may no longer
be doing business with them will close their shops;
7.5 The contribution to the Overseas Worker's Welfare Administration by the sector, which
is USD 25.00 per contract and translates to US DOLLARS FOUR MILLION (US$
4,000,000.00)annually, will be drastically reduced. This is not to mention the processing
fees paid to POEA, Philippine Regulatory Commission (PRC), Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) and Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) for the documentation of these
seafarers;
7.6 Worst, some 195,917 (as of 1998) families will suffer socially and economically, as
their breadwinners will be rendered jobless; and
7.7 It will considerably slow down the government's program of employment generation,
considering that, as expected foreign employers will now avoid hiring Filipino overseas
contract workers as they will become regular employees with all its concomitant
effects.[15]
Significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General, in a departure from its original position in
this case, has now taken the opposite view. It has expressed its apprehension in
sustaining our decision and has called for a re-examination of our ruling.[16]
Considering all the arguments presented by the private respondents, the Intervenor FAME
and the OSG, we agree that there is a need to reconsider our position with respect to the
status of seafarers which we considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the
Labor Code. We, therefore, partially grant the second motion for reconsideration.
In Brent School Inc. v. Zamora,[17] the Supreme Court stated that Article 280 of the Labor
Code does not apply to overseas employment.
In the light of the foregoing description of the development of the provisions of the Labor
Code bearing on term or fixed-period employment that the question posed in the opening
paragraph of this opinion should now be addressed. Is it then the legislative intention to
outlaw stipulations in employment contracts laying down a definite period therefor? Are
such stipulations in essence contrary to public policy and should not on this account be
accorded legitimacy?
On the other hand, there is the gradual and progressive elimination of references to term
or fixed-period employment in the Labor Code, and the specific statement of the rule that:
Regular and Casual Employment - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall
be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of
the employee or where the work or service to be employee is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph; provided that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists.
There is, on the other hand, the Civil Code, which has always recognized, and continues
to recognize, the validity and propriety of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite
period, and imposes no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a
contract, whatever its object, be it specific, goods or services, except the general
admonition against stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. Under the Civil code, therefore, and as a general proposition, fixed-term
employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those
by natural seasonal or for specific projects with predetermined dates of completion; they
also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of
termination.
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contract which may be neither for
seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural
appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of
the engagement, the concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not
appear ever to have been applied. Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding also
appointments to the positions of dean, assistant dean, college secretary, principal, and
other administrative offices in educational institutions, which are by practice or tradition
rotated among the faculty members, and where fixed terms are a necessity without which
no reasonable rotation would be possible. Similarly, despite the provisions of Article 280,
Policy Instructions. No. 8 of the Minister of Labor implicitly recognize that certain company
officials may be elected for what would amount to fix periods, at the expiration of which
they would have to stand down, in providing that these officials, xxx may lose their jobs
as president, executive vice-president or vice-president, etc. because the stockholders or
the board of directors for one reason or another did not reelect them.
There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the circumstances
it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security
by the employee, they should be struck down or disregard as contrary to public policy,
morals, etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise,
where the reason for the law does not exists, e.g., where it is indeed the employee himself
who insists upon a period or where the nature of the engagement is such that, without
being seasonal or for a specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non,
would an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore anathema? Would
such an agreement come within the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted
"to prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in xxx his
employment
As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of the
Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut
of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but
would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to
freely stipulate within his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that
such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a
reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole
concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract
to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from
obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly,
curing a headache by lopping of the head.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences."
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would
lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle that goes back to In re
Allen decided on October 27, 1902, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. That is a strong argument against
its adoption. The words of Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: "the appellants would
lead to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it."
Xxx We have, here, then a case where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent of spirit must
prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the
statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions
and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor code clearly appears to have been, as
already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his
tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or
oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein
should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out;
agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no
application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly
and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by
the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to
apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes
pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended
consequences.
Again, in Pablo Coyoca v. NLRC,[18] the Court also held that a seafarer is not a regular
employee and is not entitled to separation pay. His employment is governed by the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen.
XXX. In this connection, it is important to note that neither does the POEA standard
employment contract for Filipino seamen provide for such benefits.
As a Filipino seaman, petitioner is governed by the Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment and the said Rules do not provide for separation or termination
pay. What is embodied in petitioner's contract is the payment of compensation arising
from permanent partial disability during the period of employment. We find that private
respondent complied with the terms of contract when it paid petitioner P42,315.00 which,
in our opinion, is a reasonable amount, as compensation for his illness.
Lastly, petitioner claims that he eventually became a regular employee of private
respondent and thus falls within the purview of Articles 284 and 95 of the Labor Code. In
support of this contention, petitioner cites the case of Worth Shipping Service, Inc., et al.
v. NLRC, et al., wherein we held that the crew members of the shipping company had
attained regular status and thus, were entitled to separation pay. However, the facts of
said case differ from the present. In Worth, we held that the principal and agent had
"operational control and management" over the MV Orient Carrier and thus, were the
actual employers of their crew members.
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees.
They can not be considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and
their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is
contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season.[19] We need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the
two aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the
employment status of seafarers.
Petitioners insist that they should be considered regular employees, since they have
rendered services which are usually necessary and desirable to the business of their
employer, and that they have rendered more than twenty(20) years of service. While this
may be true, the Brent case has, however, held that there are certain forms of employment
which also require the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed
one year but do not necessarily attain regular employment status under Article 280.[20]
Overseas workers including seafarers fall under this type of employment which are
governed by the mutual agreements of the parties.
In this jurisdiction and as clearly stated in the Coyoca case, Filipino seamen are governed
by the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. The Standard Employment Contract
governing the employment of All Filipino seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the
POEA, particularly in Part I, Sec. C specifically provides that the contract of seamen shall
be for a fixed period. And in no case should the contract of seamen be longer than 12
months. It reads:
Section C. Duration of Contract
The period of employment shall be for a fixed period but in no case to exceed 12 months
and shall be stated in the Crew Contract. Any extension of the Contract period shall be
subject to the mutual consent of the parties.
Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers are
for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite
peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the
employer why the employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of
time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay for
a long and an indefinite period of time at sea.[21] Limited access to shore society during
the employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and
lingual diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that necessitates the limitation
of its period.[22]
Petitioners make much of the fact that they have been continually re-hired or their
contracts renewed before the contracts expired (which has admittedly been going on for
twenty (20) years). By such circumstance they claim to have acquired regular status with
all the rights and benefits appurtenant to it.
Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance of continuous re-hiring was
dictated by practical considerations that experienced crew members are more preferred.
Petitioners were only given priority or preference because of their experience and
qualifications but this does not detract the fact that herein petitioners are contractual
employees. They can not be considered regular employees. We quote with favor the
explanation of the NLRC in this wise:
Xxx The reference to "permanent" and "probationary" masters and employees in these
papers is a misnomer and does not alter the fact that the contracts for enlistment between
complainants-appellants and respondent-appellee Esso International were for a definite
periods of time, ranging from 8 to 12 months. Although the use of the terms "permanent"
and "probationary" is unfortunate, what is really meant is "eligible for-re-hire". This is the
only logical conclusion possible because the parties cannot and should not violate POEA's
requirement that a contract of enlistment shall be for a limited period only; not exceeding
twelve (12)months.[23]
From all the foregoing, we hereby state that petitioners are not considered regular or
permanent employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners' employment have
automatically ceased upon the expiration of their contracts of enlistment (COE). Since
there was no dismissal to speak of, it follows that petitioners are not entitled to
reinstatement or payment of separation pay or backwages, as provided by law.
With respect to the benefits under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP), we
hold that the petitioners are still entitled to receive 100% of the total amount credited to
him under the CEIP. Considering that we have declared that petitioners are contractual
employees, their compensation and benefits are covered by the contracts they signed and
the CEIP is part and parcel of the contract.
The CEIP was formulated to entice seamen to stay long in the company. As the name
implies, the program serves as an incentive for the employees to renew their contracts
with the same company for as long as their services were needed. For those who
remained loyal to them, they were duly rewarded with this additional remuneration under
the CEIP, if eligible. While this is an act of benevolence on the part of the employer, it can
not, however, be denied that this is part of the benefits accorded to the employees for
services rendered. Such right to the benefits is vested upon them upon their eligibility to
the program.
The CEIP provides that an employee becomes covered under the Plan when he
completes thirty-six (36) months or an equivalent of three (3) years of credited service
with respect to employment after June 30, 1973.[24] Upon eligibility, an amount shall be
credited to his account as it provides, among others:
III. Distribution of Benefits
A. Retirement, Death and Disability
When the employment of an employee terminates because of his retirement, death or
permanent and total disability, a percentage of the total amount credited to his account
will be distributed to him (or his eligible survivor(s) in accordance with the following:
Reason for Termination Percentage
a) Attainment of mandatory retire- 100%
ment age of 60.
b) Permanent and total disability, 100%
while under contract, that is
not due to accident or misconduct.
c) Permanent and total disability, 100%

while under contract, that is
due to accident, and not due to
misconduct.
xxx
B. Voluntary Termination
When an employee voluntary terminates his employment with at least 36 months of
credited service without any misconduct on his part, 18 percent of the total amount
credited to his account, plus an additional ½ of one percent for each month (up to a
maximum of 164 months of credited service in excess of 36, will be distributed to him
provided (1) the employee has completed his last Contract of Enlistment and (2) employee
advises the company in writing, within 30 days, from his last disembarkation date, of his
intention to terminate his employment. (To advise the Company in writing means that the
original letter must be sent to the Company's agent in the Philippines, a copy sent to the
Company in New York).
xxx
C. Other Terminations
When the employment of an employee is terminated by the Company for a reason other
than one in A and B above, without any misconduct on his part, a percentage of the total
amount credited to his account will be distributed to him in accordance with the following.
Credited Service Percentage
36 months 50%
48 " 75%
60 " 100%
When the employment of an employee is terminated due to his poor-performance,
misconduct, unavailability, etc., or if employee is not offered re-engagement for similar
reasons, no distribution of any portion of employee's account will ever be made to him (or
his eligible survivor[s]).
It must be recalled that on June 21, 1989, Millares wrote a letter to his employer informing
his intention to avail of the optional retirement plan under the CEIP considering that he
has rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous service. Lagda, likewise,
manifested the same intention in a letter dated June 26, 1989. Private respondent,
however, denied their requests for benefits under the CEIP since: (1) the contract of
enlistment (COE) did not provide for retirement before 60 years of age; and that (2)
petitioners failed to submit a written notice of their intention to terminate their employment
within thirty (30) days from the last disembarkation date pursuant to the provision on
Voluntary Termination of the CEIP. Petitioners were eventually dropped from the roster of
crew members and on grounds of "abandonment" and "unavailability for contractual sea
service", respectively, they were disqualified from receiving any benefits under the
CEIP.[25]
In our March 14, 2000 Decision, we, however, found that petitioners Millares and Lagda
were not guilty of "abandonment" or "unavailability for contractual sea service," as we
have stated:
The absence of petitioners was justified by the fact that they secured the approval of
private respondents to take a leave of absence after the termination of their last contracts
of enlistment. Subsequently, petitioners sought for extensions of their respective leaves
of absence. Granting arguendo that their subsequent requests for extensions were not
approved, it cannot be said that petitioners were unavailable or had abandoned their work
when they failed to report back for assignment as they were still questioning the denial of
private respondents of their desire to avail of the optional early retirement policy, which
they believed in good faith to exist.[26]
Neither can we consider petitioners guilty of poor performance or misconduct since they
were recipients of Merit Pay Awards for their exemplary performances in the company.
Anent the letters dated June 21, 1989 (for Millares) and June 26, 1989 (for Lagda) which
private respondent considered as belated written notices of termination, we find such
assertion specious. Notwithstanding, we could conveniently consider the petitioners
eligible under Section III-B of the CEIP (Voluntary Termination), but this would, however,
award them only a measly amount of benefits which to our mind, the petitioners do not
rightfully deserve under the facts and circumstances of the case. As the CEIP provides:
III. Distribution of Benefits
xxx
E. Distribution of Accounts
When an employee terminates under conditions that would qualify for a distribution of
more than one specified in A, B or C above, the largest single amount, only, will be
distributed.
Since petitioners' termination of employment under the CEIP do not fall under Section III-
A (Retirement, Death and Disability) or Section III-B (Voluntary Termination), nor could
they be considered under the second paragraph of Section III-C, as earlier discussed; it
follows that their termination falls under the first paragraph of Section III-C for which they
are entitled to 100% of the total amount credited to their accounts. The private
respondents can not now renege on their commitment under the CEIP to reward
deserving and loyal employees as the petitioners in this case.
In taking cognizance of private respondent's Second Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court hereby suspends the rules to make them conformable to law and justice and to
subserve an overriding public interest.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE COURT Resolved to Partially GRANT Private
Respondent's Second Motion for Reconsideration and Intervenor FAMES' Motion for
Reconsideration in Intervention. The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated June 1, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The
Private Respondents, Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and Esso International
Shipping Co.,Ltd. are hereby jointly and severally ORDERED to pay petitioners One
Hundred Percent (100%) of their total credited contributions as provided under the
Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan(CEIP).
SO ORDERED.
GU-MIRO vs. ADORABLE G.R. No. 160952 | 2004-08-20
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66131 dated May 29, 2003,[1] which modified the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by increasing the incentive bonus awarded to
petitioner from US$594.56 to US$1189.12.
Petitioner Marcial Gu-Miro was formerly employed as a Radio Officer of respondent
Bergesen D.Y. Philippines, which acted for and in behalf of its principal Bergesen D.Y.
ASA, on board its different vessels. A Certification dated April 14, 1998 was issued by
Bergesen D.Y. Philippines, Inc.'s President and General Manager Rolando C. Adorable
showing that petitioner served in the company on board its vessels starting 1988.[2] The
case before us involves an employment contract signed by petitioner to commence
service on board the M/V HEROS, which stipulated a monthly salary of US$929.00 for a
period of eight (8) months. It also provided for overtime pay of US$495.00 per month and
vacation leave with pay in the amount of US$201.00 per month equivalent to six and a
half days.[3] The contract of employment was signed on March 18, 1996 and petitioner
commenced work on April 15, 1996.
Record shows that respondent company traditionally gives an incentive bonus termed as
Re-employment Bonus to employees who decide to rejoin the company after the
expiration of their employment contracts. After the expiration of petitioner's contract in
December 1996, the same was renewed by respondent company until September 9,
1997, as stated in the Certification issued by Bergesen D.Y. Philippines, Inc. In September
1997, petitioner's services were terminated due to the installation of labor saving devices
which made his services redundant. Upon his forced separation from the company,
petitioner requested that he be given the incentive bonus plus the additional allowances
he was entitled to. Respondent company, however, refused to accede to his request.
Thus, in June 1999 petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch
of Cebu, for payment of the incentive bonus from April 15, 1996 to September 15, 1997,
10% of the basic wage, unclaimed payment for incentive bonus from September 1993 to
June 1994, non-remittance of provident fund from July 1992 to June 1994, moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. On December 29, 1999, the complaint
was provisionally dismissed by the NLRC due to the failure of petitioner to file the required
position paper. Petitioner re-filed the complaint on March 2, 2000 accordingly.
In a Decision dated June 6, 2000, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit,[4]
based on the following findings:
x x x. "Incentive bonus" or reemployment bonus are benefits not found in the POEA
approved contract. These are benefits which are specifically granted pursuant to an
internal memorandum entitled "Employment Conditions for Filipino Seafarers serving on
board vessels of Bergesen D.Y. ASA". As stated in the said internal memorandum,
entitlement to the benefits therein (is) not automatic but (is) subject to some conditions.
As clearly stated in the said memorandum, the reemployment bonus is an"incentive bonus
system for reemployment upon signing for a subsequent period." x x x. In order that a
seafarer, like the complainant, be entitled to reemployment/incentive bonus, he must
satisfy all of the following requirements, to wit:
1) He must be employed in a vessel under a principal who is a member of the
reemployment bonus scheme;
2) He must have been an officer of the principal member's vessel subject to the additional
conditions stated in page 2 of the aforementioned internal memorandum; and
3) After serving in a principal-member's vessel, he must be reemployed in another or the
same principal-member's vessel.
To avail of the benefits under this scheme, seafarers like the complainant has to prove
that he met all the foregoing conditions. It is, thus, his burden to prove that he is entitled
to the said benefit. Complainant, however, miserably failed to adduce evidence that he
met all the foregoing conditions for entitlement to the benefit. He relied on his
unsubstantiated allegation that a certain Captain D. Ramirez received an incentive bonus
even if he did not sign up with the Company. x x x.
For obvious reasons, complainant's claims for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees are denied. x x x.[5]
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered
respondents to pay petitioner the amount of US$594.56 in a Decision dated March 5,
2001. The pertinent portion of the NLRC's decision states:
The Contract of Employment entered into between the complainant and the respondents
specifically set a term of eight (8) months which was supposed to be from April 15, 1996
up to December 14, 1996. The complainant's length of service from December 15, 1996
to September 9, 1997, or a period of nine (9) months, more or less, was an extended term
of employment. A closer look at the facts shows that the extended term was even longer
than the original term of the contract.
[W]e construe that the extended term of the contract of employment from December 15,
1996 up to September 9, 1997 was considered as re-employment of the complainant. And
when there was re-employment, it is presumed that all the conditions set forth by the
respondents in their established company written policy entitled "Employment Conditions
for Filipino Seafarers Serving Onboard Vessels of Bergesen D.Y. ASA" are deemed
complied with. The pertinent portion of the said company policy states:
2. Re-employment bonus
The company has established an incentive bonus system for re-employment upon signing
for a subsequent period.
The conditions are as follows:
Radio Officers/Electricians " Serving onboard bulk carriers- 8% of basic wage per month
of actual service.
To do otherwise, we would allow the respondent to circumvent its own established policy
to merely extending the original contract of employment.[6]
Petitioner and respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which were both
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated April 24, 2001.
Not satisfied with the monetary award, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals claiming that there was an error in computing the amount of the incentive
bonus he is entitled to. Petitioner argued that he should be considered as a regular
employee of respondent company and thus, entitled to backwages or, at the very least,
separation pay.
The Court of Appeals, on May 29, 2003, rendered the assailed Decision where it ruled:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 5, 2001 is
hereby MODIFIED increasing the award of incentive bonus from US$594.56 to
US$1189.12.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In arriving at its decision, the appellate court made the following findings:
It is uncontroverted that the company grants incentive bonus for re-employment upon
signing for a subsequent period. For radio officers onboard bulk carriers, it shall be 8% of
the basic wage per month of actual service. In this case, we find nothing in the record to
show that the classification of the vessel to which the petitioner was deployed is a Clearly, petitioner cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the
Gas/LPG Tanker, which would make him entitled to 10% instead of 8% of the basic wage work he performs is necessary and desirable in the business of respondent company. As
as incentive bonus. Thus, the public respondent correctly applied the rate of 8% of the expounded in the above-mentioned Millares Resolution, an exception is made in the
basic wage per month of actual service, the basic wage in this case being the amount situation of seafarers. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on
stipulated in the contract of employment, i.e., US$929.00, and does not include the a contractual basis.
stipulated rate for overtime pay.
The question now is the application of the provision of the memorandum with respect to
the length of actual service. Record shows that after the expiration of the original eight- Thus, even with the continued re-hiring by respondent company of petitioner to serve as
month employment contract on December 15, 1996, the petitioner was in fact re-employed Radio Officer onboard Bergesen's different vessels, this should be interpreted not as a
when his service was extended for another nine (9) months or up to September 1997. basis for regularization but rather a series of contract renewals sanctioned under the
This unquestionably entitled him to the incentive bonus for the 8-month period covered by doctrine set down by the second Millares case. If at all, petitioner was preferred because
the contract and which was correctly awarded to him by the public respondent NLRC. of practical considerations"namely, his experience and qualifications. However, this does
However, as to the succeeding period, although it was not covered by a written contract, not alter the status of his employment from being contractual.
it is unrebutted that the petitioner was actually made to suffer work during that period.
Hence, there was a monthly re-employment of the petitioner for the succeeding 9 months.
Conformably, since the incentive bonus is given for re-employment upon signing for a With respect to the claim for backwages and separation pay, it is now well-settled that the
subsequent period, for purposes of computing the same, the petitioner is deemed to have award of backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement are reliefs that are
been re-employed not only for the 8 months covered by the contract but also for the awarded to an employee who is unjustly dismissed.[16] In the instant case, petitioner was
succeeding 8 months preceding the last month when he was terminated. x x x. separated from his employment due to the termination of an impliedly renewed contract
As for the claim for backwages or separation pay, we note that these claims were neither with respondent company. Hence, there is no illegal or unjust dismissal.
raised in the petitioner's position paper nor in the motion for reconsideration filed before
the NLRC; hence, they can no longer be raised for the first time in this petition. x x x.[8]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari based on the following grounds: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT PLACED THE BURDEN of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66131 dated May 29, 2003 is MODIFIED in
UPON PETITIONER TO PROVE THAT M/V HEROS IS AN LPG/GAS TANKER. that the award of incentive bonus is increased from US$1189.12 to US$1,486.40.
II. CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER HAD WORKED FOR BERGESEN D.Y. Petitioner's claim that he be declared a regular employee and awarded backwages and
PHILIPPINES FOR AND IN BEHALF OF ITS PRINCIPAL BERGESEN D.Y. ASA FOR separation pay is DENIED for lack of merit.
TEN (10) LONG YEARS ABOARD ITS DIFFERENT VESSELS, PETITIONER SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE BY THE COURT OF SO ORDERED.
APPEALS.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN IT SAID IN ITS RAVAGO vs. ESSO EASTERN MARINE, LTD.
DECISION THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF BACKWAGES AND G.R. No. 158324 | 2005-03-14
SEPARATION PAY IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED WITH THE CALLEJO, SR., J.:
NLRC.[9] Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
In this petition, we are called upon to resolve two basic issues: The first concerns what as amended, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) as well as its Resolution in
percentage to use in computing the incentive bonus which petitioner is entitled to. In the CA-G.R. SP No. 66234 which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
memorandum entitled Employment Conditions for Filipino Seafarers Serving Onboard
Vessels of Bergesen D.Y. ASA (Employment Conditions Memorandum), Radio Officers The Factual Antecedents
are entitled to re-employment bonus equivalent to a certain percentage of their basic wage
per month of actual service. If the employee served onboard a bulk carrier, he is entitled The Esso Eastern Marine Ltd. (EEM), now the Petroleum Shipping Ltd., is a foreign
to 8% of his basic wage per month of actual service. Alternatively, if service was done company based in Singapore and engaged in maritime commerce. It is represented in the
onboard a gas carrier tanker, the employee is entitled to 10% of his basic wage per month Philippines by its manning agent and co-respondent Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.
of actual service. (Trans-Global), a corporation organized under the Philippine laws.
The NLRC and the Court of Appeals both agree that petitioner failed to adduce concrete
proof to show that M/V HEROS is a Gas/LPG Tanker and not a bulk carrier. Hence, the Roberto Ravago was hired by Trans-Global to work as a seaman on board various
Court of Appeals upheld the use of 8% by the NLRC as multiplier to compute the incentive Esso vessels. On February 13, 1970, Ravago commenced his duty as S/N wiper on board
bonus. Respondent company argues that petitioner failed to allege the nature of M/V the Esso Bataan under a contract that lasted until February 10, 1971. Thereafter, he was
HEROS at the earliest opportunity, belatedly alleging this information in the Motion for assigned to work in different Esso vessels where he was designated diverse tasks, such
Reconsideration with the NLRC. Petitioner insists that M/V HEROS is a Gas/LPG Tanker as oiler, then assistant engineer. He was employed under a total of 34 separate and
which entitles him to 10% of his basic wage as incentive bonus; and that the Court of unconnected contracts, each for a fixed period, by three different companies, namely,
Appeals erred in ruling that it was petitioner's burden to prove the classification of M/V Esso Tankers, Inc. (ETI), EEM and Esso International Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd. (EIS),
HEROS. Singapore Branch. Ravago worked with Esso vessels until August 22, 1992, a period
We rule in petitioner's favor. The registration papers, which contain the vessel spanning more than 22 years, thus:
classification of M/V HEROS, are the conclusive evidence that petitioner needs to prove
his allegation. However, these are in the custody of respondent company or its mother CONTRACT DURATION POSITION VESSEL
company, Bergesen D.Y. ASA. Interestingly, respondent company never presented the COMPANY
registration papers in evidence.
We find that respondent company's failure to controvert the allegation, when it had the FROM TO
opportunity and resources to do so, works in favor of petitioner. Time and again we have
held that should doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[10] Moreover, the law
creates the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if 13 Feb 70 10 Feb 71 SN/Wiper Esso Bataan
produced.[11] ETI[2]
Consequently, the amount of incentive bonus termed as re-employment bonus which
petitioner is entitled to should be computed as follows: 07 May 71 27 May 72 Wiper Esso Yokohama
Salary per month = US$929.00 EEM[3]
No. of months of actual service = 16 months
Rate = 10% of basic wage 07 Aug 72 02 Jul 73 Oiler Esso Kure
US$929.00/month x 16 months x 10% = US$1,486.40 EEM
The second and third grounds raised in this petition are related, based on petitioner's
allegation that he should be considered a regular employee of respondent company, 03 Oct 73 30 Jun 74 Oiler Esso Bangkok
having been employed onboard the latter's different vessels for the span of 10 years. ETI
Hence, petitioner claims that he is entitled to backwages or at the very least separation
pay, invoking our decision in Millares, et al. v. NLRC[12] where it was held that the 18 Sep 74 26 July 75 Oiler Esso Yokohama
repeated re-hiring of a Chief Engineer of a shipping company for 20 years is sufficient EEM
evidence of the necessity and indispensability of the employee's service to the employer's
business or trade. Hence, applying the express provision of Article 280 of the Labor 23 Oct 75 22 Jun 76 Oiler Esso Port Dickson
Code,[13] such an employee should be considered as a regular employee. EEM
Petitioner's argument is not well-taken. The decision of Millares, et al. v. NLRC was
reconsidered and set aside in a Resolution[14] where it was held: 10 Sep 76 26 Dec 76 Oiler Esso Bangkok
[I]t is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees. They can not be ETI
considered as regular employees under Article 280 of Labor Code. Their employment is
governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is 27 Dec 76 29 Apr 77 Temporary Jr. 3AE Esso Bangkok
terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain ETI
period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been 08 Jul 77 15 Mar 78 Jr. 3AE Esso Bombay
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the nature of the ETI
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration
of the season. 03 Jun 78 03 Feb 79 Temporary 3AE Esso Hongkong
ETI

Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers (is) 04 Apr 79 24 Jun 79 3AE Esso Orient
for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite EEM
peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the
employer why employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of time. 25 Jun 79 16 Jul 79 3AE Esso Yokohama
Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they cannot stay for a long EEM
and an indefinite period of time at sea. Limited access to shore society during the
employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual 17 Jul 79 05 Dec 79 3AE Esso Orient
diversity among the crew during the [Contract of Enlistment] is a reality that necessitates EEM
the limitation of its period.[15]
10 Feb 80 25 Oct 80 3AE Esso Orient
EEM
 As a seaman, we consider his inability partial permanent. His injury corresponds to Grade
19 Jan 81 03 Jun 81 3AE Esso Port 13 in the Schedule of Disability of the Standard Employment Contract. ...[11]
Dickson EEM
Consequently, instead of rehiring Ravago, EIS paid him his Career Employment
04 Jun 81 11 Sep 81 3AE Esso Orient Incentive Plan (CEIP)[12] as of March 1, 1993 and his final tax refund for 1992. After
EEM deducting his Social Security System and medical contributions from November 1992 to
February 1993, EIS remitted the net amount of P162,232.65, following Ravago's
06 Dec 81 20 Apr 82 3AE Esso Chawan execution of a Deed of Quitclaim and/or Release.[13]
EEM
However, on March 22, 1993, Ravago filed a complaint[14] for illegal dismissal with
21 Apr 82 01 Aug 82 Temporary 2AE Esso Chawan prayer for reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney's fees against Trans-Global
EEM* and EIS with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Adjudication Office.

03 Nov 82 06 Feb 83 2AE Esso Jurong In their Answer dated April 14, 1993, respondents denied that Ravago was dismissed
EEM without notice and just cause. Rather, his services were no longer engaged in view of the
disability he suffered which rendered him unfit to work as a seafarer. This fact was further
07 Feb 83 10 Jul 83 2AE Esso Yokohama validated by the company doctor and Ravago's attending physician. They averred that
EEM Ravago was a contractual employee and was hired under 34 separate contracts by
different companies.
31 Aug 83 13 Mar 84 2AE Esso Tumasik
EEM In his position paper, Ravago insisted that he was fit to resume pre-injury activities as
evidenced by the certification[15] issued by Dr. Marciano Foronda M.D., one of his
04 May 84 08 Jan 85 2AE Esso Port attending physicians at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital, that "at present, fracture of
Dickson EEM tibia has completely healed and patient is fit to resume pre-injury activities anytime."[16]
Ravago, likewise, asserted that he was not a mere contractual employee because the
13 Mar 85 31 Oct 85 2AE Esso Castellon respondents regularly and continuously rehired him for 23 years and, for his continuous
EEM service, was awarded a CEIP payment upon his termination from employment.

29 Dec 85 22 Jul 86 2AE Esso Jurong On December 15, 1996, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes rendered a decision
EIS[4] in favor of Ravago, the complainant. He ruled that Ravago was a regular employee
because he was engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable
13 Sep 86 09 Jan 87 2AE Esso Orient in the usual trade or business of the employer. The Labor Arbiter noted that Ravago's
EIS services were repeatedly contracted; he was even given several promotions and was paid
a monthly service experience bonus. This was in keeping with the increasing number of
21 Mar 87 15 Oct 87 2AE Esso Port long term careers established with the respondents. Finally, the Labor Arbiter resolved
Dickson EIS that an employer cannot terminate a worker's employment on the ground of disease
unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the said disease
20 Nov 87 18 Dec 87 Temporary 1AE Esso Chawan is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months
EIS even with proper medical treatment. He concluded that Ravago was illegally dismissed.
The decretal portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision reads:
19 Dec 87 25 Jun 88 2AE Esso Melbourne
EIS WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal
illegal and ordering respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position without
04 Aug 88 19 Mar 89 Temporary 1AE Esso Port loss of seniority rights and other benefits. Further, the respondents are jointly and
Dickson EIS severally liable to pay complainant backwages from the time of his dismissal up to the
promulgation of this decision. Such backwages is provisionally fixed at US$96,285.00 less
20 Mar 89 19 May 89 1AE Esso Port the P162,285.83 (sic) paid to the complainant as Career Employment Incentive Plan. And
Dickson EIS* ordering respondents to pay complainant 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's
fees.
28 Jul 89 17 Feb 90 1AE Esso Melbourne
EIS All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

16 Apr 90 11 Dec 90 1AE Esso Orient SO ORDERED.[17]

EIS
Aggrieved, the respondents appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations
09 Feb 91 06 Oct 91 1AE Esso Melbourne Commission (NLRC) on July 3, 1997, raising the following grounds:
EIS
THE DECISION IS VITIATED BY SERIOUS ERRORS IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT
16 Dec 91 22 Aug 92 1AE Esso Orient WHICH, IF NOT CORRECTED, WOULD CAUSE GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE DAMAGE
EIS OR INJURY TO THE RESPONDENTS. THESE FINDINGS ARE:

---------------------------------- (A) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE BECAUSE HE WAS HIRED
AND REHIRED IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES ON BOARD ESSO VESSELS IN A SPAN OF
* Upgraded/Confirmed on regular rank on board.[5] 23 YEARS;

On August 24, 1992, or shortly after completing his latest contract with EIS, Ravago
was granted a vacation leave with pay from August 23, 1992 until October 28, 1992.
Preparatory to his embarkation under a new contract, he was ordered to report, on
September 28, 1992, for a Medical Pre-Employment Examination.[6] The Pre-
Employment Physical Examination Record shows that Ravago passed the medical
examination conducted by the O.P. Jacinto Medical Clinic, Inc. on October 6, 1992.[7] He,
likewise, attended a Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar conducted by the Capt. I.P.
Estaniel Training Center, a division of Trans-Global, on October 7, 1992.[8]
(B) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE BECAUSE HE WAS
ENGAGED IN THE SERVICES INDISPENSABLE IN THE OPERATION OF THE
VARIOUS VESSELS OF RESPONDENTS;
(C) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS FIT TO RESUME PRE-INJURY ACTIVITIES AND HIS
FRACTURE COMPLETELY HEALED NOTWITHSTANDING A CONTRARY MEDICAL
OPINION OF COMPLAINANT'S OWN PHYSICIAN AND RESPONDENTS' COMPANY
PHYSICIAN; AND

On the night of October 12, 1992, a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg while he was
waiting for a bus ride in Cubao, Quezon City. He fractured his left proximal tibia and was
hospitalized at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital. Ravago's wife, Lolita, informed Trans-
Global and EIS of the incident on October 13, 1992 for purposes of availing medical
benefits. As a result of his injury, Ravago's doctor opined that he would not be able to
cope with the job of a seaman and suggested that he be given a desk job.[9] Ravago's
left leg had become apparently shorter, making him walk with a limp. For this reason, the
company physician, Dr. Virginia G. Manzo, found him to have lost his dexterity, making
him unfit to work once again as a seaman.[10] Citing the opinion of Ravago's doctor, Dr.
Manzo wrote:
... Because of his unsteady gait, pronounced limp, and loss of normal dexterity of his leg
and foot, we doubted whether Mr. Ravago can physically tackle the usual activities of a
seaman in the course of his work without any added risk over and above the ordinary or
standard risk inherent to his job. These activities include climbing up and down the engine
room through a long flight of iron stairs with narrow steps which could be slippery at times
due to grease or oil, jumping from an unsteady and floating motor launch or boat to board
or alight a tanker through a flight of steps or climbing up and down a pilot ladder, wearing
of heavy safety shoes, etc.
Mr. Ravago's doctor replied that, after being informed about the nature of the job, he
believes that Mr. Ravago would not be able to cope with these kinds of activities. In effect,
the Orthopedic doctor said Mr. Ravago is not fit to go back to his work as a seaman.
We concur with the opinion of the doctor that Mr. Ravago is not fit to go back to his job as
a seaman in view of the risk of physical injury to himself as result of the deformity and loss
of dexterity of his injured leg.
(D) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY RESPONDENTS.[18]
On April 26, 2001, the NLRC rendered a decision affirming that of the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC based its decision in the case of Millares v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[19] wherein it was held that:
It is, likewise, clear that petitioners had been in the employ of the private respondents for
20 years. The records reveal that petitioners were repeatedly re-hired by private
respondents even after the expiration of their respective eight-month contracts. Such
repeated re-hiring which continued for 20 years, cannot but be appreciated as sufficient
evidence of the necessity and indispensability of petitioners' service to the private
respondents' business or trade.
Verily, as petitioners had rendered 20 years of service, performing activities which were
necessary and desirable in the business or trade of private respondents, they are, by
express provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code, considered regular employees.[20]
The NLRC, likewise, declared that Ravago was illegally dismissed and that the
quitclaim executed by him could not be considered as a waiver of his right to question the
validity of his dismissal and seek reinstatement and other reliefs. According to the NLRC,
such quitclaim is against public policy, considering the economic disadvantage of the
employee and the inevitable pressure brought about by financial capacity.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, claiming that the
ruling of the Court in Millares v. NLRC[21] had not yet become final and executory.
However, the NLRC denied the motion.
Thereafter, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on the following
grounds: (a) the ruling in Millares v. NLRC had not yet acquired finality, nor has it become
a law of the case or stare decisis because the Court was still resolving the pending motion
for reconsideration; (b) Ravago was not illegally dismissed because after the expiration of
his contract, there was no obligation on the part of the respondents to rehire him; and (c)
the quitclaim signed by Ravago was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable
settlement of the account due him.
On August 29, 2001, the respondents filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin and restrain the
Labor Arbiter from enforcing his decision. On September 5, 2001, the CA issued a
Resolution[22] temporarily restraining NLRC Sheriff Manolito Manuel from enforcing
and/or implementing the decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC.
On November 14, 2001, the CA granted the application for preliminary injunction upon
filing by the respondents of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. Thus, the respondents
filed the surety bond as directed by the appellate court. Before the approval thereof,
however, Ravago filed a motion to set aside the Resolution dated November 14, 2001,
principally arguing that the instant case was a labor dispute, wherein an injunction is
proscribed under Article 254[23] of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
In their comment on Ravago's motion, the respondents professed that the case before
the CA did not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of Article 212(l)[24] of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, but a money claim against the employer as a result of termination
of employment.
On August 28, 2002, the CA rendered a decision in favor the respondents. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the NLRC are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the injunctive writ issued on November 14, 2001, is
hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.[25]
The CA ratiocinated as follows:
The employment, deployment, rights and obligation of Filipino seafarers are particularly
set forth under the rules and regulations governing overseas employment promulgated by
the POEA. Section C, Part I of the Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels emphatically provides
the following:
"SECTION C. DURATION OF CONTRACT
The period of employment shall be for a fix (sic) period but in no case to exceed 12 months
and shall be stated in the Crew Contract. Any extension of the Contract period shall be
subject to the mutual consent of the parties."
It is clear from the foregoing that seafarers are contractual employees whose terms of
employment are fixed for a certain period of time. A fixed term is an essential and natural
appurtenance of seamen's employment contracts to which, whatever the nature of the
engagement, the concept of regular employment under Article 280 of the Labor Code
does not find application. The contract entered into by a seafarer with his employer sets
in detail the nature of his job, the amount of his wage and, foremost, the duration of his
employment. Only a satisfactory showing that both parties dealt with each other on more
or less equal terms with no dominance exercised by the employer over the seafarer is
necessary to sustain the validity of the employment contract. In the absence of duress, as
it is in this case, the contract constitutes the law between the parties.[26]
The CA noted that the employment status of seafarers has been established with
finality by the Court's reconsideration of its decision in Millares v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[27] wherein it was ruled that seamen are contractual employees. According
to the CA, the fact that Ravago was not rehired upon the completion of his contract did
not result in his illegal dismissal; hence, he was not entitled to reinstatement or payment
of separation pay. The CA, likewise, affirmed the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier
issued, declaring that an injunction is a preservative remedy issued for the protection of a
substantive right or interest, an antidote resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be rendered under any standard
compensation.
Hence, the present recourse.
Ravago, now the petitioner, has raised the following issues:
I.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPLEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND VIOLATED
THE LABOR CODE WHEN IT ISSUED A RESTRAINING ORDER AND THEREAFTER
A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 66234.
II.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, [AND]
BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON PROTECTION
TO FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, AND COUNTENANCED UNWARRANTED
DISCRIMINATION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT BECOME A
REGULAR EMPLOYEE.[28]
On the first issue, the petitioner asserts that the CA violated Article 254 of the Labor
Code when it issued a temporary restraining order, and thereafter a writ of preliminary
injunction, to derail the enforcement of the final and executory judgment of the Labor
Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the
issue has become academic since the CA had already decided the case on its merits.
The contention of the petitioner does not persuade.
The petitioner's reliance on Article 254[29] of the Labor Code is misplaced. The law
proscribes the issuance of injunctive relief only in those cases involving or growing out of
a labor dispute. The case before the NLRC neither involves nor grows out of a labor
dispute. It did not involve the fixing of terms or conditions of employment or representation
of persons with respect thereto. In fact, the petitioner's complaint revolves around the
issue of his alleged dismissal from service and his claim for backwages, damages and
attorney's fees. Moreover, Article 254 of the Labor Code specifically provides that the
NLRC may grant injunctive relief under Article 218 thereof.
Besides, the anti-injunction policy of the Labor Code, basically, is freedom at the
workplace. It is more appropriate in the promotion of the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor and industrial disputes.[30]
Generally, an injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of a person's
substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but a mere provisional
remedy, an appendage to the main suit. Pressing necessity requires that it should be
resorted to only to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
measure of consideration. The application of an injunctive writ rests upon the presence of
an exigency or of an exceptional reason before the main case can be regularly heard. The
indispensable conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are: (a) that the
complaint alleges facts which appear to be satisfactory to establish a proper basis for
injunction, and (b) that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction
is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation.[31]
It bears stressing that in the present case, the respondents' petition contains facts
sufficient to warrant the issuance of an injunction under Article 218, paragraph (e) of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.[32] Further, respondents had already posted a surety bond
more than adequate to cover the judgment award.
On the second issue, the petitioner earnestly urges this Court to re-examine its
Resolution dated July 29, 2002 in Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission[33]
and reinstate the doctrine laid down in its original decision rendered on March 14, 2000,
wherein it was initially determined that a seafarer is a regular employee. The petitioner
asserts that the decision of the CA and, indirectly, that of the Resolution of this Court
dated July 29, 2002, are violative of the constitutional mandate of full protection to
labor,[34] whether local or overseas, because it deprives overseas Filipino workers, such
as seafarers, an opportunity to become regular employees without valid and serious
reasons. The petitioner maintains that the decision is discriminatory and violates the
constitutional provision on equal protection of the laws, in addition to being partial to and
overly protective of foreign employers.
The respondents, on the other hand, asseverate that there is no law or administrative
rule or regulation imposing an obligation to rehire a seafarer upon the completion of his
contract. Their refusal to secure the services of the petitioner after the expiration of his
contract can never be tantamount to a termination. The respondents aver that the
petitioner is not entitled to backwages, not only because it is without factual justification
but also because it is not warranted under the law. Furthermore, the respondents assert
that the rulings in the Coyoca v. NLRC,[35] and the latest Millares case remain good and
valid precedents that need to be reaffirmed. The respondents cited the ruling of the Court
in Coyoca case where the Court ruled that a Filipino seaman's contract does not provide
for separation or termination pay because it is governed by the Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment.
The contention of the respondents is correct.
In a catena of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that seafarers are contractual, not
regular, employees.
In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora,[36] the Court ruled that seamen and overseas
contract workers are not covered by the term "regular employment" as defined in Article
280 of the Labor Code. The Court said in that case:
The question immediately provoked ... is whether or not a voluntary agreement on a fixed
term or period would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer."
The definition seems non sequitur. From the premise - that the duties of an employee
entail "activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer" - the conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and
employee should be forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of those
activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of an
employment contract and the nature of the employee's duties set down in that contract as
being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer." The
concept of the employee's duties as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer" is not synonymous with or identical to employment with
a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the
activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon by
the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship, a day
certain being understood to be "that which must necessarily come, although it may not be
known when." Seasonal employment, and employment for a particular project are merely
instances of employment in which a period, were not expressly set down, is necessarily
implied.[37]
....
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may be neither for
seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural
appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of
the engagement, the concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not
appear ever to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding; also
appointments to the positions of dean, assistant dean, college secretary, principal, and
other administrative offices in educational institutions, which are by practice or tradition
rotated among the faculty members, and where fixed terms are a necessity without which
no reasonable rotation would be possible. ... [38]
...
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as
already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his
tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or
oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein
should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out:
agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no
application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly
and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by
the former over the latter. Unless, thus, limited in its purview, the law would be made to
apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes
pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended
consequences.[39]
 The Court made the same ruling in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
Commission[40] and declared that a seafarer, not being a regular employee, is not entitled
to separation or termination pay.
Furthermore, petitioner's contract did not provide for separation benefits. In this
connection, it is important to note that neither does the POEA standard employment
contract for Filipino seamen provide for such benefits.
As a Filipino seaman, petitioner is governed by the Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment and the said Rules do not provide for separation or termination
pay. ...
...
Therefore, although petitioner may not be a regular employee of private respondent, the
latter would still have been liable for payment of the benefits had the principal failed to pay
the same. ...[41]
In the July 29, 2002 Resolution of this Court in Millares v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[42] it reiterated its ruling that seafarers are contractual employees and, as
such, are not covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code of the Philippines:
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees.
They cannot be considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and
their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is
contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season. We need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two
aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the
employment status of seafarers.
...
... The Standard Employment Contract governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen
on Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA, particularly in Part I, Sec. C, specifically
provides that the contract of seamen shall be for a fixed period. And in no case should the
contract of seamen be longer than 12 months. It reads:
Section C. Duration of Contract
The period of employment shall be for a fixed period but in no case to exceed 12 months
and shall be stated in the Crew Contract. Any extension of the Contract period shall be
subject to the mutual consent of the parties.
...
Petitioners make much of the fact that they have been continually re-hired or their
contracts renewed before the contracts expired (which has admittedly been going on for
twenty [20] years). By such circumstance they claim to have acquired regular status with
all the rights and benefits appurtenant to it.
Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance of continuous re-hiring was
dictated by practical considerations that experienced crew members are more preferred.
Petitioners were only given priority or preference because of their experience and
qualifications but this does not detract the fact that herein petitioners are contractual
employees. They can not be considered regular employees. We quote with favor the
explanation of the NLRC in this wise:
xxx The reference to "permanent" and "probationary" masters and employees in these
papers is a misnomer and does not alter the fact that the contracts for enlistment between
complainants-appellants and respondent-appellee Esso International were for a definite
periods of time, ranging from 8 to 12 months. Although the use of the terms "permanent"
and "probationary" is unfortunate, what is really meant is "eligible for-re-hire." This is the
only logical conclusion possible because the parties cannot and should not violate POEA's
requirement that a contract of enlistment shall be for a limited period only; not exceeding
twelve (12) months.
From all the foregoing, we hereby state that petitioners are not considered regular or
permanent employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners' employment have
automatically ceased upon the expiration of their contracts of enlistment (COE). Since
there was no dismissal to speak of, it follows that petitioners are not entitled to
reinstatement or payment of separation pay or backwages, as provided by law. ...[43]
The Court ruled that the employment of seafarers for a fixed period is not discriminatory
against seafarers and in favor of foreign employers. As explained by this Court in its July
29, 2002 Resolution in Millares:
Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers are
for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite
peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the
employer why the employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of
time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay for
a long and an indefinite period of time at sea. Limited access to shore society during the
employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual
diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that necessitates the limitation of its
period.[44]
In Pentagon International Shipping, Inc. v. William B. Adelantar,[45] the Court cited its
rulings in Millares and Coyoca and reiterated that a seafarer is not a regular employee
entitled to backwages and separation pay:
Therefore, Adelantar, a seafarer, is not a regular employee as defined in Article 280 of
the Labor Code. Hence, he is not entitled to full backwages and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement as provided in Article 279 of the Labor Code. As we held in Millares,
Adelantar is a contractual employee whose rights and obligations are governed primarily
by [the] Rules and Regulations of the POEA and, more importantly, by R.A. 8042, or the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The latest ruling of the Court in Marcial Gu-Miro v. Rolando C. Adorable and Bergesen
D.Y. Manila[46] reaffirmed yet again its rulings that a seafarer is employed only on a
contractual basis:
Clearly, petitioner cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the
work he performs is necessary and desirable in the business of respondent company. As
expounded in the above-mentioned Millares Resolution, an exception is made in the
situation of seafarers. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on
a contractual basis.
Thus, even with the continued re-hiring by respondent company of petitioner to serve as
Radio Officer onboard Bergesen's different vessels, this should be interpreted not as a
basis for regularization but rather a series of contract renewals sanctioned under the
doctrine set down by the second Millares case. If at all, petitioner was preferred because
of practical considerations - namely, his experience and qualifications. However, this does
not alter the status of his employment from being contractual.
The petitioner failed to convince the Court why it should restate its decision in Millares
and reverse its July 29, 2002 Resolution in the same case.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated August 28, 2002 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CALONZO
G.R. Nos. 115150-55 | 1996-09-27
BELLOSILLO, J.:
REYDANTE CALONZO Y AMBROSIO was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale and five (5) counts of Estafa by Bernardo Miranda, Danilo de los Reyes, Elmer
Clamor, Belarmino Torregrosa and Hazel de Paula. On 5 April 1994 the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced
1. In criminal Case No. 98850 for Estafa, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eleven
(11) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor to fifteen (15) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, to reimburse the
complainant-victim Bernardo Miranda in the amount of P120,000.00 and to pay the costs.
2. In criminal Case No. 98851 for Estafa, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eleven
(11) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor to fifteen (15) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, to reimburse the
complainant-victim Danilo de los Reyes in the amount of P120,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
3. In Criminal Case No. 98852 for Estafa, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eleven
(11) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor to fifteen (15) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, to reimburse the
complainant-victim Elmer Clamor in the amount of P120,000.00 and to pay the costs.
4. In Criminal Case No. 98853 for Estafa, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of nine
(9) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, to reimburse the
complainant-victim Belarmino Torresgrosa in the amount of P100,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
5. In Criminal Case No. 98854 for Estafa, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eleven
(11) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prison mayor fifteen a (15) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, to reimburse the
complainant-victim Hazel de Paula in the amount of P120,000.00 and to pay the costs.
6. In Criminal Case No. 98855 for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale), to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to
pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay the costs.
In the successive service of his sentences, the accused shall be credited in full with the
period of his preventive imprisonment.
The above terms shall also be subject to the application of the Three-Fold Rule 1
Accused-appellant in this appeal assails his conviction by the trial court. He claims that
the court below erred in disregarding the testimony of Nenita Mercado, an employee of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), who categorically stated
that their records indicated that Calonzo never processed complainants' applications for
employment abroad. He concludes from that fact alone that he cannot be deemed to have
engaged in the recruitment of workers for employment abroad.
As regards the estafa cases, accused-appellant contends that the court a quo erred in
giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses considering that the amounts
claimed to have been collected by him did not correspond to the amounts indicated in the
receipts presented by the complaining witnesses.
The antecedents: Sometime in February 1992 Danilo de los Reyes and his brother-in-law
Belarmino Torregrosa met Reydante Calonzo in the house of Loreta Castañeda at No. 10
P. Burgos Street, Pasig, Metro Manila. In that meeting Calonzo lost no time in informing
them that he could provide them employment abroad, particularly Italy, for a fee. Calonzo
was glib and persuasive that De los Reyes and Torregrosa were quickly convinced to cast
their lot with him. Upon returning home they took stock of their assets and resources and
came up with the figures sufficient for the processing of their applications for employment
abroad. Two months after their initial meeting, or on 13 April 1992, De los Reyes gave
Calonzo P50,000.00. He also pledged the Ford Fiera of his brother-in-law to Calonzo for
P70,000.00 in order to come up with the P120,000.00 processing fee imposed by
Calonzo. The latter then informed De los Reyes of his "scheduled" departure for Italy on
29 April 1992. However, despite the lapse of the period, De los Reyes and Torregrosa
remained in the Philippines although their recruiter reiterated his promise to send them to
Italy.
On 1 May 1992, instead of sending them to Italy, they were billeted at Aloha Hotel along
Roxas Boulevard. The following day, or on 2 May 1992, they boarded a plane that was
supposed to take them to Italy. But Calonzo had another destination in mind. They landed
in Bangkok instead where their visas for Italy, according to Calonzo, would be processed.
They stayed at P.S. Guest Hotel for one and a half months. While in Bangkok the accused
again collected money from them purportedly to defray the expenses for their visas. They
also incurred expenses for food and accommodation, and for overstaying, De los Reyes
had to pay 2800 bahts to the immigration authorities only to discover to their utter dismay
that Calonzo had already returned to the Philippines.

In their helplessness in a foreign land they sought the help of Loreta Castañeda by calling
her up in Manila. Castañeda promptly fetched them from Bangkok and brought them back
to the Philippines. The day following their arrival they went to the office of Calonzo on
Padre Faura. Despite their frustrations in Bangkok Calonzo still insisted that he would
send them to Italy as he promised. In their naivete which was no match to the unmitigated
audacity of Calonzo, De los Reyes and Torregrosa still clung to the promises of Calonzo
hoping against hope that the latter would still fulfill them. However the promises remained
unfulfilled so they looked again for Calonzo. But this time their quarry had already
absconded.
They verified from the POEA whether Calonzo or his R.A.C. Business Agency was duly
authorized and licensed to recruit people for employment abroad. The POEA certified that
R.A.C. Business Agency was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Torregrosa substantiated the above account. He testified that he gave Calonzo a total of
P100,000.00. On cross-examination however he stated that he gave such amount on 27
April 1992 and not on 13 April 1992 as testified to by De los Reyes. But the date appearing
on the receipt marked Exhibit A is 13 April 1992. Torregrosa also claimed that while in
Bangkok he gave Calonzo an additional amount of US$100.00.
On her part, Hazel de Paula testified that she first met appellant and the other
complainants at the house of Loreta Castañeda at No. 10 P. Burgos Street, Pasig, Metro
Manila. Convinced that she would eventually be employed in Italy as a domestic helper
she gave Calonzo P120,000.00. Unlike the other complaining witnesses, she was not able
to fly to Bangkok on 2 May 1992 as her passport was not yet available. She left only on 6
May 1992 where she was met by Calonzo at the airport and brought to the P.S. Guest
Hotel where her companions who had arrived earlier were already billeted. She said that
while in Bangkok Calonzo asked money again from her.
Elmer Clamor, a 28-year old resident of Gen. Trias, Cavite, was similarly situated with
Hazel de Paula. Clamor narrated that he gave Calonzo P120,000.00 for the latter's
commitment to send him to Italy, and in fact while in Bangkok he gave Calonzo US$250.00
more.
Bernardo Miranda, a construction worker from Talisay, Batangas, was another victim of
Calonzo. Lured by the latter's assurances that he would be sent to Italy, he gave Calonzo
a total of P120,000.00 for the processing of his application for work in Italy. But, like all
the rest of them, Miranda only reached Bangkok. The promised job, his hard-earned
money and Calonzo himself eventually disappeared.
Senior Labor Employment Office Nenita Mercado of the POEA confirmed that neither
Reydante Calonzo nor his R.A.C. Business Agency was authorized to recruit workers for
employment abroad.
Reydante Calonzo tells us his own story. He admits being engaged in the consultancy
business through his R.A.C. Business Agency but denies any involvement in recruitment
activities. He admits knowing Loreta Castañeda and Leticia Solis as the two have sought
his assistance regarding their real estate business. He denies knowing the complaining
witnesses except Danilo de los Reyes and Belarmino Torregrosa who once visited him in
his office. While he disclaims the receipts presented by the prosecution as official receipts
of his R.A.C. Business Agency he admits that the signatures thereon were similar to his.
We frustrate the expectations of the accused. Article 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code
defines recruitment and placement as
(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment is specifically defined in Art. 38 of the Code thus
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code . . .
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article
39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
All the five (5) complaining witnesses met each other for the first time at the house of
Loreta Castañeda. They were not in any way acquainted with one another prior to that
meeting save for Danilo de los Reyes and his brother-in-law Belarmino Torregrosa. They
all came from different places, yet, they were all united in pointing to Calonzo as the
person who enticed them to apply for employment abroad. Of course, Calonzo could not
explain what motivated the complaining witnesses to file these cases against him. The
most that Calonzo could do on the witness stand was to deny all the charges against him.
Alas, his denial is at most lame and cannot prevail over the positive assertions of the
complaining witnesses. In People v. Villafuerte 2 we ruled
. . . The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses
of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain no improper motive existed and their testimony
is worthy of full faith and credit. Accused-appellant's denial cannot prevail over the positive
assertions of complainants who had no motive to testify falsely against her except to tell
the truth.
Illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when a person "(a) undertakes any
recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits the same against
three or more persons, individually or as a group." 3 The testimony of complainants
evidently showed that Calonzo was engaged in recruitment activities in large scale. Firstly,
he deluded complainants into believing that jobs awaited them in Italy by distinctly
impressing upon them that he had the facility to send them for work abroad. He even
showed them his passport to lend credence to his claim. To top it all, he brought them to
Bangkok and not to Italy. Neither did he have any arrangements in Bangkok for the
transfer of his recruits to Italy. Secondly, POEA likewise certified that neither Calonzo nor
R.A.C. Business Agency was licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad.
Appellant admitted this fact himself. Thirdly, appellant recruited five (5) workers thus
making the crime illegal recruitment in large scale constituting economic sabotage.
In his attempt to exculpate himself, although belatedly, Calonzo denies having received
money from the complainants. But as against their positive testimonies, this denial of
appellant is worthless and at most self-serving. All the complaining witnesses testified that
they gave their money to Calonzo through Loreta Castañeda who in turn gave the
amounts to Calonzo in their presence. In support thereof complainants even presented
receipts issued by the R.A.C. Business Agency with Calonzo's signature affixed thereon.
Nobody corroborated Calonzo's denial. Even Loreta who could have confirmed such
denial testified that all the amounts given by the complainants were turned over by her to
Calonzo. The attempt of the defense at reinforcing such denial proved futile when it
presented Carmeo Alix to testify that appellant owned another import-export business as
it had no relevance to his defense.
As regards the conviction of Calonzo for estafa on five (5) counts we ruled in People v.
Turda 4 that recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary
recruiting permit or authority from the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however,
where some other crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the
Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes. In People v. Romero 5
we said that the elements of estafa were: (a) that the accused defrauded another abuse
of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Corollarily, Art. 315
of the Revised Penal Code provides for its penalty thus
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such a case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
In the case before us, we are convinced that Calonzo defrauded complainants through
deceit. They were obviously misled into believing that he could provide them employment
in Italy. As a result, the five (5) complainants who desperately wanted to augment their
income and improve their lot parted with their hard-earned money. In Crim. Cases Nos.
98850, 98851, 98852 and 98854 the amount defrauded of each complainant was
P120,000.00. In consonance with Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period the range of which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, to five (5)
years, five (5) months and ten (10) days as minimum, while the medium period is from
five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days, and the maximum is six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days, to eight (8) years. Since the amount of P120,000.00 was defrauded in each case,
the maximum penalty should be taken from the maximum period of the penalty prescribed,
plus one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 which, in these four (4)
cases is equivalent to nine (9) additional years. Hence, the maximum imposable penalty
should be fifteen (15) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed in the Code, i.e., prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium
in any of its periods. Prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium ranges
from six (6) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months. Clearly, the
penalty imposed by the court below in each of the aforesaid cases, which is eleven (11)
years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor medium, to fifteen (15)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal medium, is
properly within the range of the imposable penalty.
The same principle would apply to Crim. Case No. 98853 where the amount defrauded
was P100,000.00. The trial court therefore correctly imposed the penalty of nine (9) years,
eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor medium, to thirteen (13) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal minimum, which is
properly within the range of the imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding acccused-appellant REYDANTE
CALONZO Y AMBROSIO guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in Crim. Case No.
98855 (G.R. No. 115155), and of Estafa in Crim. Case No. 98850 (G.R. No. 115150),
Crim. Case No. 98851 (G.R. No. 115151), Crim. Case No. 98852 (G.R. No. 115152),
Crim. Case No. 98853 (G.R. No. 115153) and Crim. Case No. 98854 (G.R. No. 115154)
as well as the corresponding penalties imposed by the court a quo is AFFIRMED, with
costs against accused-appellant.
In the service of the various prison terms herein imposed upon accused-appellant, the
provisions of Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be observed.
SO ORDERED.
GAGUI vs. DEJERO G.R. No. 196036 | 2013-10-23
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Rule 45 Petition 1 dated 30 March 201 I assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3
ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104292, which affirmed the Decision4 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. OCW-RAB-IV-4-
392-96-RI, finding petitioner Elizabeth M. Gagui solidarily liable with the placement
agency, PRO Agency Manila, Inc., to pay respondents all the money claims awarded by
virtue of their illegal dismissal.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed separate
Complaints5 for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of
transportation expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc.,
and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes.
After due proceedings, on 7 May 1997, Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a Decision,6
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, ALL FOREGOING CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondents Pro Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to jointly and
severally pay complainants, as follows:
a) US$4,130.00 each complainant or a total of US$8,260.00, their unpaid salaries from
July 31, 1992 up to September 1993, less cash advances of total of SR11,000.00, or its
Peso equivalent at the time of payment;
b) US$1,032.00 each complainant for two (2) hours overtime pay for fourteen (14) months
of services rendered or a total of US$2,065.00 or its Peso equivalent at the time of
payment;
c) US$2,950.00 each complainant or a total of US$5,900.00 or its Peso equivalent at the
time of payment, representing the unexpired portion of their contract;
d) Refund of plane ticket of complainants Teodoro Parejo and Simeon Dejero from Saudi
Arabia to the Philippines, in the amount of P15,642.90 and P16,932.00 respectively;
e) Refund of excessive collection of placement fees in the amount of P4,000.00 each
complainant, or a total of P8,000.00;
f) Moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 each complainant, or a
total of P20,000.00;
g) Attorney’s fees in the amount of P48,750.00.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to this Decision, Labor Arbiter Ramos issued a Writ of Execution7 on 10 October
1997. When the writ was returned unsatisfied,8 an Alias Writ of Execution was issued, but
was also returned unsatisfied.9
On 30 October 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency
Manila, Inc.’s Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtors.10 It included
petitioner as the Vice- President/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agency, Manila, Inc.
After due hearing, Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan issued an Order11 on 25
April 2003 granting respondents’ motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the motion to implead is hereby granted insofar as Merlita G. Lapuz and
Elizabeth M. Gagui as parties-respondents and accordingly held liable to complainant
jointly and solidarily with the original party-respondent adjudged liable under the Decision
of May 7, 1998. Let 2nd Alias Writ of Execution be issued for the enforcement of the
Decision consistent with the foregoing tenor.
SO ORDERED.
On 10 June 2003, a 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was issued,12 which resulted in the
garnishment of petitioner’s bank deposit in the amount of P85,430.48.13 However, since
the judgment remained unsatisfied, respondents sought the issuance of a third alias writ
of execution on 26 February 2004.14
On 15 December 2004, Executive Labor Arbiter Lita V. Aglibut issued an Order15 granting
respondents’ motion for a third alias writ. Accordingly, the 3rd Alias Writ of Execution16
was issued on 6 June 2005, resulting in the levying of two parcels of lot owned by
petitioner located in San Fernando, Pampanga.17
On 14 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution;18
and on 29 June 2006, a Supplemental Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution.19 In these
motions, petitioner alleged that apart from not being made aware that she was impleaded
as one of the parties to the case,20 the dispositive portion of the 7 May 1997 Decision
(1997 Decision) did not hold her liable in any form whatsoever.21 More importantly,
impleading her for the purpose of execution was tantamount to modifying a decision that
had long become final and executory.22
On 26 June 2006, Executive Labor Arbiter Lita V. Aglibut issued an Order23 denying
petitioner’s motions on the following grounds: (1) records disclosed that despite having
been given sufficient notices to be able to register an opposition, petitioner refused to do
so, effectively waiving her right to be heard;24 and (2) under Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 (R.A. 8042) or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
corporate officers may be held jointly and severally liable with the placement agency for
the judgment award.25
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which rendered a Decision26 in the following
wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of the respondent Elizabeth M. Gagui is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Order of Labor Arbiter Lita V. Aglibut
dated June 26, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The NLRC ruled that “in so far as overseas migrant workers are concerned, it is R.A. 8042
itself that describes the nature of the liability of the corporation and its officers and
directors. x x x [I]t is not essential that the individual officers and directors be impleaded
as party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A finding of liability on the part
of the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers or
directors.”27
Upon appellate review, the CA affirmed the NLRC in a Decision28 promulgated on 15
November 2010:
From the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to hold the NLRC guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the Order of Executive
Labor Arbiter Aglibut which held petitioner solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc.
and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes as adjudged in the May 7, 1997 Decision of Labor Arbiter
Pedro Ramos.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
The CA stated that there was “no need for petitioner to be impleaded x x x because by
express provision of the law, she is made solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc.,
for any and all money claims filed by private respondents.”29 The CA further said that this
is not a case in which the liability of the corporate officer must be established because an
allegation of malice must be proven. The general rule is that corporate officers, directors
and stockholders are not liable, except when they are made liable for their corporate act
by a specific provision of law, such as R.A. 8042.30
On 8 and 15 December 2010, petitioner filed two Motions for Reconsideration, but both
were denied in a Resolution31 issued by the CA on 25 February 2011.
Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 March 2011.
On 1 August 2011, respondents filed their Comment,32 alleging that the petition had been
filed 15 days after the prescriptive period of appeal under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
On 14 February 2012, petitioner filed a Reply,33 countering that she has a fresh period of
15 days from 16 March 2011 (the date she received the Resolution of the CA) or up to 31
March 2011 to file the Petition.
ISSUES
From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not this petition was filed on time; and
2. Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency
Manila, Inc. in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042, despite not having been
impleaded in the Complaint and named in the Decision.
THE COURT’S RULING
Petitioner has a fresh period of 15
days within which to file this petition,
in accordance with the Neypes rule.
We first address the procedural issue of this case.
In a misleading attempt to discredit this petition, respondents insist that by opting to file a
Motion for Reconsideration instead of directly appealing the CA Decision, petitioner
effectively lost her right to appeal. Hence, she should have sought an extension of time to
file her appeal from the denial of her motion.
This contention, however, deserves scant consideration. We agree with petitioner that
starting from the date she received the Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days within which to appeal to this Court.
The matter has already been settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,34 as follows:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two Motions for Reconsideration
only on 16 March 2011, she had another 15 days within which to file her Petition, or until
31 March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March 2011, fell within the prescribed 15-day
period.
Petitioner may not be held jointly
and severally liable, absent a finding
that she was remiss in directing the
affairs of the agency.
As to the merits of the case, petitioner argues that while it is true that R.A. 8042 and the
Corporation Code provide for solidary liability, this liability must be so stated in the
decision sought to be implemented.35 Absent this express statement, a corporate officer
may not be impleaded and made to personally answer for the liability of the corporation.36
Moreover, the 1997 Decision had already been final and executory for five years and, as
such, can no longer be modified.37 If at all, respondents are clearly guilty of laches for
waiting for five years before taking action against petitioner.38
In disposing the issue, the CA cited Section 10 of R.A. 8042, stating that there was “no
need for petitioner to be impleaded x x x because by express provision of the law, she is
made solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc., for any and all money claims filed by
private respondents.”39
We reverse the CA.
At the outset, we have declared that “R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to
regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the
injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad.”40
The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows:
SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and
all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated
in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its
approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sto. Tomas v. Salac,41 we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this
provision. We have thus maintained:
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of Section
10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors, officers, and partners of recruitment
and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and damages that
may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
xxxx
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of
corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable
with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs
of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities. In the
case of Becmen and White Falcon, while there is evidence that these companies were at
fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no mention of any evidence
in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmen’s corporate officers
and directors, were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or omissions
in Jasmin’s case. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate
finding that she was remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal
dismissal of respondents. Examination of the records would reveal that there was no
finding of neglect on the part of the petitioner in directing the affairs of the agency. In fact,
respondents made no mention of any instance when petitioner allegedly failed to manage
the agency in accordance with law, thereby contributing to their illegal dismissal.
Moreover, petitioner is correct in saying that impleading her for the purpose of execution
is tantamount to modifying a decision that had long become final and executory.42 The
fallo of the 1997 Decision by the NLRC only held “respondents Pro Agency Manila Inc.,
and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to jointly and severally pay complainants x x x.”43 By
holding her liable despite not being ordained as such by the decision, both the CA and
NLRC violated the doctrine on immutability of judgments.
In PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,44 we stressed that “respondent's
[petitioner’s] obligation is based on the judgment rendered by the trial court. The
dispositive portion or the fallo is its decisive resolution and is thus the subject of execution.
x x x. Hence the execution must conform with that which is ordained or decreed in the
dispositive portion of the decision.”
In JNIMACO v. NLRC, 45 we also held thus:
None of the parties in the case before the Labor Arbiter appealed the Decision dated
March I 0, 1987, hence the same became final and executory. It was, therefore, removed
from the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC to further alter or amend it. Thus,
the proceedings held for the purpose of amending or altering the dispositive portion of
the said decision are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Also, the Alias Writ of Execution
is null and void because it varied the tenor of the judgment in that it sought to enforce the
final judgment against ''Antonio Gonzales/Industrial Management Development Corp.
(INIMACO) and/or Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corp. and Gerardo Sicat," which makes
the liability solidary.
In other words, "[ o ]nee a decision or order becomes final and executory, it is removed
from. the power or jurisdiction of the cow1 which rendered it to further alter or amend it. It
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction,
including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. An order of extention which varies
the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity."46
While labor laws should be construed liberally in favor of labor, we must be able to balance
this with the equally important right of petitioner to due process. Because the 1997
Decision of Labor Arbiter Ramos was not appealed, it became final and executory and
was therefore removed from his jurisdiction. Modifying the tenor of the judgment via a
motion impleading petitioner and filed only in 2002 runs contrary to settled jurisprudence,
rendering such action a nullity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated 15 November 2010 and Resolution dated 25 February 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104292 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 161757 | 2006-01-25
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, deployed to Taiwan Divina A.
Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective
February 1, 1997.[1] The deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker,
Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working for
her Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned
to the Philippines on February 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint[2] before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the
Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three
months and that she was underpaid.
The following day or on February 15, 2000, Labor Arbitration Associate Regina T. Gavin
issued Summons[3] to the Manager of Sunace, furnishing it with a copy of Divina's
complaint and directing it to appear for mandatory conference on February 28, 2000.
The scheduled mandatory conference was reset. It appears to have been concluded,
however.
On April 6, 2000, Divina filed her Position Paper[4] claiming that under her original one-
year contract and the 2-year extended contract which was with the knowledge and
consent of Sunace, the following amounts representing income tax and savings were
deducted:
Year
Deduction for
Income Tax
Deduction for Savings
1997
NT10,450.00
NT23,100.00
1998
NT9,500.00
NT36,000.00
1999
NT13,300.00
NT36,000.00;[5]
and while the amounts deducted in 1997 were refunded to her, those deducted in 1998
and 1999 were not. On even date, Sunace, by its Proprietor/General Manager Maria Luisa
Olarte, filed its Verified Answer and Position Paper,[6] claiming as follows, quoted
verbatim:
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED
FOR THE REFUND OF HER 24 MONTHS
SAVINGS
3. Complainant could not anymore claim nor entitled for the refund of her 24 months
savings as she already took back her saving already last year and the employer did not
deduct any money from her salary, in accordance with a Fascimile Message from the
respondent SUNACE's employer, Jet Crown International Co. Ltd., a xerographic copy of
which is herewith attached as ANNEX "2" hereof;
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED
TO REFUND OF HER 14 MONTHS TAX
AND PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
4. There is no basis for the grant of tax refund to the complainant as the she finished her
one year contract and hence, was not illegally dismissed by her employer. She could only
lay claim over the tax refund or much more be awarded of damages such as attorney's
fees as said reliefs are available only when the dismissal of a migrant worker is without
just valid or lawful cause as defined by law or contract.
The rationales behind the award of tax refund and payment of attorney's fees is not to
enrich the complainant but to compensate him for actual injury suffered. Complainant did
not suffer injury, hence, does not deserve to be compensated for whatever kind of
damages.
Hence, the complainant has NO cause of action against respondent SUNACE for
monetary claims, considering that she has been totally paid of all the monetary benefits
due her under her Employment Contract to her full satisfaction.
6. Furthermore, the tax deducted from her salary is in compliance with the Taiwanese law,
which respondent SUNACE has no control and complainant has to obey and this
Honorable Office has no authority/jurisdiction to intervene because the power to tax is a
sovereign power which the Taiwanese Government is supreme in its own territory. The
sovereign power of taxation of a state is recognized under international law and among
sovereign states.
7. That respondent SUNACE respectfully reserves the right to file supplemental Verified
Answer and/or Position Paper to substantiate its prayer for the dismissal of the above
case against the herein respondent. AND BY WAY OF -
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . answer to
complainant's position paper"[7] alleging that Divina's 2-year extension of her contract
was without its knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim
arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of
Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document was annexed to
said ". . . answer to complainant's position paper."
To Sunace's ". . . answer to complainant's position paper," Divina filed a 2-page reply,[8]
without, however, refuting Sunace's disclaimer of knowledge of the extension of her
contract and without saying anything about the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and
Affidavit of Desistance.
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for two
more years was without its knowledge and consent in this wise:
We reject Sunace's submission that it should not be held responsible for the amount
withheld because her contract was extended for 2 more years without its knowledge and
consent because as Annex "B"[9] shows, Sunace and Edmund Wang have not stopped
communicating with each other and yet the matter of the contract's extension and
Sunace's alleged non-consent thereto has not been categorically established.
What Sunace should have done was to write to POEA about the extension and its
objection thereto, copy furnished the complainant herself, her foreign employer, Hang Rui
Xiong and the Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang.
And because it did not, it is presumed to have consented to the extension and should be
liable for anything that resulted thereform (sic).[10] (Underscoring supplied)
The Labor Arbiter rejected too Sunace's argument that it is not liable on account of Divina's
execution of a Waiver and Quitclaim and an Affidavit of Desistance. Observed the Labor
Arbiter:
Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the
same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsel
(sic), if any, before the Labor Arbiter.
The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was
voluntarily entered into by the parties and after having explained to them the terms and
consequences thereof.
A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor
Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall be approved by him, if after confronting the
parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and
conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely voluntarily (sic) by them
and the agreement is not contrary to law, morals, and public policy.
And because no consideration is indicated in the documents, we strike them down as
contrary to law, morals, and public policy.[11]
He accordingly decided in favor of Divina, by decision of October 9, 2000,[12] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents SUNACE
INTERNATIONAL SERVICES and its owner ADELAIDA PERGE, both in their personal
capacities and as agent of Hang Rui Xiong/Edmund Wang to jointly and severally pay
complainant DIVINA A. MONTEHERMOZO the sum of NT91,950.00 in its peso equivalent
at the date of payment, as refund for the amounts which she is hereby adjudged entitled
to as earlier discussed plus 10% thereof as attorney's fees since compelled to litigate,
complainant had to engage the services of counsel.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Underescoring supplied)
On appeal of Sunace, the NLRC, by Resolution of April 30, 2002,[14] affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's decision.
Via petition for certiorari,[15] Sunace elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
dismissed it outright by Resolution of November 12, 2002,[16] the full text of which reads:
The petition for certiorari faces outright dismissal.
The petition failed to allege facts constitutive of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the public respondent amounting to lack of jurisdiction when the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's finding that petitioner Sunace International Management Services impliedly
consented to the extension of the contract of private respondent Divina A. Montehermozo.
It is undisputed that petitioner was continually communicating with private respondent's
foreign employer (sic). As agent of the foreign principal, "petitioner cannot profess
ignorance of such extension as obviously, the act of the principal extending complainant
(sic) employment contract necessarily bound it." Grave abuse of discretion is not present
in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.[17]
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis on words in capital letters in the original; emphasis on words in small letters
and underscoring supplied)
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution
of January 14, 2004,[18] Sunace filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC's finding that Sunace knew of
and impliedly consented to the extension of Divina's 2-year contract. It went on to state
that "It is undisputed that [Sunace] was continually communicating with [Divina's] foreign
employer." It thus concluded that "[a]s agent of the foreign principal, 'petitioner cannot
profess ignorance of such extension as obviously, the act of the principal extending
complainant (sic) employment contract necessarily bound it.'"
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with
the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer Xiong.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese broker to Sunace, the only
basis of a finding of continuous communication, reads verbatim:
xxxx
Regarding to Divina, she did not say anything about her saving in police station. As we
contact with her employer, she took back her saving already last years. And they did not
deduct any money from her salary. Or she will call back her employer to check it again. If
her employer said yes! we will get it back for her.
Thank you and best regards.
(sgd.)
Edmund Wang
President[19]
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the above-quoted telefax
message, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and
therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the
contract is misplaced. The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to
the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract.
That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divina's allegedly
withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the
contract. As Sunace points out in its Reply[20] filed before the Court of Appeals,
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to the
petitioner that the private respondent had t[aken] already her savings from her foreign
employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the
extension or the petitioner's consent thereto.[21]
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume
that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on
February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following
Divina's filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the Court of Appeals following dictum:
As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension
as obviously, the act of its principal extending [Divina's] employment contract necessarily
bound it,[22]
it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the
principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around.[23] The knowledge of the principal-
foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under
the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such,
it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina's claims arising from the
2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides,
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.[24]
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code reading
The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the
agent, dealing directly with third persons.
thus applies.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the validity of the Waiver and
Affidavit of Desistance which Divina executed in favor of Sunace is rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent Divina A.
Montehermozo against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION G.R. No. 78085 | 1989-10-16
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale seeks the nullification of a resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed a decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) holding it liable to pay, jointly and severally with
Zamel-Turbag Engineering and Architectural Consultant (ZAMEL), private respondent
Virgilio P. Nacionales' salary and vacation pay corresponding to the unexpired portion of
his employment contract with ZAMEL.
In 1983, petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed
private respondent for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi
Arabia. On May 25, 1983, a service agreement was executed by private respondent and
ZAMEL whereby the former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus
US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one (1) year commencing from the date of his
arrival in Saudi Arabia. Private respondent departed for Saudi Arabia on June 28, 1983.
On February 13, 1984, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the
ground that his performance was below par. For three (3) successive days thereafter, he
was detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers
were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the
Philippines.
Private respondent then filed on April 23, 1984 a complaint for illegal termination against
petitioner and ZAMEL with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 84-04-401.
Based on a finding that petitioner and ZAMEL failed to establish that private respondent
was terminated for just and valid cause, the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office
of the POEA issued a decision dated June 23, 1986 signed by Deputy Administrator and
Officer-in-Charge Crescencio M. Siddayao, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against
respondents, ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally, to complainant the following
amounts:
1. TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY US DOLLARS (US$2,640.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of payment, representing the salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of complainant's contract;
2. SIX HUNDRED US DOLLARS (US$600.00) less partial payment of FIVE HUNDRED
FIFTY-EIGHT SAUDI RIYALS (SR 558), or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time
of actual payment, representing the unpaid balance of complainant's vacation pay;
3. THREE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its equivalent in Philippine
currency at the time of actual payment representing reimbursement of salary deductions
for return travel fund;
4. Ten percent (10%) of the above-stated amounts, as and for attorney's fees.
Complainant's claim for legal and transportation expenses are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[POEA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34.]
On July 18, 1986, petitioner filed thru its new counsel a motion for reconsideration which
was treated as an appeal to the NLRC by the POEA. Petitioner alleged that the POEA
erred in holding it solidarily liable for ZAMEL's violation of private respondent's service
agreement even if it was not a party to the agreement.
In a resolution promulgated on December 11, 1986, the NLRC affirmed the POEA
decision, holding that, as a duly licensed private employment agency, petitioner is jointly
and severally liable with its foreign principal ZAMEL for all claims and liabilities which may
arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contract or service
agreement [NLRC Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 26-27].
On March 30, 1987, the NLRC denied for lack of merit petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition captioned as "Petition for Review".
At this point, it is not amiss to note that the filing of a "Petition for Review" under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is not the proper means by which NLRC decisions are appealed to
the Supreme Court. It is only through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that NLRC
decisions may be reviewed and nullified on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in the
interest of justice, this Court opted to treat the instant petition as if it were a petition for
certiorari. Thus, after the filing of respondents' comments, petitioner's joint reply thereto,
and respondents' rejoinders, the Court resolved to consider the issues joined and the case
submitted for decision.
The case at bar involves two principal issues, to wit:
I. Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held jointly and
severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the employment contracts of the employees
recruited and deployed abroad;
II. Whether or not sufficient evidence was presented by petitioner to establish the
termination of private respondent's employment for just and valid cause.
I.
Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules
implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an
employment agency or recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement
performed abroad, or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for
purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of an employment agreement.
Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with ZAMEL
for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement.
Petitioner's conclusion is erroneous. Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had
voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it
submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a
private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was
required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed
all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts
of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment
[Section 2(e), Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. It was also
required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the
foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which
contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the
foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts
of employment [Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V, Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor
Code (1976)]. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as
determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed
recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment
as appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978) amending Article 31 of the Labor
Code].
These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other
private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal,
the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts
[See Ambraque International Placement and Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77970, January
28, 1988, 157 SCRA 431; Catan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77279, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
691; Alga Moher International Placement Services v. Atienza, G.R. No. 74610, September
30, 1988].
In a belated attempt to bolster its position, petitioner contends in its joint reply that the
omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code are invalid for not having been published in
the Official Gazette pursuant to the Court's pronouncements in the cases of Tañada v.
Tuvera [G.R. No. 63915, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 27; December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA
446]. Petitioner further contends that the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations, in particular
Section 1, Rule I of Book VII * quoted in the NLRC decision, should not have been
retroactively applied to the case at bar.
But these contentions are irrelevant to the issues at bar. They proceed from a
misapprehension of the legal basis of petitioner's liabilities as a duly licensed private
employment agency. It bears repeating that the basis for holding petitioner jointly and
severally liable with the foreign-based employer ZAMEL is the contractual undertakings
described above which it had submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. The
sections of the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code cited by this Court merely
enumerate the various documents or undertakings which were submitted by petitioner as
applicant for the license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment
and placement. These sections do not create the obligations and liabilities of a private
employment agency to an employee it had recruited and deployed for work overseas. It
must be emphasized again that petitioner assumed the obligations and liabilities of a
private employment agency by contract. Thus, whether or not the omnibus rules are
effective in accordance with Tanada v. Tuvera is an issue the resolution of which does
not at all render nugatory the binding effect upon petitioner of its own contractual
undertakings.
The Court, consequently, finds it unnecessary to pass upon both the implications of
Tanada v. Tuvera on the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code as well as the
applicability of the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations.
Petitioner further argues that it cannot be held solidarily liable with ZAMEL since public
respondent had not acquired jurisdiction over ZAMEL through extra-territorial service of
summons as mandated by Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
This argument is untenable. It is well-settled that service upon any agent of a foreign
corporation, whether or not engaged in business in the Philippines, constitutes personal
service upon that corporation, and accordingly, judgment may be rendered against said
foreign corporation [Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa, G.R. No. L-38649,
March 26, 1979, 89 SCRA 131]. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that petitioner is
an agent of ZAMEL. The service agreement was executed in the Philippines between
private respondent and Milagros G. Fausto, the General Manager of petitioner, for and in
behalf of ZAMEL [Annex "D" of Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 37]. Moreover, one of the
documents presented by petitioner as evidence, i.e., the counter-affidavit of its General
Manager Ms. Fausto, contains an admission that it is the representative and agent of
ZAMEL [See Paragraph No. 1 of Annex "H" of Petition; Rollo, p. 43].
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioner jointly and
severally liable with its foreign principal ZAMEL for all claims which have arisen in
connection with the implementatrion of private respondent's employment contract.
II.
Petitioner asserts that the NLRC failed to consider the overwhelming evidence it had
presented before the POEA which establishes the fact that private respondent was
terminated for just and valid cause in accordance with his service agreement with ZAMEL.
This assertion is without merit. The NLRC upheld the POEA finding that petitioner's
evidence was insufficient to prove termination from employment for just and valid cause.
And a careful study of the evidence thus far presented by petitioner reveals to this Court
that there is legal basis for public respondent's conclusion.
It must be borne in mind that the basic principle in termination cases is that the burden of
proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause, and
failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore,
was illegal [Polymedic General Hospital v. NLRC, G.R. No. 64190, January 31, 1985, 134
SCRA 420; and also Article 277 of the Labor Code]. And where the termination cases
involve a Filipino worker recruited and deployed for overseas employment, the burden
naturally devolves upon both the foreign-based employer and the employment agency or
recruitment entity which recruited the worker, for the latter is not only the agent of the
former, but is also solidarily liable with its foreign principal for any claims or liabilities
arising from the dismissal of the worker.
In the case at bar, petitioner had indeed failed to discharge the burden of proving that
private respondent was terminated from employment for just and valid cause. Petitioner's
evidence consisted only of the following documents:
(1) A letter dated May 15, 1984 allegedly written by an official of ZAMEL, stating that a
periodic evaluation of the entire staff was conducted; that the personnel concerned were
given a chance to improve; that complainant's performance was found below par; and that
on February 13, 1984, at about 8:30 AM, complainant was caught on the way out of the
office to look for another job during office hours without the permission of his supervisor;
(2) A telex message allegedly sent by employees of ZAMEL, stating that they have not
experienced maltreatment, and that the working conditions (in ZAMEL) are good;
(3) The signatures of fifteen (15) persons who allegedly sent the telex message;
(4) A receipt dated February 16, 1984 signed by complainant, stating that he was paid
SR915 representing his salary and SR558, representing vacation pay for the month of
February 1984;
(5) The counter-affidavit of Milagros G. Fausto, the General Manager of Royal Crown,
stating that complainant was dismissed because of poor performance, acts of dishonesty
and misconduct, and denying complainant's claim that his salary and leave pay were not
paid, and that he was maltreated [See POEA Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 32, See also
Annexes "E", "F", "F-1", "G" and "H" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 38-43].
Certainly, the telex message supposedly sent by the employees of ZAMEL is not relevant
in the determination of the legality of private respondent's dismissal. On the other hand,
the receipt signed by private respondent does not prove payment to him of the salary and
vacation pay corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract.
More importantly, except for its allegation that private respondent was caught on February
13, 1984 on his way out of the office compound without permission, petitioner had failed
to allege and to prove with particularity its charges against private respondent. The letter
dated May 15, 1984 allegedly written by the Actg. Project Architect and the counter-
affidavit of petitioner's General Manager merely stated that the grounds for the employee's
dismissal were his unsatisfactory performance and various acts of dishonesty,
insubordination and misconduct. But the particular acts which would indicate private
respondent's incompetence or constitute the above infractions were neither specified nor
described therein. In the absence of any other evidence to substantiate the general
charges hurled against private respondent, these documents, which comprise petitioner's
evidence in chief, contain empty and self-serving statements insufficient to establish just
and valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent [See Euro-Lines, Phils., Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 75782, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 78; Ambraque International
Placement and Services v. NLRC, supra].
The Court is aware of the document attached in petitioner's manifestation and joint reply
which is purportedly a xerox copy of a statement executed on December 13, 1987 in Saudi
Arabia by private respondent claiming that the latter had settled the case with ZAMEL and
had "received all [his] benefits that is salary, vacation pay, severance pay and all other
bonuses before [he] left the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 13 Feb. 1984 and hereby
indemnify [ZAMEL] from any claims or liabilities, [he] raised in the Philippine Courts"
[Annex "A" of petitioner's Manifestation with Motion to hold in Abeyance; Rollo, p. 82. And
also Annex "A" of petitioner's Joint Reply; Rollo, p. 111].
But the veracity of the contents of the document is precisely disputed by private
respondent. He claims that he was made to sign the above statement against his will and
under threat of deportation [See Telex of private respondent received by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines on January 14, 1988; Rollo, p. 83. And also private respondent's
Rejoinder, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 139-141].
Petitioner finally contends that inasmuch as clause no. 13 of the service agreement
provided that the law under which the agreement shall be regulated was the laws of Saudi
Arabia [Annex "D" of Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 36], public respondent should have taken into
account the laws of Saudi Arabia and the stricter concept of morality availing in that
jurisdiction for the determination of the legality of private respondent's dismissal.
This contention is patently erroneous. The provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
its implementing rules and regulations, and doctrines laid down in jurisprudence dealing
with the principle of due process and the basic right of all Filipino workers to security of
tenure, provide the standard by which the legality of the exercise by management of its
prerogative to dismiss incompetent, dishonest or recalcitrant employees, is to be
determined. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the
protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the
contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of
the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers
and employers. For the State assures the basic rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work [Article
3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article
XIII, 1987 Constitution]. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the
Civil Code which states that laws "which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
Needless to say, the laws of Saudi Arabia which were, incidentally, neither pleaded nor
proved by petitioner, have absolutely no bearing whatsoever to the case at bar.
The Court holds, therefore, that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the POEA's finding of insufficiency
of evidence to prove termination for just and valid cause.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition.
SO ORDERED.
OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 138193 | 2003-03-05
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Rules of Court do not require that all supporting papers and documents
accompanying a petition for certiorari should be duplicate originals or certified true copies.
Furthermore, unilateral decisions to alter the use of a vessel from overseas service to
coastwise shipping will not affect the validity of an existing employment contract validly
executed. Workers should not be prejudiced by actions done solely by employers without
the former's consent or participation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the February 11, 1999 and the March 26, 1999 Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50667. The assailed Resolutions dismissed a
Petition filed in the CA, challenging an adverse ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The first Resolution disposed as follows:
"We resolve to OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS the petition."[2]
The second Resolution[3] denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
On the other hand, the NLRC Decision disposed in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED
in that respondents OSM Shipping Phils. Inc. and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping
Agency Services Co. are jointly and severally ordered to pay complainant the sum of
ELEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE and 65/100 [US dollars]
(US$11,359.65) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing complainant's
unpaid salaries, accrued fixed overtime pay, allowance, vacation leave pay and
termination pay."[4]
The Facts
This case originated from a Complaint filed by Fermin F. Guerrero against OSM Shipping
Philippines, Inc.; and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. The
Complaint was for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and
vacation pay. The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:
"[Private respondent] was hired by [Petitioner] OSM for and in behalf of its principal, Phil
Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SLC) to board its vessel M/V '[Princess] Hoa'
as a Master Mariner for a contract period of ten (10) months. Under the said contract, his
basic monthly salary is US$1,070.00, US$220.00 allowance, US$321.00 fixed overtime,
US$89 vacation leave pay per month for x x x 44 hours f] work per week. He boarded the
vessel on July 21, 1994 and complied faithfully with the duties assigned to him.
"[Private respondent] alleged that from the start of his work with M/V 'Princess Hoa', he
was not paid any compensation at all and was forced to disembark the vessel sometime
in January 1995 because he cannot even buy his basic personal necessities. For almost
seven (7) months, i.e. from July 1994 to January 1995, despite the services he rendered,
no compensation or remuneration was ever paid to him. Hence, this case for illegal
dismissal, [non-payment] of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay.
"[Petitioner] OSM, for its part, alleged that on July 26, 1994, Concorde Pacific, an
American company which owns M/V 'Princess Hoa', then a foreign registered vessel,
appointed x x x Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship
manager particularly to negotiate, transact and deal with any third persons, entities or
corporations in the planning of crewing selection or determination of qualifications of
Filipino Seamen. On the same date, [Petitioner] OSM entered into a Crew Agreement with
x x x PC-SASCO for the purpose of processing the documents of crew members of M/V
'Princess Hoa'. The initial plan of the [s]hip-owner was to use the vessel in the overseas
trade, particularly the East Asian Growth Area. Thereafter, the contract of [private
respondent] was processed before the POEA on September 20, 1994.
"OSM alleged further that the shipowner changed its plans on the use of the vessel.
Instead of using it for overseas trade, it decided to use it in the coastwise trade, thus, the
crewmembers hired never left the Philippines and were merely used by the shipowner in
the coastwise trade. Considering that the M/V 'Princess Hoa' was a foreign registered
vessel and could not be used in the coastwise trade, the shipowner converted the vessel
to Philippine registry on September 28, 1994 by way of bareboat chartering it out to
another entity named Philippine Carrier Shipping Lines Co. (PCSLC). To do this, the
shipowner through Conrado V. Tendido had to terminate its management agreement with
x x x PC-SASCO on September 28, 1994 by a letter of termination dated September 20,
1994. In the same letter of termination, the ship owner stated that it has bareboat
chartered out the vessel to said [PCSLC] and converted it into Philippine registry.
Consequently, x x x PC-SASCO terminated its crew agreement with OSM in a letter dated
December 5, 1994. Because of the bareboat charter of the vessel to PCSLC and its
subsequent conversion to Philippine registry and use in coastwise trade as well as to the
termination of the management agreement and crew agency agreement, a termination of
contract ensued whereby PCSLC, the bareboat charterer, became the disponent
owner/employer of the crew.
As a disponent owner/employer, PCSLC is now responsible for the payment of
complainant's wages. x x x. [5]
Labor Arbiter (LA) Manuel R. Caday rendered a Decision[6] in favor of Private Respondent
Guerrero. Petitioner and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services, Co.
(PC-SASCO), were ordered to jointly and severally pay Guerrero his unpaid salaries and
allowances, accrued fixed overtime pay, vacation leave pay and termination pay. The
Decision held that there was a constructive dismissal of private respondent, since he had
not been paid his salary for seven months. It also dismissed petitioner's contention that
there was a novation of the employment contract.
On appeal, the NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the LA's Decision, with a modification as
to the amount of liability. On January 28, 1999, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition[7] to
set aside the NLRC judgment. The petition was dismissed, because petitioner had
allegedly failed to comply with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court. Specifically, petitioner had attached to its Petition, not a duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the LA's Decision, but a mere machine copy thereof. Further, it had
not indicated the actual address of Private Respondent Fermin F. Guerrero.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court's consideration:
"1. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it
required as attachment to the Petition for Certiorari the duplicate original of another
Decision which is not-the subject of the said Petition?

"2. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it
disregarded the subsequent compliance made by petitioner?
"3. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it
did not consider the Notice to private respondent Guerrero through his counsel as Notice
to Guerrero himself?"[10]
The foregoing issues all refer to the question of whether, procedurally, petitioner has
complied with Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Additionally and in the interest
of speedy justice, this Court will also resolve the substantive issue brought before the CA:
did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of private respondent?
The Court's Ruling
While petitioner is procedurally correct, the case should nonetheless be decided on the
merits in favor of private respondent.
Procedural Issue:
Compliance with the Rules of Court
Petitioner puts at issue the proper interpretation of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court.[11] Specifically, was petitioner required to attach a certified true copy of the LA's
Decision to its Petition for Certiorari challenging the NLRC judgment?
Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting papers and documents
accompanying a petition be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Even under Rule
65 on certiorari and prohibition, petitions need to be accompanied only by duplicate
originals or certified true copies of the questioned judgment, order or resolution. Other
relevant documents and pleadings attached to it may be mere machine copies thereof.[12]
Numerous decisions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals under Rule 45 and
in original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is
required to be certified is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution.[13]
Since the LA's Decision was not the questioned ruling, it did not have to be certified. What
had to be certified was the NLRC Decision. And indeed it was.
As to the alleged missing address of private respondent, the indication by petitioner that
Guerrero could be served with process care of his counsel was substantial compliance
with the Rules.
This Court has held that the sending of pleadings to a party is not required, provided that
the party is represented by counsel.[14] This rule is founded on considerations of fair play,
inasmuch as an attorney of record is engaged precisely because a party does not feel
competent to deal with the intricacies of law and procedure.[15] Both jurisprudence[16]
and the basics of procedure[17] provide that when a party has appeared through counsel,
service is to be made upon the latter, unless the court specifically orders that it be upon
the party.
We also note that from the inception of the case at the LA's office, all pleadings addressed
to private respondent had always been sent to his counsel, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino. Note
that private respondent, who was employed as a seaman, was often out of his home. The
service of pleadings and other court processes upon him personally would have been
futile, as he would not have been around to receive them.
This Court has repeatedly held that while courts should meticulously observe the Rules,
they should not be overly strict about procedural lapses that do not impair the proper
administration of justice.[18] Rather, procedural rules should be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[19]
Substantive Issue:
Liability of Petitioner for Unpaid Salaries
It is worthwhile to note that what is involved in this case is the recovery of unpaid salaries
and other monetary benefits. The Court is mindful of the plight of private respondent and,
indeed, of workers in general who are seeking to recover wages that are being unlawfully
withheld from them. Such recovery should not be needlessly delayed at the expense of
their survival. This case is now on its ninth year since its inception at the LA's office. Its
remand to the CA will only unduly delay its disposition. In the interest of substantial
justice,[20] this Court will decide the case on the merits based upon the records of the
case, particularly those relating to the OSM Shipping Philippines' Petition before the CA.
On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, petitioner does not deny hiring Private Respondent
Guerrero as master mariner. However, it argues that since he was not deployed overseas,
his employment contract became ineffective, because its object was allegedly absent.
Petitioner contends that using the vessel in coastwise trade and subsequently chartering
it to another principal had the effect of novating the employment contract. We are not
persuaded.
As approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), petitioner was the
legitimate manning agent of PC-SASCO.[21] As such, it was allowed to select, recruit,
hire and deploy seamen on board the vessel M/V Princess Hoa, which was managed by
its principal, PC-SASCO.[22] It was in this capacity that petitioner hired private respondent
as master mariner. They then executed and agreed upon an employment contract.
An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties
come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent
of the contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and
(c) cause of the obligation.[23] Based on the perfected contract, Private Respondent
Guerrero complied with his obligations thereunder and rendered his services on board the
vessel. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the contract had an object, which was the
rendition of service by private respondent on board the vessel. The non-deployment of
the ship overseas did not affect the validity of the perfected employment contract. After
all, the decision to use the vessel for coastwise shipping was made by petitioner only and
did not bear the written conformity of private respondent. A contract cannot be novated
by the will of only one party.[24] The claim of petitioner that it processed the contract of
private respondent with the POEA only after he had started working is also without merit.
Petitioner cannot use its own misfeasance to defeat his claim.
Petitioner, as manning agent, is jointly and severally liable with its principal,[25] PC-
SASCO, for private respondent's claim. This conclusion is in accordance with Section 1
of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations.[26] Joint and solidary liability is meant to
assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.[27]
The fact that petitioner and its principal have already terminated their agency agreement
does not relieve the former of its liability. The reason for this ruling was given by this Court
in Catan National Labor Relations Commission,[28] which we reproduce in part as follows:
"This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the [manning] agreement
between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such
agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement
do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the, employment
contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law
governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted."[29]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE, and the September 10,
1998 NLRC Decision REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SANTIAGO vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 162419 | 2007-07-10
Tinga, J.:
At the heart of this case involving a contract between a seafarer, on one hand, and the
manning agent and the foreign principal, on the other, is this erstwhile unsettled legal
quandary: whether the seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and
refused deployment without valid reason but whose POEA-approved employment
contract provides that the employer-employee relationship shall commence only upon the
seafarer's actual departure from the port in the point of hire, is entitled to relief?
This treats of the petition for review filed by Paul V. Santiago (petitioner) assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 2003 and 19 February
2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 68404.[1]
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent)
for about five (5) years.[2] On 3 February 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of
employment with respondent, with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a
monthly salary of US$515.00, overtime pay and other benefits. The following day or on 4
February 1998, the contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Petitioner was to be deployed on board the "MSV Seaspread"
which was scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998.
A week before the scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondent's
Vice President, sent a facsimile message to the captain of "MSV Seaspread," which
reads:
I received a phone call today from the wife of Paul Santiago in Masbate asking me not to
send her husband to MSV Seaspread anymore. Other callers who did not reveal their
identity gave me some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time if allowed to depart will
jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, O/S who jumped ship from the
C.S. Nexus in Kita-kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.
We do not want this to happen again and have the vessel penalized like the C.S. Nexus
in Japan.
Forewarned is forearmed like his brother when his brother when he was applying he
behaved like a Saint but in his heart he was a serpent. If you agree with me then we will
send his replacement.
Kindly advise.[3]
To this message the captain of "MSV Seaspread" replied:
Many thanks for your advice concerning P. Santiago, A/B. Please cancel plans for him to
return to Seaspread.[4]
On 9 February 1998, petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada
anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some
future date.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees against
respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd.[5] The case was
raffled to Labor Arbiter Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract
remained valid but had not commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According to
her, respondent violated the rules and regulations governing overseas employment when
it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages representing lost
salary income for nine (9) months and fixed overtime fee, all amounting to US$7, 209.00.
The labor arbiter held respondent liable. The dispositive portion of her Decision dated 29
January 1999 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby Ordered to pay complainant
actual damages in the amount of US$7,209.00 plus 10% attorney's fees, payable in
Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment.
All the other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that
there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because
under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment
contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport
at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual
damages, and attorney's fees should be dismissed.[7] On the other hand, the NLRC found
respondent's decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management
prerogative.[8] The NLRC disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision dated January 29, 1999
is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as other claims are concerned and with MODIFICATION
by VACATING the award of actual damages and attorney's fees as well as excluding
Pacifico Fernandez as party respondent.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC's Decision but his motion was
denied for lack of merit.[10] He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari.
In its Decision[11] dated 16 October 2003, the Court of Appeals noted that there is an
ambiguity in the NLRC's Decision when it affirmed with modification the labor arbiter's
Decision, because by the very modification introduced by the Commission (vacating the
award of actual damages and attorney's fees), there is nothing more left in the labor
arbiter's Decision to affirm.[12]
According to the appellate court, petitioner is not entitled to actual damages because
damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency within the
period prescribed in the POEA Rules.[13] It agreed with the NLRC's finding that
petitioner's non-deployment was a valid exercise of respondent's management
prerogative.[14] It added that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila,
no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages
against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.[15]
Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 19 February 2004.[16]
The present petition is anchored on two grounds, to wit:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law when it ignored
[S]ection 10 of Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Worker's Act
of 1995 as well as Section 29 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (which is deemed
incorporated under the petitioner's POEA approved Employment Contract) that the claims
or disputes of the Overseas Filipino Worker by virtue of a contract fall within the jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error when it disregarded the
required quantum of proof in labor cases, which is substantial evidence, thus a total
departure from established jurisprudence on the matter.[17]
Petitioner maintains that respondent violated the Migrant Workers Act and the POEA
Rules when it failed to deploy him within thirty (30) calendar days without a valid reason.
In doing so, it had unilaterally and arbitrarily prevented the consummation of the POEA-
approved contract. Since it prevented his deployment without valid basis, said deployment
being a condition to the consummation of the POEA contract, the contract is deemed
consummated, and therefore he should be awarded actual damages, consisting of the
stipulated salary and fixed overtime pay.[18] Petitioner adds that since the contract is
deemed consummated, he should be considered an employee for all intents and
purposes, and thus the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of his claims.[19]
Petitioner additionally claims that he should be considered a regular employee, having
worked for five (5) years on board the same vessel owned by the same principal and
manned by the same local agent. He argues that respondent's act of not deploying him
was a scheme designed to prevent him from attaining the status of a regular
employee.[20]
Petitioner submits that respondent had no valid and sufficient cause to abandon the
employment contract, as it merely relied upon alleged phone calls from his wife and other
unnamed callers in arriving at the conclusion that he would jump ship like his brother. He
points out that his wife had executed an affidavit[21] strongly denying having called
respondent, and that the other alleged callers did not even disclose their identities to
respondent.[22] Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to adopt the unfounded
conclusion of the NLRC, as the same was not based on substantial evidence.[23]
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award
petitioner's monetary claims. His employment with respondent did not commence
because his deployment was withheld for a valid reason. Consequently, the labor arbiter
and/or the NLRC cannot entertain adjudication of petitioner's case much less award
damages to him. The controversy involves a breach of contractual obligations and as such
is cognizable by civil courts.[24] On another matter, respondent claims that the second
issue posed by petitioner involves a recalibration of facts which is outside the jurisdiction
of this Court.[25]
There is some merit in the petition.
There is no question that the parties entered into an employment contract on 3 February
1998, whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board "MSV
Seaspread" for the consideration of US$515.00 per month for nine (9) months, plus
overtime pay. However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to
Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in
the point of hire, the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee
relationship was created between the parties.[26]
However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract
and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the
contract, which in this
case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and
respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and
conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier
discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point
of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship,
contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain
rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the
erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be
deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Moreover, while the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither
the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed
without a valid reason.
Respondent's act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding
"MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner's cause of
action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy
petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.
We take exception to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that damages are not recoverable
by a worker who was not deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules[27] are
silent as to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the
seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment
do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all
documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an
action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.
The POEA Rules only provide sanctions which the POEA can impose on erring agencies.
It does not provide for damages and money claims recoverable by aggrieved employees
because it is not the POEA, but the NLRC, which has jurisdiction over such matters.
Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. The
jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee
relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied]
Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for
overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus
liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months' worth of
salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the
contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said
amount regardless of whether or not he rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner
was "prevented without valid reason from rendering regular much less overtime
service,"[28] the fact remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will perform overtime
work had he been allowed to board the vessel. The amount of US$286.00 stipulated in
the contract will be paid only if and when the employee rendered overtime work. This has
been the tenor of our rulings in the case of Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission[29] where we discussed the matter in this light:
The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for
computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated,
the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was
actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to
overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary.
In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to
such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very
nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work
schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might
be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be
extremely unfair and unreasonable.[30]
The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees in the concept of damages
and expenses of litigation. Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.[31] We note
that respondent's basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just
like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several persons
whose identities were not even confirmed. Time and again, this Court has upheld
management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement
of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights
of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.[32] Respondent's failure
to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to institute the suit
below. The award of attorney's fees is thus warranted.
However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. While respondent's failure to
deploy petitioner seems baseless and unreasonable, we cannot qualify such action as
being tainted with bad faith, or done deliberately to defeat petitioner's rights, as to justify
the award of moral damages. At most, respondent was being overzealous in protecting
its interest when it became too hasty in making its conclusion that petitioner will jump ship
like his brother.
We likewise do not see respondent's failure to deploy petitioner as an act designed to
prevent the latter from attaining the status of a regular employee. Even if petitioner was
able to depart the port of Manila, he still cannot be considered a regular employee,
regardless of his previous contracts of employment with respondent. In Millares v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[33] the Court ruled that seafarers are considered
contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor
Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are
rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. The exigencies of
their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis.[34]
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision dated 16 October 2003 and
the Resolution dated 19 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora dated 29 January 1999
is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that respondent CF Sharp Crew Management,
Inc. is ordered to pay actual or compensatory damages in the amount of US$4,635.00
representing salary for nine (9) months as stated in the contract, and attorney's fees at
the reasonable rate of 10% of the recoverable amount.
SO ORDERED.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. CABILES
G.R. No. 170139 | 2014-08-05
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given
the facts and the law, to approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’
decision2 dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor
Relations Commission’s resolution dated March 31, 2004,3 declaring respondent’s
dismissal illegal, directing petitioner to pay respondent’s three-month salary equivalent to
New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00
withheld from respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorney’s fees.4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
application for a quality control job in Taiwan.6
Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment
contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas
Agency required her to pay a placement fee of 70,000.00 when she signed the
employment contract.9
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She
alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one
year.11 In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang
from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she
should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.”13 She was asked
to “prepare for immediate repatriation.”14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total
of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to
Manila.16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations
Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally
dismissed.18 She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for
repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary
damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign
principal.20
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to
her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her “failure to comply with the work
requirements [of] her foreign [employer].”21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask
for a placement fee of 70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860
dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of 20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that Wacoal's
accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower &
Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner asserts that
it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it.26 It alleged
that there was no employer-employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the claims
against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued
that the employment contract should first be presented so that the employer’s contractual
obligations might be identified.29 It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s
illegal acts.30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere allegations.32 The
Labor Arbiter found that there was no excess payment of placement fees, based on the
official receipt presented by petitioner.33 The Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a
discussion on petitioner’s transfer of obligations to Pacific34 and considered the matter
immaterial in view of the dismissal of respondent’s complaint.35
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations Commission.
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission
declared that Joy was illegally dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of
proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the
employer.39 It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there
were just causes for termination.40 There was no sufficient proof to show that respondent
was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with company requirements.41
Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating respondent.42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of
placement fees for lack of jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged
transfer of obligations to Pacific.44 It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to
rule on the matter.45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months
worth of salary in the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld
from her, and attorney’s fees of NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration47 dated May 12, 2004
through a resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a
petition49 for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations
Commission’s resolutions dated March 31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three
months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s
fees.51 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific.52 The Court
of Appeals held, thus:
Although the public respondent found the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal,
we should point out that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or
the amount of NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its finding that she was dismissed
without due process, a finding that we uphold, given petitioner’s lack of worthwhile
discussion upon the same in the proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain
NLRC’s finding in regard to the reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based on the
law; as well as the award of attorney’s fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public respondent for further
proceedings, for the purpose of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioner’s third-
party complaint against the transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower & Management
Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We should emphasize that as far as the decision of
the NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is hereby affirmed with
finality, and we hold petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to further hearings on
its third party complaint against Pacific for reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby partly
AFFIRMED in accordance with the foregoing discussion, but subject to the caveat
embodied in the last sentence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.54
We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling
of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and
awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her
repatriation, and attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of
termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding
of Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in her work.55
Therefore, it claims that respondent’s dismissal was valid.56
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s accreditation was validly transferred to
Pacific at the time respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now
assume responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual obligations to the workers originally
recruited by petitioner.57
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s petition is without merit. We find for respondent.
I
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing
Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at
work.58 They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply
with these standards.59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.60
Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is
guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer.61 While the law
acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the oppression
or self-destruction of the employer.”62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and
in our jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s right
to security of tenure.”63 Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process
before termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just
cause as determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.64
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a
different jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the
principle of lex loci contractus.
Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending
that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws
of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of
Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health authority in the
dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract
is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment
in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its
implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment
agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII,
Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
....
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers
to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be
dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination of
employment contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL
Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges
against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity
to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these
need not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code
which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the
Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into by and between petitioners and
private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its
implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.68
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or
authorized cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer.
Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her
duties69 may, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but
only if petitioner was able to prove it. The burden of proving that there is just cause for
termination is on the employer. “The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate
evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.”70 Failure to show that there was
valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.71
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:
1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the
employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been
communicated to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable
time prior to the employee’s performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees, which allow
termination of the employee only when there is “just cause or when [the probationary
employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his [or her] engagement.”72
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary
employment. That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which
are guaranteed to all employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the
probationary employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular
employee. Due process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such
standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she can adjust his or her character
or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the
employee’s qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s chances of being positively
assessed for regularization by his or her employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop after regularization. The
employer, on a regular basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient,
based on work standards. Based on that determination, and after complying with the due
process requirements of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its management
prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or
she meets all the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met
are set for the purpose of retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be
expected to meet any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were not
communicated to him or her. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the
employer’s failure to communicate work standards that would govern one’s employment
“if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate.”73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work.74 No evidence was shown
to support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements
were not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of
respondent constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards
against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as
to the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title
was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just
cause for termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same
day show not only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of the
existence of just cause for termination. They patently show that the employers did not
comply with the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of
dismissal.75 The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written
notices before termination.76 One of the written notices must inform the employee of the
particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice must “[inform] the
employee of the employer’s decision.”78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee
must also be given “an opportunity to be heard.”79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent
started working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997
effective on the same day and barely a month from her first workday. She was also
repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her termination. The abruptness of
the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified and given the
opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s
fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without
just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.”
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and
all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent
for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency,
as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment
contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made
locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive
of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of
the settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
....
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that “repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the
agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas.” The exception is when
“termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker,”80 which as we have
established, is not the case. It reads:
SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. – The
repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary
responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs
attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its
principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings
of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or
local agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the
fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be
responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.
....
The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as
attorney’s fees when the withholding is unlawful.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision to
award respondent NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth equivalent of her salary, attorney’s
fees of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which
answered for her repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the
three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the
amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court
ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less”83 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.84
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as
if it has not been passed at all.”85
We are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic
Act No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
Section 7. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this mandate,
the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global
services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and
all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated
in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its
approval. The performance bond to de [sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment
contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made
locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive
of damages under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the
settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s
salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and
the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be
automatically disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine
Overseas Employment Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and
unless it fully satisfies the judgement award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case provided under this
section shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the
prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies
therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for
five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any
liability which any such official may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules
and regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis
supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the
reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of
respondent’s termination from work in 1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was
amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial
positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as
unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the
exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial
change in the circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and
the Court of Appeals. At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay
the execution of the judgment in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the
wrong done to petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to “[p]romulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.”87 When cases
become moot and academic, we do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar
in situations where the same violations are capable of repetition but will evade review.
This is analogous to cases where there are millions of Filipinos working abroad who are
bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration of an identical clause
in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution
cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any
law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or
a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a
reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so
changed so as to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these
cases.
The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior
to Serrano. Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same
untold economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid.
Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses for further litigation that will reduce
their hardearned wages as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of the
protection of our laws simply because our precedents have not been followed. There is
no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural niceties.
Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of
the Solicitor General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in
Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.90 The legislators
intended a balance between the employers’ and the employees’ rights by not unduly
burdening the local recruitment agency.91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause
was already declared as constitutional in Serrano.92
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and
constitutional.93 However, since the parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality
of the clause as reinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its contention is that it is beyond
judicial review.94
On the other hand, respondent argued that the clause was unconstitutional because it
infringed on workers’ right to contract.95
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well
as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances
that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of
due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and
falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.”97 It is a guarantee against “undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make distinctions and classifications.”99
In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.101 A law is void
on this basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the
equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if
there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and
those who do not fall within the class.103 A law that does not violate the equal protection
clause prescribes a reasonable classification.104
A reasonable classification “(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.”105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished
between fixed-period overseas workers and fixedperiod local workers.106 It also
distinguished between overseas workers with employment contracts of less than one year
and overseas workers with employment contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class
of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction
between those with at least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year
left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.108
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a
“legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.”109
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano,
“[i]mbued with the same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed]
the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect
classification prejudicial to OFWs.”111
We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money
claims of illegally terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment were
computed in the same manner.112 Their money claims were computed based on the
“unexpired portions of their contracts.”113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in
Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas
workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three months worth of their
salary.114 There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local
workers with fixed-term employment.115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had
a term of less than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion
of their employment contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with
employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of
their salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts.117
Observing the terminologies used in the clause, we also found that “the subject clause
creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more
than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their
contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while
those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall
be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries
for three months only.”118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any
real or substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the
computation of money claims resulting from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at
least for the period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be
dismissed before the end of their contract terms without due process. If they were illegally
dismissed, the workers’ right to security of tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither
greater than nor less than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is
illegally terminated. It is state policy to protect the rights of workers without qualification
as to the place of employment.119 In both cases, the workers are deprived of their
expected salary, which they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed.
For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and disparity.120 The
same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with an employment contract
of less than one year and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract,
and between overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas
workers with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed. For
this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that “[overseas workers] are contractual
employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers”121
because it already justifies differentiated treatment in terms of the computation of money
claims.122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers’ money claims
do not justify a differentiated treatment in the computation of their money claims.123 If
anything, these issues justify an equal, if not greater protection and assistance to
overseas workers who generally are more prone to exploitation given their physical
distance from our government.
We also find that the classifications are not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to
“establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers,
their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes.”124 Further, we
find specious the argument that reducing the liability of placement agencies “redounds to
the benefit of the [overseas] workers.”125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the
standard of protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more
incentivized by the reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it
gives them more flexibility to violate our overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for
arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers whose
rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are impressed with an
expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer contract period disregard other
opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that are less than
what others in the same situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates
a situation where the law meant to protect them makes violation of rights easier and simply
benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact
provides a hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability. While intended as an
incentive accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the
OFWs’ recovery in wrongful dismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of
whoever may be liable, including the principal/employer – the direct employer primarily
liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 – read as a grant of incentives
to recruitment/manning agencies – oversteps what it aims to do by effectively limiting what
is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really
operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to
mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of
liability under Section 10 cannot be an “appropriate” incentive, to borrow the term that
R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a
grant that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts
undertaken, the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already
deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability
to OFWs, justified solely by the law’s intent to encourage greater deployment efforts.
Thus, the incentive, from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to
sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs — the
benefits accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are taken from
the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract
rightfully belong. Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies
even profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract
embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the
lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this same
lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake; the
lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always be a consideration a foreign employer will
take into account in termination of employment decisions. . . .126
Further, “[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that
alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector,
especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less
than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated
to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.”127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is
arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable
valid purpose.128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract,
in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started
working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to
her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security
of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation
based on an unconstitutional provision of law.”129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013,
which revised the interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of
stipulation, applies in this case. The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013,
read:
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following
revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts,
thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits
and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate
of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for
Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for
Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in
computing legal interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed,
as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e.,
a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment
of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall,
in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to
July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the
rate of interest fixed therein.131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits,
and in judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is
only applicable if the judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013.132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise.
While the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates,133 these
interest rates do not apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be
applied. “[A] Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another
law.”134
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated
overseas workers are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an
interest of 12% per annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannot repeal
Republic Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of
changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%.
This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6% interest rate
applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. “The contracting parties need not
repeat them. They do not even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not
only what has been explicitly stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing
on the matter.”135 There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in contracts between the
placement agency and the overseas worker that in case the overseas worker is adjudged
as entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the amount shall be subject to
a 12% interest per annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799
because the law does not provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and there was
no stipulation in the contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims
under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum
in accordance with Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money
claims from the finality of this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment
agency that facilitated respondent’s overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the
foreign employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for
money claims including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or
damages. This section also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency
shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to the
employee.
This provision is in line with the state’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating
workers’ plight.136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign employer is
attended by practical and legal complications. The distance of the foreign employer alone
makes it difficult for an overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of the
Labor Code. There are also possible conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural
rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas worker’s attempt to advance his or her
claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be impleaded in the
complaint as an indispensable party without which no final determination can be had of
an action.137
The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 assures overseas workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these
complications.
The fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that “each of the debtors is liable for
the entire obligation.”138 A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if only
one of the joint and several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of
overseas employment, either the local agency or the foreign employer may be sued for
all claims arising from the foreign employer’s labor law violations. This way, the overseas
workers are assured that someone — the foreign employer’s local agent — may be made
to answer for violations that the foreign employer may have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers
have recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the
liability of the foreign employer may be “enforced to the full extent”139 against the local
agent, the overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due
them.140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and several
liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of
going after the foreign employer from the overseas worker to the local employment
agency. However, it must be emphasized that the local agency that is held to answer for
the overseas worker’s money claims is not left without remedy. The law does not preclude
it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has
made to the employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign employer.
A further implication of making local agencies jointly and severally liable with the foreign
employer is that an additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local
agencies, which are businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in being always on
the lookout against foreign employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their
reputation or finances, local agencies must already have mechanisms for guarding
against unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level prior to overseas employment
applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine whether there was
indeed a transfer of obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle
for the respondent overseas worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment.
Petitioner is possessed with the resources to determine the proper legal remedies to
enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.
V and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as they travel into the
farthest and most difficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v.
NLRC:141
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the
foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more
fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-
human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane
acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can
do as they please in their own country. While these workers may indeed have relatively
little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not
continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted
complaint. There is no reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws
cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.142
But it seems that we have not said enough.
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be told a million times
over; each of their stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien
cultures and the heartbreak of families left behind daily. They would count the minutes,
hours, days, months, and years yearning to see their sons and daughters. We all know of
the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all grown up and, being so, they
remember what their work has cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and many other
gadgets and online applications will never substitute for their lost physical presence.
Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and
economic crises. They are our true diplomats, they who show the world the resilience,
patience, and creativity of our people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to
the provision of material creations of this world. This government loses its soul if we fail
to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default by limiting the contractual wages
that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are breached by the foreign
employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward our overseas
workers with what they deserve: their dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED~ The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is
ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the
unexpired portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6o/o per annum from the
finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the
withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less" in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
SO ORDERED.
SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO G.R. No. 81510 | 1990-03-14
SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest
and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a
sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for
brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
"04.T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang akmg PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong
manager. Horty Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong
inireklamo mo?
S: Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S: Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing
hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag-9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay hindi pa niya
ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC
Card ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said
complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
"YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA
ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS
AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED
AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
"HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated
at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents
recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit
and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987."
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B.
Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio
Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today
proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs Flora Salazar informed
the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.)
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and
saw about twenty more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which
were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
"Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26,
1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees
right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2
policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well
as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent
and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the
color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128
of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in
all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four
(24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and
criminal, to protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters."
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant
petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig
Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought
to be barred are already faith accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider
the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the
petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case was declared
that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of
the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does
the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less
issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power
on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which
took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof,
warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being
evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said
1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and
issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to
exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and
detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or
search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case.
Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and
his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to
make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our
mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand
Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers:
[c] The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave
the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or
will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers
for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving
the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
[c] The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers.
The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises end seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and
the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule
in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo
involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10
It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters
involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes,
228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125) That power may be exercised by the
Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds
that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public
interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco
Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil 41).
"The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified" (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs.
Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956.) 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like
the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that
it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated
at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents
and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit
and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is
null and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
"1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and
the like used an/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and
all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the 'WE FORUM'
newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote
the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE FORUM' and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,.
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking 'Bagong Silang.'"
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for `books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the
Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to 'seize any evidence in connection with the violation
of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate
Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of
the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of
our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of
non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2 , of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other,
who may issue warrants of arrest and search;
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order
of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order
No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC.
(ACCESS) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 131656 | 1998-10-12
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT
SYSTEM & SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS) seeks to modify the monetary awards against it
in the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated
October 14, 1997, a case for illegal dismissal.
The records disclose that petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a
mason in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The
term of his contract was two (2) years, from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.
On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he
earned after working for more then a year. His application for leave was granted. While
en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been dismissed from
service. The information turned out to be true.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal deductions, non-
payment of 13th month pay and salary for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract.
On March 17, 1997, the labor arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.1 [Decision,
Rollo, pp. 11-20.] The dispositive portion reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of
complainant's dismissal and ordering the respondent ACCESS and/or ABDULLAH
LELINA to pay the complainant the amount of SR 13,200 representing complainant's
payment for the unexpired portion of his contract and refund of the illegality deducted
amount less P5,000.00, the legally allowed placement fee.
"Respondent are further ordered to pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the judgment award or the amount of SR 1,320, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
"All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERD." (emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, the labor arbiter applied Section
10 R.A. 8042,2 [Entitled: Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.] the law
relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and computed private respondent's
salary for the unexpired portion of his contract as follows: SR1,200 x 3 months = SR3,600.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the labor arbiter but
modified the appealed decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement
fee for lack of jurisdiction.3 [NLRC Decision, dated August 18, 1997; Rollo, pp. 26-32.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiter's award of SR13,200
in the dispositive portion of the decision, representing respondent's salary for the
unexpired portion of his contract. invoking Section 10 R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged that its
liability for respondent's salary is for only three (3) months. Petitioner claimed that it should
pay only SR 3.600 (SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the unexpired portion of respondent's
employment and SR360 (10% of SR3,600) for attorney's fees.4 [Motion for
Reconsideration, Rollo, pp. 33-35.]
The NLRC denied petitioner's motion. It ruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as
respondent's employment which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity
on July 15, 1995.5 [Decision, dated October 14, 1997; Rollo, pp. 36-38.]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
In the case at bar, petitioner's illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed.
Petitioner merely impugns the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private
respondent. It submits that although the unexpired portion of private respondent's
employment contract is eight (8) months,6 [Respondent was dismissed from service in
June 1996 (after his vacation leave), while his employment contract was supposed to end
on February 28, 1997.] it is liable to pay respondent only three (3) months of his basic
salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly salary) multiplied by 3
months, for a total of SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in ruling that as
private respondent's employment started only on February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042, which
took effect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case. Petitioner argues that it is not
the date of employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in
determining the applicability of R.A. 8042. Petitioner prays that the award in the NLRC
Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to SR3,600 instead of 13,200 and that the
award of attorney's fees be deleted.
We affirm with modifications.
As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the
action.7 [Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC, 256 629, 637, (1996), citing Philippine-Singapore Ports.
Corp. vs. NLRC, 218 SRA 77 (1993)] In the case at bar, private respondent's cause of
action did not accrue on the date of his date of his employment or on February 28, 1995.
His cause of action arose only from the-time he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from
service in June 1996, after his vacation leave expired. It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which
took effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent's employment contract is
eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary
corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.8 [Computed as follows: monthly
salary of SR1,200 x 3 months.]
We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in the body of his
decision.9 [Supra.] Despite said computation in the body of the decision, however, the
labor arbiter awarded higher sum (SR13,200) in the dispositive portion.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the
fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the
fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.
However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to
show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will
prevail.10 [Olac, vs. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 321, 328 (1992), citing Aguirre vs.
Aguirre, 58 SCRA 461 (1974) and Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333
(1964)]
We find that the labor arbiter's award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was
clearly an error for there is nothing in the text of the decision which support the award of
said higher amount. We reiterate that the correct award to private respondent for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract is SR3,600.
We come now to the award of attorney's fees in favor of private respondent. Article 2208
of the Civil Code allows attorney's fees to be awarded when its claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought. Moreover, attorney's fees
are recoverable when there is sufficient showing of bad faith.11 [Tumbiga vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 274 SCRA 338, 349 (1997)] The Labor Code,12 [Article
111, Chapter III, Title II, Book Three.] on the other hand, fixes the attorney's fees that may
be recovered in an amount which should not exceed 10% of the total amount of wages
awarded.
In the case at bar, petitioner's bad faith in dismissing private respondent is manifest.
Respondent was made to believe that he would be temporarily leaving Jeddah, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with pay. However, while on board the plane
back to the Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed from his
job as he was given only a one-way plane ticket by petitioner. True enough, private
respondent was not allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation leave.
Thus, private respondent was compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal with the labor
arbiter and hence entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with modifications:
petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of
the amounts of SR3,600 for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, and SR360
for attorney's fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION G.R. No. 77828 | 1989-02-08
FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Decision dated 19 March
1987 of the public respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA"),
in POEA Case No. L-86-01-026.
The pertinent facts follow:
Manuel Zaragoza had been an employee of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
("Eastern") for several years, having served as engineer on board several of Eastern's
vessels since 1973. At the time of his death on 18 September 1983, Manuel Zaragoza
was in Kakogawa, Japan serving as Chief Engineer of the M/V Eastern Meteor, a vessel
then owned by Freesia Shipping Company S.A. and chartered by Eastern. A Death
Certificate 1 issued by Dr. Masayuki Inoue of the Kakogawa Hospital stated that
Zaragoza's death had been caused by "myocardial infarction."
On 17 December 1985, Manuel Zaragoza's widow, private respondent Ma. Lourdes A.
Zaragoza, filed with the public respondent POEA a formal Complaint 2 (docketed as
POEA Case No. L-86-01-026) against Eastern, after the latter allegedly had refused to
act favorably on the widow's claim for gratuity arising from the death of her husband. Mrs.
Zaragoza alleged that the M/V Eastern Meteor having been registered with the Ministerio
de Hacienda y Tesoro of the Republic of Panama at the time of her husband's death, she
was entitled to receive from Eastern death benefits in the amount of P100,000.00 as
provided under Memorandum Circular No. 71 issued on 18 November 1981 by the former
National Seamen Board. Moral damages or P50,000.00 and attorney's fees were likewise
sought by the widow.
In its Answer, 3 Eastern alleged, among other things, that no cause of action existed
against it as the company had already paid Mrs. Zaragoza a cash benefit of P12,000.00
for the death of her husband and an amount of P5,000.00 for funeral expenses. Eastern
further denied having incurred any additional liability under NSB Memorandum Circular
No. 71, alleging that "[the M/V Eastern Meteor] had been then also considered a vessel
of Philippine registry." Eastern assailed the jurisdiction of the POEA over the complaint,
asserting that the company is not engaged in overseas employment even as [it] admits
that [its] vessels are ocean-going vessels."
On 19 March 1987, public respondent POEA rendered a Decision 4 requiring petitioner to
pay to private respondent Mrs. Zaragoza P88,000.00 as the unpaid balance of her
deceased husband's death benefits, and dismissing the claim for moral damages for want
of jurisdiction.
From this judgment, Eastern came directly to this Court. We issued a Temporary
Restraining Order on 8 April 1987. 5
A preliminary point was raised by the Solicitor General in his Comment 6 on the Petition,
that Eastern had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in this case ---- i.e., that
petitioner Company did not interpose an appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commission before coming to this Court on certiorari. Inasmuch, however, as the petition
at bar raises questions essentially legal in nature, we do not consider the same as having
been prematurely filed with this Court. 7
We address first the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner Company does not deny that Manuel
Zaragoza was its employee at the time of his death on 18 September 1983. Petitioner
would contend, however, that the company had neither been nor acted as an "overseas
employee" of Manuel Zaragoza, and that the latter had never been its "overseas
employee." Hence, petitioner concludes, private respondent's claim for death benefits
should have been filed with the Social Security System, not with the POEA.
The argument does not persuade. Applicable here ---- and petitioner admits this in its
Petition ---- is Executive Order No. 797 (promulgated 1 May 1982), which abolished the
former National Seamen Board and created in its place the present Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 797 expressly provides
that, the POEA "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." This
provision is clarified substantially in the Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment
issued by the POEA, Section 1 (d), Rule I, Book VI of which provides that "claims for
death, disability and other benefits arising out of [overseas] employment" fall within the
POEA's original and exclusive jurisdiction. The following definitions contained in Section
1, Rule II, Book I of said POEA Rules and Regulations are also useful:
"g. contract Worker ---- means any person working or who has worked overseas under a
valid employment contract and shall include seamen.
xxx xxx xxx
x. Overseas Employment ---- means employment of a worker outside the Philippines,
including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid
employment contract.
xxx xxx xxx
We note that the statute and the relevant regulations refer to employment of Filipino
workers overseas, i.e., outside the Philippines. The statute and regulations do not limit
their coverage to non-Filipino employers. Filipinos working overseas share the same risks
and burdens whether their employers be Filipino or foreign.
Neither party disputes that Manuel Zaragoza, at the time of his death, was covered by an
existing contract of employment with Eastern and that the deceased was at that time
employed as a seaman (Chief Engineer) on board the M/V Eastern Meteor, which vessel
---- then chartered by Eastern ---- was engaged in plying ocean routes, outside Philippine
waters and which, at the time of Zaragoza's demise, was berthed in a foreign port (Japan).
In addition, the record shows that Eastern submitted its shipping articles to public
respondent POEA for processing, formalization and approval, 8 apparently in recognition
of POEA's regulatory authority over overseas employment under Executive Order No.
797. While not in itself conclusive proof of employment by Eastern of people overseas,
nevertheless, this latter circumstance strongly suggests that Eastern must have regarded
itself as engaged in such employment, otherwise, it would not have found it necessary or
useful to submit its shipping articles to the POEA. We hold that the complaint of private
respondent widow of Manuel Zaragoza falls well within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of public respondent POEA. 9
We come to the issue regarding the amount of death benefits for which Eastern may be
held liable to private respondent. In assessing such amount, the POEA relied upon
Memorandum Circular No. 71 (effective 1 December 1981) issued by the now defunct
National Seamen Board (NSB):
"SECTION D. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS DURING THE TERM OF THE
CONTRACT.
1. In case of total and permanent disability or death of the seaman during the term of his
contract, the company shall pay the seaman or his beneficiaries the amount of:
P100,000.00 ---- for masters and Chief Engineers
75,000.00 ---- for other officers
50,000.00 ---- for ratings
over and above the benefits which are provided for and are the liabilities of the Philippine
government under the Philippine laws. Provided that when the employment of a seaman
is also covered by a collective bargaining agreement or death/disability insurance which
provides for higher benefits than those enumerated above, in which case, the seaman or
his heirs/beneficiaries may elect under what scheme he is or they are claiming. Recovery
under one scheme is a bar to any further recovery; except where there is a clear showing
in the collective bargaining agreement and/or death/disability insurance that benefits
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement and death/disability insurance are
separate and distinct from the abovementioned benefits. The exact amount of insurance
that each seaman is covered under this contract are as stipulated in Column J of Appendix
2 of this contract. In addition to the above, the expenses for hospitalization of the seaman
shall be borne by the employer.
2. In lieu of paragraph 1 above, the liability of [an] employer of a Philippine registered
vessel (except foreign-owned vessels bareboat chartered to a Philippine shipping
company) shall be governed by existing Philippine Laws over and above the benefits
granted [under] Philippine laws on social security and employees' compensation benefits
provided that the Philippine registered vessel and any vessel bareboat ---- chartered to a
Philippine Shipping Company shall be manned by full Filipino crews.
It is the argument of Eastern here that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 collides with
the public law principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Eastern also argues that
assuming the validity of the Circular, its provisions (specifically paragraph 1) do not cover
Eastern.
These arguments again do not persuade. Concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of
NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Article 20 of the Labor Code before its repeal by
Executive Order No. 797, provided in salient part:
"Art. 20. National Seamen Board. A National Seamen Board is hereby created which shall
develop and maintain a comprehensive program for Filipino seamen employed overseas.
It shall have the power and duty:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping
companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible
terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith;
xxx xxx xxx
The question of validity of the delegation of quasi-legislative power in favor of NSB's
successor, respondent POEA, embodied in the article quoted above, was addressed and
resolved in the affirmative by the Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, et al. 10 On the authority of this case, we hold that
NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 was issued in a valid exercise by the NSB of its "power
and duty . . . [to] secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen
workers and [to] secure compliance therewith."
We consider next petitioner's argument that it is not covered by the provisions of NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 71. Eastern submitted in evidence Certificate of Philippine
Register Nos. ICGD-78-0428 dated 28 December 1978 11 and ICGD-84-0288 dated 7
August 1984 12 to show that the M/V Eastern Meteor was registered with the Philippine
Coast Guard in 1978 and again in 1984. Eastern further maintained that M/V Eastern
Meteor had always been fully manned by a Philippine crew. The record also shows,
however, that this vessel was at the same time also registered in the Republic of Panama
as evidenced by the Patente Permanente de Navegacion Servicio Internacional Nos.
7708-77 (dated 31 March 1977) 13 and 770877-A (dated 27 February 1987). 14 Petitioner
had in fact paid taxes to the Panamanian government in 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982 and
1983, 15 presumably because the M/V Eastern Meteor was during those years operating
under a valid Panamanian navigation license. It, therefore, appears that at the time of the
death of Manuel Zaragoza, the Eastern Meteor was both foreign-owned and foreign-
registered on one hand and upon the other hand, simultaneously registered in the
Philippines. Interpreting Section D of Memorandum Circular No. 71, it appears clear that
paragraph 1 covers Philippine seamen working in foreign-registered ships while
paragraph 2 applies to Philippine seamen working on Philippine-registered vessels. The
parenthetical phrase except foreign-owned vessels bare boat-chartered to a Philippine
shipping company" in paragraph 2 precisely covers the situation of the Eastern Meteor,
that is, a foreign-owned vessel registered in a foreign country (Panama), with a second
registration in the Philippines; such a vessel is excepted from coverage by paragraph 2,
and hence covered by paragraph 1 instead. If the M/V Eastern Meteor had been
registered only in Panama, there would have been no question that it was covered by
paragraph 1 of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. It is well-known that foreign-owned
and foreign-registered vessels have frequently also secured Philippine registration where
the interest or convenience of the owners dictated such second or dual registration. The
effect of the parenthetical phrase in paragraph 2 is, as already indicated, to bring such
dual-registered vessel within the scope not of paragraph 2, but of paragraph 1. The fact
that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 5 (Series of 1986) in upgrading death benefits
(P250,000.00 for master and chief engineers) specified that such upgraded benefits "shall
be applicable to all Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel provided the cause
of action occurs on March 1 and thereafter" suggests to us the correctness of our above
reading of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. The underlying regulatory policy, as we
see it, is that Filipino seamen working on ocean-going vessels should receive the same
wages and benefits, without regard to the nationality or nationalities of the vessels on
which they serve. We hold the POEA correctly held private respondent Mrs. Zaragosa
entitled to the benefits given to Philippine seamen under the provisions of Section D.
paragraph of 1 NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, i.e. (1) P100,000.00 death benefit,
and in addition, (2) death and related benefits provided under applicable ordinary laws of
the Philippines administered by the Social Security System.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Decision of the POEA in
POEA Case No. L-86-01-026 is hereby affirmed. The Temporary Restraining Order of 8
April 1987 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. Vs. SURIO
G.R. No. 154213 | 2012-08-22
BERSAMIN, J.:
On appeal is the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December 21, 2001
affirming the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring
itself to be without appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) involving petitioners' complaint for disciplinary action
against respondents.1
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar
Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents were still on board the vessel, they experienced
delays in the payment of their wages and in the remittance of allotments, and were not
paid for extra work and extra overtime work. They complained about the vessel's
inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their repeated
requests for the improvement of their working conditions. On December 19, 1993, when
MT Seadance docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to discharge oil, representatives
of the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and found the wages
of the respondents to be below the prevailing rates. The ensuing negotiations between
the ITF and the vessel owner on the increase in respondents' wages resulted in the
payment by the vessel owner of wage differentials and the immediate repatriation of
respondents to the Philippines.
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated
respondents a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of discipline and for the
reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office
of the POEA.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino
workers in the Labor Arbiters, to wit:
Section 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the
filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA
Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners
received the order of dismissal on July 24, 1996.2
Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book VII of the 1991 POEA Rules, petitioners filed a partial
appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining that respondents should be
administratively sanctioned for their conduct while they were on board MT Seadance.
On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed petitioners' appeal for lack of jurisdiction,3 thus:
We dismiss the partial appeal.
The Commission has no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA Administrator
involving disciplinary actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, the Labor Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money claims involving employer-
employee relationship (sec. 10, R.A. 8042). Said law does not provide that appeals from
decisions arising from complaint for disciplinary action rest in the Commission.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant appeal from the Order of May 23, 1996 is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion.
They received the denial on July 8, 1997.4
Petitioners then commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus. Citing St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission,5
however, the Court referred the petition to the CA on November 25, 1998.
Petitioners contended in their petition that:
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING PETITIONERS' APPEAL AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN
IT REFUSED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONERS' APPEAL DESPITE BEING
EMPOWERED TO DO SO UNDER THE LAW.6
On December 21, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus,
holding that the inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers from the POEA
blacklist/watchlist were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of
the NLRC, and that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the matter, viz:
Section 10 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, provides that:
"Money Claims - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
xxxx
Likewise, the Rules and Regulations implementing RA 8042 reiterate the jurisdiction of
POEA, thus:
"Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. - The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide:
a) All cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of
rules and regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment
agencies or entities; and
b) Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character,
involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers."
Further, Sections 6 and 7 Rule VII, Book VII of the POEA Rules & Regulations (1991)
provide:
"Sec. 6. Disqualification of Contract Workers. Contract workers, including seamen,
against whom have been imposed or with pending obligations imposed upon them
through an order, decision or resolution shall be included in the POEA Blacklist Workers
shall be disqualified from overseas employment unless properly cleared by the
Administration or until their suspension is served or lifted.
Sec. 7. Delisting of the Contract Worker's Name from the POEA Watchlist. The name of
an overseas worker may be excluded, deleted and removed from the POEA Watchlist
only after disposition of the case by the Administration."
Thus, it can be concluded from the afore-quoted law and rules that, public respondent has
no jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases decided by the POEA involving contract
workers. Clearly, the matter of inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the
POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion
of the public respondent. Nor has the latter appellate jurisdiction to review the findings of
the POEA involving such cases.
xxx
In fine, we find and so hold, that, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public
respondent when it issued the assailed Decision and Order, dated March 21, 1997 and
June 13, 1997, respectively, dismissing petitioners' appeal from the decision of the POEA.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with merit, the same is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.7
Issue
Petitioners still appeal, submitting to the Court the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ON APPEAL CASES
DECIDED BY THE POEA ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
They contend that both the CA and the NLRC had no basis to rule that the NLRC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal only because Republic Act No. 8042 had not provided
for its retroactive application.
Respondents counter that the appeal should have been filed with the Secretary of Labor
who had exclusive jurisdiction to review cases involving administrative matters decided
by the POEA.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
Petitioners' adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the
POEA's decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents
was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section
10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims
involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not
remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character involving
such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus
its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving such workers. This
intent was even expressly recognized in the Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on
February 29, 1996, viz:
Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. - The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide:
(a) all cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations or
rules and regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment
agencies or entities; and
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in
character, involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant
workers.
Section 29. Venue - The cases mentioned in Section 28(a) of this Rule, may be filed with
the POEA Adjudication Office or the DOLE/POEA regional office of the place where the
complainant applied or was recruited, at the option of the complainant. The office with
which the complaint was first filed shall take cognizance of the case.
Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, as mentioned in the preceding Section,
shall be filed with the POEA Adjudication Office.
It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.
Petitioners' position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to the
review of the POEA's decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has no
support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless
the contrary is expressly provided,8 or unless the law is procedural or curative in nature,9
there is no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to
the appeal of the POEA's decision on petitioners' disciplinary action against respondents.
In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing or omitting
guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v. Vda. De
Mangubat,10 when it -
Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners' complaint by virtue of the case being then
still pending or undetermined at the time of the law's passage, there being no vested rights
in rules of procedure.11 They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to ascertain
which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint was originally
filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules
and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their appeal. A statute that
eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final and unappealable
only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to prosecute an appeal that has been
perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested
and cannot be impaired.12 Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when
a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect should comply with the
provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new law. Relevantly,
petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a privilege
established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out
the cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and
the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved.13 This is why we
consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in character, and is available only if
granted by law or statute.14
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of
cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of
Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1),
Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Section 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. - Unless otherwise expressly stated
in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
Supervision and Control. - Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law
governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word "control" shall encompass
supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. xxx.
Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations specifically
provides, as follows:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. - The Secretary shall have the exclusive and original jurisdiction
to act on appeals or petition for review of disciplinary action cases decided by the
Administration.
In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the
POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being
correct on its conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on December 21, 2001 by the Court
of Appeals; and ORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DE JESUS vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 151158 | 2007-08-17
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Joel B. De Jesus appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the
September 28, 2001 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 58241,
and the December 12, 2001 Resolution[2] denying its reconsideration.
On November 20, 1996, De Jesus applied for shipboard employment with respondent
Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. (POMI), a domestic corporation duly licensed by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to operate as a manning
agency. As a standard operating procedure, POMI directed De Jesus to undergo the pre-
employment medical examination at the Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic, its accredited
clinic. On the query pertaining to his medical history, specifically as to whether he was
suffering from or had been told that he had any disease or ailment, including stomach pain
or ulcer, De Jesus answered in the negative. After the examination, he was reported fit
for work.[3]
De Jesus was then hired as 4th Engineer by POMI, for and in behalf of its principal Celtic
Pacific Ship Management Ltd. (Celtic), on board the ocean-going vessel M/V Author on
March 26, 1997. The employment contract[4] stipulated that he would work for a period of
nine (9) months with a monthly salary of US$824.00 and a fixed overtime rate of
US$459.00. De Jesus also signed the Standard Employment Contract Addendum,[5]
barring alcohol, drugs, and any medication on board without written permission from the
master of the vessel. The use of drugs not prescribed by a medical doctor on board or
ashore was prohibited and considered a fundamental breach of the contract of
employment. It was also provided that any prescribed drug should be kept at the vessel's
hospital, and used only with the approval and supervision of the captain. Any seafarer
taking any medication prescribed by a medical doctor was further required to inform the
company master manning agent or drug and alcohol test collector of this fact.
De Jesus departed from the Philippines on March 28, 1997 and embarked on M/V Author
the following day. Early in his stint on board M/V Author, De Jesus experienced stomach
pains, which became unbearable during the second month of his stay, especially when
his captain required him to work even during meal hours. His condition worsened and he
severely lost weight. Thus, when the ship docked in Hamburg, Germany, De Jesus
requested for medical treatment. The ship captain referred him to Dr. Jan-Gerd H.
Hagelstein. De Jesus was diagnosed to be suffering from relapse of gastric ulcer and was
advised to sign off for thorough diagnostic examination and treatment. He was declared
fit for repatriation.[6]
De Jesus was repatriated to the Philippines on June 19, 1997. Upon his arrival, he went
to POMI and requested financial assistance and medical treatment for his illness. POMI,
however, refused. De Jesus was constrained to seek medical treatment from Bataan
Doctor's Hospital at his own expense. He sought reimbursement from POMI, but again it
was refused because De Jesus allegedly concealed his previous history of ulcer. POMI,
likewise, disallowed De Jesus' claim for unpaid salary, on the ground that the amount had
already been applied to the cost of his repatriation.[7] Thus, De Jesus filed a complaint[8]
for the recovery of unpaid wages, sickwage allowance and medical expenses.
POMI, on the other hand, had a different story. According to POMI, De Jesus committed
misrepresentation when he concealed in his medical history that he suffered from ulcer
two (2) years ago; that he breached his employment contract when he brought on board
his medicines for ulcer without the ship captain's permission; and that De Jesus admitted
having deliberately brought pieces of Cimetidine for fear that his ulcer might recur on
board. POMI posited that De Jesus was validly discharged, and ultimately prayed for the
denial of the claims. [9]
By Decision[10] of August 28, 1998, the Labor Arbiter declared that De Jesus'
misrepresentation cannot be made basis for the denial of his claims. According to the
Labor Arbiter, De Jesus underwent a thorough medical examination before his
deployment and was reported fit to work by POMI's accredited clinic. POMI cannot now
be heard to claim otherwise. Besides, POMI was aware that De Jesus had been
discharged on November 29, 1994 due to illness while on board M/V Oriental Venus. It
was, thus, expected that POMI would conduct, as it, in fact, conducted a thorough medical
examination in determining De Jesus' state of health before his deployment. He concluded
that De Jesus' illness was work-related or at least work-aggravated. He also ruled that
POMI failed to convincingly establish that De Jesus violated his employment contract.
The Labor Arbiter, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of complainant
and against the [respondent] ordering the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the sum of
US$2,735.15 as unpaid salaries and medical allowance for 59 days or its present peso
equivalent in the sum of P118,705.51 plus another sum of P5,000.00 as medical benefits
or reimbursement of medical expenses of complainant.
SO ORDERED.[11]
POMI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), claiming that there
was prima facie abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter in granting the claims
of De Jesus. The NLRC granted the appeal. It found De Jesus guilty of unauthorized
possession of medicines on board M/V Author, justifying his discharge. Likewise, it denied
the claim for medical and sickness allowance, stating that a relapse of ulcer was not work-
related, as the illness already existed when De Jesus applied with POMI, but the former
intentionally concealed it so he could be hired. Such misrepresentation disqualified De
Jesus from claiming employment benefits under the contract. Finally, the NLRC sustained
POMI in applying De Jesus' unpaid salaries to the cost of his repatriation.[12] Hence, it
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Decision appealed from is totally REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one [is] entered
DISMISSING the instant case for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
De Jesus' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Resolution[14] of July 30,
2001, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari.
In its Decision[15] of September 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. It
agreed with the NLRC that De Jesus' misrepresentation disqualified him from
employment, benefits and claims. The appellate court added that De Jesus did not
categorically deny the charge of unauthorized possession of Cimetidine, in violation of the
Standard Employment Contract Addendum. The CA concluded that POMI was justified in
discharging him from M/V Author, and the NLRC, thus, acted well within its discretion in
reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
De Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[16] but the Court of Appeals denied it on
December 12, 2001.[17]
Aggrieved by the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, De Jesus comes to this Court
positing these issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHALL (sic) BE AWARDED HIS UNPAID SALARIES,
MEDICAL ALLOWANCE AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS MEDICAL EXPENSES.
II
WHETHER PETITIONER SHALL (sic) BEAR THE COST OF HIS REPATRIATION.[18]
It is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised before this Court. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a re-evaluation
of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination. Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies
with greater force in labor cases.[19] However, factual issues may be considered and
resolved when the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are
inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,[20] as in this case.
De Jesus insists on reimbursement for his medical expenses and entitlement to sickness
allowance and his unpaid salaries. POMI, on the other hand, counters that De Jesus
committed misrepresentation and breach of contract. The Labor Arbiter lent credence to
De Jesus' posture and granted his claims, but the NLRC and Court of Appeals reversed
the Arbiter's findings. Thus, a review of the records of the case, with an assessment of
the facts, is necessary.
The evidence shows that De Jesus previously suffered from ulcer but he ticked "NO" in
his medical history. De Jesus, therefore, committed misrepresentation. Nonetheless, he
passed the pre-employment medical examination, was reported fit to work, and was
suffered to work on board M/V Author for more than two (2) months, until his repatriation
on June 19, 1997.
The rule is that an ailment contracted even prior to his employment, does not detract from
the compensability of the disease. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor
in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the
benefits incident thereto. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a
small measure, to the development of the disease.[21]
In this case, POMI failed to rebut De Jesus' claim that he was required to work even during
mealtime and that the meals served on board did not fit the dietary preference of the
Filipinos. Such plight took a toll on De Jesus' health and surely contributed, even in a
slight degree, to the relapse of his illness.
In OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,[22] this Court, in granting similar claims,
held:
Labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract must be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor
of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels.
Despite his misrepresentation, Arbit underwent and passed the required pre-medical
examination, was declared fit to work, and was suffered to work by petitioner. Upon
repatriation, he complied with the required post-employment medical examination.
Under the beneficent provisions of the Contract, it is enough that the work has contributed,
even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.
Strict proof of causation is not required.[23]
De Jesus' misrepresentation cannot, therefore, be made basis by POMI for the denial of
his claims under the contract.
Apparently realizing the folly of the denial grounded solely on the employee's
misrepresentation, POMI then asserted that De Jesus breached his employment contract.
It alleged that De Jesus was caught in possession of several pieces of Cimetidine, without
the ship captain's permission, and that therefore, he was discharged for a just cause.
Indeed, possession of medicines on board without the ship captain's permission was a
violation of the Standard Employment Contract Addendum and would entitle POMI to
dismiss the erring crew member but only after compliance with the procedure provided in
the contract.[24] Section 17 of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels supplies
the disciplinary procedure against an erring seafarer:
SECTION 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES:
The Master shall furnish the seafarer with the following disciplinary procedure against an
erring seafarer:
A. The master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the following:
1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this Contract.
2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges against the seafarer
concerned.
B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the investigation or hearing,
giving the seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend himself against the charges. An
entry on the investigation shall be entered into the ship's logbook.
C. If after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty
is justified, the Master shall issue a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the
seafarer, which copies shall be furnished to the Philippine Agent.
D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the master without furnishing the seafarer
with notice of dismissal if doing so will prejudice the safety of the crew or the vessel. This
information shall be entered in the ship's logbook. The Master shall send a complete report
to the manning agency substantiated by the witnesses, testimonies and any other
documents in support thereof.
In this case, there was no showing that Celtic complied with the foregoing procedure, thus,
casting a serious doubt on the validity of De Jesus' discharge.
Likewise, neither the ship's logbook nor the report sent to POMI as Celtic's manning agent
was presented in the proceedings a quo to establish the breach committed by De Jesus.
The pieces of evidence submitted before the Labor Arbiter in support of De Jesus'
discharge zeroed in on the alleged misrepresentation, which, as mentioned, cannot be a
valid basis for the denial of De Jesus' claims.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer
to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. The case of the employer must
stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee's defense.[25] In
this case, no convincing proof was offered to prove POMI's allegation. All that we have is
its self-serving assertion that De Jesus violated his employment contract. There is no
proof that the prescribed disciplinary procedure was followed. We, therefore, agree with
the Labor Arbiter's finding that POMI utterly failed to establish its claim of valid dismissal.
Accordingly, the NLRC and Court of Appeals erred in reversing the said finding.
It is clear from the records that De Jesus disembarked for a medical reason. Hence, the
cost of De Jesus' repatriation should be borne by Celtic and POMI, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 20(B)(4) of the Standard Employment Contract:
4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment. The employer shall
bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation;
or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board
his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
The cost of repatriation should not be deducted from De Jesus' unpaid salaries of
US$911.00.
Likewise, records show that De Jesus immediately reported to POMI for post-employment
medical examination and treatment, but the latter adamantly refused to extend him
medical assistance. He was constrained to seek medical attention from Bataan Doctor's
Hospital at his own expense. Celtic and POMI should, therefore, reimburse De Jesus for
his medical expenses.
Finally, De Jesus is entitled to his sickness allowance for fifty-nine (59) days from June
19, 1998 until August 16, 1998, when he was declared fit to work. Section 20(B)(3) of the
Contract governs the contractual liability of an employer to pay sickness allowance to a
seafarer who suffered illness or injury during the term of his contract viz.:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
xxxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no
case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his
return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice
to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to
comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of his right
to claim the above benefits x x x.
In fine, we affirm the Labor Arbiter's Decision granting De Jesus' claims for unpaid salary
of US$911.00, sickness allowance for fifty-nine (59) days, and reimbursement of his
medical expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 58241, and its Resolution dated December 21, 2001, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 28, 1998 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
NFD International Manning Agents vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 165389 | 2008-10-17
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the June 21, 2004 Decision[1] and September 14, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78870.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Jose I. Ilagan, Jr. and Constantino Co, Jr. (private respondents) were among 21 Filipino
seamen hired by herein petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. (NFD) to work
on board the chemical tanker M/T Lady Helene, a vessel owned and operated by
petitioner A/S Vulcanus Oslo (Vulcanus), NFD's foreign principal.
On February 11, 1997, while M/T Lady Helene was at Island View Port, Durban, South
Africa, Ship Master Captain Steiner Andersen dismissed the 21 Filipino seamen, including
herein private respondents, from their employment. They were subsequently repatriated,
arriving in the Philippines on February 15, 1997.
On March 3, 1997, NFD filed before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), a disciplinary complaint against the 21 seamen
alleging that they were guilty of mutiny, insubordination, desertion/attempting to desert the
vessel and conspiracy. Subsequently, in an Order[3] dated October 12, 1999, the POEA
Adjudication Office dismissed the disciplinary complaint filed by NFD, ordering that the
names of the 21 seamen be removed from the POEA watchlist.
Meanwhile, on May 6, 1997, private respondents, together with eight (complainants) of
the 21 seamen whose employments were terminated, filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), National Capital Region in Quezon City, a Complaint[4]
for wrongful breach of contract, illegal dismissal and damages against NFD and Vulcanus,
contending that: they were summarily dismissed from their employment without just and
valid cause and in gross violation of the terms of their employment contracts; they were
forcibly disembarked from the vessel; at the time of their discharge, and up to the filing of
their complaint, they had not been paid their accrued salaries, guaranteed overtime pay
and leave pay; for their summary dismissal, forcible disembarkation and subsequent
repatriation, they seek recovery of their unpaid wages and other benefits as well as moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Position Paper,[5] NFD and Vulcanus (petitioners) contended: The complainants
were validly and lawfully dismissed from their employment for their acts of "mutiny,
insubordination, desertion/attempting to desert the vessel and conspiracy among
themselves together with the other Filipino seamen in refusing and or failing to join M/T
Lady Helene in its next trip or destination to Mauritius without just and valid cause";
contrary to complainants' claim, they were not forcibly disembarked from the vessel; four
out of the ten complainants had already withdrawn their complaints; out of the remaining
six complainants, five were given the option to return to M/T Lady Helene and rejoin it in
its next trip to Mauritius; the filing of the complaint was merely an afterthought of the
complainants after NFD filed cases for disciplinary action against them; complainants
were not entitled to any of the amounts which they sought to recover, instead, they should
reimburse NFD for the expenses incurred by the latter in connection with their valid
dismissal and subsequent repatriation to the Philippines.
In their Reply to Respondents' Position Paper,[6] complainants averred that no single
specific act of insubordination, desertion or attempt to desert the vessel or refusal to sail
with the vessel was attributed to them; the Filipino crewman who reportedly instigated the
alleged mutiny was among those absolved of any liability by petitioners in exchange for a
waiver or quitclaim which he may have had against the latter; the disciplinary cases filed
against them was a tactical move resorted to by herein petitioners to preempt
complainants from filing a complaint for illegal dismissal; nothing was alleged and no
evidence was presented to prove that complainants were accorded the benefit of due
process before they were terminated from their employment.
In their Rejoinder,[7] private respondents contended that the Affidavit[8] of Anselmo V.
Rodriguez, NFD President and General Manager, contained several attachments proving
the illegal acts of the complainants; that it was an act of desperation on the part of
complainants to put color to the action of NFD in promptly reporting to the POEA the illegal
acts committed by the latter; that, on the contrary, the complaint for illegal dismissal, which
was filed three months after their termination from employment took place, was the
complainants' belated move to serve as a smokescreen for their illegal acts.
On January 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint
on the ground that the complainants were lawfully dismissed for just cause.[9]
Complainants filed an appeal with the NLRC.[10]
On August 30, 2001, the NLRC promulgated a Decision,[11] the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is set aside. The respondents [herein petitioners]
are directed to jointly and severally pay the appellants complainants[herein private
respondents and their companions] their wages for the payment of the unexpired portion
of their respective contracts, and unpaid wages including moral and exemplary damages
of P50,000.00 each and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees of the total amount awarded.
The complaint of Alcesar Baylosis is hereby dismissed in view of the settlement of the
monetary claims effected on July 17, 1997.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Herein petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[13] On April 9, 2002, the NLRC
came up with the herein assailed Resolution[14] which granted petitioners' motion and
reinstated the Decision dated January 30, 1998 of the LA in their favor.

Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] but it was denied by the NLRC in its
Order[16] promulgated on June 16, 2003.
Thereafter, five out of the ten original complainants, to wit: Jose I. Ilagan, Jr. (herein
private respondent), Reynaldo G. Digma, Francisco C. Octavio, Constantino D. Co, Jr.
(herein private respondent) and Jesus G. Domingo filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the CA assailing the April 9, 2002 Resolution and the June 16, 2003 Order of the
NLRC.[17]
On September 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution[18] denying due course to and
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that only one out of the five petitioners
therein signed the verification and certificate against forum-shopping attached to the
petition without any showing that such petitioner was duly authorized to sign for and in
behalf of the other petitioners.
On October 3, 2002, herein private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Exclude Reynaldo G. Digma, Francisco C. Octavio and Jesus G. Domingo as
petitioners on the ground that the above-named seamen were still abroad by reason of
their employment.[19]
In a Resolution[20] dated October 16, 2003, the CA reinstated the petition insofar as
herein private respondents were concerned.
On June 21, 2004, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision in favor of private
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution and order
dated April 9, 2002 and June 16, 2003 of the NLRC are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The NLRC decision dated August 30, 2001 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[21] (Underscoring supplied)
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] but the CA denied it in its
Resolution of September 14, 2004.
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DISREGARDING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, WHICH FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVING THAT
RESPONDENTS WERE DISMISSED FOR JUST AND VALID CAUSE.
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PROVES THAT RESPONDENTS WERE GUILTY OF
MUTINY, INSUBORDINATION, DESERTION/ATTEMPTING TO DESERT THE VESSEL
AND CONSPIRACY WITH THE OTHER FILIPINO SEAFARERS IN REFUSING AND/OR
FAILING TO JOIN M/T LADY HELENE IN ITS NEXT TRIP OR DESTINATION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
[RESPONDENTS'] TERMINATION WAS EFFECTED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
[RESPONDENTS'] TERMINATION WAS ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH OR DONE
CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY.[23]
The petition has no merit.
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether private respondents'
termination from their employment was valid.
There are two requisites which must be complied with by an employer for a valid dismissal
of employees, to wit: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the
employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself.[24]
Anent the first requisite, it is a basic principle that in the dismissal of employees, the
burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal is not justified.[25]
This is in consonance with the guarantee of security of tenure in the Constitution and in
the Labor Code. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the
charges leveled against him by his employer.[26] The determination of the existence and
sufficiency of a just cause must be exercised with fairness and in good faith and after
observing due process.[27]
The Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contentions in its first and second assigned
errors that the CA should have accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact and
conclusions of the LA as these are supported by substantial evidence; that petitioners, in
fact, were able to present substantial evidence to prove that private respondents were
guilty of mutiny, insubordination, desertion/attempt to desert their vessel and conspiracy
with the other Filipino seamen in refusing to join said vessel in its next trip.
Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality. However, the rule is not without exceptions, one of which is when the findings of
fact of the labor officials on which the conclusion is based are not supported by substantial
evidence.[28] Another exception is when it is perceived that far too much is concluded,
inferred or deduced from bare facts adduced in evidence.[29] Moreover, when the findings
of the LA and the NLRC are inconsistent with that of the CA, as in the instant case, there
is a need to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more
conformable to evidentiary facts.[30] The Court finds that the present case falls under the
above-mentioned exceptions.
After a review of the arguments and evidence of the parties, the Court sustains the findings
and conclusions of the CA, the same being in accord with the facts and law of the case.
The Court agrees with the following findings and conclusion of the CA, to wit:
[Herein petitioners] charged [herein private respondents] for mutiny, insubordination,
desertion and conspiracy in refusing to join the vessel in its next trip. However, except for
the disagreement between Capt. Andersen and Engine Fitter Castillo, when the latter
refused to resume his work in the Engine Room wherein the other Filipino crew sided with
Castillo, there is no proof showing the alleged mutinous and concerted actions of the
[private respondents] against Capt. Andersen. There is also the glaring absence of
corroborative statements of other officers or crew on board attesting that [private
respondents] participated directly or indirectly to any wrong doing, or even intervened in
the quarrel between Andersen and Castillo. The records fail to establish clearly the
commission of any threat, or any serious misconduct which would justify [private
respondents'] dismissal.[31]
which affirmed the earlier finding of the NLRC in its August 30, 2001 Decision, thus:
We also noted that [herein petitioners'] various charges against the [private respondents]
were bereft of factual details showing the alleged mutinous and concerted actions of
herein [private respondents] against the ship captain. The absence of competent evidence
or corroborative statements of other officers or crew on board attesting to the fact that
complainants have participated directly or indirectly, to any wrongdoing or intervened in
the quarrel of the Ship Captain with Fitter Bautista[32] deters us in considering the said
charges with probity.[33]
Moreover, the above-quoted findings of the CA and the NLRC are consistent with the
findings of the POEA in its October 12, 1999 Order dismissing the disciplinary complaint
filed by NFD against herein private respondents and their companions. Pertinent portions
of the POEA Order reads:
Aside from telexes and telefax messages exchanged between complainant NFD
International Manning Agents, Inc. and its principal AS Vulcanus which are all self-serving
in nature, no other proof, such as official logbook extracts, was adduced in support of the
complaint. Had respondents committed the offense charged, this should at least deserve
attention, entry and/or proper documentation in the vessel's logbook/journal.
Inciting mutiny, being a serious offense, and punishable under the "Table of Offense and
Corresponding Administrative Penalties of the Standard Employment Contract Governing
Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean Going Vessels" for two to three year
suspension, must be established by clear, strong, and incontrovertible pieces of evidence.
In the absence of substantial evidence, such as in the instant case, the charge of inciting
mutiny/refusal to sail cannot be given credence.[34]
Indeed, there is no record in the logbook or journal of the ship to indicate that the 21
Filipino seamen, including herein private respondents who were terminated from their
employment, threatened to cease and desist from working and to abandon their vessel as
a result of the misunderstanding that happened between the Ship Master and a Filipino
crew member.
Petitioners' claim that private respondents and their fellow Filipino seamen were guilty of
conspiracy in committing mutiny, insubordination, attempting to desert their vessel and
refusing to sail with the vessel is not supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the
communications, through telex messages, sent by representatives of petitioner Vulcanus
and the President and General Manager of NFD, no competent documentary proof was
presented to substantiate the charges against private respondents and the other Filipino
seamen. No record of any hearing or investigation was presented. Moreover, petitioners
did not present the Ship Master or any member of the ship's crew in order to validate or
verify the truth regarding the charge against the 21 Filipino seamen. All that were
presented by petitioners were allegations which they claimed to have gathered from
information provided by the Ship Master that herein private respondents and their fellow
Filipino seamen were guilty of the various acts of which they were accused to have
committed.
Petitioners insist that the findings and conclusions of the LA should be respected.
However, the Court finds that the LA failed to cite substantial evidence to support his
conclusions. It is not enough for the LA to declare in his Decision that "the established
facts of the case, however, reveal that complainant[s] were lawfully dismissed for just
cause"; or that "records show that complainants were discharged from their employment
for committing acts of mutiny, insubordination and desertion and/or attempting to desert
the vessel as well as conspiracy among themselves in refusing to join M/T Lady Helene
in its next trip to Mauritius without just and valid cause x x x" without specifying the
evidence upon which he derived his conclusions.
It is true that the LA cited documents consisting of the following: (1) telex message, dated
February 11, 1997, sent by a certain Marianne D. Hovland whose connection with or
position at Vulcanus was not indicated, informing NFD that there had been no solution to
their problems; and that a Filipino crewman named Castillo has not left the vessel; and
that "some other crew" have communicated their intention to leave if Castillo would
leave;[35] (2) telex message, dated February 11, 1997, from the NFD President and
General Manager addressed to all NFD officers and crew warning them of the possible
consequences, should they decide to leave their vessel to accompany Castillo, and
advising them to refrain from refusing to work and to treat their problem intelligently and
not to involve others;[36] (3) telex message, dated February 12, 1997, from a Captain
Helge Grotle whose position at Vulcanus was also not indicated, informing NFD that the
Ship Master of M/T Lady Helene decided to dismiss its crew for refusal to go to sea with
the vessel, and that according to Grotle, the act of the crew constituted mutiny;[37] (4)
telex message, dated February 12, 1997, from Captain Andersen informing NFD of his
decision to give 14 of the Filipino seamen, which included herein petitioners, the option to
return to the vessel on the ground that these seamen were not involved in the alleged
mutiny;[38] (5) letter from the NFD President and General Manager, dated February 28,
1997, informing the POEA about the dismissal of the 21 Filipino seamen on grounds of
mutiny and conspiracy for their concerted refusal to work and join the vessel in going to
its next destination.[39]
However, these documents, standing alone and uncorroborated by any other competent
evidence, do not constitute substantial proof that herein private respondents are indeed
guilty of mutiny. On the contrary, it proves their innocence. First, the evidence consisting
of the telex messages from supposed representatives of Vulcanus and NFD are hearsay
because they did not come directly from the Ship Master or officer of M/T Lady Helene.
The information contained in these communications were merely based on the alleged
report or message which came from the Ship Master. However, petitioners failed to
present any telex message, testimony or even an affidavit of the Ship Master or any other
crew member or officer of the subject vessel to prove that private respondents and their
companions were guilty of the acts with which they were charged. Second, the telex
message dated February 12, 1997 which came from the Ship Master himself established
that private respondents and 12 of their companions were not guilty of mutiny as, in fact,
they were given the option to return to the vessel if they wished to. Third, the letter-
complaint filed by NFD with the POEA was later found baseless as the POEA, in its Order
dated October 12, 1999, dismissed the complaint of NFD.
Even the NLRC, in its subsequent Resolution dated April 9, 2002, subject of herein
petition, wherein it set aside its August 30, 2001 Decision and reinstated the LA's
Decision, did not cite any specific evidence as basis for adopting the factual findings of
the LA.
The Court also finds that in their pleadings before the LA, the NLRC, the CA and this
Court, petitioners failed to cite any direct and substantial evidence to support their claim
that private respondents and their companions were guilty of mutiny and conspiracy.
Hence, the CA was correct in reinstating the NLRC August 30, 2001 Decision finding that
petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that the dismissal of private
respondents was for a just and valid cause.
The next question is whether there was compliance with the second requisite of a valid
dismissal which is due process.
The Court does not agree with petitioners' asseverations in their third assigned error that
in dismissing respondents from their employment, the Ship Master simply acted within his
management rights in order to protect the safety of the vessel and its crew, which act,
according to petitioners, is recognized under the provisions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract.
The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings, which must be
complied with even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the
employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present
their own side on the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the management's
decision to terminate.[40] To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must
furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent
notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the employers' decision to dismiss
him.[41]
Petitioner maintains that the Ship Master is allowed to dismiss an erring seafarer without
notice under Section 17, paragraph D of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels[42] issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Section 17 sets forth the disciplinary procedures against erring seafarers, to wit:
Section 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary procedures against an erring
seafarer:
A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the following:
1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this Contract.
2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges against the seafarer
concerned.
B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the investigation or hearing,
giving the seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend himself against the charges. An
entry on the investigation shall be entered into the ship's logbook.
C. If, after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty
is justified, the Master shall issue a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the
seafarer, with copies furnished to the Philippine agent.
D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the Master without furnishing the seafarer
with a notice of dismissal if doing so will prejudice the safety of the crew or the vessel.
This information shall be entered in the ship's logbook. The Master shall send a complete
report to the manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other
documents in support thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Under paragraph D, Section 17 of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels, the Ship Master is excused from furnishing a seafarer with the required notice of
dismissal if doing so will prejudice the safety of the crew and the vessel, as in cases of
mutiny.
Explaining the notice requirements under Section 17, this Court held in Skippers Pacific,
Inc. v. Mira,[43] that :
x x x under Section 17 of what is termed the Standard Format, the "two-notice rule" is
indicated. An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is
afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then
a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It
is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or
vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report
should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the
findings.[44] (Emphasis supplied)
However, in the instant case, petitioners failed to establish that private respondents and
their companions were guilty of mutiny or that, in any other manner, they posed a clear
and present danger to the vessel and its crew which would have justified the Ship Master
in dispensing with the required notices. Even if the Ship Master was justified in dispensing
with the notice requirements, still, it was essential that his decision to dismiss the Filipino
seamen should have been entered in the ship's logbook; and that a complete report,
substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other documents in support thereof, duly
sent to the manning agency. The record of this case is bereft of any such entry in the
ship's logbook or journal and of any report and supporting documents. Instead,
respondents and the other Filipino seamen were verbally ordered to disembark from the
vessel and were repatriated to the Philippines without being given written notice of the
reasons why.
There being no mutiny, petitioners should have complied with Section 17A quoted above.
The records reveal that Section 17A was not complied with by the Ship Master. Petitioners
failed to present evidence prove that private respondents and their fellow complainants
were served written notices stating the particular acts or omissions constituting the
grounds for their termination. Neither was there evidence to show that private respondents
and their companions were given opportunity to answer the charges against them.
Thus, the Court sustains the findings of the CA that private respondents and the other
complainants were not given the benefit of procedural due process before they were
terminated from their employment.
Anent the last assigned error. While the Court agrees with petitioners that there is no
evidence to prove that force, violence or intimidation was employed to effect the
disembarkation of the Filipino seamen, the Court still sustains the finding of the CA that
the dismissal of private respondents and their companions was done in bad faith, contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy, arbitrary and oppressive to labor, thus entitling
them to the award of moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are recoverable
where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.[45] On the other hand, exemplary damages are proper when the dismissal
was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner, and public policy requires
that these acts must be suppressed and discouraged.[46] In the instant case, it is
undisputed that respondents and the other Filipino seamen were actually engaged in the
performance of their assigned tasks aboard M/T Lady Helene and were even rendering
overtime work when they were unceremoniously directed to disembark from their vessel.
Moreover, the total absence of any prior written notice of the charges against them, the
opportunity to defend themselves against such charges and a written notice of the
subsequent decision of the Ship Master to terminate their employment establish the
arbitrary and oppressive character of the dismissal from employment of private
respondents and their companions.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2004 and September 14, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78870 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DAGASDAS vs. GRAND PLACEMENT AND GENERAL SERVICES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 205727 | 2017-01-18
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the September 26, 2012
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115396, which annulled and
set aside the March 29, 20102 and June 2, 20103 Resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC OFW-L-02-000071-10, and concomitantly
reinstated the November 27, 2009 Decision4 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissing the
Complaint for lack of merit.
Also challenged is the January 28, 2013 Resolution5 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Rutcher T. Dagasdas (Dagasdas ).
Factual Antecedents
Grand Placement and General Services Corp. (GPGS) is a licensed
recruitment or placement agency in the Philippines while Saudi Aramco (Aramco) is its
counterpart in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Industrial & Management Technology
Methods Co. Ltd. (ITM) is the principal of GPGS, a company existing in Saudi Arabia. 6
In November 2007, GPGS, for and on behalf of ITM, employed Dagasdas as Network
Technician. He was to be deployed in Saudi Arabia under a one-year contract7 with a
monthly salary of Saudi Riyal (SR) 5,112.00. Before leaving the Philippines, Dagasdas
underwent skill training8 and pre-departure orientation as Network
Technician.9Nonetheless, his Job Offer10 indicated that he was accepted by Aramco and
ITM for the position of "Supt."
Dagasdas contended that although his position under his contract was as a Network
Technician, he actually applied for and was engaged as a Civil Engineer considering that
his transcript of records, 11 diploma 12 as well as his curriculum vitae 13 showed that he
had a degree in Civil Engineering, and his work experiences were all related to this field.
Purportedly the position of Network Technician was only for the purpose of securing a
visa for Saudi Arabia because ITM could not support visa application for Civil Engineers.
14
On February 8, 2008, Dagasdas arrived in Saudi Arabia.15 Thereafter, he signed with
ITM a new employment contract16 which stipulated that the latter contracted him as
Superintendent or in any capacity within the scope of his abilities with salary of
SR5,112.00 and allowance of SR2,045.00 per month. Under this contract, Dagasdas shall
be placed under a three-month probationary period; and, this new contract shall cancel
all contracts prior to its date from any source.
On February 11, 2008, Dagasdas reported at ITM's worksite in Khurais, Saudi Arabia. 17
There, he was allegedly given tasks suited for a Mechanical Engineer, which were foreign
to the job he applied for and to his work experience. Seeing that he would not be able to
perform well in his work, Dagasdas raised his conce1n to his Supervisor in the Mechanical
Engineering Department. Consequently, he was transferred to the Civil Engineering
Department, was temporarily given a position as Civil Construction Engineer, and was
issued anidentification card good for one month. Dagasdas averred that on March 9, 2008,
he was directed to exit the worksite but Rashid H. Siddiqui (Siddiqui), the Site Coordinator
Manager, advised him to remain in the premises, and promised to secure him the position
he applied for. However, before Dagasdas' case was investigated, Siddiqui had severed
his employment with ITM. 18
In April 2008, Dagasdas returned to Al-Khobar and stayed at the ITM Office.19 Later, 11M
gave him a termination notice20 indicating that his last day of work was on April 30, 2008,
and he was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract, which provided that ITM
reserved the right to terminate any employee within the three-month probationary period
without need of any notice to the employee.21
Before his repatriation, Dagasdas signed a Statement of Quitclaim22 with Final
Settlement23 stating that ITM paid him all the salaries and benefits for his services from
February 11, 2008 to April 30, 2008 in the total amow1t of SR7,156.80, and ITM was
relieved from all financial obligations due to Dagasdas.
On June 24, 2008, Dagasdas returned to the Philippines.24 Thereafter, he filed an illegal
dismissal case against GPGS, ITM, and Aramco.
Dagasdas accused GPGS, ITM, and Aramco of misrepresentation, which resulted in the
mismatch in the work assigned to him. He contended that such claim was supported by
exchanges of electronic mail (e-mail) establishing that GPGS, ITM, and Aramco were
aware of the job 1nismatch that had befallen him. 25 He also argued that although he was
engaged as a project employee, he was still entitled to security of tenure for the duration
of his contract. He maintained that GPGS, ITM, and Aramco merely invented "imaginary
cause/s" to terminate him. Thus, he claimed that he was dismissed without cause and due
process of law.26
GPGS, ITM, and Aramco countered that Dagasdas was legally dismissed. They explained
that Dagasdas was aware that he was employed as Network Technician but he could not
perform his work in accordance with the standards of his employer. They added that
Dagasdas was informed of his poor performance, and he conformed to his termination as
evidenced by his quitclaim. 27 They also stressed that Dagasdas was only a probationary
employee since he worked for ITM for less than three months.28
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On November 27, 2009, the LA dismissed the case for lack of merit. The LA pointed out
that when Dagasdas signed his new employment contract in Saudi Arabia, he accepted
its stipulations, including the fact that he had to undergo probationary status. She declared
that this new contract was more advantageous for Dagasdas as his position was upgraded
to that of a Superintendent, and he was likewise given an allowance ofSR2,045.00 aside
from his salary of SR5,112.00 per month. According to the LA, for being more favorable,
this new contract was not prohibited by law. She also decreed that Dagasdas fell short of
the expected work performance; as such, his employer dismissed him as part of its
management prerogative.
Consequently, Dagasdas appealed to the NLRC.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On March 29, 2010, the NLRC issued a Resolution finding Dagasdas' dismissal illegal.
The decretal portion of the NLRC Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the respondent[s]
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the salaries corresponding to the unexpired
p01tion of his contract amounting to SR46,008 (SR5112 x 9 months, or from May 1, 2008
to January 31, 2009), plus ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's foes. The respondents
are jointly and severally liable for the judgment awards, which are payable in Philippine
currency converted on the basis of the exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual
payment.
SO ORDERED.29
The NLRC stated that Dagasdas, who was a Civil Engineering graduate, was "recruited
on paper" by GPGS as Network Technician but the real understanding between the
parties was to hire him as Superintendent. It held that GPGS erroneously recruited
Dagasdas, and failed to inform him that he was hired as a "Mechanical Superintendent"
meant for a Mechanical Engineer. It declared that while ITM has the prerogative to
continue the employment of individuals only if they were qualified, Dagasdas' dismissal
amounted to illegal termination since the mismatch between his qualifications and the job
given him was no fault of his.
The NLRC added that Dagasdas should not be made to suffer the consequences of the
miscommunication between GPGS and ITM considering that the government obligates
employment agencies recruiting Filipinos for overseas work to "select only medically and
technically qualified recruits."30
On June 2, 2010, the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of its Resolution dated
March 29, 2010.
Undeterred, GPGS filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that Dagasdas was illegally dismissed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On September 26, 2012, the CA set aside the NLRC Resolutions and reinstated the LA
Decision dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The CA could not accede to the conclusion that the real agreement between the parties
was to employ Dagasdas as Superintendent. It stressed that Dagasdas left the Philippines
pursuant to his employment contract indicating that he was to work as a Network
Technician; when he arrived in Saudi Arabia and signed a new contract for the position of
a Superintendent, the agreement was with no participation of GPGS, and said new
contract was only between Dagasdas and ITM. It emphasized that after commencing work
as Superintendent, Dagasdas realized that he could not perform his tasks, and
"[s]eemingly, it was [Dagasdas] himself who voluntarily withdrew from his assigned work
for lack of competence."31 It faulted the NLRC for falling to consider that Dagasdas
backed out as Superintendent on the excuse that the same required the skills of a
Mechanical Engineer.
In holding that Dagasdas' dismissal was legal, the CA gave credence to Dagasdas'
Statement of Quitclaim and Final Settlement. It ruled that for having voluntarily accepted
money from his employer, Dagasdas accepted his termination and released his employer
from future financial obligations arising from his past employment with it.
On January 28, 2013, the CA denied Dagasdas' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Dagasdas filed this Petition raising these grounds:
[1] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITIED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN TT Rt. VERSED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATION’S COMMISSION.32
[2] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WITH ITS FINDINGS
THAT THE CONTRACT SIGNED BY DAGASDAS IN ALKHOBAR IS MORE
ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE LATTER AND THAT IT WAS [H]IS PERSONAL ACT OR
DECISION [TO SIGN] THE SAME.33[3] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
GRAVELY ERRED IN FAULTING THE NLRC FOR ITS FAILURE TO INVALIDATE OR
DISCUSS THE FINAL SETTLEMENT AND STATEMENT OF QUITCLAIM SIGNED BY
[DAGASDAS].34
Dagasdas reiterates that he was only recruited "on paper" as a Network Technician but
the real agreement between him and his employer was to engage him as Superintendent
in t'1e field of Civil Engineering, he being a Civil Engineering graduate with vast
experience in said field. He stresses that he was terminated because of a "discipline
mismatch" as his employer actually needed a Mechanical (Engineer) Superintendent, not
a Civil Engineer.
In addition, Dagasdas insists that he did not voluntarily back out from his work. If not for
the discipline mismatch, he could have performed his job as was expected of him. He also
denies that the new employment contract he signed while in Saudi Arabia was more
advant1geous to him since the basic salary and allowance stipulated therein are just the
same with that in his Job Offer. He argues that the new contract was even
disadvantageous because it was inserted therein that he still had to undergo probationary
status for three months.
Finally, Dagasdas contends that the new contract he signed while in Saudi Arabia was
void because it was not approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). He also claims that CA should have closely examined his quitclaim because he
only signed it to afford his plane ticket for his repatriation.
On the other hand, G PGS maintains that Dagasdas was fully aware that he applied for
and was accepted as Network Technician. It also stresses that it was Dagasdas himself
who decided to accept from ITM a new job offer when he arrived in Saudi Arabia. It further
declares that Dagasdas' quitclaim is valid as there is no showing that he was compelled
to sign it.
Issue
Was Dagasdas validly dismissed from work?
Our Ruling
The Petition is with merit.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, this rule allows certain exceptions, including a situation where the
findings of fact of the courts or tribunals below are conflicting.35 In this case, the CA and
the NLRC arrived at divergent factual findings anent Dagasdas' termination. As such, the
Court deems it necessary to re-examine these findings and detemline whether the CA has
sufficient basis to annul the NLRC Decision, and set aside its finding that Dagasdas was
illegally dismissed from work.
Moreover, it is well-settled that employers have the prerogative to impose standards on
the work quantity and quality of their employees and provide measures to ensure
compliance therewith. Non-compliance with work standards may thus be a valid cause for
dismissing an employee. Nonetheless, to ensure that employers will not abuse their
prerogatives, the same is tempered by security of tenure whereby the employees are
guaranteed substantive and procedural due process before they are dismissed from work.
36
Security of tenure remains even if employees, particularly the overseas Filipino workers
(OFW), work in a different jurisdiction. Since the employment contracts of OFWs are
perfected in the Philippines, and following the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of
the place where the contract is made), these contracts are governed by our laws,
prin1arily the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations.37
At the same time, our laws generally apply even to employment contracts of OFWs as our
Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether
local or overseas.38 Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or she is entitled to
security of tenure, among other constitutional rights.39
In this case, prior to his deployment and while still in the Philippines, Dagasdas was made
to sign a POEA-approved contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM; and, upon arrival in Saudi
Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment contract. Nonetheless, this new contract,
which was used as basis for dismissing Dagasdas, is void.
First, Dagasdas' new contract is in clear violation of his right to security of tenure.
Under the Labor Code of the Philippines the following are the just causes for dismissing
an employee:
ARTICLE 297. [282] Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.40
However, per the notice of termination given to Dagasdas, ITM terminated him for violating
clause 17.4.3 of his new contract, viz.:
17.4 The Company reserves the right to terminate this agreement without serving any
notice to the Consultant in the following cases:
xxxx
17.4.3 If the Consultant is terminated by company or its client within the probation period
of 3 months.41
Based on the foregoing, there is no clear justification for the dismissal of Dagasdas other
than the exercise of ITM's right to terminate him within the probationary period. While our
Civil Code recognizes that parties may stipulate in their contracts such terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, these terms and conditions must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or policy.42 The above-cited clause is contrary
to law because as discussed, our Constitution guarantees that employees, local or
overseas, are entitled to security of tenure. To allow employers to reserve a right to
terminate employees without cause is violative of this guarantee of security of tenure.
Moreover, even assuming that Dagasdas was still a probationary employee when he was
terminated, his dismissal must still be with a valid cause. As regards a probationary
employee, his or her dismissal may be allowed only if there is just cause or such reason
to conclude that the employee fails to qualify as regular employee pursuant to reasonable
standards made known to the employee at the time of engagement.43
Here, ITM failed to prove that it informed Dagasdas of any predetermined
standards from which his work will be gauged.44 In the contract he signed while still in
the Philippines, Dagsadas was employed as Network Technician; on the other hand, his
new contract indicated that he was employed as Superintendent. However, no job
description - or such duties and responsibilities attached to either position - was adduced
in evidence. It thus means that the job for which Dagasdas was hired was not definite
from the beginning.
Indeed, Dagasdas was not sufficiently informed of the work standards for which his
performance will be measured. Even his position based on the job title given him was not
fully explained by his employer. Simply put, ITM failed to show that it set and
communicated work standards for Dagasdas to follow, and on which his efficiency (or the
lack thereof) may be determined.
Second, the new contract was not shown to have been processed through the POEA.
Under our Labor Code, employers hiring OFWs may only do so through entities authorized
by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment.45 Unless the employment
contract of an OFW is processed through the POEA, the same does not bind the
concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA, certainly the State
has no means of determining the suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers. 46
This new contract also breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was entered into even
before the expiration of the original contract approved by the POEA. Therefore, it cannot
supersede the original contract; its terms and conditions, including reserving in favor of
the employer the right to terminate an employee without notice during the probationary
period, are void.47
Third, under this new contract, Dagasdas was not afforded procedural due process when
he was dismissed from work.
As cited above, a valid dismissal requires substantive and procedural due process. As
regards the latter, the employer must give the concerned employee at least two notices
before his or her tem1ination. Specifically, the employer must inform the employee of the
cause or causes for his or her termination, and thereafter, the employer's decision to
dismiss him. Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must be accorded the
opportunity to be heard.48
Here, no prior notice of purported infraction, and such opportunity to explain on any
accusation against him was given to Dagasdas. He was simply given a notice of
termination. In fact, it appears that ITM intended not to comply with the twin notice
requirement. As above-quoted, under the new contract, ITM reserved in its favor the right
to terminate the contract without serving any notice to Dagasdas in specified cases, which
included such situation where the employer decides to dismiss the employee within the
probationary period. Without doubt, ITM violated the due process requirement in
dismissing an employee.
Lastly, while it is shown that Dagasdas executed a waiver in favor of his employer, the
same does not preclude him from filing this suit.
Generally, the employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from
demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an illegal dismissal case.
This is because waiver or quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor, and is frowned upon for
being contrary to public policy. Unless it can be established that the person executing the
waiver voluntarily did so, with full understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and
credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding undertaking. Moreover, the
burden to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the
employer.49
In this case, however, neither did GPGS nor its principal, ITM, successfully discharged its
burden. GPGS and/or ITM failed to show that Dagasdas indeed voluntarily waived his
claims against the employer.
Indeed, even if Dagasdas signed a quitclaim, it does not necessarily follow that he freely
and voluntarily agreed to waive all his claims against his employer. Besides, there was no
reasonable consideration stipulated in said quitclaim considering that it only determined
the actual payment due to Dagasdas from February 11, 2008 to April 30, 2008. Verily, this
quitclaim, under the semblance of a final settlement, cannot absolve GPGS nor ITM from
liability arising from the employment contract of Dagasdas.50
All told, the dismissal of Dagasdas was without any valid cause and due process of law.
Hence, the NLRC properly ruled that Dagasdas was illegally dismissed. Evidently, it was
an error on the part of the CA to hold that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the NLRC ruled for Dagasdas.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 26, 2012 and
Resolution dated January 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115396
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the March 29, 2010 and June 2, 2010
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC OFW-L-02-
000071-10 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC. vs. MINISTER OF LABOR
G.R. No. 50734-37 | 1981-02-20
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer that the Orders dated
December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen Board (NSB) be declared
null and void.
Private respondents were hired by petitioner sometime in May 1975 to work as seamen
for a period of ten months on board the M/V Woermann Sanaga, a Dutch vessel owned
and operated by petitioner's European principals. While their employment contracts were
still in force, private respondents were dismissed by their employer, petitioner herein, and
were discharged from the ship on charges that they instigated the International Transport
Federation (ITF) to demand the application of worldwide ITF seamen's rates to their crew.
Private respondents were repatriated to the Philippines on October 27, 1975 and upon
their arrival in Manila, they instituted a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal
and recovery of wages and other benefits corresponding to the five months' unexpired
period of their shipboard employment contract.
In support of their complaint, private respondents submitted a Joint Affidavit 1 stating the
circumstances surrounding their employment and subsequent repatriation to the
Philippines, material averments of which are herein below reproduced:
"JOINT AFFIDAVIT
xxx xxx xxx
"5. That aside from our basic monthly salary, we are entitled to two (2) months vacation
leave, daily subsistence allowance of US$8.14 each, daily food allowance of US$2.50, as
well as overtime pay which we failed to receive because our Shipboard Employment
Contract was illegally terminated;
"6. That while we were in Rotterdam, on or about July 9, 1975, representative of the ITF
boarded our vessel and talked with the Ship's Captain;
"7. That the following day, the representatives of the ITF returned and was followed by
Mr. M.S.K. Ogie who is the Company's Administrative Manager, again went to see the
Captain;
"8. That at around 7:00 in the evening all the crew members were called in the Mess Hall,
where the ITF representatives informed us that they have just entered into a "Special
Agreement" with the Wallem Shipping Management, Ltd., represented by Mr. M.S.K.
Ogle, Administrative Manager, wherein new salary rates were agreed upon and that we
were going to be paid our salary differentials in view of the new rates;
"9. That in the same meeting, Mr. M.S.K. Ogle also spoke where he told that a Special
Agreement has been signed and that we will be receiving new pay rate and enjoined us
to work hard and be good boys;
"10. That the same evening we received our salary differentials based on the new rates
negotiated for us by the ITF;
"11. That while we were in the Port Dubai, Saudi Arabia, we were not receiving our pay,
since the Ship's Captain refused to implement the worldwide rates and insisted on paying
us the Far East Rate;
"12. That the Port Dubai is one that is within the Worldwide rates sphere;
"13. That on October 22, 1975, Mr. Greg Nacional, Operation Manager of respondent
corporation, arrived in Dubai, Saudi Arabia and boarded our ship.
"14. That on October 23, 1975, Mr. Nacional called all the crew members, including us to
a meeting at the Mess Hall and there he explained that the Company cannot accept the
worldwide rate. The Special Agreement signed by Mr. Ogle in behalf of the Company is
nothing but a scrap of paper. Mr. Jaime Caunca then asked Mr. Nacional, in view of what
he was saying whether the Company will honor the Special Agreement and Mr. Nacional
answered "Yes". That we must accept the Far East Rates which was put to a vote. Only
two voted for accepting the Far East Rates.
"15. That immediately thereafter Mr. Nacional left us;
"16. That same evening, Mr. Nacional returned and threatened that he has received a
cable from the Home Office that if we do not accept the Far East Rate, our services will
be terminated and there will be a change in crew.
"17. That when Mr. Nacional left, we talked amongst ourselves and decided to accept the
Far East Rates;
"18. That in the meeting that evening because of the threat we informed Mr. Nacional we
were accepting the Far East Rate and he made us sign a document to that effect;
"19. That we the complainants with the exception of Leopoldo Mamaril and Efren Garcia,
were not able to sign as we were at the time on work schedules, and Mr. Nacional did not
bother anymore if we signed or not;
"20. That after the meeting Mr. Nacional cabled the Home Office, informing them that we
the complainants with the exception of Messrs. Mamaril and Garcia were not accepting
the Far East Rates;
"21. That in the meeting of October 25, 1975, Mr. Nacional signed a document whereby
he promised to give no priority of first preference in "boarding a vessel and that we are
not blacklisted";
"22. That in spite of our having accepted the Far East Rate, our services were terminated
and advised us that there was a change in crew;
"23. That on October 27, 1975, which was our scheduled flight home, nobody attended
us, not even our clearance for our group travel and consequently we were not able to
board the plane, forcing us to sleep on the floor at the airport in the evening of October
27, 1975;
"24. That the following day we went back to the hotel in Dubai which was a two hours ride
from the airport, where we were to await another flight for home via Air France;
"25. That we were finally able to leave for home on November 2, 1975 arriving here on
the 3rd of November;
"26. That we paid for all excess baggages;
"27. That Mr. Nacional left us stranded, since he went ahead on October 27, 1975;
"28. That immediately upon arriving in Manila, we went to respondent Company and saw
Mr. Nacional, who informed us that we were not blacklisted, however, Mr. Mckenzie,
Administrative Manager did inform us that we were all blacklisted;
"29. That we were asking from the respondent Company our leave pay, which they
refused to give, if we did not agree to a US$100.00 deduction;
"30. That with the exception of Messrs. Jaime Caunca, Amado Manansala and Antonio
Cabrera, we received our leave pay with the US$100.00 deduction;
"31. That in view of the written promise of Mr. Nacional in Dubai last October 23, 1975 to
give us priority and preference in boarding a vessel and that we were not blacklisted we
have on several occasions approached him regarding his promise, which up to the present
he has refused to honor.
Xxx xxx xxx
Answering the complaint, petitioner countered that when the vessel was in London, private
respondents together with the other crew insisted on worldwide ITF rate as per special
agreement; that said employees threatened the ship authorities that unless they agreed
to the increased wages the vessel would not be able to leave port or would have been
picketed and/or boycotted and declared a hot ship by the ITF; that the Master of the ship
was left with no alternative but to agree; that upon the vessel's arrival at the Asian port of
Dubai, on October 22, 1975, a representative of petitioner went on board the ship and
requested the crew together with private respondents to desist from insisting the
worldwide ITF rate and instead accept the Far East rate; that said respondents refused to
accept Far East ITF rates while the rest of the Filipino crew members accepted the Far
East rates; that private respondents were replaced at the expense of petitioner and it was
prayed that respondents be required to comply with their obligations under the contract
by requiring them to pay their repatriation expenses and all other incidental expenses
incurred by the master and crew of the vessel.
After the hearing on the merits, the Hearing Officer of the Secretariat rendered a decision
2 on March 14, 1977 finding private respondents to have violated their contract of
employment when they accepted salary rates different from their contract verified and
approved by the National Seamen Board. As to the issue raised by private respondents
that the original contract has been novated, it was held that:
xxx xxx xxx
For novation to be a valid defense, it is a legal requirement that all the parties to the
contract should give their consent. In the instant case only the complainants and
respondents gave their consent. The National Seamen Board had no participation in the
alleged novation of the previously approved employment contract. It would have been
different if the consent of the National Seamen board was first secured before the alleged
novation of the approved contract was undertaken, hence, the defense of novation is not
in order.
Xxx xxx xxx
The Hearing Officer likewise ruled that petitioner violated the contract when its
representative signed the Special Agreement and he signed the same at his own risk and
must bear the consequence of such act, and since both parties are in pari delicto, the
complaint and counterclaim were dismissed for lack of merit but petitioner was ordered to
pay respondents Caunca and Cabrera their respective leave pay for the period that they
have served M/V Woermann Sanaga plus attorney's fees.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board which modified the
decision of the Secretariat in an Order 3 of December 19, 1977 and ruled that petitioner
is liable for breach of contract when it ordered the dismissal of private respondents and
their subsequent repatriation before the expiration of their respective employment
contracts. The Chairman of the Board stressed that "where the contract is for a definite
period, the captain and the crew members may not be discharged until after the contract
shall have been performed" citing the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Ogilvie, et
al. (104 Phil. 748). He directed petitioner to pay private respondents the unexpired
portions of their contracts and their leave pay, less the amount they received as
differentials by virtue of the special agreements entered in Rotterdam, and ten percent of
the total amounts recovered as attorney's fees.
Petitioner sought clarification and reconsideration of the said order and asked for a
confrontation with private respondents to determine the specific adjudications to be made.
A series of conferences were conducted by the Board. It was claimed by petitioner that it
did not have in its possession the records necessary to determine the exact amount of
the judgment since the records were in the sole custody of the captain of the ship and
demanded that private respondents produce the needed records. On this score, counsel
for respondents manifested that to require the master of the ship to produce the records
would result to undue delay in the disposition of the case to the detriment of his clients,
some of whom are still unemployed.
Under the circumstances, the Board was left with no alternative but to issue an Order
dated April 3, 1979 4 fixing the amount due private respondents at their three (3) months'
salary equivalent without qualifications or deduction. Hence, the instant petition before Us
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent official as Chairman of
the Board, in issuing said order which allegedly nullified the findings of the Secretariat and
premised adjudication on imaginary conditions which were never taken up with full
evidence in the course of hearing on the merits.
The whole controversy is centered around the liability of petitioner when it ordered the
dismissal of herein private respondents before the expiration of their respective
employment contracts.
In its Order of December 19, 1977 5 the Board, thru its Chairman, Minister Blas F. Ople,
held that there is no showing that the seamen conspired with the ITF in coercing the ship
authorities to grant salary increases, and the Special Agreement was signed only by
petitioner and the ITF without any participation from the respondents who, accordingly,
may not be charged as they were, by the Secretariat, with violation of their employment
contract. The Board likewise stressed that the crew members may not be discharged until
after the expiration of the contract which is for a definite period, and where the crew
members are discharged without just cause before the contract shall have been
performed, they shall be entitled to collect from the owner or agent of the vessel their
unpaid salaries for the period they were engaged to render the services, applying the case
of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Jesus Oglivie, et al.
The findings and conclusion of the Board should be sustained. As already intimated
above, there is no logic in the statement made by the Secretariat's Hearing Officer that
the private respondents are liable for breach of their employment contracts for accepting
salaries higher than their contracted rates. Said respondents are not signatories to the
Special Agreement, nor was there any showing that they instigated the execution thereof.
Respondents should not be blamed for accepting higher salaries since it is but human for
them to grab every opportunity which would improve their working conditions and earning
capacity. It is a basic right of all workingmen to seek greater benefits not only for
themselves but for their families as well, and this can be achieved through collective
bargaining or with the assistance of trade unions. The Constitution itself guarantees the
promotion of social welfare and protection to labor. It is therefore the Hearing Officer that
gravely erred in disallowing the payment of the unexpired portion of the seamen's
respective contracts of employment.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceeding to their demands, and this constitutes serious
misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The
records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for
them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to
abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were
only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of
expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak
of in the case at bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their
firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it entered into
without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents.
On the other hand, it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed
the respondents without just cause and prior to the expiration of the employment
contracts. As the records clearly show, petitioner voluntarily entered into the Special
Agreement with ITF and by virtue thereof the crew men were actually given their salary
differentials in view of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of respondents'
fault that petitioner made a sudden turn-about and refused to honor the special
agreement.
In brief, We declare petitioner guilty of breach of contract and should therefore be made
to comply with the directives contained in the disputed Orders of December 19, 1977 and
April 3, 1979.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 14, 1977 of the Hearing
Officer is SET ASIDE and the Orders dated December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the
National Seamen Board are AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
CHAVEZ vs. BONTO-PEREZ G.R. No. 109808 | 1995-03-01
PUNO, J.:
One of the anguished cries in our society today is that while our laws appear to protect
the poor, their interpretation is sometimes anti-poor, uncounselled entertainment dancer
signed a contract with her Japanese employer calling for a monthly salary of One
Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500) but later had to sign an immoral side
agreement reducing her salary below the minimum standard set by the POEA. Petitioner
invoked the law to collect her salary differentials, but incredibly found public respondents
straining the seams of our law to disfavor her. There is no greater disappointment to the
poor like petitioner than to discover the ugly reality behind the beautiful rhetoric of laws.
We will not allow this traversty.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), 1 dated December 29, 1992, which affirmed the Decision of public
respondent Philippine Employment Agency (POEA) Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento,
dated February 17, 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint for unpaid salaries amounting
to six Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00).
The facts are undisputed.
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard
employment contract for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning Japan
Co., LTD., 2 through its Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum Placement
& Promotions Corporation. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and
petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S.
Dollars (US$1,500.00). On December 5, 1988, the POEA approved the contract.
Subsequently, petitioner executed the following side agreement with her Japanese
employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion:
"Date: Dec. 10, 1988
"SUBJECT: Salary Deduction
------
MANAGERIAL COMMISSION
-------------
"DATE OF DEPARTURE: _____________
"ATTENTION: MR. IWATA
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily have the
honor to authorize your good office to please deduct the amount of TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my contracted monthly salary of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY
DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my Manager, Mr. Jose A. Azucena, Jr.
"That my monthly salary (net) is FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500).
(sgd. by petitioner)" 3
On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6)
months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989.
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on
February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months.
Charged in the case were private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement
Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., its insurer, Times
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion.
The complaint was dismissed by public respondent POEA Administrator on February 17,
1992. He ratiocinated, inter alia:
". . . Apparently and form all indications, complainant (referring to petitioner herein) was
satisfied and did not have any complaint (about) anything regarding her employment in
Japan until after almost two (2) years (when) she filed the instant complaint on February
21, 1991. The records show that after signing the Standard Employment Contract on
December 1, 1988, she entered into a side agreement with the Japanese employer into a
side agreement with the Japanese employer thru her local manager, Jaz Talents
Promotion consenting to a monthly salary of US$750.00 which she affirmed during the
conference of May 21, 1991. Respondent agency had no knowledge nor participation in
the said agreement such that it could not be faulted for violation of the Standard
Employment Contract regarding the stipulated salary. We cannot take cognizance of such
violation when one of the principal party (sic) thereto opted to receive a salary different
from what has been stipulated in their contract, especially so if the other contracting party
did not consent/participate in such arrangement. Complainant (petitioner) cannot now
demand from respondent agency to pay her the salary based (on) the processed
Employment contract for she is now considered in bad faith and hence, estopped from
claiming thereto thru her own act of consenting and agreeing to receive a salary not in
accordance with her contract of employment. Moreover, her self-imposed silence for a
long period of time worked to her own disadvantage as she allowed laches to prevail which
barred respondent from doing something at the outset. Normally, if a person's right (is)
violated, she/he would immediately react to protect her/his rights which is not true in the
case at bar.
"The term laches has been defined as one's negligence or failure to assert his right in due
time or within reasonable time from the accrual of his cause of action, thus, leading
another party to believe that there is nothing wrong with his own claim. This resulted in
placing the negligent party in estoppel to assert or enforce his right. . . . Likewise, the
Supreme Court in one case held that only is inaction within reasonable time to enforce a
right the basic premise that underlies a valid defense of laches but such inaction evinces
implied consent or acquiescene to the violation of the right. . . .
"Under the prevailing circumstances of this case, it is outside the regulatory powers of the
Administration to rule on the liability of respondent Jaz Talents Promotions, if any, (it) not
being a licensed private agency but a promotion which trains entertainers for abroad.
"xxx xxx xxx
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Decision, thus:
"We will to see any conspiracy that the complainant (petitioner herein) imputes to the
respondents. She has, to put it bluntly, not established and/or laid the basis for US to
arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have been and should be held liable for her
claims.
"The way We see it, the records do not at all indicate any connection between respondents
Centrum Promotion & Placement Corporation and Jaz Talents Promotion.
"There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal. Hence, We affirmed. 4
Dissatisfied with the NLRC's Decision, petitioner instituted the present petition, alleging
that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in finding: that she is guilty
of laches; that she entered into a side contract on December 10, 1988 for the reduction of
her basic salary to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) which superseded,
nullified and invalidated the standard employment contract she entered into on December
1, 1988; and that Planning Japan Co., Ltd. and private respondents are not solidarily liable
to her for Six Thousand US Dollars (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. 5
The petition is meritorious.
Firstly, we hold that the managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to
authorize her Japanese employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00)
from her monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and
public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract of December 1, 1988
approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:
"It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in
conformance with the Standard Employment contract for Entertainers prescribed by the
POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes
made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and
void;" 6
The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section 2(f), Rule I,
Book VI of the 1991 Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, thus:
"Book V, Rule II
"Section 1. Employment Standards. The Administration shall determine, formulate and
review employment standards in accordance with the market development and welfare
objectives of the overseas employment program and the prevailing market conditions.
"Section 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be considered the
minimum requirements for contracts of employment:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Section 3. Standard Employment Contract. The Administration shall undertake
development and/or periodic review of region, country and skills specific employment
contracts for landbased workers and conduct regular review of standard employment
contracts (SEC) for seafarers. These contracts shall provide for minimum employment
standards herein enumerated under Section 2, of this Rule and shall recognize the
prevailing labor and social legislations at the site of employment and international
conventions. The SEC shall set the minimum terms and conditions of employment. All
employers and principals shall adopt the SEC in connection with their adoption of other
terms and conditions of employment over and above the minimum standards of the
Administration."
and
"BOOK VI, RULE I
"Section 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
"xxx xxx xxx
"f. Substituting or altering employment contracts and other documents approved and
verified by the Administration from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to
and including the period of expiration of the same without the Administration's approval.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties standard employment contract is in accordance
with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA. Thus,
the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S.
Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment
standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement
is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless
oversees workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs.
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands" cannot be applied to petitioner.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, 7 thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it. 8 It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the
fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches. 9
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 10 There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to
its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.
11
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period
for the filling of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. 12 For this reason,
we hold the doctrine of laches inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled in Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 (1991):
". . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate
Court . . . that it is a long standing principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising
equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . . ., this Court was more emphatic in upholding the
rules of procedure. We said therein:
"As for equity, which has been aptly described as a 'justice outside legality,' this is applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules
of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being
present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on
equity."
"Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery therefore
cannot be barred by laches. courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than
the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd. - the
agency's foreign principal - are solidarily liable to petitioner for her unpaid wages. This is
in accordance with stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard employment contract which
provides:
"13.7. The employer (in this case, Planning Japan Co., Ltd.) and its locally (sic)
agent/promoter/representative (private respondent Centrum Promotions & Placement
Corporation) shall be jointly and severally responsible for the proper implementation of
the terms and conditions in this Contract." 13
This solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), rule V, Book I of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, thus:
"Section 10. Requirement before recruitment. - Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:
a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer in favor
of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former . . . Such formal
appointment or recruitment agreement shall contain the following provisions, among
other:
xxx xxx xxx
"2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or
foreign based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment."
"xxx xxx xxx"
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come from the poorest
sector of our society. They are thoroughly disadvantaged. Their profile shows they live in
suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crime. hardly literate and in ill health, their
only hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance
makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the
seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they
will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least
we can do is to protect them with our laws in our land. Regretfully, respondent public
officials who should symphatize with the working class appear to have a different
orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA
Administrator and NLRC commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-02-199 (ER),
respectively dated February 17 and December 29, 1992, and the Resolution of the NLRC,
dated March 23, 1993, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. private respondents are held
jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment for the payment of SIX
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. Costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.