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Remedial law

Writ of possession available to person who bought from the original bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale, but the application for the writ is not ex parte but should be with notice and hearing. (Reyes v.
Chung, 13 September 2017, Velasco, J.).
Nothing in law which limits the time in which court may order the issuance of the decree in land
registration. S6 R39 not applicable to land registration proceeding. (Republic v. Yap, 7 February
2018, Velasco, J.).
An action for annulment of a real estate mortgage is incapable of pecuniary estimation even if the realty
had been foreclosed provided that the action was filed before the registration of the certificate of sale.
(First Sarmiento Property Holdings v Phil. Bank of Communications, 19 June 2018, e.b.,
Leonen, J.).
Since good faith is presumed, lower court may not dismiss an action for non-compliance with barangay
conciliation on assumption that application for preliminary injunction was intended merely to circumvent
the requirement on barangay conciliation. (Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh, 6 June 2018, Velasco, J.).
An action for partition filed with the RTC which did not allege the assessed value of the realty involved
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Agarrado v. Librando-Agarrado, 6 June 2018, Reyes,
J.).
One-year prescriptive period to file a quo warranto action under S11 R86 is not applicable when the
petitioner is not a mere private individual but the government itself since prescription does not lie against
the State. (Republic v. Sereno, 11 May 2018, e.b., Tijam, J.)

Under our law, there is no independent action or petition for declaration of presumptive death where the
petitioner does not intend to remarry. The presumptions of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code arise by operation of law without need of judicial declaration. (Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, 25
April 2018, Velasco, J.)
Foreclosure is a real action and not incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence RTC correctly dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction a foreclosure suit where the assessed value of the realty did not exceed P20,000.
(Roldan v. Barrios, 23 April 2018, Peralta, J.).
DOJ Circular No. 41, which provided for the issuance by the Secretary of Justice of hold-departure orders
(HDO), Watchlist Orders (WLO), and allow-departure orders (ADO), is unconstitutional, as the DOJ
cannot restrict the right to travel except by virtue of a law. (Genuino v. De Lima, 17 April 2018, e.b.,
Reyes, J.)

Since a judgment in a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Law (e.g., for declaration of
presumptive death) is immediately final and executory, a motion for reconsideration is not a condition
precedent for filing a special civil action for certiorari. (Republic v. Catubag, 18 April 2018, Reyes,
J.).

Maritime lien not a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. (Tsuneishi Heavy
Industries v. MIS Maritime Corporation, 4 April 2018, Jardeleza, J.).

Death of state witness after discharge but before he could testify during trial does not render
inadmissible his testimony given during discharge proceedings. (People v. Dominguez, 19 February
2018, Velasco, J.).

Philippine courts may exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under the
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act, committed through marital infidelity, even when the
alleged illicit relationship occurred outside the country. (AAA v. BBB, 11 January 2018, Tijam, J.).

Fact that tax declaration (showing assessed value of realty subject of action) was offered by plaintiff
without objection from defendant will not cure jurisdictional defect. S5 R10 cannot cure jurisdictional
defects. (Cabrera v. Clarin, 28 Nov 2016, Peralta, J.).

A judgment by default which awards a relief greater than that prayed for is a nullity as to the excess
since the right to due process was violated. Hence the same may be set aside under R47 even if the
default judgment had become final and unappealable. (Diona v. Balangue, 7 January 2013).

In suit by lessor against lessee for unpaid rentals, the counterclaim by lessee for the taking over of the
leased premises and the harvesting of crops is permissive. (Sy-Vargas v Estate of Ogsos, 5 Oct
2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

In action for recovery of possession of land against Spring Homes (transferor) & Sps. Lumbres
(transferee), the transferor is not an indispensable party. (Spring Homes v. Tablada, 23 Jan 2017,
Peralta, J.)

A beneficiary under a stipulation pour autrui is considered a party to a written contract and is bound by
the parol evidence rule. (Pacres v. Heirs of Ygoña, 5 May 2010, Del Castillo, J.).

The Management Contract entered into between the Asian Terminals Inc. (ATI) and the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA is a
government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country.
The PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with
ATI. As such, judicial notice cannot be taken of the provision in the management contract capping ATI’s
liability at P5,000 per package. (Asian Terminals Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., 4 April 2011, Del Castillo,
J.).
The Secretary of Justice has no authority to issue Hold-Departure Orders, Watch-List Orders, and Allow-
Departure Orders. DOJ Circular No. 41 is unconstitutional for being violative of the right to travel. The
right to travel may be restricted only on grounds of national security, public safety, and public health as
may be provided by law. DOJ Cir. 41 is not a law. (Genuino v. De Lima, 17 April 2018, e.b.).

Sec. 90 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165), which confers exclusive original
jurisdiction on the RTC over drugs crimes, is a special law which prevails over Sec. 4(b) of PD 1606
(Sandiganbayan Law) which is a general law. Hence even if the illegal drug trading were office-related, it
is the RTC not the SB which has jurisdiction over the charges against Sen. De Lima. (De Lima v.
Guerrero, 10 October 2017, e.b.).

PRO HAC VICE DECISIONS CONTRARY TO LAW?


“Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent because the decision is for the specific case
only, not to be followed in other cases. A pro hac vice decision violates statutory law - Article 8 of the Civil Code -
which states that ‘judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.’ The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate of the
law every decision of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the
same facts as the present case, that case must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the
constitutional mandate of equal protection of the law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision also violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.” - Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, 25 April 2017 (en banc).
Does this pronouncement spell the end of the pro hac vice decision? I don’t think so. First the statement is merely
obiter. Second, I don’t think Article 8 can restrict the Supreme Court’s plenary judicial power. Finally, the equal
protection clause applies to laws, not to judicial decisions, which have to take into account the special facts of each
case.
Having said that, I’m no big fan of pro hac vice decisions. They tend to disregard the maxim that what’s sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander
Where the accused was acquitted of estafa through misappropriation, the criminal court has no authority to award
damages based on civil liability ex contractu (e.g. arising from loan). The reason is that it is only the civil action to
recover civil liability ex delicto which was deemed instituted in the criminal case. Civil liability ex contractu must be
recovered in a separate civil action. (Dy v. People, 800 SCRA 39 [2016]).

The Regional Trial Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over an action for revival of judgment,
since it is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Anama v. Citibank, N.A., 13 December
2017, Jardeleza, J.).

When no criminal action has yet been filed, any court (e.g. a MTC) may issue a search warrant even
though it has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed. (People v. Castillo, 7
November 2016, Peralta, J.)

A bank which unjustifiably refuses to pay the proceeds of the check to the holder may be held liable for
damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code. (HSBC v Catalan, 18 October 2004).

Where an accused charged with estafa through misappropriation was acquitted on the ground that the
checks were not entrusted to her but delivered by way of loan, the criminal court has no authority to
award civil damages. It can only award civil damages if the liability is ex delicto, not ex contractu. (Dy v.
People, 10 August 2016, Jardeleza, J.).

The marital disqualification rule provides that during their marriage, a spouse may not testify for or
against the other spouse without the latter’s consent. (Section 22, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence).
The reasons for the rule are: (1) to preserve and advance harmony and peace in the marital relation, and
(2) to avoid the danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other where there
is want of domestic tranquility. (People v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-568, 16 July 1947).
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides for two exceptions to the marital disqualification
rule. (1) A civil case by one spouse against the other, or (2) a criminal case for a crime committed by one
spouse against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants. In these cases, a spouse may
testify for or against the other spouse.
In determining whether a crime is one which is committed by one spouse against the other, the Supreme
Court has adopted the test laid down in the United States case of Cargill v. State, 35 ALR 133, which
states that such a crime is one which directly attacks, or directly or vitally impairs, the conjugal relation.
A question that may be asked is: Is the lack or absence of marital harmony or peace by itself another
exception to the marital disqualification rule? My opinion is that it is not.
As earlier stated one of the reasons for the rule is to avoid the danger of one spouse being punished
through the hostile testimony of the other where a want of domestic tranquility exists. Going by this
rationale alone, it is evident that strained relations per se is not and should not be an exception to the
marital disqualification rule.
The view that lack or absence of marital harmony or peace is an exception to the rule may have been
engendered by the statement in Alvarez v. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72, 76 (2005), that “where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.”
A perusal of Alvarez however reveals that such statement was made in the context of the crime of arson
committed by the husband by setting fire to his sister-in-law’s house when he knew that his wife was also
inside the house. The Supreme Court stated that “[o]bviously, the offense of arson attributed to the
[husband], directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife” and that the commission of
the offense “underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved.”
(Alvarez at 77). Clearly the ratio decidendi of the case is that a crime was committed by one spouse
against the other, not their strained relations per se.
Strained relations by itself should not be an exception to the marital disqualification rule. Otherwise, the
very danger sought to be avoided by the rule, that is, one spouse being punished through the hostile
testimony of the other, would be present.
In terrorem impact of Sec. 63 of the Securities Regulation Code, which provides for treble damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, is not promoted if party allegedly defrauded forgives the
principal actor but not his aiders and abettors. (Benedicto-Munoz v. Cacho-Olivares, 9 November 2015).

The designation of an RTC branch as a special commercial court did not diminish its power as a court of
general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.
(Concorde Condominium Inc. v. Baculio, 17 February 2016, Peralta, J.).

An original party who fails to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention can be declared in default in
respect of such complaint. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of an answer to the
complaint-in-intervention is no longer optional but is mandatory. (Lim v. NAPOCOR, 685 SCRA 477, 480
[2012]). The obiter dictum in Sarmiento v. Juan, 120 SCRA 403, is no longer good case law.

Motion to revive provisionally dismissed criminal case (selling dangerous drugs) may be filed by arresting
officer since offense charged a victimless crime. (Saldariega v. Panganiban, 15 April 2015).

A ground not raised in a motion for reconsideration of the judgment cannot be raised in an original action
for certiorari assailing the judgment. The ground was waived pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule under
Section 8 of Rule 15. (Home Dev’t Mutual Fund v. See, 22 June 2011).

While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, the
contract is admissible as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract.
(Tan v Hosana, 3 February 2016, Brion, J.).

Where a complaint was dismissed on the ground of improper venue, the proper remedy for the Plaintiff is
a special civil action for certiorari under R65. Except for cases falling under paragraphs (f), (h), or (i), the
dismissal of an action based on the grounds enumerated in S1 R16 is without prejudice and does not
preclude the refiling of the same action. And under S1(g) R41, an order dismissing an action without
prejudice is not appealable. The proper remedy therefrom is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65. (United Alloy Phils. v. UCPB, 23 November 2015). The ruling is arguable. It is submitted that the
“order dismissing an action without prejudice” mentioned in S1(g) R41 is limited to those cases wherein
the Rules specifically state that the dismissals are without prejudice, such as S5 R7, S3 R17, and S5 & 6
R18. It is a settled rule that an order of dismissal is a final and not an interlocutory order and thus the
proper subject of an appeal. For instance S8 R40 provides that an order dismissing a case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction is appealable. In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp., 11
August 2004, it was held that the proper remedy from an order dismissing a case for failure to state a
cause of action was appeal not certiorari, the Court rejecting the argument that S5 R16 limits the remedy
of an appeal to dismissals based on S1(f)(h) and (i) of R16. Pursuant to Section 4(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is submitted that Madrigal represents the controlling case law on the matter.

Venue of B.P. Blg. 22 cases may be laid in the place where the check was deposited, even if it was issued
and drawn elsewhere. The reason is that the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a continuing or transitory offense.
(Morillo v. People, 9 December 2015, Peralta, J.).

Q An accused former mayor was charged with the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of official/public documents. The amount alleged to have been malversed was P274,000.
Under Article 217(4) of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for malversation of public funds or property if
the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. Article 48 concerning the penalty for complex crimes provides that the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. The prosecution contends that the accused is not
entitled to bail as a matter of right since the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period is
reclusion perpetua. Is the accused entitled to bail as a matter or right?
A Yes. The term “punishable” in Section 7 of Rule 114 refers to the prescribed penalty, not to the
imposable penalty. An imposable penalty is one which is meted only after establishing that attending or
modifying circumstances were present in the commission of the crime. Here the penalty of reclusion
perpetua may be imposed only after it is established after trial that a complex crime was indeed
committed. Since the prescribed penalty for the more serious crime of malversation starts with reclusion
temporal, bail is a matter of right even if the high end of the prescribed penalty is reclusion perpetua.
(People v. Valdez, 8 December 2015, e.b., Peralta, J.).

The second paragraph of Section 14, R.A. No. 6770, which provides that “[n]o court shall hear any
appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law” is unconstitutional and void. It limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus attempts to effectively increase the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Art. VI of the
Constitution. (Carpio Morales v CA, 10 November 2015, e.b., Perlas-Bernabe, J.).

The first paragraph of Section 14, R.A. No. 6770, which bars courts from issuing a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional since
it encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s constitutional rule-making authority under Section 5(5), Article
VIII. (Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals, 10 November 2015, e.b., Perlas-Bernabe, J.).
A foreigner plaintiff residing abroad who chose to file a civil suit in the Philippines is allowed to take
deposition abroad for his direct testimony on the ground that he is “out of the Philippines” pursuant to
Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court. (Santamaria v. Cleary, 15 June 2016).

The deliberative process privilege does not end when a government agency has adopted a definite
proposition or when a contract has been perfected or consummated. Otherwise the privilege’s purpose
will be defeated. The privilege may be invoked in arbitration proceedings. (DFA v BCA International
Corp., 29 June 2016).

RTC, not Labor Arbiter, has jurisdiction over action for replevin filed by employer to recover car against
former employee pursuant to stipulation in car plan that employee must return car upon cessation of her
employment. The action for replevin is civil in nature. (Malayan Insurance Co. v. Alibudbud, 20
April 2016).

Certification by LCR that a certain marriage license could not be found after diligent search, made
pursuant to S28 R132, is not proof that the marriage license does not exist where there was a
circumstance of suspicion, that is, the proponent had been criminally charged for bigamy. (Vitangcol v.
People, 13 January 2016).

As a rule there is no right to informational privacy on photos posted in Facebook. Hence the writ of
habeas data is not available for the redaction of compromising photos obtained by a school from
Facebook. (Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, 29 September 2014, Velasco, J.).

Where a check drawn against Metrobank, Pampanga, was deposited in the payee’s account in Equitable-
PCIBank, Makati City, and was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank, the venue of the BP 22
case may be laid in Makati City where the check was deposited. The reason is that the violation of BP Blg.
22 is a transitory or continuing crime. (Morillo v. People, 9 December 2015).

A writ of preliminary injunction is deemed dissolved or lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, even if
such dismissal is appealed. Hence the defendants cannot be cited for contempt if they close the right of
way. (Buyco v. Baraquia, 21 December 2009).

As a rule, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) does not have jurisdiction over a
claim/dispute over ancestral land which involves a person who is not a member of an Indigenous Cultural
Community or of an Indigenous People. (Unduran v. Aberasturi, 20 October 2015).

It is superfluous for the accused to file a motion for judicial determination of probable cause where the
trial court had already issued the arrest warrant upon the filing of the information and the supporting
papers. The issuance of the arrest warrant implies that the trial court had already determined probable
cause. (Balindong v. Court of Appeals, 19 October 2015).

A lessee may not stop the payment of rentals on the ground of the Asian Financial Crisis, invoking legal
or physical impossibility under Article 1266 of the Civil Code or rebus sic stantibus under Art. 1267. The
obligation to pay rentals is not an obligation to do contemplated under Art. 1266 or a service envisaged
in Art. 1267. Since the lessee’s defenses failed to tender an issue, a judgment on the pleadings in favor
of the plaintiff lessor is proper. (Comglasco Corp. v. Santos Car Check Center., 25 March 2015).

Q A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, effective 16 August 2004, provides thus: “Within 5 days from date of filing of the
reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference . If the
plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the branch clerk of court shall issue a notice of
pre-trial.” May the trial court dismiss the case for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to promptly
move that the case be set for pre-trial?
A Yes. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does not relieve the plaintiff of the duty under S1 R18 to promptly move that
the case be set for pre-trial nor does it repeal S3 R17 that allows dismissals due to plaintiff’s fault. A.M.
No. 03-1-09-SC together with S3 R17 and S1 R18 accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint
upon plaintiff’s failure to show justifiable reason for not promptly setting the case for pre-trial. (Bank of
the Philippine Islands v. Genuino, 22 July 2015).
Under the 1997 Rules, the filing of an answer to the complaint in intervention is no longer optional but
mandatory. S4 R19 states that “[t]he answer to the complaint-in-intervention shall be filed within 15 days
from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court.” Failure to
answer can give rise to default. (Lim v. National Power Corporation, 685 SCRA 477, 480 [2012]).
A search warrant is null and void if there is nothing in the records or evidence to show that the judge
undertook a searching personal examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses. The nullity is not waived by the failure to object during the trial since a fundamental
constitutional right is involved. (Ogayon v. People, 2 September 2015).

Boundary dispute cannot be resolved in an ejectment suit but in an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. (Javier v. De Guzman, 2 September 2015).

A motion for the enforcement of a charging lien is in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer
against the client for collection of attorney’s fees and which thus requires the payment of the prescribed
docket fees . (Navarez v. Abrogar, 2 September 2015).

One who buys land in which the notice of adverse claim was cancelled not by the claimant but by a
different person is not an innocent purchaser for value. His suspicion should have been aroused by the
improper cancellation of the notice of adverse claim. (Mendoza v. Garana, 5 August 2015).

An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a
personal action because it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
Hence it may be filed in Makati where the bank’s main office is located. (BPI Family Savings Bank v.
Yujuico, 22 July 2015).

An appeal from an RTC decision in a Rule 65 certiorari case (wherein the RTC set aside the MTC’s refusal
to give due course to an appeal) should be by way of Rule 41 (ordinary appeal) and not by Rule 42
(petition for review), since the RTC rendered the decision in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The
SC upheld the dismissal of the Rule 42 petition for review filed with the CA for being the wrong mode of
appeal. (Heirs of Garcia v. Mun. of Iba, Zambales, 22 July 2015).

Service of judgment on security guard of building where counsel’s office is located is valid and binding.
Counsel should devise system to ensure prompt receipt of official communications and cannot hide
behind the security guard’s negligence. (Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 15 July 2015).

A stipulation in the real estate mortgage wherein the mortgagor agrees to the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgaged property is not the special power to sell required under Act No. 3135. Hence the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage was void. (Baysa v. Plantilla, 13 July 2015).

In an interpleader suit, the ones to pay the docket fees on the claims subject thereof are the conflicting
claimants themselves. Since the defendants-in-interpleader are actually theones who make a claim - only
that it was extraordinarily done through theprocedural device of interpleader - then to them devolves the
duty to pay thedocket fees prescribed under S7 R141. S7 R62 pertains only to the docket feesfor
initiating the interpleader suit itself not the claims subject thereofsince the one who initiated the
interpleader suit claims no interest whatsoeverin the subject matter. (Bank of Commerce v. Planters
Development Bank, 24September 2012)

Charging an offender with both online libel under Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law and libel under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code, where the charges involve the same libelous material, is a blatant
violation of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 18
February 2014).

A “letter of guaranty,” wherein a bank undertakes to release the loan proceeds to the landowner-seller
upon transfer of the title to the borrower, is not a contract of guaranty but an innominate contract.
Hence the same is not covered by Section 74 of the General Banking Act which prohibits banks from
entering into a contract of guaranty or suretyship. (Games & Garments Developers v. Allied
Banking Corporation, 13 July 2015).
Note: Under Section 35 of the General Banking Law, banks may now extend guarantees, subject to the
single borrower’s limit.
In a BP 22 case, the prosecution must prove when the drawer received the notice of dishonor; otherwise
the presumption of the drawer’s knowledge of insufficiency of funds under Sec. 2 of BP 22 will not arise.
(Chua vs. People, 13 July 2015).

Monthly interest on a loan at the rate of 2.5% is unconscionable and void for being “contrary to morals
and the law.” (Sps. Abella v. Sps. Abella, G.R. No. 195166, 8 July 2015).

The coverage of the Writ of Amparo is confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. Hence the writ cannot be availed of by an alien detained by the Bureau of Immigration
by virtue of legal process. (Mison v. Gallegos, 23 June 2015, e.b.).
The mortgagor’s claim for refund of the excess of the bid price over the mortgage obligation is a
compulsory counterclaim which should have been set up by the mortgagor in the mortgagee’s action for
deficiency judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals cannot award the refund as it is barred under
Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. (Metrobank v CPR Promotions, 22 June 2015, Velasco,
J.)

David v. Poe, the SET found that Grace Poe was a natural-born Filipino from the following facts:
1. She has the physical features of an ordinary Filipino.
2. She was found abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Jaro, Iloilo, the population of which is predominantly
Filipinos.
Thus according to the SET in accordance with Section 3(y), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provides that
“things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life,” the foregoing facts
give rise to a disputable presumption that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos.
The evidential issue if this case is brought to the Supreme Court is whether these facts indeed give rise to a
disputable presumption that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos or whether these facts merely show that it is much
more probable that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos rather than foreigners.
In the first situation where the facts give rise to a disputable presumption that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos, the
Petitioner’s evidence that Grace Poe is a foundling is simply not enough to overthrow the disputable presumption,
since clear and convincing evidence is needed to override a disputable presumption. Evidence that Respondent’s
parents are unknown is not clear and convincing evidence that her parents are not Filipinos.
On the other hand, if the facts merely show that it is much more probable that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos
rather than foreigners, it would appear that the facts are not sufficient to prove that Grace Poe’s parents are
Filipinos. That an alleged fact is quantitatively probable is not probative evidence of its actual truth. (Day v. Boston &
Marine R.R., 96 Me. 207, 217-218, 52 A. 771, 774 (1902) see also Toledo St.L., & W.R. Co. v. How, 191 F. 776, 782-
783 (6th. Cir. 1911). To render a finding based on quantitative probabilities would amount to a bet on the odds. In
Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co. 406 F.2d 1315, 1318, the plaintiff employee of Sears was injured when a tire
which he was installing exploded. The court held that proof that 80% of the tires marketed by Sears were made by
defendant Armstrong Rubber Co. is not proof that the tire which injured the plaintiff was manufactured by defendant.
The resolution of the evidentiary effect of the foregoing facts could be material in the ultimate decision in this case.

A check issuer's offer of compromise made prior to the filing of a criminal case for bouncing checks
against her was not made in the context of a criminal proceeding. Hence the offer of compromise cannot
be considered as an implied admission of guilt. (San Miguel Corp. v. Kalalo, 13 June 2012).

The order of the RTC judge under Section 5, Rule 112, dismissing for lack of probable cause the criminal
case against the Highway Patrol Group officers (while continuing to try the case against the PNP SAF
officers) is a final order with respect to the HPG officers. Hence the OSG's remedy against such dismissal
order is appeal not certiorari. (Cajipe v. People, 23 April 2014).

The Plain View Doctrine finds no application where the police officers purposely searched the accused
after a lawful arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag containing
marijuana. They deliberately opened it as part of a search incident to a valid arrest. (People v.
Calantiao, 18 June 2014, Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

Where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the
order quashing the warrant ends the judicial process. Hence the remedy from such an order is appeal
and not certiorari under Rule 65. (Worldwide Web Corp. v. People, 13 January 2014).
A medical report offered in evidence without presenting in court the doctor who executed the same is
inadmissible for being hearsay. (People v. Rondina, 30 June 2014).

Under Sec. 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, interest is excluded in computing the jurisdictional amount of the
RTC. However if the interest haD already accrued at the time of the filing of the complaint, the same is
included in computing the jurisdictional amount. (Gomez v. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693, 704
The general rule is that the validity of an Environmental Compliance Certificate cannot be challenged by a
Writ of Kalikasan. The proper procedureto question a defect in an ECC is to follow the DENR appeal
process. Aftercomplying with the proper administrative appeal process, recourse may be madeto the
courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies. However, inexceptional
cases, a Writ of Kalikasan may be availed of to challenge defectsin the ECC provided that (1) the defects
are causally linked or reasonablyconnected to an environmental damage of the nature and magnitude
contemplatedunder the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan, and (2) the case does not violate, orfalls under an
exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies and/or primary jurisdiction. (Paje v.
Casino, G.R. No. 207257, 3 February 2015).

The procedure under Rules 23 to 28 allows the taking of depositions in civil cases,either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge,notary public or person authorized to administer
oaths at any time or placewithin the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official,commissioned
officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreignstate or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice inwriting to the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminalcases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably beunavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before thecourt, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required bythe clear mandate of Sec. 15 Rule
119. To dootherwise would violate the accused’s right to confront the witnesses againsthim. (Go v.
People, 18 July 2012).
It is more precise to speak of a year as consisting of 12 calendar months (Sec. 31, Chapter 8, Book 1 of
Administrative Code of 1987) rather than 365 days (Art. 13, Civil Code). Hence one year from 2 July
2003 is 2 July 2004 (not 1 July 2004) notwithstanding that 2004 was a leap year. (Co v. New
Prosperity Plastic Products, Inc., 30 June 2014). This ruling greatly simplifies the computation of
years by discounting the additional day in leap years.

The validity of an environmental compliance certificate may be challenged by a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan provided the petitioner shows a causal link between the defects of the ECC and the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Otherwise the
petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Paje v. Casino, 3
February 2015).

Mandamus does not lie to compel a custodian to produce a will for probate. The reason is that there is a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law, that is, the filing of a petition for
probate under Section 1Rule 76 and then moving for the production of the will under Secs. 2-5 Rule
75. (Uy v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010).

If the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is barred by prescription, the court is
mandated to dismiss the claim even if prescription is not raised as a defense. (China Banking Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 4 February 2015).

Mandamus does not lie to compel a custodian to produce a will for probate. The reason is that there is a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law, that is, the filing of a petition for
probate under Section 1Rule 76 and then moving for the production of the will under Secs. 2-5 Rule
75. (Uy v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010).
The ruling in Braza v. City Civil Registrar (607 SCRA 638 [2009]) that a court in a Rule 108 proceeding
cannot pass upon the validity of marriage is inapplicable to a petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage celebrated in the Philippines between a Japanese national and a
Filipino. (Fujiki v. Marilag, 700 SCRA 69 [2013]).

Compelling a person arrested for extortion to submit a urine sample for drug testing violates his right to
privacy and his right against self-incrimination. (Dela Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655 [2014]).

As regards Petitioner’sassertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state thatservice of
summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition,be it under Rule 102 or A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC. A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhatcomparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of saidwrit, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent. (Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera, 28 July2014).

Without any prior order or at least a motion forexclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot simply
allow or disallow thepresentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard thetestimony of
another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counselto protect the interest of his client during
the presentation of otherwitnesses. If respondent actually believed that the testimony of Kenneth
wouldgreatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's counsel was clearly remissin his duty to protect
the interest of his client when he did not raise theissue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely
manner. (Design SourcesInternational v. Eristingcol, 19 February 2014).

As to the admissibility of the text messages,the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolutionapplying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re:
Expansion of the Coverage ofthe Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002, effective 14
October2002). Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was aparty to the same
or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing asthe accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order toidentify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and tothe mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messagesand was competent to testify on them. (People v. Enojas, 10 March 2014). (Note: The
pronouncement as to the inclusion of criminal actions andproceedings in the coverage of the REE cleared
up doubts engendered by People v. Abad, 20 April 2010, where SCin an obiter stated that the REE does
not apply to criminal actions).

A procedural rule (Section 3 Rule 17) cannot prevailover the substantive right of co-owners to ask for
partition at any time. (Art. 494 of the Civil Code). Hence the counterclaim for partition may be
entertained even if an earlier action for partition was dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Quintos v
Nicolas, 16 June 2014, Velasco,J.).

The defendant should raise the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over hisperson in the very first
motion to dismiss. Failure to raise the issueof improper service of summons in the first motion to
dismiss is a waiver ofthis defense and cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions
andpleadings. Such amounted to a voluntaryappearance which is equivalent to service of summons
under S20 R14. (Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corp. v. Ting GuanTrading Corp., 7 April 2014).