PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V.

AGUILAR
FACTS: On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the
port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee
to said cargo. While the cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's
accompanying documents where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the
NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three cargo
trucks were seized and impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal Complaint for
the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as
amended, against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion,
Alejandro K. Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also charged with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and
Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No.
98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.

On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks, through the
previous direction of the complainant. Due notice were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez
and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items
seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.On March 16, 1998, subpoenas
were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March 17,

1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his

counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed

Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver
them

to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the

Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a letter addressed to the
Chief

Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to be recovered are
involved

in criminal proceedings. He also submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law
and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them.

Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L Hadja and to prevent
it

from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the
Philippine

Coast Guard. According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban

City, either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his direct connivance with interested

parties. Moreover, complainant pointed out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to

Hernandez within the five day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ,

thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying the integrity of said evidence.

Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was premature since there
is a

pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he

was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an order

dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject items,

pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges stresses

that

the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of
the

Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no apprehension report was issued by the NBI

regarding the shipment and neither did the DENR issue a seizure report.

Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard to prevent the

departure of subject vessel since he does not have the means to physically prevent the vessel from

sailing. He further claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from
a

legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order. Respondent sheriff

contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the

contrary.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999, recommended that the judge
be
fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and that the charges against

respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence for

issuing the writ of replevin.RULING: The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark
and the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting
documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official
disposition and appropriate action". These allegations would have been sufficient to alert the
respondent judge that the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative
proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who
seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his representatives may
order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned,
including the conveyances involved in the offense.

It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement of forestry laws,
rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within
the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.
The court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body of special competence.

The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates
ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance
of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.

On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA that they should be
dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his material duty to serve the writ with
reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.

Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly
ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt more severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is
dismissed for lack of merit.
Tan vs Dir. of Forestry G.R. No. L- 24548 Facts: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry
issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated
in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.).
This public forest land, consisting of 6,420hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland

, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI

rec.).chanrobles virtual law library

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form

after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants

submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-

appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.).
Against

this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for

reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon - who

succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office - issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series
of

1963, pertinent portions of which state:

SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 - 1. In order to

acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the Department, the
authority

delegated to the Director of forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30,
1963,

to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000

hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000

hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new licenses , including
amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture
and

Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution
of

the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the

Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of

Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular,

anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Issue: whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action

Ruling: Petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident

on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License
No.

20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al.
(105

Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented
by its

annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon

and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said
complaint

does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court
further

held that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its
annexes

where it clearly appears that the claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in
question

is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be dismissed due

to

lack of cause of action. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right
can

be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs.
Municipalityof Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481,
Oct. 24,1970).

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director
of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and
supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon
license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of
Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable
regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs.
Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over
bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials
(Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31,
1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses
issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of
petitionerappellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee
(Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as
corollary to which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously
inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto,
supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as
ordained by the Constitution.chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST
PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

People vs. Que G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996 FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals
from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705. The facts show that two weeks before
March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information
that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on
said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the
vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. There were three
persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an
unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs,
but inserted therein were sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to show a
permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated Section 68 OF P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended
Section 68, which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents, did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal,
and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said
E.O. YES .HELD: Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those
laws and

regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested

interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill
but

give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the

time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of

1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Thus

Ques posses sion of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense

under Section 68 of P.D. 705. Also, the court rejected Ques argument that the law only penalizes

possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that
the

cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two distinct and

separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1) (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting

and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or

disposable public and, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or

other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations

In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting

or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR.
In

the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal

of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper

documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is

immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products

without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum. On the second and third assignment of

error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a
poisonous tree." Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his

constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel. We do
not

agree.

Factoran vs CA

Facts: On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, SubStation III,

intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber
as

it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent

Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special

Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner
Atty

. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the following discrepancies in
the

documentation of the narra lumber:[2] which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development
(BFD

) Circular No. 10. The said BFD Circular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be

supported by the following documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued

only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3)

Delivery Receipt; and (4) Tally Sheets.[4] Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[5] Thus, petitioner Atty.
Robles

issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
6

]On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural

Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Secretary) issued an order for the confiscation of
the
narra lumber and the sixwheeler truck.[7] On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a
complaint

with prayer for the issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary

restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and sixwheeler truck, and to enjoin
the

planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.[9]

Issue: Whether or Not The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the petitioner Secretary
Fulgencio

Factoran, Jr. of the DENR is valid

Ruling: Petitioner Secretarys authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705
is

distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided
for

in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, in Paat, we held that: x x x precisely because of the need to
make

forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the urgency to

conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68- A.

This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal

proceedings. x x x. The preamble of EO 277 that added Section 68-A to PD 705- is most revealing:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the

benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos; WHEREAS, our forest
resources

may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation
of

our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to
certain

inadequacies in the Penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and WHEREAS,

to overcome this [sic] difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to
present

situations and realities;

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not

only conveyances but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products
by

the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents
insist,

the power of confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68,
then

Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any

solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, x x x.[43] in the records supports private respondents

allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to
the

confiscation of their properties.

On the contrary, by private respondents own admission, private respondent Sy who drove the six-

heeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the DENR.

Thereafter, private respondent Sy and his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain the

deficiencies in the documents.[45] Private respondents categorically stated that they made a

continuous and almost daily follow-up and plea x x x with the PIC for the return of the truck and

lumber x x x.[46] Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private respondent Lily Francisco Uy

requested petitioner Secretary for immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn

lumber.[47] Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before

the

order of confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in
all

instances, essential in administrative proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when
the

parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or
anopportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.