Galo vs. Monge, G. R. No.

170308
Facts:
On July 20, 1994, Monge(petitioner) and Potencio were found by the barangay tannods in
possession of and transporting 3 pieces of mahogany lumber in Iriga City. Monge and Potencio were not
able to show any documents or the requisite permit from DENR. The trial court found Monge guilty of
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277 while Potencio was discharged because
he was used as a state witness.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to CA where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a
state witness on the ground that there is no absolute necessity for his testimony. Monge contested that it
was Potencio who owned the lumbers and not him, that he was only hired by Potencio to transport the
lumbers to a sawmill. The appellate court dismissed his petition, hence, he filed a review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Monge was guilty of the offense charged?
Held:
Yes.
The contention of Monge is unavailing.
Under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate
offences namely;
a. Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
b. The possession of timber or other forest products without legal documents required under the
existing laws and regulations.
In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or
other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. The second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products
are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents
consummates the crime.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his
possession nor his claim that he was merely hired by Potencio to provide the latter with assistance in
transporting the said lumber. PD 705 is a penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. In
other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even
absent malice or criminal intent is illegal.

PALLADA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000 FACTS:
DENR officers, assisted by the PNP, raided the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation.
The company is engaged in rice milling and trading. They found a large stockpile of lumber of varying
sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner
produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17,
1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero
Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by
chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. Accordingly, all the lumber in
the warehouse had been seized and the petitioner was charged with violation of §68 of P.D.No. 705, as
amended.
RTC convicted the petitioner. The trial court did not give credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin
presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of
Lumber Origin. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, petitioner then filed a
petition for review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. 2. Whether the presence
of erasures in the certificate of timber origin render them valueless as evidence.
HELD:
Different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. The
issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber
Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the
numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter. The irregularities and
discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus,
justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. The presence of such glaring irregularities
negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION as to the
penalty.
ALVAREZ VS. PICOP
Facts :
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application
to have its Timber License Agreement(TLA) No. 43 converted into an Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA). In the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to
attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T.
Alvarez to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to –
Issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly
TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber
from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioner’s pulp
and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government
and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and
contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29,
[1969]between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest. x x
PICOP had tried to put a cloud of ambiguity over Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371:
a) Ancestral domains – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim
of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally
or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
Verily, in interpreting the term "held under claim of ownership," the Supreme Court could not have meant
to include claims that had justbeen filed and not yet recognized under the provisions of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2 Series of 1993, nor to any other community / ancestral domain program prior
to R.A. 8371.
One can not imagine the terrible damage and chaos to the country, its economy, its people and its future if
a mere claim filed for the issuance of a CADC or CADT will already provide those who filed the
application, the authority or right to stop the renewal or issuance of any concession, license or lease or any
production-sharing agreement. The same interpretation will give such applicants through a mere application
the right to stop or suspend any project that they can cite for not satisfying the requirements of the
consultation process of R.A. 8371. If such interpretation gets enshrined in the statures of the land, the
unscrupulous and the extortionists can put any ongoing or future project or activity to a stop in any part of
the country citing their right from having filed an application for issuance of a CADC or CADT claim and
the legal doctrine established by the Supreme Court in this PICOP case.

We are not sure whether PICOP’s counsels are deliberately trying to mislead us, or are just plainly ignorant
of basic precepts of law. The term "claim" in the phrase "claim of ownership" is not a document of any sort.
It is an attitude towards something. The phrase "claim of ownership" means "the possession of a piece of
property with the intention of claiming it in hostility to the true owner."86 It is also defined as "a party’s
manifest intention to take over land, regardless of title or right."87 Other than in Republic Act No. 8371,
the phrase "claim of ownership" is thoroughly discussed in issues relating to acquisitive prescription in
Civil Law.

Before PICOP’s counsels could attribute to us an assertion that a mere attitude or intention would stop the
renewal or issuance of any concession, license or lease or any production-sharing agreement, we should
stress beforehand that this attitude or intention must be clearly shown by overt acts and, as required by
Section 3(a), should have been in existence "since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations."