RESEARCH PROJECT

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF STUDY

AND RESEARCH IN LAW, RANCHI

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE II

MID TERM PROJECT

ON

CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ROLE OF GOVERNOR IN

INDIA

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

DR. SYMALA KANDADAI RAKESH KUMAR SAHU

FACULTY, NUSRL SEMESTER - III SEC-B

ROLL NO. – 704

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INTRODUCTION

The role of the Governor has emerged as one of the key issues in Union-State relations. The Indian
political scene was dominated by a single party for a number of years after Independence. Problems
which arose in the working of Union-State relations were mostly matters for adjustment in the
intra-party forum and the Governor had very little occasion for using his discretionary powers. The
institution of Governor remained largely latent. Events in Kerala in 1959 when President's rule
was imposed, brought into some prominence the role of the Governor, but thereafter it did not
attract much attention for some years. A major change occurred after the Fourth General Elections
in 1967. In a number of States, the party in power was different from that in the Union. The
subsequent decades saw the fragmentation of political parties and emergence of new regional
parties. Frequent, sometimes unpredictable realignments of political parties and groups took place
for the purpose of forming governments. These developments gave rise to chronic instability in
several State Governments. As a consequence, the Governors were called upon to exercise their
discretionary powers more frequently. The manner in which they exercised these functions has
had a direct impact on Union-State relations. Points of friction between the Union and the States
began to multiply. The Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President of India. The
normal tenure of the Governor is five years, which starts from the date of assumption of office.
However, the Governor shall continue to hold the office even after the expiry of his term until his
successor enters upon his office.4 Article 158(2) of the Constitution provides that he/she shall not
hold any other office of profit during his tenure as the Governor. The Governor is not answerable
to any court for the exercise of his powers or performance of his duties regarding his office or for
any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and
duties. He enjoys immunity against criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or
continued in any court during the term of his office. He is immune from the arrest or imprisonment
issue from any court during his term of office. No civil proceedings in which relief is claimed shall
be instituted during his term of office in any court in respect of any act done or purporting to be
done by him in his personal capacity, whether before or after he entered upon his office of
Governor until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been served upon him
stating the nature of the proceedings, the cause of action, the name, description and place of
residence of the party by whom such proceedings are to be instituted and the relief which he claims.

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the Supreme Court ruled that the governors cannot be removed on grounds of “lack of confidence”
or “conflict of political and ideological opinions” with the party in power at the centre1. Further it
must be noted that it was held that governor can not decide the question of innocence of accused
and it is the power of court2. Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that in Satpal & Anr. v. State
of Haryana & Ors3, this Court held that the power of granting pardon under Article 161 was very
wide and did not contain any limitation as to the time and occasion on which and the circumstances
under which it was to be exercised. Since the power is a constitutional power, it is amenable to
judicial review on the following grounds:

 If the Governor had been found to have exercised the power himself without being advised
by the government,
 If the Governor transgressed his jurisdiction in exercising the said power,
 If the Governor had passed the order without applying his mind,
 The order of the Governor was mala fide, or
 The order of the Governor was passed on some extraneous considerations.

Although the Governor is not answerable to any court and is immune from criminal consequences
for any act done during the performance of his functions, this does not restrict the right of any
person to initiate appropriate proceedings against the Governor to have declared such acts
unconstitutional.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Government of India Act, 1858 transferred the responsibility for administration of India from
the East India Company to the British Crown. The Governor then became an agent of the Crown,
functioning under the general supervision of the Governor-General. The Montagu-Chelmsford
Reforms (1919) ushared in responsible Government, albeit in a rudimentary form. However, the
Governor continued to be the pivot of the Provincial administration. The Government of India Act,
1935 introduced provincial autonomy. The Governor was now required to act on the advice of
Ministers responsible to the legislature. Even so, it placed certain special responsibilities on the
Governor, such as prevention of grave menace to the peace or tranquility of the Province,

1
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331
2
Narayan Dutt v. State of Punjab (2011) 4 SCC 353
3
Satpal & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 1702

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safeguarding the legitimate interests of minorities and so on. The Governor could also act in his
discretion in specified matters. He functioned under the general superintendence and control of the
Governor-General, whenever he acted in his individual judgement or discretion. In 1937, when the
Government of India Act, 1935 came into force, the Congress Party commanded a majority in six
provincial legislatures. They foresaw certain difficulties in functioning under the new system
which expected Ministers to accept, without demur, the censure implied, if the Governor exercised
his individual judgement for the discharge of his special responsibilities. The Congress Party
agreed to assume office in these Provinces only after it received an assurance from the Viceroy
that the Governors would not provoke a conflict with the elected Government. Independence
inevitably brought about a change in the role of the Governor. Until the Constitution came into
force, the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 as adapted by the India (Provisional
Constitution) Order, 1947 were applicable. This Order omitted the expressions 'in his discretion',
'acting in his discretion' and 'exercising his individual judgement', wherever they occurred in the
Act. Whereas, earlier, certain functions were to be exercised by the Governor either in his
discretion or in his individual judgement, the Adaptation Order made it incumbent on the Governor
to exercise these as well as all other functions only on the advice of his Council of Ministers.

The framers of the Constitution accepted, in principle, the Parliamentary or Cabinet system of
Government of the British model both for the Union and the States. While the pattern of the two
levels of government with demarcated powers remained broadly similar to the pre-Independence
arrangements, their roles and inter-relationships were given a major re-orientation. The Constituent
Assembly discussed at length the various provisions relating to the Governor. Two important
issues were considered. The first issue was whether there should be an elected Governor. It was
recognized that the co-existence of an elected Governor and a Chief Minister responsible to the
Legislature might lead to friction and consequent weakness in administration. The concept of an
elected Governor was therefore given up in favor of a nominated Governor. Explaining in the
Constituent Assembly why a Governor should be nominated by the President and not elected,
Jawaharlal Nehru observed that “an elected Governor would to some extent encourage that
separatist provincial tendency more than otherwise”. There will be far fewer common links with
the Centre.

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GOVERNOR AS A AGENT OF CENTER

Governor is the Chief Executive official of the state. The Executive power of the state is vested in
him and all executive actions are taken in his name in accordance with the Constitution. Governors
of Indian states have been vested with powers and functions at the state level as that of the President
at the capital. The powers and functions so conferred include the exercise of certain discretionary
powers where the Governor is expected to act on his own judgment. It is the duty of the Governor
as the representative of the center to ensure that the state is being carried on in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution. This follows that if it comes to his notice that the State no longer
can be carried on in accordance with the Constitution he may report the same to the President. The
President on being satisfied with such report or otherwise may take over the administration of the
state by declaring President’s rule. This power of the Centre to take over the State’s administration
has been severely criticized. It has been alleged that when the Constitution has declared India to
be a federation, the existence of such a provision runs antithetical to the federal principle. The
theory of federalism connotes that the states and the federal government are two sovereign entities
and that; one sovereign cannot overtake another sovereign. Criticism has also been leveled that the
Union Government utilizes the Governor for its own political ends. Lately, it has also been
observed that many Governors came to regard themselves as the agents of ruling party rather than
the guardians of federal democracy. Governor acts as a defender of the Constitution. He owes an
undivided allegiance to the “Constitution and the Law" while undertaking the obligation to devote
himself to the service and wellbeing of the people. He is to act as a formal channel of
communication between the Union and the State. In doing so, he is vested with certain
discretionary powers. One of such independent functions is the making of the report to the Union
Government on the basis of which the Presidential power under Article 356(1) of the Constitution
could be exercised. Governor while acting in such capacity in the larger interests of people acts as
an observer of the Union. He has to keep a watch on the functioning of the administrative
machinery and every organ of the State. The Governor should act immediately and report to the
Centre when there is a failure of law and order. The report so sent by the Governor must contain
facts and circumstances relevant to assess the situation leading to particular satisfaction of the
President though it remains unjustifiable. In the absence of such an observation he cannot
satisfactorily discharge his function of making the report which forms the basis of Presidential

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satisfaction under Article 356(1) of the Constitution. This project tends to analyze the position of
Governor as the Constitutional head of the state in the backdrop of federalism. The project analyzes
the legal position of Governor with the help of case law. The researcher has placed an exclusive
reliance on Article 356 since it has been alleged that the office of Governor has been misused by
the Centre by its unwarranted application. This is followed by a reference to those instances where
there is a prima facie misuse of this provision. The use of Governor as an agent of the Centre
happened several times over.

 In 1984, amidst of many controversies the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh who created
history in the annals of parliamentary democracy by launching a new party, Telugu Dasam
Party, backed by a vast majority had been dismissed by Governor. It was alleged that this
dismissal followed a political rivalry between the Chief Minister and Mrs. Indira Gandhi,
the then Prime Minister of India.
 B.P Singh, the Governor of Goa, had gone to the extent of replacing the Chief Minister
with another MLA by interpreting the pleasure clause. This was an obvious misuse of the
clause. And more recently, the U.P Governor, Moti lal Vora has been accused of acting at
the behest of his erstwhile party’s top leadership.
 Dr. Chenna Reddy of the Congress Party was the Governor of Uttar Pradesh at the time
when the State was undergoing the period of emergency. In his address to the joint sitting
of both Houses, he openly appreciated the emergency which was subsequently criticized
by him on the change of Government. This instance shows the pathetic and embarrassing
position of the Governors of Indian States.
 When in Jharkhand, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Chief Shibu Soren was sworn-in as Chief
Minister hurriedly in a hush-hush manner. Governor Syed Sibtey Razi gave him three
weeks’ time to prove the majority on the floor of the House, although he did not enjoy
majority support. As against it NDA had a pre-poll alliance, it was the single largest party
and enjoyed the support of 41 legislators in a House of 81 members. Shibu Soren remained
as Chief Minister illegally for 8 days. The Apex Court had earlier taken exception to the
Governor’s decision of inviting Soren to form the government. By doing so, the SC sought
to save democracy and stopped Razi from playing ‘fraud’ with the Constitution. A
Governor has discretionary powers to invite a leader of a political party enjoying majority
support, to form a government, but in a given situation, when the Governor behaves

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 wrongly, the SC has to intervene to save democracy. Jharkhand Governor ‘defrauded’ the
Constitution by appointing Shibu Soren as Chief Minister. It raised a lot of political dust.
BJP President, Lal Kishen Chand Advani has labeled Jharkhand Governor, Syed Sibtey
Razi as ‘the supari killer of democracy’ because the pre-poll combine of BJP-JDU was not
asked to form the new government in the State despite claiming a majority of 41 Legislators
in a House of 81. The Governor, Razi on the specific instruction from the Congress High
Command invited NDA’s Arjun Munda to form the government. Razi ought to have taken
such a step earlier and shown moral uprightness instead of bowing to the wishes of the
Congress.
 Another example, when the Governor had acted as the agent of the Centre was in Bihar,
where after General Assembly Elections in 2005, no political party or group came out with
the majority and gave birth to a hung Assembly. The Governor, Buta Singh recommended
for the imposition of the President’s Rule in the State. The Supreme Court has declared
that the action of Governor, Buta Singh was unconstitutional and wrong4. The Sarkaria
Commission has stated very categorically and very clearly that Article 356 can be used
when there is not only a breakdown of law and order but also when there is a constitutional
breakdown. In Bihar, this high-handed and undemocratic use of Governor’s power once
again highlights as to why the post of ‘Governor’ as used in the Indian context should not
be abolished, as it deprives the Chief Minister of his powers under the State’s rights as
enshrined in the Constitution. The list of the acts of the Governor when he acted only as
the agent of the Centre is very long and it is not possible to discuss all the incidents
here. Founding fathers of our Constitution would never have thought that the Centre may
use the office of the Governor in such a way.

Justice Krishna Iyer calls the usurpation of the State power by the Centre as a sabotage of
federalism and a grave frustration of basic structure of the Constitution. He called Governor a
pathetic functionary. Therefore, it is clear from the above examples that sometimes Governor acts
a agent of the center and acts for the center’s benefit. This has prevailed due a lack of a regulating
body and loopholes in the constitution of India.

4
Rameshwar Prashad vs the Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC I

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DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR

Discretionary powers of the Governor mean the powers of the Governor which he exercises as per
his own individual judgement or without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. In the
discharge of his responsibilities as the Head of the State, the Governor exercises his powers similar
to that of the President as the Head of the Union. Our Constitution provides that there shall be a
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advice the Governor in the
exercise of his functions.5 About the discretionary powers granted to the Governors, Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar, the Chairman of Constituent Assembly expressed his views that, “Because the
Provincial Governments are required to work in subordination to the Central Government and
therefore, the Governor will reserve certain things in order to give the President the opportunity to
see that the rules under which the Provincial Governments are supposed to act according to the
Constitution or in subordination to the Central Government are observed.6

But the occasions to exercise such discretionary powers are few and far. Madras High Court in the
case of S. Dharmalingam vs Governor of Tamil Nadu7 held that certain powers are available to the
Governor under Article 1638 which he would exercise in his sole discretion. The immunity of the
Governor is absolute, when he acts in his own discretion. In Pratap Singh Raojirao Rane vs
Governor of Goa9 court held that the Governor is not answerable to the court even in respect of
charge of malafide. Discretionary powers of the Governor may be divided into two parts:-

 Specific discretionary powers

 Circumstantial discretionary power

SPECIFIC DISCRETIONARY POWERS

Circumstances, which are mentioned in the Constitution, under which the Governor may use his
discretion, are called specific discretionary powers. By specific Articles in the Constitution certain
responsibilities are conferred on the Governor and to fulfill these responsibilities Governor acts in
his discretion. In discharging these responsibilities, he is not bound to seek or accept the advice of

5
Article 163 (1), Constitution of India.
6
Vol. VIII, CAD at 502
7
S. Dharmalingam vs Governor of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1989 Mad. 48.
8
Constitution of India.
9
Pratap Singh Raojirao Rane vs Governor of Goa, AIR 1999 Bom. 53.

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his Council of Ministers. In the case of Ganamani vs Governor of Andhra10 the court observed that
“All the powers exercisable by the Governor can be exercised on the advice of the Council of
Ministers except insofar as the Constitution expressly or perhaps by necessary implication says
that he can exercise those powers in his individual discretion” The Articles which give specific
discretionary powers to the Governor are as under

 ARTICLE 239 Article 239 provides that a Union Territory shall be administered by the
President through an Administrator with such designation as he may specify or a Governor
of a State, adjoining Union Territory, may be appointed as the Administrator of that Union
Territory. Where the Governor of a State is appointed as the Administrator of an adjoining
Union Territory, he shall exercise his functions as the Administrator without the aid and
advice of his Council of Ministers. Or in other words Governor as an Administrator can act
independently without his Council of Ministers.
 Para nine of 6th schedule11 is related to the licenses or leases for the purpose of prospecting
for or extraction of minerals. Part-1 of para nine of 6th schedule provides that “such share
of the royalties accruing each year from licenses or leases for the purpose of prospecting
for or extraction of minerals guaranteed by the government of the State in respect of any
area within an autonomous District as may be agreed upon between the government of the
State and the District Council of such District shall be made over to that District Council.
 Article 371 of the Constitution provides that the President may confer special
responsibilities upon the Governor with respect to the State of Maharashtra and Gujarat for
the establishment of separate Development Boards for Vidarbha, Marathwada, Saurashtra,
Kutch and the rest of Gujarat with the provision that a report on the working of each of
these Boards will be placed each year before the State Legislative Assembly. Article 371
A of the Constitution has conferred special responsibilities on the Governor of Nagaland
for certain purposes. For discharging these responsibilities, the Governor shall after
consulting his Council of Ministers, exercise his individual judgement as to the action to
be taken. These responsibilities are as follows:
 with respect to law and order so long as internal disturbances occur in some areas
of that State.

10
Ganamani vs Governor of Andhra, AIR 1954 A.P. 9.
11
Constitution of India.

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  to establish a Regional Council for Tuensang District.
 to arrange for equitable allocation of money between Tuensang District and the rest
of Nagaland.12
 Article 371 C of the Constitution13 confers special responsibilities upon the Governor of
Manipur to secure the proper functioning of a Committee of the Members of the Legislative
Assembly consisting of the members representing the Hill Area.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL DISCRETIONARY POWERS

Circumstantial discretionary powers are not defined by the Constitution. These powers are implied
powers, which are exercised according to the situations which may vary. When Governor acts in
such circumstances, his role becomes controversial many a times. This raises a question that
whether the Governor is merely a figure head, who is to exercise his powers in accordance with
the advice of his ministers, responsible to the Lower House or he has some real power. If any
question arises as to whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by
or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his
discretion shall be final and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in
question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion.14 Report of
Administrative Reforms Commission, which was set up in 1960 to review the Centre-State
relations, pointed out that the Governor has to face situations in which he has to take decisions in
view of his oath of his office to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law of the
land. This report insists that the Governor must be impartial and must have a sense of fair play and
he should command the respect of all parties in his State. He must have firm faith in the
constitutional set up and the democratic institution. The circumstances, in which the he may use
his discretionary powers, arise in the following matters;

 Appointment of the Chief Minister;

 Governor’s Assent to Bills;
 Dissolution of State Assembly;
 Dismissal of Ministry

12
Brij Kishore Sharma, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Second Edition, Prentice- Hall India, 2004, p. 187.
13
Inserted in the Constitution by the ( Constitution 27th Amendment) Act, 1971
14
Article 163 (2), Constitution of India.

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  Summon and Prorogue the State Assembly;
 Recommendation of President’s Rule;
 Pardoning Power
 Appointment of the Vice-Chancellor;

Further many a times the governor has misused the discretion given to him in various ways:-

 On Feb. 21, 1998, in U.P., the Governor dismissed the Kalyan Singh Government without
giving him an opportunity to face the confidence motion and invited the leader of
Loktantrik Party, Mr. Jagdamba Pal to form the ministry at 10.30 P.M. It shows the
malafide intention of the Governor. The then President of India, Mr. K.R. Narayanan had
also advised the Governor not to act in haste. Allahabad High Court restored the Kalyan
Singh Government and quashed the appointment of Jagdambika Pal. Jagdambika Pal
moved the Supreme Court against the Allahabad High Court order reinstating the Kalyan
Singh Government15.
 On May 14, 2001 the Governor of Tamil Nadu, Fatima Beevi vowed Jayalalitha as Chief
Minister in spite of the fact that she stood convicted by the judiciary for corruption. It was
the misuse of discretionary power in the appointment of the Chief Minister. The Governor
should have refused to vow Jayalalitha as the Chief Minister. The Supreme Court ordered
for dismissal of convicted Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Ms. Jayalalitha and ruled that it was
beyond the discretion of Governor to appoint as Chief Minister an ineligible person
disqualified to contest election or a lunatic or a foreigner.
 In Karnataka the leader of the Janta Party, Shri S.R. Bommai formed the Government on
August 30, 1988. On April 18, 1989, Shri K.R. Molakery member of ruling party presented
19 signed letters of the legislators including 17 Janta Dal legislators and 1 independent
legislator, to the Governor about withdrawal of their support to the ruling party. On April
19, 1989 the Governor sent a report to the President stating therein that due to defection
the ministry came in minority. He also added that no other party was in a position to form
the government and recommended the invocation of Article 356(1). On April 20, 1989, 7
legislators out 19 defector legislators wrote letters to the Governor, therein they alleged
that in earlier letters their signature were obtained by misrepresentation and affirmed their

15
Jagdambika Pal vs State of U.P., AIR 1998 SC 998

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 support to the Bommai Ministry. The Governor sent another report on April 20, 1989 and
referred therein the support letters of 7 legislators. He mis-stated therein that the support
of 7 members had been obtained under pressure by the Chief Minister and he recommended
for the invocation of Article 356(1). On the report of the Governor the President invoked
the President’s rule on April 21, 1989. S.R. Bommai challenged the proclamation in the
Karnataka High Court. A special bench of three judges of Karnataka High Court dismissed
the writ petition16. S.R. Bommai appealed in the Supreme Court against the High Court’s
judgement.169 The Supreme Court was also called upon to decide the validity of
imposition of President’s rule in Meghalaya and Nagaland. The Supreme Court declared
that the President’s rule in Karnataka was unconstitutional. The majority of the
commanding party was not tested on the floor of the House. Moreover, the Governor did
not try to find alternate ministry. This proved that the report of the Governor was faulty
and malafide. The same was seen in the case of Rameshwer Prasad vs Union of India17

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RECOMMENDATION BY VARIOUS COMMISSIONS ON THE OFFICE OF

GOVERNORS.

SARKARIA COMMISSION
A Commission headed by Justice R.S. Sarkaria, a former Judge of the Supreme Court (and who is
now a Member of the present Commission), was constituted to “examine and review the working
of the existing arrangements between the Union and States in regard to powers, functions and
responsibilities in all spheres and recommend such changes or other measures as may be
appropriate”. The notification dated June 9, 1983 appointing the Commission stated further that
“In examining and reviewing the working of the existing arrangements between the Union and
States and making recommendations as to the changes and measures needed, the Commission
will keep in view the social and economic developments that have taken place over the years and
have due regard to the scheme and framework of the Constitution which the founding fathers
have so sedulously designed to protect the independence and ensure the unity and integrity of
the country which is of paramount importance for promoting the welfare of the people”. In their
report submitted in the year 1987-88, the Commission have dealt with the “Role of the

16
S. R. Bommai v. Union of India 1994 SCC (3) 1
17
Rameshwer Prasad vs Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1.

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Governor” in Chapter IV and “Reservation of Bills by Governors for President’s Consideration,
and Promulgation of Ordinances” in Chapter V. In Chapter IV, the Commission first examined the
historical background to the institution of Governor, the constitutional provisions concerning the
Governor and the scope of these provisions and then pointed out the three main facets of
Governor’s role. The three facets so pointed out are: (a) as the constitutional head of the State
operating normally under a system of Parliamentary democracy; (b) as a vital link between the
Union Government and the State Government; and (c) as an agent of the Union Government in a
few specific areas during normal times [e.g. Article 239(2)] and in a number of areas during
abnormal situations [e.g. Article 356(1)]. Pausing here, we must say that really speaking, the
Constitution did not envisage the Governor as an agent of the Centre. By making reports under
Article 356, the Governor does not become an agent of the Central Government. Such a report
has to be made by the Governor as required by his oath which obliges him to “preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution” and to devote himself “to the service of well-being of the people” of
that State. If he is honestly satisfied, in a given situation that the government of that State cannot
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, it becomes his duty to make a
report to that effect to the President. This he does as the Governor of the State and in the interest
of the State and not as “the agent of the Centre”. It is another matter that because of the conduct
and actions of some over the last several decades, they have earned this notoriety and the pejorative
appellation of an agent.
Coming back to the Sarkaria Commission, it took note of the criticism with respect to the role of
the Governor and also set out the matters in which the Governor has to act in his discretion. The
matters in which the Governor, according to the Commission, is expected to use his discretion are:
-
 In Choosing the Chief Minister
 In testing majority of the government in office
 In the matter of dismissal of a Chief Minister
 In dissolving the Legislative Assembly
 In recommending President’s rule
 In reserving Bills for President’s Consideration.
The Commission then referred to the suggestions received by it with respect to the institution and
role of Governor which inter alia established out that this office is of vital importance having

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multi-faceted role, that Governor is linchpin of constitutional apparatus, that Governor’s office
assures continuity of Government and that it should not be dispensed with. The Commission
proceeded to discuss the manner of selection of Governors, the term of their office, their eligibility
for further offices after the expiry of their term and the retirement benefits available to them. The
Commission then discussed the areas in which the Governor has to act in his discretion and the
need for such discretionary powers.
The Commission also discussed the issue of laying down guidelines for the Governors under the
heading “Guidelines for Governors”. The Commission observed that laying down such guidelines
is a difficult task and that they should be evolved in course of time embodying accepted
conventions. It pointed out that the draft Constitution had provided that in choosing Chief
Ministers and in his relations with them, the Governor would be guided by the Instructions set out
in the Schedule (viz. the Fourth Schedule). However, this Schedule was subsequently deleted by
the Constituent Assembly on the reasoning that inasmuch as the Governor has to act on the advice
of his Ministers and further because the areas in which he has to act in his discretion are very
meagre, the matter be left to be governed by conventions.
PUNCHI COMMISSION
The Central government constituted the Punchi Commission in 2007 to examine centre-state
relations along with the possibility of giving sweeping powers to the centre for suo motu
deployment of Central forces in states and investigation of crimes affecting national security. It
was chaired by the former Chief Justice of India M.M. Punchi. It submitted its recommendation in
2009. Some of its important recommendations are given in the following:
 It called for giving a fixed term of five years to the governors and their removal by the
process of impeachment (similar to that of the President) by the State Legislature.
 The governor should have the right to sanction prosecution of a minister against the advice
of the council of ministers.
CONCLUSION

Governor in the Indian Democratic scenario is at the prominent position in the notion of the
interstate relations. The concept of governor has been in a dynamic nature and been evolving from
time to time. The British system provided the position of governor general as the most pivotal role
in the state. After independence the powers of the governor were more systematized. It should not

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be like this governor is required to maintain the glory of his constitutional post. In Hargovind Pant
vs Dr. Raghukul Tilak18, the court held that it is no doubt true that the Governor is appointed by
the President which means in effect and substance the Government of India, but that is only a mode
of appointment and it does not make the Governor an employee and servant of the Government of
India. He is the head of the State and holds a high constitutional office which carries with it
important constitutional functions and duties. He holds office during the pleasure of the President.
It is a constitutional provision for determination of the term of office of the Governor and it does
not make the Government of India an employer of the Governor. He is not amenable to the
direction of the Government of India nor is he accountable to them for the manner in which he
carries out his functions and duties. He is an independent constitutional office, which is not subject
to the control of the Government of India. Actually, the Governor is more than a constitutional
head. He is an important functionary designed to play a vital role in the administration of the affairs
of the State. Or in other words, he is a link between the Centre and the States under the Indian
Constitution. But on some occasions, he looks as the agent of the Centre. Various commissions
have recommended various modification in the role of the governor which could reduce the
chances of it being a state’s agent and minimize its autocratic discretionary powers.

SUGGESTIONS

 It is important for the current democratic system to curb the discretionary powers of the
governor during the appointment of chief minister, applying president’s rule, assenting to
ordinances and bills etc. several instances have brought up a need for a regulating body
which would regulate these discretionary powers of the governor and not let these powers
become absolute and arbitrary
 It is also important to check that the governor does not become a puppet under the hands
of the Union. They are neither agent nor can be treated as a agent, they are a specific entity
provided by the constitution of India. therefore, there needs to be check and balance
between the powers of the Union and the governor.

18
Hargovind Pant vs Dr. Raghukul Tilak, (1979) 3 SCC 458

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