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rPHERE are few circumstances among those which

-L make up the present condition of human know
ledge, more unlike what might have been expected,
or more significant of the backward state in which
speculation on the most important subjects still lin
gers, than the little progress which has been made in
the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion
of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy,
the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what
is the same thing, concerning the foundation of
morality, has been accounted the main problem in
speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted
intellects, and divided them into sects and schools,
carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another.
And after more than two thousand years the same
discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged
under the same contending banners, and neither
thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being
unanimous on the subject, than when the youth

Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted

(if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conver
sation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular
morality of the so-called sophist.
It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty,
and in some cases similar discordance, exist respecting
the first principles of all the sciences, not excepting
that which is deemed the most certain of them,
mathematics ; without much impairing, generally in
deed without impairing at all, the trustworthiness of
the conclusions of those sciences. An apparent ano
maly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed
doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from,
nor depend for their evidence upon, what are called
its first principles. Were it not so, there would be
no science more precarious, or whose conclusions were
more insufficiently made out, than algebra ; which
derives none of its certainty from what are commonly
taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid
down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as
full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as
theology. The truths which are ultimately accepted
as the first principles of a science, are really the last
results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the ele
mentary notions with which the science is conversant ;
and their relation to the science is not that of founda
tions to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may
perform their office equally well though they be never
dug down to and exposed to light. But though in
science the particular truths precede the general
theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case
with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. All
action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action,

it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole

character and colour from the end to which they are
subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear
and precise conception of what we are pursuing would
seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last
we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong
must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining
what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of
having already ascertained it.
The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to
the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense or
instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For—
besides that the existence of such a moral instinct is
itself one of the matters in dispute—those believers
in it who have any pretensions to philosophy, have
been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what
is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our
other senses discern the sight or sound actually pre
sent. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its
interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers,
supplies us only with the general principles of moral
judgments ; it is a branch of our reason, not of our
sensitive faculty ; and must be looked to for the
abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it
in the concrete. The j'ntuitive, no less than what
may be termed the inductive, school of ethics, insists
on the necessity of general Taws, They both agree
that the morality ot an individual action is not a
question of direct r"»ver>tion, but of the application of
a law to an individual case. They recognise also, to
a great extent, the same moral laws ; but differ as to
their evidence, and the source from which they derive
their authority. According to the one opinion, the
B 2

principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring

nothing to command assent, except that the meaning
of the terms be understood. According to the other
doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and false
hood, are questions of observation and experience.
But both hold equally that morality must be deduced
from principles ; and the intuitive school affirm as
strongly as the inductive, that there is a science of
morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list
of the a priori principles which are to serve as the
premises of the science ; still more rarely do they
make any eiFort to reduce those various principles to
one first principle, or common ground of obligation.
They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals
as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the com
mon groundwork of those maxims, some generality
much less obviously authoritative than the maxims
themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining
popular acceptance. Yet to support their pretensions
there ought either to be some one fundamental prin
ciple or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be
several, there should be a determinate order of pre
cedence among them ; and the one principle, or the
rule for deciding between the various principles when
they conflict, ought to be self-evident.
To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency ,
have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the
moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made
uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition
of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete
survey and criticism of past and present ethical doc
trine. It would, however, be easy to show that
whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs

have attained, has been mainly due to the tacit in

fluence of a standard not recognised. Although the
non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has
made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of
men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments,
both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced
by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon
their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham
latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has
had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even
of those who most scornfully reject its authority.
Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to
admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a
most material and even predominant consideration in
many of the details of morals, however unwilling to
acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of
morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might
go much further, and say that to all those a priori mo
ralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian
arguments are indispensable. It is not my present
purpose to criticise these thinkers ; but I cannot help
referring, for illustration, to a systematic treatise by
one of the most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of
Ethics, by Kant. This remarkable man, whose system
of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in
the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the
treatise in question, lay down an universal first prin
ciple as the origin and ground of moral obligation ; it
is this :—' So act, that the rule on which thou actest
would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational
beings.' But when he begins to deduce from this
precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails,
almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any

contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impos

sibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the
most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All
he shows is that the consequences of their universal
adoption would be such as no one would choose to
On the present occasion, I shall, without further
discussion of the other theories, attempt to contribute
something towards the understanding and appreciation
of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and towards
such prool as it is susceptible of. it is evident that
this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular
meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are
not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved
to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means
to something admitted to be good without proof. The
medical art is proved to be good, by its conducing to
health ; but how is it possible to prove that health is
good ? The art of music is good, for the reason,
among others, that it produces pleasure ; but what
proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good ? If,
then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive
formula, including all things which are in themselves
good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an
end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or
rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly
understood by proof. "We are not, however, to infer
that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind
impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning
of the word proof, in which this question is as amen
able to it as any other of the disputed questions of
philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of
the rational faculty ; and neither does that faculty

deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Conside

rations may be presented capable of determining the
intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the
doctrine ; and this is equivalent to proof.
We shall examine presently of what nature are
these considerations ; in what manner they apply to
the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be
given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula.
But it is a preliminary condition of ratiorial accept
ance or rejection, that the formula should be correctly
understood. I believe that the very imperfect notion
ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the chief obstacle
which impedes its reception ; and that could it be
cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions,
the question would be greatly simplified, and a large
proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, there
fore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds
which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian
standard, I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine
itself ; with the view of showing more clearly what it
is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing
of such of the practical objections to it as either
originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken
interpretations of its meaning. Having thus pre
pared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to
throw such light as I can upon the question, con
sidered as one of philosophical theory.


A PAS SING remark is all that needs be given to

the ignorant blunder of supposing that those
who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong,
use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial
sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An
apology is due to the philosophical opponents of
utilitarianism, for even the momentary appearance of
confounding them with any one capable of so absurd
a misconception ; which is the more extraordinary,
inasmuch as the contrary accusation, of referring
everything to pleasure, and that too in its grossest
form, is another of the common charges against uti
litarianism : and, as has been pointedly remarked
by an able writer, the same sort of persons, and often
the very same persons, denounce the theory " as im
practicably dry when the word utility precedes the
word pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous when
the word pleasure precedes the word utility." Those
who know anything about the matter are aware that
every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who main
tained the theory of utility, meant by it, not some
thing to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but
pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain ;
and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or
the ornamental, have always declared that the useful

means these, among other things. Yet the common

herd, including the herd of writers, not only in news
papers and periodicals, but in books of weight and
pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow
mistake. Having caught up the word utilitarian,
while knowing nothing whatever about it but its
sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or
the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms ; of
beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the
term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparage
ment, but occasionally in compliment ; as though it
implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures
of the moment. And this perverted use is the only
one in which the word is popularly known, and the
one from which the new generation are acquiring
their sole notion of its meaning. Those who intro
duced the word, but who had for many years discon
tinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel
themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so
they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing
it from this utter degradation.*
The creed which accepts as the foundation ofmorals,
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
* The author of this essay has reason for believing himself to be
the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use. He did
not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Gait's
Annals of the Parish-. After using it as a designation for several
years, he and others abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything
resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as
a name for one single opinion, not a set of opinions—to denote the
recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of ap
plying it—the term supplies a want in the language, and offers, in
many cases, a convenient mode of avoiding tiresome circumlocution.

reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended plea

sure, and the absence of pain ; by unhappiness, pain,
and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view
of the moral standard set up by the theory, much
more requires to be said ; in particular, what things
it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure ; and to
what extent this is left an open question. But these
supplementary explanations do not affect the theory
of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—
namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the
only things desirable as ends ; and that all desirable
things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in
any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure
inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion
of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds,
and among them in some of the most estimable in
feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose
that life has (as they express it) no higher end than
pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and
pursuit—they designate as utterly mean and grovel
ling ; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom
the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period,
contemptuously likened ; and modern holders of the
doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally
polite comparisons by its German, French, and English
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always
answered, that it is not they, but their acctisers, who
represent human nature in a degrading light ; since
the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of
no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.
If this supposition were true, the charge could not be


gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation ;

for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same
to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which
is good enough for the one would be good enough for
the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to
that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a
beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's con
ceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties
more elevated than the animal appetites, and when
once made conscious of them, do not regard anything
as happiness which does not include their gratification.
I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been
by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme
of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do
this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as
Christian elements require to be included. But there
is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not
assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings
and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much
higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensa
tion. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian
writers in general have Diaced the superiority of
mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater
permanency, safety, uncostliness, &c., of the former—
that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than
in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points
utilitarians have fully proved their case ; but they
might have taken the other, and, as it may be called,
higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite
compatible with the principle of utility to recognise
the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable
and more valuable than others. It would be absurd
that while, in estimating all other things, quality is


considered as well as quantity, the estimation of plea

sures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality
in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable
than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being
greater in amount, there is but one possible answer.
Of two. Dlga§ureg. if there V>e onp.io which nil or almost
all who have experience of both give a decided pre
ference, irrespective of any teeline" of moral obligation
to prefer it, that is the more desirable cleasure. If
one of the two is, by those who are competently
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other
that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be at
tended with a greater amount of discontent, and would
not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure
which their nature is capable of, we are justified in
ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in
quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it,
in comparison, of small account.
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who
are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of
appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most
marked preference to the manner of existence which
employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures
would consent to be changed into any of the lower
animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a
beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would
consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an
ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would
be selfish and base, even though they should be per
suaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better
satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They
would not resign what they possess more than he, for

the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which

they have in common with him. If they ever fancy
they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so
extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange
their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in
their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires
more to make him happy, is capable probably of more
acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more
points, than one of an inferior type ; but in spite of
these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into
what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We
may give what explanation we please of this unwilling
ness ; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is
given indiscriminately to some of the most and to
some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind
are capable ; we may refer it to the love of liberty and
personal independence, an appeal to which was with
the Stoics one of the most effective means for the in
culcation of it ; to the love of power, or to the love of
excitement, both of which do really enter into and
contribute to it i but its most appropriate appellation
is a sense of (dignity) which all human beings possess
in one form orotfter, and in some, though by no means
in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and
which is so essential a part of the happiness of those'
in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts
with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an
object of desire to them. Whoever supposes that this
preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness—that
the superior being, in anything like equal circum
stances, is not happier than the inferior—confounds
the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content.
It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of


enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having

them fully satisfied ; and a highly-endowed being will
always feel that any happiness which he can look for,
as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can
learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bear
able ; and they will not make him envy the being
who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but
only because he feels not at all the good which those
imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the
fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because
they only know their own side of the question. The
other party to the comparison knows both sides.
It may be objected, that many who are capable of
the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence
of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this
is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the in
trinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from
infirmity of character, make their election for the
nearer good, though they know it to be the less
valuable ; and this no less when the choice is between
two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily
and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the
injury of health, though perfectly aware that health
is the greater good. It may be further objected, that
many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for every
thing noble, as they advance in years sink into indo
lence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those
who undergo this very common change, voluntarily
choose the lower description of pleasures in preference
tQ the higher. I believe that before they devote
themselves exclusively to the one, they have already

become incapable of the other. Capacity for the

nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant,
easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by
mere want of sustenance ; and in the majority of
young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations
to which their position in life has devoted them, and
the society into which it has thrown them, are not
favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise.
Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their in
tellectual tastes, because they have not time or oppor
tunity for indulging them ; and they addict themselves
to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately
prefer them, but because they are either the only ones
to which they have access, or the only ones which
they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be
questioned whether any one who has remained equally
susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever know
ingly and calmly preferred the lower ; though many,
in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual
attempt to combine both.
From this verdict of the only competent judges,
I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question
which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or
which of two modes of existence is the most grateful
to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and
from its consequences, the judgment of those who
are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ,
that of the majority among them, must be admitted
as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to
accept this judgment respecting the quality of plea
sures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred
to even on the question of quantity. What means
are there of determining which is the acutest of two
' • ' '


pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations,

except the general suffrage of those who are familiar
. with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homo-
l geneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with
pleasure. What is there to decide whether a par
ticular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost ot a
particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of
the experienced ? When, therefore, those feelings
and judgment- declare the pleasures derived from the
higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from
the question of intensity, to those of which the
animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is
JS&icL theyJ are entitled on this subject to the
same regard..
I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary
part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or
Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human
conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable con
dition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard ;
for that standard is not the agent's own greatest
happiness, but the ^rsatesT; amount of happiness
altogether ;~ and if it may possibly be doubted whether
a noble cnafacter is always the happier for its noble
ness, there can be no doubt that it makes other
people happier, and that the world in general is
immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore,
could only attain its end by the general cultivation
of nobleness of character, even if each individual
were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and
his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a
sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare
enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders
refutation superfluous.

According to the Greatest Happiness Principle,

as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference
to and for the sake of which all other things are
desirable (whether we are considering our own good
or that of other people), is an existence exempt as
far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in
enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality ;
the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it
against quantity, being the preference felt by those
who, in their opportunities of experience, to which
must be added their habits of self-consciousness and
self-observation, are best furnished with the means of
comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian
opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also
the standard of morality ; which may accordingly
be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct,
by the observance of which an existence such as has
been described might be, to the greatest extent
possible, secured to all mankind ; and not to them
only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to
the whole sentient creation.
Against this doctrine, however, arises another
class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any
form, cannot be the rational purpose of human life
and action ; because, in the first place, it is unattain
able : and they contemptuously ask, What right hast
thou to be happy ? a question which Mr. Carlyle
clenches by the addition, What right, a short time ago,
hadst thou even to be ? Next, they say, that men
can do without happiness ; that all noble human
beings have felt this, and could not have become
noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or
renunciation ; which lesson, thoroughly learnt and

submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning and

necessary condition of all virtue.
The first of these objections would go to the root of
the matter were it well founded ; for if no happiness
is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment
of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational
conduct. Though, even in that case, something
might still be said for the utilitarian theory ; since
utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness,
but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness ; and
if the former aim be chimerical, there will be all the
greater scope and more imperative need for the latter,
so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and
do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide
recommended under certain conditions by Novalis.
When, however, it is thus positively asserted to be
impossible that human life should be happy, the
assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is
at least an exaggeration. If by happiness be meant
a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is
evident enough that this is impossible. A state ol
exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some
cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days,
and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjbjinent, not
its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philo
sophers who have taught that happiness is the end of
life were as fully aware as those who taunt them.
The happiness which they meant was not a life of
rapture, but moments of such, in an existence made up
of few and transitory pains, many and various plea
sures, with a decided predominance of the active over
the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole,
not to expect more from life than it is capable of

bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have

been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always
appeared worthy of the name of happiness. And
such an existence is even now the lot of many,
during some considerable portion of their lives. The
present wretched education, and wretched social ar
rangements, are the only real hindrance to its being
attainable by almost all.
The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human
beings, if taught to consider happiness as the end of
life, would be satisfied with such a moderate share of
it. But great numbers of mankind have been satis
fied with much less. The main constituents of a
satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by
itself is often found sufficient for the purpose : tran
quillity, and excitement. With much tranquillity,
many find that they can be content with very little
pleasure : with much excitement, many can reconcile
themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. There
is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even
the mass of mankind to unite both ; since the two are
so far from being incompatible that they are in natural
alliance, the prolongation of either being a preparation
for, and exciting a wish for, the other. It isxmly
those in whom indolence amounts to a vice, that^p
not desire excitement after an interval of repose ; it is\
only those in whom the need of excitement is a disease,
that feel the tranquillity which follows excitement
dull and insipid, instead of pleasurable in direct pro
portion to the excitement which preceded it. When
people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward
lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it
valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring for

nobody but themselves. To those who have neither

public nor private affections, the excitements of life
are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value
as the time approaches when all selfish interests must
be terminated by death : while those who leave after
them objects of personal affection, and especially those
who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the
collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an in
terest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of
youth and health. Next to selfishness, the principal
cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want of
mental cultivation. A cultivated mind—I do not
mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which
the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and
which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to
exercise its faculties—finds sources of inexhaustible
interest in all that surrounds it ; in the objects of
nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of
poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind
past and present, and their prospects in the future.
It is possible, indeed, to become indifferent to all this,
and that too without having exhausted a thousandth
part of it ; but only when one has had from the
beginning no moral or human interest in these things,
and has sought in them only the gratification of
Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of
things why an amount of mental culture sufficient to
give .an intelligent interest in these objects of contem
plation, should not be the inheritance of every one
born in a civilized country. As little is there an in
herent necessity that any human being should be a
selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling or care but those
which centre in his own miserable individuality. Some
thing far superior to this is sufficiently common even
now, to give ample earnest of what the human species
may be made. Genuine private affections, and a sin
cere interest in the public good, are possible, though
in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought-up human
being. In a world in which there is so much to inter
est, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct
and improve, every one who has this moderate amount
of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an
existence which may be called enviable ; and unless
such a person, through bad laws, or subjection to the
will of others, is denied the liberty to use the sources
of happiness within his reach, he will not fail to find
this enviable existence, if he escape the positive evils
of life, the great sources of physical and mental suf
fering—such as indigence, disease, and the unkind-
ness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of
affection. The main stress of the problem lies, there
fore, in the contest with these calamities, from which
it is a rare good fortune entirely to escape ; which, as
things now are, cannot be obviated, and often cannot
be in any material degree mitigated. Yet no one
whose opinion -deserves a moment's consideration can
doubt that most of the great positive evils of the J,
world are in themselves removable, and will, if human
affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced
within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying
suffering, may be completely extinguished by thea
wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and
providence of individuals. Even that most intractable
of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in
dimensions by good physical and moral education.

and proper control of noxious influences ; while the

progress of science holds out a promise for the future
of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe.
And every advance in that direction relieves us from
some, not only of the chances which cut short our
own lives, but, what concerns us still more, which
deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt
up. As for vicissitudes of fortune, and other dis
appointments connected with worldly circumstances,
these are principally the effect either of gross impru
dence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect
social institutions. All the grand sources, in short,
of human suffering are in a great degree, many of
them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and
effort ; and though their removal is grievously slow—
though a long succession of generations will perish in
the breach before the conquest is completed, and this
world becomes all that, if will and knowledge were
not wanting, it might easily be made—yet every
mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a
part, however small and unconspicuous, in the endea
vour, will draw a noble enjoyment from the contest
itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form
of selfish indulgence consent to be without.
And this leads to the true estimation of what is
said by the objectors concerning the possibility, and
the obligation, of learning to do without happiness.
Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness;
it is done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of
mankind, even in those parts of our present world
which are least deep in barbarism ; and it often has
to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for
the sake of something which he prizes more than his


individual happiness. But this something, what is

it, unless the happiness of others, or some of the
requisites of happiness? It is noble to be capable of
resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or
chances of it : but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be
for some end ; it is not its own end ; and if we are
told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which
is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be
made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it
would earn for others immunity from similar sacri
fices? Would it be made, if he thought that his
renunciation of happiness for himself would produce
no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make
their lot like his, and place them also in the condition
of persons who have renounced happiness ? All honour
to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal
enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they
contribute worthily to increase the amount of happi
ness in the world ; but he who does it, or professes to
do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of
admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar.
He may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do,
but assuredly not an example of what they should.
Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the
world's arrangements that any one can best serve the
happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his
own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect
state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make
such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be
found in man. I will add, that in this condition of
the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the
conscious ability to do without happiness gives the
best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attain

able. For nothing except that consciousness can

raise a person above the chances of life, by making
him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they
have not power to subdue him : which, once felt, frees
him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of
life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst
times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquil
lity the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, with
out concerning himself about the uncertainty of their
duration, any more than about their inevitable end.
Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the
morality of self-devotion as a possession which belongs
by as good a right to them, as either to the Stoic or
to the Transcendentalist. The utilitarian morality
does recognise in human beings the power of sacri
ficing their own greatest good for the good of others.
It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a
good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to
increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as
wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds,
is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means
of happiness, of others 5 either of mankind collec
tively, or of individuaTs within the limits imposed by
the collective interests of mankind.
I must again repeat, what the assailants of utili
tarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that
the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of
what is right in conduct, is not- the agent's own hap
piness, but that of all concerned. As between his
own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism re
quires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested
and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus
of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics


of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to

love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal
perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of
making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility
would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements
should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically
it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as
nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the
whole ; and secondly, that education and opinion,
which have so vast a power over human character,
should so use that power as to establish in the mind
of every individual an indissoluble association between
his own happiness and the good of the whole ; espe
cially between his own happiness and the practice of ,
such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard |
for the universal happiness prescribes : so that not_[
only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of
happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed
to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to
promote the general good may be in every individual
one of the habitual motives of action, and the senti
ments connected therewith may fill a large and promi- -
nent place in every human being's sentient existence.
If the impugners of the utilitarian morality repre
sented it to their own minds in this its true character,
I know not what recommendation possessed by any
other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting
to it : what more beautiful or more exalted develop
ments of human nature any other ethical system can
be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not
accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for
giving effect to their mandates.
The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be

charged with representing it in a discreditable light.

On the contrary, those among them who entertain
anything like a just idea of its disinterested character,
sometimes find fault with its standard as being too
high for humanity. They say it is exacting too much
to require that people shall always act from the in
ducement of promoting the general interests of society.
But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard
of morals, and to confound the rule of action with the
motive of it.j It is the business of ethics to tell us
what are our duties, or by what test we may know
them ; but no system of ethics requires that the sole
motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty ; on the
contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions
are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if
the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the
more unjust to utilitarianism that this particular mis
apprehension should be made a ground of objection
to it, inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have gone
i beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive
has nothing to do with the morality of the action,
though much with the worth of the agent. He who
saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is
morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the Jbope
of being paid for his trouble : he who betrays the
friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his
object be to serve another friend to whom he is under
greater obligations.* But to speak only of actions

* An opponent, whose intellectual and moral fairness it is a

pleasure to acknowledge (the Rev. J. Llewellyn Davis), has objected
to this passage, saying, " Surely the rightness or wrongness of sav
ing a man from drowning does depend very much upon the motive
with which it is done. Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy

done from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience 1

to principle : it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian
mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people
should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the
World, or society at large. The great majority of good"1'
actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world,
but for that of individuals, of which the good of the
world is made up ; and the thoughts of the most vir- _
tuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond

jumped into the sea to escape from him, saved him from drowning
simply in order that he might inflict upon him more exquisite tor-
tures, would it tend to clearness to speak of that rescue as 'a
morally right action ? ' Or suppose again, according to one of the
stock illustrations of ethical inquiries, that a man betrayed a trust
received from a friend, because the discharge of it would fatally
injure that friend himself or some one belonging to him, would
utilitarianism compel one to call the betrayal ' a crime ' as much as
if it had been done from the meanest motive ? "
I submit, that he who saves another from drowning in order to
kill him by torture afterwards, does not differ only in motive from
him who does the same thing from duty or benevolence ; the act
itself is different. The rescue of the man is, in the case supposed,
only the necessary first step of an act far more atrocious than leaving
him to drown would have been. Had Mr. Davis said, " The right-
ness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does depend
very much "—not upon the motive, but—"upon the intention," no
utilitarian would have differed from him. Mr. Davis, by an over
sight too common not to be quite venial, has in this case confounded
the very different ideas of Motive and Intention. There is no point
which utilitarian thinkers (and Bentham pre-eminently) have taken
more pains to illustrate than this. The morality of the action de
pends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent
wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him
will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none
in the morality : though it makes a great difference in our moral
estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad
habitual disposition—a bent of character from which useful, or
from which hurtful actions are likely to arise.

the particular persons concerned, except so far as is

necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he
is not violating the rights—that is, the legitimate and
authorized expectations—of any one else. The multi
plication of happiness is. according to the utilitarian
ethics, the object of ^irtue^ the occasions on which
any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his
power to do this on an extended scale, in other words,
jto be a public benefactor, are but exceptional ; and on
(these occasions alone is he called on to consider public
j utility ; in every other case, private utility, the interest
or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to
attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions
extends to society in general, need concern themselves
habitually about so large an object. In the case of
abstinences indeed—of things which people forbear to
do, from moral considerations, though the consequences
in the particular case might be beneficial—it would
be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be con
sciously aware that the action is of a class which, if
practised generally, would be generally injurious, and
that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain
from it. The amount of regard for the public in
terest implied in this recognition, is no greater than
is demanded by every system of morals ; for they all
enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly per
nicious to society.
The same considerations dispose of another reproach
against the doctrine of utility, founded on a still
grosser misconception of the purpose of a standard of
morality, and of the very meaning of the words right
and wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism
renders men cold and unsympathizing ; that it chills

their moral feelings towards individuals ; that it makes

them regard only the dry and hard consideration of
the consequences of actions, not taking into their
moral estimate the qualities from which those actions
emanate. If the assertion means that they do not
allow their judgment respecting the Tightness or wrong-
ness of an action to be influenced by their opinion of
the qualities of the person who does it, this is a com
plaint not against utilitarianism, but against having
any standard of morality at all ; for certainly no known
ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad
because it is done by a good or a bad man, still less
because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent
man, or the contrary. These considerations are rele
vant, not to the estimation of actions, but of persons ;
and there is nothing in the utilitarian theory inconsis
tent with the fact that there are other things which
interest us in persons besides the Tightness and wrong-
ness of their actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the
paradoxical misuse of language which was part of their
system, and by which they strove to raise themselves
above all concern about anything but virtue, were fond
of saying that he who has that has everything ; that
he, and only he, is rich, is beautiful, is a king. But
no claim of this description is made for the virtuous
man by the utilitarian doctrine. Utilitarians are quite
aware that there are other desirable possessions and
qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to
allow to all of them their full worth. They are also
aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate
a virtuous character, and that actions which are blame-
able often proceed from qualities entitled to praise.
When this is apparent in any particular case, it modi-

fies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of

the agent. I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of
opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good
character is good actions ; and resolutely refuse to
consider any mental disposition as good, of which
the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct.
This makes them unpopular with many people ; but
it is an unpopularity which they must share with
every one who regards the distinction between right
and wrong in a serious light ; and the reproach is not
one which a conscientious utilitarian need be anxious
to repel.
If no more be meant by the objection than that
many utilitarians look on the morality of actions, as
measured by the utilitarian standard, with too exclu
sive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the
other beauties of character which go towards making
a human being loveable or admirable, this may be ad
mitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their moral
feelings, but not their sympathies nor their artistic
perceptions, do fall into this mistake ; and so do all
other moralists under the same conditions. What
can be said in excuse for other moralists is equally
available for them, namely, that if there is to be
any error, it is better that it should be on that side.
As a matter of fact, we may affirm that among utili
tarians as among adherents of other systems, there is
every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in
the application of their standard : some are even puri
tanically rigorous, while others are as indulgent as
can possibly be desired by sinner or by sentimentalist.
But on the whole, a doctrine which brings prominently
forward the interest that mankind have in the re-

pression and prevention of conduct which violates the

moral law, is likely to be inferior to no other in turning
the sanctions of opinion against such violations. It
is true, the question, What does violate the moral
law? is one on which those who recognise different
standards of morality are likely now and then to
differ. But difference of opinion on moral questions
was not first introduced into the world by utili
tarianism, while that doctrine does supply, if not
always an easy, at all events a tangible and intelli
gible mode of deciding such differences.

It may not be superfluous to notice a few more of

the common misapprehensions of utilitarian ethics,
even those which are so obvious and gross that it
might appear impossible for any person of candour
and intelligence to fall into them : since persons, even
of considerable mental endowments, often give them
selves so little trouble to understand the bearings of
any opinion against which they entertain a prejudice,
and men are in general so little conscious of this
voluntary ignorance as a defect, that the vulgarest
misunderstandings of ethical doctrines are continually
met with in the deliberate writings of persons of the
greatest pretensions both to high principle and to
philosophy. We not uncommonly hear the doctrine
of utility inveighed against as a^o^esi^Qctime^ If it
be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an
assumption, we may say that the question depends
upon what idea we have formed of the moral character
of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires,
above all things, tne Happiness of his creatures., and.
that this_ was hisr _A__
£ .j_
— _ ~.-*f—
creation, utility
• • \J i —
-- -•*-*»i--»

not only not fl godless ductrioe. bukmore profoundly

religious tnan any other. If it be meant that utili
tarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God
as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that an utili
tarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom-
of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has
thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must
fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree.
But others besides utilitarians have been of opinion
that the Christian revelation was intended, and is
fitted, to inform the hearts and minds of mankind
with a spirit which should enable them to find for
themselves what is right, and incline them to do it
when found, rather than to tell them, except in a very
general way, what it is : and that we need a doctrine
of ethics, carefully followed out, to interpret to us the
will of God. Whether this opinion is correct or not,
it is superfluous here to discuss ; since whatever aid
religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical
investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as
to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God
to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of
action, by as good a right as others can use it for the
indication of a transcendental law, having no con
nexion with usefulness or with happiness.
Again, Utility is often summarily stigmatized as an
immoral doctrine by giving it the name of Expediency,
and taking advantage of the popular use of that term
to contrast it with Principle. But the Expedient, in
the sense -in which it is opposed to the Right, gene
rally means that which is expedient for the particular
interest of the agent himself ; as when a minister
sacrifices the interest of his country to keep himself

in place. When it means anything better than this,

it means that which is expedient for some immediate
object, some temporary purpose, but which violates a
rule whose observance is expedient in a much higher
degree. The Expedient, in this sense, instead of being
the same thing with the useful, is a branch of the
hurtful. Thus, it would often be expedient, for the
purpose of getting over some momentary embarrass
ment, or attaining some object immediately useful to
ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as
the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on
the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and
the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most
hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instru
mental ; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional,
deviation from truth, does that much towards weaken
ing the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is
not only the principal support of all present social
well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more
than any one thing that can be named to keep back
civilisation, virtue, everything on which human hap
piness on the largest scale depends ; we feel that the
violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such
transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and that
he who, for the sake of a convenience to himself or
to some other individual, does what depends on him
to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them
the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which
they can place in each other's word, acts the part of one
of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred
as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged
by all moralists ; the chief of which is when the with
holding of some fact (as of information from a male-

factor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill)

' would preserve some one (especially a person other
than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when
the withholding can only be effected by denial. But
in order that the exception may not extend itself
beyond the need, and may have the least possible
effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to
be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined ; and
if the principle of utility is good for anything, it
must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities
against one another, and marking out the region
within which one or the other preponderates.
Again, defenders of utility often find themselves
called upon to reply to such objections as this—that
there is not time, previous to action, for calculating
and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on
the general happiness. This is exactly as if any one
were to say that it is impossible to guide our conduct
by Christianity, because there is not time, on every
occasion on which anything has to be done, to read
through the Old and New Testaments. The answer
I to the objection is, that there has been ample time,
' namely, the whole past duration of the human species.
During all that time mankind have been learning by
experience the tendencies of actions ; on which expe
rience all the prudence, as well as all the morality of
life, is dependent. People talk as if the commence
ment of this course of experience had hitherto been
put off, and as if, at the moment when some man feels
tempted to meddle with the property or life of another,
he had to begin considering for the first time whether
murder and theft are injurious to human happiness.
Even then I do not think that he would find the

question very puzzling ; but, at all events, the matter

is now done to his hand. It is truly a whimsical
supposition, that if mankind were agreed in consider
ing utility to be the test of morality, they would!-
remain without any agreement as to. what is useful,
and would take no measures for having their notions '
on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by
law and opinion. There is no difficulty in proving
any ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we sup
pose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it, but on
any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this
time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects
of some actions on their happiness ; and the beliefs
which have thus come down are the rules of morality
for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he
has succeeded in finding better. That philosophers
might easily do this, even now, on many subjects ;
that the received code of ethics is by no means of
divine right ; and that mankind have still much to
learn as to the effects of actions on the general happi
ness, I admit, or rather, earnestly maintain. The
corollaries from the principle of utility, like the pre
cepts of every practical art, admit of indefinite im
provement, and, in a progressive state of the human
mind, their improvement is perpetually going on.
But to consider the rules of morality as improvable,
is one thing ; to pass over the intermediate generali
zations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual
action directly by the first principle, is another. It
is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a
first principle is inconsistent with the admission of
secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the
place of his ultimate destination, is not to forbid the
D 2

use of land-marks and direction-posts on the way.

The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of
morality, does not mean that no road ought to be
laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither
should not be advised to take one direction rather
than another. Men really ought to leave off talking
a kind of nonsense on this subject, which they would
neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical
concernment. Nobody argues that the art of naviga
tion is not founded on astronomy, because sailors can
not wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being
rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calcu
lated ; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea
of life with their minds made up on the common
questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of
the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish.
And this, as long as foresight is a human quality, it is
to be presumed they will continue to do. Whatever
we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we
require subordinate principles to apply it by : the im
possibility of doing without them, being common to
all systems, can afford no argument against any one
in particular : but gravely to argue as if no such
secondary principles could be had, and as if mankind
had remained till now, and always must remain,
without drawing any general conclusions from the
experience of human life, is as high a pitch, I think,
as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical contro
The remainder of the stock arguments against
utilitarianism mostly consist in laying to its charge
the common infirmities of human nature, and the
general difficulties which embarrass conscientious

persons in shaping their course through life. We are

told that an utilitarian will be apt to make his own
particular case an exception to moral rules, and, when
under temptation, will see an utility in the breach
of a rule, greater than he will see in its observance, j
But is utility the only creed which is able to furnish
us with excuses for evil doing, and means of cheating
our own conscience ? They are afforded in abundance
by all doctrines which recognise as a fact in morals
the existence of- conflicting considerations ; which all
doctrines do, thatTiave been believed by sane persons.
It' is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated
nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot
be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that
hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down
as either always obligatory or always condemnable.
There is no ethical creed which does not temper the
rigidity of its laws, by giving a certain latitude, under
the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommoda
tion to peculiarities of circumstances ; and under every
creed, at the opening thus made, self-deception and
dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral
system under which there do not arise unequivocal
cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real
difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of
ethics- and in the conscientious guidance of personal
conduct. They are overcome practically with greater
or with less success according to the intellect and
virt ue of the individual ; but it can hardly be pre
tended that any one will be the less qualified for
dealing with them, from possessing an ultimate stan
dard to which conflicting rights and duties can be
a£erred. If utility is the ultimate source of moral

obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between

them when their demands are incompatible. Though
the application of the standard may be difficult, it is
better than none at all : while in other systems, the
moral laws all claiming independent authority, there
is no common umpire entitled to interfere between
them ; their claims to precedence one over another
rest on little better than sophistry, and unless deter
mined, as they generally are, by the unacknowledged
influence of considerations of utility, afford a free
scope for the action of personal desires and partiali
ties. We must remember that only in these cases of
conflict between secondary principles is it requisite
that first principles should be appealed to. There is
no case of moral obligation in which some secondary
principle is not involved ; and if only one, there can
seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the
mind of any person by whom the principle itself is



rE question is often asked, and properly so, in

regard to any supposed moral standard—What
is its sanction? what are the motives to obey it ? or
more specifically, what is the source of its obligation ?
whence does it derive its binding force ? It is a
necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the
answer to this question ; which, though frequently
assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian
morality, as if it had some special applicability to that
above others, really arises in regard to all standards.
It arises, in fact, whenever a person is called on to
adopt a standard or refer morality to any basis on
which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the
customary morality, that which education and opinion
have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself
to the •mind with the feeling of being in itself obli
gatory ; and when a person is asked to believe that
this morality derives its obligation from some general
principle round which custom has not thrown the
same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox ; the
supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force
than the original theorem ; the superstructure seems
to stand better without, than with, what is represented
as its foundation. He says to himself, I feel that I

am bound not 'to rob or murder, betray or deceive ;

but why am I bound to promote the general happi
ness ? If my own happiness lies in something else,
why may I not give that the preference ?
If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy
of the nature of the moral sense be correct, this dif
ficulty will always present itself, until the influences
which form moral character have taken the same hold
of the principle which they have taken of some of the
consequences—until, by the improvement of educa
tion, the feeling of unity with our fellow creatures
shall be (what it cannot be doubted that Christ in
tended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character, and
to our own consciousness as completely a part of our
nature, as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well-
brought-up young person. In the mean time, how
ever, the difficulty has no peculiar application to the
doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to
analyse morality and reduce it to principles ; which,
unless the principle is already in men's minds invested
with as much sacredness as any of its applications,
always seems to divest them of a part of their
The principle of utility either has, or there is no
reason why it might not have, all the sanctions which
belong to any other system of morals. Those sanc
tions are either external or internal. Of the external
sanctions it is not necessary to speak at any length.
They are, the hope of favour and the fear of displea
sure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of
the Universe, along with whatever we may have of
sympathy or affection for them or of love and awe
of Him, inclining us to do His will independently of_

selfish consequences. There is evidently no reason

why all these motives for observance should not
attach themselves to the utilitarian morality, as com
pletely and as powerfully as to any other. Indeed,
those of them which refer to our fellow creatures are
sure to do so, in proportion to the amount of general
intelligence ; for whether there be any other ground
of moral obligation than the general happiness or
not, men do desire happiness ; and however imperfect
may be their own practice, they desire and commend
all conduct in others towards themselves, by which
they think their happiness is promoted. With regard
to the religious motive, if men believe, as most profess
to do, in the goodness of God, those who think that
conduciveness to the general happiness is the essence,
or even only the criterion, of good, must necessarily
believe that it is also that which God approves.
The whole force therefore of external reward and
punishment, whether physical or moral, and whether
proceeding from God or from our fellow men, together
with all that the capacities of human nature admit,
of disinterested devotion to either, become available to
enforce the utilitarian morality, in proportion as that
morality is recognized ; and the more powerfully, the
more the appliances of education and general cultiva
tion are bent to the purpose.
.So far as to external sanctions. The internal sanc
tion of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be,
is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind ; a
pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of
duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises,
in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an
impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and

connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not

with some particular form of it, or with any of the
merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Con
science ; though in that complex phenomenon as it
actually exists, the simple fact is in general all en
crusted over with collateral associations, derived from
sympathy, from love, and still more from fear ; from
all the forms of religious feeling ; from the recollec
tions of childhood and of all our past life ; from self-
esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally
even self-abasement. This extreme complication is, I
apprehend, the origin of the sort of mystical character
which, by a tendency of the human mind of which
there are many other examples, is apt to be attributed
to the idea of moral obligation, and which leads people
to believe that the idea cannot possibly attach itself
to any other objects than those which, by a supposed
mysterious law, are found in our present experience to
excite it. Its binding force, however, consists in the
existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken
through in order to do what violates our standard of
right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that
standard, will probably have to be encountered after
wards in the form of remorse. Whatever theory we
have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what
essentially constitutes it.
The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality
(external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in
our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those
whose standard is utility, in the question, what is the
sanction of that particular standard ? We may answer,
the same as of all other moral standards—the con
scientious feelings of mankind. Undoubtedly this

sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not

possess the feelings it appeals to ; but neither will
these persons be more obedient to any other moral
principle than to the utilitarian one. On them
morality of any kind has no hold but through the
external sanctions. Meanwhile the feelings exist, a
fact in human nature, the reality of which, and the
great power with which they are capable of acting on
those in whom they have been duly cultivated, are
proved by experience. No reason has ever been
shown why they may not be cultivated to as great in
tensity in connection with the utilitarian, as with any
other rule of morals.
There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that
a person who sees in moral obligation a transcendental
fact, an objective reality belonging to the province of
" Things in themselves," is likely to be more obedient
to it than one who believes it to be entirely sub
jective, having its seat in human consciousness only.
But whatever a person's opinion may be on this point
of Ontology, the force he is really urged by is his own
subjective feeling, and is exactly measured by its
strength. No one's belief that Duty is an objective
reality is stronger than the belief that God is so . yet
the belief in God, apart from the expectation of actual
reward and punishment, only operates on conduct
through, and in proportion to, the subjective religious
feeling. The sanction, so far as it is disinterested, is
always in the mind itself; and the notion, 4herefore,
of the transcendental moralists must be, that this
sanction will not exist in the mind unless it is believed
to have its root out of the mind ; and that if a person
is able to say to himself, That which is restraining

me, and which- is called my conscience, is only a feeling

in my own mind, he may possibly draw the conclu
sion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases,
and that if he find the feeling inconvenient, he may
disregard it, and endeavour to get rid of it. But
is this danger confined to the utilitarian morality ?
Does the belief that moral obligation has its seat
outside the mind make the feeling of it too strong to
be got rid of ? The fact is so far otherwise, that all
moralists admit and lament the ease with which, in
the generality of minds, conscience can be silenced or
stifled. The question, Need I obey my conscience ?
is quite as often put to themselves by persons who
never heard of the principle of utility, as by its ad
herents. Those whose conscientious feelings are so
weak as to allow of their asking this question, if they
answer it affirmatively, will not do so because they
believe in the transcendental theory, but because of
the external sanctions.
It is not necessary, for the present purpose, to de
cide whether the feeling of duty is innate or implanted.
Assuming it to be innate, it is an open question to
what objects it naturally attaches itself; for the philo
sophic supporters of that theory are now agreed that
the intuitive perception is of principles of morality,
and not of the details. If there be anything innate
in tiie matter, I see no reason why the feeling which
is innate should not be that of regard to the pleasures
and pains. of others. If there is any principle of morals
which is intuitively obligatory, I should say it must
be that. It so, the intuitive ethics would coincide
with the utilitarian, and there would be no further
quarrel between them. Even as it is, the intuitive

moralists, though they believe that there are other

intuitive moral obligations, do already believe this to
be one ; for they unanimously hold that a large portion
of morality turns upon the consideration due to the
interests of our fellow creatures. Therefore, if the
belief in the transcendental origin of moral obligation
gives any additional efficacy to the internal sanction,
it appears to me that the utilitarian principle has
already the benefit of it.
On the other hand, if, as is my own belief, the
moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are
not for that reason the less natural. It is natural to
man to speak, to reason, to build cities, to cultivate
the ground, though these are acquired facult:es. The
moral feelings are not indeed a part of our nature, in
the sense of being in any perceptible degree present
in all of us ; but this, unhappily, is a fact admitted
by those who believe the most strenuously in their
transcendental origin. Like the other acquired capa
cities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a
part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it ;
capable, like them, in a certain small degree, of
springing up spontaneously ; and susceptible of being
brought by cultivation to a high degree of develop
ment. Unhappily it is also susceptible, by a sufficient
use of the external sanctions and of the force of early
impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direc
tion : so that there is hardly anything so absurd or
so mischievous that it may not, by means of these
influences, be made to act on the human mind with
all the authority of conscience. To doubt that the
same potency might be given by the same means to
the principle of utility, even if it had no foundation

in human nature, would be flying in the face of all

But moral associations which are wholly of artificial
creation, when intellectual cultiire goes on, yield by-
degrees to the dissolving force of analysis : and if the
feeling of duty, when associated with utility, would
appear equally arbitrary ; if there were no leading
department of our nature, no powerful class of senti
ments, with which that association would harmonize,
which would make us feel it congenial, and incline us
not only to foster it in others (for which we have
abundant interested motives), but also to cherish it
in ourselves ; if there were not, in short, a natural
basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality, it might
well happen that this association also, even after it
had been implanted by education, might be analysed
But there is this basis of powerful natural senti
ment ; and this it is which, when once the general
happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, will
constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality.
This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of
mankind ; the desire to be in unity with our fellow
creatures, which is already a powerful principle in
human nature, and happily one of those which tend
to become stronger, even without express inculcation,
from the influences of advancing civilization. The
social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so
habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circum
stances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he
never conceives himself otherwise than as a member
of a body ; and this association is riveted more and
more, as mankind are further removed from the state

of savage independence. Any condition, therefore,

which is essential to a state of society, becomes more
and more an inseparable part of every person's con
ception of the state of things which he is born into,
and which is the destiny of a human being. Now,
society between human beings, except in the relation
of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any
other footing than that the interests of all are to be
consulted. Society between equals can only exist on
the understanding that the interests of all are to be
regarded equally. And since in all states of civiliza
tion, every person, except an absolute monarch, has
equals, every one is obliged to live on these terms
with somebody ; and in every age some advance is
made towards a state in which it will be impossible to
" live permanently on other terms with anybody. In
this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible
to them a state of total disregard of other people's
interests. They are under a necessity of conceiving
themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser
injuries, and (if only for their own protection) living
in a state of constant protest against them. They are
also familiar with the fact of co-operating with others,
and proposing to themselves a collective, not an indi
vidual, interest, as the aim (at least for the time being)
of their actions. So long as they are co-operating,
their ends are identified with those of others ; there
is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of
others are their own interests. Not only does all
strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of
society, give to each individual a stronger personal
interest in practically consulting the welfare of others ;
it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more

with their good, or at least with an ever greater

degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as
though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a
being who of course pays regard to others. The good
of others becomes to him a thing naturally and neces
sarily to be attended to, like any of the physical con
ditions of our existence. Now, whatever amount of
this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest
motives both of interest and of sympathy to demon
strate it, and to the utmost of his power, encourage it
in others ; and even if he has none of it himself, he is
as greatly interested as any one else that others should
have it. Consequently, the smallest germs of the
feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the contagion
of sympathy and the influences of education ; and a
complete web of corroborative association is woven
round it, by the powerful agency of the external
sanctions. This mode of conceiving ourselves and
human life, as civilization goes on, is felt to be more
and more natural. Every step in political improve
ment renders it more so, by removing the sources of
opposition of interest, and levelling those inequalities
of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing
to which there are large portions of mankind whose
happiness it is still practicable to disregard. In an
improving state of the human mind, the influences are
constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in
each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest ;
which feeling, if perfect, would make him never think
of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in
the benefits of which they are not included. If we now
suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion,
and the whole force of education, of institutions, and

of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of

religion, to make every person grow up from infancy
surrounded on all sides both by the profession and by
the practice of it, I think that no one, who can realize
this conception, will feel any misgiving about the
sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness
morality. To any ethical student who finds the
realization difficult, I recommend, as a means of faci
litating it, the second of M. Comte's two principal
works, the Systeme de Politique Positive. I entertain
the strongest objections to the system of politics and
morals set forth in that treatise ; but I think it has
superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to
the service of humanity, even without the aid of
belief in a Providence, both the physical power and
the social efficacy of a religion ; making it take hold
of human life, and colour all thought, feeling, and
action, in a manner of which the greatest ascendency
ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and
foretaste ; and of which the danger is, not that it
should be insufficient, but that it should be so exces
sive as to interfere unduly with human freedom and
Neither is it necessary to the feeling which consti
tutes the binding force of the utilitarian morality on
those who recognize it, to wait for those social influ
ences which would make its obligation felt by mankind
at large. In the comparatively early state of human
advancement in which we now live, a person cannot
indeed feel that entireness of sympathy with all
others, which would make any real discordance in the
general direction of their conduct in life impossible ;

but already a person in whom the social feeling is at

all developed, cannot bring himself to think of the rest
of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him
for the means of happiness, whom he must desire to
see defeated in their object in order that he may
succeed in his. The deeply-rooted conception which
every individual even now has of himself as a social
being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural
wants that there should be harmony between his
feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.
If differences of opinion and of mental culture make
it impossible for him to share many of then* actual
feelings—perhaps make him denounce and defy those
feelings—he still needs to be conscious that his real
aim and theirs do not conflict ; that he is not opposing
himself to what they really wish for, namely, their own
good, but is, on the contrary, promoting it. This
feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength
to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting alto
gether. But to those who have it, it possesses all the
characters of a natural feeling. It does not present
itself to their minds as a superstition of education, or
a law despotically imposed by the power of society,
but as an attribute which it would not be well for
them to be without. This conviction is the ultimate
sanction of the greatest-happiness morality. This it
is which makes any mind, of well-developed feelings,
work with, and not against, the outward motives to
care for others, afforded by what I have called the
external sanctions ; and when those sanctions are
wanting, or act in an opposite direction, constitutes
in itself a powerful internal binding force, in propor

tion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the

character ; since few but those whose mind is a moral
blank, could bear to lay out their course of life on the
plan of paying no regard to others except so far as
their own private interest compels.

E 2


IT has already been remarked, that questions of

ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary
acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by
reasoning is common to all first principles); to the
first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of
our conduct. But the former, being matters of fact,
may be the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties
which judge of fact—namely, our senses, and our
internal consciousness. Can an appeal be made to
the same faculties on questions of practical ends ? Or
by what other faculty is cognizance taken of them?
Questions about ends are, in other words, questions
what things are desirable. The utilitarian doctrine
is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing
desirable, as an end ; all other things being only
desirable as means to that end. What ought to be
required of this doctrine—what conditions is it
requisite that the doctrine should fulfil—to make
good its claim to be believed?
The only proof capable of being given that an object
is visible, is that people actually see it. The only
proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it :
and so of the other sources of our experience. In like
manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible

to produce that anything is desirable, is that people

do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian
doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in
practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could
ever convince any person that it was so. ' No reason
can be eiven why the general happiness is desirable,
exceDt that each person, so far as he believes it to be
attainable- desires his own "Eapmness. JTEis, however,-
being a fact, we have not only all the proof which
the case admits of, but all which it is possible to
require, that happiness is a good : that each person's
happiness is a good to that person, and the general
happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all
persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of
the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the
criteria of.morality.
But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be
the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the
same rule, necessary to show, not only that people
desire happiness, but that they never desire anything
else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things
which, in common language, are decidedly distin
guished from happiness. They desire, for example,
virtue, and the absence of vice, no less really than
pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of
virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact,
as the desire of happiness. And hence the opponents
of the utilitarian standard deem that they have a
right to infer that there are other ends of human
action besides happiness, and that happiness is not
the standard of approbation and disapprobation.
But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people
desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to

be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not only

that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired
disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the
opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original con
ditions by which virtue is made virtue ; however they
may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions
are only virtuous because they promote another end
than virtue ; yet this being granted, and it having
been decided, from considerations of this description,
what is virtuous, they not only place virtue at the very
head of the things which are good as means to the
ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychologi
cal fact the possibility of its being, to the individual,
a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond
it; and hold, that the mind is not in a right state, not
in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most
conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love
virtue in this manner—as a thing desirable in itself,
even although, in the individual instance, it should
not produce those other desirable consequences which
it tends to produce, and on account of which it is held
to be virtue. This opinion is not, in the smallest
degree, a departure from the Happiness principle.
The ingredients of happiness are very various, and
each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely
when considered as swelling an aggregate. The prin
ciple of utility does not mean that any given pleasure,
as music, for instance, or any given exemption from
pain, as for example health, are to be looked upon as
means to a collective something termed happiness, and
to be desired on that account. They are desired and
desirable in and for themselves ; besides being means,
they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to the

utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally

part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so ; and
in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so,
and is desired and cherished, not as a means to
happiness, but as a part of their happiness.
To illustrate this farther, we may remember that
virtue is not the only thing, originally a means, and
which if it were not a means to anything else, would
be and remain indifferent, but which by association
with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for
itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. What,
for example, shall we say ofthe love of money ? There
is nothing originally more desirable about money than
about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is
solely that of the things which it will buy ; the
desires for other things than itself, which it is a means
of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one
of the strongest moving forces of human life, but
money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself ; the
desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire
to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires
which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it,
are falling off. It may be then said truly, that
money is desired not for the sake of an end, but as
part of the end. From being a means to happiness, it
has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the in
dividual's conception of happiness. The same may be
said of the majority of the great objects of human life
—power, for example, or fame ; except that to each of
these there is a certain amount of immediate pleasure
annexed, which has at least the semblance of being
naturally inherent in them ; a thing which cannot be
said of money. Still, however, the strongest natural

attraction, both of power and of fame, is the immense

aid they give to the attainment of our other wishes ;
and it is the strong association thus generated between
them and all our objects of desire, which gives to the
direct desire of them the intensity it often assumes,
so as in some characters to surpass in strength all
other desires. In these cases the means have become
a part of the end, and a more important part of it
than any of the things which they are means to.
What was once desired as an instrument for the
attainment of happiness, has come to be desired for_
its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is^'
however^ desired as part of happiness. The person is
made, or thin¥s he would be made, happy by itsmere
possession ; and is made unhjujpjfjjy^failurj^to obtain
it._ The desire of it is not a different thing from the
desire of happiness, any more than the love of music,
or the desire of health. They are included in happi
ness. They are some of the elements of which the
desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an
abstract idea, but a concrete whole ; and these are
some of its parts. And the utilitarian standard sanc
tions and approves their being so. Life would be a
poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happi
ness, if there were not this provision of nature, by
which things originally indifferent, but conducive to,
or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our
primitive desires, become in themselves sources of
pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures,
both in permanency, in the space of human existence
that they are capable of covering, and even in intensity.
Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a
good of this description. There was no original desire

of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure,)

and especially to protection from pain. But through
the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in
itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as
any other good ; and with this difference between it
and the love of money, of power, or of fame, that all
of these may, and often do, render the individual
noxious to the other members of the society to which
he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him
so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the
disinterested love of virtue. And consequently, the
utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves
those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond
which they would be more injurious to the general
happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires
the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest
strength possible, as being above all things important
to the general happiness.
It results from the preceding considerations, that
there is in reality nothing desired except happiness.
Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to
some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness,
is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not
desired for itself until it has become so. Those who
desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because
the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the
consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for
both reasons united ; as in truth the pleasure and pain
seldom exist separately, but almost always together,
the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of
virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more.
If one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other
no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would

desire it only for the other benefits which it might

produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for.
We have now, then, an answer to the question, of
what sort of proof the principle of utility is suscep
tible. If the opinion which I have now stated is
psychologically true—if human nature is so consti
tuted as to desire nothing which is not either a part
of happiness or a means of happiness, we can nave no
pwer proof, and we require no other, that these'' are__
the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole
end of human action, and the promotion of it the test
by which to judge of all human conduct ; from whence
it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of
morality, since a part is included in the whole.
And now to decide whether this is really so ;
whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but that
which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence
is a pain ; we have evidently arrived at a question of
fact and experience, dependent, like all similar ques
tions, upon evidence. It can only be determined by
practised self-consciousness and self-observation, as
sisted by observation of others. I believe that these
sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare
that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion
to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena
entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same
phenomenon ; in strictness of language, two different
modes of naming the same psychological fact : that
(to think of an obiect as desirable Sunless for the sake
ot its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are
one and the same thing ; and that to desire anything,
except in proportion as the idea ot it is plea-«aat. is jj_
physical and metaphysical impossibility.

So obvious does this appear to me, that I expect it

will hardly be disputed : and the objection made will
be, not that desire can possibly be directed to any
thing ultimately except pleasure and exemption from
pain, but that the will is a different thing from desire ;
that a person of confirmed virtue, or any other person
whose purposes are fixed, carries out his purposes
without any thought of the pleasure he has in con
templating them, or expects to derive from their ful
filment ; and persists in acting on them, even though
these pleasures are much diminished, by changes in
his character or decay of his passive sensibilities, or
are outweighed by the pains which the pursuit of the
purposes may bring upon him. All this I fully admit,
and have stated it elsewhere, as positively and em
phatically as any one. Will, the active phenomenon, is
a different thing from desire, the state of passive sensi
bility, and though originally an offshoot from it, may
in time take root and detach itself from the parent
stock ; so much so, that in the case of an habitual pur
pose, instead of willing the thing because we desire it,
we often desire it only because we will it. This, how
ever, is but an instance of that familiar fact, the power
of habit, and is nowise confined to the case of virtuous
actions. Many indifferent things, which men ori
ginally did from a motive of some sort, they continue
to do from habit. Sometimes this is done uncon
sciously, the consciousness coming only after the
action : at other times with conscious volition, but
volition which has become habitual, and is put into
operation by the force of habit, in opposition perhaps
to the deliberate preference, as often happens with
those who have contracted habits of vicious or hurtful

indulgence. Third and last comes the case in which

the habitual act of will in the individual instance
is not in contradiction to the general intention pre
vailing at other times, but in fulfilment of it ; as in
the case of the person of confirmed virtue, and of all
who pursue deliberately and consistently any deter
minate end. The distinction between will and desire
thus understood, is an authentic and highly important
psychological fact ; but the fact consists solely in this
—that will, like all other parts of our constitution, is
amenable to habit, and that we may will from habit
what we no longer desire for itself, or desire only
because we will it. It is not the less true that will,
in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire ; in
cluding in that term the repelling influence of pain as
well as the attractive one of pleasure. Let us take
into consideration, no longer the person who has a
confirmed will to do right, but him in whom that
virtuous will is still feeble, conquerable by temptation,
and not to be fully relied on ; by what means can it
be strengthened ? How can the will to be virtuous,
where it does not exist in sufficient force, be implanted
or awakened ? Only by making the person desire virtue
—by making him think of it in a pleasurable light, or
of its absence in a painful one. It is by associating
the doing right with pleasure, or the doing wrong with
pain, or by eliciting and impressing and bringing
home to the person's experience the pleasure naturally
involved in the one or the pain in the other, that it is
possible to call forth that will to be virtuous, which,
when confirmed, acts without any thought of either
pleasure or pain. Will is the child of desire, and passes
out of the dominion of its parent only to come under

that of habit. That which is the result of habit affords

no presumption of being intrinsically good ; and
there would be no reason for wishing that the pur
pose of virtue should become independent of pleasure
and pain, were it not that the influence of the plea
surable and painful associations which prompt to
virtue is not sufficiently to be depended on for unerring
constancy of action until it has acquired the support
of habit. Both in feeling and in conduct, habit is the
only thing which imparts certainty ; and it is because
of the importance to others of being able to rely ab
solutely on one's feelings and conduct, and to oneself
of being able to rely on one's own, that the will to do
right ought to be cultivated into this habitual inde
pendence. In other words, this state of the will is a
means to good, not intrinsically a good ; and does
not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to
human beings but in so far as it is either itself plea
surable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting
But if this doctrine be true, the principle of utility
is proved. Whether it is so or not, must now be left
to the consideration of the thoughtful reader.


IN all ages of speculation, one of the strongest

obstacles to the reception of the doctrine that
Utility or Happiness is the criterion of right and
wrong, has been drawn from the idea of Justice. The
powerful sentiment, and apparently clear perception,
which that word recalls with a rapidity and certainty
resembling an instinct, have seemed to the majority
of thinkers to point to an inherent quality in things;
to show that the Just must have an existence in
Nature as something absolute—generically distinct
from every variety of the Expedient, and, in idea,
opposed to it, though (as is commonly acknowledged)
never, in the long run, disjoined from it in fact.
In the case of this, as of our other moral senti
ments, there is no necessary connexion between the
question of its origin, and that of its binding force.
That a feeling is bestowed on us by Nature, does not
necessarily legitimate all its promptings. The feeling
of justice might be a peculiar instinct, and might yet
require, like our other instincts, to be controlled and
enlightened by a higher reason. If we have intel
lectual instincts, leading us to judge in a particular
way, as well as animal instincts that prompt us to act
in a particular way, there is no necessity that the
former should be more infallible in their sphere than

the latter in theirs : it may as well happen that wrong

judgments are occasionally suggested by those, as
wrong actions by these. But though it is one thing
to believe that we have natural feelings of justice, and
another to acknowledge them as an ultimate criterion
of conduct, these two opinions are very closely con
nected in point of fact. Mankind are always pre
disposed to believe that any subjective feeling, not
otherwise accounted for, is a revelation of some ob
jective reality. Our present object is to determine
whether the reality, to which the feeling of justice
corresponds, is one which needs any such special reve
lation ; whether the justice or injustice of an action
is a thing intrinsically peculiar, and distinct from all
its other qualities, or only a combination of certain of
those qualities, presented under a peculiar aspect. For
the purpose of this inquiry, it is practically important
to consider whether the feeling itself, of justice and
injustice, is sui generis like our sensations of colour
and taste, or a derivative feeling, formed by a com
bination of others. And this it is the more essential
to examine, as people are in general willing enough
to allow, that objectively the dictates of justice coin
cide with a part of the field of General Expediency ;
but inasmuch as the subjective mental feeling of
Justice is different from that which commonly attaches
to simple expediency, and, except in extreme cases
of the latter, is far more imperative in its demands,
people find it difficult to see, in Justice, only a par
ticular kind or branch of general utility, and think
that its superior binding force requires a totally dif
ferent origin.
To throw light upon this question, it is necessary

to attempt to ascertain what is the distinguishing

character of justice, or of injustice : what is the
quality, or whether there is any quality, attributed in
common to all modes of conduct designated as unjust
(for justice, like many other moral attributes, is best
defined by its opposite), and distinguishing them from
such modes of conduct as are disapproved, but with
out having that particular epithet of disapprobation
applied to them. If, in everything which men are ac
customed to characterize as just or unjust, some one
common attribute or collection of attributes is always
present, we may judge whether this particular attri
bute or combination of attributes would be capable of
gathering round it a sentiment of that peculiar charac
ter and intensity by virtue of the general laws of our
emotional constitution, or whether the sentiment is
inexplicable, and requires to be regarded as a special
provision of Nature. If we find the former to be the
case, we shall, in resolving this question, have resolved
also the main problem : if the latter, we shall have to
seek for some other mode of investigating it.

To find the common attributes of a variety of

objects, it is necessary to begin by surveying the
objects themselves in the concrete. Let us therefore
advert successively to the various modes of action,
and arrangements of human affairs, which are classed,
by universal or widely spread opinion, as Just or as
Unjust. The things well known to excite the senti
ments associated with those names, are of a very
multifarious character. I shall pass them rapidly in
review, without studying any particular arrangement.
In the first place, it is mostly considered unjust to

deprive any one of his personal liberty, his property,

or any other thing which belongs to him by law.
Here, therefore, is one instance of the application of
the terms just and unjust in a perfectly definite sense,
namely, that it is just to respect, unjust to violate,
the legal rights of any one. But this judgment admits
of several exceptions, arising from the other forms in
which the notions of justice and injustice present
themselves. For example, the person who suffers
the deprivation may (as the phrase is) have forfeited
the rights which he is so deprived of : a case to which
we shall return presently. But also,
Secondly ; the legal rights of which he is deprived,
may be rights which ought not to have belonged to
him ; in other words, the law which confers on him
these rights, may be a bad law. When it is so, or
when (which is the same thing for our purpose) it is
supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to the justice
or injustice of infringing it. Some maintain that no
law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an indi
vidual citizen ; that his opposition to it, if shown at
all, should only be shown in endeavouring to get it
altered by competent authority. This opinion (which
condemns many of the most illustrious benefactors of
mankind, and would often protect pernicious institu
tions against the only weapons which, in the state of
things existing at the time, have any chance of suc
ceeding against them) is defended, by those who hold
it, on grounds of expediency ; principally on that of
the importance, to the common interest of mankind,
of maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission
to law. Other persons, again, hold the directly con
trary opinion, that any law, judged to be bad, may

blamelessly be disobeyed, even though- it be not

judged to be unjust, but only inexpedient ; while
others would confine the licence of disobedience to
the case of unjust laws : but again, some say, that all
laws which are inexpedient are unjust ; since every
law imposes some restriction on the natural liberty
of mankind, which restriction is an injustice, unless
legitimated by tending to their good. Among these
diversities of opinion, it seems to be universally ad
mitted that there may be unjust laws, and that law,
consequently, is not the ultimate criterion of justice,
but may give to one person a benefit, or impose on
another an evil, which justice condemns. When,
however, a law is thought to be unjust, it seems
always to be regarded as being so in the same way
in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infring
ing somebody's right ; which, as it cannot in this case
be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and
is called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that
a second case of injustice consists in taking or with
holding from any person that to which he has a moral
Thirdly, it is universally considered just that each
person should obtain that (whether good or evil)
which he deserves ; and unjust that he should obtain
a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which he does
not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most
emphatic form in which the idea of justice is con
ceived by the general mind. As it involves the
notion of desert, the question arises, what constitutes
desert? Speaking in a general way, a person is un
derstood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he
does wrong ; and in a more particular sense, to de

serve good from those to whom he does or has done

good, and evil from those to whom he does or has
done evil. The precept of returning good for evil
has never been regarded as a case of the fulfilment of
justice, but as one in which the claims of justice are
waived, in obedience to other considerations.
Fourthly, it is confessedly unjust to break faith
with any one : to violate an engagement, either ex
press or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by
our own conduct, at least if we have raised those
expectations knowingly and voluntarily. Like the
other obligations of justice already spoken of, this one
is not regarded as absolute, but as capable of being
overruled by a stronger obligation of justice on the
other side ; or by such conduct on the part of the
person concerned as is deemed to absolve us from our
obligation to him, and to constitute a forfeiture of the
benefit which he has been led to expect.
Fifthly, it is, by universal admission, inconsistent
with justice to be partial ; to show favour or pre
ference to one person over another, in matters to
which favour and preference do not properly apply.
Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded
as a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some
other duty ; for it is admitted that favour and pre
ference are not always censurable, and indeed the
cases in which they are condemned are rather the ex
ception than the rule. A person would be more likely
to be blamed than applauded for giving his family or
friends no superiority in good offices over strangers,
when he could do so without violating any other
duty ; and no one thinks it unjust to seek one person
in preference to another as a friend, connexion, or

companion. Impartiality where rights are concerned

is of course obligatory, but this is involved in the
more general obligation of giving to every one his
right. A tribunal, for example, must be impartial,
because it is bound to award, without regard to any
other consideration, a disputed object to the one of
two parties who has the right to it. There are other
cases in which impartiality means, being solely in
fluenced by desert ; as with those who, in the capacity
of judges, preceptors, or parents, administer reward
and punishment as such. There are cases, again, in
which it means, being solely influenced by considera
tion for the public interest ; as in making a selection
among candidates for a Government employment.
Impartiality, in short, as an obligation of justice, may
be said to mean, being exclusively influenced by the
considerations which it is supposed ought to influence
the particular case in hand ; and resisting the solici
tation of any motives which prompt to conduct dif
ferent from what those considerations would dictate.
Nearly allied to the idea of impartiality, is that of
equality ; which often enters as a component part both
into the conception of justice and into the practice of
it, and, in the eyes of many persons, constitutes its
essence. But in this, still more than in any other
case, the notion of justice varies in different persons,
and always conforms in its variations to their notion
of utility. Each person maintains that equality is
the dictate of justice, except where he thinks that
expediency requires inequality. The j ustice of giving
equal protection to the rights of all, is maintained by
those who support the most outrageous inequality in
the rights themselves. Even in slave countries it is

theoretically admitted that the rights of the slave,

such as they are, ought to be as sacred as those of
the master ; and that a tribunal which fails to enforce
them with equal strictness is wanting in justice ;
while, at the same time, institutions which leave to
the slave scarcely any rights to enforce, are not
deemed unjust, because they are not deemed inexpe
dient. Those who think that utility requires distinc
tions of rank, do not consider it unjust that riches
and social privileges should be unequally dispensed ;
but those who think this inequality inexpedient,
think it unjust also. Whoever thinks that govern
ment is necessary, sees no injustice in as much in
equality as is constituted by giving to the magistrate
powers not granted to other people. Even among
those who hold levelling doctrines, there are as many
questions of justice as there are differences of opinion
about expediency. Some Communists consider it un
just that the produce of the labour of the community
should be shared on any other principle than that of
exact equality ; others think it just that those should
receive most whose needs are greatest ; while others
hold that those who work harder, or who produce
more, or whose services are more valuable to the com
munity, may justly claim a larger quota in the divi
sion of the produce. And the sense of natural justice
may be plausibly appealed to in behalf of every one
of these opinions.
Among so many diverse applications of the term
Justice, which yet is not regarded as ambiguous, it is
a matter of some difficulty to seize the mental link
which holds them together, and on which the moral
sentiment adhering to the term essentially

Perhaps, in this embarrassment, some help may be

derived from the history of the word, as indicated by
its etymology.
In most, if not in all languages, the etymology of
the word which corresponds to Just, points to an origin
connected either with positive law, or with that which
was in most cases the primitive form of law—autho
ritative custom. Justum is a form of jussum, that
which has been ordered. Jus is of the same origin.
AtxoLiov comes from S/XTJ, of which the principal meaning,
at least in the historical ages of Greece, was a suit at
law. Originally, indeed, it meant only the mode or
manner of doing things, but it early came to mean the
prescribed manner ; that which the recognized autho
rities, patriarchal, judicial, or political, would en
force. Recht, from which came right and righteous, is
synonymous with law. The original meaning, indeed,
of recht did not point to law, but to physical straight-
ness ; as wrong and its Latin equivalents meant twisted
or tortuous ; and from this it is argued that right did not
originally mean law, but on the contrary law meant
right. But however this may be, the fact that recht
and droit became restricted in their meaning to posi-
' tive law, although much which is not required by law is
equally necessary to moral straightness or rectitude, is
as significant of the original character of moral ideas as
if the derivation had been the reverse way. The courts
of justice, the administration of justice, are the courts
and the administration of law. La justice, in French,
is the established term for judicature. There can, I
think, be no doubt that the idee mere, the primitive
element, in the formation of the notion of justice, was
conformity to law. It constituted the entire idea

among the Hebrews, up to the birth of Christianity ;

as might be expected in the case of a people whose laws
attempted to embrace all subjects on which precepts
were required, and who believed those laws to be a
direct emanation from the Supreme Being. But other
nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans,
who knew that their laws had been made originally,
and still continued to be made, by men, were not
afraid to admit that those men might make bad laws ;
might do, by law, the same things, and from the same
motives, which, ^if done by individuals without the
sanction of law, would be called unjust. And hence
the sentiment of injustice came to be attached, not to
all violations of law, but only to violations of such
laws as ought to exist, including such as ought to exist
but do not ; and to laws themselves, if supposed to be
contrary to what ought to be law. In this manner the
idea of law and of its injunctions was still predominant
in the notion of justice, even when the laws actually
in force ceased to be accepted as the standard of it.
It is true that mankind consider the idea ofjustice
and its obligations as applicable to many things which
neither are, nor is it desired that they should be,
regulated by law. Nobody desires that laws should
interfere with the whole detail of private life ; yet
every one allows that in all daily conduct a person
may and does show himself to be either just or unjust.
But even here, the idea of the breach of what ought
to be law, still lingers in a modified shape. It would
always give us pleasure, and chime in with our feel
ings of fitness, that acts which we deem unjust should
be punished, though we do not always think it expe
dient that this should be done by the tribunals. We

forego that gratification on account of incidental in

conveniences. We should be glad to see just conduct
enforced and injustice repressed, even in the minutest
details, if we were not, with reason, afraid of trusting
the magistrate with so unlimited an amount of power
over individuals. When we think that a person is
bound in justice to do a thing, it is an ordinary form
of language to say, that he ought to be compelled to
do it. We should be gratified to see the obligation
enforced by anybody who had the power. If we see
that its enforcement by law would be inexpedient, we
lament the impossibility, we consider the impunity
given to injustice as an evil, and strive to make amends
for it by bringing a strong expression of our own and
the public disapprobation to bear upon the offender.
Thus the idea of legal constraint is still the generating
idea ofthe notion ofjustice, though undergoing several
transformations before that notion, as it exists in an
advanced state of society, becomes complete.
The above is, I think, a true account, as far as it
goes, of the origin and progressive growth of the idea
of justice. But we must observe, that it contains, as
yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral
obligation in general. For the truth is, that the idea
of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters
not only into the conception of injustice, but into that
of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything
wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought
to be punished in some way or other for doing it ; if
not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures ; if
not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own con
science. This seems the real turning point of the dis
tinction between morality and simple expediency. It

is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its

forms, that a person may rightfully be compelled to
fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from
a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that
it might be exacted from him, we do not call it his
duty. Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other
people, may militate against actually exacting it; but
the person himself, it is clearly understood, would
not be entitled to complain. There are other things,
on the contrary, which we wish that people should do,
which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dis
like or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that
they are not bound to do ; it is not a case of moral
obligation ; we do not blame them, that is, we do not
think that they are proper objects of punishment.
How we come by these ideas of deserving and not
deserving punishment, will appear, perhaps, in the
sequel ; but I think there is no doubt that this dis
tinction lies at the bottom of the notions of right
and wrong ; that we call any conduct wrong, or
employ instead, some other term of dislike or dispa
ragement, according as we think that the person ought,
or ought not, to be punished for it ; and we say that
it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it
would be desirable or laudable, according as we would
wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled
or only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that
This, therefore, being the characteristic difference
* See this point enforced and illustrated by Professor Bain, in
an admirable chapter (entitled " The Ethical Emotions, or the
Moral Sense ") of the second of the two treatises composing his
elaborate and profound work on the Mind.

which marks off, not justice, but morality in general,

from the remaining provinces of Expediency and
Worthiness ; the character is still to be sought which
distinguishes justice from other branches of morality.
Now it is known that ethical writers divide moral
duties into two classes, denoted by the ill-chosen ex
pressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect obliga
tion ; the latter being those in which, though the act
is obligatory, the particular occasions of performing
it are left to our choice ; as in the case of charity or
beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practise,
but not towards any definite person, nor at any pre
scribed time. In the more precise language of philo
sophic jurists, duties of perfect obligation are those
duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in
some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation
are those moral obligations which do not give birth to
any right. I think it will be found that this distinc
tion exactly coincides with that which exists between
justice and the other obligations of morality. In our
survey of the various popular acceptations of justice,
the term appeared generally to involve the idea of a
personal right—a claim on the part of one or more
individuals, like that which the law gives when it
confers a proprietary or other legal right. Whether
the injustice consists in depriving a person of a pos
session, or in breaking faith with him, or in treating
him worse than he deserves, or worse than other people
who have no greater claims, in each case the supposi
tion implies two things—a wrong done, and some
assignable person who is wronged. Injustice may
also be done by treating a person better than others ;
but the wrong in this case is to his competitors, who

are also assignable persons. It seems to me that this

feature in the case—a right in some person, correlative
to the moral obligation—constitutes the specific dif
ference between justice, and generosity or beneficence^
Justice implies something which it is not only right
to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual
person can claim from us as his moral right. No one
has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, be
cause we are not morally bound to practise those virtues
towards any given individual. And it will be found,
with respect to this as with respect to every correct
definition, that the instances which seem to conflict
with it are those which most confirm it. For if a
moralist attempts, as some have done, to make out that
mankind generally, though not any given individual,
have a right to all the good we can do them, he at
once, by that thesis, includes generosity and beneficence
within the category of justice. He is obliged to say,
that our utmost exertions are due to our fellow crea
tures, thus assimilating them to a debt; or that nothing
less can be a sufficient return for what society does for
us, thus classing the case as one of gratitude ; both of
which are acknowledged cases of justice. Wherever
there is a right, the case is one of justice, and not of
the virtue of beneficence : and whoever does not place
the distinction between justice and morality in general
where we have now placed it, will be found to make
no distinction between them at all, but to merge all
morality injustice.
Having thus endeavoured to determine the distinc
tive elements which enter into the composition of the
idea of justice, we are ready to enter on the inquiry,
whether the feeling, which accompanies the idea, is

attached to it by a special dispensation of nature, or

whether it could have grown up, by any known laws,
out of the idea itself ; and in particular, whether it
can have originated in considerations of general expe
I conceive that the sentiment itself does not arise
from anything which would commonly, or correctly,
be termed an idea of expediency ; but that, though
the sentiment does not, whatever is moral in it does.
We have seen that the two essential ingredients in
the sentiment of justice are, the desire to punish a
person who has done harm, and the knowledge or
belief that there is some definite individual or indi
viduals to whom harm has been done.
Now it appears to me, that the desire to punish a
person who has done harm to some individual, is a
spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in
the highest degree natural, and which either are or
resemble instincts ; the impulse of self-defence, and
the feeling of sympathy.
It is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any
harm done or attempted against ourselves, or against
those with whom we sympathize. The origin of this
sentiment it is not necessary here to discuss. Whether
it be an instinct or a result of intelligence, it is, we
know, common to all animal nature ; for every animal
tries to hurt those who have hurt, or who it thinks are
about to hurt, itself or its young. Human beings, on
this point, only differ from other animals in two par
ticulars. First, in being capable of sympathizing, not
solely with their offspring, or, like some of the more
noble animals, with some superior animal who is kind
to them, but with all human, and even with all

sentient beings. Secondly, in having a more de

veloped intelligence, which gives a wider range to
the whole of their sentiments, whether self-regarding
or sympathetic. By virtue ofhis superior intelligence,
even apart from his superior range of sympathy, a
human being is capable of apprehending a community
of interest between himself and the human society of
which he forms a part, such that any conduct which
threatens the security of the society generally, is
threatening to his own, and calls forth his instinct (if
instinct it be) of self-defence. The same superiority
of intelligence, joined to the power of sympathizing
with human beings generally, enables him to attach
himself to the collective idea of his tribe, his country,
or mankind, in such a manner that any act hurtful to
them rouses his instinct of sympathy, and urges him
to resistance.
The sentiment of justice, in that one of its elements
which consists of the desire to punish, is thus, I con
ceive, the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance,
rendered by intellect and sympathy applicable to those
injuries, that is, to those hurts, which wound us
through, or in common with, society at large. This
sentiment, in itself, has nothing moral in it ; what is
moral is, the exclusive subordination of it to the
social sympathies, so as to wait on and obey their
call. For the natural feeling tends to make us resent
indiscriminately whatever any one does that is dis
agreeable to us ; but when moralized by the social
feeling, it only acts in the directions conformable to
the general good ; just persons resenting a hurt to
society, though not otherwise a hurt to themselves,
and not resenting a hurt to themselves, however

painful, unless it be of the kind which society has a

common interest with them in the repression of.
It is no objection against this doctrine to say, that
when we feel our sentiment of justice outraged, we
are not thinking of society at large, or of any collec
tive interest, but only of the individual case. It is
common enough certainly, though the reverse of com
mendable, to feel resentment merely because we have
suffered pain ; but a person whose resentment is really
a moral feeling, that is, who considers whether an act
is blameable before he allows himself to resent it—
such a person, though he may not say expressly to
himself that he is standing up for the interest of
society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule
which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own.
If he is not feeling this—if he is regarding the act
solely as it affects him individually—he is not con
sciously just ; he is not concerning himself about the
justice of his actions. This is admitted even by anti-
utilitarian moralists. When Kant (as before remarked)
propounds as the fundamental principle of morals,
' So act, that thy rule of conduct might be adopted
as a law by all rational beings,' he virtually ac
knowledges that the interest of mankind collectively,
or at least of mankind indiscriminately, must be in
the mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding
on the morality of the act. Otherwise he uses words
without a meaning : for, that a rule even of utter
selfishness could not possibly be adopted by all
rational beings—that there is any insuperable ob
stacle in the nature of things to its adoption—>can-
not be even plausibly maintained. To give any
meaning to Kant's principle, the sense put upon it

must be, that we ought to shape our conduct by

a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit
to their collective interest.
To recapitulate : the idea of justice supposes two
things ; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which
sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed com
mon to all mankind, and intended for their good.
The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment
may be suffered by those who infringe the rule. There
is involved, in addition, the conception of some defi
nite person who suffers by the infringement ; whose
rights (to use the expression appropriated to the case)
are violated by it. And the sentiment of justice
appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or
retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with
whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all
persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy,
and the human conception of intelligent self-interest.
From the latter elements, the feeling derives its
morality ; from the former, its peculiar impressive-
ness, and energy of self-assertion.
I have, throughout, treated the idea of a right
residing in the injured person, and violated by the
injury, not as a separate element in the composition
of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms
in which the other two elements clothe themselves.
These elements are, a hurt to some assignable person
or persons on the one hand, and a demand for punish
ment on the other. An examination of our own
minds, I think, will show, that these two things
include all that we mean when we speak of violation
of a right. When we call anything a person's right,
we mean that he has a valid claim on society to pro

tect Him in the possession of it, either by the force

of law, or by that of education and opinion. If he
has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever
account, to have something guaranteed to him by
society, we say that he has a right to it. If we
desire to prove that anything does not belong to him
by right, we think this done as soon as it is admitted
that society ought not to take measures for securing
it to him, but should leave it to chance, or to his own
exertions. Thus, a person is said to have a right to
what he can earn in fair professional competition ;
because society ought not to allow any other person
to hinder him from endeavouring to earn in that
manner as much as he can. But he has not a right
to three hundred a-year, though he may happen to
be earning it ; because society is not called on to
provide that he shall earn that sum. On the contrary,
if he owns ten thousand pounds three per cent, stock,
he has a right to three hundred a-year ; because
society has come under an obligation to provide him
with an income of that amount.
To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have
something which society ought to defend me in the
possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it
ought, 1 can give him no other reason than general
utility. If that expression does not seem to convey
a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation,
nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling,
it is because there goes to the composition of the
sentiment, not a rational only but also an animal
element, the thirst for retaliation ; and this thirst
derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification,
from the extraordinarily important and impressive

kind of utility which is concerned. The interest

involved is that of security, to every one's feelings
the most vital of all interests. Nearly all other
earthly benefits are needed by one person, not needed
by another ; and many of them can, if necessary, be
cheerfully foregone, or replaced by something else ;
but security no human being can possibly do without ;
on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and
for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the
passing moment ; since nothing but the gratification
of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could
be deprived of everything the next instant by who
ever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. Now
this most indispensable of all necessaries, after phy
sical nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery
for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play.
Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our
fellow creatures to join in making safe for us the very
groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings round
it so much more intense than those concerned in any
of the more common cases of utility, that the dif
ference in degree (as is often the case in psychology)
becomes a real difference in kind. The claim assumes
that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity,
and incommensurability with all other considerations,
which constitute the distinction between the feeling of
right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency and
inexpediency. The feelings concerned are so power
ful, and we count so positively on finding a responsive
feeling in others (all being alike interested), that ought
and should grow into must, and recognized indispensa-
bility becomes a moral necessity, analogous to phy
sical, and often not inferior to it in binding force.

If the preceding analysis, or something resembling

it, be not the correct account of the notion of justice ;
if justice be totally independent of utility, and be
a standard per se, which the mind can recognize
by simple introspection of itself ; it is hard to
understand why that internal oracle is so ambi
guous, and why so many things appear either just
or unjust, according to the light in which they are
We are continually informed that Utility is an
uncertain standard, which every different person
interprets differently, and that there is no safety but
in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakeable
dictates of Justice, which carry their evidence in
themselves, and are independent of the fluctuations
of opinion. One would suppose from this that on
questions of j ustice there could be no controversy ;
that if we take that for our rule, its application to
any given case could leave us in as little doubt as a
mathematical demonstration. So far is this from
being the fact, that there is as much difference of
opinion, and as fierce discussion, about what is just,
as about what is useful to society. Not only have
different nations and individuals different notions of
justice, but, in the mind of one and the same indi
vidual, justice is not some one rule, principle, or
maxim, but many, which do not always coincide in
their dictates, and in choosing between which, he is
guided either by some extraneous standard, or by his
own personal predilections.
For instance, there are some who say, that it is
unjust to punish any one for the sake of example to
others ; that punishment is just, only when intended

for the good of the sufferer himself. Others maintain

the extreme reverse, contending that to punish persons
who have attained years of discretion, for their own
benefit, is despotism and injustice, since if the matter
at issue is solely their own good, no one has a right
to control their own judgment of it ; but that they
may justly be punished to prevent evil to others, this
being an exercise of the legitimate right of self-
defence. Mr. Owen, again, affirms that it is unjust
to punish at all ; for the criminal did not make his
own character ; his education, and the circumstances
which surround him, have made him a criminal, and
for these he is not responsible. All these opinions
are extremely plausible ; and so long as the question
is argued as one of justice simply, without going down
to the principles which lie under justice and are the
source of its authority, I am unable to see how any of
these reasoners can be refuted. For, in truth, every
one of the three builds upon rules of justice con
fessedly true. The first appeals to the acknowledged
injustice of singling out an individual, and making
him a sacrifice, without his consent, for other people's
benefit. The second relies on the acknowledged
justice of self-defence, and the admitted injustice of
forcing one person to conform to another's notions of
what constitutes his good. The Owenite invokes the
admitted principle, that it is unjust to punish any one
for what he cannot help. Each is triumphant so long
as he is not compelled to take into consideration any
other maxims of justice than the one he has selected ;
but as soon as their several maxims are brought face
to face, each disputant seems to have exactly as much
to say for himself as the others. No one of them can

carry out his own notion of justice without trampling

upon another equally binding. These are difficulties ;
they have always been felt to be such ; and many
devices have been invented to turn rather than to over
come them. As a refuge from the last of the three,
men imagined what they called the freedom of the
will ; fancying that they could not justify punishing
a man whose will is in a thoroughly hateful state,
unless it be supposed to have come into that state
through no influence of anterior circumstances. To
escape from the other difficulties, a favourite contri
vance has been the fiction of a contract, whereby at
some unknown period all the members of society
engaged to obey the laws, and consented to be
punished for any disobedience to them ; thereby
giving to their legislators the right, which it is
assumed they would not otherwise have had, of
punishing them, either for their own good or for that
of society. This happy thought was- considered to
get rid of the whole difficulty, and to legitimate the
infliction of punishment, in virtue of another received
maxim of justice, volenti non Jit injuria ; that is not
unjust which is done with the consent of the person
who is supposed to be hurt by it. I need hardly
remark, that even if the consent were not a mere
fiction, this maxim is not superior in authority to the
others which it is brought in to supersede. It is, on
the contrary, an instructive specimen of the loose and
irregular manner in which supposed principles of
justice grow up. This particular one evidently came
into use as a help to the coarse exigencies of courts of
law, which are sometimes obliged to be content with
very uncertain presumptions, on account of the greater

evils which would often arise from any attempt on

their part to cut finer. But even courts of law are
not able to adhere consistently to the maxim, for they
allow voluntary engagements to be set aside on the
ground of fraud, and sometimes on that of mere mis
take or misinformation.
Again, when the legitimacy of inflicting punish
ment is admitted, how many conflicting conceptions
of justice come to light in discussing the proper ap
portionment of punishment to offences. No rule on
this subject recommends itself so strongly to the
primitive and spontaneous sentiment of justice, as the
lex talionis, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.
Though this principle of the Jewish and of the
Mahomedan law has been generally abandoned in
Europe as a practical maxim, there is, I suspect, in
most minds, a secret hankering after it ; and when re
tribution accidentally falls on an offender in that
precise shape, the general feeling of satisfaction
evinced, bears witness how natural is the sentiment to
which this repayment in kind is acceptable. With
many the test of justice in penal infliction is that the
punishment should be proportioned to the offence ;
meaning that it should be exactly measured by the
moral guilt of the culprit (whatever be their standard
for measuring moral guilt) : the consideration, what
amount of punishment is necessary to deter from the
offence, having nothing to do with the question of
justice, in their estimation : while there are others to
whom that consideration is all in all ; who maintain
that it is not just, at least for man, to inflict on a
fellow creature, whatever may be his offences, any
amount of suffering beyond the least that will suffice

to prevent him from repeating, and others from imi

tating, his misconduct.
To take another example from a subject already
once referred to. In a co-operative industrial asso
ciation, is it just or not that talent or skill should give
a title to superior remuneration ? On the negative
side of the question it is argued, that whoever does
the best he can, deserves equally well, and ought not
in justice to be put hi a position of inferiority for no
fault of his own ; that superior abilities have already
advantages more than enough, in the admiration they
excite, the personal influence. they command, and the
internal sources of satisfaction attending them, with
out adding to these a superior share of the world's
goods ; and that society is bound in justice rather to
make compensation to the less favoured, for this un
merited inequality of advantages, than to aggravate
it. On the contrary side it is contended, that society
receives more from the more efficient labourer ; that
his services being more useful, society owes him a
larger return for them ; that a greater share of the
joint result is actually his work, and not to allow his
claim to it is a kind of robbery ; that if he is only to
receive as much as others, he can only be justly re
quired to produce as much, and to give a smaller
amount of time and exertion, proportioned to his
superior efficiency. Who shall decide between these
appeals to conflicting principles of justice ? Justice
has in this case two sides to it, which it is impossible
to bring into harmony, and the two disputants have
chosen opposite sides ; the one looks to what it is just
that the individual should receive, the other to what
it is just that the community should give. Each,

from his own point of view, is unanswerable ; and

any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must
be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide
the preference.
How many, again, and how irreconcileable, are the
standards of justice to which reference is made in dis
cussing the repartition of taxation. One opinion is,
that payment to the State should be in numerical
proportion to pecuniary means. Others think that
justice dictates what they term graduated taxation ;
taking a higher percentage from those who have more
to spare. In point of natural justice a strong case
might be made for disregarding means altogether, and
taking the same absolute sum (whenever it could be
got) from every one : as the subscribers to a mess, or
to a club, all pay the same sum for the same privileges,
whether they can all equally afford it or not. Since
the protection (it might be said) of law and govern
ment is afforded to, and is equally required by, all,
there is no injustice in making all buy it at the same
price. It is reckoned justice, not injustice, that a
dealer should charge to all customers the same price
for the same article, not a price varying according to
then- means of payment. This doctrine, as applied to
taxation, finds no advocates, because it conflicts strongly
with men's feelings of humanity and perceptions of so
cial expediency ; but the principle ofjustice which it in
vokes is as true and as binding as those which can be
appealed to against it. Accordingly, it exerts a tacit
influence on the line of defence employed for other
modes of assessing taxation. People feel obliged to
argue that the State does more for the rich than for
the poor, as a justification for its taking more from

them : though this is in reality not true, for the rich

would be far better able to protect themselves, in the
absence of law or government, than the poor, and
indeed would probably be successful in converting the
poor into their slaves. Others, again, so far defer to
the same conception of justice, as to maintain that all
should pay an equal capitation tax for the protection
of their persons (these being of equal value to all),
and an unequal tax for the protection of their pro
perty, which is unequal. To this others reply, that
the all of one man is as valuable to him as the all of
another, From these confusions there is no other
mode of extrication than the utilitarian.

IB, then, the difference between the Just and the

Expedient a merely imaginary distinction ? Have
mankind been under a delusion in thinking that
justice is a more sacred thing than policy, and that
the latter ought only to be listened to after the former
has been satisfied ? By no means. The exposition
we have given of the nature and origin of the senti
ment, recognises a real distinction ; and no one of
those who profess the most sublime contempt for the
consequences of actions as an element in their morality,
attaches more importance to the distinction than I do.
While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which
sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded
on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on
utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the
most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice
is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which
concern the essentials of human well-being more
nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation,

than any other rules for the guidance of life ; and the
notion which we have found to be of the essence of
the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an indi
vidual, implies and testifies to this more binding
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one
another (in which we must never forget to include
wrongful interference with each other's freedom) are
more vital to human well-being than any maxims,
however important, which only point out the best
mode of managing some department of human affairs.
They have also the peculiarity, that they are the
main element in determining the whole of the social
feelings of mankind. It is their observance which
alone preserves peace among human beings : if obe
dience to them were not the rule, and disobedience
the exception, every one would see in every one else a
probable enemy, against whom he must be perpetually
guarding himself. What is hardly less important,
these are the precepts which mankind have the
strongest and the most direct inducements for im
pressing upon one another. By merely giving to
each other prudential instruction or exhortation, they
may gain, or think they gain, nothing : in inculcating
on each other the duty of positive beneficence they
have an unmistakeable interest, but far less in degree :
a person may possibly not need the benefits of others ;
but he always needs that they should not do him
hurt. Thus the moralities which protect every indi
vidual from being harmed by others, either directly
or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his
own good, are at once those which he himself has
most at heart, and those which he has the strongest

interest in publishing and enforcing by word and

deed. It is by a person's observance of these, that
his fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of human
beings, is tested and decided ; for on that depends his
being a nuisance or not to those with whom he is in
contact. Now it is these moralities primarily, which
compose the obligations of justice. The most marked
cases of injustice, and those which give the tone to
the feeling of repugnance which characterizes the
sentiment, are acts of wrongful aggression, or wrong
ful exercise of power over some one ; the next are
those which consist in wrongfully withholding from
him something which is his due ; in both cases, in
flicting on him a positive hurt, either in the form of
direct suffering, or of the privation of some good
which he had reasonable ground, either of a physical
or of a social kind, for counting upon.
The same powerful motives which command the
observance of these primary moralities, enjoin the
punishment of those who violate them ; and as the
impulses of self-defence, of defence of others, and of
vengeance, are all called forth against such persons,
retribution, or evil for evil, becomes closely connected
with the sentiment of justice, and is universally in
cluded in the idea. Good for good is also one of the
dictates of justice ; and this, though its social utility
is evident, and though it carries with it a natural
human feeling, has not at first sight that obvious
connexion with hurt or injury, which, existing in the
most elementary cases of just and unjust, is the source
' of the characteristic intensity of the sentiment. But
the connexion, though less obvious, is not less real.
He who accepts benefits, and denies a return of them

when needed, inflicts a real hurt, by disappointing one

of the most natural and reasonable of expectations,
and one which he must at least tacitly have encou
raged, otherwise the benefits would seldom have been
conferred. The important rank, among human evils
and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is
shown in the fact that it constitutes the principal
criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a
breach of friendship and a breach of promise. Few
hurts which human beings can sustain are greater,
and none wound more, than when that on which they
habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them
in the hour of need ; and few wrongs are greater than
this mere withholding of good ; none excite more
resentment, either in the person suffering, or in a
sympathizing spectator. The principle, therefore, of
giving to each what they deserve, that is, good for
good as well as evil for evil, is not only included
within the idea of Justice as we have defined it, but
is a proper object of that intensity of sentiment,
which places the Just, in human estimation, above
the simply Expedient.
Most of the maxims of justice current in the world,
and commonly appealed to in its transactions, are
simply instrumental to carrying into effect the prin
ciples of justice which we have now spoken of. That
a person is only responsible for what he has done
voluntarily, or could voluntarily have avoided ; that
it is unjust to condemn any person unheard ; that the
punishment ought to be proportioned to the offence,
and the like, are maxims intended to prevent the just
principle of evil for evil from being perverted to
the infliction of evil without that justification. The

greater part of these common maxims have come into

use from the practice of courts of justice, which have
been naturally led to a more complete recognition and
elaboration than was likely to suggest itself to others,
of the rules necessary to enable them to fulfil their
double function, of inflicting punishment when due,
and of awarding to each person his right.
That first of judicial virtues, impartiality, is an
obligation of justice, partly for the reason last men
tioned ; as being a necessary condition of the fulfil
ment of the other obligations of justice. But this is
not the only source of the exalted rank, among human
obligations, of those maxims of equality and impar
tiality, which, both in popular estimation and in that
of the most enlightened, are included among the pre
cepts of justice. In one point of view, they may be
considered as corollaries from the principles already
laid down. If it is a duty to do to each according to
his deserts, returning good for good as well as repress
ing evil by evil, it necessarily follows that we should
treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbids)
who have deserved equally well of us, and that society
should treat all equally well who have deserved
equally well of it, that is, who have deserved equally
well absolutely. This is the highest abstract stan
dard of social and distributive justice ; towards which
all institutions, and the efforts of all virtuous citizens,
should be made in the utmost possible degree to con
verge. But this great moral duty rests upon a still
deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the
first principle of morals, and not a mere logical corol
lary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is
involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the

Greatest-Happiness Principle. That principle is a

mere form of words without rational signification,
unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree
(with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted
for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions
being supplied, Bentham's dictum, ' everybody to
count for one, nobody for more than one,' might be
written under the principle of utility as an explana
tory commentary.* The equal claim of everybody to

* This implication, in the first principle of the utilitarian scheme,

of perfect impartiality between persons, is regarded by Mr. Herbert
Spencer (in his Social Statics) as a disproof of the pretentions of
utility to be a sufficient guide to right; since (he says) the principle
of utility presupposes the anterior principle, that everybody has an
equal right to happiness. It may be more correctly described as
supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable,
whether felt by the same or by different persons. This, however, is
not a pre-supposition ; not a premise needful to support the prin
ciple of utility, but the very principle itself ; for what is the prin
ciple of utility, if it be not that ' happiness ' and ' desirable ' are
synonymous terms 1 If there is any anterior principle implied, it can
be no other than this, that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to
the valuation of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities.
[Mr. Herbert Spencer, in a private communication on the subject
of the preceding Note, objects to being considered an opponent of
Utilitarianism ; and states that he regards happiness as the ultimate
end of morality ; but deems that end only partially attainable by
empirical generalizations from the observed results of conduct, and
completely attainable only by deducing, from the laws of life and the
conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to pro
duce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. With the
exception of the word " necessarily," I have no dissent to express
from this doctrine ; and (omitting that word) I am not aware that
any modern advocate of utilitarianism is of a different opinion. Bent-
ham, certainly, to whom in the SocialStatics Mr. Spencer particularly
referred, is, least of all writers, chargeable with unwillingness to de
duce the effect of actions on happiness from the laws of human nature
and the universal conditions of human life. The common charge

happiness in the estimation of the moralist and the

legislator, involves an equal claim to all the means of
happiness, except in so far as the inevitable conditions
of human life, and the general interest, in which that
of every individual is included, set limits to the
maxim ; and those limits ought to be strictly con
strued. As every other maxim of justice, so this, is
by no means applied or held applicable universally ;
on the contrary, as I have already remarked, it bends
to every person's ideas of social expediency. But in
whatever case it is deemed applicable at all, it is held
to be the dictate of justice. All persons are deemed
to have a right to equality of treatment, except when
some recognised social expediency requires the reverse.
And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to
be considered expedient, assume the character not of
simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so
tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they
ever could have been tolerated ; forgetful that they
themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under
an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correc
tion of which would make that which they approve
seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last
learnt to condemn. The entire history of social im
provement has been a series of transitions, by which
one custom or institution after another, from being a
against him is of relying too exclusively upon such deductions, and de
clining altogether to be bound by the generalizations from specific ex
perience which Mr. Spencer thinks that utilitarians generally confine
themselves to. My own opinion (and, as I collect, Mr. Spencer's) is,
that in ethics, as in all other branches of scientific study, the consili
ence of the results of both these processes, each corroborating and
verifying the other, is requisite to give to any general proposition
the kind and degree of evidence which constitutes scientific proof.]

supposed primary necessity of social existence, has

passed into the rank of an universally stigmatized in
justice and tyranny. So it has been with the distinc
tions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians
and plebeians ; and so it will be, and in part already
is, with the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex.
It appears from what has been said, that justice is a
name for certain moral requirements, which, regarded
collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility,
and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than
any others ; though particular cases may occur in
which some other social duty is so important, as to
overrule any one of the general maxims of justice.
Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but
a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food
or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the
only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as
we do not call anything justice which is not a virtue,
we usually say, not that justice must give way to
some other moral principle, but that what is just in
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle,
not just in the particular case. By this useful accom
modation of language, the character of indefeasibility
attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from
the necessity of maintaining that there can be laudable
The considerations which have now been adduced
resolve, I conceive, the only real difficulty in the
utilitarian theory of morals. It has always been evi
dent that all cases of justice are also cases of expedi
ency : the difference is in the peculiar sentiment which
attaches to the former, as contradistinguished from
the latter. If this characteristic sentiment has been


sufficiently accounted for ; if there is no necessity to

assume for it any peculiarity of origin ; if it is simply
the natural feeling of resentment, moralized by being
made coextensive with the demands of social good ;
and if this feeling not only does but ought to exist in
all the classes of cases to which the idea of justice
corresponds ; that idea no longer presents itself as
a stumbling-block to the utilitarian ethics. Justice
remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities'
which are vastly more important, and therefore more
absolute and imperative, than any others are as a
class (though not more so than others may be in par
ticular cases) ; and which, therefore, ought to be, as
well as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment not
only different in degree, but also in kind ; distin
guished from the milder feeling which attaches to
the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or con
venience, at once by the more definite nature of
its commands, and by the sterner character of its


LONDON, September 1%"]%.





A History of England The History of England
from the Conclusion of the Great from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat
War in 1815. By SPENCER WALPOLE, of the Spanish Armada. By T A
Author of ' Life of the Rt. Hon. Spencer FROUDE, M.A. ' "
Perceval.' VOLS. I. & II. 8vo. 36^. CABINET EDITION, 12 vols. cr. 8vo. ^3, izs
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Swinbourne's Picture Logic 6 Zeller'i Plato 3
TancocKs England during the Wars, - Socrates 3
1778-1820 3 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics... 3
Taylor's History of India 2 Zimmerii s Lessing 4
- Ancient and Modern History ... 4 Schopenhauer 4


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JWVU'93 OEC141994
18 1993
DEC 0 8 '97
JUN 3 0 '93
JUN181993REC'D DEC081997IEC'0

OCT9 '93 HAY 28 '98

NOV2 2 1994
NOV22 1994REC'D
Series 2373
I - "
3 2106 00004 4476
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