573541

research-article2015
CAC0010.1177/0010836715573541Cooperation and ConflictChaban and Knodt

Article

Cooperation and Conflict

Energy diplomacy in the

2015, Vol. 50(4) 457­–474
© The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
context of multistakeholder sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010836715573541
diplomacy: The EU and BICS cac.sagepub.com

Natalia Chaban and Michèle Knodt

Abstract
This paper examines a supranational actor, the European Union (EU), as a producer of energy
diplomacy. This study uses a comparative analytical framework of state-centred vs. multistakeholder
diplomacies to explore EU energy diplomacy towards the ‘emerging’ powers of Brazil, India, China
and South Africa (BICS). It also elaborates the multistakeholder model by advocating the inclusion
of a new element – a consumer of diplomatic actions – into its conceptualization. In this way
the paper suggests a new synthesis of the concepts of multistakeholder and public diplomacies.
Advancing the notion of energy diplomacy, our analysis suggests that this type of diplomacy
goes beyond state actors as producers of diplomatic outcomes, and is no longer confined to
the norms of security of supply and competitiveness; EU energy diplomacy is a complex blend
of multistakeholder and state-centred diplomacies, participants (producers and consumers) and
communication modes. This comprehensive approach to diplomacy – led in the EU’s case by
norms of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – is a response to the challenges of
global governance, multipolarity and multinational cross-sectoral networks.

Keywords
BICS, energy diplomacy, EU, multistakeholder diplomacy model

Introduction
As global governance, networking and multipolarity challenge states as the main diplomacy
actors, traditional diplomacy is facing an identity crisis. The practice of diplomacy is now
attempted by multilateral and supranational organizations as well as NGOs, companies and
lobbies. Scholarly reflections on this complexity argue for a parallel existence of state-
centred and multistakeholder diplomacies (Hocking, 2006). In state-centred diplomacy, the
state is the diplomatic actor and other stakeholders are the consumers. In the multistake-
holder context, other actors can also become producers of diplomatic outcomes. While inter-
national policy is still predominantly shaped by governments, the roles of ‘consumers’ and

Corresponding author:
Natalia Chaban, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800,
Christchurch, New Zealand.
Email: natalia.chaban@canterbury.ac.nz

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

458 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

‘producers’ of diplomacy are dependent on the ‘dynamics underpinning the trisectoral inter-
actions between governments, NGOs, and business’ (Hocking, 2006: 17). In the shaping of
international politics, states find it increasingly difficult to ignore other stakeholders.
This paper applies the multistakeholder diplomacy model to the energy interactions of
the European Union (EU), as a supranational actor, with major ‘netto’ energy consumer
countries in the South: the four ‘emerging’ powers of BICS (Brazil, India, China and
South Africa). In an increasingly multipolar world, with a growing demand by newly
‘emerging’ powers for energy, external energy relations between the main ‘poles’ who
remain energy consumers is a high-priority issue for policy-makers and scholars.
However, these relations are scarcely addressed in the relevant literature. Driven by sig-
nificant strategic constraints that risk the securitization of energy policies, how does the
EU harness the potential for cooperation with newly ‘emerging’ powers and realize the
possibilities for multipolar energy relations?
Our study has both an empirical and a theoretical aim as it explores the EU energy
interactions with BICS, which range from formal negotiations to a variety of partner-
ships and interactions between state and non-state actors. The multistakeholder analyti-
cal model is thus useful to classify the EU as a producer of energy diplomacy. Energy
diplomacy remains under-operationalized and under-defined. Goldthau’s widely
accepted definition states that energy diplomacy is:

…the way countries give their energy companies a competitive edge in bidding for resources
by using the state’s power: consumer countries strengthen their supply situation by diplomatically
flanking energy contracts, whereas producer countries use diplomacy to enhance access to
markets or reserves. (Goldthau, 2010: 25)

This paper revisits the concept of energy diplomacy as a type of diplomacy generated
only by state or state actors and limited to the security and competitive norm only, and
argues a conceptual difference between energy diplomacy on the one hand and global
energy governance and energy markets on the other. More specifically, our research
focuses on a supranational producer of energy diplomacy outcomes (the EU) and the
scope of its relations with a wide range of state and non-state actors (including busi-
nesses, NGOs, scientific experts and even the general public).
A complex sui generis entity, the EU is a unique international actor – neither a central-
ized federal state, nor simply a loose intergovernmental organization. Much of the litera-
ture has reflected on the EU’s role as an actor in the international arena (Bretherton and
Vogler, 1999; Elgström and Smith, 2006; Rhodes, 1998; Smith, 2002), including EU
performance since the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of the European external action
service (EEAS) (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). Relevant literature also contends that
this supranational producer of diplomatic efforts aspires to and claims its global identity
as a ‘normative power’. ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) (Manners, 2002) intends to
shape and transfer norms, rules and values of sustainability, competitiveness and security
of supply by non-coercive practices and recognition of this identity in the energy field by
its external partners, including BICS.
Considering a range of global reactions to the EU’s normative messages – from accept-
ance to rejection (Björkdahl et al., 2015) – this paper proposes to extend the multistake-
holder diplomacy model’s exclusive focus on a producer of diplomatic outcomes to an

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 459

additional focus on a consumer of those outcomes and on the interactions between them.
Respectively, the notions of a true dialogue and dialogue-based collaboration – typical in the
theorization of public diplomacy – enter our conceptualization of energy diplomacy in a
multistakeholder context. This paper departs from the narrow definition of public diplomacy
as the ‘actions of governments to inform and influence foreign publics’ (The Edward R.
Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, online, as cited in McDowell, 2008: 8), taking on a
new, broader interpretation of ‘the transnational impact of all government or private activi-
ties’ (McDowell, 2008: 7). These activities ‘inevitably, if not purposefully, have an impact
on foreign policy and national security as well as on trade, tourism and other national inter-
ests’ (The Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, online, as cited in McDowell,
2008: 7–8).
We argue that EU energy diplomacy towards BICS is an essential part of the EU’s
wider strategic diplomacy in a rapidly changing, globalizing and increasingly multipolar
world. The type of diplomacy produced by the EU is found to be of a complex, ‘blended’
nature that combines the levels of diplomacy models, participants and communication
modes. Firstly, it is characterized by a simultaneous use of state-centred and multistake-
holder tools. Secondly, it mixes a range of state and non-state participants (producers and
consumers of diplomatic outcomes). Thirdly, it engages two overlapping modes of com-
munication – ‘talking at’ external partners (a top-down one-way communication of
externally projecting internalised norms and values typical for energy governance dis-
courses) vs. ‘talking with’ international counterparts (a horizontal dialogue-led two-way
communication process typical for diplomacy conduct). The three strands arguably
advance the understanding of the notion of ‘energy diplomacy’.

Energy governance, energy market and energy diplomacy

Relevant literature features three concepts to describe global energy interactions: energy
governance, energy markets and energy diplomacy. These concepts are radically differ-
ent in terms of how they conceive and communicate with the ‘Other’ in international
interactions.

Energy governance
The concept of energy governance dominates research on global or international
energy interactions (see Barbé et al., 2014; Goldthau and Witte, 2009; Lesage et al.,
2010; Selianova, 2011; Van de Graaf, 2013). Governance allows energy-related inter-
actions to be defined in a functionally confined, institutionalized arena and comprises
of interactive arrangements in which different kinds of actors, including private actors,
cooperate. These forms of liberal governance arrangements aim at ‘solving societal
problems or creating societal opportunities’ (Kooiman, 2002: 73). Governance arrange-
ments concerning energy policies face a number of issue-specific demands. Energy
governance involves a more complex and fragmented array of public and private actors
(Keohane and Victor, 2011; Lesage et al., 2010) than other policy fields. This diversity
needs to be addressed. The arrangement of energy relations on the basis of bilateral
resource agreements poses a challenge for the introduction of more flexible, sustaina-
ble, multi-actor and multilevel modes of energy governance (Florini and Sovacool,
2011: 63–67). Thus, external energy governance is defined here as a ‘form of coordination

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

460 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

and cooperation, involving a variety of actors within a multilevel system, and seeks to
regulate inter- and transnational energy relations through a combination of soft steer-
ing instruments, policy diffusion, communicative arrangements and diplomatic activi-
ties’ (Müller et al., 2015). External energy governance in particular is conceptualized
as a one-way communication process, projecting and imposing internal values, princi-
ples and rules onto international interlocutors. This view is shared by Herranz-Surrallés
(2014), who argued that energy governance is about externalizing internal rules for
external markets.
The EU is a striking example of an international actor whose external energy message
is heavily shaped by internal positions and norms. Since 2005, the demand for more
coherent energy policies has increased. The Treaty of Lisbon (Title XXI, Art. 194 TFEU)
(The Treaty of Lisbon, n.d.) clearly defines the three main priorities of the EU in the
energy field: sustainability, security of supplies and competition. The sustainability
vision aims to promote energy efficiency and includes the EU’s emphasis on renewable
energies. Security of supplies is interpreted as ‘the goal of ensuring the security of energy
supply in the Union. Finally, competitiveness is defined as ensuring the functioning
of the energy market’ and the promotion of the ‘interconnection of energy networks’
(European Commission, 2010, 2013, 2014).

Energy markets
Energy markets treat energy as a commodity and are in place to deal with the trade and
supply of energy. This paper’s focus on the EU raises discussion of a relevant notion of
‘market power Europe’ (MPE) (Damro, 2012) in the energy context. As a reply to
Manners’ concept of the NPE (2002), Damro pointed to the fact that ‘we should recon-
sider what the EU is and conceptualize it as MPE, a powerful actor that actively engages
in international affairs through the externalization of its economic and social market-
related policies and regulatory measures’ (Damro, 2012: 697). Damro empirically demon-
strated that the EU has developed from a market integration experiment ‘into the world’s
foremost economic bloc’. He points out that the EU has developed strategies and efforts
‘to exercise MPE through the externalization of its economic and social agendas’ (Damro,
2012: 696).
The same argument can be found in analyses of EU energy policy, especially in the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). As Herranz-Surrallés (2014) argues, the changes to global
energy markets and the structure of the world economy over the past decade have sub-
stantially diminished the EU’s ability to exert influence, especially in the international
regime of the ECT.
It has been argued by legal scholars such as Bradford (2012), Fahey (2014) and Scott
(2009, 2013) that, as a market, the EU is capable of externalities. Bradford remarks that
companies that want to trade with the EU as one of the world’s largest internal markets
must decide whether to adopt one set of standards for Europe or multiple sets of stand-
ards for the rest of the world. In most cases, they opt for the EU’s single standard.
Therefore, despite its financial and political shortcomings, the EU is a major force in the
global economy (Bradford, 2012). This interpretation of global energy interactions sug-
gests pragmatic interaction between buyers and sellers based on competition.

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 461

Energy diplomacy
Ultimately, diplomacy is about the practice of influence. In terms of process, energy
diplomacy is about the practice of influence through negotiations to manage energy-
related international relations. Self-centred promotion of internal positions (associated
here with energy governance) or competitiveness (typical for energy market discourses)
are counterproductive to the dialogue promoted by the diplomatic approach.
However, the definition of energy diplomacy is problematic. Energy dialogue spans
policy fields ranging from external relations to trade, energy supply, development, envi-
ronment, human rights and climate. While the combination of the concepts of ‘energy’
and ‘diplomacy’ has always been present in the conduct of international relations, a ‘gen-
erally accepted definition of energy diplomacy does not exist’ (Goldthau, 2010: 28).
Goldthau proposed his popular definition to address the lack of conceptualization and
operationalization of energy diplomacy. He conceptualizes state or state actors as the
‘primary units of analysis’ (Goldthau, 2010: 28): ‘the use of foreign policy to secure
access to energy supplies abroad and to promote (mostly bilateral, government to gov-
ernment) cooperation in the energy sector’ (Goldthau, 2010: 25). This definition is lim-
ited to the security and competitiveness norm only.
These definitions are the departure point for our study; however, we disagree with
Goldthau’s other two key arguments, which have an exclusive focus on states as energy
policy actors and on the security and competitiveness norms.
In addition to states, Baccini et al. (2011: 3) identified 24 different organizations deal-
ing with energy in the international realm. The absence of a ‘World Energy Organization’
has led to a highly diversified network of international governmental organizations that
deal with the regulation of energy supplies (Müller et al., 2015). Moreover, the EU is
among a plethora of supranational actors including NGOs, transnational companies and
multinational lobbies all seeking to participate in the energy field.
Secondly, we challenge Goldthau’s linking of energy diplomacy to security and com-
petitiveness norms only. Goldthau depicts energy diplomacy as the strategic and instru-
mental use of foreign policy to secure and compete for a country’s energy supplies only.
According to this vision, energy diplomacy exclusively follows political logic, prioritiz-
ing national security goals over maximizing business opportunities. Our challenge to this
narrow definition is supported by the relevant literature. Within the debate on energy
security, Dyer and Trombetta (2013) argued the need for new research directions to con-
sider dimensions such as renewable energy, environmental change, climate governance
and human security. Goldthau himself, in his most recent edited book (Goldthau, 2013),
advocates for a variety of perspectives when analysing the challenges in global energy
policy. Alongside the energy market and security issues, these perspectives now also
incorporate issues of development and sustainability.
We argue that energy diplomacy extends far beyond the debate on energy security and
competitiveness to include such norms as sustainability. Our focus is on the EU’s
European external energy policy (EEEP). It has three central norms: sustainability, com-
petition and security of supply, thus demonstrating that an exclusive focus on security
and competitiveness in energy diplomacy is insufficient. Significantly, the EEEP serves
as a policy background to a range of EU diplomatic interactions with international coun-
terparts (state and non-state) in the energy area.

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

462 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

Any type of diplomacy is increasingly about the ‘creation of networks, embracing a

range of state and non-state actors focusing on the management of issues that demand
resources over which no single participant possesses a monopoly’ (Hocking, 2006: 13).
Hocking captured the differences between the state-centred diplomacy and multistake-
holder diplomacy in a nine-part paradigm of context, forms, participants, roles, communi-
cation patterns, functions, location, representation patterns and rules. In the next section,
we use this framework to explore the EU’s energy interactions with the four BICS coun-
tries and argue that the EU is already an established energy diplomacy producer.

Applying the multistakeholder diplomacy model to EU

global energy interactions
Contexts, forms and participants
Hocking (2006) argues that the first key difference between the state-centred diplomacy
vis-à-vis multistakeholder diplomacy is the contextual position of the state. In the former
case, states remain an ‘unchallenged terminal authority’; in the latter, there are ‘multiple
spheres of authority’ (Hocking, 2006:18).
In its external energy relations, the EU addresses both state and non-state actors. The
EU’s state-level interactions occur externally at the level of intergovernmental energy
agreements, and internally by treating energy as an intergovernmental competency area for
its member states. At the same time, there is overwhelming evidence of the EU’s energy
multistakeholder contexts. In the international arena, including its interactions with BICS,
the EU is challenged by the polyphony of European voices typical of EU diplomacy.
The EU actors engaged in energy-related diplomacy include: the European Commission
with its commissioners and directorates-general (DGs) on energy, DevCo, climate action,
enterprise, environment, research and trade; EEAS; the European Parliament; the Council
of the EU; EU Delegations; and individual EU member states with their own governments,
parliaments, ministries of energy and national diplomatic missions. EU energy actors
performing internationally include corporations and transnational companies, as well as
business chambers and associations. The EU’s multiple energy-related diplomatic actions
and messages are not well orchestrated, sometimes duplicating and sometimes contradicting
each other (Knodt et al., 2015b). This is a challenge inherent to multilateral, intergovern-
mental or supranational organizations attempting any kind of diplomacy.
The contexts of diplomatic activities dictate a set of forms and outline targeted partici-
pants. Government-led forms using bilateral and multilateral channels are typical for
state-centred diplomacy. In a multistakeholder diplomacy, forms are more diffused and
may be led by governments or other stakeholders (Hocking, 2006: 18). As for participants,
in the state-centred vision of diplomacy, diplomats are professionals with ‘credentials
based on the principles of sovereignty’ (Hocking, 2006: 18). The non-state actors in this
scenario are reduced to diplomacy consumers only. In contrast, in a multistakeholder
diplomacy, there are multiple participants, often based on the ‘trisectoral model incorpo-
rating government, NGOs, and business’ (Hocking, 2006: 18). Participants, whose cre-
dentials are based on interests and expertise, are able to become producers of diplomacy.
State-level actors remain the focus of the EU external energy activities. Increasingly,
the EU prioritizes energy dealings with ‘emerging powers’, including BICS (Knodt et al.,

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 463

2015a). One of the most visible energy-related interactions is the EU’s bilateral energy
dialogues with BICS, carried out under the ‘umbrella’ of the strategic partnerships. Within
the scope of the annual summits between the EU and BICS (with parallel business sum-
mits for the private sector), different sectoral dialogues have been established, including a
dialogue on energy. Over the years, energy dialogues have connected political actors and
enhanced a regular exchange of ideas (Knodt et al., 2015a). In addition to the highest level
political dialogue, the BICS case studies elaborated below provide evidence of the EU as
an energy diplomacy actor through a multistakeholder lens. The BICS preference for
bilateral cooperation with EU member states presents a diplomatic challenge for the EU.
To address this, the EU attempts to coordinate its policies and projects with its member
states demonstrating a policy networking typical of the multistakeholder mode.
The EU initialized a direct political dialogue, including an energy dialogue, with
Brazil in 2007, with the aim of intensifying relations and improving cooperation. The
dialogue focuses principally on biofuels, in line with the high priority that Brazil attrib-
utes to biofuels in its external energy relations and its vast energy resources and high
technological expertise in this field. With Brazil cultivating the image of a ‘green energy
country’, many EU energy diplomacy projects aim at enhancing green energy production
within the country and biofuels are of mutual interest to the EU and Brazil. However,
biofuels remain highly controversial in terms of certification of production standards.
Other energy discussion points include indirect land-use change, renewable energies and
climate change. The latest dialogue included two new areas – offshore safety and ocean
energy (Piefer et al., 2013).
The EU–India energy dialogue was initiated within the EU-India Strategic Partnership
in 2004. The key EU energy diplomacy issues towards India are energy access, energy
import dependency and climate change concerns, with priorities on developing clean
coal technologies, increasing energy efficiency and savings, promoting environmen-
tally friendly energies as well as assisting India in energy market reforms (Knodt et al.,
2013). The Republic of South Africa (RSA)–EU energy dialogue was initiated in 2008,
along with 12 other sectoral dialogues (health, education, customs, science and technol-
ogy, etc.) within the Strategic Partnership. EU energy diplomacy towards RSA prior-
itizes climate policy and development as well as poverty alleviation. EU energy
diplomacy also sees RSA as essential in the EU’s support to regional energy coopera-
tion (Knodt et al., 2015).
The oldest and most elaborated dialogue is the EU–China energy dialogue, institu-
tionalized in 1994. Six priority areas have since been identified: renewable energies,
smart grids, energy efficiency in the building sector, clean coal, nuclear energy and
energy law. Each of these areas has an established working group that meets regularly.
Many energy-related EU initiatives towards China are linked to the promotion of
competitiveness and sustainability norms (consider, for example, the EU-China Clean
Energy Center (EC2) or EU-China Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy
(ICARE)). The security norm was addressed in the dialogue for the first time in 2006,
against the background of the stalemate of the Doha Development Round and the first
Russian–Ukrainian gas conflict. It was then linked to sustainability and competitive-
ness with initiatives supporting exchanging resources through policy networks and
information exchange, as well as monitoring, defining and promoting global interests
(Knodt et al., 2013).

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

464 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

Roles and communication patterns

In the classification by Hocking (2006: 18), diplomats perform the role of gatekeepers in
the state-centred model, while diplomats are ‘boundary spanners’ in the multiple stake-
holder model (i.e. they may be stake-givers as well as stake-takers). According to Hocking
(2006: 18), in the state-centred model, interactions occur in government-focused hierar-
chical flows of information. Stakeholders are seen as the receivers of information and
diplomats are the senders. The multistakeholder model features different flows of infor-
mation: open, inclusive, fluid, unstable and multidirectional. Significantly, these flows
occur in non-hierarchical networks.
Empirical research in BICS within the transnational project ‘EU energy governance’1
demonstrated that in the eyes of the BICS stakeholders, DG Energy was seen among the
two most important actors for exchange networks in China and India. EU Delegations in
India, China and South Africa were also seen among the top three actors in terms of
being an information broker (ranked at number one in India, and number two in China
and South Africa). While the stakeholders in these three ‘emerging’ powers are mainly
interested in European expertise, experience and technology, they also recognize that
dialogues provide a platform for information exchange among their own actors. Dialogic
network structures also showed complex bilateral networks between the EU and BICS
public and non-state actors. In most of the EU–BICS bilateral networks, EU public actors
communicate with BICS private and non-state actors to a great extent. With the exception
of Brazil, EU outreach to the Chinese, Indian and South African actors is greater than
average, whereas the communication efforts of the Chinese, Indian and South African
public actors falls below the average within the respective network.2 Beyond minor com-
munication towards EU public actors, in the Chinese case public actors’ communication
with non-state European as well as non-state Chinese actors is higher than the average.
In South Africa, the pattern is somewhat different. Here, communication from public
actors is below average, whereas non-state actors try to outreach to the South African
public actors. In India, public actors try to speak to each other and non-state actors, and
vice versa (Piefer et al., 2015).
While interpretation of these patterns is a subject for a different analysis, our study
notes the complex patterns of information flows suggesting that EU energy-related dia-
logues with BICS go beyond state-to-state communication and indicating that there are
no exclusive state-focused hierarchies in information flows.

Functions
For Hocking (2006: 19), the function of diplomacy in the state-centred model is to manage
relations between sovereign entities [in order to] define and promote national interests. The
multistakeholder model acknowledges the deficiencies of the diplomatic process. To rem-
edy them, resources are exchanged through policy networking, information exchange,
monitoring processes, and defining and promoting global interests (Hocking, 2006: 19).
The EU’s diplomatic service was only established in 2009 following the Treaty of
Lisbon. The EEAS’ mandate and composition had remained unclear for some time, leav-
ing the many EU actors listed above to carry out energy activities in various international
arenas. Among those actors are the EU delegations, EEAS diplomatic representations in

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 465

139 locations with energy-related activities within their portfolios. The EU Delegations
in BICS tend to run EU-sponsored, development-focused energy projects more than
other types of energy-related projects. The EU Delegations are tasked with disseminating
information about these projects among local stakeholders. However, the EU Delegations’
activities on the ground are often challenged by an enduring confusion about who should
speak for the EU; the EU Delegations’ size, expertise and capabilities in external energy
relations which remain dwarfed by member state diplomatic efforts; and institutional
loyalties and behavioural dynamics within the EEAS and its delegations.
The EU Delegations’ energy-related activities in BICS are guided by a set of priorities
such as sustainability, energy security and energy technology transfer, as well as climate
change and policies targeting underprivileged groups and regions, with the aim of improv-
ing living conditions, facilitating the overall development of struggling communities and
building the capacity of civil society organizations. The EU Delegation to India focuses
on the themes of energy goods, energy services, technology cooperation and demand side
management. The key issues for this Delegation are energy access and energy import
dependency, and climate. In addition, this Delegation prioritizes energy in the context of
development (EUD to India, n.d.). In the EU–Brazil joint action plan, energy is a key area.
However, the context of the EU Delegation energy-related activities in Brazil is very
different from the other ‘emerging’ countries due to its vast energy resources and high
technological expertise (especially in the biofuels sector), as well as Brazil’s concern
about climate change and sustainable development. As discussed above, Brazil’s strategy
is to brand itself internationally as a ‘green energy country’. Many projects facilitated by
the EU Delegation aim at enhancing green energy within the country (EUD to Brazil,
n.d.). The EU Delegation to South Africa emphasizes climate policy and development
issues and lists a number of multisectoral projects, many of them with energy-related
elements in the context of sustainable development and poverty alleviation (EUD to South
Africa, n.d.). Finally, the EU Delegation to China also lists a number of EU-supported
projects in the field of ‘energy diplomacy’. Paralleling the EU–China energy dialogue,
energy efficiency is a dominant theme in these projects (EUD to China, n.d.).
Another characteristic of multistakeholder diplomacy is promoting global interests.
On different levels, the EU aims at integrating BICS into global governance on energy
and climate change as well as strategic issues, such as energy security (e.g. for China that
will be with Central Asia).

Location and representation patterns

Hocking (2006: 19) locates the diplomatic activities of the state-centred model in arenas
outside the domestic sphere. Intergovernmental sites are the main location of the diplo-
matic interactions. Unsurprisingly, this model emphasizes mission diplomacy in mixed
bilateral and multilateral representations. These settings are contrasted with the multi-
stakeholder locations which cross the boundaries between the domestic and interna-
tional, have multiple diplomatic sites and variable permanent representations, and are
both multilateral and mission oriented (Hocking, 2006: 19).
The energy-related diplomatic activities of the EU correspond to the multistakeholder
model in terms of locations and representations. In addition to a set of EU Delegations

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

466 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

with some energy-related tasks, there is also a plethora of international energy arenas
where 28 EU member states negotiate with each other and also with international actors,
including BICS (Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), International Energy Agency of the
European Commission (IEA), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA),
International Energy Forum (IEF), G-20, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), UN and the World Bank). These multilateral representations of the EU are fur-
ther complemented by the bilateral, mission-oriented representations through the EU
delegations to BICS. The EU Delegations discussed serve as focal points of EU foreign
policy outreach with increased competencies, including the energy field.
EU energy diplomacy also faces the challenge of building a good reputation with EU
citizens. One initiative that addresses this challenge is the EU Sustainable Energy Week
(EUSEW) initiated by the European Commission in 2006. Each year, hundreds of state
and non-state organizations and individuals from the EU and outside it are involved. This
event is designed to appeal to both the general public and experts: ‘through bottom-up
efforts, organisers of EUSEW Energy Days, events and activities connect directly with
citizens and energy stakeholders at local, regional and national levels’ (EUSEW, n.d.).
EUSEW events are also organized outside of Europe with the EU’s support. The activity
showcases the EU as the producer of diplomatic efforts – a facilitator and entrepreneur
– able to act across domestic and international arenas, and multiple diplomatic sites.

Rules
The final category in Hocking’s models is rules. Sovereignty related rules emphasize the
‘centrality of protocol’, ‘confidentiality’ and the ‘immunity of diplomatic agents’ in the
centre-centred model (2006: 19). Hocking also stipulates clear normative expectations of
behaviour. The multistakeholder model features ‘underdeveloped rules’, a multitude of
clashes between ‘sovereignty and non-sovereignty based rules’, ‘institutional tensions’
and expectations clashes (Hocking, 2006: 19). This mode is also characterized by the
‘openness, accountability and transparency’ of the diplomatic practices.
A number of the EU’s energy-related diplomatic interactions with BICS at the summit
level and in sectoral dialogues between the high level officials are dominated by protocol
and strictly confidential. The Heads of EU Delegations are full ambassadors who
enjoy the privilege of diplomatic immunity. However, with energy diplomatic outputs
produced by both the EU and its member states, the clash of sovereignty and non-
sovereignty based rules is inevitable. Accountability and transparency are an EU mantra;
excessive secrecy in the field of global energy interactions is impossible. With many EU
stakeholders involved in energy-related diplomacy production, there are predictable
tensions between participating institutions. If we consider that some energy-related dip-
lomatic activities of the EU are carried out by the EU delegations of the EEAS (as
discussed above), the multistakeholder characteristics described by Hocking correspond
to the features of the ‘interstitial organization’ of the EEAS (Bátora, 2013). According to
Bátora, such organizations have ‘different and sometimes conflicting organizational
principles and practices introduced within the organization … and different and some-
times conflicting sets of expectations in relation to the Service from actors within the
organization as well as from outside’ (Bátora, 2013: 598).

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 467

This section demonstrated that the EU – a supranational sui generis actor – is a producer
of various modes and modalities by which the EU exercises energy diplomacy towards the
‘emerging’ powers of BICS. The EU is able to establish ‘relationships of varying scope and
composition … bring[ing] together governmental actors, and business’ (Hocking, 2006:
20). These energy-related external activities could be classified as ‘energy diplomacy’
using the multistakeholder model. This challenges the first key feature of Goldthau’s popu-
lar definition of energy diplomacy, where states are the primary units of analysis.
Our analysis also observed that EU energy activities with ‘emerging powers’ are dom-
inated by priorities of sustainability, energy security and energy technology transfer, as
well as climate change and policies targeting underprivileged groups and regions, with
the aim of improving living conditions, facilitating the development of struggling com-
munities and building the capacity of civil society organizations. The EU’s normative
messages – either of a moral/cosmopolitan nature (e.g. sustainability, development) or of
a liberal/market nature (e.g. competitiveness, security of supply) – are not necessarily
unanimously accepted or positively received by international counterparts. External
reactions to the EU’s normative messages range from acceptance and adoption to resist-
ance and rejection (Björkdahl et al., 2015). The energy field will not be an exception.
Negative reactions are often associated with the Euro-centred content of the ‘normative’
message and the ensuing process.
Focusing on the receiver of the EU diplomatic messages, we challenge the multistake-
holder model’s preoccupation with the producer of diplomatic outcomes and suggest the
incorporation of the notion of the consumer of such outcomes. It is somewhat puzzling
that the multistakeholder model – which argues ‘influence and the right to be heard
should be based on the value of each stakeholder’s unique perspective and expertise’
(Hemmati, 2000: 7) as well as ‘inclusiveness and partnership in policy processes’
(Hocking, 2006: 17) – has overlooked the consumer of diplomatic efforts in its concep-
tualizations. The next section addresses this oversight, and engages analytical concepts
of public diplomacy theory to complement the multistakeholder model.

Focus on the receiver

Moving away from the ‘narrow’ definition of public diplomacy as the ‘actions of govern-
ments to inform and influence foreign publics’ (The Edward R. Murrow Center for
Public Diplomacy, on line, as cited in McDowell, 2008: 8), we employ the concept of a
‘new’ public diplomacy: ‘new thinking, new tools, and adaptation by government hier-
archies to network capabilities and stronger more imaginative relationships with civil
society’ (Gregory, 2008: 286). We argue a number of conceptual connections between
the ‘new’ public diplomacy and the multistakeholder diplomacy model. Very similar to
the multistakeholder model, the ‘new’ public diplomacy conceptualizes government as
one of many stakeholders: ‘not necessarily undertaking the entire conception and execu-
tion of a project but at least playing a role, working with civil society partners, funding,
coordinating, and/or directing’. (McDowell, 2008: 8). ‘New’ public diplomacy aims to
take into account diverse targets – state and supranational actors, elites and experts as
well as ordinary citizens. It accounts for technological innovations and has to faction the
networking nature of relations between different actors (Gregory, 2008).

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

468 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

The ‘new’ public diplomacy is argued to be exercised by ‘states, associations of states

and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour; build and manage
relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance interests and values’ (Gregory,
2008: 276) [italics original]. This emphasis on influence via communication, relations and
understanding suggests the central position of the consumer of the diplomatic outcomes
– on a par with the producer. As such, we propose to link the conceptualizations of the
multistakeholder model in the energy diplomacy context to the three theoretical modes of
public diplomacy: monologue, dialogue and collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008).
We also advocate for active listening as a part of a successful multistakeholder diplomacy
outreach. Listening is one of five levels in the public diplomacy theorization (Cull, 2008).

Introducing the concepts

The monologue mode is a ‘one-way communication to advocate foreign policy strate-
gies’ (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 13). It is a necessary but limited mode of communica-
tion: a heavy reliance on monologue in the world of networks and interdependencies is
no longer sufficient to ensure the success of a sender’s ‘strategic communication’.
Communication modes of dialogue and collaboration have become crucial. The dia-
logue mode provides an ‘opportunity to listen or allow for feedback or critical responses
from the audience’ (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 16). Executed at the personal or organi-
zational level, dialogue is seen as a ‘method for improving relationships and increasing
understanding, not necessarily for reaching consensus or for winning an argument’
(Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 19). Finally, collaboration means ‘initiatives in which par-
ticipants from different nations participate in a project together’ (Cowan and Arsenault,
2008: 21). Collaboration efforts could attempt to solve shared problems, or advance
shared visions, or aim to complete a joint physical project (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008:
21). Engaging external stakeholders in concrete projects and achieving successful joint
outcomes is argued to be key in building a relationship and mutual trust. Ideally, the three
communication modes should co-exist and inform one another. Despite its inherent limi-
tations, monologue is still necessary to convey an idea, a vision or a perspective, and to
present it eloquently and clearly (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 21). At the same time,
dialogue and collaboration modes present numerous challenges in their planning and
execution, not least due to the lack of skills among practitioners.
Further conceptualization of public diplomacy includes consideration of five levels of
activities: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international
news broadcasting (Cull, 2008). Of particular interest to this analysis is listening (as
defined by Cull, 2008) as a prerequisite of all successful public diplomacy efforts.
Specifically, listening is ‘actors’ attempt to manage the international environment by col-
lecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to
redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly’ (Cull, 2008: 32).

Applying public diplomacy concepts to EU energy diplomacy

One of the typical criticisms of the EU’s external affairs is that it is good at ‘talking at’ the
world rather than ‘talking with’ it (Holland and Chaban, 2011). In diplomatic terms, this

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 469

could be interpreted as a preference for monologue and advocacy over other modes and
levels of diplomacy. Incorporated into every level of the multistakeholder model, reflec-
tions on the three modes and five levels of public diplomacy would help to maximize the
shift from monologue to a true dialogue and then to a meaningful and inclusive collabora-
tion in energy diplomacy conduct. ‘True’ dialogue is understood here in Buber’s (1958)
interpretation – an exchange of opinions where the expected outcome is not an imposition
of one side’s opinion on the other side, but a better understanding of the interlocutors’
positions, even when disagreement emerged at the end of the dialogue.
A range of activities in the dialogue and collaboration modes is currently observed in
EU energy diplomacy. As discussed above, dialogues and collaboration activities tran-
scend the target groups and involve state, non-state and supranational actors in specific
energy-related projects. In the BICS cases, EU energy diplomacy involved top government
officials and institutes, private businesses and members of the scientific community in the
dialogue frequently brokering interactions not only between the EU and a local actor, but
between local actors. In addition, many collaborations in the energy field are supported by
the EU. Among such projects are the ones administered by EU delegations. They typically
target sustainable development and local capacity building, access to renewable energy
sources linked to environmental aspects of energy operation, and poverty alleviation.
While dialogue-based advocacy and scientific exchanges remain the most typical
level of diplomatic exchanges, the arsenal of the EU’s listening activities on energy-
related matters around the word remains limited. This is despite the central place assigned
to listening in a successful diplomatic outcome. In the past, DG Energy in its external
dimension has not been coordinated with EEAS and, as such, the mandates the EU
Delegations around the world have for collecting energy-related information remained
unclear. One exceptional example of systematic listening is a research project, supported
by the Jean Monnet Programme, which looks into EU images as a global normative
energy actor in BRICS (BICS plus Russia) and compares them with EU self-perceptions
(External Images of the EU (EXIE) as a Global Normative Energy Actor, n.d.). Future
research could explore the potential role international broadcasting and cultural/science
diplomacy could play in energy diplomacy.

Discussion and conclusions

In today’s globalizing environment, states are no longer the only significant global
actors. State, non-state and supranational actors are intertwined in a multitude of
networks, with numerous ‘poles’ of power (Castells, 2009). This swiftly changing
multipolar architecture challenges international relations practitioners and scholars to
conceptualize and operationalize an obvious paradox: the increasingly interconnected
world with all its networks and interdependencies is also a progressively competitive
environment where ‘established’ and ‘emerging’ powers are vying for influence, appeal
and resources. This paradox tests the art of modern-day diplomacy. This paper addressed
this challenge by revisiting the notion of energy diplomacy in a case-study of the EU
towards the ‘emerging’ powers of BICS. The four BICS countries are strategic partners
for the EU, and energy diplomacy towards them is an important part of a larger strategic
diplomacy with these ‘rising’ powers.

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

470 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

The EU was conceptualized as a supranational actor producing energy-related diplo-

matic efforts, and a systematic insight into the EU’s procedural issues was conceived
within the multistakeholder model. The model proved to be a useful tool to advance the
conceptualization of energy diplomacy as a phenomenon in international relations. Our
analysis showed that the EU, a supranational actor, is already a producer of diplomatic
outcomes in the field of international energy relations. Advancing understanding of energy
diplomacy, our analysis suggests that energy diplomacy is a complex phenomenon featur-
ing a number of blends in its process. In our case, those were observed on the levels of
diplomacy models, participants (producers and consumers) and communication modes.
The application of the multistakeholder model to EU energy diplomacy revealed our
first intertwining – the EU did not use the multistakeholder tools exclusively, but simulta-
neously employed both ‘multistakeholder’ and ‘state-centred’ tools. This blended pattern
was most frequently observed on the levels of forms (e.g. in using bilateral channels used
exclusively by the government in addition to a simultaneous use of other diffused channels
involving the government along with other stakeholders); representations patterns (e.g. the
EU Delegations as formal diplomatic missions of a supranational actor); and roles (e.g.
the diplomats as gatekeepers and facilitators/entrepreneurs). This observation may indicate
that a sharp opposition of the multistakeholder vis-a-vis the state-centred model is ideal-
ized. In reality, diplomatic efforts in the energy field include the simultaneous practice of
both models. This blended type could be explained by the fact that states are still visible
and prominent actors in the International Relations (IR) practices. Unsurprisingly, the EU
often has to resort to the established state-centred structures – either because its interna-
tional interlocutors are states, or because states remain an important element of the EU as
a supranational body. It may also indicate that in order to achieve success any modern-day
producer of diplomacy must master both models and apply them appropriately. This also
raises the bigger question: if the EU blends the models intentionally, is it a well-planned
strategy or merely a random combination? Our preliminary observation suggests the latter;
however, future research may provide more answers to this question.
In terms of participants (consumers and producers), our analysis showed a complex
blend of consumers on both state and non-state levels. Where the EU is targeting a range
of diplomacy consumers such as high officials and the local top government bodies in a
bilateral regime, EU energy diplomacy actions sit comfortably on the state-centred diplo-
macy side of the continuum. There is also plenty of evidence that EU energy diplomacy
targets its own and ‘emerging’ powers’ stakeholders, including businesses, energy
experts, civil society and even the general public. The EU’s focused effort to involve the
international general public in its energy diplomacy activities (e.g. through EUSEW) is
a diplomatic innovation. This event appeals to the expert groups (scientific and technol-
ogy community) and civil society, as well as the general public. Communicating with the
general public is a new facet of energy diplomacy practice that warrants future research.
The EU’s supranational institutional architecture establishes a blend of multiple
spheres of authority that do not necessarily coordinate with each other. The open, inclu-
sive, fluid, unstable and multidirectional flows of information coming from the EU are
not always coherent. Institutional tensions within the EU structures and the clash of
sovereignty and non-sovereignty rules between the EU and EU member states are con-
stant. This lack of cohesion may send mixed messages to the consumers of diplomatic

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 471

practice. It may translate into an image of a ‘weaker partner’ – and external interlocutors
will respond to this negatively. The next question is: does this negative image of the EU
dominate the perceptions of its external partners, or is there another interpretation that
guides foreign policy production towards the EU in the energy field? This question sug-
gests that the multistakeholder model must incorporate another conceptual dimension on
a par with the producer – the consumer of the diplomatic effort – and advocate an active
and systematic listening component within it. This is crucial, as networks, open com-
munication and collaboration are the cornerstones of the multistakeholder model.
The final conceptual intertwining is between communication modes. EU energy actions
in the third countries (including BICS) are informed by norms declared by EU internal
discourses; namely sustainability, competitiveness and security of a supply. In itself, the
normative message of the EU is a blend between the cosmopolitan/moral norms (sustain-
ability, development, environment protection) and liberal/market norms (competitiveness,
security of supply, technological exchanges). The interplay between the moral and market
norms and values will then dictate the type of energy actors the EU will engage internation-
ally, and thus guide EU diplomatic practice on the ground. These norms are not only used
for internal decision-making but are projected onto the consumers of the diplomatic out-
comes. This suggests a mixture between a one-way top-down communication approach
informed by the diffusion of norms (typical of governance discourses) and a two-way hori-
zontal dialogic communication patter (typical of diplomatic discourse).
It is clear that EU energy diplomacy is challenged by the supranational sui generis
nature of this entity and the multilevel nature of its international energy-related
dialogue. In light of this, two directions for future research are proposed. Subsequent
analyses could compare the EU’s energy diplomacy efforts with different multilateral
organizations such as NATO or the UN. Future studies could also examine the EU’s
energy diplomacy practices vis-à-vis such efforts by EU member states, in particular
looking at whether all member states are acting in concert, as well as developing the
notion of multilevel diplomacy.

Funding
This research received support from two projects: (1) Jean Monnet Multilateral Project ‘External
Images of the EU (EXIE): Images of the EU as a Normative Energy Player (BRICS vis-a-vis
the EU)’ supported by Lifelong Learning: Erasmus, Jean Monnet Programme of Education,
Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, European Commission, Grant Agreement 2012-
2884; and (2) an international interdisciplinary research project on EU External Energy
Governance towards the emerging powers China, Brazil, India and South Africa financed by
Volkswagen Foundation (VW, Germany), Riksbankens Jubieumsfonds (Sweden) and Compagnia
de San Paolo (Italy).

1. Interdisciplinary project financed through VW. Data came from interviews, document analy-
sis and a survey including network analysis with overall 143 foundations. For details, see
Knodt et al. (2015).
2. Brazilian actors try to communicate above the average with the EU public actors. This can be
explained by the specific time of the analysis (2012–2013), when Brazilian actors attempted
to engage with the EU on the certification of Brazil’s second generation of biofuels according
to EU standards.

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

472 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

References
Baccini L, Lenzi V and Thurner P (2011) Global energy governance: Bilateral trade and the dif-
fusion of international organizations. Paper presented at the 2011 EPSA annual conference,
Dublin, 16–18 June.
Barbé E, Costa O, Herranz-Surrallés A, et al. (2014) The EU in an unsettled international system.
Coping with the power shift in global governance. Paper presented at the ISA conference,
Toronto, ON, Canada, 26–29 March.
Bátora J (2013) The ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’: The EEAS as an interstitial organization and the dynam-
ics of innovation in diplomacy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51(4): 598–613.
Björkdahl A, Chaban N, Leslie J, et al. (eds) (2015) Importing EU Norms? Conceptual Framework
and Empirical Findings. New York: Springer.
Bradford A (2012) The Brussels effect. Northwestern Law Reviews 107(1). Available at: http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/v107/n1/1/LR107n1Bradford.pdf
Bretherton C and Vogler J (1999) The European Union as a Global Actor. London: Routledge.
Buber M (1958) I and Thou. New York: Scribner.
Castells M (2009) Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cowan G and Arsenault A (2008) Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The three
layers of public diplomacy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 616: 10–30.
Cull N (2008) Public diplomacy, taxonomies and histories. The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 616: 31–54.
Damro C (2012) Market power Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 19(5): 682–699.
Dyer H and Trombetta MJ (eds) (2013) International Handbook of Energy Security. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Elgström O and Smith M (eds) (2006) The European Union’s Roles in International Politics:
Concepts and Analysis. London: Routledge.
EUD to Brazil (n.d.) Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/index_en.htm
EUD to China (n.d.) Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/projects/list_of_pro-
jects/202901_en.htm
EUD to India (n.d.) Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/index_en.htm
EUD to South Africa (n.d.) Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/south_africa/index_en.htm
European Commission (2010) Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure
energy, Communication from the European Commission to the European Council and the
European Parliament, COM (2010) 639 final, Brussels.
European Commission (2013) Green Paper. A 2013 framework on climate and energy policy,
COM (2013) 169 final, 27 March, Brussels.
European Commission (2014) European energy security strategy, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 28 May, COM (2014)
330 final.
EU Sustainable Energy Week (EUSEW) (n.d.) Available at: http://eusew.eu/
External Images of the EU (EXIE) as a Global Normative Energy Actor (n.d.) Multilateral Jean
Monnet lifelong learning programme project, European Commission, 2012–2014.
Fahey E (2014) Damro’s ‘Market Power Europe’: A legal perspective, discussion remarks
at University of Luxembourg Faculty of Law ‘EU in the World Lecture Series’, 12 June.
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457810; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2457810
Florini A and Sovacool BJ (2011) Bridging the gaps in global energy governance. Global
Governance 17(1): 57–74.
Goldthau A (2010) Energy diplomacy in trade and investment in oil and gas. In: Goldthau A and
Witte JM (eds) Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institute Press, pp.25–47.

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

Chaban and Knodt 473

Goldthau A (ed.) (2013) The Handbook of Global Energy Policy. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
Goldthau A and Witte JM (2009) Back to the future or forward to the past? Strengthening markets
and rules for effective global energy governance. International Affairs 85(2): 373–390.
Gregory B (2008) Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 616(1): 274–290.
Hemmati M (2000) Multistakeholder Processes for Governance and Sustainability: Beyond
Deadlock and Conflict. London: Earthscan.
Herranz-Surrallés A (2014) An upstream battle: Dealing with adversity in global energy govern-
ance. Paper presented at the UACES conference, Cork, 1–3 September.
Hocking B (2006) Multistakeholder diplomacy: Forms, functions, and frustrations. In: Kurbalija
J and Katrandjiev V (eds) Multistakeholder Diplomacy – Challenges and Opportunities.
Msida: DiploFoundation, pp.13–29.
Holland M and Chaban N (2011) The EU as an agent for democracy: Images of the EU in the
pacific media “Mirror”. Journal of European Integration 33(3): 285–302.
Keohane O and Victor D (2011) The regime complex for climate change. Perspectives on Politics
9(1): 7–23.
Keukeleire S and Delreux T (2014) The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (2013) European Union external energy relations with emerging
powers. Paper presented at the 1st ECPR-SGIR European workshops in international studies
(EWIS), Tartu, 5–8 June.
Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (2015) Challenges of European External Energy Governance
with Emerging Powers: Meeting Tiger, Dragon, Lion and Jaguar. Farnham: Ashgate.
Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (2015a) Introduction. In: Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (eds)
Challenges of European External Energy Governance with Emerging Powers: Meeting
Tiger, Dragon, Lion and Jaguar. Farnham: Ashgate.
Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (2015b) Explaining European union energy governance with
emerging powers. In: Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (eds) Challenges of European External
Energy Governance with Emerging Powers: Meeting Tiger, Dragon, Lion and Jaguar.
Farnham: Ashgate.
Kooiman J (2002) Governance: A social-political perspective. In: Grote J and Bernard G (eds)
Participatory Governance: Political and Societal Implications. Opladen: Leske und Budrich,
pp.71–96.
Lesage D, Van de Graaf T and Westphal K (2010) Global Energy Governance in a Multipolar
World. Aldershot: Ashgate.
McDowell M (2008) Public diplomacy at the crossroads: Definitions and challenges in an “Open
Source” era. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 32: 7–15.
Manners I (2002) Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market
Studies 40(2): 235–258.
Müller F, Knodt M and Piefer N (2015) Conceptualizing emerging powers and EU energy govern-
ance: Towards a research agenda. In: Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (eds) Challenges of
European External Energy Governance with Emerging Powers: Meeting Tiger, Dragon, Lion
and Jaguar. Farnham: Ashgate.
Piefer N, Knodt M and Müller F (2015) Interaction of the EU and emerging powers in energy
policy: Exploring the empirical puzzle. In: Knodt M, Müller F and Piefer N (eds) Challenges
of European External Energy Governance with Emerging Powers: Meeting Tiger, Dragon,
Lion and Jaguar. Farnham: Ashgate.
Rhodes C (1998) The European Union in the World Community. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienuer.
Scott J (2009) From Brussels with love: The transatlantic travels of European law and the chemis-
try of regulatory attraction. American Journal of Comparative Law 57(4): 897–942.

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016

474 Cooperation and Conflict 50(4)

Scott J (2013) Extraterritoriality and territorial extension in EU Law. American Journal of

Comparative Law 62(1): 87–125. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276433
Selianova Y (2011) The energy charter and the international energy governance. In: Selianova Y
(ed.) Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law. New York: Kluwer Law International,
pp.373–406.
Smith H (2002) European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does. London; Sterling,
VA: Pluto Press.
The Treaty of Lisbon (n.d.) The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Available at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en
Van de Graaf T (2013) The Politics and Institutions of Global Energy Governance. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.

Author biographies
Natalia Chaban is Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the National Centre for Research
on Europe, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. She has significant experience in analysing
EU identity outside the EU, widely publishing and advancing methodological expertise in this
regard. Since 2002, she has co-led a comparative transnational project on EU external perceptions
comprising a multicultural team from 20 Asia–Pacific locations, as well as a ‘mirror’ perceptions
project: ‘Asia in the Eyes of Europe’.
Michèle Knodt is JM Chair, specializing in European multilevel governance, European external
energy governance and interest intermediation. She is a leader of the Energy Centre at TU
Darmstadt. She is currently coordinating an international project on EU external energy govern-
ance towards the emerging powers supported by the VW Foundation (Germany), Riksbankens
Jubieumsfonds (Sweden) and Compagnia de San Paolo (Italy), which incorporates 11 EU partners
and four emerging powers.

Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at University College London on March 9, 2016