Legal Research and Thesis Writing ROMUALDO PAGSIBIGAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELEAZAR CABASAL,
Commissioner Lee Respondents.

Pages: 22
Case Digests from Syllabus I.-F-1. To II. F.
Note: Tanada vs Tuvera and Tawang vs LTWD is not included
in the list, since we’ve already read it in other subject/s (Intro
to Law)
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_16386
8_2009.html
In the matter of the charges of plagiarism,
etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo. [A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]

Disclaimer: Read at your own risk FACTS:

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which

Missing Cases (No Digests) dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in
the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr.,
G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967 counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He
raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners, Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the
vs.
honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES
BONIFACIO, respondents. support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/feb1967/gr_l- Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b.
22533_1967.html Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark
Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
G.R. No. 189529 AUGUST 10, 2012 (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian
J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and
WINSTON F. GARCIA his capacity as President and General As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct,
Manager of the GSIS, Petitioner, and at least inexcusable negligence. Interestingly, even the
vs. three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works
MARICAR B. BUENVIAJE-CARREON, Respondent. were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the
assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/feb1967/gr_l-
22533_1967.htmlG.R. No. 163868 June 4, 2009 ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as
emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on
plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons
language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly
understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings,
etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing
off of the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable
element of plagiarism.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the
“deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s
original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence,
in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was
attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice
del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were inadvertently
deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to
take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past
decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404),
the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in
plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all
cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very
disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable
and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used
inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their
works were merely used as background facts in establishing the
state on international law at various stages of its development.
The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’
works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also
stated that since the attributions to said authors were
accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del
Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is
in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of
his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent one.
The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from
reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third
in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was
merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft
Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important
portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error
on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence
nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent
when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to
researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices
in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to
assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to
the researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control in the
writing of the draft.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos
researcher also explained, most legal references, including the
collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic
diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of
books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that
were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied
them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of
materials that she thought she might need.
She electronically cut relevant materials from books and
journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these to a main
manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for
discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the
Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general
shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that
manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the
positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and
adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her
continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor,
demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that
computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their work.
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S.
TABALINGCOS A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for
Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty.
Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the
respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The
complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his counsel, and the
respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The
commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position
papers.
In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1,
2005, he averred that he was employed by the respondent as
financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of
corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they
had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to
₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases
they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees
paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was
issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent
being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were
working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to
him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful
solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms
as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross
immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his
first marriage was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and
asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his law
firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.,
one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that
complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing
his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them
regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional
fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that
the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also
denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his
contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement
and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations
of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross
immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed
messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no
probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other
women
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit
Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of respondent wherein he
attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts
referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to
the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that he was
not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that
criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
He also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both
petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there
were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his
name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar
Lozano on different occasions.
The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20
November 2007. Respondent moved for the suspension of the
resolution of the administrative case against him, pending
outcome of petition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was
denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case
against him be submitted for resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its
Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges
against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the
nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for
lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client
for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited
cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the
violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found
respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the
gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar
him was premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the
Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution
dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful
solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for
having married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the
fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge
against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale
behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an
agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the
Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the
case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an
agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the
fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and
void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for
unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations
in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed
the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations
and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific
provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case,
he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers
from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other
lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the
business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner
as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of
the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one
that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice
of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by
complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated
to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for
the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering
consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the
degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, the
Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the
latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third charge: Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment
case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness
of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v.
Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as
the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this
case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications
for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards
for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified
true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages
while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third
marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a
negative pregnant.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that
respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage
was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56
we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar
whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack
of that good moral character required of them not only as a
condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise,
for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been
made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is
because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is
expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times
since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and
honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of
dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration
of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an
officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and
moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may
rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to
disbar respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys.
Hipos Sr vs Bay GR No 174813-15 17
March 2009
Facts: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one
Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed
against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur
Villaruel and two others before RTC presided by Judge Bay.
Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been
filed against petitioners and their co-
accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases. Hipos and other filed their Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed
against them. However, 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor reversed the
Resolution holding that there was lack of probable cause. City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations
before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the motion hence the
petition.
Issue: WON the Hon. Supreme compel Judge Bay to dismiss
the case through a writ of mandamus by virtue of the
resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of QC finding no
probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing a
motion to withdraw information.
Decision: Petition bereft of merit.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when
the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that
of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving
judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ
of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in
those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of either. While a judge refusing to act on
a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled
by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to
act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the
case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to
Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying
the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to
Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners
should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the
assailed Order of Judge Bay.
Allied Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 144412 (2003)
Topic. Other unethical conduct
Case. Petition for certiorari assailing CA decision dismissing
Galanida
Facts. Allied Bank Corporation (ABC) hired Galanida as
accountant book-keeper with conditions that the Bank has
right to transfer employees whenever public necessity
requires. Galanida every now and then got transferred and
promoted. One day, ABC sought his transfer to Bacolod.
Galanida refused through a letter arguing that the transfer
would impede his family relationships in Cebu. Thereafter,
Galanida filed a complaint in the Labor Arbiter for constructive
dismissal. ABC transferred Galanida to Tagbiliran citing its
Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure which provides that
refusal to transfer is insubordination and insubordination is
punishable by suspension to dismissal. Galanida retaliated in
a letter asserting discrimination and favoritism practices by the
management. Bank Memo fired him.
Labor arbiter issued a decision in favor of Galanida citing
Dosch v. NLRC which supposedly pens that “refusal to obey a
transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where
employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being
away from the family.” National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed Labor Arbiter decision via same Dosch case.
CA affirmed the same.
Issue. Was Galanida illegally dismissed? -No
Ratio. No because the dismissal was within ABC’s power and
there appears to be no discrimination in the action as transfers
in the bank are routine.
Doctrine. Relevant discussion in line with Legal Research
pertains to the citation of Dosch. The present court asserts
that the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA misquoted the decision
in Dosch. The above cited phrase, the court says, was lifted
from the syllabus of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA). The Court in Dosch did not rule anything of the kind
as proposed by the SCRA. SCRA does not reflect the opinion
of the Court as they are mere works of reporters and lawyers
beyond the Judiciary’s ambit. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer
should not misquote or misrepresent court decision texts.
Having cited these portions of the report, the lawyers in Labor
Arbiter, NLRC, and CA violated said provision.
COMELEC v. Noynay G.R. No.132365 (1998)
Topic. Other unethical conducts
Case. Petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing RTC
judge’s decision
Facts. COMELEC charged some public teachers with
violations of Omnibus Election in their engagement in partisan
political activities. COMELEC then filed these criminal cases in
RTC. RTC, through Judge Noynay directed COMELEC to file
the cases in MTC as RTC supposedly had no jurisdiction.
COMELEC filed an MR arguing that RTC has jurisdiction
following Alberto v. Lavilles where the court supposedly ruled
that RTC has jurisdiction over election cases. Noynay
dismissed MR. COMELEC appeals in present court.
Issue. Did RTC Judge Noynay err in remanding the case to
MTC? -Yes
Ratio. He did because the present case falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC, not MTC. In this issue, two laws should
be juxtaposed. On the one hand, the Omnibus Election Code
states that RTC has jurisdiction for violations of the code,
except on cases of failure to register or vote. One the other, a
BP states that MTC has jurisdiction for cases with penalties of
one year to six years. In this case, the RTC implemented the
BP. However, the present court finds his ruling mistaken in
that in the same BP providing MTC jurisdiction, it is stated that
MTC has jurisdiction only in cases that does not fall within
RTC jurisdiction. Omnibus Election Code gives jurisdiction to
RTC on violates of the code. The violation presented in this
case is a violation of the code. This provided, RTC has
jurisdiction, regardless if the penalty is less than six years.
Thus, Judge Noynay erred in ruling that RTC has no
jurisdiction.
Doctrine. In relation to Legal Research, this case is relevant in
that it zoomed in on the judge’s misreading of the law and on
the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandate
that judges should be studious in the principles of law and
office administration in due regard of legal system integrity,
respectively. As well, Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates them to be faithful to the law and
to maintain professional competence. The above actions of
Hon. Noynay contradicts these provisions.
Similarly, Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that lawyers should not misquote or
represent court rulings. In its MR, COMELEC through its
counsel Atty. Balbuena cited Alberto v. Judge Lavilles. In this
citation, however, the present court finds that errors persist.
One, that the plaintiff in the case is Alberto Naldoza not
Alberto Naldeza or Alberto as used by the COMELEC lawyer.
Two, that that case is 254 of SCRA not 245. And third, in its
ascription of a Court Administrator’s Memo as the Court’s
ruling. Atty. Balbuena is admonished.
In Re Application of Max Shoop for
Admission to Practice Law
November 29, 1920
Facts:
This is an application to the court by Max Shoop for admission
to practice law in the Philippines Islands wherein the applicant
has been admitted to practice, and has practiced for more than
five years in the highest court of the State of New York.
With the rule cited by the court, the following are required for
compliance for the admission of the applicant:
1. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced
five years as a member of the bar in the highest law
court in any other state or territory of the American
Union or in the District of Columbia.
2. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced
five years in another country whose jurisprudence is
based on the principles of the English Common Law.
Issue:
Whether Max Shoop is qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Ruling:
Accordingly, the supporting papers filed by the applicant in this
case showing to the satisfaction of the court his qualifications
as an attorney-at-law, his petition is hereby granted and he is
admitted to the practice of law in the Philippine Islands.
The decision is based upon the interpretation of the New York
rule:
(1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of the
United States, under a civil government established by the
Congress.
(2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of
this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decision in cases not
covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon
the theories and precedents of Anglo- American cases, subject
to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants
of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law
theories and of the few cases where such precedents are
inconsistent with local customs and institutions.
(3) The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the
English Common Law in its present day form of Anglo-
American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.
(4) By virtue of the foregoing, the New York rule, given a
reasonable interpretation, permits conferring privileges on
attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands similar
to those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-
45081, July 15, 1936.
FACTS:
The case was an original action filed by Jose Angara for the
issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission (EC) from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
former.
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, et.al., were candidates for the
position of National Assembly member for 1st district of
Tayabas Province.
On October 7, 1935, Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Angara as the winner. Angara then took his oath of
office. National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8
(Confirming the election of members of the National Assembly
against whom no protest had been filed)
Subsequently, Respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of
Angara. Electoral Commission adopted a resolution,
paragraph 6 of which provides: “The commission will not
consider any protest that is not submitted on or before this day
(Dec. 9)”
Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to
dismiss the protest” on the ground that it must uphold
Resolution No. 8 of National Assembly. Ynsua countered that
there is no constitutional prohibition barring the filing of protest.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution denying
the “Motion to dismiss the Protest” filed by Angara.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission as well as the subject matter of the controversy
(Resolution of National Assembly or Resolution of EC) – YES.
2. WoN the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction when: (1)it assumed cognizance of the protest
despite the previous confirmation by the National Assembly;
(2) it adopted its resolution in Dec. 9 – NO.
3. WoN Resolution No. 8 can “nullify” filing of protest or toll the
time of filing protest effectively rendering the resolution of the
Electoral Commission moot – NO.
RATIO:
1. On judicial review
“In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.”
Sec. 4 of Art VI provides EC the sole power of deciding such
matters. Also, from the transcript of the Framers’ discussion, it
is clearly the intention of the Framers to give EC “sole”
jurisdiction over election protests.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of powers within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere but it does not follow that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other.
Constitution institutes the system of checks and balances.
Moderating power of the court is granted by clear implication
from section 2 article VIII of the Constitution.
The judiciary does not intend to assert superiority over other
departments or deliberately nullify of invalidate acts of the
legislature. It merely asserts the obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims for authority
under the Constitution and establish rights for the parties.
“Power of judicial review is limited only to actual cases and
controversies…and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented.”
2. On the legality of the Electoral Commission’s acts
National Assembly has no jurisdiction over election protests so
it follows that they don’t have the authority to prescribe the
time or prevent the filing of protest. Separation within same
branch of government.
Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative. It acted within its jurisdiction. The
EC’s resolution will stand. National Assembly’s Resolution No.
8 should neither prevent the filing of protest within the time
prescribed in EC’s resolution nor “toll the time” in filing
protests.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR 94 PHIL. 534 (1954)
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the
Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to
Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to
and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade
lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall
be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect
of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the
Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for
an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was
based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission
who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to
the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution
of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary
prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative
power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this
power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can
practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to
class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could
not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law
was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not
revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission
to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall
within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify
rules of admission to the practice of law.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically
considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato
C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18,
2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or
limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such
as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment
of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether
the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the
Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed
of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article
VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article
VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the
same character, in that they affect the power of the President
to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only
to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the
framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds
of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
PHIL. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
GR. NO. 1677330 September 18, 2009, SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION (CORONA, J.)
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is
to establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid group
practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance
organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons
enrolled in the health care plan and to provide for the
administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the
organization. On January 27, 2000, respondent CIR sent
petitioner a formal deman letter and the corresponding
assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency
taxes, including surcharges and interest, for the taxable years
1996 and 1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18. The
deficiency assessment was imposed on petitioner’s health
care agreement with the members of its health care program
pursuant to Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code. Petitioner
protested the assessment in a letter dated February 23, 2000.
As respondent did not act on the protest, petitioner filed a
petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking
the cancellation of the deficiency VAT and DST assessments.
On April 5, 2002, the CTA rendered a decision, ordering the
petitioner to PAY the deficiency VAT amounting to
P22,054,831.75 inclusive of 25% surcharge plus 20% interest
from January 20, 1997 until fully paid for the 1996 VAT
deficiency and P31,094,163.87 inclusive of 25% surcharge
plus 20% interest from January 20, 1998 until fully paid for the
1997 VAT deficiency. Accordingly, VAT Ruling No. [231]-88 is
declared void and without force and effect. The 1996 and 1997
deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby
CANCELLED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent is ORDERED to
DESIST from collecting the said DST deficiency tax.
Respondent appealed the CTA decision to the (CA) insofar as
it cancelled the DST assessment. He claimed that petitioner’s
health care agreement was a contract of insurance subject to
DST under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code.
On August 16, 2004, the CA rendered its decision which held
that petitioner’s health care agreement was in the nature of a
non-life insurance contract subject to DST. Respondent is
ordered to pay the deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.
engaged in insurance business.
(2) Whether or not the agreements between petitioner and its
members possess all elements necessary in the insurance
contract.
HELD:
NO. Health Maintenance Organizations are not engaged in the
insurance business. The SC said in June 12, 2008 decision
that it is irrelevant that petitioner is an HMO and not an insurer
because its agreements are treated as insurance contracts
and the DST is not a tax on the business but an excise on the
privilege, opportunity or facility used in the transaction of the
business. Petitioner, however, submits that it is of critical
importance to characterize the business it is engaged in, that
is, to determine whether it is an HMO or an insurance
company, as this distinction is indispensable in turn to the
issue of whether or not it is liable for DST on its health care
agreements. Petitioner is admittedly an HMO. Under RA 7878
an HMO is “an entity that provides, offers or arranges for
coverage of designated health services needed by plan
members for a fixed prepaid premium. The payments do not
vary with the extent, frequency or type of services provided.
Section 2 (2) of PD 1460 enumerates what constitutes “doing
an insurance business” or “transacting an insurance
business”which are making or proposing to make, as insurer,
any insurance contract; making or proposing to make, as
surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as
merely incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of
the surety; doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance
business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of
an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; doing
or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to
any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the
provisions of this Code.
Overall, petitioner appears to provide insurance-type benefits
to its members (with respect to its curative medical services),
but these are incidental to the principal activity of providing
them medical care. The “insurance-like” aspect of petitioner’s
business is miniscule compared to its noninsurance activities.
Therefore, since it substantially provides health care services
rather than insurance services, it cannot be considered as
being in the insurance business
G.R. No. L-49112 – 88 SCRA 195 – Political Law –
Constitutional Law – Generally Accepted Principles of
International Law – Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is
assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which
requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular
early warning devices•. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights
which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists.
And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of
reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would
only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an
expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose
cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore
and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking
lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968
Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist
from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without
thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that
road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which
is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers
passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of
the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance
warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all
about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car?
Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind
of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the
danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise
of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the
main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it
has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of
the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in
the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force,
Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence
in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in
a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it
could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe
v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above
sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government.
It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its
scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or
urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power
measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public
safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-
existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained
the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with
the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and
streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact,
the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group
established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as
then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with
“the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The
serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave
under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the
signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92
out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed
the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The
Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone
sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA
and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003
(E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In
esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of
the strategic security and defense partnership between the two
countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements
have been effected by and between the US and 33 other
countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or
former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other
shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any
international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other
entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the
purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers
a person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not
agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise
transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP]
will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the
third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the
date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to
terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement
shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or
any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L.
Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28,
2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that,
under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion
to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER
AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations that
are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to
form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot
be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain
well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and
jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations
Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term
as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement,
that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each
of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the
accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government
Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of
its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and
“executive agreements” have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On
the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and
at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner
to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The
Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and
other governments ends and agreements – whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-
028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself,
or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as
consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a
legally binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab
initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance
with allegedly universally recognized principles of international
law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals
immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes
our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x
x x.”63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier
position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP,
by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international
law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard
that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its
desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x
The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and
competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its
national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and
judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression
that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape
criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the
Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the
US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of
individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things,
there is nothing immoral or violative of international law
concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an
offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.
Saguisag v. Exec Secretary Ochoa July 26,
2016 G.R. No. 212426 EDCA, Treaty,
Executive Agreement, International
Agreement
FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking
to reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v.
Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between
the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to
this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a
treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction
under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on
foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they
reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications,
taxation, and nuclear weapons.
The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is
evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the Decision that
EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the
allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it
provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases,
troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S.
military bases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
RULING:
Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to
their original petition, claiming that the VFA and MDT did not
allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors
We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty
despite the presence of these provisions. The very nature of
EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably
categorize it as an executive agreement – a class of
agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25
restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the
Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of
Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which
they are concluded.
As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of
noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve
arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules,
laws, or agreements.
They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers
under the Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior
constitutional or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a
domestic variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms
and designations of international agreements, ranging from the
traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified
forms that no longer necessitate ratification.
An international agreement may take different forms: treaty,
act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d’arbitrage,
convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute,
pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement,
modus vivendi, or some other form.
Consequently, under international law, the distinction between
a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive
agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining
international rights and obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law
distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and
executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form,
or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is
demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain
two very important features that distinguish treaties from
executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in
the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an
express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the
validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious
question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce
the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not
to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn,
executive agreements cannot create new international
obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably
implied in the law they purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior

to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of
the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements,
which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being
on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable
conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is
prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive
agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty
are considered ineffective. Both types of international
agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate

the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an executive
agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT,
and seamlessly merged with the whole web of Philippine law.
We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices to state
that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves
treaty status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It

fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT
and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued
policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various
military and humanitarian issues that may arise.