Ahmad
CASE NO. 01 CASE NO. 02
ART XVIII SEC 8: Transitory Provisions
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village
Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila. BAVA, received a letter of request from MMDA to open Neptune
Street of Bel-Air village for the use of the public. The said opening of the street
was for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow in
Makati City, pursuant to MMDA law or RA No. 7924. On the same day, BAVA
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Ave.
would be demolished. BAVA to stop the opening of the street and demolition of
the wall filed a preliminary injunction and a TRO, it claimed that the MMDA had
no authority to do so and the court decided in its favor, MMDA now appealed the
decision and claimed authority to open the said street to public traffic because it
is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila.
Issue: WON MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune St. to public pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers.
Ruling: No. The court held that the MMDA has no such capacity to exercise police
power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However,
police power may be delegated to government units. MMDA here is a
development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, such
powers cannot be delegated to them, hence they cannot exercise it. RA 7924 does
not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila, it is not a
legislative unit of the government. The powers of the MMDA are limited only to
the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of system
and administration. There is no syllable that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power.
Main Point: MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental org. and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
Ahmad
ART XVIII SEC 16: CAREER CIVIL SERVICE OFFICER
Dario v. Mison
Facts: Mison sent notices of termination to 394 Custom officials in accordance
with Cory Aquino’s effort to reorganize the government, some sought
reinstatement from the CSC to which the latter granted 279 of them, thereafter
Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC, also RA 6656 was
passed providing that all officers and employees who are found by the CSC to
have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered
reinstated or reappointed. Dario was one of the deputy Commissioners of BOC
until his relief on orders of Mison, he questions the legality of his dismissal which
he alleged is upon the authority of Sec. 59 EO 127, which he claims Mison could
not have legally invoked, he avers that he could not have been legally deemed to
be an “incumbent whose position is not included therein or who is not
reappointed” to justify his separation from service, finally he claims that under
the provisional constitution, the power to dismiss public officials without cause
ended Feb. 25, 1987, thereafter they enjoyed security of tenure under the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: WON Sec. 16 of Art. XVIII is a grant of a license upon the government to
remove Career Public Officials it could have validly done under an “automatic”-
vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
Ruling: No. By its terms, the authority to remove a public official under the
provisional constitution ended on Feb. 25, 1987 advanced by jurisprudence to
Feb. 2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place
is upon the authority of the present charter, and necessarily upon the mantle of
its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that the
court is merely continuing what the revolutionary constitution of the
revolutionary government had started. Assuming then that this reorganization
allows removals “not for a cause” in a manner that would have been permissible
in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that
the Commissioner would have been powerless, In any event to order the
dismissal at the Customs Bureau left and right. Lastly, reorganizations must be
carried in good faith, in this case Mison failed to prove that the reorganization
was indeed made in good faith because he hired more people to replace thoses
that he fired, and no legitimate structural changes have been made. To sum up
the President could have validly removed officials before the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution even without cause because it was a revolutionary
Government. However, from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State
did not lose its right to reorganize resulting to removals, but such
reorganization must be made in good faith.
Main point: IN BOLD
Ahmad
CASE NO. 03
ART XVIII SEC 16: CAREER CIVIL SERVICE OFFICER
Mendoza v. Quisumbing
Facts: Mendoza questions the validity of the letter-order of the then Sec. DECS
Quisumbing which terminated his employment as Schools Division
Superintendent of Surigao City, he has served the DepEd for forty-two years and
was even re-appointed by Quisumbing as such with a PERMANENT status.
Pursuant to EO 117, which provides for a reorganization of the DECS he was
considered separated from the service, it even particularly stated that all
incumbent officials/personnel are on ‘holdover’ status unless advised otherwise.
In place of Mendoza, Sering was appointed on permanent status but in the
meantime, Mendoza wrote a letter to the Sec. requesting reconsideration of the
letter-order, this was forwarded to RAB which remained unacted upon, hence
Mendoza filed this instant petition. In a resolution, RAB recommended that action
on the letter-consideration be deferred pending resolution of the instant petition.
Issue: WON the separation of Mendoza et.al from office allegedly resulting from
the reorganization is valid.
Ruling: No. It is apparent that Mendoza’s termination was pursuant to the public
respondent's view that under Section 24 of Executive Order No. 117 all
incumbent officials/personnel of DECS were on hold-over status unless advised
otherwise. The use of "reorganization" even under the concept advocated by the
SOLGEN appears trivial if not unnecessary. To use reorganization of the biggest
Department in the government in order to avoid the hassles of bringing
administrative charges against Mendoza and perhaps a few other
alleged persona-non-gratas like him is precisely what the Court rejects when it
applied the bona-fide rule. There was GAD when the petitioner's services were
terminated by a mere letter-order on the justification that the petitioner, together
with the entire personnel of the DECS, was only in a hold-over capacity. If the
petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to the charges against him
instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over status in order to run after him.
Petition was granted, the letter-order set-aside and Mendoza was ordered to be
restored to his position.
Main Point: An examination of the facts of these cases invariably shows that the
bona-fide rule has been ignored or disobeyed. It is a paramount principle in
Public Officers’ Law that the power to abolish public offices vested in the
legislature is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations that it be exercised in
good faith, should never be for personal or political reasons, and cannot, be
implemented in a manner contrary to law.
RAB- Reorganization Appeals Board
Ahmad
CASE NO. 04
ART XVIII SEC 16: CAREER CIVIL SERVICE OFFICER
Ontiveros v. CA
Facts: Petitioner was Security Officer I in the Investigation and Security Division
of the Ministry of tourism, having been appointed to that position on 1976 and
on 1986, he was dismissed from the service for inefficiency, incompetence, and
unauthorized absences by then Minister of Tourism Gonzales. Ontiveros
appealed this to the CSC, but it was not given due course since accordingly
jurisdiction over such appeal was vested with the Review Committee, he filed for
MOfR, but was again denied by the CSC stating that Pursuant to the Provisional
Constitution and the various Executive Orders issued by then President Aquino
when she was the sole law-making authority, the different Departments of
Government were authorized to carry on reorganization programs. No specific
causes for removal were given in the Provisional Constitution because at that
time, there was no setting up of clear-cut policies and guidelines on
reorganization to protect the security of tenure of civil servants. Despite the
foregoing circumstances, Ontiveros was removed from the service on the bases
of two administrative offenses. Therefore, it is with more reason that his
separation from the service under the [Provisional] Constitution was justified,
especially considering that the same is for cause. Another MOfR was filed before
the CA which was again denied, they held that review of petitioner’s dismissal
was barred by laches, hence the petition.
Issue: WON this case does not fall under the Review Committee's jurisdiction
because his separation from the service was not in consequence of the
reorganization of the government, as provided in the Provisional Constitution but
was for cause; hence, appeal lies with the CSC.
Ruling: No. petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of a proclamation or
executive order of the President of the Philippines nor by reason of
the designation or appointment and qualification of his successor, the
memorandum of then Minister Gonzales, dismissing him from the service, clearly
stated that it was being issued pursuant to Art. III, 2 of the Provisional
Constitution since the grounds for petitioner's dismissal are grounds under civil
service laws and regulations. E.O. No.17 provided the grounds for the separation
of employees from the service not to bring their cases under ordinary civil service
laws and regulations but to provide limits on what otherwise would be absolute
discretion and thus prevent an abuse of power.
FRED
CASE No.5
ARTICLE XVIII, SEC 25: FOREIGN MILITARY BASES,
TROOPS AND FACILITIES
BAYAN V ZAMORA
FACTS: On July 18, 1997, the US panel met with the Philippine panel, to exchange
notes on the complementing strategic interests of the US and the Philippines in the
Asia-Pacific region. Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated
draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations[3] that
culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary
Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
Thereafter, President Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA.
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Ex Sec Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines pursuant to Sec 21 Art VII. It
was later approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members.
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes
between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA
has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the
Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should
apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which
involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint
military exercises
ISSUE: W/N he VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD: NO. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other
things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the
Senate, it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light
of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific
terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made
by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article
XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.
FRED
CASE No.6
ARTICLE XVIII, SEC 26: SEQUESTRATION ORDERS
JOYA V. PCGG
Facts: Chairman of PCGG through letter, requested President Cory, to sign the
proposed Consignment Agreement between PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods
International, Inc. concerning the scheduled sale of (82) Old Masters Paintings and
antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the MMM alleged to be part of the ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses. In1990s, President Cory, authorized the signing of the
Agreement allowing Christie's to auction off the subject art pieces. COA later found
out in an audit it conducted that the assets subject of auction were historical relics and
had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. 2
PCGG defended the Consignment Agreement and on the same date, Director of
National Museum issued a certification that the items subject of the agreement did not
qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Later sale at public auction proceeded
as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.
Petitioners allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces,
petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of
law in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: W/N petitioners are the real party in interest?
Held: NO. Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They themselves allege that
the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock
corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman
was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R.
Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the
foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given
the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued
pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Mainpoint: The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or
legal question.
NOTE: I really can’t relate the case to the section. Subject to change pa tong case na
to.
FRED
CASE No.7
ARTICLE XVIII, SEC 26: SEQUESTRATION ORDERS
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: PCGG, on the basis of prima facie evidence, issued an order sequestering
Philippine Integrated Meat Corporation. The RoP, through the PCGG, filed with
respondent a Complaint against Marcos and Peter Sabido for illegally acquiring
PIMECO assets. Sabido in an answer refuted that he was a close business associate of
F. Marcos and that he has not participated in the acts stated in the complaint.
Sabido learned later that the PCGG intends to turn over the management of PIMECO
to the GSIS through its subsidiary Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines MPCP.
Sandiganbayan in an order required the PCGG to submit its comment specifically ‘as
to the veracity of the alleged turnover of PIMECO to the GSIS if true, to furnish
movant a copy of the PCGG resolution or order approving the same.
In a motion Sabido prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that
would enjoin the PCGG from transferring the management, control and possession of
PIMECO to the GSIS/MPCP which the SB granted.
Petitioner argues, among others, that PCGG’s selection of the men who should manage
PIMECO involves the exercise of its purely administrative functions or managerial
prerogatives which may not be interfered with by the Court. Petitioner further assails
the jurisdiction of respondent court in rendering the assailed resolution since this is a
clear violation of the time-honored constitutional rule of separation of powers.
ISSUE: W/N PCGG excessed its powers in turning over the management of PIMECO
TO MPCP?
RULING: Yes. Powers of PCGG do not include performance of acts of
ownership. SC found that the projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MPCP
is unwarranted and was effected or done by petitioner beyond the scope of the powers
vested upon it by law. Such turnover made by the PCGG is equivalent to the
performance of an act of ownership which PCGG cannot exercise. SC have invariably
ruled that the PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker which can exercise only
powers of administration over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over
(Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company Inc., v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, 150 SCRA 181 [1987]; Cojuangco, Jr., v. Roxas, 195 SCRA 797
[1991]). In the exercise of its functions, it must consistently bear in mind that it can
only do acts and things necessary to fulfill its mission to conserve and preserve
sequestered assets.
FRED
CASE No.8
ARTICLE XVIII, SEC 26: SEQUESTRATION ORDERS
COJUANCO V ROXAS
FACTS: On April 18, 1989, the annual meeting of shareholders of SMC was held.
Among the matters taken up was the election of fifteen (15) members of the board of
directors for the ensuing year. Petitioners were among the twenty four (24) nominees
to the board. Because of PCGG's claim that the shares of stock were under
sequestration, PCGG was allowed to represent and vote the shares of stocks of the
following shareholders.
Representatives of the corporate shares present at the meeting claimed that the shares
are not under sequestration; or that if they are under sequestration, the PCGG had no
right to vote the same. They were overruled. The fifteen individuals who received the
highest number of votes were declared elected.
On May 31, 1989, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a petition for quo
warranto impleading as respondents the fifteen (15) candidates who were declared
elected members of the board of directors of SMC for the year 1989-1990. Summons
was issued only as to respondents Antonio J. Roxas, Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. and Oscar T.
Hilado whose election will be affected by the claim of petitioners if the same were
upheld.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the main thrust of which is that the right to vote
sequestered shares of stock is vested in the actual shareholders not in the PCGG.
ISSUE: W/N PCGG has the right to vote the sequestered shares of petitioners
RULING: No, the Court finds and so holds that the PCGG has no right to vote the
sequestered shares of petitioners including the sequestered corporate shares. Only
their owners, duly authorized representatives or proxies may vote the said shares.
FRED
CASE No.9
ARTICLE XVIII, SEC 26: SEQUESTRATION ORDERS
ARANETA III V SB
FACTS: PCGG conducted a preliminary investigation on the supposed transfer of a
major portion of the assets of PNEI to NETI, a newly organized corporation
principally owned and controlled by Araneta III, a son-in-law of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos who was on "forced" exile abroad.
After wrapping up its preliminary investigation against averred close associates of
the late President, the PCGG filed its information with the Sandiganbayan.
When the official ban against his return to the country was lifted, petitioner came
back. Later, prior to his arraignment, Araneta III filed an omnibus motion to quash
the amended information or to refer the case to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation.
He averred that the PCGG did not have the legal authority to file the information for
alleged graft and corruption. The SB denied petitioner's motion to quash. Hence the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SB acted with GAD when it ruled the PCGG has the
authority to conduct the prelim investigation of and file an ordinary graft case under
R.A. 3019, contrary to and in violation of doctrines clearly enunciated in its previous
rulings?
HELD: No. The SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan in refusing to dismiss the case. While the information may have used
the exact terminologies of R.A. No. 3019, viz, “with manifest partiality and evident
bad faith;” “with manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions;”
“unwarranted benefits, advantages and preferences;” and “causing undue injury to
the damage and prejudice of the Government,” it is, nevertheless, clear that the
charge against petitioner (for violation of R.A. No. 3019) is in relation to E.O. No. 1,
No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A, on the ultimate recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
For a penal violation to fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG under Section 2(a) of
Executive Order No. 1, the following elements must concur: (1). It must relate to
alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2). Of the late President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates; (3). Who took undue advantage of their
public office and/or used their power, authority, influence, connections or
relationship.”
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 10
ART XVIII SEC. 26: SEQUESTRATION ORDERS
AUTHORITY OVER ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
ROMUALDEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: One of the very first undertakings of the Revolutionary Government
swept into power by the so-called EDSA Revolution in February, 1986 was the
recovery of "ill-gotten wealth" reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs.
Ferdinand Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Pursuant to
this, the PCGG was created by virtue of E.O. No. 1.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction
over all cases of ill-gotten wealth.
RULING: Yes. Executive Order No. 145 conferred on the Sandiganbayan exclusive
and original jurisdiction over all cases of ill-gotten wealth. The exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was stressed in BASECO case and in PCGG vs.
Peña, et al. Furthermore, it appears to have been universally acknowledged that
President Aquino had legitimate authority to wield legislative power under
the revolutionary regime until the constitution was promulgated on March
25, 1986. The matter of the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was explicitly dealt
with therein; and President Aquino was thereby given the right and duty to
"give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people," among
others, to "recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people
through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." These
special remedies were prescribed and defined in Executive Orders
Numbered 1 (creation of Presidential Commission on Good Government or
PCGG) and 2 (identifying said ill-gotten wealth). The PCGG's powers
included "the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by the Marcos’.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 11
ART XVIII SEC. 26: SEQUESTRATION ORDERS
JUDICIAL ACTION
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: PCGG issued an Order of Sequestration directed against all properties,
assets, records and documents of PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. (PHI); another
Order sequestering shares of stock of PHILIPPINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INVESTMENT CORPORATION (PTIC); and a letter addressed to a law firm
that the PCGG, in its session, resolved, among others, to order the
sequestration of all the shareholdings PHI, which owns approximately 46% of
PTIC, which in turn owns approximately 26% of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT). Three years later, Civil Case No. 0002 was filed
seeking to declare the order of sequestration against PHI automatically
lifted for the failure of PCGG to file the appropriate judicial action within
the period prescribed under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, or not later than 2 August 1987, since the sequestration order was
issued on May 9, 1986, which was a date before the ratification of the Philippine
Constitution on 2 February 1987. Sandiganbayan in its resolution,
automatically lifted the sequestration orders against PHI and its shares of
stock in PTIC; hence the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sequestration order is deemed invalid and
automatically lifted on the ground that the PCGG failed, within the prescribed
period, to institute or to implead or include private respondents in the proper
judicial action, as required by the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: Yes. Petition denied. Whether PHI itself—an entirely different
corporate entity, though a major investor in PTIC—has shareholdings unlawfully
or anomalously acquired, or whether it was organized with ill-gotten wealth, is a
different matter. Notably, the judicial action against them was belatedly
instituted long after the lapse of the constitutional time frame.
MAIN POINT: Prescription is a legal defense accorded any person against whom
a judicial action is belatedly brought after the lapse of the time specified by law.
Here, it is the Constitution itself which defines the period within which judicial
proceedings may be brought against sequestered entities. From the foregoing, it
is clear that no judicial action was instituted against the private respondents
within the prescribed period.
PASTOR
Case No. 12
ART. XVIII SEC 27: TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
EFFECTIVITY
De Leon vs. Esguerra
FACTS:
1. In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with
the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B.
Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A
separate Memorandum with the same dates was also issued by Hon.
Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen.
2. De Leon along with the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the
subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the respondents from
taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that
OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the
1987 Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6) years in
pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
valid.
HELD:
No. The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date
when it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was
already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in
Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions.
MAIN POINT:
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987.
By that date therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its
ratification.
RYLE
CASE NO. 13
ART XVI SEC 26: SEQUESTRATION, ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, FREEZE ORDERS
Cojuangco v. Roxas
FACTS: Petitioners are stockholders of record of SMC. On April 18, 1989, the
annual meeting of shareholders of SMC was held. Among the matters taken up
was the election of fifteen (15) members of the board of directors for the ensuing
year. On the date of the annual meeting, 94.58%, of the shares were present at
the meeting, either in person or by proxy. Because of PCGG's claim that the shares
of stock were under sequestration, PCGG was allowed to represent and vote the
shares of stocks of said shareholders. Representatives of the corporate shares
present at the meeting claimed that the shares are not under sequestration; or
that if they are under sequestration, the PCGG had no right to vote the same. They
were overruled. With PCGG voting the corporate shares, an election for members
of the SMC board of directors commenced, where petitioners were elected. The
PCGG claimed it represented 85,756,279 shares at the meeting including the
corporate shares which corresponded to 1,286,744,185 votes which in turn were
distributed equally among the fifteen (15) candidates who were declared elected.
Petitioners allege that the 27,211,770 shares or a total of 408,176,550 votes
representing the corporate shares, were illegally cast by PCGG and should be
counted in favor of petitioners
In due course, a resolution was rendered by the Sandiganbayan on November 16, become inoperative, the OIC Gov. could no longer rely on Sec. 2 of Art III
1989, affirming its jurisdiction over the petition but dismissing it for lack of cause thereof to designate respondents to the elective position occupied by De
of action on the ground that the PCGG has the right to vote sequestered shares. Leon et. al.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG) may vote the sequestered shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) and elect its members of the board of directors.

RULING: No. PCGG has no right to vote the sequestered shares of petitioners
including the sequestered corporate shares.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds and so holds that the PCGG
has no right to vote the sequestered shares of petitioners including the
sequestered corporate shares. Only their owners, duly authorized
representatives or proxies may vote the said shares.

Ahmad
CASE NO. 14
ART XVIII SEC 27: Effectivity
De Leon v. Esguerra

Facts: De Leon together with the other petitioners were elected as Brgy. Captain
and Councilmen respectively in a Province in Rizal which was held under BP
Blg. 222. On Feb.9, 1987, De Leon received a letter antedated Dec. 1, 1986 but
was signed by OIC-Gov. Esguerra on Feb. 8, 1987 designating Magno as Brgy.
Captain and other respondents as Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that
pursuant to Sec. 3 of BP 222, their terms of office shall be six years which shall
continue until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. It was also
their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no
longer has the authority to replace them and designate their successors. On the
other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the provisional constitution and not because their term
of six years had not yet expired.

Issue: WON the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was

validly made during the one-year period which ended Feb. 25, 1987.

Ruling: No. The 1987 Constitution was ratified Feb. 2, 1987, by that date
the Provisional Constitution was deemed to have been superseded. Having