G.R. NO.

L-19650 SEPTEMBER 29, 1966

CALTEX (Philippines), Inc., petitioner-appellee, vs
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
respondent- appellant

FACTS
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)
conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up
patronage for its oil products for "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants
therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station
will dispense during a specified period. Participation is to be open indiscriminately to all
"motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made.
Foreseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for
mailing.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated
October 31, 1960, in which to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-
lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unfortunately, Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltex‘s request
stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and
ultimately, declined Caltex‘s request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that the contest was not commendable as
a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as ―Gift
Enterprise‖, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUES
1. Do we need to apply rules of construction to determine if ―Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest‖ promo violates the Postal Law?
2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

RULING
1. Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. Construction, verily, is the art or process
of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law. This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme
proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words
used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation
as any other.

2. Yes, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it
appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any
requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any services be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a
prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form
which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing
of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
1
 Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of
some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift
enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for
their market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to
win a prize. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute
lottery. In the present case, the element of consideration is not observed. No
payment or purchase of merchandise was required for the privileged to participate.

G.R. NO. L-39419 APRIL 12,

1982 MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act. Petitioner‘s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month
Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000.00.
The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Subsequently, petitioner was charged
because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation, which is not
allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office
of the Insurance Commission. Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she
naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant left
a note on top of her husband‘s desk. The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On
appeal, the trial court‘s decisions were affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding
petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec
189 of the insurance act.

ISSUE
Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or
intent of the Insurance Act.

RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio.Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person
from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications
for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance

2
 Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within
the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for
its violation. The appellate court‘s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the
second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the
definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189,
which is ―any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of
this section.‖ Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189
of the Insurance Act.

G.R. NO. L-34964 JANUARY 31, 1973

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners
vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents

FACTS
On December 17, 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a
quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino
Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of
money against B & B Forest Development Corporation. To satisfy the judgment, the Acaban
sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest Development Corporation
with the China Banking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued
by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim
Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the CBC of
B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to
comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking
the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly
prohibits the disclosure of any information concerning to bank deposits. The trial court, despite
having denied the motion, ordered that the cashier confirm whether or not the defendants
have existing deposit in their bank. The cashier moved to reconsider but was denied and,
subsequently, he was ordered to comply with the order of the court within 10 days, otherwise,
he would be arrested.

ISSUE
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with
a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions
of Republic Act 1405.

RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972,
with costs against the petitioners.
From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction
of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the
deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process.
Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond
the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did not
order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation,
as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B
& B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order.
3
G.R. No. L-37867 February 22, 1982
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINES VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch
III, and CALIXTO V. GASILAO, respondents.

FACTS
Calixto V. Gasilao, pauper litigant and petitioner in the above-
entitled case, was a veteran in good standing during World War II. On October 19, 1955, he
filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9, Republic Act No. 65. The claim was
disapproved by the Philippine Veterans Board (now Board of Administrators, Philippine
Veterans Administration).
Meanwhile, the said act was amended by RA 1362, including now benefits for the
pensioner‘s unmarried children below 18 years. Another amendment was made in 1957,
increasing the life pension of the veteran but retaining the same benefits for his children.
In 1968, after 12 years following the disapproved claim, it was reconsidered and the
claim was finally approved. The respondent, thereafter, requested from the petitioners that
his claim be made retroactive from the time his original claim was disapproved. The petitioners
did not act on his request. Private respondent claims that he was deprived of his right to the
pension from the time his claim was disapproved until the time of reconsideration. He filed a
petition before the lower court and was granted.
The petitioners through the Solicitor General challenged the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE
Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968

RULING
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office) to make Gasilao‘s pension effective
18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his
then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from
22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said
Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried

minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by
virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for
the purpose.
As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to
compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and
the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated
for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran
pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those
who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war or revolution, by
extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal
construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to
favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides
to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular
language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be
accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights,
privileges, and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old
4
positions in government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations,
a life pension for the incapacited, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and
medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon
approval of the application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which
had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. Such stand, therefore
does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law.
Gasilao‘s claim was sustained.

G.R. No. L-63318 August 18, 1984

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE
CO., respondents.

FACTS
Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the
approval of a revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an
ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however, was set aside by
this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that ―there was a necessity of a
hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the application of the PLDT‖. On
November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the questioned decision permanently approving PLDT‘s
new and increased SIP rates. It is the submission of the petitioner that the SIP schedule
presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC
has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 217.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 2 of PD No. 217 is mandatory.

RULING
What is mandatory however, is the immediate implementation of the policies declared
in P.D. No. 217. It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 217 which is a special law only repeals
pertinent portions of Act 3436 and the Public Service Act (which is a general law regulating
all manner of public franchises) and that the Board of Communications, the immediate
predecessor of the NTC was adequately served by their own rules of procedure. This meant
that the acts complained of by NCF, i.e. the fixing of provisional rates without public hearing
(Section 16 of the public service act), was a valid act.
In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a
simple problem of statutory construction – that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217.
The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules
and regulations because the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is
the permissive
―may‖ and not the mandatory ―shall.‖ The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the
canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est
recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no departure). Accordingly, the
decision of NTC is annulled and set aside.

5
G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION,
ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,
petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING
OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD
PRODUCTS,
respondents.

FACTS
On March 5, 1982, the National Federation of Labor, certified by the
Ministry of Labor as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid
employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., charged the respondent firm
before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment. Petitioners declared a strike
against the respondent, after the latter terminated the president of the union. Respondent
firm filed a complaint before the respondent Judge against the members and officers of the
union for obstruction and prayed for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The
petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended, and filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

RULING
The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the
20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined
the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned,
from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose
of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is
never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the
jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the
forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore,
since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since
(2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers
or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after
Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3)
Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive
original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only
mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts
beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for
damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

6
 G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional
Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the
DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain.
Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan‘s action for confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR
Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against
petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could
not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings.

ISSUE
 Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances
belongs to the courts
 Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277

RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision
and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on
27 September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch
The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively
(pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are
not mentioned nor included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must
be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should
be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief,
and secure the benefits intended. In the case at bar, the phrase ―to dispose of the same‖ is
broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only
limitation is that it should be made ―in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.‖
Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of the amendatory executive
order, when it eliminated the phrase
―shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ― and inserted the words ― shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,‖ meant that the
7
act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to
Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and
further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its
possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court
proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license.
The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas
and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of
People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and
which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art.
879.

ISSUE
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a
proper defense to illegal possession of firearms.

RULING
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court‘s decision. The law is explicit
that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in
possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for
a secret agent.
Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer
speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note
that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption
that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a
‗peace officer‘ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

8
 G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988
PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C. VASCO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

FACTS
Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant
case: Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and. Leveriza over a parcel of land
containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for
25 years. Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between
Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000
square meters for 25 years; and Contract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between
defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000
square meters, for 25 years. There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter
of the three contracts of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is
the same parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is
4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has been reduced to 3,000
square meters.
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it
appears that defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for durations of
time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil, and the latter, as
LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit:
(1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of time that also overlapped. Leveriza, the
lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased. This is the reason why
her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of brevity, these defendants
shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the
ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been
cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is
the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present
litigation is concerned.
Defendants Leverizas‘ claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never
been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and
defendant CAA which should be declared void.
CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by
Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the violation
committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B
without the consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been approved
by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid. After trial, the lower
courts rendered judgment:
 Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has
therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;
 Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28,
1966 because of the cancellation of Contract A;
 Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is still valid
and subsisting;

CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was properly
registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the President of the
Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute the lease contract

9
pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the Airport General Manager
has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between the CAA and
Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however
denied.

On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for
Review on certiorari.

ISSUE
There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid contract.
The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after its cancellation
by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B)
without the consent of CAA and the execution of another contract of lease between CAA
and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C). The issue narrows down to: Whether or not there is a
valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A.

RULING
Yes, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Contract A was entered into by CAA as the
lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically ―for the purpose of operating and
managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.‖
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the
provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:
The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in such
eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event,
such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and
conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:
Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and conditions
herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the Party of the
First Part without need of judicial demand. It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees)
entered into a contract of sublease (Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA
(lessor). The cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General
Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming
that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They
maintain that it is only the (1) Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for
the President, or by delegation of power, the (2) Director of CCA who could validly cancel
the contract. Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the
Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the
Administrator. Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such
revocation or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in
Contract ―A‖ which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is evident that
in the implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said Department Head is no
longer necessary if not redundant.

10
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father,
ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and
AMANDA
RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

FACTS
Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private respondents filed
a petition before the MTC of San Nicolas seeking adoption of two minors. Petitioners filed
an opposition to the adoption invoking the provisions of the Civil Code. That the
respondents have a legitimate child, the mother of the petitioners, now deceased, as such
they are not qualified to adopt as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The petition for
adoption was granted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph 1 of Art. 335.

RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to
costs.
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was
adopted, it changed the word ―descendant,‖ found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New
Civil Code was patterned, to ―children.‖ The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined
meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the
subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the
grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.

G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

FACTS
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff-
appellee to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946.
After paying the amount, he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance
contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of
the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the
Constitution.

11
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts
to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would
appear that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is
on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.
Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior,
and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing
can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
In the general course of human nature, a power over a man‘s subsistence amounts to a power
over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries.
Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or
privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The
covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as
part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own
particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in
the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial
preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge,
integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured
salary an object of personal concern.
On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar,
with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate
themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is
irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an
exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others
are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal
exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received
in the place of the tax.

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953. 93 Phil 696

Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Saturnino
David, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

FACTS
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia
the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of
P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to
October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950
to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE
Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary
of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme
Court has found and decided otherwise.

RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and
holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.
The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a
12
public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court
has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and
of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and
that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted
in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of
the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in
a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section
13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase ―which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office,‖ found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution
or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is
assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is
more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not
within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law
would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department
is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the
execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application
of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and
apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law,
but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to
be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial
officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO
and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S.
FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA
and CARMEN S.
FLORESCA; petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge ofBranch
XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave- in that buried them in the
tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the
Workmen‘s Compensation Act before the Workmen‘s Compensation Commission. They also
petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in
the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary
security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex
invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the Workmen‘s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction
over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of
judicial legislation.
13
RULING
The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not
legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice
then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution,
and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178,
1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its
ruling in People vs. Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same
authority as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction‘s legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed
by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court‘s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues
that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that
―No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.‖ Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances,
the court ―do and must legislate‖ to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the
legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to
which the law may apply.

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET,
respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

FACTS
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the
President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who
are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating
that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the
Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments
made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment made by the President without the
confirmation from COA is valid.

RULING
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers
that needed confirmation from the Commission on Appointment. It enumerated the four (4)
groups whom the President shall appoint:
 Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or
consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain,
and Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by
the President that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those
which does not require approval from COA:
14
  All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
by law;
 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

G.R. No. 160261 November 10,

2003 ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

FACTS
In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress adopted its Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. The new rules superseded impeachment Rules
of the 11th Congress. Secs. 16 and 17 of these Rules state that impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in
substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House
Committee on Justice on the substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement
before the HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.
A few months later, House of Representative passed a resolution directing the
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by Chief Justice Davide of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).‖
In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide and 7 Associate Justices of SC for
―culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.‖
The complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
On October 13, 2003, the House of Representative Committee on Justice found the
first impeachment complaint ―sufficient in form.‖ However, it also voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Ten days later, on October
23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a second impeachment complaint against CJ
Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the JDF. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a ―resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment‖ signed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.
Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar, members of the
House of Representatives, as well as private individuals, all asserting their rights, among
others, as taxpayers to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that Article XI, Section 3
(5) of the 1987 Constitution bars the filing of the second impeachment complaint. The
constitutional provision states that ―(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated

15
 against the same official more than once within a period of one year.‖ Speaker Jose de
Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating that the High Court does not have
jurisdiction to hear the case as it would mean an encroachment on the power of House of
Representative, a co-equal branch of government.

ISSUES

1. Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates Sec. 3(5), Article XI
of the Constitution.
2. Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
approved by the House of Representative are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked

RULING
The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar under the Constitution. Sec
16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court employed
three principles in deciding the case:
 Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
(verbal egis);
 If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of
the framers; and
 The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

Applying these principles, to ―initiate‖ in its ordinary acceptation means simply to begin.
The records of the debates by the framers affirm this textual interpretation. From the
records of the Constitutional Convention and the amicus curiae briefs of its two members
(Maambong and Regalado), the term ―to initiate‖ in Sec 3(5), Art. XI of the Constitution
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with taking initial action by
Congress on the complaint.

By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated
(1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if
the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on
the substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the House of
Representative Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House. In this light,
Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for Impeachment are unconstitutional
because the rules clearly contravene Sec.
3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the term ―initiate‖ a different meaning from filing and
referral.
Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the
constitutional one-year ban.
 The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.
The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial review, only carried out its
duty as stated in Section 1, Article VIII, which mandates the judicial department to look
into cases where there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the different
branches of government. Here, it only reviewed the constitutionality of the Rules of
Impeachment against the one-year ban explicitly stated in the Constitution. Consequently,
the contention that judicial review over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.
The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter, effectively
checks on the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law. It must
declare executive and legislative acts void if they violate the Constitution. The violation of
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution is thus within the competence of the Court to
decide.

16
 G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered
July 17, 2012 that JBC‘s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to
represent the JBC to be unconstitutional

FACTS
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of
a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the
phrase ― a representative of congress‖ refers that both houses of congress should have
one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of
―congress‖ as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE
Whether the JBC‘s practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

RULING
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase
―a representative of congress‖ should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the
constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of ―Congress‖ as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in
the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress‘ non-
legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of
these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however,
cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term ―Congress‖ must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only.

17
 G.R. No. L-45459 March 13,
1937 GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

FACTS
The Director of Post announced that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration of City of Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church pursuant to Act No. 4052 for
the purpose of appropriating funds for the making of new postage stamps. Aglipay requested
Atty. Vicente Sotto to denounce the matter to the President. It was alleged that Ruiz is in
direct violation of the Constitution by issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. That such act was violative of Art. VI, Sec. 23
(3) of the Philippines, to wit:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium. The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of
separation of church and state.

ISSUE
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.

RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence
for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so
far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored
―the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their
ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy,‖ they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
―advantageous to the Government.‖ Of course, the phrase ―advantageous to the Government‖
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at
bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an
event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people
and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp
contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that
18
 reads ―Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.‖

G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010 ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,

Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.

FACTS
Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution.

ISSUES
1. Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a
violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
2. Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as members of the presidential
electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution

RULING
First Issue: Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before
this Court involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon.
Unquestionably, theoverarching frameworkaffirmed inTecson v. Commission on Electionsis that
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election
protests while concurrentlyacting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Verba legisdictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers
orratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. Last,ut
magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court,
albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not
unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the
change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court. the PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent,but not separate, from the
judicial department,i.e., the Supreme Court.
Second Issue: It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice- presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that
"it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact,Angara pointed out that
"[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935
Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII,
Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution. DENIED

19
20
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant,
vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.

FACTS
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas
City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty
five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent‘s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant
Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—
the Jehovah‘s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly
have a ‗Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness‘ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.

ISSUE
Whether or not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights. The State‘s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage
or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State‘s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a
distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming
arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption
to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

21
G.R. No. 176579 October 9, 2012
HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA,* Petitioners,
vs.
FINANCE SECRETARYMARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE UNDERSECRETARYJOHN P.
SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND
MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI
SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO
PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L.
NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE
BARIN OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT
FRANCIS LIMOF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, Respondents.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, Petitioner-in-Intervention.

FACTS
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale
of shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific‘s common shareholdings
in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates
the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public
utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the
petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011
decision filed by the respondents.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term
capital ‘in its 2011 decision?

RULING/REASON
The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing
an economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Asserting the ideals that our Constitution‘s Preamble want to achieve, that is – to
conserve and develop our patrimony, hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled
economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term
‗capital‘ which refers to the
‗shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership‘ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which
implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount
to an effective control.
Therefore, the Court‘s interpretation of the term ‗capital‘ was not erroneous. Thus,
the motion for reconsideration is denied.

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G.R. No. 195580 April 21, 2014
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT,
INC., and MCARTHUR MINING, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP., Respondent.

FACTS
Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp.
(Redmont), a domestic corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, took
interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the province of Palawan. After inquiring
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), it learned that the
areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered
by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro
and McArthur. Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-in- interest Sara Marie Mining,
Inc. (SMMI), filed an application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines
and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
Subsequently, SMMI was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 covering an area of over 1,782
hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA-IVB-
44 which includes an area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan. The
MPSA and EP were then transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on
November 6, 2006, assigned to petitioner McArthur.
Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and Development
Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining & Development Corporation (PLMDC) which
previously filed an application for an MPSA with the MGB, Region IV-B, DENR on January 6,
1992. Through the said application, the DENR issued MPSA- IV-1-12 covering an area of
3.277 hectares in barangays Calategas and San Isidro, Municipality of Narra, Palawan.
Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or assigned its rights and interests over
the MPSA application in favor of Narra. Another MPSA application of SMMI was filed with the
DENR Region IV- B, labeled as MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA- IVB-47) over 3,402
hectares in Barangays Malinao and Princesa Urduja, Municipality of Narra, Province of
Palawan. SMMI subsequently conveyed, transferred and assigned its rights and interest over
the said MPSA application to Tesoro. On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of
Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3) separate petitions for the denial of petitioners‘
applications for MPSA designated as AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154 and MPSA IV-1-12. In the
petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian
corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners,
it was the driving force behind petitioners‘ filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by
applications since it knows that it can only participate in mining activities through
corporations which are deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners‘
capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from engaging
in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner corporations are Filipino and can valid
be an issued Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) and Exploration
Permit (EP).

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RULING
No. The SEC Rules provide for the manner of calculating the Filipino interest in a
corporation for purposes, among others, of determining compliance with nationality
requirements (the ‗Investee Corporation‘). Such manner of computation is necessary since
the shares in the Investee Corporation may be owned both by individual stockholders
(‗Investing Individuals‘) and by corporations and partnerships (‗Investing Corporation‘).
The said rules thus provide for the determination of nationality depending on the ownership
of the Investee Corporation and, in certain instances, the Investing Corporation.
Under the SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the
Investee Corporation. The first case is the ‗liberal rule‘, later coined by the SEC as the
Control Test in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of
the 1967 SEC Rules which states, ‗(s)hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of
Philippine nationality.‘ Under the liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace the
ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing Corporation since a
corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is considered as Filipino.
The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the
portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, ―but if the percentage of
Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of
shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality.‖ Under
the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation
and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e.,
―grandfathered‖) to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership. Moreover, the
ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing
Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation.
In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule
or the second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity
ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and
foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other
joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino).
Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the
Grandfather Rule will not apply.

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