Trevor Hopper (2017) Neopatrimonialism, Good Governance, Corruption and Accounting in Africa Idealism Versus Pragmatism

Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies
Neopatrimonialism, Good Governance, Corruption and Accounting in Africa: Idealism versus Pragmatism
Trevor Hopper
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Neopatrimonialism, Good Governance, Corruption and
Accounting in Africa: Idealism versus Pragmatism
Trevor Hopper
University of Sussex, UK; Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden; and Victoria

University of Wellington, New Zealand
1
Neopatrimonialism, Good Governance, Corruption and
Accounting in Africa: Idealism versus Pragmatism
Abstract
• Purpose
o The aim is to reflect on how best to design, implement and assess
accounting reforms in Africa.
• Design/methodology/approach
o A cross-disciplinary literature review
• Findings
o Whilst neopatrimonialism inhibits optimal development some forms do
not block it. Such governance often permeates African politics and
reforms directed at its elimination may fail due to lack of political will.
Thus accounting reforms should recognise their political feasibility and
be directed at areas congruent with strengthening attributes of a
developmental state.
• Research limitations/implications
o There is a need to evaluate accounting reforms with respect to the level
of a country’s development, relate them to its political governance, and
evaluate them with respect to incremental rather than absolute
achievement of their aims.
• Practical implications
o Rather than relying on imported ‘best practice’ accounting standards
and systems, there is a need for greater indigenous involvement to
create systems that meet local needs and circumstances to increase
indigenous accounting capacity and will to reform.
• Social implications
o Whilst the push to good governance is a desirable ideal, reforms need
to be pragmatic with respect to feasibility.
• Originality/value
o The paper relates recent work on development to accounting reform in
Africa which has been neglected by accounting scholars and
practitioners.
• Keywords Accounting, African politics, neopatrimonialism, corruption, good

governance
2
1. Introduction
Until recently accounting researchers have neglected links between accounting,

corruption and underdevelopment (Englebert and Tull, 2008). With a few
exceptions, e.g. Everett et al., 2007), pertinent research consists of large-scale, cross-
country analyses that neglect context (Kimbro, 2002; Wu, 2005; Malagueño et
al., 2010). This paper argues that work of this ilk should be placed within local
social, institutional and historical contexts – otherwise it will fail.
Since independence, many African countries have adopted development policies

ranging from state central planning through market-based and now good governance
ones prescribed by external financial bodies and development experts (Ibrahim,
2007). Each is underpinned by recommendations to adopt accounting and
accountability systems used in prosperous countries based on assumptions that legal-
rational authority prevail. African governments (willingly or unwillingly) have
frequently instituted these remedies but in practice they are frequently ignored or
used in unanticipated ways sometimes with undesirable repercussions for
development (Andrews, 2013; Hopper et al., 2012; Wynne and Lawrence, 2012). A
study commissioned by the World Bank (WB) in 2000 noted that government
accounting in Sub-Saharan Africa remains ‘precariously weak’ (Schacter, 2000;
Lienert and Sarraf, 2001). Examples of accounting reforms that failed or had
limited success include Durevall and Erlandsson (2005) for Malawi, Global
Integrity (2009) for Uganda, and Roberts and Andrews (2005) and Betley et al.
(2012) for Ghana. Failures have been attributed to the techniques, the approach to
implementation and design, and vested interests (Andrews, 2013; Schiavo-Campo,
2009; Dabla-Norris et al., 2011). The causes of failure are often attributed to a lack
of will by political leaders who fear the reforms will inhibit their ability to extract
rents from the public purse, and oversimplified solutions that import complex
Western systems recommended by and implemented by Western consultants with
little regard to local involvement, needs, capacity and infrastructure. Increasing local
accounting capacity is a major plank of development policies by international
financial institutions but its exercise is constrained by a fear that local involvement
has insufficient will and skills to contribute effectively.
3
The concept of neopatrimonialism, prominent in development studies and political
science since the 1970s, has been used to explain the underdevelopment and political
instability of many underdeveloped countries (UDCs), especially those in Africa
(Eisenstadt, 1973; Clapham, 1985; Roth, 1968). Clapham (1985) defines
neopatrimonialism as: “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly
patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally
constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic
organizations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers, so
far as they can, as a form not of public service but of private property” (ibid:48)
Neopatrimonialism aids corruption and renders official and formal systems of

accountability redundant, except arguably to present a veneer of accountability to
gain legitimacy from external parties. Since the late 1980s development policies,
especially of major international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB)
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and donors have promulgated Good
Governance policies, partly to redress corruption and promote economic growth.
However, the concepts of neopatrimonialism and good governance, and claims that
eliminating the former by incorporating the latter, will hasten economic development
in Africa have been questioned. This has implications for prescribing and evaluating
accounting reforms in Africa.
The aspiration of this paper is to examine how to break out of apparent cycle of
failures when many accounting and accountability reforms in Africa meet domestic
politics and needs. Drawing from recent work in development economics, the paper
argues that research and policy must recognize and possibly work within some
neopatrimonial systems given their likely persistence, not because they are optimal
economically or politically, but for pragmatic reasons. Sometimes working with
neopatrimonial regimes may be the most feasible means of securing effective
incremental change sensitive to indigenous influence, needs and realities. The danger
of not doing so is that further foreign ‘universalistic’ prescriptions derived from
governance based on Western legal-rational authority and bureaucracy will suffer the
fate of their predecessors, and accounting research will merely continue to catalogue
this. The paper concludes with suggestions on how such work might beneficially
proceed.
4
2. Changing Development Policies
After gaining independence from colonial rule, many UDCs adopted socialist
regimes and instituted parliamentary democracies. Early accounting commentators
emphasised the need for timely and reliable accounting information for investment
and operational decisions by the state, businesses and for national economic
planning (Seidler, 1967). Financial statements should trace economic transactions;
monitor the performance of state owned enterprises (SOEs) through reports to the
minister concerned, parliament and potentially the public; audits should monitor
and determine the accuracy of financial records and whether expenditure in

private and public enterprises was sanctioned; internal accounting systems should
provide economic data for rational decisions and monitor managers’ achievements
of plans; and budgeting between enterprises and planners should be the lifeblood
of iterative central planning.
However, events transpired differently in many African countries often prone to

economic, social and physical crises, political instability and regime changes. A
recurring finding is that whilst basically sound accounting and accountability
systems in government departments and SOEs were adopted and maintained, in
actuality they often played a ceremonial role to gain legitimacy from the populace
and external funders (Hopper et al., 2012). They played little role in ministerial and
parliamentary scrutiny or in decisions at both the policy and operating levels.
Instead, political rather than legal rational bureaucratic or economic criteria were
dominant. Thus matters like filling positions, awarding contracts, and operating
decisions became subject to patronage by politicians seeking to bolster political
support or for personal gain. Officials, often poorly rewarded and trained, often
responded by rule-bound behaviour or indulging in corrupt practices. A result was a
failure to develop economically and recurrent fiscal crises caused, in part, by large
accumulating losses of SOEs.
During the 1980s and 1990s external funders, especially the WB and IMF, began to
regard many states in UDCs as too big, corrupt, and a block rather than facilitators of
development. The assumption was that state bureaucracies were often inflexible,
5
uncreative, rule-bound, and corrupt. Following the demise of the ‘Cold War’, the
WB, the IMF and their acolytes began to advocate and enforce market-based
solutions to development. Put crudely, the state was seen as the problem not the
solution. The international financial community tried to reduce corruption by
reforming state institutions and introducing market mechanisms and privatizations
(World Bank, 1983, 1988) in the belief that competition and private ownership
would foster better controls; and corruption will wither if the structures that
precipitate it are eliminated. Such beliefs stem from neo-classical economic theories
of agency and property rights that treat corrupt acts as self-evident transgressions by
individuals pursuing calculated economic self-interests (Hemming and Mansoor,
1988; Adam et al., 1992; Doig, & McIvor, 1999).
Loans to rectify fiscal imbalances of LDCs often became conditional on adopting

structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) stipulating free trade, competition,
attracting private capital, limited government intervention, and public sector
reforms (Toye, 1994; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Hemming and Mansoor, 1988;
Cook, 1986). Effective accounting is crucial to such reforms, though often neglected
by the IMF and WB, whose officers tend to assume that accounting is a technical
matter that will flow from market reforms. Accounting reforms usually followed the
advice and reports of Western accounting consultants, who invariably recommended
adoption of Western accounting and auditing standards and systems within the
private and public sector. It was presumed that competitive pressures and personal
ownership in privatized companies would induce more commercial accounting
systems; and the dictates of more active capital markets, monitored by government
regulators and international audit standards, would improve financial reports and
thence better lubricate capital market transactions. Alongside this government
accounting, particularly new public sector management (NPM) (Hood, 1995) was a
major focus. This promulgates private sector practices in government departments,
especially: tendering; decentralization - often to local government; granting local
managers greater discretion over means (subject to budget constraints);
reconstructing civil service organizations around programmes; and appraising civil
servants against ‘key performance indicators’. The belief was that seeing citizens as
customers and reducing principal-agent conflicts facing civil servants through better
6
internal auditing, tight monitoring of results and performance-related rewards would
improve accountability, lessen corruption, and thus increase economic growth.
However, market-based reforms frequently experienced difficulties. They could

exacerbate inequalities; neglect poverty reduction, social goals and environmental
issues; diminish local democracy; and the economic growth promised often failed to
materialise. Whilst states frequently adopted (willingly or unwillingly) international
accounting and auditing standards and government accounting reforms
recommended by the WB, IMF and Western donors like USAID, again these were
often ignored in practice, and corruption and patronage abounded. Political
intervention could continue sometimes in different guises, e.g. through regulatory

capture, and taking advantage of inadequate financial systems for equity sales
(Commander and Killick, 1988; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). Moreover, in many
African countries government accountants reporting misdeeds often could not
look to governments and the judiciary for protection (Perera, 2012). For example,
auditors in Nigeria reporting corruption could risk their lives (Wallace, 1992;
Okike, 2004). Sometimes the reforms could have unanticipated and unintended
consequences and become instruments that nullify their very aims (Kelsall, 2002;
de Renzio, 2006; Lockwood, 2005). For example, anti-corruption institutions in
Malawi were used to eliminate political rivals (Andrews, 2013).
In retrospect it was realised that downsizing the state was an error.1 In 1992
the WB identified that a country's governance quality: the type of political regime;
how authority is exercised when managing resources for development; and a
governments’ capacity to formulate and effectively implement policies; were crucial
for development. Since 1997 international financial institutions, whilst not abandoning
macro-economic market-based reforms and encouraging private enterprise, have focused
on governance to address corruption, transparency, tax reform, and other domestic
concerns. Attention turned to the ‘Capable State’ and ‘Good Governance’ to
complement market-based policies (World Development Report, 1997). The agenda
included strengthening the rule of law and protecting property rights; maintaining macro-
economic stability; investing in human resources and infrastructure; protecting the most
1
It is a myth that states in Africa have an exceptionally large proportion of gross national productivity
and bloated bureaucracies given their current state of development (Mkandawire, 2015).
7
vulnerable, especially the poor and women; safeguarding natural resources and the
environment; combatting corruption and mismanagement, and integrating developing
countries into the global economy. Undemocratic tendencies and poor government
were seen as liabilities. Today World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI),
developed for 215 economies from 1996–2012, monitor in aggregate and by country
six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and absence
of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of
corruption.
Such policies have ramifications for accounting. There has been increased emphasis on
the three components of ‘Triangle Accountability’ (World Development Report, 2004)

whereby improved development is claimed to emanate from (1) the state (politicians and
policy-makers) through greater democracy and more effective internal and external
controls; (2) service providers (managers and frontline workers) through market
disciplines and increased public choice; and (3) citizens and clients of services through
greater transparency, media and civil society involvement, and elections. Triangular
accountability has five key dimensions: delegation (clear assignment of duties and
responsibilities); finance (adequate funding at all levels); performance (clear targets and
monitoring); information (about performance); and enforceability (the rule of law
especially over managers and politicians). To increase the capacity of states more donor
funding has been directly placed into government coffers rather than to specific projects
and delivery agencies; which has brought further emphasis on improving planning and
control systems including accounting ones; securing better motivated, trained and
remunerated civil servants; greater delegation of powers and resources to local
government and communities, e.g. through village development committees, commune
accountability boards, citizen complaint procedures; and strengthening the voice and
involvement of civil society organizations, political parties, the media, and external
organizations such as NGOs to make public servants more accountable and increase
beneficiary involvement . For example, Awio et al. (2011) found an NGO project to
deliver welfare services to a Ugandan community affected by the HIV/AIDS
pandemic managed to reconcile its formal accountability obligations to funders with
effective “bottom-up” accountability to beneficiaries, with positive outcomes for
social services delivery.
8
Thus the route to development is seen as increased accountability and accounting
(defined broadly) that simultaneously incorporates state and market-based accounting (as
described previously), supplemented with greater democracy and greater
decentralization to local levels. This raises a series of new accounting issues such as how
to involve civil society involvement in budgeting, promoting democratic forces through
transparent financial information, increasing the participation of marginal poor clients,
monitoring sustainability and poverty reduction by non-financial indicators, and
strengthening media scrutiny of public servants (Hopper et al., forthcoming). However,
the accounting reforms remain framed in terms of legal rational authority.
African political leaders, at least publically, have accepted the Good Governance
agenda. In the Seventh African Governance Forum Report (2007) they delineated that
a ‘capable’ state should: (a) create, promote and sustain an enable environment of
peace, security and stability to enable people to engage in creative and productive
activities; (b) promote and sustain constitutionalism, the rule of law and due processes
of law; accountability and transparency; ensuring better understanding of citizenship
entitlements and obligations; (c) create and maintain an appropriate and continuously
flexible balance between the efficiency of the market forces and the availability and
delivery of the public goods and services; (d) create the enabling environment and the
appropriate policies, regulatory mechanisms and processes for the promotion of the
private sector; ensuring good corporate governance; avoiding cronyism, and
preventing corruption; (e) empower the people to decide the form and composition of
government; (f) manage diversities; (g) mobilize human and material resources; (h)
promote and consolidate gender equality; (i) promote trust, understanding and the
imperatives of national consensus amongst the political parties; and (j) promote
democracy and good governance. However, will the current development policies
promoted mainly but not exclusively by Western institutions that largely mimic Western
practices and beliefs be effectively implemented, are they superior to previous market-
based solutions, or will they suffer the fate of previous attempts at reform?
3. Corruption and Neopatrimonialism Revisited

a. Corruption and Good Governance
Africa’s development problems, ranging from embezzlement of aid and corruption to
slow economic growth, are often attributed to ‘bad governance’. Corruption is the
9
misuse of public office for private gains (Everett et al., 2007; Kimbro, 2002) or “an
act in which the power of public office is used for personal gains in a manner that
contravenes the rules of the game” (Jain, 2001:73). Corruption embodies many ills
including fraud, bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks, and money laundering (Sohail and
Cavill, 2008). It concerns policy makers, international organizations, the media, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society because it can endanger
national security; aid international crime; hamper free trade and foreign investment;
impede public health and safety; promote an uneven appropriation of resources and
opportunities; and inhibit economic development and social wellbeing (Leiken, 1996;
Davis, 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Hence the good governance agenda of
protecting property rights, rooting out corruption, achieving accountable and

democratic government, and imposing the rule of law has come to define much
development policy. However, several macro-economists question whether ‘good
governance’, as conceived in wealthy post-industrial Western states, is a prerequisite
for development or is supported by theories of economic development (Meisel and
Ould-Aoudia, 2008).
Definitions of a capable state and good governance are often vague and varied
(Mkandawire, 2015), not least because some discretion is left with local policy-
makers (United Nations, 2007). Definitions focus on means rather than ends, as is
attested by the myriad of good governance indicators produced by the WB and others.
A major criticism is that it makes unrealistic assumptions about the choices leaders
and officials can, in practice, make; and good governance reforms regularly fail
because they treat symptoms not the causes of corruption and poor governance (Booth
and Cammack, 2013).
There is a danger of demonising the African populace as inherently corrupt. Moreno

(2003) cites studies indicating that corruption permissiveness at the citizen level is
lower in Africa than in many other regions. It is not evident that corruption in Africa
is exceptional given its stage of development. For example, Chang (2012) argues that
today’s developed countries were worse in terms of suppression of democracy,
corruption, state capture, incoherence of the state machinery, nepotism, and other
‘pathological’ forms of politics when at levels of economic development comparable
to that in African countries now. Moreover, improved governance may not be a
10
necessary precondition for development but rather follows successful economic
development (Khan 2009; Kurtz and Schrank 2007). Undoubtedly some poor African
countries suffer poor governance and do worse on governance measures than richer
ones, which is unsurprising as good governance measures require resources, but many
well governed ones remain poor; and many African countries are well governed once
governance indicators are adjusted for income levels (Sachs et al., 2004). When
African countries are considered in aggregate there is a weak relationship between
governance improvements and growth. Sachs et al. (2004:121-122) conclude that,
‘Africa’s crisis requires a better explanation than governance alone. Our explanation
is that tropical Africa, even the well-governed parts, is stuck in a poverty trap, too
poor to achieve robust, high levels of economic growth and, in many places, simply
too poor to grow at all. More policy or governance reform, by itself, will not be
sufficient to overcome this trap’. Thus development economists tend to emphasise the
need for macro-economic changes emphasising trade liberalisation and infrastructure
developments to aid increased trade and indigenous business development rather than
good governance. The link between micro-economic factors relating to corruption and
governance, and macro-economic development that emphasises economic growth is
weak or at least ill understood. This raises a conundrum for good governance
accounting reformers regarding causality – do such reforms follow economic growth
rather than being necessary factors for it to ensue? The links between micro- and
macro-economic factors are unclear.
On the other hand, it can be argued good governance involves human rights and
development goals such as ecological issues, civil society involvement, literacy and
health that transcend the economic realm. Better governance goals (such as improving
government accountability or lowering corruption) of social justice movements in
Africa may overlap with the official good governance agenda but the reasons for their
support can differ. How they are supported can impede the achievement of social
goals (Gray and Khan, 2010). For example, posing corruption as an economic problem
encourages perceptions that, “Social connections, friendship networks, patronage,
anything that stands outside of the logic of cold, calculated exchange needs
eliminating [and] what is required in the place of the social is the individual, homo
economicus, a rational agent whose only goal is the maximization of ‘utility’” (Everett
et al., 2007, p.531). This privileges a view of corruption as the pursuit of individual self-
11
interest and the protection of private interests over moral, political and social goals and
the public interest, and ignores the context and historical features of corruption (Everett,
2012).
Critics allege that good governance policies mask donors’ continued pursuit of
neoliberal objectives (Rowden and Ocaya-Irama, 2004), and the WB’s ‘prior actions’
and ‘triggers’ detailed in loan agreements are simply SAPs renamed to give the
illusion of change (Chang, 2007:35). Donors’ conception of civil society has been
criticised as, an elusive concept with many definitions serving plural interests. Similar
suspicions abound about the WB’s commitment to human rights. Critics argue that,
“from its documents … the [WB]’s notion of [human] rights is thin and somewhat
incoherent, often expressed in legalistic than ethical terms” (McNeill and St. Clair,
2006:36); and its small department responsible for ethical values has a marginal role,
its staff are unclear on what they can do about this, and citizen participation in politics
remains elusive (Harrison, 2004a; Lynch and Crawford, 2011). Repercussions for not
meeting WB targets are unclear. For example, “Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda
generally do not fare well on governance index-rankings; nevertheless, they enjoy
very favourable judgements by the Bank and others as effective reformers. … [T]he
generic concerns of governance can be employed to ‘reward’ or ‘punish’ African
States.” (Harrison, 2004b:72-73) The objective to reduce debts of Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) has largely failed to materialise. For example, in Uganda:
“After having about one fifth external debt written off in 1998 [under the HIPC
initiative], the Ugandan government immediately increased borrowing and had a
bigger debt by 1999 than before.” (Allen and Weinhold, 2000: 870). Tanzania gained
HIPC status in 1999 but by 2015 the net present value of its debt will have increased
threefold (Danielson, 2001). Most debts were contracted from developed countries
and international financial institutions with the proceeds flowing back to them.
Corruption is normally viewed as anathema to accounting and accountants. For

example, government guidelines often require accountants to expose corruption in
public offices; supreme audit institutions are recommended to encourage governments
to reinforce their internal control systems, pay close attention to areas susceptible to
corruption, and augment staff resistance to bribery (Grzymala-Busse, 2007).
Economic or rational-technical analyses depict corrupt acts as self-evident acts of
12
deviance. Many accounting remedies are internally oriented, functional and
procedural, and reduce the problem to individuals relatively low in organizational
hierarchies performing economically small transgressions, rather than the largesse of
corrupt acts by politically and economically powerful actors. They emphasize the
demand rather than the supply side of corruption (Everett et al., 2007). At the firm
level it is widely presumed that sound and transparent financial reporting with
integrity strengthens accountability by capital markets, which can reduce corruption
(Doig and Mclvor, 1999; Siame, 2002; Torres, 2004; Kimbro, 2002).
However, accounting and corruption has political and cultural dimensions.

Development policy shifts to strengthen the role of the state, emphasising democracy,
transparency and accountability presume that insufficient openness or a lack of
‘transparency’ encourages corruption (Caroll, 2009: Compin, 2008; Grzymala-Busse;
2007; Mitchell et al., 1998; Hale, 2008). Thus accounting has a democratic dimension
in that public disclosure of reliable and open accounting information can expose
corruption; help campaigners, especially those within civil society fight it; and further
public participation (Gruner, 1999; McMahon, 1995). However, policy prescriptions
cast in this light neglect the unique characteristics of how corruption occurs within
both developed and developing countries (Fitzsimmons, 2009; Siame, 2002;
Kaufman, 1997; Doig, 2006; Aidt; 2003). Different social and institutional factors
create different means of corruption (Neu et al., 2010), and corruption is culturally
specific - what constitutes corruption in one culture may be tolerable elsewhere
(Sohail and Cavill, 2008; Williams, 1987; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). It can assume
different forms at different levels of society, and have different impacts (Robinson,
1998). Thus research and policies on corruption and accounting must engage with their
social and institutional context (Rahaman & Lawrence, 2001a, 2001b; Rahaman, et al.,
2004; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005).
Not doing so can lead accounting reforms to have unexpected and unsought
consequences. Local politicians may lack commitment to accounting reforms that
erode their power to siphon public funds from government treasuries and extract
economic rents within a façade of rules (Cammack, 2007). For example, anti-
corruption initiatives in Uganda that threatened the regime’s patronage-based support
lacked political commitment (Robinson, 2006); the failure of an Integrated Financial
13
Management Information system in Ghana was attributed to politicians believing it was
a technical matter foisted on them but their support waned when they realised the
political implications of greater transparency and accountability (Wynne, 2005); in
Benin, the Chamber of Accounts, the supreme audit institution, has never had the
resources or independence needed to audit government accounts - it performs less
than ten percent of its constitutional mandate, allowing corruption and
misappropriations across the government sector to thrive (Akakpo, 2009);
telecommunications reforms did not require any accounting – making it difficult to
trace where millions of US dollars were spent (Sutherland, 2011); and the General
Inspectorate of State – a key accounting institution resuscitated within good
governance reforms of the President – was used to persecute unions and other
organisations (including civil society ones) demanding public investigations of
financial scandals (Wynne, 2011). Such results suggest that contemporary accounting
reforms, whilst admirable in principle, need fundamental rethinking in terms of their
conception, design and implementation.
It is argued that corruption impedes development because it diverts resources that

would otherwise be invested productively, and deters investments by increasing
uncertainty. Corruption in African countries is often attributed to the greed of public
officials who abuse their discretionary powers for their self-interest - hence anti-
corruption strategies should protect property and contractual rights. However, there is
little evidence that anti-corruption measures significantly accelerate economic growth
(Khan 2006a, b). Indeed, rent creation was important in many African development
strategies prior to the market-based development policies in the 1980s, as it provided
incentives for innovations conducive with economic progress and not possible by
privatizations or economic liberalization (Mkandawire, 2015). Undoubtedly, state-
created rents augment incomes of state functionaries and politicians but efforts to
eliminate such rents can reduce the capacity of many African governments to address
market failures (Gray and Khan, 2010). For example, legal titling campaigns to
register property titles and other defined property rights has had mixed results in
bringing more productive and less contested asset distributions. In Sub-Sahara Africa,
especially IN Kenya, it has been argued that reallocating low productivity assets and
resources with missing, poorly defined or contested property claims to more
productive sectors may be more effective through non-market processes, sometimes
14
legally (through privatization or land redistribution), but also quasi-legally (politically
influenced market transfers) or even illegally (asset grabbing) (Musembi, 2007). Thus
some types of corruption are more damaging than others.
Claiming to fight corruption in Africa (by implementing a laundry list of desired

governance and accounting reforms) may appear impressive and deserving of support
but they can ignore more feasible and focused policies that can improve economic
performance. As it is virtually impossible to address all types of corruption
simultaneously, arguably policy should focus on forms most damaging to
development, such as those that waste precious investment resources. This requires
difficult balancing of moral and economic goals with local needs, circumstances, and
policies that are feasible and have some likelihood of attainment. Otherwise, reforms
can set unattainable targets, inadvertently causing disillusionment and reform fatigue
as failure becomes apparent (Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2013). For example, Zambia
has had succesive neopatrimonial regimes but the creation of the Zambia Revenue
Authority upon donor advice lessened corruption, created an effective bureaucracy for
tax collection, and increased tax revenues but managed to be consistent with a
nepatrimonial rationale (von Soest, 2006).
b. Neopatrimonialism
Neopatrimonialism, a term coined by Eisenstadt (1973) and developed by Médard

(1982) and Clapham (1995) is widely used to explain political and underdevelopment
problems in poor countries, especially those in Africa (Roth, 1968; Clapham, 1985).
Weber delineated (especially in Economy and Society, 1968) three major forms of
legitimate authority across societies: traditional, charismatic and legal rational. Initially
African studies attributed rulers’ legitimate domination in traditional and then post-
independence societies to charisma (when people follow a leader because of his
exceptional personal qualities). When this was found wanting, they turned to
patrimonialism. Weber did not employ patrimonialism (where the state is the domain of
one or a few leaders - often chiefs, elders or the ‘big man’) as a pejorative term. Rather it
is a form of traditional domination often found in small-scale, traditional, tribal societies
in Africa and elsewhere. Client-patron relations are not governed by predictable
economic calculations and codified laws. Rather rulers distribute symbolic and material
15
rewards (often unevenly) to fulfill reciprocal obligations in a shared culture. Relations
are direct, dyadic and personal: there is no delineation of private and public realms, and
no formal mechanisms of accountability or transparency. Nevertheless, leaders are
accountable, e.g. successful revolutionaries must legitimate their succession by adhering
to traditional collective codes (Pitcher et al., 2009). Modes of calculation and
accountability existed but its accounting is disputed [see the dispute between Asechemie
(1997) and Wallace (1997) on whether agency theory, with its capitalist assumptions,
reflects accounting and African labour processes]. Patrimony is a socially constructed
and institutionalized structure suited to small scale traditional societies although post-
independence African leaders sometimes adopt its symbols to bolster their legitimacy.
Weber argued that legal-rational authority was exemplified in bureaucracies found in

large-scale modern states, city governments, and private and public corporations.
They are marked by specialized tasks, personal discipline, time awareness, technical
competence, impersonality, and legal-rational authority underpinned by a formalistic
belief in the content of the law (legal) or natural law (rationality). Obedience is not
given to a specific leader - whether traditional (including patrimonial) or charismatic -
but a set of uniform principles. Within bureaucracies staff members are personally
free but observe the impersonal duties of their offices whose functions and authority
are clearly specified. Offices are structured hierarchically and rights of control and
complaint are defined. Officials are selected according to professional, externally
examined qualifications; salaries are graded according to rank; and there is a career
structure with promotion based on seniority or merit as judged by superiors. The
position is the occupant’s sole or major occupation. They can resign their contract and
likewise the organisation can terminate it. Officials cannot appropriate their position
or resources that accompany it for personal ends. Decisions are based on technical and
legal rules, and administration on written documents and officials are subject to a
unitary control and disciplinary system. (Albrow, 1970: 43-4)
Neopatrimonialism is a hybrid post-Weberian invention - “a creative mix of two

Weberian types of domination: a traditional subtype, patrimonial domination, and
rational-legal bureaucratic domination” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007:104). Despite the
presence of rules, regulations and government bureaucracies formally built on the pursuit
of legal rational decision-making those in power exercise their interests through the
16
informal means of patrimonialism. The system is held together by the personal
distribution of material resources (‘rents’ in modern economic terminology) to reinforce
patronage, clientelism, corruption, nepotism, and ethnic ties (Zolberg, 1969; Lemarchand
and Legg, 1972). The distinction between private and public spheres, at least formally,
exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to it but in practice the
distinction is blurred. Thus there are “systems based on personalized structures of
authority where patron-client relationships operate behind a façade of ostensibly
rational state bureaucracy” (Taylor and Williams, 2008: 137). The exercise of power
in neopatrimonial regimes is erratic and incalculable.
Clientelism and patronage are integral aspects of neopatrimonialism. Patronage is “the

politically motivated distribution of favors [e.g. roads, schools] not to individuals but
essentially to groups, which in the African context will be mainly ethnic or sub-ethnic
groups” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007:107). It is political rather than redistributive as it
can symbolize and reinforce ties between a politician and the recipient group to help
maintain political cohesion, e.g. by helping build coalitions. In contrast, clientelism is
individualistic, residing in relations between a patron and client. It occurs when the
‘big man’ (patron) transfers public goods and services to the ‘small man’ (client) for
political favors (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). The major benefits accrue to the patron
and decisions about “jobs, promotions, credits and licenses are distributed according to
private discretion” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007:104). Politicians and officials use this for
personal gain and to build networks of supporters. Thus informal relations permeate
formal structures and become interlinked, mutually reinforcing, and eventually
institutionalized (Snyder, 1992; Boas, 2001; Erdmann and Engel, 2007). Clientelism
seeks to overcome the institutional uncertainty stemming from neopatrimonialism but it
exaggerates it, for its actions are not calculable, except by the head of state. Actors try
to overcome their insecurity by drawing on both formal and informal logics, which
produces a political culture of institutionalized informality that feeds corruption.
Arguably, neopatrimonialism is a legacy of colonialism that ruptured patrimonial

societies and reconfigured patron-client relationships within artificial boundaries. The
colonial state was never a modern state: the legal-rational was confined to the
powerful centre where the European and a small minority of immigrants resided. It
primarily served the economic interests of the mother colonial government and its
17
businesses. Most of the indigenous population were governed indirectly through the
patrimonial rule of kings, chiefs and elders. Only for a decade after World War Two
did colonial powers try to build a legal rational bureaucracy that employed and
governed Africans. After independence this became Africanised (Edelmann and
Engel, 2007). Arguably, the distance of the colonial state from the concerns of the
indigenous population divided postcolonial political cultures in Africa between ‘two
publics’ (Ekeh, 1975) Society is split between a highly amoral ‘civic public’ with
strong connections with Western donors, and a ‘primordial public’ with strong moral
values but little expectation that civic public members will adhere to such values Ekeh
(1975). The civic public encompasses the state bureaucracy such as the civil service,
schools, police, and the primordial public to communal, kinship and ethnic groups.
Gains and benefits lie in the civic public whereas the claims to these lie in the
primordial public. Political actors operate in both publics simultaneously but on
different moral grounds. A good citizen of the primordial public gives and asks for
nothing in return but those fortunate enough to be in the civic public take advantage of
this but return little, though to gain legitimacy they must return some gains to the
primordial public. Thus it becomes legitimate to rob the civic public to strengthen the
primordial public, i.e., in this sense, corruption is a political and socio-cultural norm
(Olivier de Sardan 1999; Cammack 2007: 605). Indeed, a citizen ‘may risk serious
sanctions from members of his own primordial public if he seeks to extend the
honesty and integrity with which he performs his duties in the primordial public to his
duties in the civic public by employing universalistic criteria of impartiality’ (Ekeh
1975:110). Goddard et al. (2015) employed Ekeh’s concepts to examine accounting in
Tanzanian institutions. Seeking legitimacy and loose coupling were central concerns
affecting accounting practices, and gaming and corruption abounded in central
government consistent with the civic public but especially in local government where
participants were caught between the two publics’ moralities. Accountability and
moral responsibility was stronger in NGOs associated with the primordial public but,
unlike the central government, accounting in NGOs was problematic and sometimes
dysfunctional.
Many leading scholars of African studies claim neopatrimonialism encapsulates much

political and administrative behavior in Africa (Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Médard,
1982; Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; Englebert, 2000; van de Walle, 2001). For
18
example, Taylor and Williams (2008:137) argue that in Sub-Saharan Africa it is the
dominant political culture and the root of recurring economic and political crises
(Englebert, 2000; van de Walle, 2001), e.g. civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone
(Boas, 2001). However, neo-classical economists are suspicious of its socio-political
emphasis and Marxists have dismissed it as a neo-liberal justification for contemporary
attacks on the state (Erdman and Engel, 2007. It has been accused of being a ‘catch all’
phrase that ignores variations across states, and neglects historical and ethnographic
differences (Pitcher et al., 2009). Mkandawire (2015) argues that it is a convenient and
ubiquitous moniker for African governance that may describe social practices of states
and individuals but it lacks analytical content and has no predictive value for
economic policy. With respect to new measures of good governance,

neopatrimonialism should reduce voice and accountability, weaken government
effectiveness and regulatory control, undermine the control of corruption, dilute the
rule of law, and compromise political stability, which suggests that African countries
should perform worse according to these widely used indicators. However,
Mkandawire found most African countries actually perform as well as might be
expected for their level of economic development and exhibit considerable
divergence. His analysis suggested a close relationship between levels of development
and quality of governance (as measured by the indicators). He concluded that
neopatrimonialism is too blunt and too formulaic an instrument for understanding the
variety of African experiences and the contradictory interests, ideologies, and
motivations of social actors involved (Mkandawire, 2015).
Nevertheless, examples of neopatrimonialism are a recurring finding of accounting

studies in UDCs generally and in Africa specifically (Lassou and Hopper,
forthcoming; Hopper et al., 2009, 2012; Andrews, 2013. There is a pattern of
accounting and auditing standards and systems based on practices from richer
countries being adopted, often under pressure from external financiers. These are
implemented and maintained but little used in practice: instead political criteria
dominate and leaders illicitly draw on state resources for personal gain and/or for
clientelism and patronage. The presence of a formal technically sound accounting
system provides a veneer of bureaucracy to gain legitimacy to the populace and
external financiers. With regard to accounting research, neopatrimonialism has good
predictive and descriptive powers in explain recurring failures of accounting reforms.
19
However, neopatrimonialism’s implicit prescriptive basis is questionable. If
accounting reforms predicated on assumptions of legal-rational authority are aimed at
eliminating neopatrimonial governance, then given that neopatrimonialism persists,
the reforms will probably fail like their predecessors. As Feit (1968) observes
“structures keep emerging [because of] … the absence of change in the institutions
that underlie the structures. … If the most appropriate structures are removed and
replaced by others less appropriate, men will seek to change back to the most
appropriate” (ibid:193). Or, as Everett et al., argue (2007:535), “The assumption must
not be made that just because a certain institution is present in a country … then it is
somehow going to … ultimately work. It may well be the case that some institutions
will never work…” Institutions and systems of neopatrimonialism may prove more
durable than alternative and/or reformed ones. Externally created legal rational
accounting systems may be ignored or used to support the very behaviour they were
designed to change. If so, then the issue may be how best to pursue accounting reform
within neopatrimonial systems to promote incremental changes towards effective
development that increases accountability and diminishes corruption. Reforms must be
feasible and work within indigenous preferences and political processes.
African governments, politicians, and electors may pursue neopatrimonialism for

logical reasons based on different frames of reference about governance and
accountability than Western models (Cammack, 2007). In poor countries rulers are
strongly motivated to retain power: control of government brings wealth and influence
as the state is the main source of income. Parliaments are weak, fluid coalition politics
prevail, and accountability is often upwards to a leader who controls resources, and to
whom decentralization is anathema. Given central powers of intervention, the rule of
law, accountability and transparency may be weak; and regulatory organisations are
often under resourced, threatened or hobbled by legislation. Civil society is weak, not
least because the government may crush organizations perceived as threatening, force
them to register, infiltrate them, or create loyalist equivalents. Moreover, governments
often control the media and propaganda. The nature of power relations weakens
citizens’ demands for responsible governments; hobbles watchdog organizations;
facilitates corruption and unfair elections, encourages chaotic and fluid party politics;
20
and accord economic growth and delivery of public services lower priority
(Cammack, 2007).
It is difficult for African politicians to make credible commitments to investments in

public goods as in Western elections, for public finances and public services are
lacking. Even if resources were available, it might be electorally illogical, as it is
difficult for many voters to judge the credibility of politicians given their poor
education and access to reliable information. Many, especially in rural areas, are
critical of democracy because the promised benefits have not materialized (Cammack,
2007). Thus African politics focus on personalities and historical connections rather
than issues. Voters tend to back a candidate from their region, religion, tribe, or ethnic
group. Candidates may threaten unsupportive electorates with denial of patronage and
clientelism, which may be acceptable given traditional expectations for leaders to
share wealth. Hence voters frequently prefer a ‘local’ candidate that honors bargains,
can access central leaders, and can divert resources to supporters, albeit through
clientelism and patronage. Politicians realize that an efficient bureaucracy is important
for development and policy disagreements may be slight but these are not priorities if
voters judge their performance by tangible private contributions. This may logical:
game theory suggests rational voters prefer politicians that act clientelistically until
incomes reach a level whereby they are indifferent to the private goods offered by
politicians (Lynne, 2007, in Kelsall, 2011).
Paradoxically, democratisation may accentuate neopatrimonialism. It makes leaders

insecure - they must spend more time securing votes and maintaining power; which
encourages short-termism, populism and patronage rather than coherent policies and
long-run development planning. Elections may diminish coalition politics and
heighten divisions if the winner must reward their constituencies through patronage
drawing on state resources (no other resources being available). Winning elections is
expensive and the costs need recuperating, often illicitly. Wealth accrues from
political power and it helps politicians to get a foothold in business - a valuable source
of rent to buy off rivals, win elections, and provide personal enrichment (Kelsall,
2011). Such factors undermine formal institutions, discourage politicians from
creating a strong independent business sector with independent regulation, and when
21
democratisation brings new structures of accountability they are often exploited for
political gain, e.g. regulatory capture (Cammack et al, 2007).
Transparency International portrays neopatrimonialism as a cancer that erodes the

development of democratic accountability and distributes resources unfairly and
inequitably, and they campaign for increased access to information (not least
financial) to end this. This reflects the conventional wisdom that neopatrimonialism
creates market distortions harmful to long-run growth and its arbitrariness and instability
is anathema to rational capitalist investors (Kelsall, 2011). Hence the efforts to replace
cronyist, ‘hand-in-glove’ business-politics with more impersonal arms-length
relations based partly on accounting systems reflecting best Western practice to

increase accountability and democracy, and reduce corruption (Kelsall, 2011). The
author has sympathy with these views and does not wish to deny the merits of
democracy - a fundamental human right – or the detrimental effects of
neopatrimonialism to economic and social development.
However, neopatrimonialism does not invariably block economic development,

though the rents it extracts and policy distortions it induces may lower its potential
rate of increase. Recent development studies research has provoked reconsideration of
the role of neopatrimonialism in Africa (see Crook and Booth, 2011; Kelsall, 2011;
Kimchoeun et al., 2007; Erdmann and Engel, 2006; Cammack, 2007; Cammack et al.,
2007). This is pertinent for prescriptions for increased accountability and improved
accounting based on Western rationalities and systems in Africa designed to eliminate
neopatrimonialism and it prompts the question of whether accounting policies should
work with rather than invariably against neopatrimonialism?
Neopatrimonialism is not unique to Africa – it is found in most states, e.g. pork belly
politics in the USA – the issue is the extent it is subject to formal law (Edelmann and
Engel, 2007). It is common in other developing countries and was the norm in many
European countries in the nineteenth century and before. However, African countries
tend to score highly on corruption measures such as those from Transparency
International, though there are considerable national differences, e.g citizens of Sierra
Leone, Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana report high and growing levels of corruption
whereas those in Botswana, Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Senegal were much more
22
positive. There is neither a linear transformation from patrimonialism through
neopatrimonialism to legal rational ‘developed’ states, nor does neopatrimonialism
preclude democracy: multi-party democratic neopatrimonialism is possible (Pitcher et
al., 2009). Thus it may be wrong to assume that accounting change in Africa will follow
a trajectory as in the West,2 or that so-called best Western accounting practices represent
the desired end point.
Neopatrimonialism is concentrated at the apex of political hierarchies where the rule

of law is weak. It is associated with authoritarian rule. This can frustrate the capacity
of state bureaucracies to fulfill universal welfare, reduce the legitimacy of politics and
political institutions, and produce leadership favouring particular interest groups and
orientations. However, neopatrimonialism can be combined with bureaucracy. It is
important to distinguish between rulers and officials. To depict all official relations as
privatized or essentially informal does not reflect African realities. Many jobs,
careers, licenses are exercised by fixed procedures and rules and laws. Bureaucracies
may be effective though the extent behaviour is routinised may vary: officials or state
organizations confronted with competing clientelistic demands can take refuge in rules
but may use informal means if the rules favour dominant groups (Erdmann and Engel,
2007).
Research may have under-emphasised legal-rational aspects of neopatrimonialism and
over-emphasised patrimonialism (Edelmann and Engel, 2007). In some African
countries skilled personal rulers have combined effective bureaucracy with centralised
economic rent distribution, which has maintained political stability and promoted
productive investment and institutions oriented to pro-market, pro-rural policies
promoting long-term growth (Kelsall, 2011). Some aspects of allegedly poor
governance can produce interventions for growth or political stability using rents that
are not easily legalized (Khan, 2006a, 2006b). In rich countries political stabilisation
is achieved by redistributing fiscal resources through open transfers but in many low
income countries, given the limited scope for fiscal transfers and the lack of political
legitimacy of many groups that threaten political stability, political stabilisation
typically cannot be achieved solely through legal rents. Hence political parties and
groups in power rely on off-budget transfers and non-legal rent creation for critical
2
Indeed, given that development policies prescribed by donors and international financial institutions
do not reflect how Western economies developed (Stiglitz, 2002), the same may be so for accounting.
23
clients and constituencies through patron-client networks. Some such rents can be
very damaging but the state’s capacity to manage political stabilisation is critical for
economic growth (Gray and Khan, 2010). This reminds us that whilst corruption has an
economic element it occurs within a wider social and political context (Everett et al.,
2007).
Kelsall (2011) differentiates four types of neopatrimonialism using two axes: short
term versus long term oriented rent distribution, i.e. the extent rents seek to increase
incomes through long term investments; and centralized versus decentralised
processes of creating and allocating rents. Under all alternatives some rents will not
be public spirited and the sacrifice of short term gains for longer term more
productive ones rest on leaders’ calculations that this will increase their rent earning
opportunities. A short-term rent regime coupled to decentralized leadership in its
extreme form can produce a highly competitive free for all, with those in power
extracting as much as they can as quickly as they can, which can bring investor flight,
e.g. Sierra Leone under Albert Margai. Decentralized leadership pursuing long-term
rent considerations is seen as relatively rare. The claim is that this will be ineffective
because the central administration cannot centralize rents and hence its ability to
control long term projects is limited. An example is Mkapa’s term of office in
Tanzania (2000-2010). He pursued donor developed policies and tried to reduce
corruption but his inability to control areas such as tax collection inhibited progress
and eventually he too became corrupt. Centralised leadership that controls major rents
and exercises short-term rent extraction simply becomes an ‘anti-development
kleptocracy’, e.g. Mbututu’s Zaire and Abacha’s Nigeria (Kelsall, 2011:3).
However, where leaders exercise centralized control over rents and adopt a long-term
view to rent maximization then, despite continuing corruption and poor
accountability, effective economic growth may be possible, especially if a disciplined,
hierarchically coordinated state bureaucracy exists, as it can balance political stability
and economic priorities. Improved financial management (an aspect of centralization)
may curb election geared rent creation, help maintain a macro-economic balance and
preserve stability, and maintain create an investor attractive regime (Kelsall, 2011). If
rent-seeking for personal enrichment is absent or slight and is used for economic
development, and the regime directs public investment to improve services and
24
infrastructure and can control rent seeking by others then development may be
enhanced. Corruption may be less harmful if it is predictable and helps promote
growth as inSeretse Khama’s Botswana. Removing such practices may not benefit
much of sub-Saharan Africa (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011; Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi, 2012). Some of the most successful African regimes are neopatrimonial
where rents have been used for growth. An example of developmental patrimonialism
through such practices is Rwanda (Dawson and Kelsall, 2011), which has centralised
rent management of which the regime directs much of the proceeds into the private
sector through its company Tri-Star (now Crystal Ventures) that invests greatly in
state infrastructure, which contributed to significant reductions in poverty between
2005 and 2011 (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). .However, such centralisation has
problems: not all rents will be productive; it may impede democracy; curb civil
liberties; be unsustainable if neglected groups resist; and lack mechanisms for
political succession (Kelsall, 2011). And centralized rent collection in itself is not
invariably conducive to development as illustrated by the Mugabe regime in
Zimbabwe (Dawson and Kelsall, 2011).
A tenet of good governance principles is decentralization to local democracies but this

can have shortcomings but some studies of local, national and sectoral governance of
development projects in Africa suggest that centralised forms of neopatrimonialism
concerned with development goals may be more effective (Crook and Booth, 2011).
Vertical authority and discipline emanating from central rulers combined with local
problem-solving that tallied with the local culture proved superior to projects adopting
good governance principles and donor approaches involving citizen empowerment.
There was little evidence that those involved demanded better public services or
greater accountability. Instead they were instrumental: groups participated because
they had an interest in doing so, and they could exercise local solidarity. They
calculated what donors would support and the benefits that would accrue to them:
accountability to an abstract public or conformity with any formal financial
accounting standards was irrelevant. However, good administrative coordination and
policy coherence among the various agencies involved was essential. Conflicts of
jurisdiction and lines of accountability, multiple sources of funding, and reliance upon
informal arrangements made coordination haphazard and fragile. Coordination needed
central authority, usually from neopatrimonial leaders at the national level but
25
occasionally from local authorities to enforce rules and discipline public agencies and
service providers whilst being attuned to the local situation (Crook and Booth, 2011).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Neopatrimonialism is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and if some forms

can support economic development then one might question the wisdom of importing
Western accounting systems seeking to eliminate it. If participants calculate payoffs
for participating according to their cultural beliefs and self-interest, then will imported
decentralized accounting systems based on abstract notions of democracy and market-
based formulations of costs and benefits fail because they lack meaning to locals who
cannot effectively regulate projects without central coordination from governments?
In brief, how realistic are many accounting reforms premised on ‘good governance’
principles and will they actually foster development?
Applying general political logics especially from abroad as in the past is dangerous
and has little predictive power other than the likelihood that associated accounting
reforms will often continue to fail. What is needed are more studies of what
accounting systems are effective, why and how. This requires more careful
grounding of accounting studies in local circumstances and beliefs about what
constitutes legitimate governance, accountability and corruption, and the type and
degree of neopatrimonialism exercised.
In states with non-developmental characteristics accounting reforms may achieve

little unless the politics change but not all forms of neopatrimonialism impede
economic development. If accounting reforms are designed to eliminate patronage
and clientelism, especially by powerful central leader with longer-term orientations,
they may fail or be counter-productive. Incremental and selective accounting change
may be the best option otherwise elites will undermine reforms that threaten their
power. It must be recognized that prosperous economies today once suffered similar
problems Africa today. As Ha-Joon Chang (2012) argues:
When they were at levels of economic development comparable to today’s African
countries, today’s developed countries were actually much worse in terms of
suppression of democracy, corruption, state capture, incoherence of the state
machinery, nepotism, and other ‘pathological’ forms of politics. [These problems]
26
“should not make us believe that we have to wait for a perfect state to emerge before
doing anything.” … “islands of competence” can be constructed within a
bureaucracy, given greater responsibilities as they succeed, and increase their
legitimacy and status until they supplant much of the old bureaucracy.
In a similar vein, Mushtaq Khan (2012) argued for policies which recognise that
governance capabilities conducive to growth need not be optimal but must be feasible.
‘One size fits all’ imported immediate prescriptions should be avoided and instead
they should involve mutual learning to and develop capacity and problem solving
skills; draw on local tacit knowledge which is variable and thence require different
solutions for different sites; recognise that learning is continuous and needs
continuous adaptation to changing circumstances; and realise that a country’s politics

shapes what is feasible. This resonates with the frequent pleas of accounting
researchers for greater indigenous involvement in accounting reforms to tailor them to
local circumstances and needs, and to increase local capacity.
No country has achieved significant “good governance” capabilities before becoming

developed but economically successful countries had governance capabilities that
sustained growth. Thus the challenge is to identify “vital growth-enhancing
capabilities” that respect sovereignty so societies can make their own political
compromises and create government institutions that work within their historical and
political constraints. Outsiders must be realists and accept that they cannot force change.
If state control has legitimacy and it is strong, then reforms should concentrate on
fostering attributes shared by developmental states and societies.3 These include strong
central state authority and systems; political stability; all classes being taxable; regulated
and disciplined labour; protection of the poor; a sense of nation and nationalism; and an
3
Cammack (2007;607) defines a developmental state as one ‘whose political and bureaucratic elites
have generally achieved relative autonomy from socio-political forces in the society and have used this
to promote a programme of rapid economic growth [exceeding 4% growth per annum] with more or
less rigour … [to] the material and social well-being of its citizens.’
The major attributes are: strong state control and legitimacy; a powerful, competent and insulated
public service that effectively implements policy and is not subject to tests of political loyalty; a
legitimate government not reliant on illicit distributions of public resources to maintain power; a state
that is responsive to but relatively independent of non-state actors; development is a policy priority; an
educated, tolerant, meritocratic and socially mobile populace willing to adopt and adapt innovations
whether local or from abroad; and a relatively uncorrupted government or one that performs corrupt
acts that are not predatory but promote national productivity.
27
environment that attracts domestic and foreign investments that promote national
development goals. If such recommendations have validity then accounting
researchers and reformers must think and act politically (Cammack, 2007). Analyses
and recommendations must understand the political context of the country; how
decisions are made and in whose interests; if formal accounting mechanisms are weak
then where do networks of power reside; what logic drives policy; how is bureaucracy
maintained and used; is tradition a factor; and how are elections won? (Cammack, 2007)
Accounting reforms that fail to address their political and cultural feasibility and realistic
means of implementation may prove useless. This calls for a more contingent approach
that recognizes the nature of local neopatrimonialism, donor aims and involvement, and
citizen participation.
In states with centralized or decentralized neopatrimonial leaders pursuing short-term

non-developmental goals governmental accounting reforms may make little
contribution to fruitful developmental decisions. They may never be implemented or
implemented but not be used, or be used for purposes contrary to their aims. Donor
pressure for accounting reforms may have little effect though by helping create better
systems waiting in the wings for a more development oriented regime may prove
effective ultimately. However, this may not be the best use of accounting aid. It may
be more effective to improve the accounting and accountability of targeted projects
under the direct control of donors delivered by NGOs and/or local businesses; and to
improve indigenous accounting capacity to foster private sector productivity and
trade through education and training not only for large businesses but also smaller
and micro-enterprises in sectors relatively free from government control.
In decentralized neopatrimonial regimes with longer run development aims then

improved government accounting may be negotiable. Controlsystems that enable the
centre to better allocate funds to, and monitor and co-ordinate projects designed and
executed locally, alongside improved local government accounting with greater
citizen participation may help. If this is attainable and made a condition that is
externally and continuously monitored then aid direct into government coffers may
be effective. In addition, accounting initiatives to regulate and improve the
28
accounting capacity of the private sector, strengthen accounting institutions, to attract
local and foreign investment, and further accounting education and training should
be possible given they are unlikely to threaten the regime.
Neopatrimonial regimes that are centralized and have long term development aims
are potentially the most conducive to a rafter of accounting reforms across the public
and private sectors. With respect to government accounting, it is important to
distinguish issues surrounding political leadership from public service organisations.
A powerful, stable, competent and insulated bureaucracy may exist or can be
nurtured and which has the authority to create, direct and manage development; and
is sufficiently competent, professional and autonomous to resist tests of political

loyalty. Indeed, major accounting reforms in both the private and public sectors may
be attractive to leaders with central power and longer term objectives as it can
reinforce their power and ends. Accounting measures that increase local capacity of
accounting, adopting international accounting and auditing standards, strengthening
the rule of law, and improving education and training are attractive if they increase
trade and the potential to yield increased long term rents.
The above is not an argument for maintaining the status quo; or abandoning
decentralization, greater democracy and accountability; and eliminating corruption.
There is a need to develop accounting systems, structures and processes that further
development in its broadest sense. Such ventures include: giving the poor and
marginalized greater voice; aiding civil society organizations that monitor and report on
government spending and activities; promoting government accountability, not least by
increasing the transparency and volume of financial information; reducing corruption;
and encouraging an independent media. Accounting researchers and reformers should
promote positive social change and address institutional weaknesses but understand their
prevailing political rationality, their national context, and how to foster indigenous
involvement in designing and implementing accounting systems adapted to local needs.
Improving financial transparency, promoting media freedom, assisting civil society
organisations that scrutinize governments and large corporations; and develop
indigenous accounting capacity through education, training and research to transform
public opinion may be more productive than seeking compliance with externally
imposed systems and standards. This will enable elites, the intelligentsia, civil servants,
the media, and thus civil society to debate the problems and repercussions of
29
neopatrimonialism, and increase African awareness of emerging and alternative modes
of governance. The search for ‘silver bullets’ that solve accounting problems will prove
illusory. Western accounting systems based on alien notions of governance that construct
mutually exclusive dichotomies are too crude to represent African realities, e.g. state
versus market led development, centralization versus decentralization of governance;
civil society versus the body politic, hence they are likely to fail. Moreover, it must be
accepted that change may be incremental, discontinuous, and patchy. Thus it is
dangerous to assign reforms that do not immediately function as might be expected in a
Western context as failures. The issue is whether they represent an incremental
improvement with regard to the attributes of a development state. However, it must be
recognized that neopatrimonial relations often permeate everyday life in African

society, and accounting practice and research must recognize that they do not always
block development, and they may have local legitimacy. Sovereignty must be respected.
However, this does not mean that accounting reform in Africa is exclusively a domestic
issue. Donors can exert beneficial influence even in the face of neopatrimonial regimes.
For example, the creation of the Zambia Revenue Authority upon donor advice was
constantly monitored by the donors (von Soest, 2006). Indeed, a major criticism of
donors involved in accounting reform is their failure to monitor their implementation,
which reduces the pressure upon local officials to effectively enact them. Also rich
countries can mitigate corruption through strengthened controls of money laundering,
tax havens, and regulation of domestic businesses conducting business abroad. The most
venal neopatrimonial leaders need to be tried under international law. The international
accounting and auditing standard setters (the International Federation of Accountants
and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)) have little representation from
developing countries, are increasingly dominated by the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms,
and consequently, particularly the IASB, have paid scant regard to the needs of
developing countries. Western educational institutions, including universities and
accounting professions, reap rich rewards from providing accounting and education to
developing countries and students from them. Sadly, they largely promote accounting
education and training that promotes Western accounting systems and beliefs, and
neglect accounting’s relationship to development issues and contexts. However, idealism
must be tinged with realism: reforms must recognise local political realities and promote
feasible change.
30
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University of Sussex, UK; Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden; and Victoria

• Keywords Accounting, African politics, neopatrimonialism, corruption, good

Until recently accounting researchers have neglected links between accounting,

Since independence, many African countries have adopted development policies

Neopatrimonialism aids corruption and renders official and formal systems of

and determine the accuracy of financial records and whether expenditure in

However, events transpired differently in many African countries often prone to

1988; Adam et al., 1992; Doig, & McIvor, 1999).

Loans to rectify fiscal imbalances of LDCs often became conditional on adopting

However, market-based reforms frequently experienced difficulties. They could

intervention could continue sometimes in different guises, e.g. through regulatory

the three components of ‘Triangle Accountability’ (World Development Report, 2004)

3. Corruption and Neopatrimonialism Revisited

protecting property rights, rooting out corruption, achieving accountable and

There is a danger of demonising the African populace as inherently corrupt. Moreno

Corruption is normally viewed as anathema to accounting and accountants. For

However, accounting and corruption has political and cultural dimensions.

It is argued that corruption impedes development because it diverts resources that

Claiming to fight corruption in Africa (by implementing a laundry list of desired

Neopatrimonialism, a term coined by Eisenstadt (1973) and developed by Médard

Weber argued that legal-rational authority was exemplified in bureaucracies found in

Neopatrimonialism is a hybrid post-Weberian invention - “a creative mix of two

Clientelism and patronage are integral aspects of neopatrimonialism. Patronage is “the

Arguably, neopatrimonialism is a legacy of colonialism that ruptured patrimonial

Many leading scholars of African studies claim neopatrimonialism encapsulates much

economic policy. With respect to new measures of good governance,

Nevertheless, examples of neopatrimonialism are a recurring finding of accounting

African governments, politicians, and electors may pursue neopatrimonialism for

It is difficult for African politicians to make credible commitments to investments in

Paradoxically, democratisation may accentuate neopatrimonialism. It makes leaders

Transparency International portrays neopatrimonialism as a cancer that erodes the

relations based partly on accounting systems reflecting best Western practice to

However, neopatrimonialism does not invariably block economic development,

Neopatrimonialism is concentrated at the apex of political hierarchies where the rule

A tenet of good governance principles is decentralization to local democracies but this

Neopatrimonialism is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and if some forms

In states with non-developmental characteristics accounting reforms may achieve

continuous adaptation to changing circumstances; and realise that a country’s politics

No country has achieved significant “good governance” capabilities before becoming

In states with centralized or decentralized neopatrimonial leaders pursuing short-term

In decentralized neopatrimonial regimes with longer run development aims then

is sufficiently competent, professional and autonomous to resist tests of political

recognized that neopatrimonial relations often permeate everyday life in African

Aharoni, Y. (1986), The Evolution and Management of State-owned Enterprises,

Aidt, T. (2003). Economic Analysis of Corruption: A survey. Economic Journal,

Akakpo, M. B. (2009), Réflexions sur la Gouvernance Financière au Bénin. Cotonou:

Albrow, M. (1970), Bureaucracy. London, Macmillan.

Andrews M. (2013). The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development – Changing

Asechemie D. P. S., (1997). African labour systems, maintenance accounting and

Booth, D. and Cammack, D. (2013), Governance for Development in Africa: Solving

Booth, D. and Golooba-Mutebi, F. 2012. Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of

Bratton, M. & van de Walle, N. (1994) Neopatrimonial regimes and political

Busse, K. (2007). The SAI‟s Role in Combating Corruption. International Journal of

Cammack, D., Golooba-Mutebi, Kanyongolo, F. and O’Neil, T. (2007),

Cammack, D. and Kelsall, T. (2011), Neo-patrimonialism, Institutions and Economic

Clapham, C. (1985), Third World Politics: An Introduction, Helm, London.

Commander S, & Killick T. (1988). Privatization in developing countries: a survey of

Compin, F. (2008). The role of accounting in money laundering and money

Cook, P., (1986), “Liberalisation in the Context of Industrial Development in Less

Cook, P. and Kirkpatrick, C., (1995), Privatisation Policy and Performance:

Crook, R. C. and Booth, D. (2011), Conclusion: Rethinking African Governance and

Danielson, A. (2001). “Can HIPC Reduce Poverty In Tanzania?” Helsinki, Finland: