STATCON CASE DIGESTS FOR CASES IN CHAPTER 3

City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969

Facts:

In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In
November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public
land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors
have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate
Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed
Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the
petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.

Issue:

Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED
on June 20, 1953

Held:

The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims
of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40
Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings
INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922
is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date
of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.

StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be
supplied or remedied by its title.

Ebarle v. Sucaldito G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987

Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidate for re-election in 1971 local
elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner filed petitions
for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme Court and alleged that the City
Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure how complainants
charging the government officials and employees with the commission of irregularities should be guided.

Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not to criminal complaints

Held: Petition dismissed.

Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of Irregularities”. It speaks of commission of irregularities and not criminal
offenses. Had the order intended to make it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific terms like
“accused,” “convicted,” and the like.

People vs. Purisima (Statutory Construction)

Facts:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated
in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly
Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations
after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the
informations did not allege facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of
the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and order
in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the
aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly
weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the
weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder.
The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a
malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of
statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.

Issue:

Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of
deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:

1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation
of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which
are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble
is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

The petition is DISMISSED.

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION,vs. MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA

MINERAL AND INDUSTRIALCORPORATION),BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING
CORPORATION,

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and IndustrialCorporation

(Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050. Infanta’s corporate name was then changed to Cobertson
Holdings Corporation and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.After sometime, Celestial filed a
Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by
Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before thePanel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB)
of the DENR.Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease
contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in
Brooke’s Point.Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to Infanta’s (now
Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835 hectares located at
Ipilan/Maasin, Brooke’s Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering another 4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit
also in Brooke’s Point.

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia’s lease contracts. Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked
by Celestial.Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field investigations, the POA granted the
petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably
meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasia’s mining areas. It upheld Blue Ridge’s petition, but only as
against the Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It
gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebach’s areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before
theMAB. Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach,
the above resolution became final and executory.

The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the Mining Lode/LeaseContracts of Macroasia.
However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previous decision, holding thatneither the POA nor the
MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by theDENR Secretary. The MAB further held that
the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.Celestial and Blue
Ridge made an appeal.The CA Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority of
the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestial’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridge’s petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and
treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA
under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily
includes the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges?

HELD:

YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges. After a scrutiny of
the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and
case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or
mineral agreements based on the following reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his administrative authority, supervision,
management, and control over mineral resources under Chapter I,Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development of all mineral
resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain, which covers
mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources
which include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the
Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel
said agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend
cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements. The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the
MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a
permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
 People v Manantan

Facts:

Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that
as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.

Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee
shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".

Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the
words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:

Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held:

Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of

the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and
justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all
kinds of judges.

A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority.
This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of
the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.

From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant- appellee. Whenever the word "judge"
was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its
operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is
applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section
54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact
that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws;
instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of
penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.

The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were
not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".

G.R. No. 42134, Director of Lands v. Abaja et al., 63 Phil. 559 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

LAUREL, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros denying the motion of the appellants to
set aside the decision of that court in Cadastral Case No. 22, G. L. R. O. Record No. 174. declaring lot No. No. 712 public
land, and to reopen the case as to said lot in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 4043 of the Philippine Legislature.

The facts of this case are undisputed. On July 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of Lands filed in the Court

of First Instance of Occidental Negros a petition praying that the titles with respect to a tract of land containing about
23,443,355 square meters, divided into lots and situated in the municipality of Ilog, Occidental Negros, be settled and
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act. After due hearing,
the lower court, in a decision dated August 15, 1925, declared lot No. 712, comprising about 1,322 square meters, public
land because no one appeared to claim it. On January 25, 1934, a motion was filed in the same court by the herein
appellants, Roman de Arruza and Mario Luzuriaga, through their attorney, praying that the aforesaid decision of the lower
court be set aside in so far as lot No. 712 was concerned, that a new trial be granted and that they be allowed to present
their claim under the provisions of Act No. 4043. On February 2, 1934, the provincial fiscal of Occidental Negros, on
behalf of the government, filed an opposition to the appellants' motion contending that the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros had no jurisdiction to reopen the case with respect to lot No. 712 because the motion was not filed
within the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043. On April 20, 1934, the judge of said court denied the motion of the
appellants in an order the dispositive part is as follows:

Interpretando las disposiciones de la Ley arriba acotada, el Juzgado es de opinion que la oposicion del Fiscal Provincial
esta bien fundada. Los procedimientos judiciales en cuanto al expediente catastral arriba especificado se han iniciado en
junio 12 de 1919, en virtud de una solicitud presentada por el Director de Terrenos, bajo la Ley No. 2259, pidiendo que se
fije y declare el dominio y titulo de los lotes de terreno comprendidos en el referido expediente catastral, entre los cuales
estaba el Lote No. 712 objeto de esta mocion. Desde junio 12 de 1919 hasta febrero 18 de 1933, en que la Ley No. 4043
entro en vigor, han transcurrido trece años, ocho meses y seis dias y, por tanto, todas aquellas personas que pretendan
tener derecho de propiedad sobre los terrenos comprendidos dentro del expediente catastral arriba titulado ya no tienen
derecho de acogerse a los beneficios de la Ley No. 4043 para pedir la reapertura de dicho expediente.

The appellants assign three errors alleged to have been committed by the court below all of which raise but one legal
question, namely, whether the ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 should be counted from the date the decision
was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings were instituted in a cadastral case.

In determining the intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate
the antecedents or the legislative history of the statute involved (Loewenstein vs. Page [1910], 16 Phil., 84, 92; U. S. vs.
De Guzman [1915], 30 Phil., 416, 419; Tamayo vs. Gsell [1916], 35 Phil., 953, 963; Mitsui Bussan Kaisha vs. Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation [1917], 36 Phil., 27, 36; Go Chioco vs. Martinez [1923], 45 Phil., 256, 270, 276;
Portillo vs. Salvani [1930], 54 Phil., 543, 546. See also Kepner vs. United States [1904], 195 U. S., 100; 24 Sup. Ct., 797;
49 Law, ed., 114; 11 Phil., 669, 692; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U.S., 470; 27 Sup. Ct., 343; 51 Law. ed., 571; 11 Phil.,
762, 766; Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson [1912], 21 Phil., 308, 331; aff'd in 231 U.S., 106; 34 Sup. Ct., 27; 58 Law ed.,
142; United States vs. Katz [1925], 271 U.S., 354; 46 Sup. Ct., 513; 72 Law ed., 986).

Act No. 4043 was not the only Act passed by the Philippine Legislature to enable persons whose lands had been declared
public lands by virtue of the operation of the cadastral system to recover said lands after complying with certain prescribed
conditions.
In 1923, the Legislature enacted Act No. 3059 (declared in force by Executive Proclamation No. 57, dated September 25,
1923); in 1930, it approved Act No. 3672 (declared in force by Executive Proclamation No. 299 dated February 28, 1930),
and more recently in 1934, it passed Act No. 4195 (declared in force by Executive Proclamation No. 767, dated February
7, 1935). A cursory scrutiny of these four Acts will show that while the titles of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195 refer to "parcels
of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered etc.", those of the earlier Acts Nos.
3059 and 3672 fail to make any such allusion. The title of Act No. 3059 is as follows:

An Act to provide that certain claims to parcels of land that have been declared public land may be filed in the proper court
within the period of one year, under certain conditions. The title of Act No. 3672 is as follows:

An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that
have been declared public land, within the period of one year from the date of the promulgation of this Act. The title of Act
No. 4043 is as follows:

An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land, that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the
approval of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) And the title of Act No. 4195 reads:

An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the
approval of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) Upon the other hand, the bodies of all the four Acts just mentioned speak in
clear and unmistakable terms of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be, declared land of public domain, by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted etc."

The discrepancy between the titles and the bodies of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195 may be explained. Act No. 4043 was
originally House Bill No. 949 (First Session, Ninth Philippine Legislature). The said bill as presented referred in both its
title and body solely to the retention of judicial decisions. The first paragraph of the explanatory note prepared by the
authors of the bill reads:

The attached bill is practically the same as Act No. 3672 approved by the Eighth Legislature with the exception that it
authorizes the filing of claims to lots that have been declared public land by virtue of judicial decisions rendered during the
last ten years, whereas by Act 3672 no such claims may be authorized if the judicial proceedings were instituted more
than ten years ago.

It is obvious that the intention of the framers of House Bill No. 949 was to alter the language and the meaning of the
previous Acts of the Legislature on the same subject. The Legislature, however, thought it proper not to make such
alteration and as finally approved, Act No. 4043 adopts the language used in Acts Nos. 3059 and 3672 and refers to the
institution of judicial proceedings instead of the decision as proposed by the authors of the bill. In enacting the bill into law,
however, the corresponding change in the title was not made. It is pertinent to observe in this connection that the title of
Act No. 4043, hereinbefore quoted, is a verbatim copy of the title of House Bill No. 949. When Act No. 4195 was passed,
the title of Act No. 4043 was almost literally retained.

The fact that in all the four Acts so far passed by the Philippine Legislature on the subject there has been a repeated and
consistent reference to the institution of judicial proceedings as the starting point in the computation of the period of ten
years (or fifteen years as regards Act No. 4195) therein laid down is, in our opinion, significant. It shows beyond question
the desire of the Legislature to adhere to the one and only method of computation consistently followed by it since the
beginning. Whether the statute is in this respect wise and expedient is not for us to determine (U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24
Phil., 1, 10; U.S. vs. Estapia [1917], 37 Phil., 17, 26; Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234, 238). Courts must
administer the law, not as they "think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences." (Velasco vs.
Lopez [l903], 1 Phil., 720, 723, 724.)

It will also be observed that the body of Act No. 4043, like those of Acts Nos. 3059, 3672 and 4195, employ the phrase
"are about to be, declared land of public domain". This phrase would be meaningless if we construe the Act to refer to the
rendition of judicial decisions in cadastral cases. A judicial decision may declare lands to be of the public domain but to
say that a decision is about to declare it so would be absurd. The fact that the construction placed upon the statute by the
appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it (In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630, 643; Marin vs.
Nacianceno [1911], 19 Phil., 238, 240; Rivera vs. Campbell [1916], 34 Phil., 348, 353; Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China vs. Imperial and National Bank [1921], 48 Phil., 931, 948; City of Manila vs. Lyric Music House [1935], 62 Phil.,
125; 25 R. C. L., 1019).
The contention of the appellants that the reference made in Executive Proclamation No. 549 to the rendition of judicial
decisions as the starting point in the computation of the ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 amounts to a
contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the Executive Department of the Government and, therefore, is
entitled to great weight and respect, is devoid of foundation. All that the proclamation did was to copy the title of the
statute to which it referred. At any rate, the intention of the Legislature, as disclosed by a uniform trend of legislation, is
clearly expressed in the body of Act No. 4043, and it is our duty to give effect to that intention in the case before us (sec.
288, Code of Civil Procedure).

The more recent Act No. 4195 repeals act No. 4043. But the provisions of Said Act No. 4195 can not be availed of by the
claimants and the appellants herein, because the cadastral proceedings in question were instituted on June 12, 1919, or
more than fifteen years before the approval of that Act. It appearing, however, that the other provisions of the Act have
been complied with, that is to say, (1) that at the time of the survey, the claimants were in actual possession of the parcel
of land involved, (2) that for some justifiable reason, they were unable to file their claim in the proper court during the
period established by law, (3) that the land has not yet been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and (4) that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have
been paid, the claimants and appellants herein may bring the matter to the attention of the proper administrative
authorities for such action as they might deem proper and equitable.

In view of the conclusion reached by us on the principal question raised in the case at bar, we do not deem it necessary to
pass upon the other questions raised by counsel of both parties in their briefs.

The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos,
Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Salaysay vs. Castro

98 Phil. 364;
January 31, 1956.

Facts:

Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte,
Rizal, and the Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of September, 1955
and for some time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from his office due to administrative charges filed
against him and so Petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that in case of temporary disability of the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged
by the Vice-Mayor. On
September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of
Mayor. Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the office of Mayor as an automatic resignation from
his office of Vice Mayor, consequently, forfeiting the office he was holding as acting Mayor. Salaysay refused to turn
over the office of Mayor and brought this action of prohibition with preliminaryinjunction against Executive Secretary
Castro, Governor Pascual and Sto.Domingo to declare invalid.

Issue:

Whether elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for an office other than the one he was elected or actually holding.

Ruling:

No, elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate of candidacy for an office other
than the one he was elected or actually holding.It is urged that the phrase “actually holding”, in section 27 of Republic Act
No
180, was meant to refer only to “permanent” incumbents and does not apply to those holding office in a temporary
character. The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any elective
local official who runs for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the nature of said possession, as long as,
it is “actual”. It is irrelevant, therefore, whether the office is held
temporarily or permanently. All this goes to show that we should not and cannot always be bound by the
phraseology or literal meaning of a law or statute but at times may interpret, nay, even disregard loose or inaccurate
wording in order to arrive at the real meaning and spirit of a statute intended and breathed into it by the law-making body.
Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpora constat which means
false description does not preclude construction: vitiate the meaning of the statute.
The intention of the amendment by the President Roxas was to give and extend privilege to the appointees and elected
official for continuity in their office. This was
not applicable for the official who assumed the office by succession because of incapacitated of his predecessor.

Commissioner of Customs vs Court of Tax Appeals

FACTS:

Pascual is the registered owner of motor boat which was apprehended by the Navy for carrying untaxed blue seal
cigarettes.

For failure of anybody to claim ownership over the cigarettes, the same were forfeited in favor of the Government.

During the forfeiture proceedings against the vessel, Pascual claimed that when he demanded the captain to return the
boat back to Manila, it failed, and the next notice to him about the boat was the apprehension of the Navy. The captain,
Joloc, claims that a friend asked him to load his fish for a fee and upon reaching his friend's boat, he was forced by armed
men to load the cigarettes.

The Collector of Customs decided to forfeit the boat in favor the government. The Collector ruled that since the vessel
was hired for a fee through its captain, to ferry the untaxed cigarettes, there was a contract of carriage entered into
between Joloc and the owner of the cigarettes thus Pascual is bound by the acts of his agent.

ISSUE:

Whether the boat should be forfeited by the government.

RULING:

YES. Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code is violated in this case. Forfeiture proceedings are in the nature of
proceedings in rem and are directed against the res.

Even if Pascual had no actual knowledge that his boat was used illegally does not render the vessel immune from
forfeiture because the forfeiture proceedings in this case was instituted against the vessel itself. Such defense is personal
to him but cannot absolve the vessel from liability of forfeiture.

Moreover, the Section 2530 prescribes in an unequivocal term the imposition of the penalty of forfeiture in cases of
unlawful importation of foreign articles regardless of whether such importation occurred with or without the knowledge of
the owner of the vessel.

GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in September and
October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged
with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official
duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed
under preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the
service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period of their
suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).

ISSUE:

Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.

HELD:

YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be
exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and
it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed.
Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree
states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the
event he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty
of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension
pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were
eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al.
[G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993]

Ponente: QUIASON, J.
FACTS:

The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining
Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued in connection with the
administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the
petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to
comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the
Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law
for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other
than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials
and employees.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.

RATIO:

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public official or
employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
“suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under
the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and
employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is
imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Meralco

Facts:

MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an average increase in its

distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that should the COA thru its audit report

find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall either be

refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser

increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision.

MRs were denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.

Ruling: YES.

The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes

prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used

for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation.

The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing

use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while

maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State

the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the

rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property

performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable

rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.

 NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 86738 November 13, 1991

FACTS:

On February 21, 1983, the Authorized Capital Stock (ACS) of petitioner Nestle was increased from P300 million divided
into 3 million shares with a par value of P100 per share, to P600 million divided into 6 million shares with a par value of
P100 per share. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures involving Board and stockholders approvals and the
necessary filings to secure the approval of the increase of ACS. It was approved by respondent SEC.
Nestle issued 344,500 shares out of its previously authorized but unissued capital stock exclusively to its principal
stockholders San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A. San Miguel Corporation subscribed to and completely paid up
168,800 shares, while Nestle S.A. subscribed to and paid up the balance of 175,700 shares of stock.
In 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter to SEC seeking exemption of its proposed issuance of additional shares to its
existing principal shareholders, from the registration requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities Act and from
payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c) of the same Act to wit:
“Sec. 6. Exempt transactions. — a) The requirement of registration under subsection (a) of Section four of this Act shall
not apply to the sale of any security in any of the following transactions: xxx xxx xxx
(4) The distribution by a corporation, actively engaged in the business authorized by its articles of incorporation, of
securities to its stockholders or other security holders as a stock dividend or other distribution out of surplus; or the
issuance of securities to the security holder or other creditors of a corporation in the process of a bona fide reorganization
of such corporation made in good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of this Act, either in exchange
for the securities of such security holders or claims of such creditors or partly for cash and partly in exchange for the
securities or claims of such security holders or creditors; or the issuance of additional capital stock of a
corporation sold or distributed by it among its own stockholders exclusively, where no commission or other remuneration
is paid or given directly or indirectly in connection with the sale or distribution of such increased capital stock.”
Nestle argued that Section 6(a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act embraces “not only an increase in the authorized capital
stock but also the issuance of additional shares to existing stockholders of the unissued portion of the unissued
capital stock“.
SEC denied petitioner’s requests and ruled that the proposed issuance of shares did not fall under Section 6 (a) (4) of the
Revised Securities Act, since Section 6 (a) (4) is applicable only where there is an increase in the authorized capital
stock of a corporation.
MR was denied and appeal to CA was also denied. Thus this Petition for Review.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Nestle’s application for exemptions should be granted.

RULING:

No. Under Sec 38 of the Corporation Code, a corporation engaged in increasing its authorized capital stock, with the
required vote of its Board of Directors and of its stockholders, must file a sworn statement of the treasurer of the
corporation showing that at least 25% of “such increased capital stock” has been subscribed and that at least 25% of the
amount subscribed has been paid either in actual cash or in property transferred to the corporation. The corporation must
issue at least 25% of the newly or contemporaneously authorized capital stock in the course of complying with the
requirements of the Corporation Code for increasing its authorized capital stock.
After approval by the SEC of the increase of its authorized capital stock, and from time to time thereafter, the corporation,
by a vote of its Board of Directors, and without need of either stockholder or SEC approval, may issue and sell shares of
its already authorized but still unissued capital stock to existing shareholders or to members of the general public.
In the case at bar, since the 344,500 shares of Nestle capital stock are proposed to be issued from already authorized but
still unissued capital stock and since the present authorized capital stock of 6,000,000 shares with a par value of P100.00
per share is not proposed to be further increased, the SEC and the CA correctly rejected Nestle’s petition.
When capital stock is issued in the course of and in compliance with the requirements of increasing its authorized capital
stock under Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the SEC examines the financial condition of the corporation, and hence
there is no real need for exercise of SEC authority under the Revised Securities Act. Thus, one of the requirements under
the current regulations of the SEC in respect of filing a certificate of increase of authorized capital stock, is submission
of “a financial statement duly certified by an independent CPA as of the latest date possible or as of the date of the
meeting when stockholders approved the increase/decrease in capital stock or thereabouts. When all or part of the newly
authorized capital stock is proposed to be issued as stock dividends, the SEC requirements are even more exacting; they
require, in addition to the regular audited financial statements, the submission by the corporation of a “detailed or Long
Form Report of the certifying Auditor.” Moreover, since approval of an increase in authorized capital stock by the
stockholders holding 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock is required by Section 38 of the Corporation Code, at a
stockholders meeting held for that purpose, the directors and officers of the corporation may be expected to inform the
shareholders of the financial condition and prospects of the corporation and of the proposed utilization of the fresh capital
sought to be raised.
On the other hand, issuance of previously authorized but theretofore unissued capital stock by the corporation requires
only Board of Directors approval. Neither notice to nor approval by the shareholders or the SEC is required for such
issuance. There would be no opportunity for the SEC to see to it that shareholders (especially the small stockholders)
have a reasonable opportunity to inform themselves about the very fact of such issuance and about the condition of the
corporation and the potential value of the shares of stock being offered.
An issuance of previously authorized but still unissued capital stock may be held to be an exempt transaction by the SEC
under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of registration under the Revised Securities Act are
“not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of the investors” by reason, inter alia, of the small amount of
stock that is proposed to be issued or because the potential buyers are very limited in number and are in a position to
protect themselves.
Petitioner Nestle’s second claim for exemption is from payment of the fee provided for in Section 6 © of the Revised
Securities Act. Petitioner claims that to require it now to pay one-tenth of one percent (1%) of the issued value of the
344,500 shares of stock proposed to be issued, is to require it to pay a second time for the same service on the part of the
SEC.
We think it clear that the fee collected in 21 February 1983 by the SEC was assessed in connection with the examination
and approval of the certificate of increase of authorized capital stock then submitted by petitioner. The fee, on the other
hand, provided for in Section 6 © which petitioner will be required to pay if it does file an application for exemption under
Section 6 (b), is quite different; this is a fee specifically authorized by the Revised Securities Act, (not the Corporation
Code) in connection with the grant of an exemption from normal registration requirements imposed by that Act. We do not
find such fee either unreasonable or exorbitant.
WHEREFORE, Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and CTA

September 30, 1969CASTRO, J.

Facts:

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being
placed in containers known as jute bags. In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags, free from customs duties and
special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax bond, conditioned upon the exportation
of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation.

However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and only 25,000 were exported out of the
75,200 jute bags imported on the second shipment. In other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647
bags were exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration
of the one-year period but within three years from their importation.
Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond
no. 6 which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period
of one year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner.

Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their
importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import
tax due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on demanded the refund of the amount it had paid.

Issues:

a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in
section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.

b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other
Administrative Agencies be given consideration? In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs.

Held:

a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while
fixing at one year the period within which the containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the
said period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66
to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known
its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.

b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of
the Tariff and Customs Code)have not been the subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine
of "judicial respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders
389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make
officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible., " would, initially, be in
order.

Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give
consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state.

The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the
executive department or other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the
highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially
when the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the
statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.

Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our
Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight.

In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to
several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling
weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental
agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that
they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to
advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with
unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.

CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007

FACTS:

• Union Cement Corporation (UCC) has two principal stockholders UCHC with shares amounting to 60.51%, and
petitioner Cemco with 17.03%. Majority of UCHCs stocks were owned by BCI with 21.31% and ACC with 29.69%. Cemco,
on the other hand, owned 9% of UCHC stocks. BCI informed the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) that it and its
subsidiary ACC had passed resolutions to sell to Cemco the BCIs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and ACCs stocks
in UCHC equivalent to 29.69%. as a result of petitioner Cemcos acquisition of BCI and ACCs shares in UCHC, petitioners
total beneficial ownership, direct and indirect, in UCC has increased by 36% and amounted to at least 53% of the shares
of UCC.
• As a consequence the PSE, inquired to SEC as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the
Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is not applicable to the purchase by petitioner of the majority of
shares of UCC.The SECs Corporate Finance Department responded to the query of the PSE that while it was the stance
of the department that the tender offer rule was not applicable, the matter must still have to be confirmed by the SEC en
banc. Thereafter, SEC confirmed that the SEC en banc had resolved that the Cemco transaction was not covered by the
tender offer rule.
• Feeling aggrieved by the transaction, respondent National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc., a
minority stockholder of UCC, sent a letter to Cemco demanding the latter to comply with the rule on mandatory tender
offer. Cemco, however, refused. Respondent filed a complaint with the SEC asking it to reverse its Resolution and to
declare the purchase agreement of Cemco void and praying that the mandatory tender offer rule be applied to its UCC
shares.
• In a Decision the SEC ruled in favor of the respondent by reversing and setting aside its Resolution and directed
petitioner Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares to respondent and other holders of UCC shares similar to the
class held by UCHC in accordance with Section 9(E), Rule 19 of the Securities Regulation Code.
• Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the SECs jurisdiction to take cognizance of
respondents complaint and its authority to require Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares, and arguing that the
tender offer rule does not apply. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the SEC.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not, the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint.

HELD:
• Yes, The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. SEC was acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Amended
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code
• Another provision of the statute, which provides the basis of Rule 19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, is Section 5.1(n), viz:
• [T]he Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions: x x x (n) Exercise such
other powers as may be provided by law as well as those which may be implied from, or which are necessary or incidental
to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.
• The foregoing provision bestows upon the SEC the general adjudicative power which is implied from the express
powers of the Commission or which is incidental to, or reasonably necessary to carry out, the performance of the
administrative duties entrusted to it. As a regulatory agency, it has the incidental power to conduct hearings and render
decisions fixing the rights and obligations of the parties.
• And as held by the Court of Appeals:
• We must bear in mind in interpreting the powers and functions of the SEC that the law has made the SEC
primarily a regulatory body with the incidental power to conduct administrative hearings and make decisions. A regulatory
body like the SEC may conduct hearings in the exercise of its regulatory powers, and if the case involves violations or
conflicts in connection with the performance of its regulatory functions, it will have the duty and authority to resolve the
dispute for the best interests of the public

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC. (PHILIPPINE BRANCH), Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent] is a Philippine branch of American Express International, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, U.S.A. It is a servicing unit of American Express International,
Inc. – Hongkong Branch (Amex-HK) and is engaged primarily to facilitate the collections of Amex-HK receivables from
card members situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.
Amex Philippines registered itself with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), as a value-added tax (VAT) taxpayer
effective March 1988.

On April 1999 respondent filed with the BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes citing as basis
therefor, Section 110 (B) of the 1997 Tax Code to wit:

‘Section 110. Tax Credits. –

xxxxxxxxx

‘(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. – If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax, the excess
shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the
succeeding quarter or quarters. Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated sales by a
VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, subject to the
provisions of Section 112.’

There being no immediate action on the part of the [petitioner], [respondent’s] petition was filed on April 15, 1999.

In addition, [respondent] relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, dated April 3, 1989, the pertinent portion of which reads as
follows:

‘In Reply, please be informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency
which is remitted inwardly to the Philippines and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central
[B]ank of the Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated effective January 1, 1998. [Section 102(a)(2) of
the Tax Code as amended]
B. Input taxes on domestic purchases of taxable goods and services related to zero-rated revenues are available as tax
refund in accordance with Section 106 (now Section 112) of the [Tax Code] and Section 8(a) of [Revenue] Regulations
[(RR)] No. 5-87, to state:

‘Section 106. Refunds or tax credits of input tax. –

(A) Zero-rated or effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, except those covered by paragraph (a)
above, whose sales are zero-rated or are effectively zero-rated, may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when such sales were made, apply for the issuance of tax credit certificate or refund of the input taxes due or
attributable to such sales, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax. x x x. [Section 106(a)
of the Tax Code]’

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner is entitled to a refund

HELD:

YES. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides:

“(b) Transactions subject to zero percent (0%) rate. — The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-
registered persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate[:]

‘(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the Philippines which goods
are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);

‘(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, the consideration for which is paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the [BSP];’”

xxxxxxxxx

Under the last paragraph quoted above, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the
processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP, are zero-rated.

Respondent is a VAT-registered person that facilitates the collection and payment of receivables belonging to its non-
resident foreign client, for which it gets paid in acceptable foreign currency inwardly remitted and accounted for in
conformity with BSP rules and regulations. Certainly, the service it renders in the Philippines is not in the same category
as “processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods” and should, therefore, be zero-rated. In reply to a query of
respondent, the BIR opined in VAT Ruling No. 080-89 that the income respondent earned from its parent company’s
regional operating centers (ROCs) was automatically zero-rated effective January 1, 1988.

In sum, having resolved that transactions of respondent are zero-rated, the Court upholds the former’s entitlement to the
refund as determined by the appellate court. Moreover, there is no conflict between the decisions of the CTA and CA. This
Court respects the findings and conclusions of a specialized court like the CTA “which, by the nature of its functions, is
dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax cases and has necessarily developed an expertise on the
subject.”93

Furthermore, under a zero-rating scheme, the sale or exchange of a particular service is completely freed from the VAT,
because the seller is entitled to recover, by way of a refund or as an input tax credit, the tax that is included in the cost of
purchases attributable to the sale or exchange.94“[T]he tax paid or withheld is not deducted from the tax base.” Having
been applied for within the reglementary period,96 respondent’s refund is in order.
 Tung Chin Hui v Rodriguez

G.R. No. 137571

September 21, 2000
THIRD DIVISION
J. Panganiban

FACTS:

Petitioner, Tung Chin Hui is an alien who has allegedly entered the Philippines illegally, and was thus turned over
to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus for illegal detention
while Respondent, Rufus B. Rodriguez as Commissioner of Immigration filed for an appeal five (5) days after its receipt of
the order of releasing Petitioner. Petitioner however, contends that the appeal was already late under sec 18, rule 41 of the
pre-1997 Rules of Court. Respondent on the other hand avers that Petitioner’s claim has no merit because such provision
was completely abrogated by sec. 3, rule 41 of the 1997 rules of court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal made by respondent should be considered to be late.
HELD:
NO. Sec. 18, rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court is deemed omitted from and thereby repealed by the 1997
Rules of Court, which completely replaces Rules 1 to 71. This is because provisions of an old law that were not reproduced
in the revision thereof covering the same subject are deemed repealed and discarded; which in this case is the intention of
the Supreme Court. Thus, declaring the appeal of respondent to be not considered late in its submission to the court.