COMELEC v.
PADILLA
Nature of the Case:Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of
the TRC of Quezon City.
Facts: Congress enacted RA 8189 or the “Voter’s Registration Act of
1996”, this provided for the modernization and computerization of
the voter’s registration list, and appropriated funds therefor. Pursuant
to the said RA, COMELEC promulgated a Resolution approving the
Voter’s Registration and Identification Project (VRIS) which
envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004
elections. COMELEC issued invitations for bid and it was awarded to
PHOTOKINA Marketing Corporation, which received the highest
total weighted score and declared winning bidder. (BID was 6.58 B
Pesos). HOWEVER, RA 8760 provided that the budget appropriated
by Congress for the COMELEC’s modernization project was only 1B
and actual available funds under Certificate of Availability of Funds
(CAF) was 1.2B. PHOTOKINA requested the execution of the
contract, but to no avail. PHOTOKINA filed a petition with the RTC
and was granted, it directed the Commissioners to resume
negotiations to formalize the execution of the contract for the VRIS
project. COMELEC filed a complaint against respondent judge.
Issue: May a successful bidder compel a government agency to
formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the
amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
Held: PHOTOKINA cannot compel COMELEC. Petition is
GRANTED, RESOLUTION issued by Judge Padilla are SET
ASIDE.
Ratio: Enshrined in the 1987 Constitution is the mandate that “no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” In the execution of government
contracts the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to
require the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the
appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.
Complementary to the constitutional injuction are the provisions
(section 46 and 47, chapter of EO 292 or “Administrative Code of
1987”) which pertinent provisions read:
Section 47. xxxno contract involving the expenditure of public funds
by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless
the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have
certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have
been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary
to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is
available for expenditure on account thereof xxx
Quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the
existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are
indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose
such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed
contract.
Court held in Metropolitan case that “the effect of an unqualified
acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a
contract, upon notice of the award to the bidder” HOWEVER, such
statement would be inconsequential in a government where the
acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold
otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract
that would obligate the government in an amount in excess of the
appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was attempted
to be made.
Clearly the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of
the entire VRIS project. There is no way that the COMELEC could
enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way
beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project.
The contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab
initio. Proposed contract is without force and effect from the very
beginning, as if it had never been entered into.
Relevance to ConstiLaw: NO MONEY PAID OUT OF THE
TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN
APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW
 CASE DIGEST: AMBIL VS
SANDIGANBAYAN; APELADO VS. PEOPLE
7:54 AM
G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden
Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan
for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil,
conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-
charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter
transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.
Issues:
1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit
where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified to be
cognizable before the lower courts.
2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by
the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019
in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2
accused held a position with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only
when none of the numerous accused occupies a position with a salary
grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower
courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial
governor and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal in the
perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.
The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local
Government Code and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include
nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested before the
courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended
by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at
hand even if the act was not one relative to the “granting of licenses
and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with
such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to
provide exclusivity. Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the
reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude
application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is
more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a
public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal
interest.
Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of
violating RA 3019 was proper.
15. LIHAYLIHAY AND VINLUAN VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Acting on the special audit report submitted by the COA,
the PNP conducted an internal investigation on the purported "ghost"
purchases of combat, clothing, and individual equipment which were
allegedly purchased from the PNP Service Store System and
delivered to the PNP General Services Command. As a result thereof,
an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging 10 PNP
officers, including Lihaylihay and Vinluan, for violation of Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan found that all the essential
elements of the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were
present in the case. Consequently, petitioners were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Petitioners filed their
separate motions for reconsideration which were all denied Hence,
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan's findings and
decision convicting petitioners of the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 should be deemed as conclusive.
RULING: Yes.
In appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this
case, only questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised.
Issues brought to the Court on whether the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the
presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not
conspiracy was satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith
was properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact. Hence,
absent any of the recognized exceptions to the above-mentioned rule,
the Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing matters should be
deemed as conclusive.
 GARCIA, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 197567, November 19, 2014
GR NO 153952-71 8/23/2010
FACTS: Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time, entered

FACTS: into a contract for the construction of a mini-theater. Roman issued a

Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Certificate stating that the project was 100% completed.

Gelacio on October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader

of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza Notwithstanding the various documents attesting to the

of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. project’s supposed completion, as well as the disbursement of funds

Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 in payment therefor, Garcia, Roman’s successor– authorized the

The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he inspection of the project and discovered that the construction

was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot remained unfinished. Garcia filed Malversation of Public Funds

in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del through Falsification of Public Documents and violation of “Anti-

Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” against the respondents.

that the lands subject herein are disposable lands, thereby inducing
said inspector to recommend approval of his application for free The Ombudsman cleared respondents from liability on the

patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 ground of insufficiency of evidence, reasoning that “mere signature

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the on a voucher or certification is not enough” to establish any

Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A motion conspiracy among them which would warrant their conviction.

to quash the information was filed by the private respondent

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its
contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has
discretion in dismissing all the criminal charges against respondents
prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was committed on
for lack of probable cause.
January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has
prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed.
HELD: YES.

ISSUE:
The Constitution and RA 6770, otherwise known as the
Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.
“Ombudsman Act of 1989,” have endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory
HELD:
and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving
Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for
public officials and employees. Hence, as a general rule, the Court
the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326,
does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings and respects the
which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and
initiative and independence inherent in its office, which “beholden to
not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on
no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the
March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to
integrity of the public service.”
fifteen years of the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a
violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the
The foregoing principle does not, however, apply when the
crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the
Ombudsman’s ruling is tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto
subjecting the same to certiorari correction. It may also be committed
law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making
when the Ombudsman patently violates the Constitution, the law or
him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished
existing jurisprudence. Indeed, any decision, order or resolution of a
under the law existing when it was committed.
tribunal tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the
highest Court is unmistakably grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman gravely

abused its discretion when it disregarded the CoA Memo and patently
misapplied existing jurisprudence – particularly, the Arias case – in
ruling that there was no probable cause for the crime of Violation of Oppression. Thus, the Court need not discussed the violation of RA
Section 3 (e), RA 3019. 3019.

Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under

the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority,

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under
color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily
vs. harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority. To be held administratively liable for
CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent. Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial
evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations. Substantial
G.R. No. 188066 October 22, 2014
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
PONENTE: Reyes

Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent

TOPIC: Oppression (administrative) and Sec. 3(e) and (f) of RA
Ombudsman contradicted itself when it found and held that petitioner
3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”
was guilty of “oppression” for not paying the private respondent her
June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact she has been paid
albeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established
from the table where it was shown that private
FACTS:
respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in

Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High the amounts of P4,613.80 and P4,612.00, respectively.

School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with

There was delay in the payment of salary because “it is a
Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of RA No. 3019 or
well-known fact that in the government service an employee must
the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” by Tuares for allegedly
submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before
withholding her salary for the month of June 2002.
one can collect his salary.”

The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 14560, 36 SCRA 394
amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit
(November 19, 2001)
her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST),
while the other teachers received their salaries for the same month. Facts:
The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was “singled out by
respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount 1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official
from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.” Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659..
2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line
ISSUE: which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That
there was a clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
Whether or not Caberoy is guilty of Oppression and accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation.
violation of Sec. 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019.
Issue/s:
HELD:

1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being

NO. Caberoy was charged with oppression and violation of vague.
RA 3019, however, the Ombudsman, found Caberoy guilty only of
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for
providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum.
Ruling:
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them. There is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the
law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in
the Plunder Law.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of
a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and
ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and
with reference to every other part.
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of
R.A. 7080
2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden
still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of
doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt
is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the information to have
been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth.
3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No.
7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder that predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political
and economic context in which the state finds itself to be
struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must
muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of
the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of people it governs
over.
Note:
 A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against the specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such exalted
statute in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the
Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The first may
be “saved” by proper construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed,
however, that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect”
upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value of all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify along attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the persons making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute draw
with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
generalin terorrem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, ET AL. (SANDIGANBAYAN,
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26558 [FOR PLUNDER], 12
SEPTEMBER 2007)
On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (“FPres.
Estradaâ€), together with Jose “Jinggoyâ€ Estrada,
Charlie ‘Atongâ€ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan, a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John & Jane
Does, for the crime of Plunderdefined and penalized
under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
7659. The Information was subsequently amended
After the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, FPres.
Estrada filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence. The
demurrer, however, was denied by the court. Accused Serapio
opted not to present his own evidence, and instead adopted
the evidence presented by FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada.
Incidentally, in 2007, the Sandiganbayan approved the Plea
Bargaining Agreement between the prosecution and accused
Atong Ang, the latter pleading guilty to a lesser offense of
Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212 in relation to
Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused Atong Ang
was sentenced to two years and four months of prision
correccional minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum, and to pay the amount of
P25,000,000.00 to the Government as his civil liability.
Accused Atong Ang is now out of jail under probation.
RULING OF THE COURT
The elements of the crime of plunder, pursuant to RA 7080 and
as laid down by the Supreme Court in the earlier case
of Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No.
148560, 19 November 2001), are as follows:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as
amended; and
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50,000,000.00.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of plunder as against former President Estrada, thus:
(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time
of the commission of the acts charged in the Amended
Information was the President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
(b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis
“Chavitâ€ Singson, who was granted immunity from suit
by the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of
other persons named by prosecution witnesses in the course of
the trial of this case, in amassing, accumulating and acquiring
ill-gotten wealth as follows:
(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from
“juetengâ€, a form of illegal gambling, during the period
beginning November 1998 to August 2000 in the aggregate
amount of P545,291,000.00. Out of this amount,
P200,000,000.00 was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation; and
(ii) by a series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and
the SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and
collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle
Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00 which was deposited
in the Jose Velarde account.
These two acts – (i) and (ii) – correspond to sub-paragraphs
(a) and (c) of the Amended Information. However, there is
uncertainty as to the participation of Jinggoy Estrada and
Serapio in the allegations under sub-paragraph (a) of the

Amended Information (both are not included in sub-paragraph
[c] of the Amended Information).
With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, there was no evidence that
the money he turned over to Gov. Singson or the latter’s
representatives was part of the jueteng protection money
collected from Bulacan or that he received funds from a certain
Viceo. The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification
presented by the defense that Jinggoy Estrada did not have an
account with the United Overseas Bank, disproving the
testimony of Emma Lim that the deposit slip in the amount said
to be part of jueteng money was turned over to her by Jinggoy
Estrada from his account at the United Overseas Bank. The
gaps in the prosecution’s evidence as to Jinggoy Estrada
create uncertainty in the mind of the Court as to the
participation of Jinggoy Estrada in the collection and receipt of
jueteng money.
With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singson’s
testimony nor the ledger entries proved that Serapio was
involved in any way in the collection or disbursement of jueteng
protection money. It is difficult to presume any criminal intent
on the part of Serapio to conceal or launder jueteng protection
money in order to contribute to the amassing and accumulation
of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection with the
transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the allegations under sub-paragraph (b) and
(d) of the amended Information:
1. Acts under sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. –
With respect to the act of divesting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, the paper trail in
relation to the P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise taxes
began with Gov. Singson and ended with Atong Ang. This
Court does not find the evidence sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada or any member of his
family had instigated and/or benefited from the diversion of
said funds. The prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable
doubt, who among the accused benefited from the
misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur and in
what amounts.
2. Acts under sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information. –
While the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that
there were numerous deposits of astoundingly large sums of
money into the Jose Velarde account, it failed to prove the
predicate act/s as defined under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080
through which the said deposits could have been acquired or
amassed, except for the amount of P189,700,000.00,
representing illegal commissions from the sales of Belle shares
and the money collected from illegal gambling. It is not per se
the accumulation of wealth which is proscribed by the Anti-
Plunder Law. The acquisition of wealth of not less than
P50,000,000.00 must be linked to the commission of overt or
criminal acts falling within the ambit of the said law. All that the
prosecution has succeeded in showing is that the Jose Velarde
account is the repository or receptacle of vast wealth belonging
to FPres. Estrada.
However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined
above (particularly, first, the regular and methodical acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth through collections from illegal gambling,
and, second, the receipt of unlawful commissions from the
sales of Belle shares twice), whether taken separately or
independently of the other or in combination with each other,
unquestionably constitute the crime of plunder as defined by
Section 2, in relation to Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended.
A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of
jueteng money collection on a regular bi-monthly basis from
the dfferent provinces nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada with
the connivance and/or participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda
Ricaforte, Emma Lim, Carmencita Itchon, SPO2 Artates, Jamis
Singson and other jueteng collectors referred to in the
Amended Information as “John Doesâ€ and “Jane
Does.â€ As proven, the collections in “several
instancesâ€ from illegal gambling money went way beyond
the minimum of P50,000,000.00 set by the Anti-Plunder Law.
These repeated collections of jueteng money from November
1998 to August 2000 would fall within the purview of a
“seriesâ€ of illegal acts constituting plunder. The said
series of acts, on its own, would have been sufficient to convict
the principal accused, FPres. Estrada. However, this Court
also finds that FPres. Estrada is criminally liable for plunder for
receiving commissions from the purchase of Belle Shares by
the GSIS and by the SSS in grave abuse of his power on two
separate occasions as charged in sub-paragraph (b) of the
Amended Information. Clearly, the receipt of these
commissions on two occasions likewise meets the definition of
a series of two similar unlawful acts employing the same
scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two
series of acts falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the
Amended Information, proven in the course of the trial could
have amounted to two (2) counts of plunder. It would be a
purely academic exercise, as the accused cannot be convicted
of two offenses or two counts of plunder on the basis of a
single Information, clearly charging him of only one count of
plunder, because that would violate his constitutional rights to
due process, given the severity of the crime charged in this
case.

The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the
Amended Information, which formed two separate series of
acts of a different nature, were linked by the fact that they were
plainly geared towards a common goal which was the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth for FPres. Estrada and that
they shared a pattern or a common method of commission
which was the abuse or misuse of the high authority or power
of the Presidency.
In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the commission by the principal accused
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of the crime of
plunder but not so in the case of former Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estrada and Atty. Edward Serapio.
People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Jinggoy Estrada, G.R.
No. 158754, 10 August 2007.
17MAY
En Banc
[GARCIA, J.]
FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution of
herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on March
6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to private
respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for
brevity). Jinggoy was among the respondents in the crime of Plunder
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Jinggoy filed with the Court
an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail
on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He reiterated his earlier
plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before the
Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the
prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were
then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda. Petitioner suggests that Jinggoy is harboring
a plan to escape, thus a flight risk. But in a Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application for Bail.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Is the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy proper on the ground
that he is no longer considered a flight risk?
HELD: YES, the grant of bail is proper.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness
of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be
denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the
promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4)
years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem
to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court
wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in
general, been consistently respectful of the Court and its
processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that he
is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued
incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social standing and his
other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this
case seems remote if not nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now
almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that
those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of
their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they can flee
from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a
reputation and a respectable name to protect and preserve are very
unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any
suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as
Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange
for becoming a fugitive from justice.
Juan Ponce Enrile v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213455, 11
August 2015.
23MAY
En Banc
[BRION, J.]
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder
against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John
Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers,
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD
JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or
acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination
or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives
LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions under the
following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project
identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target implementors of
ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be
ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan.
On the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of
arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.
ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is
vague or indefinite resulting in the serious violation of
Enrile’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him?
HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information
are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to
quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to
properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a
bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the
complaint or Information. Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court
should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the
government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full
meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of
disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and
withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends
to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is
designed to avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all
the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes
more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries
with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails
the commission of several predicate criminal acts involving a great
number of transactions spread over a considerable period of
time. Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not
less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and
property language recognized in the due process clause – is at stake
in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the
protection of those fundamental rights.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion
for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to due process,
the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental
opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different
viewed particularly from the prism of their respective objectives. In
the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not
state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is
void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already
impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but
is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to properly
plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect
of form. Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the
Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of the
accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the
motion for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in
sufficient detail because the allegations in the Information are
vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow
Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are
made.That every element constituting the offense had been alleged
in the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting
for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged
to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function
of a bill of particulars. Hence, while the information may be
sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused
is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of
enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision,
with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts
sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of
particulars shall specifically contain the following:
The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or
series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.
A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions”
allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was
arrived at.
A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or
commissions were received.
The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,”
of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified
projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year
when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects
were received.
The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which
were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s
PDAF projects.”
The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government agency
who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a particular.