Turkey’s Foreign Policy Pivot: Is it still aligned to the West?

Zaid Yahya Rassam

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of

Arts in International Relations

Coventry University
April 2019

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 Abstract

Turkey has experienced a drastic change in in its foreign policy since 2002. What was once a strong

stable relationship between Turkey and the West, a more independent Turkish foreign policy has

caused critics to question Turkish allegiance to the West. The dissertation examines two case

studies, foreign policy towards Israel and Iran, to determine whether Turkey, indeed, has realigned

its foreign policy orientation. The dissertation applies Charles Hermann’s theory of foreign policy

change to measure Turkey’s level of change in its foreign policy with aim of concluding whether

Turkey has experienced the final stage of his criteria in the complete reorientation of foreign policy.

The study concludes that Turkey has experienced a considerable amount of foreign policy

transformation but stops short of a experiencing a complete reorientation away from the West.

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Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 1......................................................................................................................................... 8
Chapter 2....................................................................................................................................... 11
Chapter 3....................................................................................................................................... 18
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 52
References .................................................................................................................................... 56

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List of Tables, Graphs and Charts

Chart 1: Page 41

Table 1: Page 44

Chart 2: Page 45

Table 2: Page 48

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Introduction

Is Turkey’s newfound strategic interest in the Middle East jeopardising its ties with Europe and the

West?

F. Stephen Larrabee, writing in the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Survival Journal in

2011 claimed that it is not, because Turkey will always act in its best strategic interests, and for the

moment, those are still aimed at eventual European Union membership. At the same time Turkey is

said to be making this “turn to the East”, enhancing relationships with states such as Syria and Iran,

it remains inextricably tied to the West “through its membership in NATO, the Council of Europe,

and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.” Turkey, contends Larrabee, is

pursuing an aggressive regional foreign policy aimed at securing Turkish relationships with its

neighbours that is not at odds with its continuing “need…for strong ties with the United States”

(2011).

This dissertation’s relevance is easily justified due to the complete turnaround of foreign

policy initiatives carried out by the Ankara since 2002 with the rise of Recep Tayyib Erdogan’s AKP

party. Turkey has saw a near meteoric rise in its position on the international stage. A once solid ally

of the West that did not shriek from the responsibilities placed upon it by the West following its

creation after the end of the Great War and the subsequent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

It’s almost auto-pilot mode of foreign policy demonstrated its passive nature in not interfering with

its neighbours and hoping not to drift from its alignment hoping to stay protected by the West from

any potential security pitfalls such as the Soviet Union and Iran.

Under the United States and the wider Western security umbrella it was financed

significantly to keep the Soviet Union at bay during the Cold War and followed this up by joining

NATO in its efforts to keep international order by allowing its soil to be used for important missile

defence systems. It followed up with unconditional support for the United States war in 1991 against

5
Iraq in Kuwait. Being the only Muslim country to join the NATO alliance and becoming the first

Muslim majority nation to recognise Israel it could easily be argued that Turkey’s position as a stable

reliable partner to the West was never in question.

However, shortly after the turn of the century in 2002, Ankara has demonstrated a change

of tune In its foreign policy. Turkish foreign policy as argued by many analysts is almost

unrecognisable with a new take on the region advocating for diplomacy with previous hostile states

and stretching itself diplomatically hoping to rise to the challenge of becoming a regional power

house that is no longer content with following the Western vision for the region but instead eager to

create its own independent foreign policy.

Accusations of a complete reorientation of foreign policy that is not aligned with the West’s

have been directed at Turkey since the AKP came into power. Ankara’s first major foreign policy

decision to shake the world was its refusal to allow the United States access into Iraq from its Turkish

borders during the second Gulf War. This was followed by its insistence to include Hamas in any

peace talks with Israel keeping in line with softening its diplomatic approach to include actors from

all sides. Turkey’s diplomatic rift with Israel following the Marmara incident, where a number of

Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli forces, followed in 2010. Turkey’s refusal to agree to Iranian

sanctions at the UN security council was also a deciding factor in levelling the accusation of Turkey

turning its back on the West.

These accusations levelled at Turkey by political circles and the media mostly gone

unchallenged and I wish to analyse Turkey’s foreign policies in Israel and Iran to gain a more nuanced

detailed analysis of Turkish foreign policies in the region and whether these policies actually

constitute a complete reorientation away from the West and towards the East. This dissertation will

use the case study method to test the foreign policy changes as set out by Charles Hermann in his

1990 work. Hermann’s criteria for foreign policy changes is broken down to four stages with the final

stage being a complete orientation of foreign policy. I will test the hypothesis and subsequent stages

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of foreign policy changes on Israel and Iran and therefore allow me determine whether Turkey has

indeed turned its back on the West in favour of aligning with the West’s opponents namely Iran,

Russia and China.

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Chapter 1
Foreign policy before 2002

Pre-Cold War Foreign Policy with Middle East

Following the military rule of 1980-1983, power was transferred into civilian hands spearheaded by

Turgut Ozal, who according to many in Turkey was the man behind the economic reforms that

revived Turkey’s economy (Robins, 2003). He was the prime minister that triggered the reorientation

of the economy towards export markets and international competition.

Turkey showcased varying attitudes in its foreign policy during the cold war era. The first

was its non-confrontational attitude towards the Middle East disputes namely the Arab Israel issue

and the Iran-Iraq conflict (Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, 1983). The second characteristic showcased was its

attempt to build and maintain respectable yet not very expansive ties with its Middle East

neighbours most notably Iran, Israel and many of the Arab regimes. The only exception to this

characteristic was its hostile relationship with Syria due to their control of a disputed land

relinquished in 1939 by France (Hale, 2000). Thirdly, having been the only Muslim country to

recognise Israel, Turkey started to shift to a more pro-Palestinian stance after 1967. This pressure

was mainly due to pressures placed on the government of Turkey by a growing allegiance to Islam

domestically and also the government’s efforts to build on their previously light relations with the

Muslim world at a time when they were starting to experience strains in their relationship with the

west due to Cyprus crisis (Hale 2000).

Post-War Cold War Foreign Policy in Middle East

The end of the Cold War forced the Turkish establishment to redefine its international purpose. It

forced Turkish Foreign policy to transform from its isolationist position concerning regional conflicts

and catering to the West’s need for it to be a stronghold against any Soviet threat. The end of the

Cold War was the beginning of the end of Turkey’s reliance on NATO and US protection. Following

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the Cold War, various international events occurred to which Turkey reacted in a more independent

manner detached from its previous passive Foreign Policy. The major events that began to shape

Turkish Foreign Policy during the post-Cold War period will be highlighted.

Iran, Syria and Iraq became the threat (Altunisik & Martin, 2011). According to the National

Security Policy Document of 1995, the greatest threat to Turkish National security is “irredentism”

and “religious fundamentalism” and that they are clearly linked to Syria and Iran. In regards to Iran,

Turkey was pessimistic in its attitude towards Iran following its Islamic revolution which was

perceived as a threat to Turkey’s identity. Iran and Turkey have previously shared an autocratic

method of modernization. However, the ways of domination parted due to Oil wealth transforming

Iran, while Turkey was wrapping itself in its Kemalist isolationism. In addition, Iran had accused

Turkey of harbouring opposition groups such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq and Turkey have similarly

accused Iran of supporting Turkish rebels and Iranian links to assassinations of a number of Turkish

intellectuals (Pope and Pope, 1998 p224).

However, this ill feeling subsided following the first signal of foreign policy reorientation as a

result of the new coalition government headed by Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamic aligned Refah

Party (Sayari 1996). Refah’s rise to power and the subsequent increasing strength of Political Islam

marks a new development in Turkish politics to which we are now witnessing the subsequent effect

which is the control of the Turkish political arena by the often described Erdogan quagmire.

Some of Erbakan’s ‘achievements’ during his tenure showcase a very expansive foreign policy

performance. In line with his previous belief that Turkey should not tunnel vision itself

internationally with a Kemalist attitude by siding with the West no matter the outcome, Erbakan

immediately made his intentions clear by identifying with the Islamic world. However, he did not do

this by cutting off ties with the west and the EU.

This willingness to pursue friendly ties with the West in conjunction with his aim of building

stronger ties with the Islamic world was illustrated by Turkeys ratification of its military agreement

9
with Israel in 1996 (Sayari 2000). Although, this agreement cannot be owned by the Turkish

Government as such due to the Turkish military’s then current ‘guardian of the strategic contours of

Turkish foreign and security policy’ (Robins, 2003).

Erbakan, in his first foreign trip, made a symbolic point by visiting Iran illustrating his previous

promises of building relations with the Islamic World. In it, he signed a $23 billion gas agreement.

This move was subsequently met with criticism from United States. Another move which signalled a

new wave of relationship building in the Middle East was when he sent diplomats to Baghdad and

Damascus. A sharp foreign policy departure from the previously established positions of the Turkish

government.

Conclusion
Following the creation of Turkish Republic its sole focus was to worry about domestic politics and to

try and improve its economy this whilst keeping to a stringent isolated neutral foreign policy. Ataturk

followed by his loyal predecessors adopted Western institutions, stifled any opposing ideology

namely its Islamic heritage. However, all these steps did not result into peace and prosperity due to

its authoritarian structure and suppression of its deep rooted Islamic, Kurdish and Turkic identities.

This era of isolationism resulted in military coups, execution of a democratically elected leader, dire

economy consequences and saw a rise in ideologies it was desperate to supress. The Cold War saw

Turkey taking a stand internationally, gradually moving away from its isolationist stance, to side with

the West against the Soviet Union. However, they were left disillusioned in the 1960’s and 1970’s

with the West’s reaction to its Foreign policy following the Cyprus occupation.

Following Turkey’s turbulent relationship with West, which was further aggravated by the

domestic political volatility and economic crises, two former members of the now defunct Islamic

Welfare Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, formed the Justice and Development Party.

The party competed in the 2002 general elections and won a third of the votes resulting in forcing

the right-wing parties out of parliament.

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Chapter 2
Turkish Foreign Policy Theory Intro

This dissertation aims to answer one fundamental question which is to what extent does Turkeys

Foreign policy transformation since the turn of the century signify a reorientation of Turkey away

from its historically close alliance with the West? In order to answer this question, the following

chapter will introduce the theoretical framework that acts as the foundation for the case studies I

have chosen in the chapters that follow. To gain a clear understanding of the research question

outlined above the literature review will examine the stand out work of changed in foreign policy. It

will then apply an analytical framework to comprehend foreign policy change to Turkey’s foreign

policy transformation since the turn of the century.

Literature Review
The study of Foreign Policy Change is a relatively new one with a renewed focus on why foreign

policy changes and what subsequent effects it has on the immediate parties involved and more

importantly the ripple effects felt further afield.

To study the foreign policy changes I will refer to Charles Hermann’s work most notably his

1990 work, ‘Changing Course, When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy.’ In it he points

out foreign policy changes which

mark a reversal or, at least, a profound redirection of a country’s foreign policy are of special
interest because of the demands their adoption poses on the initiating government and its
domestic constituents and because of their potentially powerful consequences for other
countries (Hermann, 1990).

Various symptoms come to the fore when a reconfiguration of a state’s foreign policy equilibrium

occur which according to Herman, ‘wars may begin or end. Economic well-being may significantly

improve or decline. Alliances may be reconfigured. Sometimes the entire international system is

affected.

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 Hermann uses a framework to analyse foreign policy change. The framework consists of four

graduated stages or levels of Foreign Policy Change. They are as follows:

1. Adjustment Changes. This is the shift in efforts to achieve changes. However, what is done,

how it is done and the purposes for which it is done are the same.

2. Program Changes. The shift in methods or means used to address the issue at hand. The

changes are more qualitative than they are quantitative.

3. Problem/Goal Changes. The fundamental change or forfeit of an existing goal that the policy

addresses.

4. International Orientation Changes. This, the most acute forms of foreign policy changes

which involves a complete redirection of the actor’s stance on world affairs. This sees a vast

amount of policies that are changed simultaneously.

Hermann highlights the four different areas that can bring about foreign policy change. These are:

1. Leader Driven. Change resulting from an authoritative policy-maker by imposing their own

vision of the redirection they see fit. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un peace deal with South Korea

illustrates the conviction power and energy to compel his government to change course. The

same can be said of Anwar Sadat’s willingness to pursue a peace deal with Israel following

the 1973 War.

2. Bureaucratic Advocacy. A group within the government can become an advocate for

redirection. The group can be scattered around government or located in a single

department. The most effective people will be middle level officials as they will be better

placed to receive signals that the current foreign policy is not effective. They will also be

better placed to understand the inner workings of movement and can therefore effectively

overcome resistance.

3. Domestic Restructuring

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 The politically relevant segment of society whose support a regime needs to govern and how

this segment can become an agent for change. Therefore, FP redirection occurs when elites

change their positions or views on certain aspects of the governments FP. In Turkey’s case,

much can be said of the growing middle class and religiously practicing portion of Turkey and

their influence to create change. These two groups have enjoyed a great deal of prosperity

and freedom since the AKP government were voted in. Henceforth, their happiness is one of

the priorities of the Turkish government.

4. External Shock

This area is most relatable to Turkey’s case. This source of FP change is move evident when

analysing its recent FP alterations. External shocks are large events in terms of visibility and

immediate impact. The Turkish flotilla flashpoint destined for Palestine triggered the change

in FP towards Israel.

There are a number of other prominent scholars of foreign policy such as Jerel Rosati and James

Rosenau. Rosati helps us in understanding foreign policy change by defining the variables that make

up the process or ‘cycle’ as he describes it of foreign policy change. The forces in play are, the state,

society and the environment. Rosati defines the state as a legal concept which refers to

governmental institutions to which policy makers act in the name of the people. Society is defined

by Rosati as, “the social collectivity and institutions, beliefs and relationships that have developed

among the population” (Sampson, Rosati & Hagan, 1994)

Finally, the environment, is defined as the, “resources of the state and opportunities and

constraints it faces in a global context”. Rosati explains the cyclical model as

governmental foreign policy reflecting the beliefs and actions of policymakers in

state institutions who are influenced, by the society and the environment in which
they operate (Ibid).

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This cyclical process then creates either two results, which are stability and continuation in the

status quo foreign policy or a period of instability where we foreign policy change is the most likely

outcome.

Rosati defines continuity as the, “broad patterns in foreign policy that tend to persist over

time”. More importantly, change in foreign policy according to Rosati refers to “change ranging from

modest shifts to major foreign policy restructuring” (Ibid).

Rosati contends that the interaction of state, society and wider international environment

creates a reasoned process where foreign policy evolves from stability to transition. This evolution of

foreign policy may go on to produce four different outcomes:

1) Intensification: No change – the goals, scope and strategy of foreign policy are
reinforced.
2) Refinement: Minor changes in the scope, goals and strategy of foreign policy.
3) Reform: Moderate changes in the scope, goals and strategy of foreign policy.
4) Restructuring: Major changes in the scope, goals and strategy of foreign policy (Ibid).

In his analysis of United States foreign policy cyclical change since the end of the second World War.

The first example of transition in foreign policy came about during the WWII then followed by

stability throughout the Cold War years. The Vietnam Wat then saw another transition and foreign

policy change which was then followed by a period of stability. These patterns of continuity and

change, according to Rosati, are a consequence of the “dynamics of the state’s interaction with its

society and the environment over time” (Ibid).

Dissertation Theoretical Framework

The theoretical analysis provided by the above literature on the study of foreign policy change will

allow me to answer the question my dissertation is asking which is whether Turkey has untangled

itself from its Western orientated foreign policy.

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My principle hypothesis is that Turkey’s recent foreign policy changes demonstrate that while it

meets three of Herman’s framework in measuring a country’s foreign policy changes, it is still yet to

reach the final stage of foreign policy change (International orientation change).

Implication 1 of Principal Hypothesis

This implication reflects Herman’s first stage of foreign policy change. Adjustment Changes. This is

the shift in efforts to achieve changes. However, what is done, how it is done and the purposes for

which it is done are the same. Therefore, Turkey would continue to support and observe its Western

allies foreign policy in the Middle East

Implication 2 of Principal Hypothesis

This implication refers to Herman second stage of foreign policy change. Program Changes. The shift

in methods or means used to address the issue at hand. The changes are more qualitative than they

are quantitative. New instruments of statecraft are used such as the pursuing of a goal through

diplomacy instead of military force. These changes are more in line with Turkey’s Western allies

foreign policy in the Middle East. However, it also means that Turkey’s foreign policy vision in the

region is tolerated by the West.

Implication 3 of Principal Hypothesis

This final implication refers to Herman’s penultimate stage of foreign policy changes. Problem/Goal

Changes. The initial problem or goal that the policy wishes to address is replaced or forfeited.

Turkey’s relations with its Middle East neighbours, be it trade or closer diplomatic relations, will

grow closer or further depending on the partner country. This change in relations with the Middle

East will occur simultaneously as its increase in relations with the West.

The principle hypothesis and its subsequent implications will be juxtaposed to a competing

hypothesis which refers to Herman’s final stage of foreign policy change, International Orientation

15
Changes. This, the most acute forms of foreign policy changes which involves a complete redirection

of the actor’s stance on world affairs. This sees a vast amount of policies that are changed

simultaneously. It therefore indicates that Turkey’s recent changes in its foreign policy proves that it

is demonstrating a fundamental reorientation away from its previously close ties with the West and

attempting to build itself as an absolute power in the region.

Research Methodology
This dissertation will analyse the changes that have occurred in Turkey’s foreign policy since the AKP

government got into power and to examine if these changes prove that Turkey is experiencing an

orientation away from the Western alliance it held during the Kemalist era. I will conduct two case

studies, Iran and Israel, examining Turkeys foreign policy towards each country to test the above

hypothesis.

I will lay out the hypothesis for each case study, and then the subsequent implications. I will

then provide an overview of Turkey’s foreign policy in relation to each of the two countries. This

overview will include a brief summary of Turkey’s historical foreign policy in that country and then

lay out the information for the implications of the hypothesis. Each of the two case studies will

conclude with the findings and analysis and finally identifying the common denominators that are

found within the analytical framework.

The case study methodology will be used in this dissertation because it will allow me to

investigate a contemporary issue in depth and within its real-world context especially when the

boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident (Yin, 2018). This

distinguishable feature within the case study methodology is appropriate in the context of the

research question I am attempting to answer. What this dissertation is trying to achieve is to

distinguish fact from overarching myth, resulting in painting a clearer picture of Turkish foreign

policy in the region.

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A qualitative case study is defined as “an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a

phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources” (Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack,

2008).It has also been defined as, “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to

develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George and

Bennett, 2005).

Data
The data I used in this dissertation come from a wide spectrum of primary sources such as

government reports, business reports and official documents. I also used data from public speeches

and news interviews. Secondary sources such as journals and academic books were then used to

back up the primary data by providing the dissertation with an analytical account of decisions made

in Turkish foreign policy. I have used graphs and tables to provide a visual interpretation of the data

at hand.

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Chapter 3
Case Studies

This chapter will attempt to answer the dissertation question which is whether Turkey based on its

foreign policy is experiencing a complete orientation away from its previous close alliance with the

West in favour of building closer ties with the Middle East. The case studies that are covered in this

dissertation are Israel and Iran. The dissertation examines the changes in foreign policy and the

reasons that drive these changes by using the theoretical framework introduced in the previous

chapter.

The significance in choosing Israel to determine whether Turkey is abounding its alliance

with the West is that by referring to foreign policy towards Israel it can be argued that it reflects

Turkeys relations with the rest of the West. This, due to Israel unbreakable historical ties with the

West.

The chapter will start by outlining the hypothesis and its subsequent implications. A brief

overview of Turkish foreign policy will be provided. Then the two case studies will be conducted. I

will begin each of the cases by covering Turkish foreign policy in the particular country before the

arrival of the AKP government. I will then examine the evidence against the implications of the

hypothesis. Once a clear picture of the direction of foreign policy in the particular country is evident,

I will summarise whether Turkey’s foreign policy alterations can be classed as a complete

orientation.

Case Study Framework

My hypothesis is that Turkey’s recent foreign policy changes demonstrate that while it meets three

of Herman’s framework in measuring a country’s foreign policy changes, it is still yet to reach the

final stage of foreign policy change (International orientation change).

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Implication 1 of Principal Hypothesis

This implication reflects Herman’s first stage of foreign policy change. Adjustment Changes. This is

the shift in efforts to achieve changes. However, what is done, how it is done and the purposes for

which it is done are the same. Therefore, Turkey would continue to support and observe its Western

allies foreign policy in the Middle East

Implication 2 of Principal Hypothesis

This implication refers to Herman second stage of foreign policy change. Program Changes. The shift

in methods or means used to address the issue at hand. The changes are more qualitative than they

are quantitative. These changes are more in line with Turkey’s Western allies foreign policy in the

Middle East. However, it also means that Turkey’s foreign policy vision in the region is tolerated by

the West.

Implication 3 of Principal Hypothesis

This final implication refers to Herman’s penultimate stage of foreign policy changes. Problem/Goal

Changes. The initial problem or goal that the policy wishes to address is replaced or forfeited.

Turkey’s relations with its Middle East neighbours, be it trade or closer diplomatic relations, will

grow closer or further depending on the partner country. This change in relations with the Middle

East will occur simultaneously as its increase in relations with the West.

Turkey’s Middle East Foreign Policy

Pre-Cold War

The creation of the Turkish Republic saw it transform from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire to

becoming a modern nation keeping up with Western civilisation and in doing so removing any links

19
with its Ottoman past. The Kemalist elite subsequently adopted an ‘inward looking and defensive

policy approach towards international relations’ (Dal, 2012). Following the proclamation of the

Turkish republic, Turkey went through a long process of assimilation of European influences, tearing

itself from the Middle East and propelling her into the North Atlantic region (Mango, 1957). Turkey

starting point was Ottoman style authoritarian foreign policy and moving towards a nation based

nationalist discourse which focussed on a strong sense of defending the homeland and the

Turkification of the remaining Muslim remnants of the Ottoman empire (Aras, 2009).

During these initial years of the nation’s infancy, it’s involvement in the Middle East was

limited. This was due to Turkey buying into the West’s conceptualisation of the Middle East as

inefficiency, superstition and abnormal morals. Therefore, the only time the Middle East would be

dealt with according to the Kemalist Elite was if Turkeys national security was at stake. This

according to some was due to the ill feeling the regional neighbours had of each other due to the

Ottomans ‘back stabbing’ the Arab Middle East during the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Jung, 2005).

However, as Mango points out, this rejection of the Middle East by the Turkish republic was made

easier due to the Middle East region coming under the care of Western hegemony.

Cold War Era

During the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy was mostly shaped by the West’s foreign policy towards

the region. The conflicts throughout the Cold War, namely the Israel-Palestine conflict, Iran-Iraq war

and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, saw Turkey take a step back from the region it felt was under the

political sphere of the West. Turkey played a key role in the United States containment policy against

the Soviet Union. More strategically, Turkey realised the importance of their strategic positioning in

the Cold War due to their close proximity with Russia.

Turkey, served as a vital bulwark against the Soviet Union’s long held desire of expansion

into the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Larrabee, 2010). It can be contended that it was during

this period that Turkey made up for a weak economy due to the lack of internationally relevant

20
commodities and raw materials, by turning their foreign policy into an economic recourse (Hale,

2000).

However, a turn of events in the Middle East namely the decreasing importance of Arab

nationalism and more significantly the worsening of political and economic crises compelled Turkey

to pay more attention to its regional neighbours. Consequently, Turkey began the process of

normalising its relations with the Middle East. It can be argued that Turkey was still reeling from its

treatment following the Cyprus incidents and the subsequent sanctions places on it by its Western

Allies and saw this as an opportunity to revive its relations with its Middle East neighbours.

Before the normalisation of relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours, Turkey’s

foundational foreign policy experienced a shake up following the end of the Cold War. The end of

the Cold War did not end the securitisation of Turkey’s foreign policy. Rather, one threat was

replaced with another threat. The threat from the Soviet Union was replaced by the threat its

Middle East neighbours, most notably Syria, Iran and Iraq posed (Octav, 2011).

Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union as a super power and a

threat removed the sole reason behind Turkey’s reliance on the United States for its security.

However, as stated earlier, the Soviet threat was replaced by several regional threats: Kurdish

separatism, Iraqi sectarianism, and most worrying the possible emergence of a nuclear Iran

(Larrabee).

There was a sense of Western hypocrisy against Turkey beginning to take hold due to a

number of Western moves such as Europe not accepting Turkey in the Western camp unlike its

welcoming attitude towards Eastern European countries. The rejection of Turkey’s EU membership

21
bid in 1989 further exacerbated the situation. It could be argued that the exclusion by the West

experienced by Turkey forced Turkey to pursue a more self-reliant foreign policy. It was Turkey’s

subsequent search for an independent identity in the 1990’s which resulted in it’s loyalty being

questioned by the West.

It was argued that Turkey would abandon its Western alignment and look elsewhere for an

alliance. Turkey would focus on the newly founded democracies in post-communist Russia and

central Asia to build an independent foreign policy strategy (Lesser, 1993). There was however

another side to the debate which argued that the end of the Cold War would see Turkey spread its

diplomatic wings and experiment its foreign policy strategy with its Eastern neighbours which would

in turn benefit the West. The experienced observer Paul Henze contended, that having Turkey reach

out to the Middle East and central Asia could be seen as an ‘integral component’ to the West’s

interest in the regions (Hale, 2000).

In terms of Turkey’s own interest, building relations with newly founded democracies in

central Asia and the Middle East would enhance the value of a Turkish alliance for the Western

states in the post-Cold War political arena. Therefore, it was suggested at the time, Turkey should

look ‘simultaneously to both East and West and accept that fact that Islam constitutes an important

part of its cultural heritage (Onis, 1995)’. Hence, an embracing of its own identity, be it Turkic or

Islamic, Turkey utilised it history to further enhance its foreign policy following the Cold War.

Turkeys ambitious foreign policy strategy in Central Asia coupled with West’s reluctance to accept

Turkey into Europe and the subsequent questioning of its European credentials intensified the

debate about where Turkey belonged in the new post-Cold War order (Octav).

Turkey under its first civilian government spearheaded by President Turgut Ozal, followed a

program of reconciliation with the Middle East following the latter’s lack of support during the Greek

crises during the 1960’s and 1970’s. This pattern of rapprochement with the Islamic world was a

combination of domestic policies of economic liberalization and moderate Islamisation with a key

22
active export strategy towards the Middle East (Jung). Turkey as a result of its pattern of

rapprochement resulted in an economic boom.

However, Turkey almost on every major Middle East issue showcased it Western alliance

credentials. During the 1990’s, Turkeys foreign policy strategy towards the Middle East was mostly

aligned with West, particularly the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. The economic

benefits of President Ozal’s policy with the Middle East however did not last long and by 1995

Turkey’s trade with the Middle East declined due to its siding with the US in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.

Following Ozal’s presidency, the results of the December 1995 election in which the Pro-

Islamist Welfare Party became the single biggest party in the assembly, further exacerbated

government instability. Following negations with parties previously hostile to the Welfare Party’s

Islamist vision the Welfare Party formed a coalition with the Tansu Ciller’s DYP party.

The Middle East was again put at the centre of Turkish foreign policy, this time during

Erbakan’s short tenure as Prime Minister in 1996. Although at odds with its coalition partner, the

Welfare party pursued efforts to establish an Islamic bloc (D8). Erbakan’s foreign policy activism also

included state visits to Iran and Libya. The moves were always at odds with his opposition, military

establishment and his own coalition partner. The government’s bold ambitions in forging closer ties

with the Islamic World and more significantly the Middle East, was there to see for everyone.

Erbakan’s visit to Tehran in 1996 was a major high point in his efforts to re-orient Turkey’s

foreign relations to the Muslim world. The trip resulted in an agreement with Iran to build gas

pipeline from Iran to Turkey. The Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Ankara the next year

and talks for a defence cooperation were negotiated. However, due to strong opposition from the

Turkish military the idea was vetoed.

Although these trips to the Middle East and efforts to establish an Islamic bloc were not

arguably fruitless, they indicated an ambition to move East in its foreign policy strategy. These

23
efforts were fruitless due to a number of reasons, namely his willingness to forge closer ties with

Israel and sign a military co-operation agreement. Although this move was later proved to be forced

on him by the powerful National Security Council, composed mainly of senior military personal

(Mecham, 2004). The military’s influence would soon decline and facilitate a broadening and

softening of Turkish foreign policy where rather than relying on hard power, Turkey would

increasingly look to solve problems using diplomatic solutions (Larrabee).

The pressure of maintaining a balancing act between the Welfare Party’s core support for a

more Islamic friendly government and the military and opposition elite’s demands for a cooling of

Islamic rhetoric resulted in the demise of Erbakan and his party and the subsequent resignation of

Erbakan as Prime Minister. The welfare party would later be closed by a Judicial Process due to

evidence ‘confirming its actions against the principles of the secular republic’ (Mecham). Prominent

figures within the Party also faced judicial penalties, most notably the Mayor of Istanbul Recep

Tayyip Erdogan for reading lines from a nationalist poet. Erdogan would be imprisoned for short

period and warning of removing his eligibility for running for any future political office.

Following the 2002 elections, where Erdogan’s party the AKP, won a majority to rule. The

AKP’s advent to power would witness a major shift in Turkey’s foreign policy and serious questions

were now being asked of Turkeys foreign policy orientation. Erdogan continued were Erbakan left

off, however in a more stringent manner due to the party’s overall majority in the elections and a

weakened military interference. Critics of the AKP’s policies in the region argued that its activism

was part and parcel of its Islamist commitments (Hale, 2013). This was illustrated by Turkeys greater

role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference where it lobbied for a Turkish professor as its

Secretary-General in 2005. However, as Hale argues, one should not read too much into this due to

Turkey’s attachment to a number of international organisations that played a more instrumental

role in its foreign policy such as NATO, EU and the United Nations.

24
 The ‘Davutoglu era’ deserves a mention due to its representation of being at the epicentre

of change in foreign policy in Turkey (Abramowitz and Barkey, 2009). The Foreign Minister Davutoglu

set out five principles in his assessment of 2007.

These principles are:

‘establishing balance between security and democracy; following a zero-problem policy

toward Turkey’s neighbours; developing relations with the neighbouring regions and

beyond; adherence to a multidimensional foreign policy; and finally a proactive foreign

policy based on rhythmic diplomacy; in other words, emphasizing heavily the importance of

face-to-face communication, leading with diplomatic efforts and active participation in

international organizations’ (Octav, 2016).

Davutoglu’s vision was at first perceived nothing more than imaginations of an academic, however

his elevation to the position to Erdogan’s senior foreign policy advisor and later foreign minister

allowed him to directly influence Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey as a result exploited their Ottoman

past by building on their historical and cultural ties with the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia

(Larrabee). This exploitation coupled with a liberalisation of the Turkish economy has supplemented

the economic dimension of its foreign policy. For instance, export trade with the Middle East has

increased significantly to 20%, whereas the Turkish exports to the EU has fallen below 50%.

Turkey, in its efforts to reduce tension with its neighbours, as envisioned by the Davutoglu

vision, has seen its cooperation with Iran increase. Turkey and Iran signed an agreement on security

cooperation that labelled the PKK a terrorist organisation. On the energy front, Iran has become

Turkey’s second biggest supplier of natural gas after Russia. More noteworthy is the agreement

between the two countries for Turkey to be granted licences to develop three sections of Iran’s gas

field which has reserves of over 14 trillion cubic meters (Larrabee). This agreement was met with

strong condemnation from the United States. Turkey’s argument on this matter was that it could not

25
keep relying on one supplier (Russia) for its natural gas thus blocking a Russian monopoly of Turkey’s

gas market.

Economic measures led by Turkey since 2002 towards the Middle East ties into Davutoglu’s

‘zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbours’ vision. The inclusion of an active role from

businesses and civil society as whole is imperative in order for Davutoglu’s foeign policy vision to be

a success. In his foreign policy assessment of 2007 Davutoglu puts Turkey’s foreign policy ‘success’

down to ‘state polices, civil society, business organisations and numerous other

organisations’(Davutoglu, 2008). It can be argued that Turkeys economic growth since 2002 has

facilitated Ankara’s improved relations with its previously hostile relations with Middle Eastern

countries. Kemal Kirisci conceptualises Turkey’s foreign policy as deriving from a trading state

position and argues that “behind current Turkish foreign policy lies the rise of a trading state’ (2009).

Trade between Israel has doubled in the past two decades from $2.8 billion in 2007 to $5.9

billion in 2017. This in turn has improved Turkey’s standing in the region in pursuing a peaceful

Middle East. Turkey’s trade with Iran illustrates an even more striking picture of how Turkey’s trade

with its Middle East neighbours increased in the first decade of AKP’s rule. Trade between the two

countries stood at $2.1 billion at 2002 and by 2010 that sum jumped to $20 billion (Trading

Economics, 2019). These impressive numbers between the two nations create a major headache for

the West and thus begs the question this thesis wishes to answer. However, Turkey’s trade with

Israel also shows a major increase since the start of the AKP rule which makes answering this

question a little more interesting.

26
Testing Hypothesis and Implications

Israel

Post 2002

The end of the Cold War saw Turkey abandon its traditional policy of neutrality in the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict. Turkey began building its relationship with Israel. Changes in the dynamics of the

international arena following the fall of the Soviet Union were interpreted by Turkey as an

opportunity to rebuild its relations with Israel. Both countries were in need of new allies in the

region. Turkeys testing relationship with the European Union and the new threat of the PKK, which

was openly supported by the Syrian regime coupled with Israel’s search for an ally in the region,

pushed both countries towards each other. The promising positive talks between Israel and

Palestine that began in 1991 and the subsequent signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993

contributed to the eagerness of Turkey and Israel to build on its previously stale relationship. Israel’s

peace talks with Palestine eliminated some elements of criticism that would have come Turkey’s way

from its Muslim neighbours.

The rise of the PKK is widely referenced as one of the major reasons for Turkey’s forging of

closer ties with Israel. Syrian support for the PKK led Turkey to search for military equipment that

could be used in the fight to eradicate the PKK threat. The European Union’s unwillingness to

support its membership candidate in its struggle with the PKK threat and the United States embargo

on Turkey made the option to forge closer ties with Israel a logical and easier one. The fact

that Israel shared Turkey’s opposition of Syria also made the agreements between the two countries

advantageous for each of them.

Turkeys close bond with Israel brought them closer to the West and most significantly with

the United States. The Turkish establishment long understood that good relations with Israel will

translate to support of Israeli lobbyists in Washington who in turn would shield Turkey from pro-

27
Greek and pro-Armenian advocacy groups who were pushing for congressional efforts to recognise

the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide by Turkey (Madeline and Hadley, 2012). The

relationship culminated with United States participating in a joint military exercise such as the

‘Reliant Mermaid’ exercises that occurred from the late 90’s and early 2000’s. It was also argued by

Israeli academics that Israel’s close relationship was actually encouraged by the United States due to

their preference of having a partner in the Middle East. Hence the benefits of upholding a healthy

positive relationship between Israel and Turkey was a direct result of the overlapping interests each

of them held. It is also a benefit to the United States that the close relationship with a Middle

Eastern country like Israel will keep adversaries in the region such as Iran on the defensive (Alvbright

and Hadley).

As mentioned earlier, Turkey went on to sign multiple security agreements with Israel, the

most significant being the 1996 ‘Military Training and Cooperation’ agreement. The free trade

agreement signed in the same year resulted in considerable financial gains for both countries, rising

from $407 million in 1995 to over triple that amount by 2002 to $1.4 billion.

This newly found close relationship between Israel and Turkey finally started to draw major criticism

from the Arab world. In particular, the Syrian deputy President, claimed that the cooperation

between Israel and Turkey. Its fair to say, Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East was

characterised by tension and suspicion. Turkey’s healthy relations with Israel was heavily dependent

on the success of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks (Hale). Therefore, with the failure of second round of

peace talk negotiations in 2000 and the subsequent uprising by Palestinians the relationship began

to crumble.

28
Turkey’s foreign policy towards Israel after 2002 will now be examined below. My hypothesis is that

Turkey’s recent foreign policy changes demonstrate that while it meets three of Herman’s

framework in measuring a country’s foreign policy changes, it is still yet to reach the final stage of

foreign policy change (International orientation change).

Implication 1 of Principal Hypothesis

This implication reflects Herman’s first stage of foreign policy change. Adjustment Changes. This is

the shift in efforts to achieve changes. However, what is done, how it is done and the purposes for

which it is done are the same. Therefore, Turkey would continue to support and observe its

Western allies foreign policy in Israel.

The AKP run Turkish government, although tough in its rhetoric towards Israel in relation to

the Palestinian issue, has for the most part continued to some degree a level of cooperation which

aligns with the Western policies (Bengio, 2009). Despite the rhetoric levelled at Israel’s action in the

region, Turkey has maintained diplomatic relations with Israel and its trade saw a steady increase

over the two decades the AKP have been at the helm.

The respective prime ministers for both countries, Erdogan and Sharon, met in Israel and

agreed to establish a diplomatic hotline in 2005 for the exchange of intelligence information (Tocci,

2013). The same meeting also resulted in the signing of a $400 million deal to have Israel upgrade

Turkey’s military jets (Imai, 2018). This move reinforced the securitization of Turkeys foreign policy

with Israel. During the above and following strengthening of financial and security ties, Turkey

simultaneously criticised Israel which further complicates the analysis of its relations with Israel. In

2007, Israel and Turkey finalised negotiations regarding the ‘Med Stream’ project, an offshore water

pipeline to connects Turkey and Israel over the Mediterranean.

29
 Furthermore, Sharon went on to be the first Israeli president to speak at the Turkish

national Assembly. The construction of an oil pipe line between Ceyhan and Ashkelon followed in

2008. That Turkey would be the first Muslim country to sign such defence deals with Israel is not

surprising given the history between the two communities dating back to the conquest of

Constantinople when they both lived side by side following the signing of a decree by Mehmed the

Conqueror offering them safety (Pope and Pope, 1998).

However, it must be mentioned that during the times of agreements being made between

the neighbouring states, Turkey under the AKP did not hold back when accusing Israel of war crimes,

referring to Israel’s actions in Lebanon in 2006 and 2009’s Gaza offensive. However, following a

spate of criticism targeted at Israel, Turkey made efforts to reconcile with its ally. This however was

short-lived due to the killing of nine Turkish citizens on board a flotilla, carrying humanitarian goods

to Gaza, by Israeli forces. A rift in diplomatic relations occurred and Turkey was not alone in their

criticism as Israel was met by a wave of criticisms from European parliaments and civil society

organisations. In addition, the UN Human Rights Council appointed a fact finding panel. and Turkey

demanded a set of preconditions before restoration of diplomatic ties was to happen. These were

eventually met by Israel following pressure placed on them by the United States.

To further test the first implication of my hypothesis which is that Turkey would continue to

support and observe its Western allies foreign policy in the Israel it will be beneficial to analyse the

West’s approach to the flotilla incident. The United States made worth while efforts to reduce the

tensions between the two countries mainly because the United States relied on Turkey’s bilateral

relationship with Israel in a region which at the time was experiencing backwards steps in stabilising

the region. Therefore, the United States actions reflect Western allies wishes for Turkey to share its

foreign policy in Israel. Moreover, Europe’s reaction to the incident was even more critical of Israel

which further proves the idea that the West believes in Turkey’s support in its foreign policy in Israel.

Turkey showcased its alignment with Western foreign policy in Israel when it played an important

30
behind the scenes role between 2006 and 2008 in trying to secure a release of a captured Israeli

Sergeant from Gaza.

From the United States perspective, it would be beneficial to highlight how they see Turkeys

foreign policy objectives and if that ties in with their own foreign policy in Israel and the region as a

whole. It can confidently argued that Turkey is not an ally of the United States in the traditional

European sense however, a strong bilateral relationship is strategically good reason to grow and

mature into beneficial partnership that can be put into good use to manage the complex Middle East

region with all its security, economic, humanitarian and environmental problems (Madeline and

Hadley).

Turkey’s foreign policy has been aligned with the United States since its creation and has

proved consistently that they will answer the call from the West when called upon. More recently,

Ankara agreed to base an important NATO anti-missile system radar on its land. This request was

initially rejected by Turkey for fear of antagonising Iran, however Iran’s blatant involvement in the

Syrian regime’s crimes against humanity towards its people swayed Ankara’s to alter their approach

to Iran thus aligning with the West’s foreign policy interests and simultaneously carrying out its duty

as a NATO member.

Despite the downgrading of relations following the flotilla incident, the overall trade

between the two countries actually rose. These economic ties were resilient when faced with the rift

in 2010, and despite these diplomatic spats Turkish exports to Israel continued to increase, doubling

between 2007 and 2011 (Cagaptay, 2014). More impressively, trade increased by almost thirty

percent between the years 2010 and 2011 from $3.4 billion to $4.4 billion (World Integrated Trade

Solution, 2019). By promoting these economic ties with Israel, Ankara is on the route of

rapprochement with its neighbour which would subsequently be in the interests of all parties

involved be it the Western allies, Israel and even Turkey albeit trade with Israel is not an important

source of income for Turkey.

31
Implication 2 of Principal Hypothesis

This implication refers to Herman second stage of foreign policy change. Program Changes. The

shift in methods or means used to address the issue at hand. The changes are more qualitative

than they are quantitative. These changes are more in line with Turkey’s Western allies foreign

policy in the Middle East. However, it also means that Turkey’s foreign policy vision in the region is

tolerated by the West.

The United States recognises the changes in the international order and more specifically

the changes in dynamics in the Middle East. Therefore, with the recognition of a changes in the

region, the United States understands Turkeys new role in the region and its subsequent shared

interests and hence their revaluation of its partnership with Turkey. The United States tolerance of

Turkeys new found influence in the region has given Turkey licence to go forward with its own

interests.

Ankara’s stance on the issue of Israel and Palestine and his subsequent support for a two-

state solution is in line with Western interests. In addition to aligning with the Wests foreign policy,

Erdogan has also won over a large proportion the Muslim world and more specifically the Middle

East public with his staunch support of Gaza’s right to self-determination. The Turkish government

has successfully manoeuvred its foreign policy interests by raising the rhetoric and criticism la

Israel’s perceived heavy handed actions towards the Palestinian people. Subsequently, raising

Turkey’s stature in the region which has, as a result, elevated Turkey’s credentials when it comes to

being a legitimate voice for the Muslim world and more specifically the region (Larrabee).

Following the Palestinian elections of 2006, the Palestinian issue became prioritised within

Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. The leader of Hamas, Khaled Mashal’s, visit to Turkey was met with

heavy criticism from Israel (Tur, 2013). However, talking to Hamas, according to Ankara, was in line

32
with its official strategy ‘talk to all parties’ within its zero problems with neighbours (Davutoglu,

2010).

The West, and most notably, the United States, ordered the Palestinian group in Gaza to

renounce its anti-Israel position otherwise face a threat of withholding aid to the Palestinian

Authority (Stein, 2015). In response, Ankara argued that the world should not denounce the

democratically elected party due to their stance on Israel. The Turkish government saw their line of

communication with Hamas as the only active line from the outside world.

Moreover, Turkey felt they could soften Hamas’s stance on certain issues such as when the

then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul encouraged the group to renounce violence and encouraged the

group to take part in negotiations for a resolution to the conflict with Israel (Stein). By carrying out

these controversial steps, it can be argued that Turkey was moving away from Western foreign

policy alignment however, a more nuanced analysis of their actions should be carried out. In opening

dialogue with a group that is perceived by the majority of the Western world as a terrorist

organisation, Turkey saw an opportunity to moderate the group’s position and to finally accept a

peaceful resolution to their problems which in turn would eventually align with the Western foreign

policy of a two state solution. Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor in 2011 argued that they were

trying to bring Palestinian Authority and Hamas officials together so they can talk with the Israelis

which is a core United State goal (Kitfield 2010).

The United States may not support Turkey’s close ties with Hamas, however under Turkish

guidance the party may eventually be willing to meet the Middle East Quartet’s demands; recognise

the state of Israel, renounce violence and uphold all international agreements between the

Palestinian Authority Fatah and Israel (Alvbright and Hadley). Although this is long shot in the

political sense, Turkey’s pursuing of this goal was tolerated by the West due to the benefits it may be

able to create if successful.

33
 Furthermore, a balanced foreign policy which gives the Palestinians in Gaza a direct line with

a Western orientated country such as Turkey would undoubtedly fend off any lingering support

being offered from Iran and thus benefit Israel and the West in general.

Implication 3 of Principal Hypothesis

This final implication refers to Herman’s penultimate stage of foreign policy changes.

Problem/Goal Changes. The initial problem or goal that the policy wishes to address is replaced or

forfeited. Turkey’s relations with Israel will suffer. This change in relations with the Israel will occur

simultaneously as its increase in relations with the West.

The peak in relations between Israel and Turkey is now over. The time when Turkey was a

popular holiday destination for many Israelis had passed, in favour of other Mediterranean hotspots.

For decades Turkeys strong relationship with Israel has served as a cornerstone for a stable

partnership in a volatile region. The two countries cooperated in almost every aspect of

international relations, ranging from defence, intelligence, trade and tourism (Almog and Sever,

2019). However, following a spate of incidents carried out by Israel, namely the 2008 Operation Cast

Lead and the Marmara incident in 2010, the relationship declined rapidly.

The Marmara incident in 2010 is to be remembered as the event that lead to a crisis in

relationship between the two nations mainly due to the Turkish lives lost at the hands of naval

commandos. This incident would surely test the strength of this historic relationship between the

two nations. The event led to a sharp decline in all areas of cooperation apart from trade, where as

mentioned above, saw an increase of thirty percent increase in trade (World Integrated Trade

Solution).

While relations between Turkey and Israel declined to an unprecedented level, Turkeys

relations with the West did not necessarily follow suite due to the nature of events that led to this

34
point and Turkey’s justification for its downgrading of relations with Israel. Moreover, the West and

particularly the United States illustrated their understanding of Turkeys actions following the events

of 2010. Barack Obama spoke with Erdogan at least thirteen times in 2011 which suggests

Washington values a strong relationship with Ankara albeit the latter’s insistence on an alternative

foreign policy strategy in relation to the Middle East. In this respect, Ankara’s independent foreign

policy vision resembles one of Washington’s traditional European allies (Albright and Hadley).

The Marmara incident signifies the penultimate stage of Herman’s theory on foreign policy

reorientation. The shift in methods or means used to address the issue at hand were illustrated in

2010 when Erdogan shared the primary aim of the flotilla which was to end the blockade of Gaza.

This method in ending the crisis in Palestine is not shared by the West and therefore signifies a shift

in methods to address the issue at hand which Herman’s describes in his theory. Since, the West’s

aim is for an end to the hostilities between Palestine and Israel, they would not have chosen a

flotilla, who’s primary aim is to end the blockade of Gaza, to break the deadlock. However, Turkey’s

support for this method would not signify a complete reorientation of Turkish foreign policy due to

the overall aim (ending the Israeli-Palestinian issue) still being at the forefront of Ankara’s foreign

policy vision.

Following the 2010 incident, Ankara promptly began to break off ties with Israel. A spiralling

crisis would ensue resulting in the ambassador in Tel Aviv being recalled by the government, the

highly symbolic, Turkish-Israeli military exercises were terminated, and Israeli military flights were

barred from its airspace. A more dramatic tone was taken behind closed doors as Hilary Clinton

recounted in her memoirs, that the Turkish foreign minister during a call with her, informed her that

Ankara considered declaring war against Israel, declaring that “psychologically, this attack is like

9/11 for Turkey” (Saltzman, 2015).

Foreign Policy analysis according to Ilai Saltzam, is lacking in the study of honour being an

obstacle in conflict resolution. Honour it can be argued, is at play during this time in Turkeys foreign

35
policy stance. Moreover, it has been argued that honour was deemed a major reason for the

prolonged break in relations between the two nations due to Israel’s insistence that an apology for

its actions would be perceived an attack on Israel’s national honour (Salzman).

These steps taken by Turkey is an indication of firstly how volatile the region can become

and secondly, which is more significant, is the illustration of the deep ties both of these nations had

built over the decades, something that is unthinkable when you place another regional state in the

place of Turkeys. So, the breaking down of relations and seeing first-hand the ties that have been

built over the years between the two nations has given Turkeys doubters, some food for thought

when it comes to questioning its achievements merits as a regional influencer.

Turkey and Israel eventually reconciled following pressure on Israel from the West to meet

the Turkeys conditions for a rapprochement. Before the sticky issue of an apology being issued,

Israel and Turkey had already begun a process of reconciliation when Israel allowed Turkish

companies to enter Gaza to build a hospital and the resumption of Israeli arms sales to Turkey

(Saltzman). Under the supervision of Barack Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu called Erdogan and

told the prime minister that “the tragic results regarding the Mavi Marmara were unintentional

and that Israel expresses regret over injuries and loss of life” (Rudoren and Landler 2013).

Throughout and following this breakdown in relations with Israel, Turkeys foreign policy

choices have not damaged their ties with the West. In 2011, Vice President Joe Biden, reinforced

the United States’ interest in enhancing its economic ties with Turkey when he attended the

Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Istanbul (Biden, 2011). The Unite States strengthening of

economic ties is a clear indication of its desire to reinforce the broader relationship and thus

Turkey keeping in alignment with the Western foreign policy vision.

It became abundantly clear that Turkey’s relations with the European Union during this

period were bolstered as a result of Turkey’s foreign policy manoeuvres in the region. There are

36
several instances where the EU has reacted positively to Turkeys actions in the region and thus

proving that Turkey has indeed met Herman’s penultimate stage of foreign policy changes by

executing its foreign policy independently from the West’s but ultimately aligned with their end

vision. For instance, Turkey’s role as a mediator during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza were

openly praised by France’s Nicolas Sarkozy and the EU (Tocci, 2011). Indicating the EU’s

approval of Turkey’s increasing clout in the region, EU foreign ministers proposed a joint EU-

Turkey strategic dialogue on foreign policy (Grabbe and Ulgen, 2011). Moreover, the EU Foreign

Affairs Council felt a sense of urgency in their debates on Turkey due to their approaches in the

Middle East. In the EU’s energy report, the strategic importance of Turkey in transporting

energy resources to Europe is stressed and it was recommended that Turkeys accession to the

EU be accelerated (Ozpec and Demirag, 2012).

However, Turkey has also had to face the harsh realities of its decision to ruffle a few

feathers with its bold foreign policy. Ankara has claimed credit for convincing Syria to remove its

military presence from Lebanon which angered the United States and France who headed a

security council resolution arguing for their removal and for getting Hamas to accept a ceasefire

with Israel, upsetting Cairo who were the primary brokers for a ceasefire (Abramowitz and

Barkey, 2009). The passing of the ‘genocide bill’ by US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs

Committee which aims to recognise the 1915 events as genocide, following a lack of support

from Clinton and Obama in terms of preventing the passing of the bill, and most significantly,

the loss of Jewish lobby support for Turkey as a result to Erdogan’s harsh words directed at the

Israeli President Peres at the 2009 Davos summit.

Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey may be overreaching in its foreign policy

decisions when one looks at the subsequent actions of the West in supporting Turkey’s vision.

However, the criticisms of Turkey’s strong rhetoric towards Israel and subsequent breakdown in

37
relations is offset by its strides in diplomacy within the region and the West’s reliance on Turkey

to act as an ally in a region that is beset with hostile governments in Damascus and Tehran.

Conclusion of Israel Case Study

The foreign policy favoured by Turkey in respect to Israel and the Middle East as a whole underpins

Ankara’s recognition of the regions transformation over the past two decades transforming from a

security orientated foreign policy to an economic orientated foreign policy that values the

importance of a ‘zero problem with neighbours’ strategy. Following the decline of the traditional

military elite’s role in foreign policy making and the consequent rise of the new civilian led

government headed by Erdogan and his AKP Party, a notable shift in threat perceptions occurred

and, in its place, a multidimensional foreign policy was introduced.

Erdogan’s AKP government limited the role of the military in influencing foreign policy due

to the nature of international arena following the fall of the Soviet Union. In the 90’s the civilian led

governments were in no position to temper the militaries urges in securitising Turkeys foreign policy.

The breakdown in relations with Syria triggered an alliance with Israel. The Turkish rationale behind

its alliance with Israel was to build its relations with Washington whilst also pressurising Syria to

solve its issues as they could not afford having hostile neighbours on to two fronts (Tocci, 2011).

However, since 2002, Turkey strongly supported joining the EU and hence passed various

reform packages that were directly linked with the criteria set by the EU to start negotiations. One of

the criteria set by the EU was to normalise relations with its neighbours and hence Ankara’s efforts

rebuilding its relations with Syria which consequently occurred with a deterioration in relations with

Israel. However, its relations with Israel has not completely broken off as shown in the healthy trade

between the two nations following the Marmara incident.

38
Turkey’s position on the Palestinian question has been bolstered with general public’s long history of

empathy felt towards the Palestinians. According to polls in Turkey Ankara’s decision to strongly

condemn Israel’s action in Palestine and on International waters, is a calculated one which has in

many ways strengthened its status as a reliable voice by the Middle East public. The condemnation

coincides with a lack of trust and dependence felt by many Arabs towards their leaders.

Turkey’s decision to attack Israel’s actions in Palestine have not affected its relations with

the West, rather they are shared particularly by Europe. The difference in rhetoric used by Europe is

what sets them apart from Turkey’s position on the matter. For instance, Europe has continuously

condemned Israel’s West Bank construction of settlements. In 2016, the EU adopted a resolution

criticising Israeli settlement activity which according to Nicholas Westcott, then managing director

for the Middle East and North Africa at the European External Action Service contended, “there is

unfortunately a fly in this ointment [of EU-Israel relations], an elephant in this room: the

Occupation” (Lovatt, 2017).

Turkey initially pivoted away from the US on key issues such as the Iraq war hoping it can

become a strong independent regional power focused on the Middle East, however following the

Arab Spring it has returned towards the West. Turkey did not allow a second flotilla to sail to Gaza, a

move that was pushed by the United States that assisted in re-establishing relations with Israel

(Cagaptay). Moreover, another sign that Turkey is aligned with the West is its insistence to maintain

its relations with Western institutions such as the EU and NATO. Turkey takes pride in its inclusion of

NATO where it holds the second spot for military personnel (Statista,2018). Ankara requested

assistance from NATO to contain the Syrian refugee fallout following the uprising in 2011.

Turkey’s strong influence in the world, and its subsequent independent foreign policy is

reflected in the fact that it has been given an observer status in the African Union and more

significantly been invited to the Arab League twice.

39
 Finally, the Syrian crisis has given the possibility of reconciliation of ties with Israel extra

incentive. The uprising in the Middle East has increased threats to Israel’s national security. Turkey

and Israel recognised Iran’s role in the Middle East and fear its Shiite axis may fill a void in the region

especially in Syria where both Turkey and Israel harbor a strong dislike for Bashar Al-Assad. Whereas

the United States and Europe prefer dialogue to end the conflict in Syria, Turkey prefers direct

intervention. However, it requires Washington’s support and a Turkey/Israel dialogue on

intervention in Syria can bolster this vision by enlisting Israeli pressure on the United States to share

its plans.

Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey’s foreign policy in relation to Israel is independent

from the West’s in its methods however the desired outcomes are fundamentally shared which

therefore leads me to maintain that Ankara has not experienced a complete reorientation of its

foreign policy.

Testing Hypothesis

Iran
Post-Cold War Relations

During the 1980’s and 1990’s, relations between Turkey and its neighbour Iran were best described

as tense. Prior to the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, Turkey enjoyed good relations with Iran.

The Shah modelled his Iran on the Ataturk’s secular Turkey. The change in ideology which occurred

following the rise of Khomeini saw a sharp fall in relations between the two countries (Ayman,

2014). Ideological differences stemming from contrasting political systems, one secularist heavily

backed by a hawkish orientated military and the other religious, did not allow for a trusting

relationship to build (Barkey, 1995). Nonetheless, the regimes were able to sustain some level of

cooperation which was evident in the economic sense. Turkey relied heavily on Iranian oil and gas

40
imports whilst Iran were left dependant of Turkish imports during the Iraq war due to the sanctions

placed on them (Habibi, 2012).

After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Turkey became a safe refuge for the revolution’s

opponents. Iran as a result accused Turkey of assisting Iranian opponents who were aiming to take

down the new regime. Turkey on the other hand accused the Iranians of harbouring PKK

commanders (Olson, 2000). In response, Iranian media claimed that Turkish border soldiers killed

nine Iranians and dumped their bodies at a border fence.

Iran, in 1999 permitted the PKK to hold their annual Congress in Urmiya and furthermore

assisted the PKK in recruiting Kurds to carry out terrorist attacks in Turkey. It is contented that Iran

continued to support the PKK throughout the nineties in an effort to leverage against possible moves

by Ankara (Ayman). Iran then claimed that Turkey was responsible for bombing several sites in

Iranian territory in July 1999. During the same year, Iran witnessed probably the largest protests

against the regime since the revolution in 1979. The Turkish Prime Minister Ecvit waded into Iran’s

political debacle by siding with the demonstrators noting the violence was a natural reaction to the

actions of a repressive government (Hurriyet, 1999). Iran claimed that the bombing raid was a result

of Israeli and American support due to high level visits between the countries before and after the

bombing raid (Olson).

Following the exhaustion of all accusations between the two nations during 1999, the two

states finally made inroads in rebuilding their relationship. On Turkey’s part, they admitted that

some of their bombs may have inadvertently fallen on Iranian soil. For its part, Iran was willing to

recognise that the bombing was a mistake and the Interior Minister Golamhossein Bolandian as the

head of the Iranian delegation in Ankara commented,’ I want the whole world to know that Turkish-

Iranian ties are gradually growing. The temporary dispute has ended’ (Olson). This eventually

resulted in a security agreement between the two nations in August 1999.

41
 Relations did take an upward turn following Erbakan’s victory in 1996. Turkey during his

tenure made an attempt to build bridges based on a religious connection. Erbakan’s pro-Iranian

policies created a split between the ever-powerful military and elected government. Erbakan

demonstrated his intentions by making Tehran his first foreign trip and denying the allegations that

Iran were supporting PKK terrorism despite the Turkish Intelligence report stating otherwise (Octav,

2004).

First occurrence of criticism of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran coming from the West occurred

during Erbakan’s reign in power. The signing of a Gas Deal worth $23 billion was met with fierce

objection from Washington describing it as a ‘fraternisation with a rouge state’ because of the

timing of the gas deal which took place exactly one week after President Clinton signed the Iran-

Libya Sanctions Act (Wall Street Journal, 1996).

However, examples of stable relations between the two states were short and far between

and even those were shrouded in controversy. The Sincan incident as it came to be referred to as

the straw that broke the camel’s back in terms of military patience running out for Erbakan’s foreign

policy towards Iran. The Iranian ambassador spoke at an Ankara mayoral event stating that ‘those

who signed agreements with the United States and Israel would, sooner or later, be penalised by

Turkish youths’ (Robert Olson, 1998). Following the ousting of Erbakan in 1998 after Turkish courts

declared his party illegal, Iran and Turkey, as discussed above, experienced a bumpy relationship up

until the introduction of the AKP party who are basically a consequence of the Erbakan’s Welfare

Party.

Therefore, it can be safely claimed that Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran post-Cold war

up until 2002 was generally aligned to the West due to the secular governments in power supporting

the sanctions placed on Iran by the United States.

Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran after 2002 will now be examined below.

42
My hypothesis is that Turkey’s recent foreign policy changes demonstrate that while it meets three

of Herman’s framework in measuring a country’s foreign policy changes, it is still yet to reach the

final stage of foreign policy change (International orientation change) which is the most extreme

form of foreign policy change which involves the redirection of Turkey’s complete orientation

towards world affairs (Hermann, 1990).

Implication 1 of Principal Hypothesis

This implication refers to Herman second stage of foreign policy change. Program Changes. The

shift in methods or means used to address Iran. The changes are more qualitative than they are

quantitative. These changes are in line with Turkey’s Western allies foreign policy in the Middle

East while new instruments of statecraft are used such as diplomacy rather than military force.

However, it also means that Turkey’s foreign policy vision in the region is tolerated by the West.

Iran’s contentious nuclear program has been at the centre of Western foreign policy. It has resulted

in several denunciations from the international community due to their resistance in being

transparent regarding their nuclear program (Farhi, 2012). Since Iran’s nuclear case were referred to

the United Nations Security Council in 2006, and the subsequent sanctions placed on them by the

United States, Turkey has taken a softer approach in dealing with the issue.

Date Iranian Leaders Turkish leaders

July 1994 Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel visits

Iran

August 1996 Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan visits

Iran and signs a $23 billion natural gas
dealrime Minister Suleyman Demirel
visits Iran

December1996 President Ali Akbar Hashemi

Rafsanjani visits Turkey.

43
 July 2002 President Ahmet Necdet Sezer visits Iran.
He becomes the first Turkish president to
visit the Azerbaijan province

July 2004 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

visits Iran.

August 2008 President Ahmadinejad visits Turkey.

November President Ahmadinejad visits Turkey

2009 for a one-day summit of the
Organization of the Islamic
Conference. He meets with Prime
Minister Erdogan.

May 2010 The presidents of Turkey and Brazil, who

attended the Group 15 summit in
Tehran, announce an agreement with the
leaders of Iran regarding its nuclear
program; it is subsequently rejected by
the United States.

January 2012 Speaker of Parliament Larijani visits Foreign Minister Davutoğlu visits Iran to
Turkey to discuss the Syrian uprising discuss Syria and Iran’s nuclear program
and Iran’s nuclear program

Table 1.

Turkey’s has taken the diplomacy route which is in line with its friendly approach with neighbours as

discussed earlier. Iran welcomed AKP’s advent to power claiming it a win for Islam (Hurriyet, 2002).

44
 Turkey-Iran Trade
14000

12000

10000
$millions

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011

Turkish Exports Iranian Exports

CHART 1

AKP’s victory resulted in a sharp rise in diplomatic visits between the two nations as shown in chart

1. above. The increase in high level visits illustrates Turkey’s intentions in solving the nuclear issue as

it fundamentally affects them due to their economic links. Iran is a huge oil and gas exporter

whereas Turkey relies completely on energy imports. Furthermore, due to sanctions placed on Iran,

they have had to rely on Turkish non energy goods to navigate through these sanctions. The chart

above shows the sharp increase in trade between the two countries since economic sanctions had

started to take effect in Iran.

At 1998, trade between the two coruntirees stood at around $600 million. By 2005, trade stood at

$5 billion and increased sharply by 2008 when it stood at $10 billion. This illustration of a healthy

rise in trade between the two countries serves as a reminder as to why Turkey stands against

sanctions placed on it by the United States. Turkey’s insistence on trade with Iran has caused

concern in Washington and Turkish officails were informed of these concerns in 2011 following a

new round of sanctions placed on Iran’s Central Bank (Habibi).

45
 Turkey has, however, voiced its concerns over Iran’s nuclear capabality, by publicly

denouncing any attempt to build weapons of mass destruction and dencouncing intelligence that

Iran is on its way to building weapons of mass destructiokn as faulty simialr to the inteliigence

gathered before the Iraq war (Barkey, 2010). Despite Turkey is not happy about the possibility of

Iran buildig a nuclear arsenal, it has decided not to be confrontational on the matter and instead

play a facilitator role (Ozcan, 2008). Moreover, to prove that Turkey were alligned with the Western

policy of preventing Iranian proliferation by acting as a mediator between the two sides.In 2010,

Brazil and Turkey managed to perduade Tehran to agree to the exchange of 1200 kilos of low

enricnhed uraniam which would be stored in Turkey in exhanged for 120 kilos of nuclear fuel

(Ayman). All though this agreement was rejected by the West it showcased Ankara’s intentions to

faciliate the West’s wishes for a nuclear free Iran thus alligning with the Western foreign policy

vision in Iran. Following the rejection of the deal, Turkey showed its displeasure by voting ‘no’ for

more sanctions to be placed on Iran in the next Security Council meeting. However, Turkey complied

with the sanctions and were a primary factor in not implementing the $23 billion energy deal

Erbakan agreed to in 1996 (Graham, 2008).

However, relations with the United States and Turkey did not experience a considerable

amount of strain as a result of Ankara’s public show of disagreement towards the sanctions. To

prove this point, the following year Joe Biden reinforced Washington’s commitment to enhance the

two countries economic ties.

The European Union’s stance on Iran’s Nuclear capabilites are more closely alligned with

Turkey’s. Meetings between Turkey, Iran and the EU resulted in accpting Turkey’s policies on the

matter and simulatenusly not excluding the possibuioties of further UN sanctions which is simialr to

Ankara’s position on the matter (Oczan 2008). Ankara’s role as a facilitator during the negotiotains

with Iran is an example of how Turkey contributes to the EU’s foreign policy and thus surley proves

its allignement with the West’s foreign policy in Iran.

46
 The cripploing sanctions placed on Iran eventually forced Iran to the negotioting table during

Barack Obama’s second term as president in 2013. By negotiating with Iran Gary Samore, former

White House coordinator for arms control noted that the United States finally brought Iran back

from the dark and allow them some sanction relief. Diplomacy finally worked and Iran’s President

said, ‘We have to enhance mutual trust between Iran and other countries… The first step is to show

grater transparency. We are ready to show greater transparaency and make clear that the Islamic

Republic of Iran’s actions are within international frameworks’ (Dehghan, 2013). The deal resulted in

over $100 billion from previous Iranian oil sales to be released and lifiting of sanctions that

previously banned foreign companies from invesitng in Iran. This deal was however short lived once

the election victory of Donald Trump occurred which illustrates the West’s inability to actually

solidify their foreign policy position towards Iran. Which in turn affords Turkey some breathing space

in terms of being critisised for not aligning with the West in their foreign policy towards Iran.

Implication 2 of Principal Hypothesis

This final implication refers to Herman’s penultimate stage of foreign policy changes.

Problem/Goal Changes. The initial goal that Turkey wishes to achieve is replaced or forfeited due

to mainly the Arab Spring. Turkey’s economic relations with Iran will grow closer. This change in

relations with Iran will occur simultaneously as its increase in relations with the West and thus be

aligned with the West its foreign policy.

Iran’s economic ties with Turkey has increased greatly since the AKP won power in 2002.

There are several reasons for this, most notably Turkey’s early reliance on Iran’s energy

commodities. With trade between the two countries reaching $16 billion by 2011 from around $1

billion in 2002 as shown in chart 2, it can be argued that Turkey’s healthy trade with Iran has

solidified its relations with a neighbour as problematic as Iran. Turkey has had to build on its

relations with Iran due to its growing economy to the extent that Iran is now second behind Russia

47
as Turkey’s natural gas supplier (Barkey, 2012). Switching energy imports from Iran will only deepen

its reliance on Russian energy (Robins, 2013).

Turkey’s close energy cooperation with Iran was met with United States objection to which Erdogan

rejected citing Turkey’s energy needs were increasing 6% annually (Babali, 2009). Turkey recognises

Iran’s isolation from the world due to sanctions as an opportunity for a potential

destination of Turkish exports (Barkey). However, Turkey has had to keep in line with Western

attitudes towards Iran which means abiding by US sanctions. Following pressure from Washington,

Turkish oil companies have agreed to reduce its oil imports from Iran in 2012 although they refused

to completely stop their purchasing (Habibi).

Table 2

PARTNER VALUE, %WORLD PARTNER VALUE,

MILLIONS MILLIONS

World 188,856 100% World

1 EU 28 68,425 36.2 1 EU 28

2 Russia 18,619 9.9 2 Russia

3 China 17,544 9.3 3 China

4 USA 10,481 5.6 4 USA

5 India 6,381 3.4 5 India

48
 6 Iran 5,869 3.1 6 Iran

7 South 5,371 2.8 7 South

Korea Korea

8 Japan 3,492 1.8 8 Japan

9 United 3,201 1.7 9 United

Arab Arab

Emirates Emirates

10 Brazil 2,758 1.5 10 Brazil

Turkeys trade with the EU is, however, an indication that they will not give up on their pursuit of EU

membership or reduce its economic ties with the West. The EU continues to be Turkey’s largest

trading partner with whom trade has tripled since 2002, from $48 billion in 2002 to $160 billion in

2018 (World Integrated Trade Solution). In comparison to trade between Iran and Turkey, it is

dwarfed by Turkey’s trade in percentage with the EU as shown in table 3 above. Iran as shown in the

table only accounts for 2.4% of Turkeys trade whereas the EU holds first position with 42% of

Turkeys trade making it Turkeys biggest trading partner with Russia holding second place with only

6%. These trading figures provides an overview of how cooperative Turkey and the EU are with each

other. Moreover, the EU holds a positive perception towards Turkey’s economic relationship with

Iran due to its strategic geographical position and its ability to act as a transporter of Iranian oil and

gas, hoping to break from their reliance on Russian energy. Therefore, it can be argued that a close

Turkish-Iranian economic relationship not only benefits themselves but also benefits the West and

thus fundamentally aligns Turkey with the West, at least in the economic sense.

However, Turkey’s foreign relations with Iran has experienced a great deal of divergences

regarding the Middle East following the Arab Spring. The historical events occurring in the Middle

East intensified the relationship between Iran and Turkey. Both countries viewed the Arab Spring

49
differently with Iran portraying it as an Islamic awakening similar to that of Iran’s in 1979 while

Turkey saw the it as the long-held desire for a democratisation of their politics (Larrabee and Nader,

2013).

Erdogan’s fiery rhetoric has been used in criticising Iran’s role in the Middle East especially in

Syria and Yemen. Erdogan’s criticism reflects the Arab world’s perception of Iran in the region. A

James Zogby poll in 2011 showed a considerable reversal of Iran’s popularity in the region compared

to a poll in 2006 (Larrabee and Nader). Ankara shares the same vision for Syria and that is for

President Assad to step down and therefore has come to criticise Iran’s role in the matter. In

November 2011, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that Turkey will support the

will of the people and not regimes they are oppressed by which puts them at odds with their policy

toward Iran (Larrabee and Nader). Therefore, Iran’s continued support for the Syrian regime and

Turkey’s continued support for Assad’s fall is destined to lead to sharp fall in Turkey-Iran relations

and more in line with the West’s foreign policy on Iran. This position has been condemned by Iran. A

government back media outlet warned that,

‘Should Turkish officials insists on their contradictory behaviour and if they continue

their present path, serious issues are sure to follow. We will be put in the position of having to choose

between Turkey and Syria’ (Khalili, 2011).

An example of how Turkey is fundamentally aligned with the Western alliance’s security

related foreign policy occurred in 2010. NATO’s new ballistic missile defence advanced radar would

be housed in Turkey west of Iran’s border something Iran criticised as they believed they would be

the potential target of such apparatus. Iran, predictably pressured Turkey not to go ahead with the

installation, however Turkey decided to side with the Western relationship ahead of Iran (Robins).

Another show of Turkey’s support and alignment with NATO occurred in 2011 when they agreed to

deploy an early warning radar 400 miles from the Iran’s western border and another in 2012 at the

50
request of Turkey following the death of five civilians by shell fire (Ayman). The latter was described

as an act of war and serves as a provocation and not a deterrent (Kakayi, 2012).

Furthermore, Turkey’s frusrtation with Iran has become multidimensional in the sense that it

has clashed with its strong economic partner on the issue of trade, something that both countries

rely on in order to keep their relations active. Ankara, after voicing their displeasure of being

overcharged for Iranian gas, announced in 2012 that they were to take Iran to an international court

of arbitration (Ayman).

Conclusion of Iran Case Study

The above examples of an unsteady Turkish-Iranian relationship serve to prove that Turkey is

essentially a Western ally first followed by its relationship with Iran. They serve to prove that Turkey

would generally turn to its western allies be it the United States, EU or more importanltly NATO for

its security orientated foreign policies. Iran’s nuclear issue showcased Turkey’s intentions to

influence the Western foreign policy. Rather than only oppose the West’s vision and carry out a

complete reorientation of their foreign policy it chose to infleunce the West’s actions by promoting a

more diplomatic method of dealing with their political advesaries.

This demonstrates Ankara’s lofty aims of being a regional power and illustrates their

willingness to engage and compromise with their political opponents. By choosing to side with their

NATO partners on a number of occasions and by abiding by the United States demands Turkey has

displayed their commitment to the Western alliance and their policies in the region. Therefore, the

evidence proves that Turkey’s foreign policy in Iran is alligned with the West.

51
Conclusion

Is Turkey exhibiting Charles Hermann’s final stage of foreign policy change International
orientation changes?

Since 2002 the Turkey has dramatically enhanced the role it plays in the Middle East. It has gone

from a position of neutrality choosing not to interfere with its Middle East neighbour’s issues, to a

position of influential actor in the region. Some analysts and political commentators have gone to

the extent of claiming it has overreached in its political ambitions by interfering and acting in a way

that it sometimes at odds with the Western allegiance’s vision for the region. As a result of this

accusation directed at Turkey, it has subsequently resulted in questioning its foreign policy

orientation and whether it has led to, as Charles Hermann describes, a complete international

orientation.

The case studies of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Israel examined in this

dissertation have provided us with a clearer representation of Turkey’s foreign policy changes.

According to the analysis of Turkey’s foreign policies towards these two two countries Turkey has

showcased many facets of its foreign policy approaches. Ankara has been able to diversify its foreign

policy towards these countries depending on its aims and objectives. For example, in the case of

Israel, a once reliable partner in the region boasting a range of agreements between the two from

joint annual security exercises to a healthy free trade agreement, Turkey has taken issue with their

perceived negative actions towards the Palestinians. This fallout has resulted in a break in diplomatic

relations lasting three years. However, Turkey has showcased its multidimensional foreign policy

prowess by not completely breaking ties with Israel and simultaneously bolstering its economic

relations with it instead, thus keeping itself aligned with the western alliance’s vision in some way.

When we take a closer look at Turkey’s actions disregarding the negative publicity, they

have consistently backed the same objectives of the West concerning the Palestinian issue but has

employed different tactics such as its strong rhetoric towards Israel whereas the West has normally

52
shied away from using such language when criticising Israel’s perceived wrongdoings. Furthermore,

Turkey’s role in the Middle East has revealed the westernization and liberalisation of its foreign

policy when for example it supported the rights of the people of the Middle East during the Arab

Spring. The willingness to speak out against Middle East authoritarians like Bashar Al-Assad, who was

previously a close ally, speaks volumes of Ankara’s rise as a reliable partner for the West and can be

confident that they share the West’s morals and values. Alongside the United States and Europe,

Turkey played an important role in the Libya and Syria crises and according to Burak Bilgehan Ozpec

the participation of Turkey in these missions will undermine their relationship with the governments

of the Middle East and consequently lose ground in the region which therefore illustrates Turkeys

intentions in keeping aligned with the West (2012).

On the important topic of Western policy towards Israel, Turkey showcased its fundamental

alignment with the West during the Marmara incident. What could have been perceived by a state

as an act of war following the killing of their civilians in international waters by Israel and potentially

retaliating militarily, Turkey displayed incredible restraint and proved to the West, I believe, its

desire to be counted on as a mature and reliable partner in a volatile region where occurrences such

as the Marmara incident would normally result in more death and destruction such as the Lebanon

war. A prominent Turkey scholar, Tarik Oguzlu, claims that Turkey has gradually transformed its

relationship with Western actors from one of strong alliance based on common enemies and values

to one of ‘pragmatic and strategic cooperation’. In addition, Oguzlu, claims the change of approach

has resulted in an increasingly Western understanding and practices of foreign policy (2011).

Turkey’s new found foreign policy vision that is centred around a more liberal approach

towards the Middle East which promotes peaceful relationships, soft power tactics and a more

economic inclined foreign policy has replaced the previous security based, neutral and non-

interventionist foreign policy favoured by the pre-AKP governments. This pivot towards a

democratization of its foreign policy occurred to some degrees as a result of Ankara’s push for EU

53
membership and enthusiasm it showed following AKP’s win in 2002. Much of it is down to Erdogan

and his eagerness to enhance Turkey’s role from a mere regional bridge that would be used to

connect the West with the East to a regional power that can hold its own when it comes to

challenging Western foreign policy methods employed in the region and

The question of whether Turkey can be relied upon as a strategic partner of the West can be

partly answered by looking at how opponents of Turkey’s membership to the EU deal with them.

Turkey has signed strategic bilateral agreements with both France and Germany and endorse that

the EU build a privileged partnership with Turkey (Gerhards, 2011). Moreover, Turkey’s NATO

membership and its subsequent active role within the North Atlantic Alliance illustrated by its

consistence pledge of five percent of GDP towards defence spending, making it the second highest

contributor towards NATO - only after the United States, proves that Turkey is not turning its back

away from the West. It must also be pointed out that Ankara cannot afford to turn its back on NATO

due to its reliance on the coalition to protect it from any potential threats it faces from Russia, Iran

and any other volatile state it decides to break relations with.

Furthermore, although Turkey’s trade with the Middle East countries has increased due to

Erdogan’s ‘friends with neighbours’ approach, it can be safely argued that Turkey’s economic ties

with the West, especially with its European neighbours has been and continues to be its biggest

trading partner making up for over forty percent of its overall trade with the EU. Ankara’s energy

supplies have also had to be spread across multiple countries and hence its oil and gas agreements

with Iran which breaks Russia’s monopoly over Turkey’s energy market. Moreover, the EU has

encouraged Turkey’s energy deals with Iran, hoping to benefit from Iran’s massive gas reserves by

utilising Turkey as go between between itself and Iran.

To conclude, Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East has proven that Turkey has not turned

away from the West in its efforts to build a more cohesive rounded foreign policy vision for the

middle east. Therefore, this bold Turkish foreign policy vision indicates that the West must

54
reluctantly accept Turkey’s new role on the international stage as a confident and firm actor who

wishes to simultaneously continue it historical alliance with the West.

55
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