Serana v.

Sandiganbayan (2008)

Summary Cases:

● Serana v. Sandiganbayan

Subject: Denial of a motion to quash is generally not correctible by certiorari; Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended;
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa; UP student regent is a public officer; The
offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the Information; Source of funds
is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits; A lawyer owes candor, fairness and honesty
to the Court

Facts:

Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu (UP). A student
of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Estrada in
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.

Hannah, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of OSRFI was the renovation
of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. President Estrada gave P15 Million Pesos to the OSRFI as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information,
was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa UP, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner Hannah and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana
for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed (a) that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the crime of estafa, which falls under Crimes against Property, since the Sandiganbayan only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered under Crimes Committed by Public Officers under the Revised Penal
Code, (b) that, even assuming that she received the P15M, that amount came from Estrada, and not
from the coffers of the government, (c) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She also did not receive any salary as a
student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. She claimed such
power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion and upheld its jurisdiction to try the case. Section 4(b) of
R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office. Likewise, the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in Section 4(A)(1) subsection (g) —
“Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
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universities or educational institutions or foundations” — irrespective of their salary grades, because the
primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and
functions.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Held:

Denial of a motion to quash is generally not correctible by certiorari

1. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is
not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special
defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as
a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.

2. As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss (civil case) is merely interlocutory and cannot
be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a
motion to quash (criminal case), except that instead of filing an answer, a plea is entered and no appeal
lies from a judgment of acquittal.

3. This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari
or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo
the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is
not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as
amended

4. Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486. It was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606, which
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861.
R.A. No. 7975 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended by R.A. No.
8249. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is now contained in Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.

5. Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute which represses certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Pursuant
to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019, erroneously cited by petitioner, deals
not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals.

6. In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for
their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa

7. In contending that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
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isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs
of the said provision. Petitioner's interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. Optima
statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the
whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.

8. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

9. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction
is simply subject to the twin requirements that: (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office. (see Bondoc vs. Sandiganbayan; Perlas, Jr. vs. People)
UP student regent is a public officer

10. The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

11. A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the
public. (Mechem) The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating
and conferring it. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. (see
Aparri vs. Court of Appeals; Laurel vs. Desierto)

12. Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27. This is bereft of merit. It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. While the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.

13. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over P
residents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the
Sandiganbayan that Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of
Regent (BOR) performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute
defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

14. As to petitioner's claim that she does not receive a salary as UP Student Regent, it is well
established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental
to the public office.
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15. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public makes one a public officer. The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article
XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.
Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
created for profit. Petitioner is therefore a public officer by express mandate of P.D. No. 1606 and
jurisprudence.

The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the Information

16. According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She
adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President
Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her
act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.

17. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. More than that,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
upon the whims of defendant or respondent.

18. In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a
student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in
relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother,
JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government x x x."

Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits

19. It is contended that the amount came from President Estrada's private funds and not from the
government coffers.

20. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then
occupant, President Estrada. The Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the
P15 million is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant
case.

A lawyer owes candor, fairness and honesty to the Court

21. Petitioner's counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition
for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner's counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a
lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

22. We admonish petitioner's counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer's conduct
before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.The administration of justice would
gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.

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