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11 Jun 2010
Oil Offshore
4
The supply demand fundamentals in the FPSO sector are Relative Valuation
favourable, enabling attractive returns on selective projects. Company EV/EBITDA P/E
10e 11e 12e 10e 11e 12e
However, valuation does not discount growth, rather the sector SBM Offshore 6.6x 5.9x 6.0x 13.0x 9.2x 9.1x
continues to trade at a significant discount to current units NAV. Sevan Marine 16.6x 10.7x 7.0x N/A N/A 6.9x
Although the sector continues to be out of favour and liquidity BW Offshore 7.3x 4.6x 3.7x 6.7x 6.2x 5.4x
has halved over the past couple of years, valuation is too Prosafe Production 5.3x 4.5x 3.7x 10.7x 8.4x 7.0x
Fred. Olsen Production 5.8x 5.1x 4.3x N/A N/A N/A
attractive to ignore. Contract coverage and cash flows are solid. FPSO Sector 8.3x 6.1x 4.9x 10.1x 7.9x 7.1x
Down, but not beaten Oil Service Sector 7.1x 5.6x 4.8x 14.6x 9.7x 7.9x
The FPSO sector continues to be out of favor with liquidity drying up.
With valuation, risk profile and outlook in our view very attractive the NAV of existing units
question is if the sector will always be cheap. Net Asset Value (% of Shareprice) - Existing Units Only
` The large FPSO players are on average trading at 0.6x NAV. 300%
` Free cash flow yield assuming no new projects, in the 12-20% range 250%
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010e
2012e
2014e
2016e
limited threat to returns on new contracts. Current idle count of
competitive units is three.
` Several units have been scrapped, sold or contracted in 2010
` On selected projects, competition is limited to 1-2 companies
` Long duration, high capex contracts in Brazil are more competitive
` Latest contracts at 14-15% IRR, long term contracts with Petrobras
yields 10-12% IRR Analysts
Equity Research Credit Research
Core recommendations Kristian Diesen Øyvind Hamre
kristian@pareto.no oyvind.hamre@pareto.no
` PROD and BWO both offer attractive NAV and multiple valuation +47 2287 8736 +47 2413 2140
with solid contract backlogs. M&A could materialize in 2010. Steffen Rødsjø Lars Erik Sandgrind
` SEVAN does in our view have the best ever market outlook, but steffen@pareto.no Lars.erik.sandgrind@pareto.no
short term operational and funding issues dominate. With the driller +47 2287 8838 +47 2287 8825
on stream and more contracts in 2010, sentiment should turn. Magne M. Øy
` SBM offers size and liquidity, but valuation and risk profile is higher. mmo@pareto.no
` On the high yield bond side our top picks are Bluewater and Sevan. +65 6408 9820
Pareto Securities AS Bloomberg: PASE (go) P.O. Box 1411 Vika Tel: +47 22 87 87 00 Video Conf.: +47 22 87 88 45
www.pareto.no Reuters: PARETO N-0115 Oslo, Norway Fax: +47 22 87 87 10 Trading desk: +47 22 87 87 50
11 Jun 2010 Please refer to important disclosures at the end of this document 1(77)
Oil & Offshore Sector Research Report
Executive Summary
The FPSO sector continues to be out of favor with liquidity drying up, but
valuation, risk profile and outlook is very attractive for the patient. Current
valuations are seeing the large FPSO players on average trading at 0.6x NAV.
Free cash flow yield, assuming no new projects, for these companies are at 12-
20%. Solid contract coverage provides a low risk profile for these companies
with the average fixed contract length being 6 years and the average option
period being 5 years. Impact from the GoM spill is at this stage very limited.
On the demand side we are seeing activity back to more normalized levels after
a dismal 2009. So far this year there has been 8 awards, compared to 7 in
2009. We expect 14 awards this year, and 15-20 annually given the current
market outlook. Petrobras continues to be the main demand driver with its pre-
salt FPSOs, as well as other projects in more mature areas.
The North Sea is emerging as an active region going forward with a number of
projects in planning and tendering stage both on the UK side and the Norwegian
continental shelf. Elsewhere, West Africa continues to be dominated by large
scale projects that use Oil Company owned newbuild FPSOs, but several
smaller scale projects with leased FPSOs are expected to market. The Asian
region is also prospective, but more competition from local players is emerging.
Hence the majority of incremental units will come from new conversions from
the FPSO players. Capacity is filling up for certain players like Modec and SBM
Offshore having taken on large scale projects in Brazil. The capex on these
units are USD 1bn+, putting high requirements to the balance sheets.
The number of idle units is down considerable from year end 2009 and poses a
limited threat to returns on new contracts. The current idle count of competitive
units stands at 3 units with several units having been scrapped, sold or
contracted in 2010. On selected projects, competition is limited to 1-2
companies, while long term, high capex projects in Brazil are more competitive.
Latest contracts at 14-15% IRR, long term contracts with Petrobras 10-12%
IRR.
In the companies section we cover the main listed FPSO companies and the
most traded FPSO bonds. See next page for investment considerations.
Investment highlights
Sevan Marine (SEVAN) – A very attractive market position and outlook is
overshadowed by funding and legacy issues. Tightening the grip on current
operations, creating confidence in the funding situation and capitalizing on
market opportunities should unlock significant value for Sevan shareholders.
The Huntington contract was solid and the project activity in the North Sea is
likely to see Sevan getting contracts for FPSO # 4 & 5 in 2010. We expect the
company to continue the shift towards a license model requiring limited new
capital on new projects. BUY TP NOK 13.
Fred. Olsen Production (FOP) – FOP has 3 FPSOs on long term contracts
and the financial flexibility to add another unit. A mid-sized project is targeted,
however the company has so far been left unsuccessful in the bidding phase.
With strong share price performance (+34% YTD) and low liquidity we prefer
other FPSO names on a relative basis, but keep our BUY rating on 40%
discount to NAV. BUY TP NOK 15.
Prosafe Production (PROD) – Prosafe Production has all its units on contract,
with run-rate EBITDA proposing an 18% FCF yield. The main short term trigger
is the closing of the Turret sale to National Oilwell, however we see this
potentially slipping from the current guided timeline of a closing by end Q2.
Management now expects to start active tendering in H2’10 enabled by the cash
injection from the turret sale. A new project coupled with debt amortizations will
absorb free cash flow going forward, hence a dividend is unlikely over the next
few years. There is a NOK 4/share upside to our target on a concluded turret
sale. BUY TP NOK 18.
SBM Offshore (SBMO) – SBM has won several contracts over the recent year,
increasing the utilization of its large organization. The company has a strong
balance sheet and is well positioned in the growing Brazilian market. The risk in
the Turnkey business is phasing out with the drilling rigs and Yme nearing
completion, however still more risky than main peers. SBM represents solid long
term value and is by far the largest and most liquid FPSO stock in the sector,
currently trading well below the historical multiples. BUY TP EUR 18.
EOC Ltd. (EOC) – EOC is an Asia Pacific focused offshore service provider
with three offshore support barges and two FPSOs. With the FPSO Lewek
Arunothai now on-stream, EOC turns its attention to growth. BUY, TP NOK 13.
Sevan Bonds - Sevan bonds currently yield 10-15% and have traded up since
year end 2009, following positive newsflow related to funding on the second
driller, LOI award for FPSO Voyageur, several study contract awards and the
first Driller being accepted by Petrobras. We prefer the solid 1. lien bonds and
the Driller bond as secure investments while we see the 2. lien Voyageur bond
as an interesting event-driven investment.
Bluewater - The USDm 360 senior unsecured bond with maturity in July 2014
and a coupon of 3mL+3% is indicated in the high 50ies at an IRR to maturity
around 20%. The financial situation of Bluewater has been significantly
improved following the sales of Hanne Knudsen and Jotun and the contract
awards for the two FPSOs Munin and Glas Dowr. Main focus going forward is
start up of modification project on Glas Dowr and ongoing negotiations with
banks to amend amortization schedule and to extend maturity on the revolving
credit facility.
Please refer to the companies section for more companies and further details.
Whereas taking on new projects have been a negative thing over the past
couple of years, this should now increasingly be a positive. The FPSO
companies are currently in a position to take on new projects at attractive terms
FPSO players has now the upper with competition on many projects being limited, overall capex risk reduced
hand in contract negotiations through improved contract terms with sub-suppliers and a supply chain that has
significantly lower pressure than in the 2006 – 2008 period. Current valuation
does however not put any value on future growth, instead the FPSO sector
continues to trade at a discount to NAV.
The graph below measures the NPV from firm contracts, contract extension
options, and the residual from the remaining lifespan of the FPSO. These
estimates are presented in percent of the current share price (the line indicates
the current share price). Please note that net debt and remaining capital
expenditure on contracted units are subtracted from the value of NPV of the firm
contract value.
Valuation comparison
Net Asset Value (% of Shareprice) - Existing Units Only
300%
250%
200%
8%
13%
150% 177% 31%
Sector trading at a 40% discount 103% 47%
100% 123% 50%
to NAV of existing units 30%
50% 75%
62% 74% 72%
35%
0%
-43%
-50%
-100%
Sevan FOP PROD BWO SBM
Firm Options Residual *PROD includes turret sale
As seen, the FPSO sector is trading at a significant discount to our NAV, with
P/NAV of only 0.6x for our companies. Highest upside is found within Sevan
Marine, but as also seen through the distribution of value (high share of residual
value) the risk profile is higher. Also, short term funding issues overshadows
underlying valuation potential. Prosafe Production completed its troublesome
The alternative cost for the oil company in contracting another unit is generally
high with a significant lead time. Also, the lifting cost is on average very low
once the field is on stream and the majority of costs are sunk. The main risk to
option periods is that the reservoir is not performing, i.e. production is too low to
justify further commencement. We therefore believe that it is fair to include
options in the assessment of potential downside in FPSO stocks.
Fred. Olsen Production has the best value protection on the enterprise value
looking at the contracted EBITDA. Sevan scores lowest in the peer group on
FOPN and PROD have solid this measure, mainly due to the short term contracts on Hummingbird and the
EBITDA Backlog relative to EV relatively short term contracts on the drilling units relative to common FPSO
contracts. Additionally, Sevan has a going concern technology business, which
is not included in the EBITDA backlog.
Backlog analysis
Nominal EBITDA Backlog/Funded Enterprise Value Contract duration FPSOs
350% 16
14
300%
12
250%
10 7.0 4.6
200% 172%
6.3 3.6
8 5.2
129% 43%
150%
57% 6
100% 4 8.1
147% 6.7 6.6
123% 106% 5.5 5.3
50% 103% 49% 2
0% 17% 0
Fred. Olsen Prosafe SBM BW Offshore Sevan Fred. Olsen SBM Offshore Prosafe Sevan Marine BW Offshore
Production Production Offshore Marine Production Production
Firm Backlog Optional Backlog *SBM & BWO adj for Turnkey business Firm Years Optional Years *Sevan includes drilling rigs
Relative Performance
Shareprice performance
-3%
FPSO
-8%
-10%
Offshore Drilling
2%
-5%
Offshore Equipment
10%
1%
Seismic
11%
14%
OSV
13%
2%
Subsea/Services
19%
The poor performance of the FPSO sector in 2008 and 2009 has been
warranted with delays, cost overruns and financing experienced by the industry,
however the troublesome projects taken on in the previous cycle have now been
completed. Another issue for the sector has been that as a capital intensive
industry, it creates higher dependence on a well functioning credit market. With
a historical 70-80% leverage on the projects, equity values are sensitive to
capex overruns.
The FPSO universe is currently trading at EV/EBITDA11e 6-7x, only lower than
Offshore Equipment companies and OSV.
As most of the capital expenditure is already taken for the existing fleets in the
respective companies, D&A will be significantly higher than capex for many
companies going forward. Taking this into account, we will argue that EBITDA
multiples is the most applicable multiple.
120
100
80
60
40
Jun-09 Aug-09 Oct-09 Dec-09 Feb-10 Apr-10 Jun-10
PROD Sevan BWO FOP Modec SBMO
Valuation methodology
We value FPSO companies using a Sum-Of-The-Parts (SOTP) approach,
taking the sum of the DCF value per unit in the fleet. The DCF takes into
FPSO companies are valued account the estimated lifetime of the respective unit. This cash flow is based on
based on a SOPT approach, with the value of the fixed and optional contract period, as well as a residual value
a DCF value per unit (including scrap value), when a unit is expected to be redeployed after its
current contract. We estimate the expected useful life of a converted FPSO at
15 years, while a newbuild has an expected life of 25 years. For FPSO
companies with subsidiaries or other elements of value apart from the FPSOs, a
market value estimate is used.
The second hand market for FPSOs is virtually non-existent, and there have
been very few transactions over the past 10 years, with none worth mentioning
as a particular benchmark. There are obvious reasons for this, as FPSOs are
not generic units like e.g. drilling rigs, but field specific. Therefore, other metrics
will be more applicable to value any particular unit. The age, quality, processing
and storage capacity etc. are important factors to take into account, but usually
a unit will get an IRR in the range of 10 to 15% on contracts (using the
depreciated value at contract end as the residual value). This will vary on a
number of factors such as the length of the contract, counterparty risk and
reservoir risk.
The inability to obtain contracts proves to a certain extent that the barriers of
New entrants with one or two entry are significant also in the FPSO business, and that they not only relate to
vessels have experienced limited the access to capital but also to the ability to manage construction risk and
success having an operational track record that the oil companies favour.
FPSOs are either leased from the FPSO operator or owned by the oil company.
The chart below includes both currently working FPSOs, units under
construction, and idle units for lease companies. SBM Offshore and Modec
have the largest fleets of all the FPSO players.
97 units are owned by the lease operators, while 79 belong to the E&P
companies. The trend over the past five years has been towards leased units,
The trend has been towards as this approach enables the oil companies to finance a large part of their
more leased FPSOs projects off balance sheet and reduces their funding requirement. Some
companies, like Petrobras, prefer to own a significant share of the FPSOs, as
this makes sense on certain types of projects and is a necessity to match its
requirement with industry capacity.
As the ability of the FPSO companies to take on new projects has become more
limited due to a massive expansion in the past cycle and difficulties obtaining
satisfactory funding for new projects, there will be a reversal of this trend in our
opinion. This development will see the oil companies having to carry more of the
projects on their own balance sheet, with more EPC/turnkey FPSO projects. For
instance BW Offshore has recently been awarded contracts for the Papa Terra
FPSO and OGX FPSO I on a turnkey basis (although BWO’s scope is
somewhat limited).
Please refer to the companies section for a detailed analysis of the individual
FPSO companies.
Petrobras
CNOOC
Exxonmobil
Total
Shell
BP
Chevron
Woodside
Brasoil
Conocophillips
Hess
Maersk Olie
Coogee
Statoil
Anadarko
BHP Billiton
Premier
Husky oil
Other
Working Idle In yard Construction
Source: Pareto Research
FPSOs are by far the preferred The graphs below illustrates that FPSOs are by far the preferred choice among
FPU choice. the different floating production concepts. 143 FPSOs are currently working or in
yard, preparing for re-deployment. (A definition of the other floating production
concepts is presented in the appendix.)
FSO
FPSO
Spar
TLP
Semi
Source: Pareto Research, ODS Petrodata
1,200 120
1,000 100
800 80
600 1,200 60
400 40
550
200 400 20
300
110
0 0
Espoir Marlim Sul Kikeh Chinook Tupi
(2000) (2004) (2005) Cascade (2009)
Capex BBls/day (2007)
10,000 50%
8,000 40%
6,000 30%
11242
10189 10828
8969
4,000 20%
7075
4324 4707 4902
2,000 10%
0 0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E
Total Assets Leverage Ratio
The asset side for the largest FPSO companies has expanded by ~2.5x from
2003 to 2010e. Even though the leverage ratio is in line with the historical
average, the ability to take on new, large scale projects has decreased. Also
contributing to the limited ability to take on new projects are delayed cash flows
and cost overruns on these projects.
Construction,
28
Production,
137
The graph below summarizes the current supply and demand picture. The
supply side consists of all producing and ordered units, while the demand side is
calculated on the basis of outstanding projects, i.e. firm tenders, planned and
possible. In the different scenarios, we have weighted the outstanding projects
by our estimation of the probability that they materialize. Options are assumed
called for current contracts.
50 50
0 0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010e
2012e
2014e
2016e
Since our last update in December 2009, we have increased our low case
somewhat with higher confidence in the oil price and some projects maturing
and hence increasing in probability.
Based on these assumptions, we believe that the high fleet growth will continue
the next five years, as higher drilling activity in the deepwater segment leads to
new discoveries. As mentioned above, we do not foresee that the GoM situation
will materially impact this thesis. The main risk factor to this is low oil prices
(below USD 50-60 per barrel). Our base case estimates indicate demand for
more than 190 FPSOs within 2014e (including already producing units).
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Current
Source: Pareto Research
The fleet utilization has improved from our December update, with several of the
idle units being re-deployed (BW Carmen, Glas Dowr), sold (Nexus 1,
PetroProd I) and scrapped (Ocean Producer).
12
0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Current
We see 5 units idle at present, down from 11 at year end. However, the
competitiveness of many of these vessels is very limited, hence it is not a fair
representation of actual supply.
The Seillean has been working successfully for Petrobras in Brazil for a long
time, and we believe the unit is very likely to continue there in the not too distant
future. This is a DP unit, built for extended well testing from a rigid riser system.
The BW Carmen is a small FPSO that was awarded an LOI for the Athena field
in Q1 2010. This contract is likely to become firm over the summer. See BWO
under companies section for further details.
Berge Okoloba LPG FPSO is continuing to operate in the Niger Delta with new
owners and Ocean Producer was retired and sold for scrap by Oceaneering in
Q4 2009.
In sum, out of the 5 “idle” vessels, only three (FPSO Falcon, Seillean and Front
Puffin) are likely to be competing for new projects, with two being scrapping
candidates (Uisge Gorm, Jamestown).
Sevan has two FPSO hulls under construction at the Hantong Shipyard in
China. In total, Sevan has invested USD 140m in the two units and further
progress is uncommitted in anticipation of a firm contract and financing. Delivery
time of these units is approximately 18 months after definitive contracts. With
the tight supply/demand balance in the North Sea we believe that Sevan will be
successful in contracting these FPSOs, with Det norske’s Frøy development
emerging as the most likely candidate for FPSO #5 and potentially the Western
Isles development suitable for FPSO #4 (see North Sea market chapter for
more details)
Petroprod 1 has been acquired by Jurong Shipyard after the parent company
has been under liquidation which has been managed by KPMG. The shipyard
has decided to complete the unit, and has as we understand already found a
buyer. The unit is 65% complete, and further work will be subject to
specifications from the buyer. This buyer is Teekay that will use the unit on
Petrobras’ Tiro Sidon field. Teekay recently placed the low bid in competition
with SBM Offshore (bidding the FPSO Falcon) and Modec. Purchase price from
Jurong is in the USD 150m range, with remaining capital expenditure estimate
of some USD 250-300m. The bid from Teekay is likely to generate an IRR of
only 10-11% on our calculations, depending on final capex figure.
Deep Producer 1’s future is uncertain, with the owner FPSOcean in bankruptcy,
leaving completion of the vessel uncertain. The unit remains at the yard in Dubai
that is marketing the unit to potential buyers.
Nexus Floating Production has sold their unit to the Brazilian player OSX, and
the counterparty have chartered the unit to OGX as an early production unit.
Nexus does have an option for a second unit that is due in September 2010.
The option also gives Nexus right to terminate the agreement with an exposure
limited to USD 67m, which is already paid on the unit. We doubt that Nexus will
be in a position to take on this construction contract, and the going concern in
the company is very dependent on reaching an agreement with bondholders to
waive the residual claim of USD 67m.
15
12
0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Current
Source: Pareto Research, ODS Petrodata
Industry capacity for new projects increasing as projects awarded during the last cycle are delivered
Company Rig Name 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
SBM Offshore Tupi Nordeste
SBM Offshore Baleia Azul (Prev. Espadarte)
SBM Offshore FPSO Aseng
SBM Offshore FPSO P-57
SBM Offshore MOPU Deep Panuke
SBM Offshore FPSO Woodside CWLH
SBM Offshore SEMI-SUB (Turnkey to Delba)
SBM Offshore SEMI-SUB (Turnkey to Odebrecht Drilling Services)
SBM Offshore SEMI-SUB Thunder Hawk
SBM Offshore FPSO Frade
SBM Offshore MOPUstor Yme
SBM Offshore FPSO Espirito Santo
SBM Offshore SEMI-SUB (Turnkey to QGP)
SBM Offshore FPSO Saxi
SBM Offshore FPSO Mondo
Modec Inc. FPSO Guara
Modec Inc. FPSO Cidade de Angra dos Reis MV22
Modec Inc. FPSO Tullow Jubilee
Modec Inc. FPSO BP Angola PSVM
Modec Inc. FPSO Cidade de Santos MV20
Modec Inc. BHP Pyrenees FPSO
Modec Inc. FPSO Cidade de Niteroi MV18
Modec Inc. FPSO Song Doc Pride MV19
Modec Inc. FSO Rang Dong MV17
Modec Inc. TLP Shenzi
Modec Inc. FPSO Stybarrow Venture MV16
Modec Inc. FSO Cidade de Macae MV15
Modec Inc. FPSO Cidade do Rio de Janeiro MV14
Prosafe Production FPSO Ningaloo Vision
Prosafe Production FPSO Cidade de Sao Mateus
Prosafe Production FPSO Azurite
Prosafe Production FPSO Umuroa
Prosafe Production FPSO Polvo
BW Offshore FPSO TSB
BW Offshore FPSO BW Athena (Prev. Carmen)
BW Offshore FPSO Oil - BW Pioneer
BW Offshore FPSO Oil - BW Cidade De São Vicente
The fixed cost base varies significantly among the large FPSO companies, with
SBM having the largest installed base of permanent staff, as can be seen in the
diagram below.
Number of employees
# of employees
6,000
5,000
1534
4,000
2,000
3617
In our view, the need to fix contracts to maintain the internal activity level (but
also to a certain degree for strategic reasons) and to keep key engineers busy,
was well illustrated by the H2’09 Aseng award to SBM Offshore from Noble
Energy, where IRR is expected to be in the low end of the normal return interval.
With the major players now having filled the orderbooks, this effect is easing.
The average FPSO size for the current fleet is ~180,000 dwt. A 150,000 dwt unit
has about 1,000,000 barrels of storage capacity, while a 200,000 dwt unit has
about 1,300,000 barrels of storage. In tanker market terms, this approximate
size is referred to as a Suezmax.
As seen below, the water depth trend is clear, and we believe the future lies in
The trend is clear – average deeper waters. The world record when it comes to water depth is held by the
water depth is increasing BW Cidade de Sâo Vincente FPSO, owned by BW Offshore, currently
producing at a depth of 7,103 feet.
The most common FPSO size is between 100’ and 200’ DWT & water depth is increasing
45 % 10000
40 %
8000
35 %
30 %
6000
25 %
20 % 38 % 4000
15 %
26 %
23 %
10 % 2000
13 %
5%
0% 0
>300' 200'-300' 100'-200' 0-100' 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
When all the FPSOs in the current order book are delivered, the entire FPSO
fleet will be able to process ~15 million barrels of oil per day. This is around 17%
of the total oil production in the world. However, the actual production is well
below the capacity level.
The age distribution numbers in the figure above are estimated from the time of
conversion into FPSO. Some of the FPSOs from the early 80s are close to
retirement. However, the trend in expected newbuild activity will outpace
scrapping by over the next couple of years.
1500000
70
60
50
1000000
40
30
500000 20
10
0
0 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
1982 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 Years
Asia is in a position to increase their share of the market with a lot of FPSO
demand on smaller developments seen. We are seeing local players and yards
pursuing these opportunities quite aggressively. The USGoM is currently
installing the first ever FPSO, with the BW Pioneer expected to start producing
on Petrobras’ Cascade and Chinook field later this summer (although timing is
somewhat uncertain given the oil spill). Irrespective of the oil spill, we do not
expect this area to be a major demand driver going forward as the traditional
TLP, SPAR and semi development solutions are likely to dominate.
Northwest
South
Europe
America
Australia/Ne
w Zealand Far East
Source: Pareto research, ODS Petrodata
Newbuild
Conversion
Re-deployment risk
FPSOs are usually tailor made for a specific field, with a contract at hand before
construction. A contract is on average around 5 – 7 years fixed with typically a
similar period of options, however very dependent on the size of the field and
capital expenditure on the unit (higher capex, higher residual risk, longer
duration).
FPSOs are generally viewed as having risk on the residual value, with the
optional period also at risk pending good production from the reservoir of the
specific field. We do however see that most options are called, as the capex on
the field is sunk and hence the breakeven cost per barrel is generally low. The
residual value theme is more difficult to assess, but units with the major FPSO
companies that are still competitive after coming off contract have historically
been redeployed.
Petrojarl 1 redevelopments
1)
Used as storage and loading unit
225
200 40%
175
100 0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 <10% 10-20% 20-30%
The mismatch between what E&Ps and contractors are demanding in cost
reductions has been wide, and this was one of the main reasons for the low
frequency of contract awards in 2009. However, this is now less of an issue in
our view.
150 VLCC S/H 265K DWT 15 Year Old Seco ndhand P rices 1800 180
2002-11
2003-11
2004-11
2005-11
2006-11
2007-11
2008-11
2009-11
With the supply chain easing, operators addressing the issues experienced in
the previous cycle, and no new speculative companies, in combination with an
attractive demand side, new projects are expected to be more robust.
We are still likely to see projects at the 10% IRR level (as seen with Guara and
Tupi Nordeste in Brazil), however that is expected on large sized projects with
long duration contracts (typically in line with the life of the FPSO or 15 – 20
years) and subject to very attractive gearing ratios and cheap financing backed
by government export agencies enhancing the return on equity.
With the oil price stabilizing in the USD 70 to 80/bbl band and oil companies
generally challenging with production growth and reserve replacement, we are
confident that the spending figures will increase over the coming years. We
have increased our 2010e spending estimate steadily from August 2010, from
flat development to our current estimate of 9% increase.
20%
80 120%
10%
60 100%
0%
40 80%
-10%
-20% 20 60%
Nominal spending grow th (lhs) Average Brent (rhs)
-30% 0 40%
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011e 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
For 2010e, NOCs are continuing their upwards spending pattern and we expect
that this segment will increase the spending level by 10% this year, driven by
the Brazilian giant Petrobras. Majors are also increasing their spending,
however the large deltas are seen within Independents and Onshore players.
Independents are returning to the market with the higher oil price than seen in
2009 and perhaps more importantly the access to funding.
120 700
100 600
500
80
400
60
300
40
200
20 100
0 0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010e 2011e 2012e
UDW fleet
Subsea tree aw ards* (right axis) *Quest Offshore projections
Source: Pareto Securities, Quest
Number of subsea tree awards coincides very well with the activity in the FPSO
space. The number of awards has been stable the recent years, with a decline
Number of subsea trees and seen in 2009 with the standstill in contract awards.
hence subsea infrastructure
spending is expected to increase With the increase in ultra deepwater drilling rigs, the number of subsea wells
significantly in 2010 an onwards and hence subsea infrastructure spending is expected to increase significantly
boding well for FPSO demand going into 2010 and onwards. This should also imply a strong demand for
FPSOs.
15 contracts have been awarded or are to be signed over the next couple of
months. With the current prospect list, we estimate that 6 additional FPSO
contracts will be awarded through H2’10 and our base case sees annual award
of 15-20 units per year going forward.
20
26
6
10 19 20
18 17
15
7 8
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010e 2011e 2012e
Our award estimate is partly linked to our oil price assumption of USD 75/bbl in
2010 and USD 90/bbl in 2011/12, and the re-emergence of smaller E&P
companies. There are a number of marginal field developments operated by
E&P companies with a limited portfolio and production. Cash flows from existing
production will generally be fully invested and with easing credit markets, the
Regional demand
Brazil is the largest FPSO region both in terms of current FPSOs and future
estimated demand. However the other regions are also seeing a lot of
prospects, which to a greater extent is seeing Independent oil companies as
operators (hence greater risk).
40 40 5
9 1
30 30 23
30 9
20 21 20
27 18 35 21
7 5
11 20
10 10 4
6 7 11
8 4 8
5 5 4
2 3 2 0 2 3
0
South Asia West Africa Northwest Other South Asia West Africa Northwest Other
America Europe America Europe
Tendering Planned Possible NOC Major IOC
Source: Pareto research, ODS-Petrodata
The Tupi FPSOs will predominantly be EPC contracts with a high degree of
local content and standardization, however there are several lease possibilities
as seen with the recent Tupi Nordeste LOI to SBM Offshore and Tiro-Sidon
FPSO due for award shortly (Teekay with low bid).
Petrobras and its partners are targeting as much as 39 FPSOs in the deepwater
pre-salt area in the Sanotos basin by 2027. The FPSOs are standardised units,
with an expected production capacity of some 120,000-150,000 boe/day. Total
Standardised FPSOs with capex capex for the units are in the region of USD 1.1-1.2bn, and IRR on the leased
in the region of USD 1.1-1.2bn contracts estimated to around 10%. Although a low figure in an historical
perspective, one should bear in mind the low counterparty risk, high potential
gearing and low financing cost, generating a solid return on equity. Petrobras
has also signed an agreement with Engevix-GVA to commence the
procurement services for the construction of 8 FPSO hulls targeted the Tupi
development. A tender for the FEED for topside production modules for the 8
FPSOs was issued less than 2 months ago. The FPSOs are likely to go to both
BM-S-09 (Guara) and BM-S-11 (Tupi), with the majority expected to go the
latter.
There are several projects with likely near term award, with the Frøy consortium
expected to contract either SKDP (Production Jack-up) or Sevan (FPSO#5) in
Q3’10. The recently awarded Huntington LOI (Sevan) illustrates the tight
supply/demand balance in the North Sea, given the attractive economics.
World wide FPSO Projects with potential award over the next 24 months
Projects with potential award next 24 months
Type Field Country Operator First oil Comment on FPSO provider
FPSO Baleias/Chachalote Phase 2 Brazil Petrobras 2012 Tendering
FPSO Tiro-Sidon Brazil Petrobras 2012 Tender out, 9 year lease, Teekay with low bid
FPSO Pipa 3 (Guanambi) Brazil Petrobras 2014 Two DP FPSOs, tender delayed
FPSO Tupi (BMS-11) Brazil Petrobras 2010-2017 1x EWT & 2x pilot (awarded), 8 FPSO producers
FPSO Carioca (BMS-9) Brazil Petrobras 2012-2020 1x EWT, 1x pilot, 8 FPSO producers
FPSO Parati (BMS-10) Brazil Petrobras 2012-2020 1x EWT, 1x pilot, 4-8 FPSO producers
FPSO Caramba (BMS-21) Brazil Petrobras 2012-2020 1x EWT, 1x pilot, 4-8 FPSO producers
FPSO Bem-Te-Vi (BMS-8) Brazil Petrobras 2012-2020 1x EWT, 1x pilot, 4-8 FPSO producers
FPSO Iara (BMS-11) Brazil Petrobras 2012-2020 1x pilot (awarded), 4-8 FPSO producers
FPSO Guara (BMS-9) Brazil Petrobras 2012-2020 1x pilot (awarded), 4-8 FPSO producers
FPSO P-62 Brazil Petrobras 2013 Jurong awarded hull
FPSO Aruana Brazil Petrobras 2012 1xEWT + FPSO
FPSO Waimea Brazil OGX 2011-2012 1x EWT , 1x FPSO+
FPSO Vesuvio Brazil OGX 2011-2012 1x EWT , 1x FPSO+
FPSO Western Isles North Sea Dana 2012 Currently tendering
FPSO Frøy North Sea Det Norske 2013 Sevan, SKDP competing; Selection mid 2010
FPSO Rosebank North Sea Chevron 2015 Development studies underway, FEED in 2011
FPSO Mariner North Sea Statoil 2014 Sevan awarded study contract
FPSO Bream North Sea BG Group 2013 Tendering, Petrojarl I chasing
FPSO Luno North Sea Lundin 2013 Sevan with study contract
FPSO Jordbaer North Sea BG Group 2013 Bids submitted early June
FPSO Grevling North Sea Talisman 2015 Development studies likely in 2011
FPSO Draupne North Sea Det norske 2014 Successful appraisal, likely FPSO
FPSO Huntington North Sea E.ON 2012 Sevan with LOI
FPSO Fyne/Dandy North Sea Antrim 2012 Tendering
FPSO Golden Eagle North Sea Nexen 2013 Nexen exploring development options
FPSO Luva North Sea Statoil 2015 Gas development, FEED in 2011
FPSO Hai Su Trang & Hai Su Den Vietnam Talisman 2011 All major names chasing
FPSO Ketapang PSC Indonesia PC Ketapang 2013 Songa Floating, M3nergy,Tanker Pacific
FPSO Terang Sirasun Batur (TSB) Indonesia Kangean Energy 2012 BWO likely to be awarded firm contract soon
FPSO Bukit Tua Indonesia Petronas 2013 Songa Floating, T.Pacific, BLT,M3nergy
FPSO Gehem Indonesia Chevron 2014 Barge FPSO
FPSO Gendalo Indonesia Chevron 2014 Barge FPSO
FPSO KG-D6 phase II India Reliance 2012 Possible phase II of current development
FPSO D-1 India ONGC 2013 Leased FPSO targeted
FPSO Nang Nuan (B6/27) Thailand PTTEP 2013 Small FPSO required
FPSO Lady Nora Australia Woodside 2013 At feasibility study level
FPSO CLOV Angola Total 2014 EPC, newbuild, award imminent
FPSO PAJD (Southeast Block 31) Angola BP 2014 SBM with LOI
FPSO Ceres & Hebe (Block 31 MID) Angola BP 2014 SBM/Modec with frameagreement
FPSO Block 32 (GCG) Angola Total 2012 Modec awarded study contract in 2008
FPSO Block 15/6 Angola ENI 2012 Possible SBM redeployment
FPSO Lucapa Angola Chevron 2014 At FEED stage, TLP/FPSO solution likely
FPSO Negage (Block 14) Angola Chevron 2013 Pending FID, project delayed for years
FPSO Platina/Chumbo/Cesio Block 18 Angola BP 2012 Pending FID
FPSO Nsiko Nigeria Chevron 2013 Pending FID, gov't approval
FPSO Egina Nigeria Total 2014 Newbuild FPSO, tendering
Companies
Current status
The Sevan Driller #1 acceptance testing has taken longer than expected, but
management announced on Friday 11th of June that is has been accepted by
Petrobras. The unit will now be on standby rate (90% of full day- rate) before
commencing full operations shortly.
Driller 1 start-up imminently
According to the Petrobras contract, Sevan is entitled to a mobilization fee that
is payable once the unit is on the field totalling some USD 20m, hence freeing
up some cash in the short term picture (payable in 30 days post start-up). Sevan
has drawn the residual USD 43m of the Driller#1 bank debt during Q2, which
can be used for general corporate purposes with all instalments paid.
Contract Overview
2010 2011 2012 2013
Unit Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Piranema - Petrobras, Brasil Contract to 2018 + 11 years optional
Hummingbird - Venture, N. Sea (UK) Contract to 2011 + 2 years optional
Voyageur - Premier Oil, N. Sea (UK) LOI contract to 2016 + perpetual options
FPSO # 4/5 Uncontracted hulls
Sevan Driller I - Petrobras, Brazil Contract to 2015
Sevan Brazil - Petrobras, Brazil Contract to 2018
Sevan Driller II - ONGC, India Pending renegotiation or termination
Goliat - ENI, Barents Sea, Norway Technology license agreement
Construction Idle
Contract Option
Source: Pareto Research
In our opinion, there is low risk of the Voyageur LOI not materalising. Hence, the
company has firmed up a decent backlog, and although the Hummingbird is
Hummingbird to be extended and coming off its fixed contract in Q2’11, we believe that options will be called by
potentially refinanced the client Centrica, which also owns 20% of the unit. The Chestnut field, where
the Hummingbird is operating, is producing well (~8,000 boe/day) and Centrica
has communicated that they are also likely to use the FPSO on another field
post Chestnut close down.
The ONGC contract on the third driller is very likely to be cancelled, and
maximum liability is set to USD 25m in such a scenario.
(1)
Mandate for financing, expected to be finalised in Q1'10
(2)
Convertible bonds towards Luxor Capital Group, Strike USD 1.05/share, due 13
(3)
Predelivery Facility of USD 250m, increasing to USD 400m (not firm) post delivery
NOK/USD 6.5
Source: Pareto Research
Study contracts
Potential
Project Operator Size First oil FEED Award Contract type
Study
Rosebank Chevron UK Large 2017 2011 2012/13 License
Luva Statoil Norway Large 2015 2011 2011 License
Extensive list of study Mariner Statoil UK Medium 2014 2010 2011 License
contracts/FEED and prospects in Bream BG Group Norway Small 2013 2010 2010 License
the North Sea is likely to see Alder Chevron UK Small 2013 2010 2010 Lease/License
Luno Lundin Norway Medium 2013 2010 2010 License
FPSO#4/#5 contracted
FEED
Frøy Det norske Norway Small 2013 2010 2010 License/lease
Potential
Jordbaer BG Group Norway Medium 2013 2010 2010 License/lease
Grevling Talisman Norway Small 2014 2010 2011 License/lease
Draupne Det norske Norway Small 2014 2010 2011 License/lease
Western Isles Dana UK Medium 2012 2010 2010 Lease
Golden Eagle Nexen UK Large 2014 2010 2011 License
Huntington E.ON Medium 2012 2010 Voyager reemployment
Sevan is turning from a lease provider into being more license focused, as seen
with the Goliat award last year. We believe that this is the future for the
company, reducing capital expenditure and financing risk on new projects.
Given the extensive prospect list and the number of study contracts awarded to
the company over the recent year, we expect that FPSO #4 and #5 will be
contracted this year. In our opinion, a likely development scenario would be a
pure license contract (with Sevan taking limited capex risk) or alternatively a
mix, where the licensees take joint ownership in the unit. The latter scenario
could see Sevan using the invested equity in the units (USD 85m on FPSO#4
and USD 50m on FPSO#5), with the clients investing a similar amount and
utilizing joint project financing of the residual capital expenditure requirement.
An issue that needs to be resolved in connection with the contracting of these
units is the first priority security that the USD 48m convertible issued in April last
year has. In addition, this CB has a pledge on the license fee payments from
ENI related to Goliat that goes into escrow, which is a challenge for Sevan given
the current situation. Calling the bond will have a cost to Sevan of approximately
USD 19m.
The Frøy development, operated by Det norske (50%) together with licensee
Premier Oil (50%), is in our opinion likely to end up with Sevan, and a contract
Sevan front-runner for the Frøy structure as outlined above could very well materialize. The licensees are
development currently in the process of getting bids for the steel jacket with AKSO and
Chinese yards as the main competitors. Frøy is however not the only option,
with also BG Group’s Bream and Jordbaer developments likely to move this
year. Given the current market position, we find it unlikely that Sevan will trigger
an equity need on a new contract at this point in time.
Of other study contracts, we would highlight the Statoil contract for the Luva
field awarded last year. This could potentially become a large scale contract,
with the Luva field expected to become a new hub in the Norwegian Sea, with
several satellite deposits already discovered. Statoil has also been working with
Aker Solutions and Technip regarding development solutions. If Sevan is to be
awarded this contract, the contract terms will likely be similar to the Goliat
award, implying limited capex risk and no funding requirement for Sevan.
Concept selection is likely to take place in late 2010 or 2011, with first
production targeted around 2016.
Competing in the Petrobras 28
rig tender, license contract i.e. no In Brazil, Sevan is also positioned to secure license contracts for its driller
capex risk design. Having teamed up with its Brazilian partner, the company is positioned
for the newbuild UDW drilling rig program that Petrobras has ongoing for a
planned 28 rigs. The tender is changing structure rapidly, however at current it
looks like Sevan is participating in a bid for two units to be owned by Petrobras.
Petrobras has now received bids for the first two parts of the tender. Bidding for
Part 1 were KeppelFELS, Jurong, Andrade Gutierrez, Engevix, EISA, Atlantico
Sul, Odebrecht Construction, STX and Alusa Galvao. For part 2, Petrobras
received 7 proposals. Bids were submitted by Keppel FELS, Jurong, Andrade
Gutierrez, Engevix, EISA, Atlantico Sul, and Odebrecht Construction. Andrade
Gutierrez is bidding the Sevan design.
Valuation
The funding position is likely to continue to weigh on the stock going forward,
with several issues that needs to be addressed by the company in order to give
a comforting situation. This primarily relates to start up on Driller #1, which has
now been achieved, refinancing and securing new debt and an improved
contribution from Piranema.
Funding position is likely to
continue to weigh on the stock In the longer run, the underlying fundamentals for Sevan are very attractive.
going forward Their study contracts and tight supply/demand picture in the North Sea bodes
well for future growth, and given a more license focused model (low
capex/financing risk), the long term value potential is in our opinion attractive.
USD NOK
NPV per share committed & new 3.0 19.4
NPV per share committed fleet 2.0 13.3
WACC 10.5%, USDNOK 6.5 © Pareto Securities AS
* Includes post-contract residual value
Source: Pareto Research
The bond has a strong security package through the 1 pri. security in Sevan
Marine’s first FPSO (Piranema), which is currently on an 11 years firm contract
with Petrobras until 2018 + 11 years options. The FPSO has had a good uptime
since contract start-up in October 2007. The FPSO Piranema is currently the
only FPSO in Sevan Marine with firm contract duration longer than the pledged
debt against the unit – upon bond maturity in 2013 the remaining firm contract
length is 5.5 years. Outstanding bond amount upon maturity is USD 202.5 –
NPV of remaining firm contract is then USD ~110m. The current contract on
FPSO Piranema does not fully reflect the potential of the FPSO as this was the
first circular shaped FPSO ever built. This is highlighted by the recent LOI award
for sister FPSO Voyageur, with an estimated annual EBITDA of ~USD 80m.
High opex and low revenue utilization has caused the EBITDA contribution from
the FPSO Piranema to be lower than expected, with estimated EBITDA of USD
14m in 2010E (USD 28m expected in 2011E). We think refinancing of the bond
in 2013E should be achievable; 5.5 years of remaining firm contract upon
maturity of the bond + 11 years option and Petrobras has indicated that they are
interested in keeping the FPSO for the rest of its life. Further, leverage in the
Group is expected to come down significantly towards 2013, driven by lower
capex and higher earnings.
The bond has 1. pri. security in the FPSO Hummingbird which is on a 2.5 years
firm contract with Centrica until March-11 plus 7 years options. The FPSO
Hummingbird is the unit with the lowest leverage in Sevan Marine. With only
USD 120m of debt outstanding on the unit upon maturity in 2011, the asset
coverage on this bond is considered to be solid – construction cost was USD
360m. The main challenge will be to secure a new contract for the unit in 2011 if
Centrica decides not to exercise any of its options. Centrica has 7 years options
in total after the firm contract period expires and the counterparty’s 20% stake in
the unit increases the possibility of options being exercised. However, should
the contract not be extended the FPSO should be well positioned to get a new
contract with a significant higher dayrate (ref. strong LOI on sister FPSO
Voyageur awarded recently).
1. lien debt on the unit is currently USD 150m, made up by a USD 105m bank
loan and a USD 45m bond from Deutsche bank. When including the NOK 870m
2. lien bond, total leverage on the FPSO is currently USD ~285m. The FPSO
originally had a 5 year firm contract with Oilexco, but following the bankruptcy of
Oilexco in early 2009 the new owner of the field, Premier Oil, decided to
decommission the FPSO in 3Q10. However, in May-10, the FPSO was awarded
a 5+10 year LOI with E.ON for the Huntington development. Estimated upgrade
capex in relation to the contract is USD 80 – 90m. Sevan has received a term
sheet for a new 1. lien bank facility of up to USD 230m which will cover the
upgrade capex in relation to the contract and take out the existing 1. lien debt.
Hence, the company has proposed to increase the 1. lien carve-out from USD
150m to USD 230m. Sevan is currently in discussions with 2. lien bondholders
regarding this amendment and potential compensation. The new 1. lien facility
will amortize with USD 12.1m quarterly, starting 6 months after first oil on
Huntington, expected in 4Q11. Estimated annual EBITDA from the new contract
is ~USD 80m. If the current proposal is completed and the contract materializes,
total leverage on the unit will be USD 365m. With a fully funded unit and a very
strong 5 year contract, the protection on the downside for the 2. lien bond
should be good. Further, we see the refinancing risk upon maturity of the 2. lien
bond (Oct-12) as limited, if the contract materializes.
The bond has 2. pri. security in the first Driller, behind USD 250m of bank debt.
The unit has a firm 6 year contract with Petrobras and was accepted by
Petrobras on 11 June 2010. The company has secured a post-delivery bank
facility of USD 400m, originally to be used for refinancing of the pre-delivery
bank facility and the bond. Terms on the post delivery facility is Libor + 4.5%,
maturity is 6 years and the facility is available 6 – 12 months after acceptance
date. Total leverage on the unit is currently USD ~404m (second Drilling unit
has secured USD 525m in financing). We think the company will refinance the
bond in order to increase leverage on the unit and / or align the debt repayment
schedule with cash flow. Call price on the bond is 104% 6 to 12 months post
acceptance date and NPV of the firm contract is estimated to ~USD 450m.
Earlier this year, PROD signed an LOI with National Oilwell Varco for sale of the
Turret and Swivel business for a total cash consideration of USD 165m. In
addition, PROD is entitled to a royalty of 10% on NOVs sale from the business
unit for 7 years. Assuming NOV is successful in selling one such system per
year, the value of the total transaction could reach USD 200m. The transaction
is subject to due diligence and board approval in both companies and is
according to management expected to close in Q2’10. The business unit has
historically only conducted internal projects with a relatively small cost base, and
no value has been attributed in our valuation of the company. A closure of the
transaction would enhance our valuation of the company by NOK ~4/share,
from the current level of NOK 16.5/share.
Contract overview
Unit 2010 2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
FPSO Umuroa - AWE, Australia Contract to 2015 + 7 years optional
FPSO Polvo - Devon Energy, Brazil Contract to 2014 + 8 years optional
FPSO Abo - Nigerian Agip, W.Africa Contract to 2011 + 2 years optional
FPSO Espoir Ivoirien - CNR, W. Africa Contract to 2011 + 10 years optional
FPSO Petróleo Nautipa - Vaalco Enrgy, W.A. Contract to 2015 + 2 years optional
FPSO Cidade de São Mateus - Petrobras, Brazil Contract to 2018 + 6 years optional
FPSO Ningaloo Vision - Apache, Australia Contract to 2016 + 8 years optional
FDPSO Azurite - Murphy, W. Africa Contract to 2016 + 8 years optional
FSO Endeavour - Aban Offshore, India Contract to end 2010e
FSO Madura Jaya - Kodeco Energy, Indonesia Contract to Nov 2010
Option Construction Idle
Dividends however are not expected in the short term, with the current debt
We expect PROD to grow the situation requiring instalments of USD 150m on an annual basis, which
fleet rather than paying dividends compares to the operating cash flow of around USD 200m. The targeted net
in the short term picture debt to EBITDA ratio is communicated to be 3-3.5x, and hence the company
should be in a position to be paying dividends in 2011 on an existing units only
scenario, but we expect that the company is more interested in growing their
fleet rather than paying dividends at this point in time.
Free cash flow yield & leverage ratio
EV/FCF and FCF Yield
29% Leverage ratio
8.0x 30%
3.5x
7.0x 24% 3.0x
25%
3.0x
6.0x
19%
20% 2.5x 2.2x
5.0x
15%
15% 2.0x
4.0x
1.5x
6.9x
3.0x 1.5x
5.4x 10%
4.2x 0.7x
2.0x 1.0x
3.4x
5%
1.0x 0.5x
0.0x 0% 0.0x
2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E
EV/FCF FCF Yield to EV Net Debt/EBITDA
Additional units
Value of one additional FPSO 125
LOI Sale of Turret Business to NOV 200
USD NOK
NPV per share committed, idle & new 4.1 26.7
NPV per share committed & idle fleet 3.6 23.6
WACC 9%, USD/NOK 6.5 © Pareto Securities AS
*Includes post-contract residual value
Source: Pareto Research
Current status
Two new projects joining the BW Offshore is well positioned in the FPSO segment, with an organization and
fleet, 3rd newbuild likely balance sheet to take on new projects. Two new FPSO projects have joined the
fleet this year, with the BW Carmen set for the Athena field on the UK side of
the North Sea and a new unit highly likely to be signed at the TSB field in
Indonesia. We believe that the company is in shape for a third newbuild, with
the North Sea as the likely destination in our view.
f
o
c
u
s
a
t
c
u
r
Source: BW Offshore r
e
The current focus is however on the BW Pioneer, which is located in the US
GoM ready for hook-up to commence production at Petrobras’ Chinook and
Cascade field. The FPSO has still not received the technical approval from
Petrobras, and is according to management now expected on standby day-rate
from end July (95%). Production at the field is now expected to start in late
2010, but due to the current situation in the USGoM a prolonged delay should
not be ruled out at this stage in time.
APL Backlog Development (USDm)
450 BW Offshore’s equipment division APL has had a challenging 2009, with
400 revenues and backlog declining steeply. However, the outlook is increasingly
350
attractive with the number of new projects in the FPSO segment gaining pace.
300
250
The company recently received an authorization to proceed with the completion
200 of the FPSO OSX-1 (previously awarded to BW from Nexus). The scope
150 includes among other delivery of a submerged turret production system (STP)
100
and topside modifications with a total value of USD 150m. We estimate that
50
0
USD ~50m of this is attributed to the APL backlog (a significant contribution),
1Q06 3Q06 1Q07 3Q07 1Q08 3Q08 1Q09 3Q09 1Q10 with the residual being booked on the FPSO segment (USD 100m).
APL backlog development Source: BW Offshore
Contract situation
BWO has 5 FPSOs working on long term contracts. In April 2009, FPSO Cidade
de Sâo Vicente commenced on a 10 year contract with Petrobras on the high
profile Tupi field. Sendje Berge is contracted with Addax until 2011 in Nigeria,
with two optional years. Berge Helene is contracted with Petronas in Mauritania
until 2013, with options for 8 more years. In Mexico, the company has an FPSO
working for Pemex until 2022, with options for 3 more years.
As mentioned above, the company has entered into an LOI with Itacha Energy
for employment of the BW Carmen on the Athena field. A firm agreement is
expected to be signed in due course, enabling the company to commence on an
upgrade for first production in Q3’11. The company is also the only bidder on
the TSB project, and a contract is very likely to be signed shortly at attractive
terms (IRR likely 14-15%, and 10 years fixed and further 4 years in options).
BWO owns 25% in Prosafe Production and 49% in Nexus Floating Production.
Nexus’ only asset (1 new FPSO completed at Samsung), was last year sold to
OSX. The total consideration of USD ~400m included remaining yard
instalments (sales price of USD 350m and USD ~50m in remaining capex).
Equity value of Nexus is close to zero.
Contract overview
2010 2011 2012 2013
Unit Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Sendje Berge - Addax, Nigeria Contract to 2011 + 2 years optional
Berge Helene - Petronas, W. Africa Contract to 2013 + 8 years optional
Belokamenka - Rosneft, Russia Contract to 2019
YÙUM K’AK’NÁAB - Pemex, GoM Contract to 2022 + 3 years optional
BW Pioneer - Petrobras, GoM Contract to 2015 + 3 years optional
BW Cidade de São Vicente - PBR, Brazil Contract to 2019 + 5 years optional
BW Carmen - LOI Construction, Contract to 2014 + life of field options
TSB - Likely contract Construction, Contract to 2022 + 4 years optional
BW Nisa, Papa Terra JV Construction, EPC (turnkey) contract
BW Ara (VLCC) Idle
Contract Option Construction Idle
Source: Pareto research, BW Offshore
SOTP
SOTP BWO USDm
Current Fleet
Sendje Berge (Addax to 2011, opt. to 2013) 82
Berge Helene (Petronas to 2013) 178
Belokamenka (Rosneft to 2019) 40
YÙUM K’AK’NÁAB (Pemex to 2022) 225
BW Pioneer (Petrobras to 2015) 481
BW Cidade de São Vicente (Petrobras to 2019 220
BW Carmen 165
BW Nisa, Papa Terra EPC 25
OSX - FPSO Segment 8
BW Ara (scrap value) 12
PROD ownership (23.9%) 129
USD NOK
Per share existing fleet 2.0 13.2
Per share including new FPSO 2.2 14.6
WACC 9%, USD/NOK 6.5 © Pareto Securities AS
Source: Pareto Research
In August ’09 a contract was signed with Noble Energy for the provision of an
FPSO for the development of the Aseng field located in ~1,000 meters offshore
Aseng USD 1.2bn FPSO lease Equatorial Guinea. The FPSO, which will be based on the conversion of a VLCC
contract with IRR of 10-11% hull from SBM Offshore’s inventory, will serve not only the Aseng field, but will
also establish a liquids hub for Noble Energy’s future developments in the area.
The processing capacity is for 120,000 bbls of liquids per day, including 80,000
bbls of oil. The unit will have storage capacity for 1.6 million barrels of oil,
including up to 500,000 barrels of condensate. The Aseng FPSO will be SBM’s
second unit in Equatorial Guinea and its ninth in West Africa. The initial contract
is for 15 years, commencing in 2012, with options for 5 years. The total contract
value to SBM is ~USDbn 1.2. IRR on the contract is calculated to 10-11%.
Late October the company received a termination from Exxon for the lease
contract of the FPSO Falcon from 3rd of December. The unit was completed and
Falcon idle, Rang Dong 1 commenced operations in 2002 for an initial 6 year lease, which was
scrapped subsequently extended twice. The Company will actively market the FPSO
Falcon for redeployment globally (most recently on the Tiro Sidon tender,
Teekay with low bid). Until a new contract has been obtained the unit will remain
in lay up conditions in the Far East.
FPSO Rang Dong 1, which has been idle post termination of charter in 2008,
was sold for scrap in Q4’09, giving a gain on sale of some USD 2m.
The order backlog was USD 10bn in February, split 80/20 between the FPSO
Order back-log USD 10 bn and turnkey business.
The company has also signed a framework arrangement with Shell for the
supply of turrets for Shell’s FLNG projects for a period of up to 15 years. So far
the workscope is limited to a FEED contract, but the potential is significant
related to future deliveries. Furthermore, the company was in late 2009 awarded
a FEED by Petrobras, studying the FLNG concept as one means to handle the
associated gas that will be produced by the series of FPSOs planned for the
pre-salt development.
Contract overview
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Unit Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
FPSO Kuito - Chevron, Angola
FPSO Espadarte - Petrobras, Brazil Contract to 2030 Belaya Azul field, 18 years
FPSO Falcon
FPSO Roncador - Petrobras Brazil Contract to 2012
FPSO Xikomba, ExxonMobil, Angola Contract to 2011 + 6 years optional (likely to be re-allocated)
FPSO Marlim Sul - Petrobras, Brazil Contract to 2012 + 2 years optional
FPSO Sanha -Chevron, Angola Contract to 2013
FPSO Capixaba (Golphinio/Cachalotte) Contract to 2022
FPSO Kikeh - Murphy Oil, Malaysia Contract to 2016 + 15 years optional
FPSO Mondo - ExxonMobil, Angola Contract to 2022
FPSO Saxi-Batuque - ExxonMobil, Angola Contract to 2023
FPSO BC-10 - Shell, Brazil Contract to 2024 + 5 years optional
FPSO Aseng Contract to 2027 + 5 years optional
Thunder Hawk Semi - Murphy, USA Contract to 2014 + undisclosed optional period
YME - Talisman, Norway Contract to 2015 + 10 year optional period
Deep Panuke - EnCana, Canada Contract to 2018 + 12 year optional period
FSO Nkossa - Total, Congo Contract to 2011
FSO Yetagun - Petronas, Myanmar Contract to 2015
13 Contract Option Construction Idle
Turnkey risk phasing out, although new major projects need to be booked
The turnkey business has seen some troublesome projects, with the 3 drilling
Orderbacklog (USDm) rigs currently being constructed in Abu Dhabi seeing delays and cost overruns.
12000 The construction of the rigs is now moving in line with expectations according to
10000 management, with the three units due for delivery in Q2/Q3/Q4’10.
2,198
8000 2,969
6000
2,304 The order-backlog also includes other large projects, namely the P-57 (offshore
2,585
installation in Q4’10) and FPSO Okha (completion in Q4’10), however SBM
4000 839 7,834
5,651 6,278 needs to start booking new larger items in the short term to keep the utilization
2000 4,407
3,220 of the turnkey business at a high level when entering 2011.
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Valuation and Sum-Of-The-Parts (SOTP)
FPSO Turnkey
The valuation of SBM has become increasingly attractive with the slide of the
overall market. The company should be relatively immune to the oil spill in the
GoM and hence the FPSO player is in our opinion attractive especially
compared to stocks within drilling and seismic, where uncertainty is likely to
persist for quite some time still. The stock currently trades below 10x P/E’11e,
significantly below the historical average of some 15x.
10x
5x
0x
Jun- Jun- Jun- Jun- Jun- Jun- Jun- Jun- Jun- Jun-
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
EV/EBITDA P/E Avg. EV/EBITDA Avg. P/E
Our SOTP of existing units only, excluding Tupi Nordeste, is EUR 18.5/share,
up form 17 in our December FPSO report, mainly due to stronger dollar vs.
Euro. We reiterate BUY, but increase the target price to EUR 18/share (17).
Target is inline with the historical P/E of 15x.
Company description
Pioneered the FPSO industry in SBM was founded in 1965, and pioneered the offering of Floating Production,
1979 Storage and Offloading (FPSO) systems in 1979. Present activities include the
engineering, supply and installation of all types of Floating Production and/or
Storage and Offloading systems as well as FPUs of all types including semi-
submersibles, TLPs and self elevating MOPUs. Construction and installation of
all hardware components and services are outsourced, while SBM provides all
the engineering and project management expertise. The group owns and
operates FPSO/FSO systems (lease division), in addition to supplying systems
on a turnkey basis to third parties.
18 units in operations The leased units are contracted on long-term charters, including their
operations, to oil companies world-wide. SBM has 18 units in their portfolio (fully
and partly owned), of which 13 FPSOs. The group is the largest player in this
market, followed by Modec and Prosafe Production. Historically, the lease
division has had 80% of earnings vs. turnkey at 20%.
Current status
Fred. Olsen Production (FOP) has 3 FPSOs on long term contracts, with great
visibility on cash flows. The company has good financial flexibility, and further
growth of the FPSO portfolio is targeted with a medium sized project (USD 300-
Good financial flexibility 450m). The company has been actively bidding on projects, with the latest likely
to be signed by BW Offshore (TSB). In addition to the FPSO contracts, the
company has a management agreement on MOPU Marc Lorenceau, which is
currently on a 30 days termination period. The company has also invested in a
tanker conversion candidate, currently operating in the short term tanker market.
The company had a cash balance of some USD 62m at the end of Q1’10, with
an undrawn credit facility of some USD 300m.
Contract overview
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Unit Client Country Field Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
FPSO Knock Adoon Sinopec Nigeria Antan Contract to 2014 + 8 year optional
FPSO Knock Allan CNR Gabon Olowi Contract to 2019 + 10 year optional
FPSO Petóleo Nautipa Vaalco Gabon Etame Contract to 2015 + 2 year optional
FSO Knock Dee* Laid up Fujairah Pinauna Provisional Contract to 2021 (El Paso, Brazil) + 5 year optional
MOPU Marc Lorenceau (mngt) Sinopec Nigeria Contract with 30 days termination period
Knock Muir Short term tanker T/C / Spot market
Contract Option Construction Idle
*Option may be declared un until 30 June '10
Sum-Of-The-Parts (SOTP)
SOTP FOP USDm
DCF committed units*
FPSO Petrolia Nautipa 32
FPSO Knock Adoon 159
Knock Allan 213
Marc Lorenceau 9
Aframax tanker 10
Idle units
Knock Dee (assumed scrapped) 5
Additional contracts
New FPSO 50
Value all units (committed, idle & new) 478
Value EOC shares (4.9% @ NOK 7.5) 6
(1)
Net debt YE'10e (124)
SG&A and tax (50)
Equity value 310
USD NOK
NPV per share committed, idle & new 2.9 19.0
NPV per share committed & idle fleet 2.5 16.0
WACC 9.5%, USD/NOK 6.5 © Pareto Securities AS
*Includes post-contract residual value
(1)
Adjusted for potential Dee Scrapping
Source: Pareto Research
Background
EOC is a 48.5% owned subsidiary of Ezra, a leading offshore services provider
in the Asia Pacific region, based in Singapore. The Company owns two
accommodation barges, one heavy lift and pipe lay barge, and one FPSO. In
addition, the Company also owns an equity stake (26.6-43.3%) in a new FPSO
(Chim Sao FPSO) that is expected to see first oil in mid 2011.
Contract Overview
2010 2011 2012
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
FPSO Lew ek Arunothai - PTTEP, Thailand Contract to 2012 + 2 years optional
Lew ek Champion Contract to March 2010
Lew ek Conqueror Contract to Mar 2014 + 5 years optional
Lew ek Chancellor Contract to June 2010
FPSO Chim Sao - Premier, Vietnam Contract to 2017 + 6 years optional
Option Construction Idle
Source: Pareto Research, EOC
Sum-of-the-parts valuation
SOTP EOC USDm
DCF committed fleet*
FPSO Lewek Arunothai 313
Lewek Conqueror 40
Lewek Chancellor 35
Lewek Champion 180
FPSO Chim Sao (30% owned JV) 63
USD NOK
NPV per share commited & new 2.4 15.7
NPV per share committed fleet 2.1 13.9
WACC 9.5%, USD/NOK 6.5 © Pareto Securities AS
*Includes post-contract residual value
Source: Pareto Research
The Bluewater bond has come down some points the last weeks from the mid
The Bluewater bond has come 60ies due to recent market turmoil. This is natural given the relative long
down a few points the last weeks duration and the bonds position in the capital structure being subordinated to
due to market turmoil USD 630m of bank debt. However, financial situation and outlook has been
significantly improved after the contract award from ENI for the FPSO Glas
Dowr, a 5-10 year contract for work at the Kitan Field in the Timor Sea, start up
on the 12-18 month contract with CNOOC for the FPSO Munin and the asset
sales of Hanne Knudsen and Jotun reducing debt levels.
The two new contracts for Munin and Glas Dowr combined with the long term
The Glas Dowr and Munin contracts for most of the remaining FPSO fleet including Aoka Mizu (firm until
contracts coupled with asset August 2015, expected beyond that), Haewene Brim (expected on current
sales have improved the contract until 2018 or beyond) and Bleo Holm (expected on current contract until
financial situation of the 2018 or beyond) has improved the cash flow outlook for many years going
Company significantly and forward. Main uncertainty is commercial terms of the Glas Dowr contract which
cash flow visibility is good for hasn’t been disclosed to market yet. We expect the contract to contribute with
many years going forward. USD 60m in annual EBITDA. Before start up on the contract, expected in
2H2011, the unit needs to undergo a modification and upgrade project to meet
specific requirements at the Kitan field. The project is expected to start in 2010
and will most likely be at a Singapore yard; either Sembawang, Keppel Shipyard
or Jurong. Budgeted CAPEX for the project has not been disclosed but is
expected to be around USDm 130. Bluewater has secured project financing for
the modification project covering expected cost plus a significant contingency.
This financing indicates that the Glas Dowr contract is strong and that the lead
syndicate banks continue to support the Company.
2009 was a challenging year due 2009 was a very challenging year for Bluewater, due to significant delays and
to cost overruns and delays on cost overruns on the conversion project on Aoka Mizu, and three FPSO
Aoka Mizu and contracts expiring contracts expiring in a muted FPSO market. During the summer of 2009
and bank debt was successfully Bluewater restructured its USD 850m revolving credit facility and reached an
restructured. agreement with banks for a USD 50m super senior tranche maturing in
December 10 and a temporary deferral of amortizations due in 2009. In
November 09, Bluewater sold the shuttle tanker Hanne Knudsen for USD 55m
and in January they sold their 55% stake in the FPSO Jotun. This was done to
repay debt and most likely according to requirements set by the banks in the
restructuring in 2009. Amortizations on the bank facility are aggressive from
2010 and onwards, and the facility amortizes from its YE09 level of USD 630m
(after sale of Jotun) down to USD 375m at maturity in December 2011.
Bluewater will not generate cash flow from operations to meet the scheduled
amortizations from late 2010 and for 2011 before Glas Dowr has started on its
new contract and has therefore initiated discussions with the bank syndicate to
amend the amortization schedule and maturity to match conservative cash flow
estimates going forward. Given the positive development since restructuring
We think the outlook for finding a
of the RCF concluded in a very difficult environment in 2009 we think the
viable long term solution with the
outlook for finding a viable long term solution with the banks is good.
banks is good.
Furthermore, we believe some of the banks under the RCF also are
involved in the project financing for Glas Dowr which we see as an
indication that banks will be constructive in the negotiations. However, the
process is time consuming due to the large number of banks in the
syndicate, all of them with veto rights in negotiations. Conclusion on the
discussions is expected within the next few months, but is not expected
before after the summer.
Currently, 4 out of 6 FPSOs are contracted, while Glas Dowr will start on the
modification for the ENI contract in 2010 and Usige Gorm is cold stacked. Uisge
Gorm is expected either to be contracted in benign waters or to be sold.
Bleo Holm and Haewene Brim is expected to stay on its current contracts until
2018 or beyond according to third party field life studies and indications from
clients.
Fleet overview
2010 2011 2012 2013
Unit Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Haewene Brim - Shell, UK Expected until 2018 or beyond
Bleo Holm - Talisman, UK Expected until 2018 or beyond
Aoka Mizu - Nexen, UK Contract to 2014 + 2 years optional
Munin - CNOOC 12-18 months contract
Glas Dowr - ENI Modification 5-10 year contract
Uisge Dorm Idle
Minimum duration Expected duration Idle
Source: Pareto Research, Bluewater
EBITDA increases from 2009 to 2010E due to full year contribution from Aoka
Mizu and Munin which started on the new contract with CNOOC in Q1’10. Glas
Dowr is expected to start on the ENI contract in 2H’11 contributing to EBITDA
from 11E and onwards.
Debt Overview
DEBT OVERVIEW 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E
Secured Debt
Revolving Credit facility 5.0 % 364 492 681 693 534 - - - -
Super Senior Tranche 6.0 % - - - - - - - - -
Glas Dowr Financing 7.0 % - - - - 80 130 100 75 -
Refinancing USDm 850 RCF 6.5 % - - - - - 450 350 300 250
Jotun debt 4.0 % 131 104 76 48 - - - - -
Long term loan 5.0 % 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Unsecured Debt
10,25% Sen. Uns. Notes 10.3 % 310 - - - - - - - -
Senior Unsecured Bond 4.5 % - 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 -
Refinancing Senior Unsecured Bond 6.5 % - - - - - - - - 350
Subordinated debt from affiliate (Marenc 7.2 % 154 162 173 186 199 214 229 245 263
Other (Adjustments including derivatives - 3 (15) 46 27 27 27 27 27 27
Total 962 1 103 1 348 1 324 1 211 1 165 1 077 1 018 901
Pareto Research, Bluewater
The capital structure consists of a 1. lien revolving credit facility (RCF) with
security over all vessels, the senior unsecured bond and a subordinated PIK
note from the affiliate company Marenco. It has been agreed that Glas Dowr can
be removed from the security package under the RCF to be pledged in favour of
the new project facility which will be issued by the vessel owning entity. The
subordinated debt, provided by the shareholder of Bluewater Hugo Heerema, is
contractually subordinated to the senior unsecured bonds and carries a PIK
coupon of 7.2%.
Credit Metrics
CREDIT METRICS 2006 2007 2008 2 009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E
EBITDA USDm 151 146 134 64 116 140 187 183 175
FFO " 31 37 64 -19 54 73 122 124 118
IBD/EBITDA x 5.3x 6.4x 8.8x 17.8x 8.7x 7.0x 4.5x 4.2x 3.7x
NIBD/EBITDA x 5.0x 6.2x 8.3x 16.8x 8.5x 6.7x 4.4x 3.9x 3.4x
NIBD bonds @ 60% / EBITDA x 5.0x 5.2x 7.2x 14.6x 7.2x 5.7x 3.7x 3.1x 2.6x
EBITDA/Net interest x 2.1x 1.4x 2.8x 0.9x 1.9x 2.1x 2.9x 3.1x 3.1x
Equity/Assets % 32 % 27 % 26 % 11 % 13 % 14 % 20 % 25 % 31 %
Net debt to EBITDA at 8.5x for 2010E is high, but levels are expected to come
down as the Company is expected to de-lever through 2010E and 2011E and
particularly in 2012E, first year Glas Dowr will have full year contribution to cash
flow. Net debt to EBITDA expected below 3.4x in 2014 should support
refinancing, but is dependent on contract backlog at maturity in 2014. We
expect that both bank debt and senior unsecured bonds have to be refinanced
in 2014.
Bond cash flow above is based on a Libor assumption for remaining life of the
bond at 1.5%. 4 year dollar swap is currently at 1.97%.
Sea Production acquired the FPSO Front Puffin, FPSO Crystal Ocean and two
Aframaxes for USD 336m in 2007 and listed on the OTC in Norway the same
year. Rubicon Offshore International Holding is currently the largest owner in
SEAP with a 76% ownership.
Estimates
Cash Flow 2 009 2010E 2011E 2012E
EBITDA - Front Puffin USDm 61 3 36 33
EBITDA - Crystal Ocean " 7 7 7 7
EBITDA - Sea Cat " 1 (1) (1) (1)
EBITDA - Sea Jaguar " (1) (1) (1) (1)
SG&A " (7) (10) (8) (5)
EBITDA " 61 (2) 33 33
Interest cost " (8.4) (10) (11) (8)
Tax: " (11) - - -
Changes in w orking capital " (25) (0) 4 0
CAPEX " (5.1) (52) (2) (2)
Free cash flow " 12 (65) 24 23
Debt amortization " (35) 50 (15) (39)
Dividend Payments " (5) - - -
Net change in cash holdings " (28) (15) 9 (16)
Cash Balance " 23 8 17 1
Source: Pareto Credit Research
dependent on the outcome of the arbitration process with AED and the
company’s ability to secure a new contract for the FPSO Front Puffin.
Overview of assets
Front Puffin Crystal Ocean Sea Cat Sea Jaguar
Rubicon was founded in 2005, and operates three assets in Asia today. The two
FPSOs are operating satisfactory, while the multi functional support vessels
(MFSV) has been idle large parts of Q1’10e. The company is private held with
Ashmore Investment as the largest shareholder.
Contract overview
2010 2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Rubicon Intreprid Vitol Marine (10 yr contract w ith 6 month termination clause)
Asset backing
USD million
350
300
60
250
60
200
123
150
110
100 180
50 110 113
80
0
Appraisal from Construction cost Bond debt at Face Bond @ 0.625
2007 Value
The company delivered Q1’10 EBITDA of some USD 24m, on good operations
by Dhirubhai-1. The Q1 cash position of the company was USD 23m, with USD
58m in short term interest bearing liabilities, of which the Secured hull loan of
USD 12m falls due in July ’10. The residual short term liabilities is due to a
syndicate of banks. The equity ratio was at a very low 4%, although they were
not in breach with covenant as the loan from Aker ASA is calculated as part of
the equity. With around USD 750m in debt, the outlook for the company looks
challenging and limited margin for error. The value of the assets is most likely
lower than the outstanding liabilities.
During March 2010, the company filed for bankruptcy, as their current contract
was insufficient to pay contractual obligations on the convertible bond and bank
loan.
The spread moored FPSO, which is a 1983 converted tanker, has a storage
capacity of 360,000 barrels and a production capacity of 30,000 barrels per day.
Overall cost for the Deep Producer 1 (DP 1) FPSO was USD ~335m. USD
~199m in pre-instalments was paid in to the yard as of Jan 2009. The company
was seeking to raise USD ~136m in funding, through debt and equity, to finance
the remaining instalments. When the contemplated USD 70m equity issue failed
in February 2009, the company was forced to liquidate.
The FPSO was purpose built for ultra deep water extended well testing, early
production and marginal field development. The vessel was a converted 1981
built tanker (68,000 dwt) with storage capacity of 400,000 barrels of oil. The
vessel was supposed to stay on site using a dynamic positioning system (DP 2),
and planned “sail away” from the yard was in July 2009.
Deep Producer 1’s future is uncertain, with the owner FPSOcean in bankruptcy,
leaving completion of the vessel uncertain.
The budget for the Aframax size FPSO was USD ~290m as of March 2009.
The company reached an agreement with an undisclosed client to sell the
vessel for USD ~216m, of which USD 181m was to cover remaining instalments
and USD 35 was retained by the borrower. However, the transaction with the
buyer failed at a later stage.
The jack-up rig (CJ 70) was acquired by Seadrill, and subsequently charted to
Statoil on long term charter in 2010.
Petroprod 1 has been acquired by Jurong Shipyard after the parent company
has been under liquidation which has been managed by KPMG. The shipyard
has decided to complete the unit, and has as we understand already found a
buyer. The unit is 65% complete, and further work will be subject to
specifications from the buyer. The buyer is most likely Teekay, which is currently
the low bidder on the Tiro-Sidon field off Brazil.
Nexus Floating Production has sold their first unit to the Brazilian player OSX,
and the counterparty have chartered the unit to OGX as an early well test unit.
The sale realised proceeds of USD 350m, which gave a full recovery to 1st
priority lenders, 50% to second lien and 10% to the convertible bond holders. In
addition USD 38.1m was used to pay outstanding balance to Samsung Heavy
Industries Ltd.
Nexus does have an option for a second unit that is due in September 2010.
The option also gives Nexus right to terminate the agreement with an exposure
limited to USD 67m, which is already paid on the unit. We doubt that Nexus will
be in a position to take on this construction contract, and the going concern in
the company is very dependent on reaching an agreement with bondholders to
waive the residual claim of USD 67m.
Source: OSX
Subsea/Services
Aker Solutions NO 89.1 3756 7.1x 6.8x 5.5x 9.4x 9.2x 7.4x 12.1x 11.4x 9.7x 55% 23%
Acergy NO 94.6 2838 4.6x 5.1x 3.7x 6.3x 7.5x 5.0x 11.7x 13.0x 9.0x 35% 7%
Subsea 7 NO 94.8 2147 4.8x 4.1x 2.9x 7.0x 6.0x 4.0x 13.8x 11.8x 8.9x 29% 1%
Prosafe SE NO 29.2 1034 5.5x 4.9x 4.4x 6.9x 6.0x 5.4x 5.0x 4.7x 4.5x -16% -16%
Schlumberger* US 59.2 70578 10.3x 7.7x 6.4x 16.1x 11.8x 8.9x 20.5x 15.4x 12.1x 0% -4%
Saipem* IT 25.2 13479 8.5x 7.2x 6.1x 12.3x 10.9x 9.2x 15.3x 13.7x 11.9x 32% 14%
Technip* FR 48.7 6442 5.0x 4.3x 3.4x 6.6x 5.6x 4.4x 13.8x 12.4x 10.5x 33% 4%
Oceaneering* US 45.7 2518 5.7x 4.8x 3.4x 8.1x 6.7x 4.7x 14.4x 11.8x 10.0x -14% -15%
Average Subsea/Services Sector 6.4x 5.6x 4.5x 9.1x 8.0x 6.1x 13.3x 11.8x 9.6x 19% 2%
Offshore Equipment
National Oil Well* US 37.4 15680 4.7x 4.7x 4.0x 5.7x 5.8x 4.2x 10.1x 11.6x 10.2x -1% -15%
Cameron* US 36.4 8886 8.2x 6.8x 5.4x 10.2x 8.1x 6.4x 16.0x 13.0x 10.6x 16% -3%
FMC Technologies* US 52.1 6330 9.7x 8.7x 7.1x 12.1x 10.6x 8.1x 18.0x 16.3x 13.4x 26% -4%
Wellstream* UK 511.0 752 11.6x 7.7x 5.4x 15.3x 9.4x 6.3x 21.4x 13.1x 9.5x -3% 2%
Average Equipment Sector 8.5x 7.0x 5.5x 10.9x 8.5x 6.2x 16.4x 13.5x 10.9x 10% -5%
Offshore Drilling
Transocean US 44.3 14163 3.6x 3.1x 3.6x 5.1x 4.4x 3.5x 4.8x 4.1x 4.8x -0.5x -45%
Diamond Offshore US 61.4 8529 3.9x 3.3x 3.9x 5.0x 4.2x 3.9x 5.2x 5.3x 5.1x -0.3x -36%
Noble Drilling US 29.5 7534 3.2x 2.9x 3.2x 4.2x 4.1x 3.8x 5.5x 6.2x 7.1x -0.2x -27%
Seadrill NO 133.5 8198 7.2x 5.5x 7.2x 9.2x 7.0x 6.2x 6.3x 4.3x 3.7x 0.4x -6%
Pride International US 24.1 4236 8.3x 4.6x 8.3x 11.7x 5.9x 4.0x 12.7x 6.5x 5.4x 0.0x -25%
Ensco International US 38.2 5440 5.5x 5.1x 5.5x 7.8x 7.4x 5.0x 10.7x 9.6x 6.8x -0.1x -9%
Fred. Olsen Energy NO 184.5 1893 4.4x 3.0x 4.4x 5.9x 3.9x 3.1x 4.5x 3.1x 2.6x -0.2x -12%
Songa Offshore NO 18.4 387 3.6x 3.6x 3.6x 5.2x 5.6x 3.7x 3.4x 4.3x 3.0x -0.2x -37%
Scorpion Offshore NO 40.2 555 7.7x 6.0x 7.7x 10.9x 8.2x 8.5x 13.3x 8.5x 10.0x 0.6x 61%
Northern Offshore NO 12.0 283 2.1x 1.9x 2.1x 3.8x 4.5x 6.9x 4.4x 6.9x 13.9x 0.6x 36%
Average Drilling Sector 5.0x 3.9x 5.0x 5.0x 3.9x 5.0x 7.1x 5.9x 6.2x 2% -10%
Offshore Supply Vessels
Ezra holding Sing. 1.8 837 11.9x 8.2x 5.9x 20.4x 14.2x 11.0x 13.2x 8.6x 6.8x 34% -19%
Tidewater US 41.7 2162 5.4x 4.6x 4.3x 8.3x 6.6x 6.2x 9.4x 7.7x 7.6x -17% -6%
Bourbon Offshore FR 33.3 2470 11.0x 8.3x 6.7x 18.6x 12.2x 9.3x 25.1x 12.8x 8.9x 15% 32%
Farstad Shipping NO 154.0 924 7.2x 6.9x 6.8x 10.9x 11.3x 11.5x 8.7x 10.0x 10.7x 27% 24%
Solstad Offshore NO 124.0 721 7.0x 5.8x 5.1x 11.7x 8.9x 8.1x 7.5x 5.1x 5.4x 28% 19%
Gulfmark Offshore US 26.0 679 6.5x 5.1x 4.2x 11.1x 8.6x 7.2x 11.6x 8.9x 8.3x -17% 0%
DOF NO 42.4 594 10.8x 8.5x 7.6x 19.2x 12.3x 10.7x 15.8x 6.3x 5.4x 13% 13%
Siem Offshore NO 11.1 614 10.9x 6.9x 5.7x 21.5x 10.9x 8.9x 16.9x 7.2x 6.0x 21% 26%
Deep Sea Supply NO 11.6 232 9.4x 5.8x 6.0x 19.3x 9.0x 9.4x N/A 6.2x 6.4x 1% 37%
Havila Shipping NO 63.0 155 10.0x 7.4x 7.1x 17.3x 11.0x 10.8x 29.1x 5.0x 5.5x 25% 13%
Average Supply Sector 9.0x 6.8x 5.9x 15.8x 10.5x 9.3x 15.2x 7.8x 7.1x 13% 14%
FPSO
SBM Offshore NL 13.0 2647 6.6x 5.9x 6.0x 15.1x 12.1x 12.7x 13.0x 9.2x 9.1x 6% 1%
Sevan Marine NO 6.9 558 16.6x 10.7x 7.0x N/A 21.2x 10.8x N/A N/A 6.9x -42% -24%
BW Offshore NO 8.6 604 7.3x 4.6x 3.7x 16.4x 9.5x 7.6x 6.7x 6.2x 5.4x 4% -3%
Prosafe Production NO 14.0 550 5.3x 4.5x 3.7x 12.1x 9.5x 7.5x 10.7x 8.4x 7.0x 2% 16%
Fred. Olsen Production NO 9.0 144 5.8x 5.1x 4.3x 40.6x 40.9x 34.6x N/A N/A N/A
Average FPSO Sector 8.3x 6.1x 4.9x 14.5x 13.1x 9.6x 10.1x 7.9x 7.1x -8% -3%
Seismic
CGG Veritas FR 16.0 2933 5.8x 4.4x 2.9x 22.6x 12.4x 6.4x 64.9x 21.4x 10.2x 19% 10%
PGS NO 61.8 1883 5.1x 3.7x 2.3x 13.8x 7.7x 3.9x 16.0x 9.5x 5.3x 49% -7%
TGS-Nopec NO 79.1 1270 2.1x 1.6x 1.1x 4.4x 3.1x 2.0x 8.4x 6.6x 5.2x 11% -19%
Fugro* NL 40.6 3946 6.8x 5.8x 5.3x 10.6x 8.7x 7.5x 12.9x 11.1x 9.9x 33% 6%
Polarcus* NO 4.7 190 N/A 5.0x 2.4x N/A 9.0x 3.4x N/A 9.1x 2.4x #NA 42%
Average Seismic Sector 4.9x 4.1x 2.8x 12.9x 8.2x 4.6x 25.6x 11.5x 6.6x 28% 6%
Average Oil Services 7.0x 5.6x 4.8x 11.4x 8.7x 6.8x 14.6x 9.7x 7.9x 11% 1%
Source: Pareto Securities, Datastream, *Consensus estimates
Estimates
Sevan estimates
Sevan M arine (SEVAN) 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E
Operating revenues USDm 121 195 335 425 577 597
Operating costs " (219) (212) (225) (238) (277) (273)
EBITDA* " (99) (18) 110 187 300 324
Depreciation & amortisation " (32) (65) (93) (93) (104) (115)
Ope r ating pr ofit " (130) (83) 17 94 196 209
A ssociated companies " 1 0 1 1 1 1
Net interest " (39) (62) (86) (100) (101) (99)
Other f inancial items " 55 (36) - - - -
Pr ofit be for e taxe s " (113) (180) (68) (5) 96 110
Minority interest " 13 - (6) (6) (1) (2)
Taxes " 5 37 6 0 (9) (10)
Ne t pr ofit " (95) (143) (68) (11) 86 98
CAPITALIZATION
Share price USD 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Market cap. USDm 201 1,004 593 593 593 593
Net interest bearing debt " 900 1,026 1,231 1,408 1,518 1,280
Enterprise value " 1,101 2,030 1,824 2,001 2,111 1,873
V ALUATION
P/E - - - - 6.9 6.0
EV /EBITDA - - 16.6 10.7 7.0 5.8
CASH FLOW
Operating cash f low USDm (164) (110) (25) 68 190 215
Net cash used in investing activities " (538) (345) (180) (245) (300) (25)
Net cash f rom f inancing activities " 522 568 93 179 136 (201)
Ne t cas h flow " (179) 113 (111) 2 26 (12)
Shareholders' equity " 990 806 814 964 1,028 1,105 1,192
Minority interests " - - - - - - -
Other long-term debt " 1 2 38 48 48 48 48
Interest bearing long-term debt " 66 1,014 1,001 851 701 551 401
Other current liabilities " 62 141 93 88 76 75 75
Interest bearing current liabilities " 54 19 151 151 151 151 151
Total liabilites & equity " 1,173 1,981 2,096 2,101 2,003 1,930 1,866
Shareholders' equity " 1,333 1,235 1,803 1,912 2,100 2,293 2,514
Minority interests " 4 6 14 14 14 14 14
Other long-term debt " 45 36 45 17 17 17 17
Interest bearing long-term debt " 922 1,430 1,282 1,582 1,932 2,232 1,832
Other current liabilities " 1,097 1,374 1,186 1,116 1,148 1,188 1,224
Interest bearing current liabilities " 234 264 328 328 328 328 328
Total liabilites & equity " 3,635 4,345 4,658 4,971 5,540 6,073 5,930
Source: Pareto Research
BW Offshore estimates
P&L BW Offshore (BWO) 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E
Operating revenues USDm 663 474 409 658 873 676
Operating costs " (562) (307) (276) (470) (607) (402)
EBITDA* " 123 (171) 89 224 282 292
Depreciation & amortisation " (41) (385) (64) (104) (139) (139)
Operating profit " 59 (218) 69 84 127 135
Net interest " (33) (34) (15) (21) (36) (33)
Other financial items " 22 (54) (6) - - -
Profit before taxes " 70 (517) 3 98 107 121
Taxes " (14) (15) (11) (10) (11) (12)
Net profit " 53 (533) (9) 89 96 109
EPS USD 0.1 (0.2) (0.0) 0.2 0.2 0.2
*)Including associated companies
CAPITALIZATION
Share price USD 4.2 0.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
Market cap. USDm 1,922 282 669 592 592 592
Net interest bearing debt " 901 585 849 778 620 428
Enterprise value " 2,824 867 1,518 1,371 1,213 1,020
VALUATION
P/E 47.8 - - 6.7 6.2 5.4
EV/EBITA 44.3 - 21.6 16.4 9.5 7.6
EV/EBITDA 26.9 21.4 11.3 7.3 4.6 3.7
CASH FLOW
Operating cash flow USDm 179 65 187 186 223 207
Net cash used in investing activities " (1,125) 288 (368) (115) (65) (15)
Net cash from financing activities " 945 (322) 181 50 - -
INTEREST COVERAGE AND LEVERAGE
Interest bearing debt / EBITDA nmf 322.8 10.8 6.5 4.5 4.4
EBITDA / Net interest nmf 0.1 6.7 8.1 7.0 7.8
Market Cap / EV 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
EBITDA
Sendje Berge (Addax to 2011, opt. to 2013) USDm (5,000) (5,000) (5,000) (5,000) (5,000) (5,000)
Berge Helene (Petronas to 2013) " - - - - - -
Belokamenka (Rosneft to 2019) " - - - - - -
Berge Okoloba Toru (Global to 2009) " - 1 1 1 1 1
YÙUM K’AK’NÁAB (Pemex to 2022) " - 1 1 1 1 1
BW Pioneer (Petrobras to 2015) " - 1 1 1 1 1
BW Cidade de São Vicente (Petrobras to 2019) " - 0 - - - -
BW Carmen " - 1 1 1 1 1
BW Nisa, Papa Terra EPC " - 0 - - 0 1
BALANCE SHEET 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E
Tangible fixed assets USDm 629 870 1,228 1,246 1,182 1,068
Other non-current assets & goodwill " 1,773 809 744 780 795 813
Interest bearing long-term receivables " 320 284 163 163 163 163
Other current assets " 252 271 191 207 275 213
Cash and liquid assets " 37 68 68 189 347 539
Total assets " 3,010 2,301 2,394 2,585 2,762 2,797
Shareholders' equity " 1,508 923 921 1,009 1,106 1,214
Minority interests " - - - - - -
Other long-term debt " 47 43 157 197 197 197
Interest bearing long-term debt " 845 936 1,080 1,130 1,130 1,130
Other current liabilities " 196 399 235 248 329 255
Interest bearing current liabilities " 413 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total liabilites & equity " 3,010 2,301 2,394 2,585 2,762 2,797
Source: Pareto Research
EOC estimates
P&L EOC (EOC) 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E
Operating revenues USDm 32 110 72 115 147 152
Operating costs " (14) (67) (37) (54) (61) (63)
EBITDA* " 18 43 35 62 90 95
Depreciation & amortisation " (2) (7) (8) (25) (27) (27)
Operating profit " 16 36 27 37 59 63
Net interest " (3) (7) (5) (16) (15) (11)
Other financial items " - - - (0) - -
Profit before taxes " 13 28 21 21 48 57
Taxes " (2) (3) (0) (2) (2) (2)
Net profit " 11 25 21 19 46 55
EPS USD 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5
*) Including associated companies
CAPITALIZATION
Share price USD 3.3 2.6 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
Market cap. USDm 369 287 129 121 121 121
Net interest bearing debt " 158 266 336 323 255 182
Enterprise value " 526 553 464 444 376 303
VALUATION
P/E 32.5 11.3 6.1 6.4 2.6 2.2
EV/EBITA 32.9 15.4 17.2 11.9 6.0 4.4
EV/EBITDA 29.3 12.8 13.3 7.2 4.2 3.2
CASH FLOW
Operating cash flow USDm 48 29 112 54 72 77
Net cash used in investing activities " (71) (147) (126) (71) (4) (4)
Net cash from financing activities " 32 123 69 (6) (45) (45)
INTEREST COVERAGE AND LEVERAGE
Interest bearing debt / EBITDA 9.6 6.7 11.8 6.2 3.9 3.3
EBITDA / Net interest 6.2 5.9 6.5 3.8 5.7 8.1
Market Cap / EV 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
EBITDA
Lewek Conqueror (Support barge) USDm - - - - - -
FPSO Lewek Arunothai " - - - - - -
Lewek Champion (Heavy lift/pipelay) " 6 6 7 8 7 7
Lewek Chancellor (Support barge) " - - (2) 43 59 59
Chim Sao FPSO " 6 10 9 4 5 5
BALANCE SHEET
Tangible fixed assets USDm 230 369 450 432 409 387
Other non-current assets & goodwill " - - 19 49 53 58
Interest bearing long-term receivables " - - - - - -
Other current assets " 43 47 54 74 95 98
Cash and liquid assets " 15 24 76 60 83 112
Total assets " 288 440 599 616 640 654
Shareholders' equity " 88 110 131 150 195 251
Minority interests " - - - - - -
Other long-term debt " 1 0 0 - - -
Interest bearing long-term debt " 149 274 363 312 267 222
Other current liabilities " 27 39 56 83 106 110
Interest bearing current liabilities " 24 17 48 71 71 71
Total liabilites & equity " 288 440 599 616 640 654
Source: Pareto Research
Glossary
Definitions of Floating production systems
FPSO
A Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) system is contained on
large, tanker-type vessels that are moored to the sea floor. A FPSO is designed
to process and stow production from nearby subsea wells and to periodically
offload the stored oil to smaller shuttle tankers, which transports the oil to
onshore facilities for further processing. While the system may be relocated, it
generally resides on the same location for a prolonged period of time.
Semi-submersible
A semi-submersible is a mobile offshore drilling, or production, unit floating on
the water surface above the subsea wellhead, and is kept in position by either
anchors or dynamic positioning. The semi-submersible name steams from the
base pontoons that are empty when the unit is towed to a location and partially
filled with water to stabilize the unit above the well.
TLP
A Tension Leg Platform (TLP) is an offshore drilling platform, vertically moored
to the sea floor by means of tethers, or tendons, grouped at each of the
structure’s corners. A group of tethers are called a tension leg. The TLP is
particularly suited for water depths greater than 300 meters. The buoyancy of
the platform applies tension to the tubes. TLP exhibit good motion due to the
low elasticity offered with the use of tethers.
SPAR
There are four different versions of a spar platform: Classic, Truss, Cell, and
Wet Tree. A Classic Spar platform is used as buoys in shipping and is moored
in place vertically. The Classic Spar consists of a large-diameter, single vertical
cylinder supporting a deck. A Truss Spar platform is a modified version of the
Classic Spar and features an open truss in the lower hull, which significantly
reduces the weight and lowers overall cost. The Cell Spar platform features a
deck supported by a long, buoyant and cylindrical tank hull section moored to
the seabed. The Wet Tree Spar platform has located the Christmas tree1 at the
sea bed and the Spar is connected to the well through a low pressure riser. A
Dry Tree Spar platform, on the other hand, uses a high pressure riser and the
Christmas tree is located dry on the topside.
SEVAN Design
Sevan offers a cylindrical FPSO design. The turret system and the circular
design provide cost advantages compared to other FPSO solutions working in
harsh environments and the motion characteristics of the FPSO has proved to
be very favourable. The oil is stored in tanks in the hull, and the topside
provides the processing facilities, living quarter etc.
1
Christmas Tree – an assembly of control valves, gauges and chokes that control oil and gas flow in a completed well. Christmas trees installed on
the ocean floor are referred to as subsea, or “wet”, trees. Christmas trees installed on land or platforms are referred to as “dry” trees (FMC
Technology)
The increased development of oil reserves in shallow water and the increased
demand for oil and energy, world-wide, calls for the need of production in
marginally profitable fields and in deep water. Production in deeper water gives
rise to challenges less relevant for production systems in shallow water, such as
heavy mooring systems and an increased need for thermally insulated pipelines.
Furthermore, the cost and complexity of installing fixed structure, such as fixed
platforms and sub-sea pipelines, also rise as a consequence of increasing
depths.
Floating production units holds the potential of being less expensive and more
environmentally sound due to the fairly short time frame in which the unit can be
located and the possibility of relocating the unit to other fields in situations
where wells are dry or contracts have expired. However, when fields are large
and close to existing infrastructure, the total cost of connecting these fields to
the pipelines may lie at levels that outweigh the advantages of floating
production units.
Advantages
The FPSO is the most commonly installed floating production system and offers
several advantages, some in which are presented next.
Field storage
FPSOs being self-contained and offering offshore segregated storage make
these systems independent of existing infrastructure. The FPSOs can therefore
be situated in fields that are distant from existing pipelines, while shuttle tankers
regularly transport the oil/gas to onshore facilities. The segregated storage
allows the FPSOs to store oil from different wells in different tanks, as quality
and price may differ among wells. Furthermore, fields holding oil with high
viscosity and low API makes it costly to pump the oil through pipelines.
Movable
FPSOs are often built with a ship-shaped hull, and are therefore movable. In
general, they are also self-propelled, and hence independent of tugboats. As a
result, FPSOs can easily be relocated in the event of an upcoming severe
storm, expiration of a contract or when the FPSO are required on another field.
The latter event might involve some modifications to the FPSO and a dry-dock
overhaul. The flexibility of the FPSO has increased the profitability of smaller
fields.
Early deployment
A FPSO can be deployed while the field is being developed. The allows the
wells start to producing immediately after being drilled. This contributes to a
shorter time to cash flow.
Leased up front
The FPSO can be leased up front, which may lead to lower up-front costs.
Expanded market
FPSO provides oil companies with the possibility of transporting oil to different
locations. The price per barrel of crude oil may become lower as the use of
pipelines implies that locations are predetermined.
Disadvantages
FPSOs also bring about several disadvantages compared to other floating
production units and fixed structures.
No well access
The FPSO lacks both access to wells and drilling equipment. With such a
device, the unit would be classified as a floating drilling production storage and
offloading unit (FDPSO).
Pareto credit analysts provide credit ratings which is a framework for comparing the credit quality of rated debt securities.
The ratings are based on the same rating scale as international rating agencies and represent the opinion of Pareto as to
the relative creditworthiness of securities. A credit rating on a stand alone basis should not be used as a basis for
investment operations. Pareto Securities may also provide credit research with more specific price targets. These price
targets are based on different valuation methods. These methods may include analysis of key credit ratios and other
factors describing the securities creditworthiness, peer group analysis of securities with similar creditworthiness and
different DCF-valuations.
Updating of Recommendations
Pareto has no fixed schedule for updating.
Previous Recommendations
For an overview of Pareto’s Recommendations in the financial instruments of the issuing company the last 12 months,
including data on changes in Recommendations. Log on to www.pareto.no, type in company name or symbol in the search
field and click search. Under Reports you will find previous Recommendations. Please be aware that certain informal
Recommendations may be excluded.
Statistics on Recommendations
Please see Appendix C for quarterly statistics on the overall ratio of “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold” and “Reduce” in Pareto’s
Recommendations in financial instruments, including a split with respect to issuers where Pareto have provided
investment banking services the previous 12 months.
Pareto Securities Inc. and/or Pareto Securities AS may have material conflicts of interest related to the production or
distribution of this research report which are disclosed on the following Appendix A and Appendix B.
This report is directed only to "accredited investors", "expert investors" and "institutional investors" as defined in the
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+65 6408 9800 in respect of any matters arising from or in connection with this report.
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securities or other financial instruments discussed in this report may not be suitable for all investors. This report has been
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consequences, of the transaction.
Disclaimer
Pareto and the analyst accept no responsibility and expressively disclaim any and all liabilities for any and all losses
related to investments caused by or motivated by Recommendations from Pareto. Any person receiving a
Recommendation from Pareto is deemed to have accepted this disclaimer. The disclaimer shall apply even if an
Investment Recommendation is shown to be erroneous or incomplete or based upon incorrect or incomplete facts,
interpretations or assessments or assumptions by Pareto, and irrespective of whether Pareto or any person related to
Pareto can be blamed for the incident.
Appendix A
Disclosure requirements pursuant to the Securities Trading ST Regulations § 3-10 (2) and § 3-11, letter a-b
Pareto Securities AS does not alone or together with related companies or persons – own a portion of the shares
exceeding 5 % of the total share capital – in any companies where a recommendation has been produced or distributed by
Pareto Securities AS.
Pareto Securities AS may hold financial instruments in companies where a recommendation has been produced or
distributed by Pareto Securities AS in connection with rendering investment services, including Market Making.
Please find below an overview of material interests in financial instruments held by employees in Pareto Securities AS, in
companies where a recommendation has been produced or distributed by Pareto Securities AS.
Appendix B
Disclosure requirements pursuant to the Securities Trading ST Regulation § 3-11, letter d-f, ref the Securities Trading Act
Section 3-10
Overview over issuers of financial instruments where Pareto Securities AS have prepared or distributed investment
recommendation, where Pareto Securities AS or related companies have been lead manager/co-lead manager or have
rendered publicly known not immaterial investment banking services over the previous 12 months:
This overview is updated monthly (this overview is for the period 01.05.2009 – 30.04.2010).
Appendix C
Column I shows the overall ratio of “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold” and “Reduce” in Pareto’s
Recommendations in financial instruments.
Column II shows the ratio of “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold” and “Reduce” in Pareto’s
Recommendations in financial instruments, where Pareto have provided investment banking
services to the issuer the previous 12 months.
Column I Column II
Strong Buy 0,6% 2,9%
Buy 63,8% 70,6%
Hold 24,4% 26,5%
Reduce 11,3% 0,0%